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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION., 
PLAINTIFF - RESPONDENT, 
vs. 
HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership., 
DEFENDANT - APPELLANT 
And 
STERLING SA VIN GS BANK, a 
Washington corporation, and 





















CASE NO. 40168-2012 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
RAMSDEN & LYONS 
Christopher D Gabbert 
700 Northwest Blvd 
Coeur D'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
LA WREN CE G WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
P.O.Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
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Date: 9/13/2012 
Time: 07:50 AM 
Page 1 of 11 
First Judicial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2010-0010095 Current Judge: Charles W. Hosack 
Idaho Transportation Board vs. H J Grathol, etal. 
User: VIGIL 
Idaho Transportation Board vs.HJ Grathol, Sterling Savings Bank, John 1-5 Does 
Date Code User Judge 
11/19/2010 NGOC BIELEC New Case Filed - Other Claims Lansing L. Haynes 
BIELEC Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type Lansing L. Haynes 
not listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings 
below Paid by: state Receipt number: 0049859 
Dated: 11/19/2010 Amount: $.00 (Cash) For: 
Idaho Transporation Board (plaintiff) 
NOTC BIELEC Notice Of Appointment Of Special Deputy Lansing L. Haynes 
Attorneys General 
LISP BIELEC Lis Pendens Lansing L. Haynes 
SUMI BIELEC Summons lssued---HJ Grathol Lansing L. Haynes 
SUMI BIELEC Summons lssued---Sterling Savings Bank Lansing L. Haynes 
11/23/2010 BIELEC Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Lansing L. Haynes 
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by: 
Holland & Hart Receipt number: 0050344 Dated: 
11/23/2010 Amount: $7.00 (Check) 
11/30/2010 AFSV ROSENBUSCH Affidavit Of Service/Sterling Savings Bank via S.J Lansing L. Haynes 
Tharp, CT Corporation System/11-24-10 
12/8/2010 BIELEC Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Lansing L. Haynes 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Dennis M 
Davis Receipt number: 0052128 Dated: 
12/8/2010 Amount: $58.00 (Check) For: Sterling 
Savings Bank ( defendant) 
NOAP HUFFMAN Notice Of Appearance-Dennis M Davis obo Lansing L. Haynes 
Sterling Savings Bank 
12/9/2010 ACKS BAXLEY Acceptance Of Service On Behalf Of HJ Grathol Lansing L. Haynes 
by Douglas S Marfice attorney 
12/20/2010 HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/30/2010 11 :00 Lansing L. Haynes 
AM) Pit's Motion for Possession, Ted Tollefson 
12/21/2010 MEMO CRUMPACKER Memorandum in Support of Motion for Order Lansing L. Haynes 
Granting Possession of Real Property 
MOTN CRUMPACKER Motion for Order Granting Possession of Real Lansing L. Haynes 
Property 
12/22/2010 NOTC SREED Notice of Dismissal of Defendant Sterling Savings Lansing L. Haynes 
Bank 
CVDI SREED Civil Disposition entered for: Sterling Savings Lansing L. Haynes 
Bank, Defendant; Idaho Transporation Board, 
Plaintiff. Filing date: 12/22/201 O 
12/23/2010 ANSW SREED Defendant HJ Grathol's Answer to Complaint - Lansing L. Haynes 
Douglas Marfice 080 Defendant Grathol 
12/27/2010 HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/13/2011 03:30 Lansing L. Haynes 
PM) Pit's Motion for Possession, Ted Tollefson 
SREED Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Lansing L. Haynes 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Marfice, 
Douglas S. (attorney for Grathol, f:i J) Receipt 
number: 0053960 Dated: 12/27/2010 Amount: 
$58.00 {Check) For: Grathol, H J (defendant) 
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Motion to Shorten Time 
Notice Of Hearing 
Affidavit of Christopher D Gabbert in Support of 
Defendants Response to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Order Granting Possession of Real Property 
Affidavit of Alan Johnson in Support of 
Defendants Response to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Order Granting Possession of Real Property 
Judge 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
CRUMPACKER Defendants Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Lansing L. Haynes 
Order Granting Possession of Real Property 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/21/2011 01 :30 Lansing L. Haynes 
PM) Pit's Motion for Possession, Ted Tollefson 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion held on 01/13/2011 Lansing L. Haynes 
03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Pit's Motion for 
Possession, Ted Tollefson 
SVERDSTEN Notice of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
LISONBEE Reply Brief In Support Of Motion For Order Lansing L. Haynes 
Granting Possession Of Real Property 
LISONBEE Affidavit Of Jason Minzghor In Support Of Motion Lansing L. Haynes 
For Order Granting Possession Of Real Property 
LEU ************New File #2 Created***************** Lansing L. Haynes 
LISONBEE Affidavit Of Karl D Vogt In Support of Motion For Lansing L. Haynes 
Order Granting Possession Of Real Property 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion held on 01/21/2011 Lansing L. Haynes 
01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: KERI VEARE 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Pit's Motion for Possession, Ted 
Tollefson 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 
03/02/2011 03:30 PM) 









Notice of Hearing 
Certificate 
Order Granting Possession Of Real Property 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal Lansing L. Haynes 
to Supreme Court Paid by: Ramsden/Lyons 
Receipt number: 0004088 Dated: 2/1/2011 
Amount: $101.00 (Check) For: Grathol, H J 
( defendant) 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 4090 Dated Lansing L. Haynes 
2/1/2011 for 100.00) 
Notice Of Appeal Lansing L. Haynes 
Notice Of Service/Christopher D Gabbert for HJ Lansing L. Haynes 
GRATHOL 2/2/11 
Plaintiff's Notice Of Tender Of Funds Lansing L. Haynes 
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Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 5447 Dated Lansing L. Haynes 
2/9/2011 for 571000.00) 
Notice Of Transcript Lodged Lansing L. Haynes 
Application To Partially Withdraw Funds Lansing L. Haynes 
Plaintiffs Response To Court's Notice Of Status Lansing L. Haynes 
Conference For Scheduling And Planning 
Hearing result for Status Conference held on Lansing L. Haynes 
03/02/2011 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated - Per 
Buck 
BIELEC Defendant HJ Grathol's Motion For A Jury Trial Lansing L. Haynes 
BIELEC Response to Status Conference Notice---Douglas Lansing L. Haynes 
Marfice 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/22/2011 03:30 Lansing L. Haynes 
PM) Motion for Jury Trial, Gabbert 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion held on 03/22/2011 Lansing L. Haynes 
03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion for Jury 
Trial, Gabbert 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/31/2011 03:00 Lansing L. Haynes 
PM) Motion for Jury Trial, Status Conference, 
Gabbert 
ROSENBUSCH Notice Of Hearing/Status Conference Lansing L. Haynes 
ROSENBUSCH Notice of Non-Opposition to Defendant HJ Lansing L. Haynes 
Grathol's Application to Partially Withdraw Funds 
ROSENBUSCH Amended Notice Of Hearing/Status Conference Lansing L. Haynes 
CLEVELAND Order Approving Application to Partially Withdraw Lansing L. Haynes 
CVDI CLEVELAND Civil Disposition entered for: Does, John 1-5, Lansing L. Haynes 










Savings Bank, Defendant; Idaho Transportation 
Board, Plaintiff. Filing date: 3/4/2011 
Judgment Lansing L. Haynes 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 518 dated Lansing L. Haynes 
3/14/2011 amount 456,800.00) 
ROSEN BUSCH ITD's Brief in Opposition to Defendant Grathol's Lansing L. Haynes 
Motion for Jury Trial 
ROSENBUSCH Affidavit of Mary V. York in Support of ITD's Brief Lansing L. Haynes 
in Opposition to Defendant Grathol's Motion for 
Jury Trial 
ROHRBACH Hearing result for Motion held on 03/31/2011 Lansing L. Haynes 
03:00 PM: Hearing Held Motion for Jury Trial, 
Status Confeience, Gabbert 
ROHRBACH District Court Hearing Held Lansing L. Haynes 
Court Reporter: Laurie Johnson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled Lansing L. Haynes 
01/17/2012 09:00 AM) 10 DAYS 
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Date Code User Judge 
4/5/2011 SVERDSTEN Notice of Trial Lansing L. Haynes 
4/18/2011 NTSD ROSEN BUSCH Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses Lansing L. Haynes 
5/12/2011 FILE BAXLEY *******************New File #3 Lansing L. Haynes 
Created**************** 
5/13/2011 NTSD ROSENBUSCH Notice of Service of Discovery Requests Lansing L. Haynes 
5/17/2011 NTSD ROSEN BUSCH Notice of Service of Discovery Responses Lansing L. Haynes 
6/13/2011 RECT CRUMPACKER Receipt Of Clerks Record Lansing L. Haynes 
6/22/2011 RECT RICKARD Receipt Of Clerk's Record Lansing L. Haynes 
7/8/2011 NTSD CRUMPACKER Notice Of Service Of Discovery Lansing L. Haynes 
7/18/2011 HUFFMAN Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Lansing L. Haynes 
Any File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid 
by: Holland & Hart Receipt number: 0030086 
Dated: 7/18/2011 Amount: $9.00 (Check) 
7/21/2011 NOTC ZOOK Plaintiff ITD's Notice of Disclosure of advancing Lansing L. Haynes 
Experts 
8/2/2011 HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Lansing L. Haynes 
Judgment 10/19/2011 03:30 PM) Ted Tollefson 
8/22/2011 NOTC CRUMPACKER Notice of compliance Lansing L. Haynes 
8/29/2011 NTSV ZOOK Notice Of Service Lansing L. Haynes 
9/14/2011 HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel Lansing L. Haynes 
10/19/2011 03:30 PM) Marfice 
AFFD CLEVELAND Affidavit of Alan Johnson in Support of Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendant's Motion to Compel 
AFFD CLEVELAND Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Support of Lansing L. Haynes 
Motion to Compel 
MOTN CLEVELAND Motion to Compel Lansing L. Haynes 
HRVC SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Lansing L. Haynes 
scheduled on 10/19/2011 03:30 PM: Hearing 
Vacated (by Naomi) Ted Tollefson 
9/15/2011 NOHG LEU Notice Of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
9/20/2011 NTSD LEU Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses Lansing L. Haynes 
9/23/2011 MOTN VIGIL Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony or Lansing L. Haynes 
Alternatively, to Compel Disclosures 
BRIE VIGIL Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Motion to Exclude Lansing L. Haynes 
Expert Testimony or, Alternatively, to Compel 
Expert Disclosures 
AFFD VIGIL Affidavit of Mark V. York in Support of Plaintiff's Lansing L. Haynes 
Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony or, 
Alternatively, to Compel Expert Disclosures 
9/26/2011 HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/19/2011 03:30 Lansing L. Haynes 
PM) Motion to Exclude, Tolefson 
NOHG BAXLEY Notice Of Hearing on 10/19/11 at 3:30 pm Lansing L. Haynes 
9/29/2011 NTSD KEMPER Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses Lansing L. Haynes 
6 of 1617
Date: 9/13/2012 
Time: 07:50 AM 
Page 5 of 11 
First Judicial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2010-0010095 Current Judge: Charles W. Hosack 
Idaho Transportation Board vs. H J Grathol, etal. 
User: VIGIL 







































Notice Of Service Lansing L. Haynes 
Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses Lansing L. Haynes 
Plaintiff ITD's Response To Defendant JH Lansing L. Haynes 
Grathol's Motion To Compel 
Affidavit Of Mary V York In Support of Plaintiff Lansing L. Haynes 
ITD's Response To Defendant JH Grathol's 
Motion To Compel 
Stipulation For Extension Of Time For Plaintiffs Lansing L. Haynes 
Rebuttal Experts Witness Disclosures And For 
"Acarrequi Offer" 
Notice of Withdrawal of Motion to Compel and Lansing L. Haynes 
Motion to Exclude Testimony and Request to 
Vacate Hearing 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Lansing L. Haynes 
10/19/2011 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion 
to Exclude, Tolefson 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled Lansing L. Haynes 
on 10/19/2011 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: LAURIE JOHNSON 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Marfice 
BAXLEY Notice Of Service Lansing L. Haynes 
BAXLEY Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum Of Stanley Lansing L. Haynes 
Moe on 11 /15/11 at 9:30 am 
BAXLEY Notice Of Deposition Duces T ecum Of Jason 
Minzghor on 11 /15/11 at 1 :30 pm 
Lansing L. Haynes 
SVERDSTEN Order Granting Defendant HJ Grathol's Motion to Lansing L. Haynes 
Compel 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled Lansing L. Haynes 
scheduled on 01/17/2012 09:00 AM: Hearing 
Vacated 10 DA VS 
SVERDSTEN Order Assigning Sr. District Judge Hosack for John T. Mitchell 
Trial Purposes Only 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 
11/08/2011 08:30 AM) IN CHAMBERS 
CONFERENCE CALL 
SVERDSTEN Notice of Hearing 
Charles W. Hosack 
Charles W. Hosack 
BAXLEY Notice Of Service Lansing L. Haynes 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Lansing L. Haynes 
11/10/2011 11 :00 AM) IN CHAMBERS 
TELEPHONIC CONFERENCE. PARTIES WILL 
CALL INTO A PHONE NUMBER. 
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Date Code User Judge 
11/7/2011 HRVC SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Charles W. Hosack 
on 11/08/2011 08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated IN 
CHAMBERS CONFERENCE CALL - CLERK 
WILL INITIATE THE CALL: DOUG MARFICE 
664-5818, MARY YORK 208-342-5000, TIM 
THOMAS 208-334-8803 
SVERDSTEN AMENDED Notice of Hearing Charles W. Hosack 
11/10/2011 HRHD ROHRBACH Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Charles W. Hosack 
on 11/10/2011 11 :00 AM: Hearing Held IN 
CHAMBERS TELEPHONIC CONFERENCE. 
PARTIES WILL CALL INTO A PHONE NUMBER 
WHICH WILL BE SUPPLIED. 
HRSC ROHRBACH Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/08/2012 10:00 Charles W. Hosack 
AM) All motions. 
HRSC ROHRBACH Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled Charles W. Hosack 
03/05/2012 09:00 AM) 8 days. 
11/14/2011 NLTR VIGIL Notice of Lodging Transcript Lansing L. Haynes 
11/15/2011 NTSD BAXLEY Notice Of Service Of Discovery Requests Lansing L. Haynes 
11/16/2011 ROHRBACH Notice of Hearing Charles W. Hosack 
ORDR ROHRBACH Amended Pretrial Order Lansing L. Haynes 
12/6/2011 NTSD GAVIN Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses Lansing L. Haynes 
NOTR GAVIN Notice Of Transcript Delivery Deponent: Jason Lansing L. Haynes 
Minzghor 
NOTR GAVIN Notice Of Transcript Delivery Deponent: Stanley Lansing L. Haynes 
Moe 
NOTR GAVIN Notice Of Transcript Delivery Deponent: Dewitt Lansing L. Haynes 
M. Skip Sherwood 
NOTR GAVIN Notice Of Transcript Delivery Deponent: Alan Lansing L. Haynes 
Johnson 
NOTR GAVIN Notice Of Transcript Delivery Deponent: Geoffrey Lansing L. Haynes 
B. Reeslund 
12/19/2011 FILE BAXLEY ******************New File #4 Created************** Lansing L. Haynes 
NOTC BAXLEY Plaintiff ITD's Notice Of Disclosure Of Rebuttal Lansing L. Haynes 
Experts 
12/27/2011 NTSV CRUMPACKER Notice Of Service Lansing L. Haynes 
1/6/2012 MNLI BAXLEY Plaintiff ITD's Motion In Limine Lansing L. Haynes 
PBRF BAXLEY Plaintiff ITD's Brief In Support Of Motion In Limine Lansing L. Haynes 
MNSJ BAXLEY Plaintiff ITD's Motion For Summary Judgment Lansing L. Haynes 
AFIS BAXLEY Affidavit Of Mary York in Support Of Plaintiff Lansing L. Haynes 
ITD's Motion For Summary Judgment And Motion 
In Limine 
BRIE LEU Plaintiff ITD's Brief In Support Of Motion For Lansing L. Haynes 
Summary Judgment 
1/9/2012 FILE BAXLEY ***************New File #5 Created**************** Lansing L. Haynes 
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LEU Notice Of Hearing 
CRUMPACKER Notice Of Service 
VICTORIN Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
VICTORIN Affidavit of Christopher Gabbert in Support of 
Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's Motion in 
Limine 
VICTORIN Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion in 
Limine 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 
02/08/2012 10:00 AM: Hearing Vacated All 
motions. 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary 
Judgment 02/02/2012 10:00 AM) 
Judge 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Charles W. Hosack 
Charles W. Hosack 
SREED 
BAXLEY 
Amended Notice Of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
ITD's Reply Brief In Support Of Motion in Limine Lansing L. Haynes 
CRUMPACKER Plaintiff's ITD's Reply Brief in Support of Motion Lansing L. Haynes 
for Summary Judgment 
LEU New File Created---#6---CREATED Charles W. Hosack 
BURRINGTON District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Byrl Cinnamon and 
Joann Schaller 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Over 100 pages 
Lansing L. Haynes 
BURRINGTON Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Charles W. Hosack 
scheduled on 02/02/2012 10:00 AM: Hearing 
Held 
BURRINGTON Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 




Notice of Hearing 
Notice of Hearing 
Email Sent Date: 02/02/2012 04:36 pm To: 
firm@ramsdenlyons.com No Files Attached. 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 
02/13/2012 11 :00 AM) 
Charles W. Hosack 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Charles W. Hosack 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Charles W. Hosack 
on 02/10/2012 11 :00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
SVERDSTEN AMENDED Notice of Hearing 
SVERDSTEN Order RE: Plaintiff's Motion in Limine 
SVERDSTEN Order RE: Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
CLAUSEN 
CLAUSEN 
Administrative assignment of Judge Charles W. John T. Mitchell 
Hosack 
Order Assigning District Judge Hosack John T. Mitchell 
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Defendant HJ Grathol's Supplemental Expert 
Witness Disclosure 
Notice of Filing Original Transcript (from J 
Schaller from 2-2-12 hrg) 
Transcript - Motion for Summary Judgment 
Judge 
Charles W. Hosack 
Charles W. Hosack 




MOLLETT Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Charles W. Hosack 
on 02/13/2012 11 :00 AM: Hearing Held 
CRUMPACKER Notice Of Transcript Lodged 
BAXLEY 
VIGIL 
Notice Of Transcript Delivery - Certificate Of 
Witness - Deponent Alan Johnson 
Order Re: Defendant HJ Grathol's Severance 
Damages 
CRUMPACKER Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses 
CRUMPACKER Plaintiff's ITD Trial Brief 
CRUMPACKER Plaintiff's ITD Trial Witness List 
VIGIL Plaintiff ITD's Trial Exhibit List 
CRUMPACKER Notice Of Transcript Delivery TV 
CRUMPACKER Notice Of Transcript Delivery BT 
CRUMPACKER Defendant HJ Grathols Witness List 
CRUMPACKER Defendant HJ Grathols List Of Exhibits 
CRUMPACKER Defendant HJ Grathols Trial Bench Brief 
ITD's Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses not 
Timely Disclosed 
Charles W. Hosack 
Charles W. Hosack 
Charles W. Hosack 
Charles W. Hosack 
Charles W. Hosack 
Charles W. Hosack 
Charles W. Hosack 
Charles W. Hosack 
Charles W. Hosack 
Charles W. Hosack 
Charles W. Hosack 
Charles W. Hosack 
Charles W. Hosack HODGE 
HODGE 
BAXLEY 
Brief in Support of ITD's Motion to Exclude Expert Charles W. Hosack 








*********New File #7 EXPANDO 
Created************* 
(Aff'd Of Mary York w/Exhibits) 
Charles W. Hosack 
Affidavit Of Mary York In Support Of ITD's Motion Charles W. Hosack 
To Exclude Expert Witnesses Not Timely 
Disclosed (EXPANDO #7) 
Court Trial Started 
Order RE: Plaintiff ITD's Motion To Exclude 
Expert Witnesses Niot Timely Disclosed 
Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled 
scheduled on 03/05/2012 09:00 AM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Anita Self 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 960 8 Day court trial 
Notice Of Transcript Delivery 
Plaintiff ITD's Post Trial Brief 
Defendant HJ Grathol's Post Trial Brief 
Charles W. Hosack 
Charles W. Hosack 
Charles W. Hosack 
Charles W. Hosack 
Charles W. Hosack 
Charles W. Hosack 
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3/29/2012 AFFD ZOOK Affidavit of Christopher D Gabbert in Support of Charles W. Hosack 
Motion to Enlarge Time 
MOTN ZOOK Motion to Enlarge Time Charles W. Hosack 
3/30/2012 ORDR MOLLETT Order To Enlarge Time Charles W. Hosack 
4/1/2012 FILE ROBBINS New File Created ****8**** Charles W. Hosack 
4/6/2012 MISC ROBBINS Plaintiff ITD's Response to Defendant's Post Trial Charles W. Hosack 
Brief 
MISC ROBBINS Plaintiff ITD's Proposed Findings of Fact and Charles W. Hosack 
Conclusions of Law 
MISC ROBBINS Defendant's (Proposed) Findings of Fact and Charles W. Hosack 
Conclusions of Law 
BRIE ROBBINS Defendant HJ Grathol's Reply to Plaintiff's Post Charles W. Hosack 
Trial Brief 






ntpratt@hollandhart.com File Attached: 
CV10-10095 1TB vs HJ Grathol.pdf 
ORDR LARSEN Post-Trial Memorandum Decision And Order For Charles W. Hosack 
Judgment 
6/4/2012 CVDI VIGIL Civil Disposition entered for: Does, John 1-5, Charles W. Hosack 
Defendant; Grathol, H J, Defendant; Sterling 
Savings Bank, Defendant; Idaho Transportation 
Board, Plaintiff. Filing date: 6/4/2012 
FJDE VIGIL Judgment Charles W. Hosack 
STAT VIGIL Case status changed: Closed pending clerk Charles W. Hosack 
action 
6/6/2012 OPIN ZOOK Opinion Filed Charles W. Hosack 
6/17/2012 FILE BAXLEY ****************New File #9 Created***************** Charles W. Hosack 
6/18/2012 MOTN BAXLEY ITD's Motion For Attorney Fees And Costs Charles W. Hosack 
BRIE BAXLEY ITD's Brief In Support Of Motion For Attorney Charles W. Hosack 
Fees And Costs 
AFIS BAXLEY Affidavit Of Mary V York In Support Of ITD's Charles W. Hosack 
Motion For Attorney Fees And Costs 
6/20/2012 BNDC LEU Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 25721 Dated Charles W. Hosack 
6/20/2012 for 140813.58) 
11.lf""IT(" '""", ,_, 
Pi.A("(" f"\ V 
IYIV"-'\J I Plaintiff's Second Notice of Tender of Funds and Charies W. Hosack 
Satisfaction of Judgment 
6/21/2012 BNDV VIGIL Bond Converted (Transaction number 1429 Charles W. Hosack 
dated 6/21/2012 amount 114,200.00) 
BNDV VIGIL Bond Converted (Transaction number 1430 Charles W. Hosack 
dated 6/21/2012 amount 140,813.58) 
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6/26/2012 FJDE VICTORIN Second Judgment and Decree of Condemnation Charles W. Hosack 
6/27/2012 FILE CRUMPACKER New File Created***1 0**** Charles W. Hosack 
7/2/2012 REMT LEU Remittitur Charles W. Hosack 
MOTN MCNEIL Defendant's Motion to Disallow Costs and Charles W. Hosack 
Objection to Plaintiff's Application for Attorney 
Fees and Costs 
MEMO MCNEIL Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion Charles W. Hosack 
to Disallow Costs and Objection to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs 
AFFD MCNEIL Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert Re: Attorney's Charles W. Hosack 
Fees and Costs 
AFFD MCNEIL Affidavit of John F. Magnuson in Opposition to Charles W. Hosack 
Attorney's Fees 
AFFD MCNEIL Affidavit of Joel P. Hazel in Opposition to Charles W. Hosack 
Attorney's Fees 
7/12/2012 HRSC SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/29/2012 10:00 Charles W. Hosack 
AM) Costs and Fees 
7/13/2012 APSC VIGIL Appealed To The Supreme Court (Filed by JH Charles W. Hosack 
Grathol) 
VIGIL Filing: L4 -Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal Charles W. Hosack 
to Supreme Court Paid by: Marfice, Douglas S. 
(attorney for Grathol, H J) Receipt number: 
0028772 Dated: 7/13/2012 Amount: $109.00 
(Check) For: Grathol, HJ (defendant) 
BNDC VIGIL Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 2877 4 Dated Charles W. Hosack 
7/13/2012 for 100.00) 
BNDC VIGIL Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 28776 Dated Charles W. Hosack 
7/13/2012 for435.75) 
7/18/2012 MISC ZOOK Clerk's Certificate of Appeal / Certified Mail to Charles W. Hosack 
Supreme Court/ 7010 3090 000 2054 8049 
7/23/2012 RTSV ZOOK Return Of Service/ Idaho Supreme Court 7/20/12 Charles W. Hosack 
7/24/2012 ORDR VIGIL Order Augmenting Appeal (Supreme Court Charles W. Hosack 
Order) 
7/26/2012 NOTC ZOOK AMENDED Notice of Appeal Charles W. Hosack 
7/27/2012 MISC VIGIL Request for Additional Transcript and Record on Charles W. Hosack 
Appeal 
7/31/2012 NOHG CRUMPACKER Notice Of Hearing Charles W. Hosack 
8/3/2012 MISC ZOOK AMENDED Request for Additional Transcript and Charles W. Hosack 
Record on Appeal 
8/14/2012 NLTR VIGIL Notice of Lodging Transcript (47 Pages-JoAnn Charles W. Hosack 
Schaller) 
BNDV VIGIL Bond Converted (Transaction number 1768 Charles W. Hosack 
dated 8/14/2012 amount 152.75) 
8/22/2012 PBRF CRUMPACKER ITD's Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Charles W. Hosack 
Attorney Fees & Costs 
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First Judicial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2010-0010095 Current Judge: Charles W. Hosack 
Idaho Transportation Board vs. H J Grathol, etal. 
Idaho Transportation Board vs. H J Grathol, Sterling Savings Bank, John 1-5 Does 
Date Code User 
8/22/2012 NLTR VIGIL Notice of Lodging Transcript (Byrl Cinnamon) 
9/10/2012 ORDR SVERDSTEN Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part 
Plaintiff ITD's Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees 
JDMT SVERDSTEN Final Judgment (Costs and Attorney's Fees) 
User: VIGIL 
Judge 
Charles W. Hosack 
Charles W. Hosack 
Charles W. Hosack 
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700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
STATE OF IOAHO ~ss 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI, 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRATHOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VIN GS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants/ Appellants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Fee Category: L(4) 
Fee: $101.00 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF, THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, an executive department of 
state government and its board. 
AND TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Defendant, HJ Grathol appeals against the above-named 
Plaintiff to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Order Granting Possession of Real Property 
to Plaintiff Idaho Transportation Board, entered in the above-entitled action on the 21 st day of 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 ORIGINAL 
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-----January, 2011, Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes presiding and certified as final pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 54(b) as contemplated by Idaho Code 7-721(2). 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant 
to Rule 1 l(a) I.A.R. 
3. Preliminary statement of issues on appeal. 
(A) Does the Complaint meet the requirements ofldaho Code § 7-707? 
(B) 1) Can the Idaho Transportation Board's power of eminent domain be 
delegated? 
2) If so, did the Idaho Transportation Board properly delegate the power 
of eminent domain through board policy? 
(C) Does the Complaint conflict with the Order of Condemnation? 
(D) Were the Complaint and Order of Condemnation approved by the Board 
of Transportation? 
(E) Did the Plaintiff make a good faith effort to acquire all property 
implicated in the construction prior to requesting possession by the 
district court? 
4. A reporter's transcript is requested. The appellant requests the preparation of the 
following portions of the reporter's transcript in electronic format: Transcript of Hearing on 
Plaintiffs Motion for Order Granting Possession of Real Property, January 21, 2011 at 1 :30 
p.m. 
5. The Plaintiff/Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the 
clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, 1.A.R.: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
15 of 1617
(a) Plaintiffs Motion for Order Granting Possession of Real Property; 
(b) Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Order 
Granting Possession of Real Property; 
( c) Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Order Granting 
Possession of Real Property; 
(d) Affidavit of Alan Johnson m support of Defendant's Response to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Order Granting Possession of Real Property; 
(e) Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in support of Defendant's Response 
to Plaintiffs Motion for Order Granting Possession of Real Property; 
(f) Plaintiffs Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Order Granting 
Possession of Real Property; 
(g) Affidavit of Jason Minzghor in Support of Motion for Order Granting 
Possession of Real Property; and 
(h) Affidavit of Karl . Vogt in Support of Motion for Order Granting 
Possession of Real Property; and 
6. The appellant requests that Defendant's demonstrative exhibits (3) submitted to 
the Court at the hearing held on January 21, 2011 to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court. 
7. No order has been entered in this matter sealing all or any part of the record or 
transcript. 
8. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter; 
(b) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
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(c) That the estimated fee for the preparation of the clerk's record has been 
paid; 
( d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to I.A.R. 20. 
DATED this 1st day of February, 2011. 
RAMSDE~ & LYONS, LLP 
.,/ 
opher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 1st day of February, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
Keri Veare 
Coeur d'Alene Reporting 
401 E. Front Ave., Ste. 215 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
X USMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
>< US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
X USMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile 
Christopher D. Gabbert 
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Serving Idaho & Washington 
TA".E ,}, :LJ,1Ji0 ~ SS office@cdareporting.com 
O'JHiY OF KOOTENAI/ 
tl ED: www .cdareporting.com 
Bank of America Building 
208. 765.3666 (JD) - 509. 703.6600 (WA) 
?O I l FER I O AM 7: 'l(jl Front Avenue, Suite 215 
· · · ·· dfilAlene, Idaho 83814 
eLtt\°0lW . I 
February 9, 2011 
Clerk of the Courts 
O[PtP v 
Idaho Supreme Court Building 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0101 
Re: State of Idaho, Idaho Trans. Board vs. HJ Grathol, et al 
Docket #38511 1/21/2011 Motion Hearing 
Dear Clerk of the Courts: 
DOCKET NO. 38511 





(HJ Grathol, et al, 
( 
( Defendant/Appellant. 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
Notice is hereby given that on February 9, 2011, I lodged an original 
transcript, totaling 70 pages, and three copies, for the above-referenced 
appeal with the District Court Clerk of the County of Kootenai in the First 
Jud·cial District. 
Personable ... Dependable ... Flexible 
Depositions - Court - Conference Room - E-Transcript - Video - Rea/time Hookup 
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700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
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HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VIN GS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
JUDGMENT 
This matter came on for hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Order Granting Possession of 
Real Property, on January 21, 2011, and for the reasons stated in the Court's Order Granting 
Possession of Real Property dated January 21, 2011, the Court finds that Plaintiff Idaho 





TIIEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADruDGED AND DECREED, and this 
does order, adjudge and decree, that the Plaintiff's Motion for Order Granting Possession of 
Real Property is granted and this shall be a final order and determination of the rights of the 
parties as to the Plaintiff's claim to possession of the real property described in the Plaintiff's 
Complaint. 
DATED this 2 8 day ofFebruary, 2011. 
District Court Judge 
RULE 54(b) Certificate 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order, it is hereby 
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the Court has determined that there 
is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the Court has and does 
hereby direct that the above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which execution 
may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this~ day ofFebruary, 2011. 
District Court Judge 
JUDGMENT-2 
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1 hereby certify that on the _!1_ day offeerttary, 2011, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
Douglas S. Marfice 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
JUDGMENT-3 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
______>fund Delivered ~o-lR 
-~- F aacc~simile (208) 334-4498 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail ,,...<:/.. 
_Jland Delivered ~-JY 
_V_F F~acsimile (208) 343-8869 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered '*' :fa. 
~ Facsimile (208) 664-5884 
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ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586} 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8803 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V. York (ISB #5020) 
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HARTLLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ GRA THOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVl0-1009S 
ITD'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT GRATHOL'S 
MOTION FOR JURY TRIAL 
ITD'S BRIEF IN OPPOSmON TO DEFENDANT GRATBOL'S 
MOTION FOR JURY TRIAL- I 
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Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board (''ITD") submits this response to 
Defendant HJ Gtathol's ("Grathol'') Motion for a Jury Trial. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Grathol's motion should be denied for the following reasons. First, Grathol failed to 
request a jury trial in its Answer, which is the standard practice in Idaho. Grathol then failed to 
request a jury trial within the 14-day period after filing its Answer, which is the grace period and 
a final cutoff established by Rule 38(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Then, instead of 
seeking relief prior to the expiration of the Rule 38(b) deadline, Grathol waited more than two 
months after filing its Answer to request a jury trial. Thus, Grathol' s request is clearly time 
barred, and Grathol has waived its right to request a jury trial. Failure "to serve a demand as 
required by [the] rule," results in a waiver of its right to a trial by jury. Idaho R Civ. P. 38(d). 
Second, Grathol has offered no legitimate basis for invoking the Court's discretion under 
Rule 39(b) to be excused from its untimely jury request. Instead, having no legitimate excuse, 
Gtathol tries to blame its failure to make a timely jury demand on the fact that ITO filed a 
motion in December of 2010. That argument is baseless and unworthy of serious consideration. 
Third, Grathol attempts to shift its burden to excuse its delay onto ITD to show prejudice 
if the motion is granted. This attempt by Grathol is contrary to Idaho law and would require the 
reversal of Idaho Supreme Court eases placing the burden squarely on the moving party to 
excuse delay in requesting a jury. 
Fourth. Grathol has no constitutional right to a jury trial in this condemnation case, and 
its suggestion otherwise is squarely refuted by long-standing Idaho eminent domain law. State 
ex rel. Flandro v. Seddon, 94 Idaho 940. 943. 500 P.2d 841, 844 (1972) ("Because eminent 
domain authority arises from an inherent sovereignty of the state to take property for its own use, 
ITD'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GRATHOL'S 
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such proceeding do not come within the scope of Idaho Const. art, 1, § 7, pertaining to trial by 
jury."); Portneuf Irrigating Co. v. Budge, 16 Idaho 116, 100 P. 1046, 1050 (1909) ("It has been 
generally held by the American courts that, in the absence of a specific constitutional provision 
granting the right of trial by jury in proceedings for condemnation, such right does not exist as a 
constitutional right."). 
Orathol' s request for jury trial is time barred and, for the reasons stated above, ITO 
respectfully requests that the Court deny Grathol' s motion for jury trial. 
II. BACKGROUND AND FACTS 
ITD filed this action November 19, 2010. See Complaint and Summons (Nov. 19, 2010). 
Gtathol accepted service on December 3, 2010 and filed its Answer on December 22, 2010. 
Grathol did not demand a jury trial in its Answer, nor did it file any such demand within 14 days 
after filing its Answer, as required by Rule 38(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Grathol's first request for a jury trial was made in its Motion for Jury Trial filed on February 25, 
2011-more than two months after filing its Answer and more than a month and a half after the 
deadline imposed by the rules had passed. 
ill. DISCUSSION 
A. Grathol's Motion For Jury Trial Is Untimely Pursuant To Rule 38(b) Of The Idaho 
Rules Of Civil Procedure, And It Has Waived Its Right To Request A Jury Trial. 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedwe regarding a demand for a jury trial are straight-
forward. Rule 38(b) states, in relevant part: 
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue 
triable of right by a jury by serving upon the other parties a 
demand therefor in writing at any time after the commencement of 
the action and not later than fourteen (14) days after the service of 
the last pleading directed to such issue. 
ITD'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GRAmovs 
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Idaho R. Civ. P. 38(b). If a party fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 38(b) and files its 
jury demand more than 14 days after its Answer, that party waives the right to a trial by jury. 
"The failure of a party to serve a demand as required by this rule and to file it as required by 
Rule S(d) constitutes a waiver by the party of trial by jury." Idaho R. Civ, P. 38{d) (emphasis 
added), This result is well recognized and enforced by the Idaho Supreme Court. See, e.g., 
Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388,396, 111 P.3d 73, 81 (2005) 
("According to I.R.C.P. 38(b), a party must demand a jury trial on an issue 'not later than 
fourteen ( 14) days after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue.' If a party fails to 
demand a jury trial within this timeframe, the right to a jury trial is waived."); Farmers Nat. 
Bankv. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 71,878 P.2d 762, 770 (1994) e'[T]he failure to make a timely 
demand under I.R.C.P. 38(b) constituted a waiver of the right"). 
Under Rule 38(b ), Grathol was required to request a jury trial within 14 days of filing its 
Answer on December 22, 2010. That time period ended on January S, 2011. Grathol failed to 
make a timely request for jury trial. Furthermore, Grathol waited nearly two months after 
missing the deadline before filing a motion on February 25, 2011 to request a jury trial. 
Grathol' s request for a jury trial is clearly time barred, and its failure to make a timely request 
"constitutes a waiver by the party of trial by jury." Idaho R. Civ, P. 38(d). Accordingly, 
Grathol 's motion should be denied. 
B. Grathol Has The Burden Of Justifying Its Failure To Comply With Rule 38(b) And 
Its Delay In Brinpng Its Motion For Jury Trial. 
Under limited circumst.ances, Rule 39(b) gives courts discretion to grant a jury trial. 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 39(b), The Idaho Supreme Court handed down considerable guidance on the 
proper use of this discretion in Hayden Lake Fire Protection District v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 
111 P.3d 73 (2005), In Hayden Lak2, the Supreme Court upheld the district court's denial of an 
ITD'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GRATHOL'S 
MOTION FOR JURY TRIAL- 4 
25 of 1617
MAR. 24. 2011 8:36AM NO. 2118 P. 6 
untimely jury trial request as a proper exercise of the collrt's discretion under Rule 39(b). Id. at 
398, 111 P.3d at 83. 
Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court properly exercised its 
discretion in denying a jury trial where the requesting party failed to explain why it did not make 
a timely jury demand. Id. The Court cited with approval Viehweg v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 265, 
64 7 P .2d 311 (Ct. App. 1982), in which the right to jury trial was declared to be waived "as a 
matter of right" when made 62 days after the filing of the answer. In Viehweg, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that, 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b) requires a party seeking a jury 
trial, on an issue triable by jury, to make a demand within ten days1 
after service of last pleading directed to such an issue. In this case, 
Thompson bad ten days from the date of serving his answer to 
demand a jury trial, He waited sixty-two days. Rule 38(d) 
provides th.at failure to make a timely demand constitutes a waiver 
of trial by jury. We hold that Thompson waived trial by jury, as a 
matter of right, in this case. 
Id at 269, 647 P.2d at 315 (internal citations omitted and emphasis added). The Court of 
Appeals further held that the district court had properly exercised its discretion by denying 
defendant's motion for a jury trial because the defendant failed to provide a legitimate reason 
why he waited 62 days to demand a jury trial. Id. ("the record discloses no showing by 
Thompson of his reason for failing to make a timely demand for a jury trial."). 
As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Hayden Lake, the Court of Appeals in Viehweg 
"focused on the fact that the defendant made no showing as to why bis jury demand was 
untimely in the first place[]" and properly refused to grant a motion for a jury trial under Rule 
l The prior version of Rule 38(b) required demand for a jury trial to be made within ten (10) 
days. Rule was amended in 1994 to provide for fourteen (14) days. 
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39(b). Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 398, 111 P.3d at 83 (citing Viehweg, 103 Idaho at 269, 647 
P.2dat319). 
The Supreme Court in Hayden Lake also analyzed its prior decision in City of Pocatello 
v. Anderton, 106 Idaho 370,679 P.2d 647 (1984). InAnderton, the Supreme Court also upheld a 
district court's decision to deny an untimely jury trial demand, and again focused on the fact that 
the party requesting the jury trial must provide a legitimate reason to explain its failure to file a 
timely jury demand. Id. at 3 73, 679 P .2d at 650 (because no reasons had been given that would 
excuse the delay '"we find no abuse of discretion in denying the request."). 
Based on these cases, the Court in Hayden Lake again concluded that where the 
requesting party "fails to explain why it did not demand a jury trial" a belated request is properly 
denied under Rule 39(b). Id. at 398, 111 P.3d at 83 (where plaintiff "fail[ed] to explain why it 
did not demand a jury trial in the first complaint it filed in January 2000. The district court did 
not abuse its discretion,") (emphasis added). 
Thus, Idaho law is clear. A jury demand must be timely made. If it is not, the right is 
waived. In detennining whether to exercise discretion under Rule 39(b), courts scrutinize the 
explanation-or lack thereof-as to why ajury trial was not timely requested. 
Under the rulings in Hayden Lake, Anderton, and Viehweg, Grathol's request for a jury 
trial should be denied. Grathol failed to make a timely jury demand and therefore waived its 
right. Grathol also failed to give a valid reason why it waited nearly two months after the 
deadline to demand a jury trial. 
c. Grathol Is Not Entitled To Relief Under Rule 39(b) Because It Bas Failed To Meet 
Its Burden And Explain Why It Failed To Timely Request A Jury Trial. 
In its motion, Grathol fails to cite any case law to support its assertion that it is entitled to 
a jury trial after having waived that right. Instead, Grathol implicitly suggests that ITD is 
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somehow to blame for its missed deadline. Additionally, Grathol intimates that ITD bears the 
burden of showing prejudice as a result of Grathol' s failure to comply with Rule 3 9(b ), and if 
ITO cannot make such a showing, then the Court should grant Grathol's motion. Grathol's 
assertions are contrary to Idaho law and would reverse the Idaho Supreme Court cases placing 
the burden squarely on the party seeking to have its delay excused. 
As clearly established in Hayden Lake, Anderton, and Viehweg, the party asking the court 
to exercise its discretion under Rule 39(b) and excuse delay in making a jury demand bears the 
burden of explaining why it failed to timely request a jury trial. Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 398, 
111 P.3d at 83; Anderton, 106 Idaho at 373, 679 P.2d at 650; Viehweg v. Thompson, 103 Idaho at 
269,647 P.2d at 315. In each case, the requesting party was unable to provide an adequate 
explanation as to why it missed the deadline required by Rule 38(b) and, as a result, the district 
court properly denied the late jury trial request under Rule 39(b). Id. Thus, Grathol has the 
burden of showing a legitimate reason for its untimely jury request. Since it has failed to do so, 
its motion should be denied. 
Grathol's only attempt at an explanation as to why it should be excused from the deadline 
imposed by Rule 38 is to suggest that it was unable to respond to ITD's Motion for Order 
Granting Possession of Real Property while it was also finalizing its Answer to ITD's Complaint. 
GTathol' s Motion for Jury Trial, at 2. At the core of Grathol' s explanation for its untimely jury 
request is a suggestion that ITO created a situation that prevented Grathol from complying with 
the deadline established for a jury demand in Rule 38(b). Grathol's assertion is unavailing for 
several reasons. 
First, OrathoP s contention that it was unable to complete its Answer due on 
December 22 because of a motion that ITD filed the day before, on December 21st, cannot be 
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taken seriously, Grathol had the full time period afforded under the rules for answering the 
Complaint. Its response to ITD's motion was not due for several weeks after the due date for 
Grathol's answer. 
Second, Grathol' s excuse has even less merit when examined under the specific facts of 
the case. Counsel for ITD provided Grathol' s attorneys with a copy of the Complaint and 
Summons at a very early date. See York Aff., Ex. A (November 17, 2010 letter from counsel for 
ITD to counsel for Grathol providing a copy of the Complaint before it was filed and providing 
Grathol1s counsel with specific notice as to when ITD would file). Grathol then gained even 
more time to prepare its Answer when ITD, as a courtesy to Grathol, refrained from having a 
process server serve Grathol, but instead sought to work with Grathol' s counsel to accept service 
for Grathol. ITD worked with counsel for two weeks on acceptance of service and finally on 
December 3, 2010-two weeks after ITD filed its Complaint-counsel for Grathol submitted an 
executed Acceptance of Service. In total, with the advanced notice of filing and the period of 
time permitted by ITO to obtain Grathol's acceptance of service, Grathol had considerably more 
time than the twenty (20) days permitted under the rules to prepare its Answer and assess 
whether to demand a jury trial Thus, Grathol's assertion that it was unable demand a jury trial 
because of a motion that was filed thirty-four (34) days after they received a copy of the 
Complaint, particularly where Grathol's response to the motion would not be due for weeks after 
filing its Answer, in no way justifies or excuses Gtathol' s untimely request for a jury trial. 
If Grathol truly felt that it did not have enough time to decide whether to demand a jury 
trial prior to filing its Answer on December 22nd, Rule 3 8(b) gave Grathol an additional 14 days _ 
after that date to request a jury trial. If Grathol still could not decide to request a jury trial even 
within that additional two-week period, Grathol could and should have moved for an extension 
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of time or other appropriate motion prior to the expiration of the deadline. Gtathol has no excuse 
for waiting until February 25, 2011 to make a request for a jury trial. 
Grathol at no time made any request for an extension of time to answer the Complaint, 
nor did it indicate that it would have any difficulty meeting its deadline for filing an AJJ.swer or 
requesting a jury trial, Grathol cannot now seek to excuse its delay with an after·the-fact claim 
that it was not able to prepare its Answer properly. 
Third, despite Grathol' s suggestion that the fact that Im filed a motion in late December 
rendered Grathol incapable of making a jury demand in its Answer, Grathol still did not raise the 
issue until February 25th, nearly two months after the deadline had passed. See Viehweg v. 
Thompson, 103 Idaho 265,269,647 P.2d 311,315 (Ct. App. 1982) (denying untimely request for 
jury trial under Rule 3 9(b) when it was filed 62 days after defendant's answer was filed). 
Fourth, Grathol cannot legitimately claim that it was unaware of the missed jury demand 
deadline or that it acted promptly to remedy the situation. On February 7, 2011, counsel for ITD 
submitted to Grathol a proposed stipulation for scheduling order, which clearly stated that the 
matter would be a Court Trial because "no timely demand for a jury trial has been made under 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure," Affidavit of Mary V. York, Ex. B,, 3 ("The case is to be 
tried as a Court Trial, as no timely demand for a jury trial has been made under the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure.") ( emphasis included in original). Despite the clear notice provided by ITO 
that the right to a jury trial had been waived, Grathol still waited 18 days-a period of time 
longer than that permitted under Rule 3 8(b )-before filing its motion. Again, Grathol provides 
no explanation as to why it waited more than two months after filing its Answer to request a jury 
trial, and its belated request is barred by Rule 38(b), Rule 39(b), and the Supreme Court cases 
enforcing the rules. 
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In summary, Grathol has failed to offer any proper basis to explain or excuse its failure to 
comply with Rule 38(b) or its delay in waiting 65 days after filing its Answer to request a jury. 
Because Grathol has not, and cannot, provide a legitimate explanation of why it failed to timely 
request a jury trial, it is barred from discretionary relief under Rule 3 9(b) by Hayden Lake, 
Anderton, and Viehweg. With Grathol having waived its right to a jury trial, the Court, in the 
proper exercise of its discretion, should deny Grathol' s untimely motion for jury trial under 
Rule 39(b). 
D. No Constitutional Right To A Jury Trial In A Condemnation Case Exists In Idaho, 
And Grathol's Unsupported Argument To The Contrary Is A Misrepresentation Of 
Idaho Law. 
Contrary to Grathol' s repeated assertions, the "right to a jury determination" in an 
eminent domain case is nQ! a "fundamental right guaranteed protection by Idaho's constitution." 
Grathol wrote: 
Further the matters at issue involving the taking of private property 
by a public entity, and the right to a jury determination on the 
value of that taking is a fundamental right guaranteed protection by 
Idaho's constitution. Idaho Constitution, Artie.le I, Section 14, 
Grathol's Motion for Jury Trial, at 3, 
Article I, Section 14 of the Idaho Constitution makes no reference to a "fundamental 
right" to a jury trial in an eminent domain proceeding. Article I, Section 14 instead lays out the 
fundamental right of the condemnor to condemn property for the public good, The full text of 
Article I, Section 14 states: 
§ 14. Right of eminent domain 
The necessary use of lands for the construction of 
reservoirs or storage basins, for the purpose of irrigation, or for 
rights of way for the construction of canals, ditches, flumes or 
pipes, to convey water to the place of use for any useful, beneficial 
or necessary purpose, or for drainage; or for the drainage of mines, 
or the working thereof, by means of roads, railroads, tramways, 
ITD'S BRIEF 1N OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GRATBOL'S 
MOTION FOR JURY TRIAL-10 
31 of 1617
MAR.24.2011 8:37AM NO.2118 P. 12 
cuts, tunnels, shafts, hoisting works, dumps, or other necessary 
means to their complete development, or any other use necessary 
to the complete development of the material resources of the state, 
or the preservation of the health of its inhabitants, is hereby 
declared to be a public use, and subject to the regulation and 
control of the state. 
Private property may be taken for public use, but not until a 
just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed by 
law, shall be paid therefor. 
Idaho Const, art. I,§ 14. 
The Constitution makes no reference to a right to a jury trial in an eminent domain case, 
and Grathol' s numerous statements that it is "constitutionally entitled to a jury trial'' or that there 
is a "fundamental right" that is guaranteed by Idaho's Constitution is simply untrue. 
In Idaho, there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in an eminent domain proceeding. 
The Idaho Supreme Court bas long held that, 
It has been generally held by the American courts that, in the 
absence of a specific constitutional provision granting the right of 
trial by jury in proceedings for condemnation, such right does not 
exist as a constitutional right. 
Portneuf Irrigating Co. v. Budge, 16 Idaho 116, 100 P. 1046, 1050 (1909) (citations omitted). 
Under Idaho law, "[b ]ecause eminent domain authority arises from an inherent sovereignty of the 
state to take property for its own use, such proceeding do not come within the scope of Idaho 
Const. Art. 1, § 7, pertaining to trial by jury." State ex rel. Flandro v. Seddon, 94 Idaho 940, 
943,500 P.2d 841,844 (1972) (citing Portneuf lrrig. Co. v. Budge, 16 Idaho 116, 100 P. at 
1050). 
Article 1, Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution, which provides that ''the right of trial by 
jury shall remain inviolate," references the right of a jury trial as it existed at the time of the 
adoption of the Idaho Constitution and therefore does not guarantee to citizens the right to trial 
by jury in a condemnation proceeding. Id. "Historically, eminent domain action was ex parte 
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and inquisitorial in the common law and has not been regarded as a civil remedy.'' Id. (citing 
Nichols on Eminent Domain,§§ 1.1-1.44 (3d rev. ed.)). Therefore, "[b]ecause eminent domain 
authority arises from an inherent sovereignty of the state to take property for its own use, such 
proceeding do not come within the scope ofldaho Const. Art. 1, § 7, pertaining to trial by jury." 
Id. See also Budge, 16 Idaho 116, 100 P. at 1049 ("The constitutional guaranty of the right to 
trial by jury is clearly a guaranty of the right that existed at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution - that right was the common-law right."). Thus, the law in Idaho is clear and well-
established that "[t]he right of trial by jury, or even of appeal, is not a constitutional right given 
him in such a case, but is a favor granted him by the lawamaking power." Budge, 16 Idaho l 16, 
100 P. at 1050. See also City of Pocatello v. Anderton, 106 Idaho 370, 372-373, 679 P.2d 647, 
649-650 (1984) ( concluding that a waiver of a jury trial in an eminent domain proceeding under 
Rule 38(b) did not violate the Idaho Constitution). 
Therefore, Grathol' s argument that a jury trial in an eminent domain case is a 
"fundamental right" or is guaranteed by the Constitution is squarely refuted by Idaho law and the 
text of Article I, Section 14. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Grathol seeks relief from its failure to follow the rules. However, Grathol has failed to 
provide any legitimate explanation of why it did not timely request a jury trial in its Answer, or 
why it failed to request a jury within the additional 14 days after the Answer provided by Rule 
38(b), or why it waited 65 days after the Answer to make its request. Accordingly, Orathol has 
waived its right to a jury trial and its untimely request should be denied. 
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MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
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Idaho Transportation Department 
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Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
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Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
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HJ ORA THOL, a California general partnership; 
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Mary V. York, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am a partner in the Boise office of the law firm of Holland & Hart LLP and am 
licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho. 
2. I am counsel of record for Plaintiff State ofldaho, Idaho Transportation Board 
("ITD'') in the above-captioned matter, and I make this affidavit in support ofITD's Brief in 
Opposition to Defendant Grathol's Motion for Jury Trial. 
3. Attached are true and correct copies of the following documents. 
4. Attached as Exhibit A is a copy of a November 17, 2010 letter from me to counsel 
for Gtathol which provides a copy of the Complaint before it was filed, and which provides 
specific notice as to when ITD would file its Complaint. 
5. Attached as Exhibit B is a proposed Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning which 
I submitted to Grathol's counsel on February 7, 2011. 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this 21st day of March, 2011. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 21st day of March, 2011. 
NdtaryPublie for Idaho 
My Commission Expires 
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Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
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VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL 
Douglas S. Marfice., Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
November 17, 2010 
Re: U.S.- 9S Condemnation; "GrathQl" Parcel.No. 19 
Dear Doug: 
NO. 2119 P. 6/22 
Maryv. York 
Phone (208) 342-SOOO 
Fax (208) 343-8869 
mvorl<@hollandhart.com 
I am. writing in :response to your email message froll) Friday, November 12, 2010. 
I appreciate the information you provided and will endeavor to respond to each of the 
issues you niised. For ease, of:teference, I will respond to your comments in the order 
set forth in your message~ 
I appreciate the clarification on the status of the ~urrent title holder of the 
property. ITD has held off filing the condemnation action until we heard back from you 
on this issue. Now that we. ha.ve confirmation that the current title holder is HJ Grathol, 
we will be filing the condemnation this week, I have attached for your reference a copy 
of the complaint that will be fi)ed. We. discussed a couple of weeks ago that you would 
be willing to accept service on behalf of HJ Grathol. Please let me know as soon as 
possible if that is not the case, and we will have service made by a process server. 
The next issue raised is your clients' apparent dissatisfaction with the length 
of time involved in the Project and their perception that ITD has been less than 
straightforward with them in negotiations. To be clear, ITD has not engaged in any 
improper de1ay as to the Project and has not given your clients "the run around/, With 
your experience in condemnation matters, you certainly understand the work ed detail 
involved in planning and designing a project of this size and scope. The time involved 
here is a direct result of the complicated nature1 and the size and scope of the Project. 
ITD has been diligent in its efforts and has taken its responsibility to the public and 
landowners very seriously. ITD disagrees with the contention that the acquisition of the 
Gratbol property is a umoving target,,, To tbe contrary, the property required for the 
Project (16,314 acres) and the design of the Project as it relates to the Grathol property 
have remained unchanged since ITD's initial negotiation contacts with your clients and 
ITD,s appraisal of the. property. 
Holland&Har1 u, 
P~o~e (2081 !42-SOOO Pa• 12.08194W869 -.hollandflart,eani 
101 SOU1h GlpitQI BQulevald s~r111400 Boise, IC! 83702 Mailing Addreu P.O.eox 25"27 8olse.lO 83701-2527 
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As support for the claim that ITD's U.S. 95 Project is a "moving target," you 
reference the extension of Sylvan Road. For purposes of clarification_, the extension of 
Sylvan Road is a separate project by the Lakes Highway District and is not part of 
ITD~s U.S. 95 Project. While the Sylvan Ro.ad extension could benefit the traveling 
public as a frontage road to U.S. 95, it is not pa.rt of rro~s Project, and the property that 
could be used for the extension road is not pa.rt of this condemnation nor is i,t on the 
Project plans. 
The issue over the extension of Sylvan Road has only been raised because the 
Lakes Highway Dbtrict wants the roadway extended, and ITD has agreed to construct 
the extension road for property owners who agree to dedicate the property to the 
Highway District. If a land-owner decides not to dedicate lands needed for the roadway, 
then it will not be constructed. Based on your email, it appears that your clients do not 
desire to have the Sylvan Road extension built. Th'erefore~ we Will consider the issue 
closed. However, in response to the comment that your clients cannot see how the 
Sylvan Road extension would help them, it is worth noting that they relied on the. 
extension of Sylvan Road in their development plan submitted to the County as part of 
their rezone application. 
The next issue- raised in your email is the prospect that one of your clients may 
....... seel<to-"force··aiea.Iignment" of U.S. 95. Given the amount oftime and money spent in 
the planning. design, and location of the Project, that effort by your clients would be 
futile. You also acknowledge that suc.h a result •~is unlikely," I am sure you are aware 
that courts give substantial deference to an agency's design and site selection of a 
public project. This is particularly true with respect to the present Project, given the 
extensive and detailed planning and design for the location of this Project, and the 
substantial review, public comment, and enviro:n.mental permitting process that this 
Project has gone through. 
For these reasons, we again request that your clients stipulate to possession. 
While ITD will eventually acquire fee title to the portions of the property required for 
the Project, it does not need fee title at this point in time for the "land swap" referenced 
in your message. Possession will suffice- for the time b·eing. Additionally, as you 
know, the grant of possession by a landowner is one of the elements that a court will 
consider in its determining whether attorney fees should be awarded to the property 
owner in a condemnation action. In addition, no reason exists for the court to deny 
possession in this case, particularly given th1 amount of detailed planning, money,. and 
effort that !TD has invested in this Project to date. 
As to your clients' concern about this process dragging on in the event they grant 
possession, I can a.s.sure you that ITD i-s committed to moving forward with the 
condemnation expeditiously. As evidence of ITD's commitment to moving this matter 
forward, we intend to file 1TD' s complaint this week, 
41 of 1617
MAR. 24. 2011 8: 38AM 
HOLLAND&HART~ ~ 
NO. 2119 P. 8/22 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
November 17, 2010 
Page 3 
Lastly, your message conv~ a settlement offer in the amouut of $2.8 million, 
with the caveats described. I have presented the offer to my clients and have been: 
instructed to decline the offer. A$ we understand the offer, it is a discounted proposal 
from the $3 .5 million value that your clients believe is due as a result of the taking of a 
portion of their property and damages caused to the remainder. The $3.5 million figure 
is based primarily on the sales identified in your letter of October 2 7, 2010 and the 
alleged damages that may be caused to the remaindert including potential damages 
resulting from the extension of Sylvan Road. As explained above~ the Sylvan Road 
extension is not part of the acquisition and, based upon your representation that your 
clients will not be dedicating any land to the Lakes Highway District, will not be 
constructed by ITD. We have reviewed the sales referenced in your October 27th letter, 
and respectfully disagree that the sales support the valuation figure advocated by your 
clients. The sales include properties located within the cities of Coeur d'Alene and 
Sandpoint, properties in far superior locations, sales with incorrect information~ and a 
sale that was actually a settlement that included amounts for improvements in addition 
to the land value. While we have yet to see any specific analysis of these sales by your 
clients' appraiser, Skip Sherwood, at this point, we do not agree that the referenced 
sales support the valuation advocated by youl' clients. 
Despite the present disagreement over values~ which is typical in condemnation 
cases, we hope that the parties oan continue to work toward a resolution of this matter. 
To that end, please feel free to contact me with any concerns your clients may have 
during the construction process or any other matter. 
Additionally, please let me know as soon as possible whether you will accept 
service and whether yom clients will stipulate to possession. If not, we will move 
forward with service of process and the setting of a possession hearing. In the 
meantime> if you have- any questions or would like 10 discuss these issues in more 





MAR. 24. 2011 8: 38AM 
LAWRENCEG. W~SDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L . .OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy Attorney General . 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #S923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Depamnent 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, I&iho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-881S 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V, York (ISB #5020) 
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 . 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO.2119 P. 9/22 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF ID.AHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ ORA THOL, a California general partnership; 
STERUNG SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
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Plain~ Idaho Transportation Department ("ITO''), by and through its attorneys, hereby 
files its Complaint in this matter against the above-named·Defendants, and complains and alleges 
as follows: 
PARTIES. JURISDICTION AND VENlJE 
1. IID, is a civil administmtive de,Partmerat of govemment of the State of Idaho, and 
Darrell V. Manning, Jan Vassar, Gary Blick, R. James Coleman, Jerry Whitehead, Neil Miller, 
and Lee Gagner are the duly appointed and qualified acting Idaho Transportation Board of the 
State. ofidaho. 
2. ITO;. pursuant to the laws of the State ofidaho, has the power of eminent domain. 
3. rm, by this action., seekg to take and condemn certain real property owned by 
Defendants (referred to as ''the Property") for an authorized public purpose, namely, the highway 
project of widening and improvmg ofU.S. Highway 95 south of State Highway 52 to north of 
the community of Sagle (referred to as "the Ptoject"). The particular segment of the Project for 
which Defendants' property is required is U.S. 9S Gatwood to Sagle - Athol Stage, Kootenai 
County,. Idaho, ITD Project Ne, A009(791), Key No, 9791. 
4, Defendant HJ Oratho~ a California general partnership, is the owner or the 
reputed owner of the Property sought to be condemned by ITO pursuant to the Warranty Deed 
dated October 1 S, 2009 and recorded November 11, 2009 as Insttutnent No. 2239116000 in the 
official records of Kootenai County, Idaho. 
S. Defendant Sterling Savings Banlc, as successor in interest by merger to First Bank 
Northwest, a Washington corporation, has an interest in the Property pursuant to a Deed of Trust, 
Assignment of Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing dated February 14, 2007 and 
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6. Defendants, Does 1 through S, based upon information and belie( were at all 
times relevant to this action individwtls or entities who have or may have an interest in or to the 
Property or lessees or tenants of the Property. Their existence and names are at present unkno\\n 
to ITO. Any such persons are joined as. unknown individuals or entities who have or may have 
an interest in or to the Property. or lessees or tenants in possession of any or all of the Property 
and are referenced herein for convenience by the fictitious designations of'Does l tbrough S. If 
the existence of any such unknown owners, lessees, tenants or claimants, if there be any, should 
be discovered during the pendency of this action, lTD will move to add them as named parties. 
1. The Property, which is the subject ofthis action, is located at or near the 
northeasterly comer of U.S. Highway 95 and St.ate Highway 54 in Kootenai County, Idaho. 
706. 
8. The cowt has jurisdiction and venue over this action pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-
COUNTI 
EMINENT DOMAIN 
8, ITD has the power of eminent domain, pursuant to the laws of the State ofldaho, 
including but not limited to, Idaho Code § § 7w 701. 
9. ITD is lawfully empowered to locate, design, construct, reconstruct, alter, extend, 
repair and maintam state highways or usooiated facilities at any place within the State of Idaho, 
and has the power and duty to acquire the i;tecessary land and property for rights-of'~way, 
turnouts, :fills, and excavations for state highway purposes by purchase, condemnation or 
otherwise. It is the duty of ITD, among other things, to establish, construct improve and 
maintain a system of state highways within the State of Idaho, and that ITD has, pursuant to the 
laws of the State ofldaho, the power of eminent domain. 
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11. The Property sought to be taken and condemned by ITO is for a public use that is 
authoru:ed by law. Namely, the Property is to be used for a highway right-ofMway to locate, 
design, construct, reconstruct, alter. extend, repair, and ma;nt.A.in state highways and associated 
facilities; the state highways are part of the e.sta.blished highway system of the State of Idaho and 
is to be used for travel by the general public; the Project that is to be constructed on the Property 
is for the safety, convenience, and utility of the general public, and it will be designated as a 
public highway or related facility. 
12. The Property sought to be taken and condemned by ITO is necessary for the 
authorized public uses, and.the location and sUl'Vey of the highway and related facilities was 
made by and under the direction ofITD and has been and is located in a manner which is most 
compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury. 
13. ITO by and through its proper officers and representatives, prior to the 
commencement of this action, sought in good faith to purchase from Defendants the Property 
necessazy for the public use described above and to settle with Defendants for dama,ges caused 
by the taking of the Property. 
14. ITO has been unable to make any reasonable bargain for or to negotiate a 
settlement with Defendants for the purchase of the Property, and Defendants have refused, and 
continue to refuse, to grant the Property to ITO for the fair market value of the Property sought 
to be taken and damages resulting from the taking. 
15. :For these reasons, it is necessary for !TD to condemn Defendants' Property in fee 
simple absolute. 
16. The Property sought to be taken and condemned is now surveyed, located and 
shown upon the official plat ofU.S.-95, Garwood to Sagle, Athol Stage, Project No. A009, Key 
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No. 9791 Highway SUIVey Project Plans located on file in the office of the Idaho Transportation 
Department in Kootenai County, State bf Idaho, and is described as follows: 
r .RGAL DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY 
[See Exhibit A-attached hereto,] 
17. The right-of-way plans showing a map of the Project route, the beginning and 
ending termini of the Project, which is at M.P. 448.00 (South Limit) and M.P. 449.83, St.ation 
No, 1014+25.0S (North Limit), Defendants, property and the Property to be taken is attached 
hereto as Exhibit B, and by th.is refetence made a part hereof as if set out in full herein. 
18. The general route of the highway for which the right-of-way is sought to be taken 
and condemned is shown upon the official project plans? which are located at the Idaho 
Department of Transportation Departmetrt,. District One Office in Kootenai County~ State of 
Idaho. 
19. The Idaho Transportation Board has detennined that the Property is necessary for 
the above-described Project and has issued an Order of Condemnation. A true and correct copy 
of the Idaho Transportation Board's Order of Condemnation is attached hereto as Exhibit C, and 
by this reference made a part hereof as if set out in full herein. 
WHEREFORE, !TD prays for judgmebt that the rights to the Property herein described 
be taken and condemned in fee simple absolute and that all rights of access be taken as shown on 
Exhibit B and as described on Exlnoit C; that just compensation be ascertained and awarded; that 
a final order of eondemnation and other appropriate orders and judgment be· entered as provided 
by law; and that such other and further relief as may be lawful and proper. 
COMPLAINT - 5 
47 of 1617
MAR.24.2011 8:39AM 
NO.2119 P. 14/22 
DATED this_ day of November, 2010. 
4P347B9_1.DOC 
CO.MPLAINT - 6 
By _____________ _ 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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From: Mary York 
Sent: Monday, February 07, 2011 1 :04 PM 
To: 'l":hri~ ~Rbhert' 
Cc: 'Shannon James'; 'Doug Marfice'; 'Tim Thomas' 
Subject: RE: ITD v. Grathol 
Attachments: 5024601_ 1.DOC 
Chris, 
I followed up with my client and was advised that they will permit the use of the property by the woodcutting 
operation you reference below until May 1, 2011. On May 2nd, the operations will need to be terminated and 
removed from the property. ITD needs to have a clear right-of-way by that date. Any property, equipment, etc. 
remaining on the property as of May 2nd will become the property of ITD. 
Next, In response to your proposed stipulation, the language looks good except we need to have included in the 
stipulation the requirement that the written undertaking be "executed by two (2) or more sufficient sureties" and 
that they will be bound to ITD for the payment of the sums to the extent that the amount withdrawn exceeds the 
amount of the final award. (IC§ 7-721(7)). I can make the changes from this end If you prefer. 
And finally, I've attached a proposed stipulation for scheduling order for your review. Please let me know if it 
looks acceptable, and if so, please sign and return and I can coordinate filing the stipulation. 
Please feel free to call If you have any questions or would like to discuss these issues In more detail. 
Regards, 
MVY 
Mary v. York 
Holland & Hart LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Building 
101 s. Capitol Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83702 
Phone (208) 342•5000 
Fax (208) 343 .. 8869 
E .. mait: myark@hollandhart.com 
HOLLAND&HAR.T.w J J 
CONFIDENTIAUTY NOTICE: Tliie meuege is conllden!la1 and may bt p~vllaged. lFyou believe that this email h11 been senl lo you 
In error, please reply to the isender that you received the meaaage in erTOt; then plaaae dele!e this e-n,all. Thar,k you. 
olsclalrner of Elec:tro1'1c: Transaction; This communicetion doe& nat reffeot an lntenttol\ by !ho eender or the sendef"e c:tlenl IO ccncluOI a 
transaotlon or make any 11graement by eleotionlc meana. Nothing conteined herein ahall constitute an electronlc signature or a 
contl'ICf under any law, rule or reguleUon appllo11ble to elacll'onlc tranaatlion&. 
From: Chris Gabbert [mallto:cgabbert@ram5den1vons.com] 
Sent: Friday, February 04, 2.01110:56 AM 
3/21/2011 
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To: Mary York 
Cc: Shannon James; Doug Marflce 
subject: ITO v. Grathol 
Dear Mary, 
NO.2119 P. 17/22 
Page 2 of2 
In follow up to our telephone conversation last week, attached please find a draft stipulation for release 
of the funds to be deposited with the Court, You indicated that ITD wlll be depositing the funds directly with the 
Court, per the order and is willing to stipulate to the withdrawal. Please review this draft stipulation and let me 
know If It is acceptable. 
Addltlonally, have vou received a response from your client as to the use of the property by the 
woodcutting operation after possession rs taken? 
Sincerely, 
Christopher D. Gabbert 
Attorney 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Boulevard 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Aleno1 ID 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
~ ,r.3m!denly.011u.run 
This e-mall is for the sole use of the intended reclplent(s) and contains Information belonglng to Ramsden & Lyons, which Is 
confldentlal and/or legallv prlvlleged, If you are not the Intended recipient. you are hereby notified that anv disclosure. 
copyln& distribution or taking of any action In reliance on the contents of this e-mall lnforrnatlon Is strictly prohibited. If 




MAR. 24. 2011 8: 40AM 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GE;NERAL 
ST ATE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (!SB #3586) 
ni.>1'111+-tr Attn.,.,.,-=,~, ~ .. nor<>l ...,,,..,.t""'"°'"'°'J .1.a. .. i,v.a.,1,,1,""'J ""'.L W,1,,W.1 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportatio11 Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimil~: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V, York (!SB #5020) 
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO. 2119 P. 18/2 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ GRATHOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
s, 
Defendants. 
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flaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") and Defe!}dant HJ 
Grathol, hereby stipulate to the entry of an Order establishing the pre-trial scheduling 
of this matter as follows: 
1. The parties hereby stipulate to the following preferences for trial dates: 
a, Week of Monday, March 5, 2012. 
b. Week of Monday, March 12, 2012 
c. Week of Monday, March 19, 2012, 
c. Week of Monday, April 2, 2012. 
The Court's clerk will confirm dates with counsel if preferences cannot be met. A 
pretrial conference will be scheduled 10 to 21 days prior to trial. 
2, Parties estimate the case will take 12 dan to try. It is anticipated to take this 
amount of time because the case is expected to be highly fact-specific and involve 
extensive expert testimony. 
3. The case is to be tried as a Court Trial, as no timely demand for a jury trial has 
been made under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4. Parties further stipulate to the following scheduling deadlines: 
a. The last day to file amendments to any pleading, or to join any additional 
parties shall be 120 days prior to trial. 
b. Plaintiff !TD shall disclose its advancing expert witnesses and opinions to 
be offered at trial 180 days prior to trial. 
c. Defendant HJ Grathol shall disclose its responsive expert witnesses and 
opinions to be offered used at trial by 150 days prior to trial. 
d. All rebuttal expert witnesses and opinions to be offered at trial shall be 
disclosed by 90 days prior to trial. 
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e. All expert witness disclosures shall be in accordance with I~aho Rule o·f 
Civil Procedure 26(b )( 4). 
f. Depositions of expert witnesses shall be completed no later than forty-
five (4S) days prior to trial. 
g. This disclosure cutoff does not absolve the parties of the duty to timely 
identify experts and their opinions in response to written discovery 
requests. 
h. The discovery cutoff shall be 60 days prior to trial. This discovery 
cutoff is the last day to initiate written discovery. Aside from depositions 
of expert witnesses, all depositions shall be completed by the discovery 
cutoff. 
1. , . All summary judgment motions shall be filed and heard no later than 60 
days prior to trial. 
4, The parties reserve the right to amend this stipulation by agreement of all parties, 
subject to Court approval, and each party reserves the right to seek amendment 
hereof by Court order. Any party may request a further status conference for any 
purpose at any time. 
DATED this_ day of February, 2011. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol 
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DATED this_ day of February, 2011. 
· HOLLAND & BART LLP 
Mary V. York, of the firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO.2119 P. 21/22 
Idaho Transportatio11 Department 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this_ day of February, 2011, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
+1-. ... ,f,. 11,..,.,; ... n-• 
1.1.l,V .LVJ..LVYf,U,.1f;1 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd, 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816~1336 
Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol 
~ U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivered 
D Fax 
D E-mail 
D Overnight UPS 
of HOLLAND & HART LI.I' 
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO 
I ND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTK 
324 W. GARDEN A VENUE 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816-9000 
) IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD 
vs. 
) Case No: CV-2010-0010095 
) 
) 
HJ GRATHOL, ETAL. ) 
) NOTICE OF TRIAL 
) 
) 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is set for: 
Court Trial Scheduled Tuesday, January 17, 2012 at 09:00 AM 
lODAYS 
Judge: Lansing L. Haynes 
Additional Presiding Judges: Benjamin R. Simpson; Charles W. Hosack; John P. Luster; John T. Mitchell; Fred 
M. Gibler; Steven Yerby; George Reinhardt, III; George D. Carey. 
I certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on Tuesday, April 05, 2011. 
MARY V. YORK M Mailed [ ] Hand Delivered [ ] Faxed 
P. 0. BOX 2527 L''\ 
BOISE, ID 83701-2527 
J. TIM THOMAS, DEP ATTY GENERAL 
P. 0. BOX 7129 
BOISE, ID 83707-1129 
DOUGLAS S. MARFICE 
PO BOX 1336 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816-1336 
Notice of Trial 
[~ailed [ ] Hand Delivered 
!XJ,_ Mailed [ ] Hand Delivered 
Dated: Tuesday, April 05, 2011 
Clifford T. Hayes 
Clerk Of The District Court 
By: Suzi Sverdsten, Deputy Clerk 
[ ] Faxed 
[ ] Faxed 
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UNIFORM PRETRIAL ORDER 
In order to assist with the trial of this matter IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. DISCOVERY: 
All written discovery shall be initiated so that timely responses shall be completed 
thirty-five (35) days before trial. The last day for taking any discovery depositions shall 
be twenty-one (21) days before trial. 
2. EXPERT WITNESSES: 
Not later than one hundred eighty (180) days before trial, Plaintiff(s) shall 
disclose all experts to be called at trial. Not later than one hundred fifty (150) days 
before, Defendant(s) shall disclose all experts to be called at trial. Rebuttal witnesses 
shall be disclosed by all parties not later than ninety (90) days before trial. Such 
disclosure shall consist of at least the information required to be disclosed pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i). Notice of compliance shall be contemporaneously filed with the 
Court. 
3. PRETRIAL MOTIONS: 
Motions for summary judgment shall be timely filed so as to be heard not later 
than ninety (90) days before trial. (NOTICE: DUE TO COURT CONGESTION IT IS 
ADVISABLE TO CONTACT THE COURT FOR SCHEDULING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT MOTIONS AT LEAST 90 DAYS PRIOR TO HEARING.) Motions in 
limine concerning designated witnesses and exhibits shall be submitted in writing at lease 
seven (7) days before trial. The last day for hearing all other pretrial motions including 
other motions in limine shall be twenty-one (21) days before trial. 
4. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: 
There shall be served and filed with each motion for summary judgment a 
separate concise statement, together with a reference to the record, of each of the material 
facts as to which the moving party contends there are no genuine issues of dispute. Any 
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party opposing the motion shall, not later than fourteen (14) days after the service of the 
motion for summary judgment and the statement of facts, serve and file a separate 
concise statement, together with a reference to the record, setting forth all material facts 
as to which it is contended there exist genuine issues necessary to be litigated. 
h1 detern1ining any motion for summary judgment, the Court may asstm1e that the 
facts as claimed by the moving party are admitted to exist without controversy, except 
and to the extend that such facts are asserted to be actually in good faith controverted by 
a statement filed in opposition to the motion. 
5. DISCOVERY DISPUTES: 
Unless otherwise ordered, the Court will not entertain any discovery motion, 
except those brought by a person appearing prose and those brought pursuant to 1.R.C.P. 
26( c) by a person who is not a party, unless counsel for the moving party files with the 
Court, at the time of filing the motion, a statement showing that the lawyer making the 
motion has made a reasonable effort to reach agreement with opposing counsel on the 
matters set forth in the motion. The motion shall not refer the Court to other documents 
in the file. For example, if the sufficiency of an answer to an interrogatory is in issue, the 
motion shall contain, verbatim, both the interrogatory and the allegedly insufficient 
answer, followed by each party's contentions, separately stated. 
6. EXHIBITS AND EXHIBIT LISTS: 
Exhibit lists and copies of exhibits shall be prepared and exchanged between 
parties at least fourteen (14) days before trial. The original exhibits and exhibit lists 
should be filed with the Clerk at the time of trial. Using the attached form, each party 
shall prepare a list of exhibits, it expects to offer. Two copies of the exhibit list are to be 
filed with the Clerk, and a copy is to be provided to opposing parties. Exhibits should be 
listed in the order that the party anticipates they will be offered. Exhibit labels can be 
obtained from the Court Clerk. Each party shall affix labels to their exhibits before trial. 
After the labels are marked and attached to the original exhibit, copies should be made. 
Plaintiffs exhibits should be marked in numerical sequence. Defendant's exhibits should 
be marked in alphabetical sequence. The civil action number of the case and the date of 
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the trial should also be placed on each of the exhibit labels. It is expected that each party 
will have a copy of all exhibits to be used at trial. 
7. 
Witness lists shall be prepared and exchanged between parties and filed with the 
Clerk at least fourteen (14) days before trial. Each party shall provide opposing parties 
with a list of the party's witnesses and shall provide the Court with two copies of each list 
of witnesses. Witnesses should be listed in the order they are anticipated to be called. 
8. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, IF JURY TRIAL REQUESTED: 
Jury instructions shall be prepared and exchanged between the parties and filed 
with the Clerk at least seven (7) days before trial. The Court has prepared stock 
instructions; copies may be obtained from the Court. The parties shall meet in good faith 
to agree on a statement of claims instruction which shall be submitted to the Court with 
the other proposed instructions. In the absence of agreement, each party shall submit 
their own statement of claims instruction. All instructions shall be prepared in 
accordance with I.R.C.P. 5l(a). 
9. BRIEFS AND MEMORANDA: 
In addition to any original brief or memorandum filed with the Clerk of Court, a 
copy shall be provided to the Court. To the extent counsel rely on legal authorities not 
contained in the Idaho Reports, a copy of each case or authority cited shall be attached to 
the Court's copy of the brief or memorandum. 
10. TRIAL BRIEFS: 
Trial briefs shall be prepared and exchanged between the parties and filed with 
the Clerk at least seven (7) days before trial. 
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11. PROPOSED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: 
If the trial is to the Court, each party shall at least seven (7) days prior to trial file 
with the opposing parties and the Court, proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law Supporting their position. 
12. MODIFICATION: 
This Pretrial Order may be modified by stipulation of the parties upon entry of an 
order by the Court approving such stipulation. Any party may, upon motion and for good 
cause shown, seek leave of Court modifying the terms of this order, upon such terms and 
conditions as the Court deems fit. Any party may request a pretrial conference pursuant 
to I.R.C.P. 16(i). 
13. SANCTIONS FOR NONCONFORMANCE: 
Failure to timely comply in all respects with the provisions of this order shall 
subject non-complying parties to sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 16(i), which may 
include: 
(a) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or 
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting such party from introducing 
designated matters in evidence; 
(b) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further 
proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part 
thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party; 
( c) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an 
order threatening as a contempt of Court the failure to comply; 
( d) In lieu or in addition to any other sanction, the Judge shall require 
the party or the attorney representing such party or both to pay the reasonable expenses 
incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule, including attorney's fees, unless 
the Judge finds that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any vacation or continuation of the trial date 
shall not change or alter any of the discovery or disclosure dates established by the initial 
trial setting. Any party may, upon motion and for good cause shown, request that the 
discovery and disclosure dates be altered on vacation or continuance of the trial date. 
Lansing L~ aynes, :district Judge 
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LIST OF EXHIBITS 
CASE NUMBER: _________ _ DATE _______ _ 
TITLE OF CASE __________ -'-v~s~. ----------
Plaintiffs Exhibits (List Numerically) 
Defendant's Exhibits (List Alphabetically) 
Third Party Exhibits (State Party) 
Additional Defendants (Contact Judge's Clerk for Directions) 
# 
Admitted/ 
Description Admitted By Stip 







RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
}ss 
Post Office Box 1336 10 ! I :5.PR 18 M1 !Q: ! Q 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JlJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VINOS BANK, 
a Washington corporation; and DOES 1 
through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
DISCOVERY RESPONSES 
TO: CLERK OF THEABOVE-ENTITLED'COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 15th day of April, 2011, that Defendant HJ 
Grathol, by and through their attorney, Douglas S. Marfice of the firm Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
did serve a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol 's Answers and Responses to 
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, together with 
a copy of this Notice, upon counsel for Plaintiff by facsimile and/or depositing the same in the 
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United States Mail, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, postage pre-paid. 
DA TED this 15th day of April, 2011. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of April, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas \/us Mail 
Deputy Attorney General __ Overnight Mail 
Idaho Transportation Department Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 7129 __ Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES - 2 
~SMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
,Hand Delivered 
_V_ F ~acsimile (208) 343-8869 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
201! fif y 13 
. ~N/0: 40 
CLERK DISTRICT 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
COURT ;ff'lt!.,dl /1(1 • ' . . • :1. 
UfPflf~.__ 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, 
a Washington corporation; and DOES 1 
through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
TO: CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 12th day of May, 2011, that Defendant HJ 
Grathol, by and through their attorney, Douglas S. Marfice of the firm Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
did serve a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol's First Set of Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production of Documents to Plaintiff, together with a copy of this Notice, upon 
counsel for Plaintiff by depositing the same in the United States Mail, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, 




DATED this 12th day of May, 2011. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
¥ ouglas S. Marfice, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 1th day of May, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS - 2 
_£_us Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
.£us Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
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700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
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HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VINOS BANK, 
a Washington corporation; and DOES 1 
through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
DISCOVERY RESPONSES 
TO: CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 3rd day of May, 2011, that Defendant HJ 
Grathol, by and through their attorney, Douglas S. Marfice of the firm Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
did serve a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol 's Supplemental Answers and 
Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, 
together with a copy of this Notice, upon counsel for Plaintiff by facsimile and/or depositing the 
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same in the United States Mail, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, postage pre-paid. 
DATED this 16th day ofMay, 2011. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
By:~~~ 
Dou~Marffoe,fthefirm 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of May, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas v"US Mail 
Deputy Attorney General __ Overnight Mail 
Idaho Transportation Department Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 7129 __ Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES - 2 
~SMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
69 of 1617
m:Naomi T. Pratt To:Clerk (12084461188) 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STA TE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idah() Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V .. York (ISB #5020) 
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
IO 1 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, .Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attomeys for Plaintiff 
16:51 07/08/11GMT-07 Pg 02-04 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ ORATHOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Was~on 
corporation; and DOES 1 through S, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY -1 
CaseNo. CVI0-10095 
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m:Naomi T. Pratt To:Clerk (12084461188) 16:51 07/08/11 GMT-07 Pg 03-04 
Pursuant to the Idaho .Rules of Civil P?Qeedw-e, notice is hereby given by the 
undersigned counsel that a copy ofITD's Response to HJ Orathol's First set of Responses to 
Defendant HJ Grathol's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to 
Plaintiff: along with a copy of this Notice, was served upon the attorneys listed on the attached 
Certificate of Service on July 8, 2011, by facsimile and overnight UPS. 
DA TED this 8th day of July, 2011. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
Special Deputy Attorneys Ge~ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Idaho Transportation Department 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY - 2 
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JU 1.21.2011 1:32PM 
LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STA TE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #S923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (208) 3344498 
Mary V. York (ISB #5020) 
Steve C. Bowman (ISB #4404) 
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342·5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
HJ GRA THOL, a California general partnership, 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOBS 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVl0-10095 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S NOTICE OF 
DISCLOSURE OF ADVANCING 
EXPERTS 
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JUl.21.2011 1:32PM NO. 2885 P. 3/4 
Plaintiff Idaho Transportation Department hereby gives notice that it has disclosed its 
advancing expert witnesses Mr. Jason Minzghor, P.E. and Mr. Stanley D. Moe, MAI, RM on the 
date set forth below, in accordance with the Court's scheduling order of April 5,2011, Rule 
26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure! and an agreed·upon extension of time between 
the parties. 
DATED this 21st day of July, 2011. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
MaryV. York 
Steve C. Bowman 
Ted s, Tollefson 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 21st day of July 2011, I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
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HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VIN GS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, pursuant to the Court's Uniform Pretrial Order entered 
in this matter that on April 5, 2011, Defendant HJ GRATHOL, by and through their attorney 
ofrecord, Ramsden & Lyons, LLP, disclosed their expert witnesses. 
DATED this 19th day of August, 2011. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
By:D~~nn 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of August, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box,2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE - 2 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
~and Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Aland Delivered 
_\T_ F Pa,csimile (208) 343-8869 
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m:Naor:, T. Prstt To:Clerk (12084461188) 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
A TIORNEY GIDIBRAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN OSB #3586) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief: Civil Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-881S 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V. York (ISB #5020) 
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
10 I South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ ORA THOL, a Californi,- general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF SERVICE· 1 
Case No. CVI0-10095 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
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m:Naor, T. Pratt To:Clerk (12084461188) 17:16 08/29/11GMT-07 Pg 04-05 
P\JJ'SUallt to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, notice is hereby given by the 
undersigned counsel that a copy of Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production to Defendant HJ Oratbol, along with a copy of this Notice, was served via facsimile 
upon the attorneys listed on the attached Certificate of Service on August 29, 2011. 
DA TED this 29th day of August, 2011. 
NOTICE. OF SERVICE - i 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
Attomeys for Plaintiff 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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m:Naomi T. Pratt To:Clerk (12084461188) 17: 16 08/29/11 GMT-07 Pg 05-05 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 29th day of August, 2011, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Fax: 208-664-5884 
Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol 
5220934_1.00C 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
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HJ GRATHOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
MOTION TO COMPEL 
COMES NOW, Defendant HJ Grathol, by and through its counsel of record, Ramsden 
& Lyons, LLP, and respectfully moves this Court pursuant to Rule 37(a), Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure for an Order compelling Plaintiff, State ofldaho, Idaho Transportation Board to fully 
and completely respond to Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents dated 
May 12, 2011, to which Plaintiff has submitted incomplete and insufficient responses and 
objections thereto. 
MOTION TO COMPEL - I ORIGINAL 
80 of 1617
This motion is supported by the pleadings filed herein and the Affidavits of Christopher 
D. Gabbert and Alan Johnson filed herewith. In making this motion, counsel represents to the 
Court that he has made written requests to Plaintiffs counsel seeking to obtain discovery 
responses. Despite endeavoring in good faith to reach an agreement on this matter, counsei has 
been unable to obtain the information sought. 
Defendant requests attorney fees and expenses for services incurred as the result of 
Plaintiffs failure to answer said Interrogatories and respond to said Requests for Production of 
Documents. 
The sufficiency of the responses to the following Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production necessitates that Defendant file its motion to compel. Pursuant to the Court's 
Uniform Pretrial Order, Section 5, the following Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents are brought before this Court: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: In the Affidavit of Jason Minzghor in Support of 
Motion or Order Granting Possession of Real Property Plaintiff states in Paragraph 16 that the 
Sylvan/Roberts Road extension is a separate and distinct project from the US-95 Garwood to 
Sagle Project. Please identify and describe what "project" the Sylvan/Roberts Road extension 
is a part of. In providing this response please include a project description, funding sources, 
contractors and expected dates for beginning and completion of the "project" pursuant to which 
Sylvan/Roberts Road extension is a part. 
ANSWER: ITO objects to Interrogatory No. 10 on the grounds that it is 
misleading and is not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence and is 
beyond the scope of permissible discovery. Whether a future project requires the 
MOTION TO COMPEL - 2 
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acquisition of additional property from the Defendant has no bearing on the amount of 
just compensation due to Defendant in this litigation. Subject to and without waiving 
any objections, there currently is no project pending to construct Sylvan/Roberts Road 
on Defendants property. 
Defendant's position: The Interrogatory was not limited to projects located on 
Defendant's property, but instead sought information regarding identification of the project to 
which the Sylvan/Roberts road expansion pertains, its funding sources and other identifying 
information. The expansion and construction of the Sylvan Road directly impacts the value 
of Plaintiffs taking in this litigation and is certainly within the scope of discoverable 
information. Further, Plaintiffs agent, Jason Minzghor, was disclosed as an expert witness 
and specifically addressed the Sylvan Road construction issues as his area of expertise, 
including the identification of current agreements to construct such road to directly benefit 
Defendant's neighbors. Plaintiffs agent testifies that the Sylvan Road/Roberts Road is a 
"separate and distinct project" yet the Board refuses to disclose any details about such 
project or development making it impossible to determine the impact on Defendant's 
valuation. 
Plaintiffs position: That there is no project to develop Sylvan Road, and if there were 
it is not within the scope of discovery in this litigation. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: In the Affidavit of Jason Minzghor in Support of 
Motion or Order Granting Possession of Real Property Plaintiff states in Paragraph 11 that 
Grathol's neighbors have expressed an interest in having Sylvan/Roberts Road 
extended/improved across their properties and decided to dedicate portions of their property to 
MOTION TO COMPEL - 3 
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such purpose. Please identify which neighbors have expressed such interest and the substance 
of such communications to or from Plaintiff regarding the same. In providing this response, 
please include the substance of any and all conversations Plaintiff has had with these property 
owners, identify any and all writings memorializing such negotiations and agreements and 
provide the dates such discussions and agreements occurred. 
ANSWER: ITD objects to Interrogatory No. 11. Please see Response to 
Interrogatory No. 10. Further, ITD objects that discussions with the Defendant's 
neighbors have no bearing on the amount of just compensation due to Defendant in this 
litigation. 
Defendant's position: This Interrogatory is in follow up to verified statements made 
by Plaintiffs agent in his affidavits to the Court about the existence of agreements and 
communications for the development of Sylvan Road. The development of this road will 
directly affect the valuation of Defendant's property and Plaintiff has considered the matter 
of enough import to include it in its agent's testimony, yet refuses to divulge any further 
details about such arrangements. As with Interrogatory No. 10, such evidence is within the 
scope of permissible discover to identify the details, schedule and discussions of such 
construction and plans for the same. 
Plaintiffs position: That any such discussions are outside of the scope of discovery 
for this litigation. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 20: If any of the individuals identified in 
Interrogatory No. 11 have signed a stipulation for possession or have settled with Plaintiff, 
please provide a copy of the stipulation or settlement agreement. 
MOTION TO COMPEL - 4 
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ANSWER: ITD objects to Request for Production No. 20 for the same grounds it 
objected to Interrogatory No. 11. 
Parties' positions: See above. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 27: Please produce any and all documents, 
memorandums and/or notes and correspondence exchanged between Plaintiff and any other 
public entity concerning or discussing the extension and/or construction of Sylvan Road. 
Please include in your response to this Request for Production any final agreements or 
concessions wherein such discussions were held. 
RESPONSE: Please see Response to Interrogatory No. 11 
Parties' positions: See above. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 28: Please produce a copy of any and all Joint 
Exercise of Power Agreements by and between Plaintiff and any other public entity concerning 
either the construction of the Project or the extension and/or construction of Sylvan Road. 
Please include in your response to this Request for Production minutes of any and all public 
meetings wherein a final action authorizing the execution of such agreements took place. 
RESPONSE: Please see Response to Interrogatory No. 11 
Parties' positions: See above. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 29: Please produce any and all budgets, 
estimates of costs and appropriation materials including line item budget requests indicating a 
cost estimate for construction and improvement of Sylvan Road. 
RESPONSE: Please see Response to Interrogatory No. 11 
Parties' positions: See above. 
MOTION TO COMPEL - 5 
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 30: Please produce copies of any 
communications, notes, memoranda, agreements or communications by and between Plaintiff, 
any other public entity and any individuals identified in your response to Interrogatory No. 11 
above. 
RESPONSE: Please see Response to Interrogatory No. 11 
Parties' positions: See above. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7: Please produce any and all soil testing 
documentation as it relates to the Subject Property including, but not limited to, the location of 
the soil testing and soil log information. 
RESPONSE: ITD objects to Request for Production No. 7 on the grounds that it is 
vague and overbroad and its terms are subject to differing interpretations. The request does not 
specify a time frame regarding a soil testing and soil log information. Nor are the terms "soil 
testing" and "soil log" defined. 
Subject to and without waiving any objections, please see attached documents including 
but not limited to IID-HJGRATHOL000926-004050. 
Defendant's position: On or about January 15, 2010, Plaintiff was granted limited 
permission by Defendant to enter the Subject Property to conduct soil testing and drill test logs 
and pits. On or about February 16, 2010, Plaintiff through its agent, American Geotechnics 
conducted testing on the Subject Property of the composition of the underlying soils. Some 
draft preliminary data of these tests were provided to Defendant by the Board. Grathol 
requested copies of the final results and associated reports generated by American Geotechnics, 
but none was provided. Plaintiffs production of materials ITD-HJGRATHOL000926-004050 
MOTION TO COMPEL - 6 
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does not contain any reference to the testing performed on the Subject Property, the results of 
such testing or the final report generated by American Geotechnics. 
Plaintiffs position: Plaintiff failed to respond to this request for production. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 23: Please produce a copy of any and all 
documents upon which Plaintiff has estimated an amount and valuation for gravel that will be 
extracted from the Subject Property. 
RESPONSE: ITD objects to Request for Production No. 23 on the grounds that it is 
vague, ambiguous and that the terms used are undefined and subject to differing interpretations. 
Gravel is made not extracted. 
Defendant's position: Plaintiff conducted specific soil testing with the permission of 
Defendant Grathol on the Subject Property to determine suitability for construction, 
composition of soils and minerals and gravel production/extraction. The documents produced 
by Plaintiff fail to reference such testing or include the final results of tests, the exact locations 
of the tests performed or the final report and/or analysis provided by American Geotechnics in 
connection with their allowed exploration of the Subject Property. 
Plaintiffs position: Plaintiff objected on the grounds that it does not understand what 
"gravel" means. It further failed to address these deficiencies in subsequent correspondence in 
follow up to its lack of response. 
Plaintiff Idaho Transportation Board has steadfastly refused to provide any records 
related to the construction of Sylvan Road claiming that it is not at issue in this litigation, is not 
relevant and outside of the scope of permissible discovery. Subsequent to this response, 
Defendant's agent, Alan Johnson, requested the same information via a public records request 
MOTION TO COMPEL - 7 
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to Idaho Transportation Department on August 3, 2011. On August 8, 2011, the Idaho 
Transportation Department denied the public records request claiming that the records are 
related to ongoing litigation and thus are not subject to disclosure. 
Plaintiff claims that the materials sought are simultaneously related to and not related to 
this litigation and thereby are not subject to disclosure or production. The inconsistent and 
inapposite treatment of this material demonstrates that the Plaintiff and the Idaho 
Transportation Department are playing games with Defendant Grathol's property interests. 
Plaintiff cannot have it both ways. Such gamesmanship should not be countenanced and 
Defendant has exhausted all available means to acquiring said materials absent assistance from 
this Court. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this I }~day of September, 2011. 
MOTION TO COMPEL - 8 
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·stopher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the -1-4.- day of September, 2011, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing by the method mdicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas ~S Mail 
Deputy Attorney General __ Overnight Mail 
Idaho Transportation Department Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 7129 __ Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
STATE Of IOAHO \ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRATHOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
) ss. 
County of O;Z.ftµr;,g, ) 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
AFFIDAVIT OF ALAN JOHNSON 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO COMPEL 
I, Alan Johnson, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I make the Affidavit of my own personal knowledge. 
2. I am employed by Hughes Investments, a California general partnership as 
Senior Vice President of Development and a partner of HJ Bayview Gateway LLC, a 
Delaware limited liability company, the managing partner of HJ Grathol, a California general 
partnership and I am also the Project Coordinator for the development of this Property and 
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am appointed by the managing partner. 
3. HJ Grathol is an affiliate of Hughes Investments and owns the real property 
that is the subject of this condemnation proceeding. 
4. On August 3, 2011, I made a public records request to the Idaho Transportation 
Department seeking, inter alia, the following public records pursuant to Idaho Code § 9-338: 
(a) Copies of any and all records, including but not limited to correspondence, 
notes, documents and electronic communications in the possession of Idaho 
Transportation Department concerning, referencing, describing or related to 
Sylvan Road, located in Kootenai County Idaho. 
(b) Copies of any and all correspondence by and between Idaho Transportation 
Department and Lakes Highway District concerning, referencing, describing or 
related to Sylvan Road, located in Kootenai County Idaho. Please include in 
this response copies of any agreements, including joint exercise of powers 
agreements executed by these public entities. 
( c) Copies of any and all budgets, estimates of costs and appropriation materials 
including line item budget requests indicating a cost estimate for any 
improvement of Sylvan Road, located in Kootenai County Idaho. 
A true and correct copy of the Public Records Request is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
5. On August 8, 2011, the Idaho Transportation Department denied the public 
records request claiming that the records are not subject to disclosure as they are related to 
ongoing litigation. A true and correct copy of Idaho Transportation Department's response is 
attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to me before this /?'1Jay of September, 2011. 
{M4tv s. 13f4nv 
Notaiy Public for-----,------
Residing at: (a,.V{ rJ?1 &f± 
My Commission expires: Ve:/_,,. !}.. '.'.3 ,-Jp(.3 
I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the~ day of September, 2011, I served a true and conect 
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below 7addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas US Maii 
Deputy Attorney General __ Overnight Mail 
Idaho Transportation Department Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 7129 _ Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
/ 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
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August 3, 2011 
HJGRATHOL 
Post Office Box 999 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 38316 
(208) 818-0836 
Idaho Transportation Department 
3311 W. State St., 
PO Box 7129, Boise, ID 83707-1129 
FAX - (208) 334-3858 
Re: Public Records Request 
Dear Sir, 
f IL£ COPY 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 9-338 please find this public records request for the 
following information. I am requesting under Idaho's Public Records Law, records in the 
possession of this agency or its agents. 
Specifically, I request the following: 
(a) Records from 2009 through today's date (August 3, 2011) showing the total 
current amount of costs and attorneys fees paid by Idaho Transportation 
Department to Holland & Hart, LLP, as attorneys in connection with Kootenai 
County Case No. CVI0-10095, Idaho Court of Appeals Case No. 38511-2011 
and ITD Project No. A009(791), Key No. 09791, Parcel 19, ITD PID 
0044775. 
(b) Copies of any and all records, including but not limited to correspondence, 
notes, documents and electronic communications in the possession of Idaho 
Transportation Department concerning, referencing, describing or related to 
Sylvan Road, located in Kootenai County Idaho. 
( c) Copies of any and all c01Tespondence by and between Idaho Transportation 
Department and Lakes Highway District concerning, referencing, describing 
or related to Sylvan Road, located in Kootenai County Idaho. Please include in 
this response copies of any agreements, including joint exercise of powers 
agreements executed by these public entities. 
EXHIBITA A ...... '.:[ i 
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( d) Copies of any and all budgets, estimates of costs and appropriation materials 
including line item budget requests indicating a cost estimate for any 
improvement of Sylvan Road. , located in Kootenai County Idaho. 
I would like this information emailed to me at ajohnson@hughcsinv.com. 
If my request for records is denied in whole or in part, please state the exact statutory 
reason for the denial. Please notify me in advance if necessary under Idaho law to assess a 
fee for this records request. 






IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise ID 83707-1129 
A,,,..,,,..+ a 0f\-1-1 
l"\U~Ui:>I u, t;..V I I 
Alan Johnson 
HJ Grathol 
PO Box 999 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
RE: Public Records Request of August 3, 2011 
Dear Mr. Johnson: 
(208) 334-8000 
itd.idaho.gov 
The Idaho Transportation Department received your request for public records on 
August 3, 2011. Please be advised the records you are requesting are related to an 
ongoing case in litigation. In accordance with Idaho Code Section 9-343 and Idaho 
Public Records Law Manual, when a public agency is a party to the proceeding they are 
governed by rules of discovery. 
Sincerely, 
Jeff Stratten 
Office of Communications Manager 
JS:lh 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
STATE OF lDAHO 'SS 
COUNTY Of KOOTENAI{ 
.. FILED: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VIN GS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTOPHER 
D. GABBERT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO COMPEL 
CHRISTOPHER D. GABBERT, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. I am an attorney of record for the Defendant HJ Grathol in this action and 
therefore am aware of the facts surrounding this matter. 
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2. On May 12, 2011, I served written Interrogatories and Requests for Production 
of Documents on Plaintiff. 
3. On or about July 8, 2011, I received Plaintiff's Answers to said Interrogatories 
and Responses to said Requests for Production of Documents and general objections. 
4. On July 21, 2011, I corresponded to Plaintiff's counsel to discuss the discovery 
responses received seeking to resolve the deficiencies and objections raised in Plaintiff's 
responses. A true and correct copy of said correspondence is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
5. On or about July 21, 2011, Plaintiff filed its Disclosure of Advancing Experts, 
identifying Jason Minzghor as an expert witness in this matter. 
6. One area of Mr. Minzghor's identified expertise is Sylvan/Roberts Road at pp. 8 
- 9 of Plaintiff's Disclosure of Advancing Experts. Mr. Minzghor specifically states that ITD 
has agreed to construct Sylvan Road extensions on neighboring properties as a frontage road 
and that the extension is a separate and distinct project. Attached as Exhibit B is a true and 
correct copy of a portion of Plaintiff's Disclosure of Advancing Experts. 
7. On July 29, 2011, Plaintiff's counsel responded to my request, denying that there 
is any project to construct Sylvan Road, and further stating that the matters sought by way of 
discovery related to Sylvan Road are outside of the scope of litigation. A true and correct copy 
of Plaintiff's response is attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
8. On or about January 15, 2010, I executed a Grant of Entry Agreement allowing 
Plaintiff or its agents to access the Subject Property to conduct geotechnical exploration and 
testing. A true and correct copy of my correspondence to Plaintiff's agents, and their 
acceptance of the terms of such permission is attached hereto as Exhibit D. 
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9. On or about April 2, 2010 I received via email a copy of preliminary boring logs 
from American Geotechnics in relation to the initial testing performed on the Subject Property. 
Attached hereto is a true and correct copy of said correspondence as Exhibit E. 
/ 
SUBSCRIBED & SWORN to before me this \1) day of September, 2011. 
,,,,11,,,,,, 
,,,~~ON J. c1.:.111 
' ~ • •• • • 1A_4',_, ._:.. r .·· .. r~ ; 
~ l: 0 tlOTAFn,,'·.~~ = : : = = . -·- : -
-;_ .~·. PUBLIC .:0 E -;, w~··. ,• ~ ~ 
........ ..,,,.~ . .: .... -~~ ,' 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the \ 9 day of September, 2011, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas /US Mail 
Deputy Attorney General __ Overnight Mail 
Idaho Transportation Department Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 7129 __ Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
~ ·1 US Mai 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
-~lCHAEL E. RAMSDEN• 
MARC A. LYONS• 
DOUGLASS. MARFICE' 
MICHAEL A. EALY' 
TERRANCE R. HARRIS' 
CHRISTOPHER D. GABBERT 
THERON J.DESMET 
P.O. BOX 1336 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816-1336 
TELEPHONE: (208) 664-5818 




700 NORTHWEST BLVD. 
COEUR D'ALENE. ID 83814 
ALL ATTORNEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO 
• LICENSED IN WASHIN"GTON 
WILLIAM F. BOYD, OF COUNSEL 
) 
MaryV. York 
Holland & Hart, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Bolse, ID 83701 
July 21, 2011 
Re: The State of Idaho v. HJ Grathol, et al. 
Kootenai Co. Case No. CV-10-10095 
Dear Mary, 
Via facsimile (208) 343-8869 
I am in receipt of ITD's responses to Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production to Plaintiff dated July 8, 2011. I have reviewed the responses and 
note that your client has objected to many of our client's discovery requests. However, I feel 
that your client's objections are not well founded, especially with regards to the following 
requests: 
1. Interrogatory No. 10; 
2. Interrogatory No. 11; 
3. Request for Production Nos. 20, 30; and 
4. Request for Production Nos. 27, 28, 29 
Interrogatory Nos. 10 and 11 and Requests for Production Nos. 27, 28 and 29 seek 
information and documentation pertaining to the status, plans, development and 
configuration of Sylvan Road as discussed by and between the Idaho Department of 
Transportation and other public entities. Sylvan Road was testified to by- ITD's agent (see, 
Affidavit of Jason Mingzghor) as an "existing project." Since Sylvan Road crosses the 
Grathol property and will eventually be the frontage road, it is certainly relevant to a final 
determination on the value of our client's remnant parcels. Your repeated objections that 
information about Sylvan Road is beyond the scope of permissible discovery are not well 
founded. The expansion and development of additional property belonging to our client on 
the same parcel of land is certainly within the scope of permissible discovery. for a valuation 
on damages. Further any such objections have been waived because they were not timely 
made under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Additionally, as you well know the very Order of Condemnation at issue in this case 
contains a specific paragraph dealing with ITD's " ... process of extending Sylvan Road to tie 
into Roberts Road," in association with this Project. That makes Sylvan Road and ITD's 
plans and communications about it not just discovery relevant, but directly relevant. 
Similarly, Interrogatory No. 11 and Request for Production Nos. 20 and 30 seek 
discovery of additional information testified to by ITD's agent in his affidavit regarding 
existing discussions with our client's neighbors regarding the expansion and dedication of 
Sylvan Road. The objection that such information "has no bearing" on the amount of just 
compensation due Defendant is assumedly an objection based on relevancy, but is otherwise 
still discoverable pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26. The information certainly has bearing on the issue 
of damages and the impact of ITD's actions in this condemnation and is reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Additionally, as above, any 
objections now raised to these discovery requests have been waived as untimely. 
Despite the large volume of information your client produced via CD, there appears to 
be information that ITD has either decided to withhold or which was not properly copied 
onto the electronic format you provided. Of note, in folder number 2, titled "ROW Diaries 
and Plans" there is a subfolder titled "Correspondence" which is empty. I assume that this 
material was inadvertently omitted from ITD's response because I find it difficult to believe 
that IID has not generated any emails, letters or correspondence related to the Subject 
Property. Additionally, certain documents and data that we requested were not provided. 
That information includes soil testing information, grading and elevation plans, and 
correspondence/agreements with other public entities relative to Sylvan Road extension 
plans. (See, Request for Production Nos. 7, 23, 27, 28, 29 and 30). 
Please note that this is an attempt to meet and confer in order to obtain discovery 
without court action pursuant to I.R.C.P. 37(a)(2). If you wish to discuss these matters 
further, please contact me immediately. Otherwise, I will expect full responses to these 
discovery requests in (10) ten days. Thank you for your attention to this · atter. 





The U.S. 95 Project was public knowledge and the construction plans for the Project 
crossing over the Grathol property were available prior to the date that Grathol purchased the 
subject Property. Grathol acknowledged and touted the benefits of the Project in its application 
to the county planning and zoning commission to change the zoning of the property to 
commercial. The county granted the application in light of the Project's creation of commercial 
potential on and in the vicinity of the Grathol property. 
5. Sylvan/Roberts Road: 
Contrary to the Grathol' s claim, ITD is not condemning any portion of the Grathol 
property in order to construct an extension of the Sylvan/Roberts Road as part of the US-95 
Garwood to Sagle Project. JTO's Complaint does not seek to condemn any property from 
Grathol for construction of any such extension. The only property being acquired by ITO in this 
case is property needed for the realignment of US-95 and the construction of the Highway 54 
Interchange. 
Grathol has apparently been confused by negotiations among ITD, Lakes Highway 
District, and other property owners in the area regarding the potential extension of 
Sylvan/Roberts Road. Specifically, Grathol's neighbors expressed an interest in having 
Sylvan/Roberts Road extended across their properties. Because of the benefits of the extended 
road, those neighbors decided to dedicate portions of their property to the Lakes Highway 
District and ITO agreed to construct the Sylvan Road extension for those landowners. The 
construction of extensions of the Sylvan/Roberts Road will act as a frontage road for these 
property owners, who view it to be beneficial to them as additional access to their property. 
In August 2010, representatives ofITD, including Mr. Minzghor, had a meeting with the 
owners of the Grathol property and their attorneys. At this August 20 l O meeting, ITD had 
discussions with the owners of the Grathol property that were separate and distinct from the 
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negotiations over the portion of the Grathol property needed for the US-95 Garwood to Sagle 
Project At that meeting, ITD stated that it would also be willing to extend Sylvan/Roberts Road 
across the Grathol property if they elected to dedicate the property for that extension. 
Unlike their neighbors, Grathol elected not to have the Sylvan/Roberts Road extended 
across their property. Therefore, ITD is not constructing any extension of the Sylvan/Roberts 
Road on the Grathol property, and ITD does not need and is not condemning any property from 
Grathol for any such extension. The only property that ITO seeks to acquire from Grathol is a 
portion of the Grathol property needed solely and specifically for realignment of US-95 and the 
construction of the Highway 54 interchange. 
The Sylvan/Roberts Road extension is a separate and distinct project and is not part of the 
US-95 Garwood to Sagle Project - Athol Segment. Construction of an extension of 
Sylvan/Roberts Road is not necessary or required for the US-95 Garwood to Sagle Project. In 
short, ITD is not condemning any portion of Grathol's property for an extension of 
Sylvan/Roberts Road in this eminent domain proceeding. 
B. Data and Other Information Considered in Forming Testimony: 
Mr. Minzghor has relied on the follO\ving data and documents in this matter: 
Planning documents related to the Project. 
Environmental documents related to the Project. 
Project design, right-of-way, and construction plans. 
Personal inspection of the site of the Project and the Grathol property. 
Applicable federal, state, and local regulations and specifications. 
Planning and zoning documents. 
Engineering standards and guidelines. 
C. Exhibits that May Be Used as a Summarv of or Support for Testimony: 
Mr. Minzghor may use the following exhibits to summarize, illustrate, or support his 
testimony: 
Planning documents related to the Project. 
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July 29, 2011 
MaryV. York 
Phone (208) 342-5000 
Fax (208) 343-8869 
myork@hollandhart.com 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Re: ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al. 
DearClnis: 
First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County 
Case No. CVlO~ 10095 
Idaho Court of Appeals Docket No. 38511-2011 
We received your letter of July 21, 2011 regarding ITD's responses to Defendant's 
First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production dated July 8, 2011. In your 
July 21, 2011 letter you requested a response within ten (10) days - July 31, 2011 - which 
is a Sunday. Before turning to the substance of your letter, we must first address two 
misrepresentations in your July 21, 2011 letter. 
First, your letter seems to allege that our discovery responses were untimely. 
This is incorrect. We obtained extensions from Mr. Marfice, and therefore our responses 
were timely. 
Second, your letter misquotes the January 18, 2011 Affidavit of Jason Minzghor, 
the ITD District 1 Project Development Engineer, Your letter quotes Mr. Minzghor's 
affidavit as saying that the construction of Sylvan Road is an "existing project." 
Mr. Minzghor's affidavit does not say that, particularly as to the Grathol property. 
Rather, Mr. Minzghor makes very clear that ITD is not condemning any portion of the 
Grathol property in order to construct Sylvan Road. 
Holland&HarhtJ> 
10. Contrary to the claim in Grathol's brief in opposition to 
the motion for possession of the property, ITD is not 
condemning any portion of the Grathol property in order to 
construct an extension of the Sylvan/Roberts Road as part of 
the US-95 Garwood to Sagle Project. ITD's Complaint does 
not seek to condemn any property from Grathol for 
construction of any such extension. 
17. In this eminent domain proceeding, ITD is not 
condemning any portion of Grathol's property for an extension 
of Sylvan/Roberts Road. 
Phone [208] 342-5000 Fax [208] 343-8869 www.hollandhart.com 
101 South Capitol Boulevard Suite 1400 Boise.ID 83702 MalUng Address P.0.Box2527 Boise.ID 83701-2527 
Aspen Bouldet Carson City Colorado Springs Denver 0enve,Tech Centet Billings Boise Cheyenne Jackson Hole Las Vegas Reno Salt Lake City Santa Fe Washington, D.C. 0 
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As to the substance of your letter, you noted that the "Correspondence" folder on 
the CD of documents produced to you was empty. We apologize. The bates numbered 
documents ITD-HJGRATHOL000252-269 were inadvertently not copied onto the CD. 
Therefore, enclosed please find a CD which includes those inadvertently omitted 
documents. 
Your July 21, 2011 letter also notes that you did not receive responses to 
interrogatories and requests for production related to Sylvan Road. You argue that 
because ITD had discussed extending Sylvan Road across Grathol's property and the 
administrative order of condemnation references Sylvan Road that any and all documents 
related to Sylvan Road are discoverable. You further argue that "[t]he expansion and 
development of additional property belonging to our client on the same parcel of land is 
certainly within the scope of permissible discovery for a valuation on damages." 
On January 21, 2011, the Court held a hearing on ITD's motion for possession. 
At that hearing, ITD presented extensive testimony that ITD was not condemning any of 
Grathol's property for the construction of Sylvan Road. At the conclusion of that hearing, 
Judge Haynes ruled that the order of condemnation did not provide for the taking of 
Grathol's property for Sylvan Road and that Sylvan Road is not the subject of the taking 
before the Court. Judge Haynes ruled: 
The order of condemnation does not provide or in this court's 
opinion does not provide for the taking of the defendanes 
property for the expansion of the Sylvan Road and Roberts 
Road. The contemplation of the expansion of Sylvan Road to 
link to Roberts Road is certainly mentioned in the order of 
condemnation, but more importantly, the complaint does not 
contemplate the extension of that road, and that is not the 
subject of the taking that is before this court. The Idaho 
Department of Transportation has offered to expand those roads 
through Grathol's property -- rather, the Sylvan Road 
expansion through Grathol's property, but that offer has been 
declined by the defendant and this has been testified to amply 
before the Court today and in Mr. Minzghor's deposition. 
January 21, 2011, Hearing Tr. 61:2-16. 
On January 27, 2011, Judge Haynes entered an Order which granted ITD possession 
of the real property described in the Complaint. As the exhibits to the Complaint clearly 
illustrate, ITD is not condemning any of Grathol's property for the construction of Sylvan 
Road. 
Further on July 21, 2011, ITD disclosed its Advancing Experts. In that disclosure, 
Mr. Minzghor again stated that "ITD is not condemning any portion of Grathol's property 
for an extension of Sylvan/Roberts Road in this eminent domain proceeding.', 
...... & . 
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The only remaining issue in this litigation is the amount of just compensation owed 
to Grathol for the property that is being condemned and any severance damages that are 
claimed to result from that taking. Grathol cannot be compensated in any way for property 
that is not being condemned. Therefore, any information or documents reiating to Syivan 
Road are wholly irrelevant to the sole issue to be tried in this case. 
Your clients elected to forego a valuable benefit of having Sylvan Road extended 
with all construction costs borne by ITD. That decision closed the issue of a possible 
extension of Sylvan Road across the Grathol property. Therefore, none of the information 
or documents referenced in your letter is relevant or discoverable. 
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Justin Wuest 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
AfJORNEYS AT LAW 
I' 0 IIOX 1336 
coi;u ll D"1\l.];NE.ID03016· 1336 
TEL liPIIONf.: (21111) 66•1-511 l8 
l'ACSIMllE: (208) 6f,,l-501H 
E-MAll-: firrn@romsdcnlyons com 
WEllSI 1 E: www ramsdcnlyons cont 
.January 15, 2010 
Idaho Transportation Dept. - District l 
600 West Prai1ie Ave. 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815 
STREF.f ADDIU(SS: 
700 NOIITIIWEST UL.Vil 
COf:UR D'Al-ENll. ID 83111-1 
A lL A T TO 11 N E Y S l I Cle N SE ll t N I IJ A I I 0 
• LICENSED IN WASlllNGION 
Re: US-95, Garwood to Sagle (Atlzol Stage), .A,fP 448 00 to 449.80, Project No . 
.11009(791), Ke_11 No 09791, G,>anf'of E1ibj1,HJ G,;athol, Pai·cel No. 53N03W-
10-5000 ::, . -
Dear Justin: 
In follow up to our te1ephone conversation and our meeting with our clients, we 
discussed the Idaho Transportation Department's ("ITD") Grant of Entry Agreement to 
access the "HJ Grathol" property for data collection. Our clients have authorized lTD access 
to their property upon two conditions. First, our c1ients would request that lTD provide them 
a minimum of four ( 4) working days notice for entry and testing on the property, in the event 
that our clients desire to have a representative present for observation. Second, ITD will 
need to provide its proof of insurance coverage for its activities on our client's property, to 
cover any losses, damages, harm or casualty to ITD's personnel or property that should occur 
by reason of lTD's activities on the property This is easiest achieved by ITD simply 
indemnifying our clients for these losses, should they occur. 
Enclosed, please find an executed copy of the Grant of Entry Agreement with the 
conditions of entry noted. Additionally, please sign and return a copy of this con·espondence 
as assurance that ITD has sufficient insurance coverage and indemnifies our clients for losses 
or damages which could occur by reasons of ITD's use of our client's property. Our clients 
recognize the possible need for ITD to remove some tr~es in order to access and conduct its 
testing activities atid the· renioval ·of those trees is excluded· fio11i ITD' s indemnification. -_ 
I:: .. ·:,· 
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If you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
I aclmowledge the terms and conditions of the Grant of Entry Agreement and the 





~ Justin Wuest 
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Chris Gabbert [cgabbert@ramsdenlyons.com] 
Monday, April 05, 2010 9:38 AM 
To: Doug Marfice; Shannon James 
Subject: FW: US 95/Hwy 54 boring logs 
Attachments: 09B-G1939 DRAFT Logs_ r1 ISSUED 4-2-10.pdf 
From: Stanley Crawforth [mailto:s crawforth@americangeotechnics.com] 
Sent: Friday, April 02, 2010 9:53 AM 
To: Chris Gabbert 
Subject: RE: US 95/Hwy 54 boring logs 
Attached are the boring logs. The final report is about 6 weeks away. 
Please thank the property owner for the access. 
Stanley G. Crawforth, PE 
American Geotechnics 
5260 Chinden Blvd. 
Boise, Idaho 83714 
Office: (208) 658-8700 
Cell: (801) 400-4004 
Fax: (208) 658-8703 
www.AmericanGeotechnics.com 
AMEIIC.A.H ,..e_. • ., 
..:- ..... ~ .:.J 
TECHMICS 
From: Chris Gabbert [mailto:cgabbert@ramsdenlyons.com] 
Sent: Thursday, April 01, 2010 4:02 PM 
To: Stanley Crawforth 
Subject: US 95/Hwy 54 boring logs 
Stan, 
In follow up to our conversation, please forward copies of the test pit and geotechnical logs for the site 
evaluation conducted on the Athol property. We appreciate your assistance in this matter. If you have any questions, 
please let me know. 
Thanks, 
Christopher D. Gabbert 
Attorney 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Boulevard 
1 
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P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
www .ramsdenlyons.com 
This e-mail is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and contains information belonging to Ramsden & Lyons, which is 
confidential and/or legally privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, 
distribution or taking of any action in reliance on the contents of this e-mail information is strictly prohibited. If you have received 
this e-mail in error, please immediately notify the sender by rep!y e-mai! and destroy all copies of the original message. 
2 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Dougias S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
COUNTY OF KOOTEHAl>SS FILED: . 1 
20 '1 SF.P l S AH ta: If 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JlJDIClt\L DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VIN GS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Date: October 19, 2011 
Time: 3 :30 p.m. (PST) 
Place: Kootenai County District Court 
TO: CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
AND TO: ALL PARTIES AND COUNSEL OF RECORD 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on Wednesday, the 19th day of October, 2011 at 
3:30 p.m. (PST), of said day, Defendant HJ Grathol will bring on its Motion to Compel, 
before the Honorable Lansing L. Haynes. 
NOTICE OF HEARING - l ORIGINAL 
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DATED this 14th day of September, 2011. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
topher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of September, 2011, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and 7ssed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas US Mail 
Deputy Attorney General __ Overnight Mail 
Idaho Transportation Department Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 7129 __ Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
~SMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
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700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant lU Grathol 
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lU GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, 
a Washington corporation; and DOES 1 
through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
DISCOVERY RESPONSES 
TO: CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 19th day of September, 2011, that Defendant 
lU Grathol, by and through their attorney, Douglas S. Marfice of the firm Ramsden & Lyons, 
LLP did serve a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol's Second Supplemental Answers 
and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents, together with a copy of this Notice, upon counsel for Plaintiff by depositing the 
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same in the United States Mail, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, postage pre-paid. 
DATED this 19th day of September, 2011. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
By: ~J.:s.~ 
Douglas s.f Marfice, Ofth Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
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Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") by and through its counsel 
ofrecord, Holland & Hart LLP, hereby submits this Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony or, 
Alternatively, to Compel Expert Disclosures. ITD requests an order from the Court excluding 
the exoert testimonv of two exoert witnesses identified bv Defendant. HJ G-rathol ("G-rathol") 
... ., .I. ., - - - - . - 7 - -- - - -- - - ' - - - --- - /:, 
Geoffrey Reeslund and Alan Johnson. Grathol has failed to comply with the expert disclosure 
requirements of the Court's Pretrial Order entered on April 5, 2011 and the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Grathol has also failed to respond to ITD discovery requests that specifically ask for 
the opinions and supporting information of all of Grathol's experts. Accordingly, testimony by 
these experts should be excluded. 
As a result of Grathol' s failure to disclose its expert opinions, ITD has been prejudiced 
because it cannot determine what rebuttal experts it will need, and it cannot prepare rebuttal 
expert reports, prepare for the depositions of Grathol's experts, prepare for trial, or engage in 
settlement negotiations. Additionally, ITD is unable under these circumstances to make a proper 
pretrial offer in accordance with the requirements of Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 
105 Idaho 873,673 P.2d 1067 (1987) and subsequent, related cases. 
In the alternative, ITD moves this Court to compel Grathol to comply with the Pretrial 
Order requiring disclosure of expert opinions and the basis of those opinions, which are also the 
subjects oflTD's discovery requests served on February 2, 2011. If the Motion to Compel is 
granted, ITD will necessarily need an extension of time to disclose rebuttal experts and reports, 
and therefore requests that the Court amend the Pretrial Order accordingly and continue the trial 
in this matter. 
Counsel has made repeated efforts to reach an agreement with opposing counsel on the 
issue of Grathol's expert disclosures and despite those efforts, no agreement could be reached. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OR ALTERNATIVELY, TO 
COMPEL EXPERT DISCLOSURES - 2 
114 of 1617
Therefore, if successful, ITD also requests that it be awarded its attorney fees and costs incurred 
in bringing this motion. 
ITD' s motion is supported by a brief and by the Affidavit of Mary V. York also filed on 
this date. 
DATED this 22nd day of September, 2011. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") by and through its counsel 
of record, Holland & Hart LLP, hereby submits this brief in support of its Motion to exclude the 
expert testimony of certain experts identified by Defendant, HJ Grathol ("Grathol"). Grathol has 
failed to comply with the requirements of the Court's Pretrial Order and has failed to respond 
properly to discovery requests propounded by ITD. ITD has suffered and will continue to suffer 
prejudice without the required expert disclosures in that it ITD is unable to identify rebuttal 
experts needed for trial, and cannot prepare rebuttal expert reports, prepare for the depositions of 
Grathol's experts, prepare for trial, or engage in settlement negotiations. Additionally, ITD is 
unable under these circumstances to make a proper pretrial offer in accordance with the 
requirements of Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P .2d 1067 
(1987) and subsequent, related cases. 
Grathol claims that it is not required to disclose the opinions or basis of opinions of these 
experts under the "actor-viewer" exception noted in the Committee Notes of Rule 26 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Grathol's attempted justification for its refusal to disclose 
expert opinions and supporting information is not supported by the facts or applicable law. The 
stated subject matters upon which these experts will offer opinion testimony fall squarely within 
the requirements of Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, even if it is 
determined that the testimony of these experts' testimony is exempted from the Idaho Rule, the 
experts' opinions and the basis and facts supporting those opinions were specifically requested in 
ITD's discovery and Grathol has refused to produce the requested information. Additionally, 
Grathol has ignored the Court's Pretrial Order and has sought to place limitations on the Court's 
requirement for the disclosure of Grathol's experts that are not contained in the Order. Finally, 
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even in one were to accept Grathol's argument regarding application of the "actor-viewer" 
exception under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and federal case law, Grathol still could not 
hide its experts' opinions. On the contrary, the federal rules require "actor-viewer" experts to 
disclose "a SUtT11-nai7 of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify." Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C). Grathol's refusal to disclose its experts' opinions is purely an attempt to 
hide the ball and deny ITD the ability to properly prepare for trial. The exclusion of expert 
testimony is the typical sanction for a party's failure to comply with Rule 26 of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure and should be applied here. 
Alternatively, ITD requests the Court enter an Order compelling Grathol to submit 
adequate and sufficient expert disclosures as required by the Court's Order and as requested by 
ITD in its discovery requests. Additionally, because ITD is unable to identify rebuttal experts, 
prepare rebuttal expert reports, prepare for expert depositions, or make an appropriate pretrial 
Acarrequi offer, ITD also requests that the Court amend the Pretrial Order to extend the time for 
ITD to disclose rebuttal experts and expert reports, and vacate and continue the trial date in this 
matter. If the testimony of Grathol's experts is not excluded, then the extension oftime and 
continuance of the trial date is the only remedy that will prevent unfair prejudice to ITD by 
requiring Grathol to disclose the opinions of its experts, and thereafter providing sufficient time 
for ITD to prepare for the depositions of Grathol' s experts and to indentify rebuttal experts and 
submit rebuttal expert reports. This remedy is also necessary to give ITD an adequate 
opportunity to evaluate the opinions of Grathol' s experts and present a fair and reasonable 
Acarrequi offer to Grathol. The continuance is also necessary to provide a fair opportunity for 
ITD to prepare its case for trial. 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OR, 
ALTERNATIVELY, TO COMPEL EXPERT DISCLOSURES -3 
119 of 1617
II. BACKGROUND AND FACTS 
The Court's Pretrial Order dated April 5, 2011 established the pretrial deadlines for the 
parties' expert disclosures. Pretrial Order, at, 2. Under the terms of the Order, ITD was 
required to disclose its expert witnesses by July 21, 2011. Id. Grathol was then required to file 
its responsive experts on August 19, 2011. Id. And then the parties would file any rebuttal 
experts on October 19, 2011. Id. The Order did not place any limitations on which experts or 
types of experts were required to be disclosed and, with respect to the substance of the 
information to be provided for each parties' respective experts, the expert disclosures were to 
"consist of at least the information required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b )( 4)(i)." Id. 
On August 19, 2011, Grathol filed its Expert Witness Disclosure in which it identified 
three expert witnesses who were expected to be called to testify at the trial of this matter, Dewitt 
"Skip" Sherwood, Geoffrey Reeslund and Alan Johnson. Affidavit of Mary V. York, Ex. H 
(Grathol's Expert Witness Disclosures). With respect to Mr. Sherwood's expert testimony, 
Grathol stated that "[h]e will testify in accordance with his appraisal report, which will be 
provided to Plaintiff upon completion." York Aff., Ex.Hat 2. Despite the specific reference to 
Mr. Sherwood's appraisal report, Grathol did not produced Mr. Sherwood's appraisal report. 1 
With respect to Grathol's expert disclosures for Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson, Grathol 
merely outlined in broad terms the general subject matter of the anticipated testimony. Grathol's 
disclosures did not provide any of the "opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons 
therefore," as required by Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, nor did it "consist 
1 On September 19, 2011, counsel for Grathol faxed a letter to ITD's counsel in which it stated 
that it was belatedly producing Mr. Sherwood's appraisal report. The fax did not contain a copy 
of the appraisal report or the supplement discovery responses being provided by Grathol. ITD 
just received Grathol's discovery responses, which included a copy of Mr. Sherwood's appraisal 
report on September 21, 2011. 
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of at least the information required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i)," as required 
by the Court's Pretrial Order. Grathol's expert disclosure as it relates to Mr. Reeslund stated 
that: 
Mr. Reeslund will give opmion testimony as to the 
development plans for the Property, testimony as to its potential 
uses, its value (before and after the condemnation), the limitations 
on uses of the Property remaining after condemnation, and land 
use planning/entitlement, construction planning activities; efforts 
and expenses associated with the purchase, holding and 
development of the Property; planning and design work associated 
with the property; and the effects of the condemnation on the 
development of the remaining property. 
York Aff. ,, 11-18, Ex. H. Grathol's expert disclosure as it relates to Mr. Johnson is similar, 
stating that: 
Mr. Johnson will give opm1on testimony as to the 
acquisition, ownership and development plans for the Property, 
testimony as to its potential uses, its value (before and after the 
condemnation), the values of the Property remaining after 
condemnation and before and after construction and 
entitlement/construction planning activities; efforts and expenses 
associated with the purchase, holding and development of the 
Property; planning and design work associated with the property; 
marketing efforts of the property prior to and after condemnation; 
and the effects of the condemnation on the remaining Property. 
York Aff., Ex. H. Grathol failed to provide any actual opinions to be offered by either expert; 
there is no detail as to the experts' value opinions, condemnation impact opinions, or 
condemnation damages opinions. Furthermore, there is no information about the basis, reasons 
or support for the experts' opinions. 
Upon receiving Grathol's expert disclosures, on August 24, 2011, counsel for ITD 
notified Grathol's counsel that its expert disclosures were deficient in that they did not comply 
with the Court's Pretrial Order, the disclosure requirements of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, or with ITD's discovery requests and the corresponding supplementation 
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requirements of the Rules. York Aff., Ex. I (August 24, 2011 Letter from counsel for ITD to 
counsel for Grathol). ITD's August 24th letter requested that Grathol provide full and complete 
disclosures. Id 
Counsel for Grathol responded to ITD's August 24th letter by stating that it believed that 
the disclosures did in fact comply with the Court's Pretrial Order and contained all of the 
information required by Rule 26(b)(4). York Aff., Ex. J (August 29, 2011 Letter from counsel 
for Grathol to counsel for ITD). While not expressly stating the underlying reasoning behind its 
refusal to provide the requested opinions and supporting information in its August 29th letter, 
Grathol's assertion that its disclosure complied with the Court's Pretrial Order and Rule 26(b)(4) 
is based upon its contention that Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson are "actor-viewer" experts and 
are therefore not subject to the requirements of Rule 26(b )( 4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In support of its assertion, Grathol cited to the Committee Notes of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, but provided no argument or analysis to support its cited reference. Grathol 
had made a similar statement in its original responses to ITD's First Set of Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production of Documents. York Aff., Ex. D (Grathol's Ans. and Resp. to Plfs First 
Set oflnterrogs. and Req. for Prod. of Doc.) at 5-6. ITD's Interrogatory and Grathol's Answer 
stated the following: 
Interrogatory No. 2: For each expert witness identified in 
response to Interrogatory No. 1, please provide the subject matter 
upon which the expert witness is expected to testify, a complete 
statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the 
reasons therefore, the substance of the expert witness' opinions, 
the basis and reasons for the opinions, the underlying facts and 
data upon which those opinions are based, and all information 
referenced in and required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ANSWER: Defendant anticipates offering expert opinion 
testimony in this matter, including testimony concerning the plan, 
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Id 
design and engineering of portions of the Plaintiffs project across 
or adjacent to Defendant's property, as well as testimony 
concerning valuation of the property. The witnesses offering 
opinion testimony as actor-viewers may include the following: 
(1) Bill Hughes 
(2) Alan Johnson 
(3) Geoff Reeslund 
(4) Scott Taylor 
(5) Brent Heleker 
(6) John Beutler 
(7) Mark Johnson 
(8) Jeff Bond 
(9) Donald Smock 
(10) Paul Daugharty 
(11) Brett Terrell 
(12) Mike Winger 
As an actor/viewer "expert," Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover 
the testimony of such persons. See, U.S.C.A., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1970 Amendment at 114 
(West 1995). 
(1) Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, CGA 
(2) Ed Morse, MAI 
With respect to these valuation experts, as of the date of the 
Answers to these Interrogatories, no formal appraisal reports have 
been completed. Therefore, the remainder of the information 
requested in this Interrogatory cannot be provided. If and when 
formal appraisal reports are prepared, the information in the above 
Interrogatory will be contained within those appraisal reports. 
On September 9, 2011, counsel for ITD held a conference call with counsel for Grathol 
as a formal "meet and confer" conference on the issue of Grathol' s deficient expert disclosure, as 
well as other discovery matters. York Aff., at ,, 18-19. During the conference, counsel for ITD 
made reasonable efforts to reach an agreement with counsel for Grathol on the issue of Grathol' s 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OR, 
ALTERNATIVELY, TO COMPEL EXPERT DISCLOSURES - 7 
123 of 1617
deficient expert disclosures for Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson. Id. At the close of conference, 
counsel for Grathol stated that he would follow up on the expert issues the following week. Id. 
Grathol's counsel did not respond within the stated time frame, but a week later, on 
September 19, 2011, Grathol' s counsel sent a letter again refusing to disclose the expert opinions 
of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson. York Aff., at~ 19 and Ex. M. In its September 19th letter, 
Grathol once again reiterated its contention that Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson were "actor-
viewer" experts and therefore not subject to the requirements of the Court's Pretrial Order or 
Rule 26(b)(4). Id. Notably, Grathol's letter did not explain why it was unable to provide the 
experts' opinions and supporting information in response to ITD's Interrogatory No. 2, which 
asked for "a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the reasons 
therefore, the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions, 
the underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based." See, id. 
ITD's counsel responded on September 20, 2011 and stated its express disagreement with 
Grathol's arguments and conclusions. York Aff., Ex. N. The September 20th letter from ITD's 
counsel also notified Grathol that it would be filing a motion to exclude the testimony of Mr. 
Reeslund and Mr. Johnson testimony or, alternatively, to compel the disclosure of their opinions 
and supporting information. Id. 
Ill. ARGUMENT 
A. The Testimony of Grathol's Experts Should be Excluded Because Grathol 
Has Failed to Comply with the Court's Pretrial Order, the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and ITD's Discovery Requests. 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allow ITD to obtain "discovery regarding any matter, 
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it 
relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any 
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other party[.]" Idaho R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l). With respect to expert witnesses, Rule 26(b)(4) 
provides that a party may discover, by interrogatory and/or deposition, a complete statement of 
the opposing party's expert's opinions and the reasons for those opinions. Id. at 26(b)(4). 
The exclusion of evidence is the recognized sanction for a party's failure to comply with 
Rule 26, including the duty to seasonably supplement responses to discovery requests. 
"Typically, failure to meet the requirements of Rule 26 results in exclusion of the proffered 
evidence." Radmer v. Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86, 90, 813 P.2d 897, 900 (1991). 
Additionally, courts have broad authority to compel obedience with its orders and may impose 
sanctions upon a party who fails to comply with its orders, including a party who fails to serve 
timely responses to discovery. Idaho Code§ 1-1603(4); Noble v. Ada County Elections Bd., 135 
Idaho 495,499, 20 P.3d 679,683 (2000); Ashby v. Western Council, Lumber Production and 
Indus. Workers, 117 Idaho 684, 686, 791 P.2d 435,436 (1990). See also Idaho R. Civ. P. 
37(b)(2)(B) (providing that where a party fails to obey an order of the Court to provide 
discovery, the Court may enter an order "refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or 
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting that party from introducing designated 
matters in evidence."). "Moreover, while trial courts are given broad discretion in ruling on 
pretrial discovery matters, reversible error has been found in allowing testimony where Rule 26 
has not been complied with." Radmer, 120 Idaho at 90, 813 P.2d at 900 (citing Smith v. Ford 
Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784 (10th Cir.1980)). 
In the present case, in addition to the requirements imposed by Rule 26(b)(4), the Court's 
Pretrial Order required that expert disclosures "shall consist of at least the information required 
to be disclosed pursuant to LR. C.P. 26(b)(4)(i)." Pretrial Order, at 2. The Order made no 
exception for alleged "actor-viewer" experts. Further, ITD propounded discovery requests on 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OR, 
ALTERNATIVELY, TO COMPEL EXPERT DISCLOSURES - 9 
125 of 1617
Grathol in which it sought "a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert 
and the reasons therefore, the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for 
the opinions, the underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based," as well as all 
information referenced in and required by Ruie 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho Ruies of Civii 
Procedure. York Aff., Ex. A, Interrogatory No. 2. 
Grathol failed to comply with or satisfy the requirements of the Court's Pretrial Order 
and Rule 26(b)(4) because it did not include a complete statement of Mr. Reeslund's and Mr. 
Johnson's expert opinions or the reasons for those opinions in its expert disclosures. Moreover, 
Grathol failed to respond to ITD's discovery requests and provide a complete statement of these 
experts' opinions and the underlying substance, reasons and basis for those opinions. See York 
Aff., Exs. H through M, and 1117-19. Accordingly, the recognized sanction for Grathol's 
disregard of the Court's Order and the discovery requirements of Rule 26 is to exclude the 
testimony of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson. 
B. The Expert Testimony of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson Fall Directly 
Within the Scope of Rule 26(b )( 4) and Should Have Been Disclosed In 
Accordance with the Court's Pretrial Order and the Requirements of 
Idaho's Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Grathol's explanation of why it refuses to produce the expert opinions of Mr. Reeslund 
and Mr. Johnson is that these experts "are not 'expert witnesses' in the traditional sense of a Rule 
26(b)(A)(i) disclosure." York Aff., Ex. M. According to Grathol, these individuals "fall within 
the 'actor/viewer exception'" of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because their 
testimony is based upon knowledge and information not acquired in preparation for litigation and 
they are "actors/viewers with respect to the occurrences that are part of the subject matter of this 
litigation." Id In support of its argument, Grathol cites to the Committee Notes of the Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26, Subdivision (b)(4). 
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Grathol' s argument has no merit because Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson are identified as 
experts who will be offering expert testimony that was obtained or created in anticipation of 
litigation. Specifically, Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson have both been identified as offering 
expert testimony on the very issues reiating to the present condemnation action. Grathoi 
identified Mr. Reeslund as providing expert testimony on issue of the value of the subject 
property before and after the condemnation, the limitations on uses of the remaining property 
after the condemnation, and the effects of the condemnation on the development of the 
remaining property. York Aff., Ex. H. Similarly, Mr. Johnson is identified as providing expert 
testimony as to ITD's acquisition of a portion of the subject property, the value of the property 
before and after the condemnation, the values of the Property remaining after condemnation and 
before and after construction, and entitlement/construction planning activities, marketing efforts 
of the property prior to and after condemnation, and the effects of the condemnation on the 
remaining Property. Id. 
Each of these identified areas of expert testimony are directly related to and, in fact, arise 
out of or in direct response to the current lawsuit. An opinion about this condemnation action 
could not have been formed in the absence of this condemnation action. Such opinions 
necessarily arise from and are directly related to this suit. Therefore, Grathol cannot sustain its 
claim that Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson created their opinions prior to or independent of this 
action. The identified subject areas of expert testimony for Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson fall 
directly within the bounds of Rule 26(b)(4) and should have been disclosed by Grathol on 
August 19, 2011. Grathol's failure to do so violated the Court's Pretrial Order and the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and the testimony should be excluded. 
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C. Grathol's Suggested Justification for Its Refusal to Produce the Expert 
Opinions of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson Is Contrary to Idaho Law. 
Grathol's contention that it is not required to disclose the expert opinions of Mr. 
Reeslund and Mr. Johnson expert fails under Idaho law, which requires Mr. Reeslund's and Mr. 
Johnson's expert opinions to be disclosed under Idaho's discovery rules. In fact, the assertions 
made by Grathol are nearly identical to those that were rejected by the Idaho Court of Appeals in 
Clark v. Raty, 137 Idaho 343, 48 P.3d 672 (Ct. App. 2002). 
In Clark, the district court excluded the testimony of a treating physician who was not 
timely disclosed. Id. at 344, 48 P .3d at 673. On appeal, plaintiff argued that he was not required 
to produce the expert's opinions because the expert's opinions and knowledge were not acquired 
or developed in anticipation of litigation and therefore were not subject to the requirements of 
Rule 26(b)(4). Id. at 345, 48 P.3d at 674. The Court of Appeals soundly rejected plaintiffs 
argument, stating that "although Clark is correct that a treating physician's knowledge that was 
not developed for purposes oflitigation is not subject to Rule 26(b)(4), the conclusion that he 
then draws-that such testimony is entirely sheltered from discovery-draws no support from 
the language of the rule or the remaining discovery rules." Id. The Court of Appeals quoted the 
federal decision of Lee v. Knutson, 112 F.R.D. 104 (N.D. Miss. 1986) and its statement that 
"[t]here is simply no reason to hold that non-26(b)(4) trial experts may not be discovered by way 
of the same interrogatories as 26(b)(4) trial experts." Id. at 346, 48 P.3d at 675 (quoting Lee v. 
Knutson, 112 F.R.D. 104, 108 (N.D. Miss. 1986)). According to the Lee decision, "[t]his result 
flows from precedent as well as logic and common sense." Id. 
The Court of Appeals in Clark concluded that Rule 26(b )( 4) "provides no justification for 
[plaintiffs] failure to respond to [defendant's] interrogatories seeking disclosure of all of 
[plaintiffs treating physician's] opinions that [plaintiff] wished to present at trial." Id. And it 
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upheld the exclusion of the treating physician's testimony as not being timely produced and for 
plaintiffs failure to seasonably supplement its responses to discovery requests as required by 
Rule 26(e)(4). Id. at 347, 48 P.3d at 676. 
Applying Clark to the present case, the same result should follow. While ITD does not 
concede that Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson are not subject to Rule 26(b)(4) and the Court's 
Pretrial Order, the ruling in Clark makes clear that Grathol is still subject to ITD's discovery 
requests, which specifically asked for "a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by 
the expert and the reasons therefore, the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and 
reasons for the opinions, the underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based," as 
well as all information referenced in and required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. York Aff., Ex. A., Interrogatory No. 2. 
Grathol has offered no explanation as to why it continues to refuse to answer ITD's 
discovery requests or why it has failed to comply with Rule 26(e)(4) and supplement its initial 
responses that failed to provide the requested information. Indeed, given that Grathol states that 
Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson are prepared to testify at deposition, at which time ITD can ask 
these experts about their opinions, Grathol obviously knows these opinions and is required under 
Rule 26(e)(4) to supplement its responses and provide that information. Grathol has refused to 
answer ITD's discovery and has refused to comply with Idaho's discovery rules, including the 
rule requiring Grathol to supplement its discovery responses. 
Grathol' s continued and strenuous efforts to hide the opinions of its experts violates the 
very purpose of the discovery rules and their efforts should not be rewarded. Like the court in 
Clark, the Court should exclude the testimony of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson for Grathol's 
failure to comply with the Court's Pretrial Order and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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D. Even if Grathol's Actor-Viewer Argument is Accepted and the Federal Rules 
are Applied, Grathol Would Still be Required to Disclose the Opinions of 
Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson. 
In support of its argument that it is not required to provide the expert opinions of 
Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson, Grathol cites to the Notes of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26, Subdivision (b)(4). The Committee Notes referenced by Grathol state that "[i]t should be 
noted that the subdivision [Rule 26(b)(4)] does not address itself to the expert whose information 
was not acquired in preparation for trial but rather because he was an actor or viewer with 
respect to transactions or occurrences that are part of the subject matter of the lawsuit." See 
Comments to 1970 Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(4). 
The federal rule that formed the context for the Committee Notes differs from Idaho Rule 
26 in that the federal rule distinguishes between those experts who are required to produce a 
report and those who are not. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(b) with Idaho R. Civ. P. 
26(b)(4). Under the federal version of the rule, an expert is required to produce a report that 
contains a complete statement of all opinions and the basis and reasons for the opinions "if the 
witness is one retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or one 
whose duties as the party's employee regularly involve giving expert testimony." Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(a)(2)(b ). However, even if an expert, such as an actor-viewer expert, is not required to 
produce a report, he is still required to disclose the subject matter on which the witness is 
expected to present evidence and "a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is 
expected to testify." Id.; Nagle v. Mink, 2011 WL 3861435, *2-3 (D. Colo. Aug. 29, 2011) 
(experts not required to disclose reports under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) are required to disclose 
"(i) the subject matter on which the witness is expected to present evidence under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 702, 703 or 705 and (ii) a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is 
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expected to testify."). Additionally, if that expert's opinion testimony goes beyond the facts 
known to him as an actor-viewer, the expert is then required to comply with the disclosure 
requirements of Federal Rule 26(a)(2)(B). See e.g., Zarecki v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 
9i4 F.Supp. i566, i573 (N.D. Iil. 1966) (concluding that the substance of expert's testimony 
went beyond personal observations and experience and therefore should have been disclosed 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) and the expert disclosure requirements of the rule); Wreath 
v. United States, 161 F.R.D. 448, 449-50 (D. Kan. 1995) (holding that to once an testifying 
physician develops additional specific opinion testimony beyond the facts made known to him 
during the course of care and treatment of the patient, he becomes subject to the provisions of 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) and the expert disclosure requirements of the rule). 
The actor-viewer expert may be excused under Federal Rule 26 from preparing a formal 
report. However, no rule excuses them from being required to disclose opinions under Rule 26, 
court scheduling orders, or interrogatories and requests for production. Thus, if one accepts 
Grathol's argument, Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson may not be required to prepare a report 
under the Federal Rules, they are certainly required to disclose a "summary of the facts and 
opinions" to which they would testify at trial. And to the extent their testimony went beyond the 
facts known to them as an actor-viewer, then Grathol would be required to comply with the 
additional requirements of Federal Rule 26(b )(2)(B). 
E. The Court's Pretrial Order does not Excuse Any Particular Type of Expert 
from Disclosure. 
The Court's Pretrial Order establishes the minimum requirements for expert disclosures, 
and it does not excuse any particular type of expert from the requirements of the Order. Pretrial 
Order, at ,-r 2. The Court's Order specifically requires that Defendants "shall disclose all experts 
to be called at trial" no later than 150 days before trial. Id ( emphasis added). The Order makes 
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no qualification, limitation or exception to the type of experts that are required to be disclosed. 
Id. With respect to the information that must be disclosed, the Order states that "such disclosure 
shall consist of at least the information required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i)." 
Id. (emphasis added). Grathol should be required to comply with the provisions of the Order. 
Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson were identified as experts and they have been disclosed 
by Grathol as individuals who will be offering expert opinion testimony at trial. York Aff., 
Ex. H. As the Court well knows, witnesses are limited to testifying as to facts within their 
personal knowledge. Under certain circumstances, a witness may go beyond that and testify as 
to opinions they have formed on matters relevant to the case. To offer these opinions, the 
witness must qualify as an expert based on their specialized training, education, or experience. 
Here, as in most cases, and in accordance with Rule 26, the Court's Pretrial Order requires all 
experts to disclose all opinions and the basis of those opinions by certain specified dates. The 
Court's Order does not exempt any experts of any kind from this requirement. 
Moreover, to the extent that Grathol contends that these individuals are experts whose 
opinions were not developed in anticipation of litigation, their opinions and the basis therefore 
must have already been formed prior to the commencement of this case. In that case, Grathol 
should have immediately disclosed Mr. Reeslund's and Mr. Johnson's opinions in response to 
ITD's discovery in April. At a minimum, Grathol was under a duty to supplement its discovery 
under Rule 26(e)(4) long before now. Grathol's failure to do so is not supportable or justified 
and should result in the exclusion of their testimony. 
F. ITD Will Be Prejudiced by Grathol's Failure to Disclose Its Experts' 
Opinions and Supporting Information. 
Grathol refusal to provide expert opinions and supporting information results in 
substantial unfair prejudice to ITD. Without sufficient disclosures, ITD cannot determine what 
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rebuttal experts it will need at trial. ITD cannot prepare and serve its rebuttal opinions in 
response to the opinions of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson because Grathol has not produced any 
substantive information about these experts' opinions or the basis for them. ITD has no 
information about their opinion as to either the before or after value of the property, what 
opinions they are going to offer as to the limitations on the use of the subject property after the 
condemnation, or their conclusions as to the effects of the condemnation on the development of 
the property. In short, ITD has nothing to rebut because Grathol has refused to provide any 
opinions from these experts. 
Additionally, ITD is not able to adequately prepare for the depositions of these experts 
without an undue and unnecessary expenditure of time and expense. ITD should not have to, nor 
is it required to, go into an expert deposition without an adequate disclosure of the experts' 
opinions and the reasons and basis for them. The Rules have been structured to require complete 
disclosures of an expert's opinions to prevent such inequities. As stated by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Clark v. Klein, 
In cases of this character [involving expert testimony], a 
prohibition against discovery of information held by expert 
witnesses produces in acute form the very evils that discovery has 
been created to prevent. Effective cross-examination of an expert 
witness requires advance preparation.... Similarly, effective 
rebuttal requires advance knowledge of the line of testimony of the 
other side. If the latter is foreclosed by a rule against discovery, the 
narrowing of issues and elimination of surprise which discovery 
normally produces are frustrated. 
Id., 137 Idaho 154, 157-58, 45 P.3d 810, 813-14 (2002) (quoting Advisory Committee Notes, 
Rule 26, Fed. R. Civ. P.). "The purpose of our discovery rules is to facilitate fair and expedient 
pretrial fact gathering." Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 873, 136 P.3d 338, 344 (2006). "It 
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follows, therefore, that discovery rules are not intended to encourage or reward those whose 
conduct is inconsistent with that purpose." Id. 
Additionally, ITD is prejudiced by Grathol's refusal to disclose its experts' opinions 
because ITD wiil be unable to evaluate the opinions and properly prepare a fair and appropriate 
pretrial offer as required by Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 
1067 (1987) and succeeding cases. Under Acarrequi, ITD as the condemnor is required to make 
a timely pretrial offer of settlement of at least 90% of the ultimate jury verdict and no later than 
90 days before trial. Id. at 876-78, 673 P.2d at 1070-72. This offer serves as the basis for 
determining awards of costs and attorney fees in condemnation actions. In cases involving large 
sums, such as the present case, the amount of costs and fees can be considerable. ITD is simply 
unable to assess these witnesses' opinions as to the fair market value of the property, before or 
after the condemnation, or their opinions on damages suffered by the remaining property after 
the condemnation. Consequently, ITD is unable to assess or determine an appropriate offer of 
settlement under Acarrequi, due solely to Grathol's unjustified refusal to disclose the opinions of 
individuals who will offer expert testimony at trial. 
The prejudice faced by ITD has been addressed by Idaho appellate courts. In the case of 
Clark v. Raty, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he potential for prejudice to the 
opposing party from the admission of evidence that was not disclosed in discovery is particularly 
acute with respect to expert testimony." Clark, 137 Idaho at 347, 48 P.3d at 676. The Idaho 
Supreme Court echoed this concern when it noted that in cases involving expert witnesses, 
advance preparation is necessary and pretrial discovery is fundamental. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 
157-58, 45 P.3d 810, 813-14 (2002). Because of Grathol's failure to disclose its experts' 
opinions or the underlying basis for the opinions, in compliance with the Court's Pretrial Order, 
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Rule 26(b)(4), and ITD's discovery requests, ITD is unable to adequately prepare its case for 
trial. Accordingly, the expert testimony of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson should be excluded. 
This sanction is particularly appropriate given Grathol's repeated willful failure and refusal to 
provide any of the opinions from these experts, as required by the Court's Pretrial Order and the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
G. In the Alternative, ITD Requests that the Court Compel Full Disclosure of 
Mr. Reeslund's and Mr. Johnson's Expert Opinions and the Supporting 
Information and Modify the Pretrial Order. 
Alternatively, if the expert testimony of these individuals is not excluded, ITD requests 
that the opinions and basis for those opinions be compelled to be disclosed, and that the Court's 
scheduling order be modified to extend ITD' s deadline to serve rebuttal reports and to continue 
the trial of this matter in order to avoid prejudice to ITD. The extension of time and continuance 
of the trial date is necessary to allow time for ITD to receive the expert opinions and supporting 
information of Grathol' s experts, to prepare for the expert depositions, and to complete its own 
expert rebuttal reports. The additional time is also needed to afford ITD a fair opportunity to 
present a reasonable Acarrequi offer to Grathol. This remedy is also needed to provide ITD with 
a fair opportunity to for trial. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Grathol has identified expert witnesses who will testify and offer opinions at trial, but it 
has refused to provide the opinions or the basis for the opinions-despite the Court's Pretrial 
Order, the requirements of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and ITD's outstanding discovery 
requests. Without the disclosure of these experts' opinions, ITD will be substantially and 
unfairly prejudiced. Accordingly, the testimony by these experts should be excluded at trial. In 
the alternative, Grathol should be compelled to disclose the opinions of their experts and the 
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basis for them, and the trial should be vacated and the Pretrial Order should be amended to give 
ITD adequate time to identify and disclose rebuttal experts. 
ITD further requests that it be awarded its attorney fees and costs incurred as a result of 
Grathol's failure to compiy with the Court's Pretrial Order and to answer its discovery requests. 
DATED this 21st day of September, 2011. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Idaho Transportation Department 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
MARY V. YORK, first being duly sworn on oath, states and affirms as follows: 
1. I am a partner in the Boise office of the law firm of Holland & Hart LLP and a1n 
duly licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho. 
2. I am one of the attorneys representing Plaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho 
Transportation Board ("ITD") in this matter, and I make this affidavit in support ofITD's 
Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony or Alternatively, to Compel Expert Disclosures. 
3. On February 2, 2011, ITD served its First Set oflnterrogatories and Requests for 
Production to Defendant HJ Grathol ("Grathol"). Pursuant to Rules 33 and 34 of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Grathol' s deadline for responding to ITD' s discovery was March 7, 2011. 
Attached as "Exhibit A" is a true and correct copy of ITD's First Set of Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production. 
4. With respect to expert witnesses, ITD propounded the following discovery 
request: 
Ex. A at 8. 
interrogatory No. 2: For each expert witness identified in 
response to Interrogatory No. 1, please provide the subject matter 
upon which the expert witness is expected to testify, a complete 
statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the 
reasons therefore, the substance of the expert witness' opinions, 
the basis and reasons for the opinions, the underlying facts and 
data upon which those opinions are based, and all information 
referenced in and required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
5. Grathol failed to produce its responses to ITD's discovery requests. On 
March 22, 2011, Grathol requested an extension of time. ITD granted Grathol's request and 
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gave it until April 5, 2011 to respond to the discovery requests. Attached as "Exhibit B" is a true 
and correct copy of an email correspondence between counsel for ITD and counsel for Grathol. 
6. Grathol failed to meet the April 5th deadline. In response, counsel for ITD sought 
to "meet and confer" with counsel for Grathol, both by phone and in writing, in Oider to obtain 
Grathol's responses to the outstanding discovery. ITD informed Grathol that it needed to 
produce its responses to ITD's discovery requests by April 5, 2011, otherwise ITD would file a 
motion to compel the responses. Attached as "Exhibit C" is a true and correct copy of the 
April 13,2011 correspondence from counsel for ITD to counsel for Grathol. 
7. On April 15, 2011, Grathol produced its answers and responses to ITD's 
discovery requests. However, the requests were deficient and failed to adequately respond to 
ITD's requests. Attached as "Exhibit D" is a true and correct copy of Grathol's Answers and 
Responses to ITD's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents. In 
response to ITD's Interrogatory No. 2 regarding Grathol's expert witnesses, Grathol responded 
as follows: 
ANSWER: Defendant anticipates offering expert opinion 
testimony in this matter, including testimony concerning the plan, 
design and engineering of portions of the Plaintiffs project across 
or adjacent to Defendant's property, as well as testimony 
concerning valuation of the property. The witnesses offering 
opinion testimony as actor-viewers may include the following: 
(1) Bill Hughes 
(2) Alan Johnson 
(3) Geoff Reeslund 
(4) Scott Taylor 
(5) Brent Heleker 
(6) John Beutler 
(7) Mark Johnson 
(8) Jeff Bond 
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(9) Donald Smock 
(10) Paul Daugharty 
(11) Brett Terrell 
(12) Mike Winger 
As an actor/viewer "expert," Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover the 
testimony of such persons. See, U.S.C.A., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Notes 
of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1970 Amendment at 114 (West 
1995). 
(1) Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, CGA 
(2) Ed Morse, MAI 
With respect to these valuation experts, as of the date of the 
Answers to these Interrogatories, no formal appraisal reports have 
been completed. Therefore, the remainder of the information 
requested in this Interrogatory cannot be provided. If and when 
formal appraisal reports are prepared, the information in the above 
Interrogatory will be contained within those appraisal reports. 
8. In addition, Grathol stated in its discovery responses that it would make certain 
documents available for review by ITD. To follow up on Grathol's statement, counsel for ITD 
requested that Grathol copy the responsive documents and send them by mail for ITD's 
counsel's review. 
9. Grathol provided the referenced documents by mail on May 16, 2011. Attached 
as "Exhibit E" is a true and correct copy of the May 16, 2011 correspondence from counsel for 
Grathol to counsel for ITD. 
10. Also on May 16, 2011, Grathol provided ITD with a supplemental response to 
ITD' s discovery request. That response consisted of a single document. Attached as "Exhibit F" 
is a true and correct copy of Grathol's Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiffs First 
Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents. 
11. On July 22, 2011, counsel for ITD notified Grathol's counsel of concerns 
regarding the number of expert witnesses disclosed and how that disclosure was inconsistent 
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with representations made to the Court regarding the number of experts Grathol intended to call 
at trial. The letter also pointed out the continued deficiencies in Grathol's discovery responses 
and identified the specific responses that were inadequate and failed to properly respond to ITD's 
requests. Attached as "Exhibit G" is a true and correct copy of the July 22, 2011 correspondence 
from counsel for ITD to counsel for Grathol. 
12. On August 19, 2011, ITD received Grathol's Expert Witness Disclosures. In its 
disclosures, Grathol stated that its expert witness, Dewitt M. "Skip" Sherwood would "testify in 
accordance with his appraisal report, which will be provided to Plaintiff upon completion." 
Expert Witness Disclosure at 2. Yet, Grathol failed to produce any appraisal report by 
Mr. Sherwood. Attached as "Exhibit H" is a true and correct copy of the Grathol' s Expert 
Witness Disclosure. 
13. In its Expert Witness Disclosure, Grathol also identified two additional expert 
witnesses, Geoffrey B. Reeslund and Alan Johnson. Grathol's disclosures consisted of a general 
listing of the subject matters upon which these experts would be testifying. They failed to 
disclose any "statement of the opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefore," as 
required by Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, Grathol failed to 
disclose a "statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the reasons therefore, the 
substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions, the underlying 
facts and data upon which those opinions are based, and all information referenced in and 
required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure," as requested in ITD's 
discovery. See ITD's First Set of Discovery Requests at Ex. A, supra. 
14. Counsel for ITD sought to "meet and confer" with Grathol on the deficiencies in 
its expert disclosures in a letter dated August 24, 2011. Attached as "Exhibit I" is a true and 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARY V. YORK IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
EXPERT TESTIMONY OR ALTERNATIVELY, TO COMPEL EXPERT DISCLOSURES - 5 
142 of 1617
correct copy of the August 24, 2011 correspondence from counsel for ITD to counsel for 
Grathol. 
15. Grathol's response to the discovery deficiencies identified by ITD is a letter dated 
August 29, 2011. Attached as "Exhibit J" is a true a.11d correct copy of the August 29, 2011 
correspondence from counsel for Grathol to counsel for ITD. 
16. On September 1, 2011, in yet another attempt to obtain the opinions of Grathol' s 
experts, ITD noticed the depositions of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson, two of the experts 
identified by Grathol. ITD set the depositions in order to obtain information regarding their 
experts opinions and the basis for their opinions in sufficient time before ITD's deadline for its 
rebuttal experts, which is set for October 19, 2011. Attached as "Exhibit K" is a true and correct 
copy of the September 1, 2011 correspondence from counsel for ITD to counsel for Grathol. 
17. On September 6, 2011, counsel for Grathol informed counsel for ITD that 
Mr. Johnson and Mr. Reeslund would not be available for depositions on September 12 or 13. 
Instead counsel for Grathol proposed additional dates for the depositions, which were either too 
close to ITD's deadline for rebuttal witnesses or well after the deadline. Attached as "Exhibit L" 
is a true and correct copy of the September 6, 2011 correspondence received from counsel for 
Grathol. 
18. Additionally, the deposition dates proposed by Grathol were unworkable because 
of Grathol' s insistence on withholding its expert opinions and would not produce the opinions 
prior to the depositions. On September 9, 2011, a conference call was held with counsel for 
Grathol in order to "meet and confer" on the deficiencies in Grathol' s expert disclosures and on 
the discovery issues identified in ITD's July 22, 2011 letter (Ex. G). Additionally, discussions 
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were had regarding the depositions of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson and counsel for ITD 
requested that the experts' opinions be produced by Grathol in advance of the depositions. 
19. During the call, counsel for Grathol stated that he would follow up on the issues 
raised during the call and that he would get back to me the following week. Counsel for Grathol 
did not respond during that next week. 
20. On September 19, 2011, counsel for Grathol once again refused to disclose the 
expert opinions of Mr. Johnson and Mr. Reeslund. Attached as "Exhibit M" is a true and correct 
copy of the September 19, 2011 correspondence received from counsel for Grathol. 
21. On September 20, 2011, counsel for ITD responded to Grathol's September 19th 
letter and its refusal to disclose its expert opinions and notified counsel that ITD would be filing 
its motion to exclude and motion to compel. Attached as "Exhibit N" is a true and correct copy 
of the September 20, 2011 correspondence sent to counsel for Grathol. 
22. Counsel has made reasonable efforts to reach an agreement with opposing counsel 
on the issue of Grathol' s expert disclosures and despite those efforts, no agreement could be 
reached. 
Dated this 21st day of September, 2011. 
N~tary Public for Idaho 
My Commission Expires IJ.5--zq_. Zo II/ 
I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of September 2011, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 









Fax (208) 664-5884 
E-mail 
Overnight UPS 
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Plaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board by and through their attorneys of 
record and pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby serves its First Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents on Defendant HJ Grathol and requests 
Defendant to answer all interrogatories and produce all documents for inspection and/or copying, 
in accordance with the Instructions and Definitions set forth below within thirty (30) days from 
the date of service of this discovery, unless otherwise provided by Court order or the parties' 
mutual agreement. 
INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING INTERROGATORIES 
Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the interrogatories set forth 
below are. to be answered within thirty (30) days of service~ fully and separately in writing, tmder 
oath, and in accordance with the above-cited rules. When responding in written form to any 
interrogatory, please give the number of the interrogatory before providing the specific response. 
Answers to these interrogatories must include not only information in your personal 
knowledge and possession, but also any and all information available to you, including 
information in the possession of any of your agents, attorneys, or employees. If you cannot 
answer any of the following Interrogatories in full, a_ft:er exercising due diligence to secure the 
information to do so, so state, and answer to the extent possible, specifying your inability to 
answer the remainder and stating whatever information or knowledge you have concerning the 
tmanswered portions. If a claim of privilege is made as to any such information, you must 
specify the basis for the claim of privilege and describe the information claimed to be privileged. 
If any document identified in an answer to an interrogatory was, but is no longer in your 
possession, custody or control, or was known to you but is no longer in existence, describe what 
disposition was made of it or what became of it. No document requested to be identified or 
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produced herein can be destroyed or disposed of by virtue of a record retention program or for 
any other reason. 
The interrogatories are intended to be continuing in nature and to require the addition of 
supplemental information and documents in the future to the fullest extent provided by Rule 
26(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. If, after responding to the interrogatories, you 
acquire any information respective thereto, you are requested to file and serve supplemental 
responses containing such information, as required by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This 
request for supplementation is also specifically a request pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26( e ). 
INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Rule 34 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, you are requested, within 
thirty (30) days of the date this document was served upon you, to present for inspection and 
copying the documents and things requested below at the offices of Holland & Hart LLP, Suite 
1400, U.S. Bank Plaza, 101 S. Capitol Blvd., Boise, Idaho. As an alternative to producing 
documents for inspection and copying, accurate, legible and complete copies of requested 
documents may be attached to your answers and responses to t.liese discovery requests and 
served within the same time period. Please clearly identify the request for production to which 
each document or group of documents you provide is responsive. 
Your response must include and be based not only on documents and things in your 
personal possession, but also on any and all documents and things available to you, including 
those in the possession of any of your agents, representatives, attorneys, or employees. If any 
document requested to be identified in the following interrogatories, or asked to be produced in 
the requests for production, was but no longer is in your possession or subject to your control, or 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION TO DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL - 3 
148 of 1617
in existence, state whether it is (1) missing or lost, (2) has been destroyed, (3) has been 
transferred, voluntarily or involuntarily, to others, or (4) otherwise disposed of; and in each 
instance, please explain the circumstances surrounding the authorization of such disposition 
thereof, and state the date or approximate date thereof. 
With respect to each document as herein denied which is required to be identified by 
these interrogatories or produced in the requests for production and which you presently contend 
you are not required to disclose because of any alleged "privilege" (which you are not presently 
prepared to waive), in lieu of the document identification called for above, please identify each 
such "privileged" document as follows: (1) give the date of each such document; (2) identify 
each individual who was present when it was prepared; (3) identify each individual to whom a 
copy was sent; ( 4) identify each individual who has seen it; (5) identify each individual who has 
custody of it; (6) identify each and every document which refers to, discusses, analyzes or 
comments upon it, in whole or in part, or which contain any or all of its contents; and (7) state 
the nature of the privilege asserted, (i.e., attorney-client, work-product, etc.). 
The document requests set forth below are intended to be continuing in nature and to 
require the addition of supplemental information and documents in the future to llie follest extent 
provided by Rule 26( e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. If, after responding to the 
requests for documents, you acquire any information respective thereto, file and serve 
supplemental responses containing such information, as required by the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. This request for supplementation is also specifically a request pursuant to Idaho Rule 
of Civil Proc·edure 26( e ). 
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DEFINITIONS 
The following definitions shall apply to these discovery requests: 
1. "Plaintiff' means the above-named Plaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board 
("Board"). 
2. "Defendant" means the above-named Defendant, HJ Grathol, a California general 
partnership, its representatives, employees, agents, or other person(s) acting for or on behalf of 
HJ Grathol. 
3. "You," "your," or "yours," means the above.-named Defendant, HJ Grathol, its 
representatives, employees, agents, or other person(s) acting for or on behalf of HJ Grathol 
4. "Subject Property'' means the property owned by Defendant which is the subject of the 
present condemnation action. The "Subject Property" is more completely described in Plaintiff's 
Complaint. 
5. "Identify" when used with respect to a natural person requires that you provide the 
following information with respect to the person: 
a. Full name; 
b. Last known business address; 
c. Last known residence address; 
d. Last known business telephone number; 
e. Last known home telephone number and 
f. Name of employer or business with whom the person was associated and 
the person's title and position at the time relevant to the identification. 
6. "Identify" when used with respect to a person that is not a natural person means, to the 
extent applicable, to provide the same information required as though the entity were a natural 
person [see Definition 5(a) through S(f) above], and also provide the additional information 
regarding a description of the nature of the entity ( e.g., partnership, corporation, limited liability 
company, etc.). 
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7. "Identify" when used with respect to a document, item or thing means to provide the 
following information relating to such document, item or thing: 
a. A general description thereof; 
b. Date it was written or created; 
c. Name and present or last known address of the person or persons who 
wrote or created it; 
d. Name and present or last known address of the person to whom it was 
sent; 
e. Name and present address of the custodian thereof; and 
f. Whether you have a copy; duplicate, reproduction, photostat, photograph, 
sample or exemplar thereof. 
8. "Identify" when used with resp~ot to Appraisals and/or Appraisal Reports means to 
provide the following information relating to such document, item or thing: 
a. The name, address, and company of each appraiser; 
b. The date the appraiser was engaged and the date of each appraisal; 
c. The reason for the appraisal and who retained the appraiser to perform the 
appraisal; 
d. The fair market value of the entire property; 
e. The fair market value of the property being taken for the public project; 
f. The amount of damages to the remainder property caused by the taking; 
g. The methodology for computing the fair market value of the entire 
property, the property taken, and the damages to the remainde:r property; 
h. If a written appraisal report was made, the name and address of the 
custodian of the report; 
9. "Describe" shall mean to set forth all facts that exhaust your information, knowledge, and 
belief with respect to the subject matter of the discovery request. 
10. "Document" or "documents" shall mean the original, all copies and drafts of papers and 
writings of every kind, description ai.-id form, and all mechanical, magnetic media, and electronic 
recordings, records, writings and data of every kind, description and form, and all photographs of 
every kind, and including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following: 
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correspondence, notes, e-mails, memoranda, reports, notebooks, binders, drawings, studies, 
analyses, drafts, diaries, intra- or inter-office communications, memoranda, reports, canceled 
checks, minutes, bulletins, circulars, pamphlets, telegrams, typewritten and handwritten notes, 
letters, telegrams, instructions, work assignments, messages (including reports, notes and 
memoranda of telephone conversations and conferences), telephone statements, calendar and 
diary entries, desk calendars, appointment books, job or transaction files, books of account, 
ledgers, bank statements, promissory notes, invoices, charge slips, working papers, lab books, 
lab notes, lab journals or notebooks, evaluation or appraisal reports, pleadings, transcripts of 
testimony or other docwnents filed or prepared in connection with any court or agency or other 
proceeding, deeds, mortgages, deeds of trust, contracts, agreements, assignments, instrwnents, 
charges, opinions, official statements, prospectuses, appraisals, feasibility studies, trusts, releases 
of claims, charters, certificates, licenses, leases, invoices, computer printouts or programs, 
summaries, audio, video or sound recordings, cassette tapes, video recorded, electronic or laser 
recorded, or photographed information. Documents are to be taken as including all attachments, 
enclosures and other documents that are attached to, relate to or refer to such documents. 
The above definition of "Docun1ent" or ''Documents" shall also faclude any 
"Electronically Stored Information." 
11. "Electronically Stored Information;' means information made, maintained, retained, 
stored, or archived by computer or electronic means in any medium, including but not limited to 
word processing documents, email, email attachments, databases, spreadsheets, writings, 
drawings, graphs, photographs, sound recordings, images, data, and data compilations. 
Electronically Stored Information shall include prior versions or drafts of information, as defined 
above, as well as all attachments, and shall include information stored on personal digital 
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assistants, cell phones, smart phones, Blackberries, personal laptop computers, hard drives, 
portable hard drives, and other similar devices. 
12. The words "relate to" or "relating to" shall be deemed to mean and include the following 
terms: regards, describes, involves, compares, correlates, mentions, connected to, refers to, 
pertains to, contradicts, or compromises. 
13. The words "and" and "and/or'' and "or" shall each he deemed to refer to both their 
conjunctive and disjunctive meanings, being construed as necessary to bring within the scope of 
the discovery request all information and documents which would otherwise be construed as 
being outside the request. · 
14. The word "any" shall mean "each and every'' and "all" as well as "any one," and "all" 
shall mean "any and all." 
15. The term "date of take" shall mean November 19, 2010, the date the initial Complaint 
and Summons in this matter was filed. 
INTERROGATORIES 
Interrov;atorv No. 1: Please identify each person whom you expect to call as a lay or 
expert witness at t.lie trial of this matter and the subject matter upon which each witness is 
expected to testify. 
Interrogatory No. 2: For each expert witness identified in response to Interrogatory 
No. 1, please provide the subject matter upon which the expert witness is expected to testify, a 
complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the reasons therefore, the 
substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions, the underlying 
facts and data upon which those opinions are based, and all information referenced in and 
required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Interrogatory No. 3: (Just Compensation) Please identify the amount of just 
compensation which you will advocate at trial that Defendant is entitled to as a result of the 
taking of a portion the Subject Property and the basis for the amount of just compensation to 
which you believe Defendant is entitled. Do not simply reference an appraisal report, which may 
or may not be relied upon and which may be subject to change. 
Interrogatory No. 4: (Just Compensation) Please state and identify each and every 
fact, and describe each and every document, which supports your opinion of the amount of just 
compensation that Defendant is entitled to as a result of the taking of a portion the Subject 
Property. Include in.your answer each and every fact and document that describes, shows, or 
evidences each aspect of just compensation which you believe Defendant is entitled. 
Interrogatory No. 5: (Opinion of fair market value-Before Take) Please state and 
identify your opinion of the fair market value of the Subject Property before the taking of a 
portion of the Subject Property as of the "date of take" as that term is defined herein. 
Interrogatory No. 6: (Opinion of fair market value -After Take) Please state and 
identify your opinion of the fair market value of the Subject Property after the taking of a portion 
oft.he Subject Property as oft.lie "date of take" as t.11at term is defined herein. 
Interrogatory No. 7: (Severance Damages) Please identify and state any witnesses' 
opinion, including your own opinion, as to whether any severance damage will result from the 
taking of a portion of the Subject Property by Plaintiff. If the response is ''yes", describe the 
amount of severance damages, the method used to calculate the amount of damages, and all facts 
and documents used or relied upon, including the comparable sales used or relied upon, as a 
basis for that opinion. 
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Interrogatory No. 8: (Purchase of Subject Property) Please identify the date you 
purchased the Subject Property, including any businesses located on the Subject Property and 
state the total amount paid for the Subject Property and identify the specific amounts paid for the 
real property, the buildings, the assets and all businesses located on the Subject Property. 
Include in your answer any all special terms or conditions related to your purchase of the Subject 
Property. 
Interrogatory No. 9: (Appraisals) Please state whether the Subject Property or any 
portion thereof, including any business located on the Subject Property has been appraised by 
you or on yom: behalf within the last five ( 5) years, and if so, please identify ( as defined above) 
each appraisal. 
Interrogatory No.10: (Income) Have you received any income from your interest in 
the Subject Property or any part thereof during the five (5) years preceding the taking? If so, 
please state the following: 
a The amount of annual income received; 
b. Every source of income for each year; 
c. The amount received each year from each source of income. 
Interrogatory No. ll: (Project Enhancement/Project Influence) Please.state whether in 
your opinion or the opinion of your expert(s), the Subject Property has experienced project 
enhancement or project influence ( also referred to as project blight), and if so, please provide a 
full explanation of the opinion and a full statement of how you and/or the expert(s) reached his 
or her conclusion and all facts, information and data used or relied upon to support t.1-iat 
conclusion. 
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Interrogatory No. 12: (Leases) As of the "date of take," were any third persons or 
entities asserting an interest in and to the Subject Property pursuant to a lease, claim, lien, 
adverse possession, prescriptive use, or other interest? If so, please list and identify ( as defined 
above) each and every lease, claim, lien, adverse possession, prescriptive use, or other interest. 
Interrogatory No. 13: (Applications for Development or Improvements) As of the 
"date of take" or during the five (5) year period immediately prior thereto, had you or any third 
party applied to the applic~ble planning and zoning department for the development or 
improvement of all or a portion of the Subject Property, zoning change, or a construction permit 
on the Subject Property? If so, please list and identify. (as defined above) each and every 
application. Include in your answer the identity of any entity or person retained or employed by 
your for the purpose of assisting in the development or improvement of the Subject Property. 
Interrogatory No. 14: (Offers to Purchase or Sell) As of the "date of take," and for the 
five (5) years immediately prior thereto, did you receive any offers to purchase or make any 
offers to sell all or a portion of the Subject Property? If so, please list and identify (as defined 
above) each and every offer to purchase or sell. 
Interrogatory No. 15: (Environmental Conta..miri..ation) As of the "date of take,'' were 
you aware of any previous environmental or hazardous wastes, including but not limited to 
asbestos, lead paint, underground storage tanks, or water contamination or damage that was 
present or had occurred under, on, or over the Subject Property? If so, please state and identify 
the nature and extent of such contamination or damage, when the contamination or damage 
occurred, whether any remediation or curative efforts have been made, a.rid whether the 
contamination or damage has been eradicated. 
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Interrogatory No. 16: (Hughes Investment) Please describe your relationship, if any, to 
Hughes Investments. Include in your response the identify of any and all officers, managers or 
other directors who are common to both you and Hughes Investments. Please also include any 
involvement you have or may have had in Hughes Investments applications for zoning changes, 
annexation into the city of Athol, development or other proposed improvements to the Subject 
Property. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Request for Production No. 1: Please produce all documents identified, used, 
referenced or relied upon in responding to the interrogatories above. 
Request for Production No. 2: Please produce the curriculum vitae or resume for each 
and every expert consulted by you in reference to this action, including Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b )( 4 )(A) experts. 
Request for Production No. 3: Please produce. copies of all documents relied upon by 
any witness expected to be called at trial as an expert which concerns or reflects any opinion 
relating to the Subject Property. 
Request for Production No. 4: Please produce any and all appraisal reports, written 
estimates, or market studies relating in any way to the issues in this case, or any other document 
that reflects an opinion relating to the Subject Property, including but not limited to, the appraisal 
reports, written estimates, market studies or market analyses of each appraiser or valuation 
witness that you intend to call to testify as an expert witness at the trial of this matter. 
Request for Production No. 5: For each appraiser and valuation witness you intend to 
call to testify as an expert witness at the trial of this matter, please produce copies of all appraisal 
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reports prepared by and/or signed by the appraiser of properties located within a ten-mile radius 
of the Subject Property which have a date of valuation within the last five (5) years. 
Request for Production No. 6: Please produce copies of all documents, objects or 
things intended to be introduced, offered or utilized by you as an exhibit at the trial of this 
matter, including but not limited to all maps, drawings, photographs, video tapes, deeds or other 
documents. If final exhibits have not been completed, please attach drafts, if available. 
Request for Production No. 7: Please produce copies of all witness statements which 
relate in any way to the issues in this case, including but not limited to, the reports, analysis, 
documentation, assessments or valuations of each appraiser or valuation witness that Defendant 
intends to call to testify as an expert witness at the triai of this matter. 
Request for Production No. 8: Please produce copies of all documents, 
correspondence, and Electronically Stored Information created, produced, received or sent by 
you within the last five (5) years which relate in any way to the value of the Subject Property 
and/or any business operated on the Subject Property. 
Request for Production No. 9: Please produce a copy of any and all compensation or 
employment agreements between you and any expert retained by you, includi..r1g but not limited 
to any expert retained by you to appraise or analyze the Subject Property ( or any aspect or 
portion thereof). 
Request for Production No. 10: Please produce copies of any and all documents, 
correspondence, communications, notes, and Electronically Stored Information between you and 
any expert retained by you in relation to the present lawsuit and/or the ta.king of a portion of the 
Subject Property by Plaintiff. 
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Request for Production No. 11: Please produce copies of any and all documents, 
correspondence, communications, notes, and Electronically Stored Information between you and 
Plaintiff in relation to the present lawsuit and/or the taking of a portion of the Subject Property 
by Plaintiff. 
Request for Production No. 12: Please produce copies of any and all documents, 
correspondence, communications, notes, and Electronically Stored Information between you and 
any governmental entity, other than Plaintiff, (such as the City of Athol, Kootenai Cowity, and 
the Lakes Highway District or any other applicable entity) in relation to Subject Property~ the 
present lawsuit and/or the taking ofa portion of the Subject Property by Plaintiff. This document 
request shall relate to all such documents for a period of five (5) years prior to the "date of take" 
and up to the present." 
Request for Production No. 13: (Loan and Other Documents) Please produce a copy 
of each and every financial statement, loan application, or other document on which a value of 
the Subject Property has been set forth during the last five (5) years. 
Request for Production No.14: (Purchase Documents) Please produce a copy of all 
documents relatiflg to your purchase of the Subject Property. 
Request for Production No. 15: (Leases) Please produce a copy of all leases, rental 
agreements, and other documents relating to rents, lease payments, or other consideration paid 
for occupancy or access to all or any portion of the Subject Property. This document request 
shall relate to all such documents for a period of five (5) years prior to the "date of take" and up 
to the present. 
Request for Production No. 16: (Applications for Development or Improvement) 
Please produce each and every application for development, improvement, rezoning, annexation, 
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or construction on the Subject Property filed, submitted or pending during the period of five (5) 
years prior to "date of take" and continuing up to the present date. 
Request for Production No. 17: (Litigation or Claims) Please produce a copy of all 
pleadings, claims, or demands relating to recorded or unrecorded interests, easements, 
descriptive uses, adverse possession, liens, or other rights in and to the Subject Property as of the 
''date of take," and for the period five (5) years immediately prior thereto up to the present date. 
Request for Production No. 18: (Unrecorded Liens or Interests and Restrictive 
Covenants) Please produce a copy of all unrecorded liens, interests, claims, easements, 
restrictive covenants, or other burdens upon the Subject Property as of the "date of take" and for 
the period five (5) years immediately prior thereto up to the present date. 
Request for Production No. 19: (Environmental Documents) Please produce a copy of 
each and every document relating in any way to environmental contamination, hazardous waste 
contamination, water contamination, asbestos, lead paint, underground storage tanks, or 
petroleum contamination upon the Subject Property during the period five (5) years immediately 
prior to the "date of take" up to the present date. 
Reouest for Production No. 20: (Surveys) Please produce a copy of all recorded and 
unrecorded surveys that have been performed upon the Subject Property, and, if more than one 
survey has been performed, please produce the most recently performed recorded survey. 
Request for Production No. 21: (Water, Sewer and Utilities) Please produce a copy of 
any and all documents related to any application to provide the Subject Property with water, 
sewer or any other utilities. Please include in your response any documents related to the current 
availability of water, sewer or other utilities on the Subject Property. 
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Request for Production No. 22: Please produce any and all documents and 
correspondence related to any and all entities or persons employed or retained to assist in the 
development or development planning of the Subject Property. 
DATED this 2nd day of February, 2011. 
Deputy Atta ey Ge ' 
Idaho Tr ' sportation Department 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of February, 2011, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grat ho! 
4958313_1.00C 
~ U.S.Mail 
D Hand Delivered 
D Fax 
D E-mail 
D Overnight UPS 
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Doug Marfice [dmarfice@ramsdenlyons.com] 
Tuesday, March 22, 2011 2:21 PM 
To: Mary York 
Subject: RE: ITD v HJ Grathol 
Mary; 
Page 1 of 4 
Thank you for your courtesies. I will certainly have you the discovery by April 5 and will try to get it to you sooner. 
I think we're on the same page now re: wood cutting/salvage operations. Sorry for the confusion on that. The 
tenant who uses the property to stage, cut and store firewood (my understanding is that he brings in wood to cut 
and doesn't harvest anything onsite) has been notified of the need to vacate by May 1. We don't anticipate any 
problems there. The other (unrelated) individual (whose name escapes me at the moment) is simply a free-lance 
logger looking to salvage merchantable timber. I think he's been contacting multiple property owners along 95. I 
assumed that ITD would probably prefer to not have to deal with that part of the work itself, but since the property 
is no longer our client's, I wanted to be sure it was ok to let this fellow go to work. 
Douglas S. Marfice 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 664-5818 - phone 
(208) 664-5884 - fax 
www.ramsdenlyons.com 
This e-mail is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and contains information belonging to Ramsden & Lyons, LLP which is confidential and/or legally privileged. If you are 
not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or taking of any action in reliance on the contents of this e-mail information is strictly 
prohibited. If you have received the e-mail in error, please immediately notify the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message. 
From: Mary York [mailto:MYork@hollandhart.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 201112:19 PM 
To: 'Doug Marfice' 
Cc: Ted Tollefson 
Subject: RE: ITD V HJ Grathol 
Doug, 
Thank you for the follow up. Our letter requested that you get us the discovery responses by March 25th. If that 
is not going to work, can you get us the responses by April 5th. 
On the salvage issue, I talked to Chris about the issue at the beginning of February and told him that ITD was 
agreeable to permitting your client (or its agents) conduct salvage operations and/or wood cutting operations on 
the property. I sent him an email on the issue on Feb. 7th, which I also cdd to you. That email, as well as his 
email to me is below. When Chris raised the issue, I had originally thought that his reference to a "wood cutting 
operation" meant the wood salvage operation that you raised during our negotiations for possession. With that 
thought in mind, I had obtained approval from ITD for those operations to go forward. He then clarified that he 
meant a wood cutting operation, as opposed to salvage operation. And again, ITD okayed that operation as well. 
In addition to our emails, we also talked about the issue by phone on Feb. 11th where i reconfirmed that iTD did 
not have a problem with either of these operations on the property. 
BUT - the important caveat on these operations (as I noted in my email to Chris below) is that the operations may 
continue only until May 1st - by which time all operations must cease and the property must be cleared. On May 
2nd the property must be cleared and ITD must have an unobstructed right-of-way. I will reiterate that any 
property, equipment, etc. that remains on the property as of May 2nd will become property of ITD and will be 
· cleared. 





Mary V. York 
Holland & Hart LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Building 
101 S. Capitol Blvd. 
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CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This message is confidential and may be privileged. If you believe that this email has been sent to you in 
error, please reply to the sender that you received the message in error; then please delete this e-mail. Thank you. 
Disclaimer of Electronic Transaction: This communication does not reflect an intention by the sender or the sender's client to conduct a 
transaction or make any agreement by electronic means. Nothing contained herein shall constitute an electronic signature or a contract 
under any law, rule or regulation applicable to electronic transactions. 
Here is the prior email: 
From: Mary York 
Sent: Monday, February 07, 20111:04 PM 
To: 'Chris Gabbert' 
Cc: 'Shannon James'; 'Doug Marfice'; 'Tim Thomas' 
Subject: RE: ITD v. Grathol 
Chris, 
Page 2 of 4 
I followed up with my client and was advised that they will permit the use of the property by the woodcutting 
operation you reference below until May 1, 2011. On May 2nd, the operations will need to be terminated and 
removed from the property. ITD needs to have a clear right-of-way by that date. Any property, equipment, etc. 
remaining on the property as of May 2nd will become the property of ITD. 
Next, in response to your proposed stipulation, the language looks good except we need to have included in the 
stipulation the requirement that the written undertaking be "executed by two (2) or more sufficient sureties" and 
that they will be bound to ITD for the payment of the sums to the extent that the amount withdrawn exceeds the 
amount of the final award. (IC§ 7-721 (7)). I can make the changes from this end if you prefer. 
And finally, I've attached a proposed stipulation for scheduling order for your review. Please let me know if it 
looks acceptable, and if so, please sign and return and I can coordinate filing the stipulation. 
Please feel free to call if you have any questions or would like to discuss these issues in more detail. 
Regards, 
MVY 
Mary V. York 
Holland & Hart LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Building 
101 s. Capitol Blvd. 
Boise, ID 83702 
Phone (208) 342-5000 
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error, please reply to the sender that you received the message in error; then please delete this e-mail. Thank you. 
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Disclaimer of Electronic Transaction: This communication does not reflect an intention by the sender or the sender's client to conduct a 
transaction or make any agreement by electronic means. Nothing contained herein shall constitute an electronic signature or a contract 
under any law, rule or regulation applicable to electronic transactions. 
From: Chris Gabbert [mailto:cgabbert@ramsdenlyons.com] 
Sent: Friday, February 04, 201110:56 AM 
To: Mary York 
Cc: Shannon James; Doug Marfice 
Subject: ITD v. Grathol 
Dear Mary, 
In follow up to our telephone conversation last week, attached please find a draft stipulation for 
release of the funds to be deposited with the Court. You indicated that ITD will be depositing the funds 
directly with the Court, per the order and is willing to stipulate to the withdrawal. Please review this 
draft stipulation and let me know if it is acceptable. 
Additionally, have you received a response from your client as to the use of the property by the 
woodcutting operation after possession is taken? 
Sincerely, 
Christopher D. Gabbert 
Attorney 
Ramsden&· Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Boulevard 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
www.ramsdenlyons.com 
This e-mail is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and contains information belonging to Ramsden & Lyons, which is 
confidential and/or legally privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, 
copying, distribution or taking of any action in reliance on the contents of this e-mail information is strictly prohibited. If 
you have received this e-mail in error, please immediately notify the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the 
original message. 
From: Doug Marfice [mailto:dmarfice@ramsdenlyons.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 201111:12 AM 
To: Mary York 
Subject: ITD v HJ Grathol 
3/23/2011 
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Mary; 
I wanted to let you know that I'm working on the discovery responses in the above matter, but it's just taking me 
longer than it should. I'll do my best to get those to you as soon as I can. I apologize for the delay. 
On an unrelated note, we had some dialogue previously about the salvage timber on the area of the property 
involved in the take. There's an entrepreneurial gentlemen who has been soliciting property owners, including 
Hughes, for the right to harvest timber off the right of way properties. Can you advise whether ITD would have any 
objection to our clients allowing this? I don't think there is much timber value there, but I haven't heard one way or 
the other. Thank you. 
Douglas S. Ma,fice 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 664-5818 - phone 
(208) 664-5884 - fax 
www.ramsdenlyons.com 
This e•mail is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and contains information belonging to Ramsden & Lyons, LLP which is confidential and/or legally privileged. If you are 
not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or taking of any action in reliance on the contents of this e-mail information is strictly 




VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 814 
Re: ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al. 
April 13, 2011 
First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County 
Case No. CVl0-10095 
Dear Doug: 
MaryV. York 
Phone (208) 342-5000 
Fax (208) 343-8869 
myork@hollandhart.com 
I am writing in another effort to "meet and confer" to try to resolve the failure 
of your client to respond to ITD 's discovery requests served on February 2, 2011 ~ 
Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 6(e)(l), 33 and 34, the responses and any 
· objections to the requests were due March 7th. After your discovery responses were 
not forthcoming, we discussed the issue with you. On March 22nd you sent us an 
email apologizing for the delay in providing us with discovery responses. I responded 
the same day and informed you that if you could not get us discovery responses by 
Margh25th, then. w~ wo:µld a99~pt di$cov~i-y l::espo11$es by April 5th. 
It is now April 13, 2011 and we still have not received any discovery responses 
from your client. Under the circumstances, we are forced into the position of preparing 
a motion to compel. We will file the motion and notice of hearing this Friday, 
April 15th, unless we receive full and complete responses before then. 
Given the failure to respond wlthin the time required, all objections to the 
discovery have been waived. Therefore, if we receive responses by Friday but 
objections to the discovery are posed, we will proceed with the motion. Also, given the 
substantial delay in answering the discovery, if the responses are incomplete or evasive, 
we will proceed with the motion. 
EXHIBIT 
I C 
Holland & Hart LLP 
Phone [208] 342-5000 Fax [208] 343-8869 www.hollandhart.com 
101 South Capitol Boulevard Suite 1400 Boise, ID 83702 Mailing Address P.O. Box 2527 Boise, ID 83701-2527 
Aspen Boulder Carson City Colorado Springs Denver Denver Tech Center Billings Boise Cheyenne Jackson Hole Las Vegas Reno Salt Lake City Santa Fe Washington, D.C. o 
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Apr. 15. 2011 12:32PM 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-:5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attomeys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
No. 2502 P. 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICl' OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR 1HE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




ID GRAIBOL, a California general 
partnership; SIBRLING SAVINGS BANK, a 
Washington coxporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants. 
TO: THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PLAINTIFF 
Case No.-CV-10_-10095 
DEFENDANTHJGRATHOVS 
ANSWERS.AND RESPONSES TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
JNTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
OF DOCU1\1ENTS 
COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol and hereby responds to Plaintiff's First Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents as follows: 
INTERROGATORIES 
Interrogatozy No. 1: Please identify each person whom you expect to call as a lay or 
ex.pert witness at the trial of this matter and the subject matter upon which each witness is 
jjii!jiiiiliilllll--~ 
expected to testify, 
EXHIBIT 
. DEF1™DANT HJ GRATHOL'S ANSWERS AND RBSPONSBS to PLAINTIFF'S Fmsr SET OF INTBlUlOOATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 1 
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ANSWER: Defendant has not yet detennined with certainty who they may call as 
either expert or lay witness in this matter. Discovery is ongoing and any or all of the 
individuals identified through discovery who possess relevant information may be called. 
The substance of all expected trial testimony will be developed during the course of 
discovery in this case. However, it is anticipated that Defendant may call any of the 
following individuals as trial witnesses and those witnesses may testify as to facts known and 
opinions held, as generally summarized below: 
(1) Bill Hughes 
(2) Alan Johnson 
(3) GeoffReeslund 
These persons may give testimony as to the acquisition, ownership and development 
plans for the Subject :Property; opinion testimony as to its use(s), its value (before and after 
the condemnation), the value of the Defendant's property remaining after condemnation and 
before and after construction, and entitlement/construction planning activities; efforts and 
expenses associated with the purchase, holdi.-r1g and development of the propert-J; planning 
and design work associated with the property; marketing efforts of the property prior to and 
after condemnation; and the effects of the condemnation on the remaining property. 
(4) Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood 
{5) Ed Morse 
(6) Dee Jamison 
(7) Scott Taylor 
(8) Brent Heleker 
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S ANSWERS AND lIBSPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SBT OF INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUE.S18 FOR PRODUCTION OF .DOCUMENTS • 2 
170 of 1617
Apr. 15. 2011 12:32PM No. 2502 P. 4 
These persons may give testimony, including opinion testimony as to the value of the 
Subject Property, pre-condemnation and post-condemnation, including impacts to the value 
occasioned by this condemnation, and other matters within their knowledge or expertise. 
(9) Ron Harvey, Idaho Transportation Department 
(10) Yvonne Dingman, Idaho Transportation Department 
(11) Karl Vogt, counsel, Idaho Transportation Department 
These individuals may be called to testify as to their .knowledge, infonnation, and 
actions relative to seeking acquisition of a portion of Defendant's property. 
(12) Darrell Manning, Chairman, Idaho Transportation Board 
(13) James Coleman, Member, Idaho Transportation Board 
(14) Janice Vassar, Member, Idaho Transportation Board 
(15) Jerry Whitehead, Member, Idaho Transportation Board 
(16) Gary Blick, Member, Idaho Transportation Board 
(17) Nejl Miller, Member, Idaho Transportation Board 
(18) Lee Gagner. Member, I~lio Transpor..ation Board 
(19) Sue Higgins, Secretary Idaho Transportation Board 
(20) Brian W. Ness, Director, Idaho Transportation Department 
(21) Pam Lowe, former Director, Idaho Transportation Department 
(22) Jesse W. Smith, Jr., Right of Way Manager, Idaho Transportation Department 
These individuals. or some of them, may be called to testify as to their knowledge, 
information and actions relative to approval of the project which precipitated the need to 
condemn Defendant's property; future plans for construction of the US 95 improvements 
through and adjacent to Defendant's property and other matters within their knowledge. 
DEFENDANf HJ GMTIIOL' S ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIR.ST SET OP JNrekR.OGATORIES AND 
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James Coleman, named above, may also testify on behalf of Coleman Engineering regarding 
the planning, design, and function of a proposed on-site sewage system and related 
infrastructure serving Defendant's property. 
(23) Tom E, Cole, Chief Engineer, Idaho Transportation Department 
(24) Tamara R. Jauregui, Management Assistant, Idaho Transportation Department 
(25) Duane L. Zimmennan, P .L.S 
(26} Jason Minzghor, Idaho Transportation Department 
(27) Justin Wuest, Idaho Transportation Department 
{28) Jerry Wilson, P~E., Idaho Transportation Department 
These individuals, or some of them, may be called to testify as to their knowledge, 
infonnation and actions relative to the design and construction of the highway improvements 
across and adjacent to Defendant's property. 
(29) Ross Blanchard, Federal Highway Administration, Idaho Division 
{30} Rod Twete, Commissioner. Lakes Highway District 
rin Monty MontgnmeMT rn ......... h,s;one .. T - 1~ .... u ..... Il"''"'"D1S0 tr!~f-\.-4J 4 ~ ~· ... ..u v ... •J, ................ ~ .. .I. .. , ....,un,.,., .L.UE,4 ,¥T<A.J J.\,,I,, 
{32) Marv Lekstrum, Commissioner, Lakes Highway District 
(33) Joe Wuest, Road Supervisor, Lakes Highway District 
{34) Eric W. Shanley, P.E., Lakes Highway District 
These individuals may be called to testify as to communications and interactions with 
the Idaho Transportation Department relative to acquisition and/or improvements of frontage 
road(s) and access on State Highway 54 in the vicinity of Defendant's property and the 
necessity, plan or expectations of bisecting Defendant's property with a frontage road. 
(35) David Evans and Associates, Inc,, including Greg Holder, P.E., Michael Kosa, 
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and/or Bill Stark. 
Defendant reserves the right to supplement this response in accordance with the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court's Pretrial Order. 
Interrogatory No. 2: For each expert witness identified in response to Interrogatory 
No. 1, please provide the subject matter upon which the expert witness is expected to testify, 
a complete statement of all opinions to_ be expressed by the expert and the reasons therefore, · 
the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions, the 
underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based, and all information 
referenced in and required by Rule 26(b )( 4 )(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ANSWER: Defendant anticipates offering expert opinion testimony in this matter, 
including testimony concerning the plan, design and engineering of portions of the Plaintiffs 
project across or adjacent to Defendant's property, as well as testimony concerning valuation 
of the property. Th~ witnesses offering opinion testimony as actor-viewers may include the 
following: 
fl\ Bill Hughes V·J 
(2) Alan Johnson 
(3) Geo.ffReeslund 
(4) Scott Taylor 
(5) Brent Heleker 
(6) John Beutler 
(7) Mark Johnson 
(8) JeffBond 
(9) Donald Smock 
DEPENDANT HJ GRATIIOL'S ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIR.ST SET OFINTBRROGATORlES AND 
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(10) PaulDaugharty 
(11) Brett Terrell 
(12) Mike Winger 
No. 2502 P. 7 
As an actor/viewer "expertt Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover the testimony of such 
persons. See, U.S.C.A., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1970 
Amendment at 114 (West 1995). 
{1) Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, CGA 
(2) Ed Morse, MAI 
With respect to these valuation experts, as of the date of the Answers to these 
futerrogatories, no formal appraisal reports have been completed. Therefore. the remainder 
of the infonnation requested in this Interrogatory cannot be provided. If and when formal 
appraisal reports are prepared, the infonnation in the above Interrogatory will be contained 
within those appraisal reports. 
Interrogat01y No. 3: (Just Compensation) Please identify the amount of just 
compensation which you will advocate at trial that Defendant is entitled to as a result of the 
taking of a portion the Subject Property and the basis for the amount of just compensation to 
which you believe Defendant is entitle~. Do not simply reference an appraisal reportJ which 
may or may not be relied upon and which may be subject to change. 
ANSWER: Defendant does not know at this time the precise amount of just 
compensation which will be advocated at trial, Defendant may offer a value assessment at 
the trial in this matter including, but not necessarily limited to, the Defendant's past and 
intended future use and development of the properly as well as the opinions derived from 
comparative market analysis undertaken by the Defendant for purposes of valuing the Subject 
DEFENDANT HJ GRATIIOL'S ANSWERS J\ND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND 
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Property, The basis of computation of the Defendantls opinion of the value of the Subject 
, 
Property is s.et forth gene.rally in the letter of Jwie 28, 2010 directed to Ron Harvey at ITD 
and the letter of October 27, 2010 directed to Mary York, Holland and Hart. 
Interrogatory No. 4: (Just Compensation) Please state and identify each and every 
fact, and describe each and every document., which supports your opinion of the amount of 
just compensation that Defendant is entitled to as a result of the trucing of a portion the 
Subject Property. Include in your answer each and every fact and document that describes, 
shows, or evidences each aspect of just compensation which you believe Defendant is 
entitled. 
ANSWER: This Interrogatory, as phrased., is overbroad, ambiguous and unreasonably 
burdensome. Further~ as phrased it seeks matters that are subject to attorney-client privilege, 
attorney work product doctrine, and otherwise not discoverable under Idaho Rule of Civll 
:Procedure 26(b ). Notwithstanding this, Defendant does not know at this time the precise 
amount of just compensation which will be advocated at trial as discovery and evaluation is 
still underway. However, it is anticipated that Defendant ~ill offer value opinions based 
upon more appropriate comparable property sales which will establish a value of the portion 
'• 
condemned in a range of .$3.00 to $5,00 per square foot for the part taken and severance 
damages for the remainder. Among the facts supporting this valuation are the comparable 
property sales described in the letter of October 27, 2010 directed to Mary York. 
Interrogatozy No. 5: (Opinion of fair market value - Before Take) Please state and 
identify your opinion of the fair market value of the Subject Property before the talcing of a 
portion of the Subject Property as of the "date oftake'1 as that tennis defined herein. 
ANSWER: It is Defendantis opinion that the fair market value of the Subject 
DEFBNDANI' HJ OM.THOL'S ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAJNTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTRRROOATORJES AND 
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Property being taken before the talce, was not less than $1,420,000.00 -up to approximately 
$3,500,000.00 in its high.est and best use. The basis of computation of the Defendant's 
opinion of the value of the Subject Property is set forth generally in the letter of June 28, 
2010 directed to Ron Harvey at ITD and the letter of October 27, 2010 directed to Mary 
Yorlc. 
Interrogatozy No 6: (Opinion of fair market value - After Take) Please state and 
identify your opinion of the fair market value of the Subject Property after the taking of a 
portion of the Subject Property as of ihe "date of take" as that term is defined herein. 
ANSWER: This Interrogatory, as phrased, is vague and ambiguous. Further, the 
question as phrased seeks matters that are potentially subject to attorney-client privilege, 
attorney work product, and the privileges afforded under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b ). Notwithstanding this, Defendant does not know at this time the value of the property 
after the take because of the ongoing uncertainty as to time of construction, completion of 
construction and ancillary severance damages occasioned by the construction and by project 
influence/stigma. 
Interrogatory No. 7: (Severance Damages) Please identify and state any witnesses' 
opinion, including your own opinion1 as to whether any severance damage will result from 
the taking of a portion of the Subject Property by Plaintiff, If the response is ''yes'') describe 
the amount of severance damages, the method used to calculate the amount of damages, and 
all facts and documents used or relied upon1 including the comparable sales used or relied 
upon, as a basis for that opinion. 
ANSWER: Yes, Defendant believes severance damages wlll result. Defendant does 
not know at this time the precise amount of severance damage it will suffer by reason of 
DEFENDANT HJ ORATIIOL'S ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERllOGATORIBS AND 
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Plaintiff's actions in this matter nor is it possible to articulate "all facts and documents" used 
to calculate Defendant's view of severance damages. Discovery and evaluation in this matter 
is ongoing and all facts supporting severance damages may not be fully known until after the 
project is completed or at least construction is initiated. 
Interrogatm.y No. 8: (Purchase of Subject Property) Please identify the date you 
purchased the Subject Property, including any businesses located on the Subject Property and 
state the total amount paid for the Subject Properly and identify the specific amounts paid for 
the real property, the buildings, ·the assets and all businesses located on the Subject Property. 
Include in your answer any all special tenns or conditions related to your purchase of the 
Subject Property, 
ANSWER: Plaintiff already has the information requested in this Interrogatory as it 
was included in Plaintiff's own appraisal data and acquisition packet. Defendant9s acquired 
the Subject Property in a distress sale circumstance in 2008 for the total purchase price of 
$1,450,000.00. Defendant does not know what is referred to as "any all special terms or 
conditio.ns ... n and as such car.not mear.ingf.tlly ~mswer this portion oft.1i~ Interrogatory. 
Interrogatory No, 9: (Appraisals) Please state whether the Subject Property or any 
portion thereof, including any business located on the Subject Property has been appraised by 
you or on your behalf within the last five (5) years, and if so, please identify (as defined 
above) each. appraisal. 
ANSWER: Yes, Defendant has evaluated the property value on its own behalf and 
with the assistance of consultants, including licensed real estate broker(s), certified, general 
appraiser(s), and land use planner(s)/consultant(s). 
Interrogatory No. 10: (Income) Have you received any income from your interest in 
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S ANSWERS AND RESPONSES 10 PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF IN1ERROOATORIES AND 
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the Subject Property or any part thereof during the five (5) years preceding the taking? If so, 
please state the following: 
a, The amount of annual income received; 
b. Every source of income for each year; 
c. The ammmt received each year from each source of income. 
ANSWER: A portion of the property has been leased on an annual basis to Shane 
Smith d/b/a Blacksmith Farms since its .acquisition. The rent derived from that use of the 
. . 
property is .$400.00 per month or $4,800.00 per year. 
Interrogatozy No. 11: (Project Enhancement/Project Influence) Please state whether 
in your opinion or the opinion of your expert(s), the Subject Property has experienced project 
enhancement or project influence {also referred to as project blight), and if so, please provide 
a full explanation of the opinion and a full statement of how you and/or the expert( s) reached 
his or her conclusion and all facts, infonna.tion and data used or relied upon to support that 
conclusion. 
ANS\VER! It is Defendant's opinion that the Subject Property has nqt experienced 
and will not experience project enhancement. It is Defendant's opinion that the Subject 
:Property has suffered "project influence" or "blight'' as those tenns are commonly used. 
Defendant does not fully know at this time the amount of damage it has suffered by reason of 
project influence or project blight and it is not possible to fully assess that element of damage 
until the project has been completed or to even make an educated estimate until construction 
is at least commenced and a completion date can be calculated. 
Interrogatory No. 12: (Leases) As of the "date of take," were any third persons or 
entities asserting an interest in and to the Subject Property pursuant to a lease, claim, lien, 
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adverse possession, prescriptive use, or other interest? If so, please list and identify (as 
defined above) each and every lease, claim, lien, adverse possession, prescriptive use~ or 
other interest. 
ANSWER: Yes, Black Smith Fanns leased a portion of the property on a month-to-
month basis since its acquisition . . See, Response to Interrogatory No. 10, above. 
Interrogatory No. 13: (Applications for Development or Improvements) As of the 
"date of take,, or during the five (5) year period immediately prior thereto, had you or any 
third party applied to the applicable planning and zoning department for the development oi-
improvement of all or a portion of the Subject Property, zoning change, or a construction 
permit on the Subject Property? If so, please list and identify (as defined above) each and 
every application. Include in your answer the identity of any entity or person retained or 
employed by your for the purpose of assisting in the development or improvement of the 
Subject Property. 
ANSWER: Subsequent to acquiring the Subject Property in 2008, Defendant, through 
-
its development agent> applied to Kootenai County to rezone the property from "Ruraj" to the 
"Commercial" zone classification. The rezone was approved on or about November 20, 
2008. Geoff Reeslund has been employed and retained to assist in the development and 
improvement of the Subject Property, including application and submittals for zone change 
and proposed subdivision of the property. 
Defendant has also retained Coleman Engineering for professional services in the 
design and development of sewer and wastewater treatment system to serve the Subject 
Property and its anticipated development buyers/tenants. Defendant has also contracted with 
and retained CLC Associates, Inc. as land use planners and architects to assist in the 
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development of plans, schematics, and uses of the Subject Property. Defendant has also 
contracted with and retained Intermountain Transportation Solutions to assist in analysis of 
development plans and to conduct a Traffic Impact Study in order to facilitate development 
proposals for the Subject Property. Defendant has also contracted with and retained Allwest 
Testing & Engineering, LLC as project geotechnical engineers to analyze the soils and gravel 
of the Subject Property for development feasibility study purposes. 
Interrogatory No. 14: (Offers to Purchase or Sell) As of the ndate of take," and for the 
five (5) years immediately prior thereto, did you receive any offers to purchase or make any 
offers to sell all or a portion of the Subject Property? If sol please list and identify ( as defined 
above) each and every offer to purchase or sell. 
. ANSWER: Yes. Defendant has actively marketed the property to prospective "end 
users,>' both purchasers and tenants, to ascertain highest and best use options for development 
of the property both with and without the anticipated project influences. No fonnal 
purchase/sale offers have been memorialized. 
Interrogatory No. 15: (Environmental Contamination) As of the "date oftake,u w~re 
you aware of any previous environmental or hazardous wastes, including but not limited to 
asbestos, lead paint, underground storage tanks, or water contamination or damage that was 
present or had occurred under, on, or over the Subject Property? If so, please state and 
identify the nature and extent of such contamination or damage, when the contamination or 
damage occurred, whether any remediation or curative efforts have been made, and whether 
the contamination or damage has been eradicated. 
ANSWER: Please see, Defendant's Phase I Environmental Site Assessment (April 
14, 2008) and the Phase II Assessment Correction Completion Certificate (May 6, 2008), 
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copies of which are available for inspection and/or copying to Plaintiff and/or its agents 
during regular business hours, upon reasonable request. 
lnterrogatozy No. 16: (Hughes Investment) Please describe your relationship, if any, 
to Hughes Investments. Include in your response the identity of any and all officers, 
managers or other directors who are common to both you and Hughes Investments. Please 
also include any involvement you have or may have had in Hughes Investments applications 
for zoning changes, annexation into the city of· Athol, development or other proposed 
improvements to the Subject Property. 
ANSWER: D~fendant HJ Grathol is a Califomia general partnership which holds title 
to the Subject Property. Hughes Investments, also a California general partnership is the 
development agent for HJ Grathol on this property. Alan Johnson is employed by Hughes 
Investments as Senior Vice President of Development and is a partner for development 
purposes with Hughes lnvestments. Additional infonnation responsive to this Interrogatory 
has been requested and will be supplemented. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Reg_uest for Production No. 1: Please produce all documents identified, used, 
referenced or relied upon in responding to the interrogatories above. 
RESPONSE: Defendant has compiled the voluminous documents responsive to these 
Requests for Production and will make them available for inspection and/or copying to 
Plaintiff and/or its agents during regular business hours, upon reasonable request. 
Request for Production No. 2: Please produce the curriculum vitae or resume for each 
and every expert consulted by you in reference to this action1 including Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b)(4)(A) experts. 
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RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production is overbroad and beyond the 
scope of I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B). See also, Answer to Interrogatory No. 2. At this time, 
Defendant bas not determined which experts it anticipates utilizing at trial, and discovery is 
not permitted as to specially retained experts. 
Request for Production No. 3: Please produce copies of all documents relied upon by 
any witness expected to be called at trial as an expert which concerns or reflects any opinion 
relating to the Subject Property. 
RESPONSE: See) Answer to Interrogatory No. 2. 
Request for Production No. 4: Please produce any and all appraisal reports, written 
estimates, or market studies relating in any way to the issues in this case, or any other 
document that reflects an opinion relating to the Subject Property, including but not limited 
to, the appraisal reports, written estimates, market studies or market analyses of each 
appraiser or valuation witness that you intend to call to testify as an expert witness at the trial 
of this matter. 
RESPONSE: Defendant has no appraisai reports responsive to this request, but 
.information relative to Defendant's opinion of the value of the Subject Property can be fowid 
in the documents produced or available for inspection and in the letters to Ron Harvey and 
Mary York referenced herein. 
Resiuestfor Production No. 5! For each appraiser and valuation witness you intend to 
calJ to testify as an expert witness at the trial of this matter, please produce copies of all 
appraisal reports prepared by and/or signed by the appraiser of properties located within a 
ten-mile radius of the Subject Property which have a date of valuation within the last five (5) 
years. 
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RESPONSE: Defendant does not have any discoverable documents responsive to this 
request. 
Request for Production No. 6: Please produce copies of all documents, objects or 
things intended to be introduced, offered or utilized by you as an exhibit at the trial of this 
matter, including but not limited to all maps, drawings, photographs, video tapes, deeds or 
other documents. If final exhibits have not been completed, please attach drafts, if available. 
RESPONSE: Defendant has not yet determined what exhibits it Will offer at trial but 
will produce such exhibits consistent with the Court's Pretrial Order. 
Request for Production No. 7: Please produce copies of all witness statements which 
relate in any way to the issues in this case, including but not limited to, the reports, analysis, 
documentation, assessments or valuations of each appraiser or valuation witness that 
Defendant intends to call to testify as an expert witness at the trial of this matter. 
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request -for Production seeks materials whieh may be 
protected by the attomey-cllent privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding 
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied. 
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.) 
Request for Production No. 8: Please produce copies of all documents, 
correspondence, and Electronically Stored Infotmation created, produced, received or sent by 
you within the last five (5) years which relate in any way to the value of the Subject Property 
and/or any business operated on the Subject Property. 
RESPONSE: Objection, This Request for Production seeks materials which may be 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding 
this. discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied. 
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(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.) 
Reguest for Production No. 9: Please produce a copy of any and all compensation or 
employment agreements between you and any expert retained by you, including but not 
limited to any expert retained by you to appraise or analyze the Subject Property ( or any 
aspect or portion thereof). 
RESPONSE: Defendant has no discoverable documents responsive to this Request 
for Production. 
. . 
Request for Production No. 10: Please produce copies of any ·and all docwnents, 
colTeSpondence, communications) notes, and Electronically Stored Information between you 
and any expert retained by you j.n relation to the present lawsuit and/or the taking of a portion 
of the Subject Property by Plaintiff. 
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be 
protected by the attomey-client privilege · and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding 
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied. 
(See, Response to :Request for Production No. 1, above,) 
Request for Production No. 11: Please produce copies of any and all documents, 
correspondence, communications. notes, and Electronically Stored Information between you 
and Plaintiff in relation to the present lawsuit and/or the taldng of a portion of the Subject 
Property by Plaintiff. 
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding 
thisJ discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been comolied. 
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.) 
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Request for Production No. 12: Please produce copies of any and all documents, 
correspondence, communications, notes, and Electronically Stored Information between you 
and any governmental entity, other than Plaintiff, {such as the City of Athol, Kootenai 
County, and the Lakes Highway District or any other applicable entity) in relation to Subject 
PropertyJ the present lawsuit and/or the taking of a portion of the Subject Property by 
Plaintiff. This document request shall_ relate to all such documents for a period of five (5) 
years prior to the ''date of take" ~d up to the present. 
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding 
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied. 
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.) 
Request for Production No. 13: (Loan and Other Documents) Please produce a copy 
of each and every financial statement, loan application, or other document on which a value 
of the Subject Property has been set forth during the last five (5) years. 
RESPONSE: Defendant has no discoverable documents responsive to this Request 
for Production. 
Request for Production No. 14: (Purchase Documents) Please produce a copy of all 
documents relating to your purchase of the Subject Property. 
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding 
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied. 
(See, Response to Request for Production No. I, above,) 
Request for Production No. 15: (Leases) Please produce a copy of all leases, rental 
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agreements, and other documents relating to rents, lease payments, or other consideration 
paid for occupancy or access to all or any portion of the Subject Property. This document 
request shall relate to all such documents for a period of five (5) years prior to the "date of 
talce" and up to the present. 
RESPONSE: Defendant has one document responsive to this Request for Production 
which is available for inspection and/or copying to Plaintiff and/or its agents during regular 
business hours, upon reasonable request. 
Request for Production No. 16: (Applications for ·nevelopment or Improvement) 
Please produce each and every application for development, improvement, rezoning, 
annexation, ot construction on the Subject Property filed, submitted or pending during· the 
period of five (5) years prior to "date of take" and continuing up to the present date. 
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Nolwithstan~ng 
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied. 
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.) 
Request for Production No. 17: (Litigation or Claims) Please produce a copy of all 
pleadings, claimsj or demands relating to recorded or unrecorded interests, easements, 
descriptive uses, adverse possession, liens~ or other rights in and to the Subject Property as of 
the "date of take/' and for the period five (5) years immediately prior thereto up to the 
present date. 
RESPONSE: Defendant has no discoverable documents responsive to this Request 
for Production other than the title insurance policy acquired at the time Defendant purchased 
the property, A copy of the same is available for inspection and/or copying to Plaintiff 
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and/or its agents during regular business hours, upon r(:asonable request. 
Request for Production No. 18: (Unrecorded Liens or Interests and Restrictive 
Covenants) Please produce a copy of all unrecorded liens, interests, claims, easements, 
restrictive covenants, or other burdens upon the Subject Property as of the "date of take" and 
for the period five (5) years immediately prior thereto up to the present date. 
RESPONSE= Defendant has no discoverable documents responsive to this Request 
for Production. 
Request for Production No. 19: ·(Environmental Documents) Please produce a copy_ 
of each aud every document relating in any way to environmental contamination, hazardous 
waste contamination, water contamination, asbestos, lead paint, underground storage tanks, 
or petroleum contamination upon the Subject Property during the period five (5) years 
immediately prior to the ''date of take,, up to the present date. 
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding 
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied. 
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.) 
Request for Production No. 20: (Surveys) Please produce a copy of all recorded and 
unrecorded surveys that have been performed upon the Subject Property, and, if more than 
one survey has been performed, please produce the most recently perfonned recorded survey. 
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding 
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied. 
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.) 
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Request for Production No. 21: (Water, Sewer and Utilities) Please produce a copy of 
any and all documents related to any ap1;>lication to provide the Subject Property with water, 
sewer or any other utilities. Please include in your response any documents related to the 
current availability of water, sewer or other utilities on the Subject Property. 
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding 
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied. 
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above,) 
Request for Production No. 22: Please produce any and all documents and 
coITC.llpondence related to any and all entities or persons employed or retained to assist in the 
development or development planning of the Subject Property. 
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be 
protected by the attomey-cllent privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding 
thi~ di~coverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied. 
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.) 
DATED this I Slh day of April, 2011. 
RAMSDEN &LYONS, LLP 
By. ~kif~ 
DouglS, Marfice, -Ofthe Finn 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
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County of Orange ) 
Alan Johnson , being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
I am the managing member of lt[ t2VtJl:fhb \ , Defendant, in the above-
entitled action; I have read Defendant HJ Grahtol's Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's First 
Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents; I know the contents thereof, 
and I state the same to be true to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 9th day of May, 20llby Alan Johns0~, 
proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person who 
appeared before me. 
Notary Public for the State of California 
Residing at Irvine, California 
Commission Expires Dec. 23, 2013 
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MICHAELE. RAMSDEN• 
MARC A. LYONS• 
DOUGLASS, MARFICE• 
MICHAEL A. EALY• 
TE"RRANCE R. HARRIS• 
CHRISTOPHER D. GABBERT 
THERON J. DE SMET 
WILLIAM F. BOYD, OF COUNSEL 
MaryV. York 
Holland & Hart, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 1336 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816-1336 
Tl!LEPHONI!: (208) 664-5818 
FACSIMILE: (208) 664-5884 
E-MAIL: firm@ramsdenlyons.com 
Wl!BSITI!: www.ramsdenlyons.com 
May 16, 2011 
Re: The State of Idaho v. HJ Grathol, et al. 
Kootenai Co. Case No. CV-10-10095 
Dear Ms. York: 
STREET ADDRESS: 
700 NORTHWEST BLVD. 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814 
ALL ATTORNEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO 
• LICENSED IN WASHINGTON 
Enclosed please find a CD containing documents (which have been Bates stamped) 
responsive to Defendant HJ Grathol's Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents in the above-referenced matter. 










RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DIS1RICT OF TI-IE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VIN GS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants. 
TO: THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PLAINTIFF 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
DEFENDANTHJGRATHOUS 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS 
AND RESPONSES TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
OF DOCUMENTS 
COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol and hereby responds to Plaintiff's First Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents as follows: 
INTERROGATORIES 
Interrogatocy No. 16: (Hughes Investment) Please describe your relationship, if any, 
to Hughes Investments. Include in your response the identity of any and all officers, 
managers or other directors who are common to both you and Hughes Investments. Please 
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also include any involvement you have or may have had in Hughes Investments applications 
for zoning changes, annexation into the city of Athol, development or other proposed 
improvements to the Subject Property. 
ANSWER: Defendant ID Grathol is a California general partnership which holds title 
to the Subject Property. Hughes Investments, also a California general partnership is the 
development agent for ID Grathol on this property. Alan Johnson is employed by Hughes 
Investments as Senior Vice President of Development and is a partner for development 
purposes with Hughes Investments. See, attached flow chart for HJ Grathol. 
DATED this 16th day of May, 201 I. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
By: ~,it2S--~ • 
Douglas Marfice, O~irrn 
Attorneys for Defendant ID Grathol 
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VERIFICATION 
STA TE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
) ss. 
County of 01vrt,1..::>(qb ) 
Alan Johnson, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
I am the Senior Vice President of the managing general partner, HJ Bayview Gateway, 
LLC, of HJ Grathol, Defendant, in the above-entitled action; I have read Defendant HJ 
Grahtol's Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production of Documents; I know the contents thereof, and I state the same to be 
true to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. 
By: HJ Grathol, a California general partnership 
By: HJ Bayview Gateway, LLC, 
managing general partner 
Its: Senior Vice President 
SUDSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this~ day of May, 201lby Alan Johnson, proved 
to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person before me. 
Notary Public for the State of California 
Residing at Irvine, California 
Commission Expires Dec. 23, 2013 
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living Trust, 
Limited Partner 
95% HJ Bayview 
Gateway, LLC, 
a Delaware limited 
liability company, 





G:\SS\110\ENTITV FLOW CHARTS.xlsx 
~~ -·--·--·---·--------------- -·- -
8070 HJ GRATHOL 
a California general 
partnership, 
CO# 8070, Bank 70 
El N 27-1369018 
4.21% Marilyn A. 
Gutwill, 
Limited Partner 
8070 HJ GRATHOL 
5% Gracal Corporation, 
a California corporation, 
CO# 8060, Bank 186 
EIN 13-6183726 
General Partner 









VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
· Re: ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al. 
July 22, 2011 
First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County 
Case No. CVI0-10095 
Dear Doug: 
MaryV. York 
Phone (208) 342-5000 
Fax (208) 343-8869 
myork@hollandhart.com 
This purpose of this letter is to meet and confer on deficiencies we see in 
Defendant HJ Grathol' s responses to ITD' s First Set of Interrogatories and Request for 
Production of Documents (the "April 15th discovery responses") and to address issues 
that have arisen regarding the responses. We hope to resolve these issues with you 
informally, without having to resort to a motion to compel. 
First, the April 15th discovery responses are in direct conflict with the 
representations that Mr. Gabbert made to Judge Haynes at the March 31, 2011 status 
al\_<l scheduling conference. Specifically, Mr. Gabbert represented at the scheduling 
conference that HJ Grathol would call, at most, two or three expert witnesses. This 
conformed with our earlier conversations with you. Judge Haynes entered a scheduling 
order and set a 10-day trial based on the representations that HJ Grathol would only call 
two or three expert witnesses. 
However, the April 15th discovery response list fourteen (14) potential expert 
witnesses. See Response to Interrogatory No. 2. Regardless whether these witnesses 
are designated "actor/view experts" or "valuation experts" these witnesses will be 
providing expert testimony - which requires substantial additional time both at trial and 
in discovery. 
After we received the April 15th discovery response, I spoke with Chris Gabbert 
about this and he indicated that he would speak to you about the number of witnesses 
HJ Grathol intended to call at trial. If the number of experts is going to be greater than 
the two or three represented to the Court, then the scheduling order will have to be 
revised, the period of time for discovery extended, the trial will have to be moved to a 
iaier date, and additionai triai days wiii have to be reserved. 
EXHIBIT 
Holland & Hart LLP I 
Phone [208] 342-5000 Fax [208] 343-8869 www.hollandhart.com 
101 South Capitol Boulevard Suite 1400 Boise, ID 83702 Mailing Address P.O. Box 2527 Boise, ID 83701-2527 
Aspen Boulder Carson City Colorado Springs Denver Denver Tech Center Billings Boise Cheyenne Jackson Hole las Vegas Reno Salt Lake City Santa Fe Washington, D.C. 0 
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If you only intend to call two or three witnesses to provide expert testimony, 
regardless of whether they are "actor/viewer experts" or "valuation experts" please 
identify which experts you actually intend to call so that, if possible, we can keep the 
current trial date and schedule. 
Second, your response to Interrogatory No. 8 indi9ated that you could not 
describe any special terms or conditions of HJ Grathol's purchase of the Subject 
Property in 2008. You responded that the Subject Property was purchased in 2008 in a 
distress sale, but did not describe any of the terms of the purchase. Additionally, ITD 
does not have the information regarding the specific terms of your client's purchase of 
the Subject Property. The documents provided (00648-00768) detail a purchase of the 
Subject Property by Hughes Investment and Gracal Corporation: It does not provide 
documents regarding HJ Grathal's acquisition of the Subject Property. Please provide 
documentation or an explanation how HJ Grathol acquired the Subject Property from 
Hughes Investment and Gracal Corporation. We are also entitled to know all terms of 
the sale to and acquisition by HJ Grathol. Therefore, we request that you please 
provide all terms and conditions of HJ Grathol's 2008 purchase of the Subject Property. 
Third, your response to Interrogatory No. 9 represented that there were 
appraisals done on the Subject Property. However, your response to Interrogatory 
No. 9 failed to identify (as defined in the definition section) each of those appraisals. 
Please indentify each of those appraisals and provide them pursuant to Request for 
Production No. I. 
Fourth, your response to Interrogatory No. 14 stated that HJ Grathol received 
offers to purchase the Subject Property in the five {5) years prior to the date of take. 
However, your response to Interrogatory No. 14 failed to identify any of those offers. 
Please fully respond to Interrogatory No. 14 by identifying, as that term is defined, each 
and every offer to purchase or sell the Subject Property within the five (5) years prior to 
the date of take. Please also provide any relevant documents pursuant to Request for 
Production No. I. 
Fifth, your response to Interrogatory No. 16 references that "additional 
information" regarding HJ Grathol's relationship to Hughes Investment has "been 
requested and will be supplemented." Please provide us with that supplemental 
information. 
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in the vicinity of the Subject Property. Please clarify whether or not appraisals 
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Seventh, response to Request for Production No. 9 also states there are no 
"discoverable" expert compensation agreements. We ask that you please produce all of 
these agreements or explain how they are not "discoverable." 
Eighth, your response to Request for Production No. 13 indicated that you had no 
"discoverable" documents regarding the value of the Subject Property. Thus, it is our 
understanding that no documents responsive to Request for Production No. 13 exist -
because if they did exist these documents would be discoverable. Please confirm that 
your response to Request for Production No. 13 is that there are no "financial 
statement, loan application, or other document on which a value of the Subject Property 
has been set forth during the last five (5) years." 
Ninth, please provide an explanation regarding your responses to Request for 
Production Nos. 14 and 16. Specifically, please explain how documents relating to the 
purchase of the Subject Property or applications for development are protected by the 
attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. For example, is it your response 
that the Subject Property was acquired for the purposes of this litigation? 
Tenth, please provide us with any new or supplemental documents or information 
responsive to our First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production. 
We look forward to resolving the above- referenced issues with you. It is our 
hope that we can resolve these discovery deficiencies without having to resort to a 
motion to compel. Therefore, we request that you please provide us with full and 
complete responses as outlined above by August 5, 2011 or we will be forced to turn to 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Gmthol 
No. 4332 P. 2/25 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 
through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S 
EXPERTWITNESSDXSCLOSURE 
COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol and pursuant to the Court's Uniform Pretrial 
Order and discloses the following experts intended to be called at the trial of the above-
referenced matter: 
1) Dewitt M. "Skip" Sherwood 
Cornerstone Property Advisors 
1311 N. Washington, Ste. C 
Spokane, WA 99201 
(509) 321-2000 
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A. Statement of Testimony: 
Mr. Sherwood is a real estate appraiser licensed in the states of Idaho and Washington. 
He will testify in accordance with his appraisal report, which will be provided to Plaintiff upon 
completion. Mr. Sherwood will testify generally as follows: 
The subject property is was transferred to Gracal Corporation on May 22, 2008 from 
North Alpine Development LLC, an Idaho limited liability corporation on May 22, 2008 and 
subsequently from Gracal Corporation to HJ Grathol, a California general prutnership on 
October 15, 2009. According to the broker who sold the site in May 2008, the sale price was 
$1,450,000; however, he relayed that there was a lien on the property from a local lender for 
a far higher amount and the seller was highly motivated due to financial problems. At the 
time of the sale the property was zoned residential. Cun-ent mvners have paid for a rezone of 
the site, engineering for site development plans, approval of city water to the site. and work 
for an onsite sewage system. 
County records indicate the property is identified under three parcel numbers: A-
0000-010-6350, 53N03Wl06100, and 53N03Wl05000. Assessed values for each of the 








The prope1ty is located on the NE Comer of Highway 95 and Highway 54 in Athol, 
Idaho and contains approximateiy 56.8 acres. In the county assessor1s records, parcel 
53N03Wl05000 is indicated as a 63.24 acre parcel, which appears to be an e1rnr based on all 
the other data reviewed on this site. Parcel A00000106350 has .419 acres and includes a 
small commercial building, but it is also the SW corner of the site at the intersection of the 
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highways and therefore considered an important part of the entire property. The subject 
property is cun·ently zoned Commercial by the Kootenai County Planning Department and 
this zoning was obtained by the current owners since their purchase of the property in 2008. 
The site is approximately 16 miles n011h of Interstate 90 in Coeur d'Alene, 8 miles 
east of Spirit Lake, 5 miles west of Bayview, and 30 miles south of Sandpoint. The 
intersection currently consists of a convenience store on the SW corner, a restaurant/bar on 
the NW comer, vacant land on the SE comer, and the subject along with some othe1· 
commercial uses on the NE comer along Highway 95. Although site is contiguous at this 
time, the new interchange planned at this location show Sylvan Road being extended north 
through the subject site when the interchange is built, splitting the subject site, 
Major attractions in the immediate area include Farragut State Park to the east of this 
location and Silve1wood Amusement Park two miles south of this location. Lake Pend 
Oreille is accessible via public and commercial launch facilities at Bayview, Farragut, or 
Sandpoint. Sandpoint is also the location of Sweitzer Mountain, the largest ski arna in the 
Inland Northwest. 
The site has approximately 750 feet of frontage along Highway 95 and 2,090 feet 
along Highway 54 with 4 deeded access points, Access is also available along Highway 95 
as all three parcels include frontage along the highway, There is another property containing 
1.58 acres that is located north of the corner parcel that has 417 feet of frontage along 
Highway 95 as well. Water to the site is avaiiabie from the City of Athoi and according to 
the owner's representative, Alan Johnson, Coleman Engineering is working on development 
of a modular waste treatment plant to meet needs for onsite sewage. Other site utilities 
include natural gas from Avista, electric from Kootenai Electric, and fiber optic from 
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Verizon. The site is generally level and at grade with both highways. The site is bounded by 
Howard Road to the east. The site is treed with small sized pine trees at this time, but these 
trees have no marketable timber value. 
Market conditions for Kootenai County were similar to other areas in the Inland 
Northwest and set records for the number of properties sold as well as appreciation rates from 
2002 through 2006. The number of residential units sold in 2002 through the Coeur d'Alene 
MLS was 2,958 and that number peaked at 5,035 units in 2005 declining to 2,821 units in 
2006. The average sale price through these same years was $138,908 in 2002 and it 
increased to $271,192 in 2006, an increase of 95% in a four year period. In 2007 and 2008 
the number of units sold continued to drop to 2,007 units in 2008 with the average sale price 
dropping to $269,120. In 2009 the total number of units sold increased to 2,216 with the 
average price dropping to $209,415. One of the reasons for the large drop in 2009 was a tax 
c1·edit for first time homebuyers, and purchasers of first homes generally buy lower price 
properties, 2010 has continued to see fewer residential sales with prices continuing to 
decline; however, there has been continued commercial development in Kootenai County in 
the past two years. Two Wal-Mart Supercenters have been built in addition to a ne,x.1 Super 1 
Foods store and a Love's Travel Plaza being built. In addition the Highway 95 co1Tidor has 
seen the construction of a U.S. District Court Facility and a 55,000 square foot Western 
States Cat facility in Hayden. 
The highest and best use of the subject property is the ideal use of vacant land or an 
improved property that results in the highest value. The use needs to be legally permitted, 
physically possible, financially feasible, and maximally productive. The subject is a large 
tract of vacant commercially zoned land (with the exception of a small commercial building) 
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on a (I lighted" intersection of two highways. The large size of 56.8 acres is much larger than 
typically utilized for a "big box" retail user which can range from approximately 10 to 30 
acres in size. Silverwood Amusement Park south of the subject occupies a large site 
including parking. This is a unique use that has grown over the past 20+ years and recently 
an application has been made by Silverwood to rezone an additional 90+ acres to the south of 
its existing facilities. Nevertheless, as population growth in this area continues, convenience 
issues will no doubt spur residents to patronize locally situated commercial establishments. 
The comer location and zoning of the subject suggest commercial uses that can take 
advantage of the traffic flow at this location that presently exists on Highway 95. I 
understand from the owner's representative that they were in negotiation with URM for a sale 
of a portion of the site for a Super One Grocery store. Mike Winger of URM confinned that 
he had been involved in discussions with Hugh's Investments for a store at this location that 
was delayed by the condemnation. He also relayed that with the opening of a new WINCO 
in Coeur d'Alene and a Wal-Mart Super Center in the City of Hayden the likelihood of a new 
grocery store at the subject site is less probable due to new competition that was not there 
when negotiations were going on with Hughes, but that changing economic conditions have 
not eliminated this possibility. Other potential uses include a travel plaza/truck stop, "big 
box" retail, specialized retail use such as "Big R', or "D & B" (local farm/ranch supply 
stores), motel, and a convenience store; however, in my opinion only about½ of the subject 
site wouid be utiiized for these uses. The balai1Ce of the site might include some self storage, 
residential uses, or perhaps some type of light industrial use. 
C,m-ent plans for the subject site included a new freeway interchange. The taking in 
this condemnation will bisect the property taking 16.31 acres leaving remnants on both sides 
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of the new interchange. Remnants on the west side of the new interchange include the .419 
comer parcel and a 3.87 acre parcel fronting the old Highway 95, On the east side of the new 
interchange will be the balance of the site containing 36.61 acres. The property enjoyed 
access from both highways in the before situation and I understand that in the after will only 
have limited access from Highway 54, Sylvan Road when built, and Howard Road which 
bounds it to the east. As discussed earlier in this report, the planned Sylvan Road extension 
will bisect the site effectively changing the original highest and best use analysis of the site. 
With the site bisected, only the 8.85 acres to the east of the new interchange and west of 
Sylvan Road in addition to the 3.87 acres on the NW corner of the site, and the .419 acre site 
on the SW comer will be available fol' development out of the original west half of the site. 
There will also likely be a condemnation of land needed for the new Sylvan Road as it does 
not currently exist. The cost of constructing Sylvan Road is also unknown at this time which 
may also be an additional item of reimbursement to the owners of the property ifldaho DOT 
makes them pay for the road improvements. 
I researched various large commercial tract sales in the Spokane, Tri Cities. Coeur 
d'Alene, and Moses Lake areas and am familiar with prices for sales in these areas for users 
such as Home Depot, Safeway, Target, Lowes, Kohl's, Yokes, Albertson's, Costco, Sam's 
Club, and Wal-Ma1t. Retail users prefer a lighted intersection in most cases for locations as 
is a benefit for customers to access stores easier. Freeway interchanges are often locations of 
retail deveJopment, but generally these developments usually occur in higher density 
residential areas. 
As a lighted intersection with commercial zoning, I viewed the site as being 
developed in two phases. With the site containing approximately 57 acres prior to the taking, 
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I considered that approximately 30 acres closest to the intersection would be valued at a 
different rate than the remaining 27 acres. A 30 acre site would likely fit several anchors 
such as grocery stol'es or other "big box'' retail users. The 30 acres would also likely 
accommodate other pad users such as banks, fast food uses, or convenience store uses in 
addition to some additional "inlineu retail uses associated with the big box users. Big box 
users often pay $4 to as high as $9 per square foot for sites as in the recent WINCO purchase 
in Coeur d'Alene. The subject location is inferior to most of the comparables discussed in 
this repo1t in that it is located in a more remote area and it doesn't presently enjoy the same 
demographics; however, the lighted intersection of two state highways offers excellent 
exposure for commercial uses and as tl'affic increases this location will become the "go to" 
location between Haden and Sandpoint. 
In the after scenario, the 16.31 acre take will leave three parcels; an 8.85 acre parcel 
on the east side of the new interchange, a 3.87 acre parcel on the west side, and the .419 acre 
parcel in the SW corner of the site. The balance of the site will be east of the newly planned 
Sylvan Road. Access to these sites will be limited to the old Highway 95 for the 3.87 acre 
parcel and Highway 54 and Sylvan Road for the 8.85 acre parcel. Estimating values in the 
after situation will be contingent upon when the project is completed. Upon completion the 
property will likely develop differently that in the before situation and although the property 
on the east side of the freeway is still large enough to accommodate some big box retail uses, 
but not stores as large as Wal-Mart, Costco, or Home Depot. Examples given above indicate 
that development may take many years. Without an accurate estimate of the completion of 
this project projecting values into the future is extremely difficult. 
I have considered the following comparable sales: 
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Idaho Comparables 
1. 1601 W Appleway Coeur d'Alene~ Sale Price $3,528,360- Sale Date 8/09 
Size 9 AC (392,040 sq ft) - Price Per Foot $9.00 
Comments: This was a former gravel pit site that was sold for a new WINCO 
Grocery Store. The sellers paid to level the site for the purchasers and granted 
easements to Ramsey Road to the west for additional access, The site included all 
utilities. This property would be considered superior to the subject for location and 
size. 
2. Seltice Way and I 90 Post Falls - Sale Price $20,456,747 - Sale Date 11/06 
Size 235 AC-Price Per Foot $2.00 
Comments: Foursquare Properties, developers, bought this site which consisted of 
numerous parcels from two other developers and Cabela,s committed to purchase 40 
acres for a new store at the same time frame. Although the site had utilities, the 
developers paid to build all the interior streets and provide access to the Cabela's 
parcel. Since the purchase another parcel has been sold for a new Wal-Marc which 
recently opened. This parcel is far larger than the subject and would be considered at 
a lower rate for size~ but a superior rate for location. The purchasers paid for bringing 
utilities to the site as well as significant costs for grading on the property to 
accommodate the new building sites and roads. 
3. Highway 41 & Prairie Post Falls - Sale Price $2,936,161- Sale Date 11/06 
Size 13.5 AC (588)060 sq ft)-Price Per Foot $5.00 
Comments: This sale is in the City of Post Falls and utilities were available. It was 
purchased with the intention of retail development. This is the SE corner of the 
intersection. This sale is a smaller parcel than the subject which would indicate a 
lesser price for the subject, but somewhat similar for location at a lighted intersection) 
but also a superior location demographically, although the subject has higher traffic 
counts. · 
4, Highway 41 & Praide Post Falls - Sale Price $6,591,591 - Sale Date 10/07 
Size 50.44 AC (2,197,197 sq ft)-Price Per Foot $3.00 
Comments: This involved the same purchaser as comparable 3 (Post Falls Station 
LLC) and it is the NE comer of the same intersection and outside the City of Post 
Falls. The site was not zoned for commercial development, but the purchaser was 
confident that they could develop the site. This is an excellent comparable for the 
subject in terms of overall size and a simila1· location at a lighted intersection, but a 
superior location demographically. The property has no sewer which likely may need 
to be purchased from the City of Post Falls. 
5. Highway 95 & Garwood Road-Sale Price $1.017,200-Sale Date 7/08 
Size 4.41 AC (192,100 sq ft)-Price Per Foot $5.30 
0~--e~+no 'l'h~s ""''St-ho.""'"' ,...f'1-l.. .. r:!-a'"""""A <'alnnn .,...,,.,....,..,.,,t<, tA lrlal.."' T"lr'IT T!,.I"'. 
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sale price was confirmed with the attorney for the property owner and he relayed that 
it represented land value only. The site was zoned commercial like the subject and it 
is the next "lighted" intersection south of the subject on Highway 95. This 
intersection is with a county road versus another state highway like the subject. The 
site is smaller than the subject which would indicate a higher value and it is also a 
superior location being closer to Coeur di Alene. I understand this sale was negotiated 
under the threat of condemnation and courts have ruled that these sales may not 
represent true market value for this reason. 
6. Ramsey & Appleway- Sale Price $7,800,000 - Sale Date 11/07 
Size 17 AC apx (740,520 sq ft)- Price Per Foot $10.53 
This sale was confim1ed with the owner who sold the property to the Coeur d, Alene 
Tribe. The site is near comparable 1 and considered superior to the subject in that it is 
a smaller parcel and located in a better location. 
7. Highway 95 & Sagle Road- Sale Price $3,400,000-Sale Date 3/08 
Size 29 AC (1,263,249 sq ft)-Price Per Foot $2.69 
This sale was confirmed with the broker who sold the property. The site was zoned 
for commercial use and it included utilities. The agent who handled the sale relayed 
that the property is currently for sale as 5 lots. This parcel does not have access to 
Highway 95 like the subject and it is not a lighted intersection like the subject. This is 
an excellent comparable sale to the subject in terms of size and it would be considered 
slightly superior for location being closer to Sandpoint~ but inferior as it does not have 
a lighted intersection and it does not have access to Highway 95. 
Washington Comparables 
8. 9527 N Nevada-Sale Price $4i813,685 - Sale Date 7/07 
Size i8.7i AC (815,100 sq ft)-Price Pet Foot $5.91 
This was the site of a new WINCO in Spokane that has been built and it included 
additional pads. This site is smaller than the subject indicating a highel' value and also 
a superior location. 
9. 21801 E Country Vista- Sale Price $3,045,405 - Sale Date 6/05 
Size 18.98 AC (608,969 sq ft)- Price Per Foot $5.00 
This is a dated sale for a new Home Depot store at Liberty Lake off Interstate 90 that 
has been built onsite, This site is smaller indicating a higher value and also a superior 
location. 
10. 4315 E Sprague - Sale Price $7,559,686 - Sale Date 9/06 
Size 22.98 AC (1,000,000 sq ft)-Price Per Foot $7.55 
This is a Wal-Mart site purchased for a new Sam's Club that has not yet been built. 
The purchasers paid for rezoning and access to Sprague as the site didn1t have 
sufficient access as purchased. The site was purchased from Union Pacific Railroad 
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and required extensive work for development. The site is somewhat similar in size, 
but considered a superior location and also located adjacent to COSTCO. 
Sales of commercial/retail sites in Washington differ from Idaho with regard to 
econornic issues regarding tax implications, but they were included as they reflect prices for 
big box retail uses. 
VALUE PRIOR TO POTENTIAL CONDEMNATION 
In considering an estimate of the west 30 acres of the subject site with commercial 
zoning and without the planned interchange I considered the values of the comparable sales 
with p~·imary emphasis on comparables 5 and 7 as they are on the same highway and located 
north and south of the subject Comparable 4 is also another good comparable which was 
given more weight like comparables 5 and 7. I also considered the sizes and locations of the 
other comparables in completing my estimate of the subject. I also considered the purchase 
price of the subject as well as the motivation of the seller when the property was sold for 
$1,450,000, but as mentioned earlier, the seller was distressed and the site was not 
commercially zoned at the time of the sale. Even considering the sale price of $.59 per foot 
the majority of tho value would have been to the 30 acres on the west side of the site. Based 
on these considerations, it is my opinion that the west 30 acres would have had a value in the 
range of $2.25 per foot or $2,940,300. 
VALUE AFTER THE POTENTIAL CONDEMNATION 
In the after situation, the west 30 acres will be bisected by the taking. This taking will 
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There will still be sufficient land in the original 30 acres to develop some commercial 
developments, but there will be three parcels of 8.85, 3.87, and .419 acres. These remaining 
parcels can accommodate various uses, but the chances of a.l'ly big box retail use on the west 
30 acre site a1·e gone. With the planned Sylvan Road forming a boundary for the remaining 
property the remaining property is also bisected, 
Until a definitive completion date of the planned interchange at the subject 
intersection can be established, it will be very difficult to estimate a value for the remaining 
parcels due the unknowns of the anticipated project. 
Utilizing the anticipated construction date for the freeway improvements as published 
by IDrs website, an assumption can be made that the best case scenario for project 
construction would be the summer of 2011. Assuming this construction date is accurate, the 
project might be completed in the spring of 2012. If the planned construction date is later, 
the completion date will be moved farther into the future. In my opinion, no potential user of 
the remaining property would have any interest in using any of the remaining parcels until 
they know for certain when the project will be completed. Assuming the completion can be 
completed as forecast above in the spring of 2012, the value of the land would need to be 
discounted from the present date. The discount is applicable as no one would pay for 
something today that they can't receive until a future date, This same principal applies to 
valuing a subdivision that is slated to be developed in the future or the purchase of an income 
stream like a real estate contract. 
In attempting to value the remaining parcels, I have made the assumption that they 
will have a similar value to the before scenario at $2.25 per square foot. I have also assumed 
that they will be available for use upon completion of the new freeway at the earliest in the 
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spring of 2012 and the latest in the spring of 2013. This results in a discount time frame of 
1.5 to 2.5 years from the date of valuation, Using this scenario, the future value of the 
remaining parceis of $1,344,457 ,vould be discounted to a present value. 
The discount rate is basically a rate of return that someone is looking for on a given 
investment. It is based on risk and that risk is affected by the rates of safe investments, 
market conditions, and other factors. In this case, we are dealing with undeveloped land in 
uncertain economic times. For this reason, I selected a rate higher than typical capitalization 
rates in the cu1Tent market and utilized a rate of 10%. The higher rate used to discount the 
future value in this case is due to all the unknowns concerning this project including the 
unlmown timing of the project being finished, issues with regard to access, Sylvan Road 
being built, the cost of who will be responsible for the cost of Sylvan Road, and the need for 
condemnation of the l'ight of way for Sylvan Road. Applying this discount rate to the 





Utilizing these estimates and the original before estimate the final concluded value 
estimates were completed as follows; 
Before Value 
After Present Value 1.5 years 





= $1,775,000 - $1,880,000 
This difference in value does not address the value of the Sylvan Road, cost of 
constructfon of Sylvan Road, or loss of access to Highway 54 which are all potential 
additional items of compensation. 
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B. Data and Other Information Considered in F om1ing Testimony: 
The data, documents, and information relied on by Mr. Sherwood in fonnulating his 
opinions are: 
Planning documents related to the Property; 
Property and project design, right-of-way, and construction plans; 
Personal inspection of the site of the property; 
Applicable federal, state and local regulations and specifications; 
Planning and zoning docwnents; 
Kootenai County Assessor's records; 
Property records and documents for the property and comparable properties; and 
MLS sales data and comparable sales information from personal interviews with 
transaction participants/agents 
C. Exhibits that May Be Used as a Summary of or Suppo1t_for Testimony: 
Mr. Sherwood may use the documents and infmmation identified in his appraisal report 
to summarize, illustrate, or support his testimony. He may also use some or all of the following: 
hereto. 
D. 
Planning documents related to the Property; 
Property and project design, right-of-way, and construction plans; 
Personal inspection of the site of the property; 
Applicable federal, state and local regulations and specifications; 
Planning and zoning documents; 
Kootenai County Assessor's records; 
Property records and documents for the property and comparable properties; and 
lv1LS sales data and comparable sales info1mation 
Qualifications of Mr. Sherwood: 
The qualifications of Mr. Sherwood are set forth in his curriculum vitae, attached 
E. Compensation Paid to Mr. Sherwood: 
:tvlr. Sherwood was paid a flat fee for his appraisal research/evaluation, He will be paid 
his standard hourly rate of$175.00 per hour for research and testimony. 
F. Publications Authored by Mr. Sherwood in the Past Ten Years: None. 
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City of Spokane vs. Frost 
WSDOT vs. Costich 
Schade vs. American West Bank 
City of Cheney vs. Showies 
WSDOTvs, Swanson 
Avista vs. Ashland Estates 
Jergens vs. Jergens 
Curry vs, Lenhertz 
Stevens County vs. Taylor 
Stevens County vs. Nelson 
Zunino vs. Rejewski 
Raynor vs. IPEC 
WSDOTvs. Douglass 
City of Spokane vs. Vonholt 
Peltier, et al vs. Markley, et al 
Martin Estate 
Sinchuck vs. Casteal 
WSDOTvs. Miller 
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Vice President, Director of Design and Construction 
Hughes Investments> LLC 
Clo Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
Statement ofNature of Testimony: 
Mr. Reeslund will give opinion testimony as to the development plans for the Property, 
testimony as to its potential uses, its value (before and after the condemnation), the limitations 
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on uses of the Property remaining after condemnation, and land use planning/entitlement, 
construction planning activities; efforts and expenses associated with the purchase, holding and 
development of the Property; pianning and design work associated with the propert'J; and the 
effects of the condemnation on the development of the remaining Property. 
B. Data and Other Infonnation Considered in Forming Testimony: 
Mr. Reeslund has relied on the following data and documents in this matter: 
· Planning documents related to the Property; 
Environmental documents related to the Property; 
Property and project design, right-of-way, and construction plans; 
Personal inspection of the site of the property; 
Applicable federal, state and local regulations and specifications; 
Planning and zoning documents; 
Engineering standards and guidelines; and 
Property records and documents 
C. Exhibits that May Be Used as a Summary of or Support for Testimony: 
Mr. Reeslund may use the following exhibits to summarize, illustrate, or support his 
testimony: 
D. 
Planning documents related to the Property; 
Environmental documents related to the Property; 
Property and project design, right-of-way, and construction plans; 
Personal inspection of the site of the property; 
Applicable federal, state and local regulations and specifications; 
Planning and zoning documents; 
Engineering standal'ds and guidelines; and 
Property records and documents 
Qualifications of Mr. Reeslund: 
Mr. Reeslund is a graduate of the University of Southern Califomia, where he earned 
Bachelors and Masters Degrees in Architecture. A registered Al·chitect since 1977, for over 
21 years Geoff worked for SGPA Architecture and Planning, one of the foremost 
retail/commercial architectural firms in the countl'y. A Principal with SGPA since 1986, he 
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provided leadership in the planning, design and entitlement processing of over 200 
· community, specialty, regional and ente1tainment centers throughout California and other 
Western states, including nine projects for Hughes. In addition, he served as SGPA's 
Southern California Marketing Director from 1993 to 1997, helping to expand their presence 
and Client b~se in the region. 
As Director of Design and Construction at Hughes Investments, Mr. Reeslund 
oversees all aspects of project planning, design, governmental approvals, and construction. 
He assembles and manages the project consultant teams, works closely with tenants and their 
consultants, and coordinates the construction process to a successful completion. 
Mr. Reeslund is a member of the American Institute of Architects, and is actively 
involved in the International Council of Shopping Centers. 
E. Compensation Paid to Mr. Reeslund; 
Mr. Reeslund is employed by Hughes Investments, LLC. His only compensation is his 
regular salary paid by Hughes Investments, LLC. No additional or separate compensation is 
being paid for his testimony. 
F. Publications Authored by Mr. Reeslund in the Past Ten Years; None. 
G. List of Other Cases in Which Mr. Reeslund has Testified as an Expert: None. 
3) Alan Johnson 
Senior Vice President, Development 
Hughes Investments, LLC 
C/o Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
A. Statement of Testimony: 
Mr. Johnson will give testimony as to the acquisition, ownership and development plans 
for the Property, testimony as to its uses, its value (before and after the condemnation), the 
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values of the Property remaining after condemnation and before and after construction and 
entitlement/construction planning activities; efforts and expenses associated with the purchase, 
holding and development of the Property; planning and design work associated with the 
property; marketing efforts of the propel'ty prior to and after condemnation; and the effects of 
the condemnation on the remaining Property. 
B. Data and Other Info1mation Considered in Forming Testimony: 
Mr. Johnson has relied on the following data and documents in this matter: 
Planning documents related to the Property; 
Environmental documents related to the Property; 
Property and project design, right-of-way, and construction plans; 
Personal inspection of the site of the property; 
Applicable federal, state and local regulations and specifications; 
Planning and zoning documents; 
Engineering standards and guidelines; and 
Property records and documents 
C. Exhibits that May Be Used as a Summary of or Support for Testimo~: 
Mr. Johnson may use the following exhibits to summarize, illustrate, or support his 
testimony: 
D. 
Planning documents related to the Property; 
Environmental documents related to the Property; 
Property and project design, right-of-way, and construction plans; 
Personal inspection of the site of the property; 
Applicable federal, state and local regulations and specifications; 
Planning and zoning documents; 
Engineering standards and guidelines; and 
Property records and documents 
Qualifications of Mr. Johnson: 
Mr. Johnson attended Mount Royal College in his native Calgary, Canada and 
graduated from the University of Oklahoma in Norman, Oklahoma. After graduation in 
1983, he joined Coldwell Banker now CB Richard Ellis, as a retail specialist, transferring to 
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the Anaheim, California office in 1985. In 1989 Mr. Johnson was hired by Hughes 
Investments as Vice President - Leasing. After nine years with Hughes Investments, Mr. 
Johnson joined The Irvine Company as Director of Leasing and concentrated on the 
development and leasing of several ground-up projects including The Market Place - Irvine, 
Northpark Plaza, Quail Hill, Trabuco Grove, Oakcreek Village, Irvine Spectrum Pavilion, 
Newport Coast, The Bluffs and several other projects throughout Irvine and Newport Beach. 
Mr. Johnson completed transactions and fom1ed relationships with Albertsons, Sav-on Drugs, 
Lowe's, Target, Kohl's, Office Depot, Ralph's, Ethan Allen, Vons, Sears and many other 
national tenants. 
In September of 2003 Mr. Johnson left The Irvine Company to serve as Senior Vice 
President, Development with Hughes Investments. Mr. Johnson is responsible for all phases 
of acquisition and development of shopping centers throughout California, Utah, Washington 
and Idaho. Mr. Johnson is a member of ICSC and has attained his Senior Cel'tified Leasing 
Specialist "SCLS" credential. 
E. Comgensation Paid to Mr. Johnson: 
Mr. Johnson is employed by Hughes Investments, LLC. His only compensation is his 
regular salary paid by Hughes Investments, LLC. No additional or separate compensation is 
· being paid for his testimony. 
F. Publications Authored by Mr. Johnson in the Past Ten Years: None. 
G. List of Other Cases in Which Mr. Johnson has Testified as an Expert: None. 
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4) As an actor/viewer ''expert," Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover the testimony of 
persons, such as Reeslund and Johnson. See, U.S,C.A., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Notes of Advisory 
Cow_rnittee on Rules, 1970 Amendment at 114 (West 1995), 
5) Reservation. 
Defendant reserves the right to call additional expe1t witnesses, including fact and 
expert witnesses, identified through discovery by Defendant. Defendant also reserves the 
right to call any expert disclosed by Plaintiff through those certain expert disclosures filed by 
Plaintiff pursuant to the Comt's Uniform Pretrial Order and the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Defendant further reserves the right to supplement this response in a timely 
manner and upon proper motion to identify rebuttal expert witnesses should the same be 
necessary in light of Plaintiff's disclosures both through discove1y and Plaintiffs expert 
disclosures. 
DATED this 19th day of August, 2011. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
By: ~ 
D~~ce,ci;Finn 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 19111 day of August, 2011, I served a true and correct, copy of 
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV, York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 




Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
~land Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
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DEWITT M. "SKIP" SHERWOOD 
APPRAISER .QUALIFICATIONS 
No. 4332 P. 22/25 
Bachelor of Science Degree - Educatfon - University of Mont. - i 970 
Navigator Flight Training - USAF 1971 
30 Semester Hours - Masters Degree- Guidance & Counseling 
1973 - 1975 Central Michigan University & Chapman College 
Residentia] Appraisal - 1978 -Amerjcan-Institut.e of RE Appraisers 
Real Estate Law - 1978-Rockwell Institute 
Fundamentals of Real Estate Investment and Taxation - 1980 - CCIM 
Course 101 - National Association of Realtors 
Fundamentals of Real Estate Appraisal - 1997 - Mykut RE School 
USPAP 1991,1997, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2007 . 
IRS 1 OJI ·Exchanges & Chftritable Trusts - 1993 - NW Closing 
Commercial Real ·Estate Tax Update - 1994 - WA Assn. RE 
Marshall Swift Cost Analysis - 199$ -Appraisal Inst. 
Multifamily Appraisals - 1999 ~ McKissock Data 
Regression Ailalysis - 1999 - -McKissock Data 
Income Capitalization - 2002 - McKissock Data 
Disclosures and Disclaimers -2005 - McKissock Data 
Red Flags Property Inspection Guide - 2005 - Mykut RE School 
Emiironmental Issues in Real Estate Practice- 2005 - Mykut RE 
Valuation of Detrimental· Conditions in RE- 2007 - Appraisal Inst. 
BUSINESS HISTORY 
1971 - 1977 Na vi gator & Instmctor USAF 
1977 - 1979 Real Estate Sales, Crane & Ward Realtors, Spokane, WA 
1980 - 1984 Real Estate Sales, Wolff & Walker Realtors, Spokane 
1984 - 2005- Real Estate Appraising & Sales, Byrd RE Grp. LLC 
2005 - Present - Cornerstone Property Advjsors, Spokane, WA 
1977 - 1981 ·Mortgage &-Finance Committee, Spokane Brd. of RE 
1986 - Member of Commercial Multiple Listing Committee 
1986 - Instructor. for Metropolitan Mortgage - Financial Analysis 
1977 - P~esent- M~mber Spokane Assn. of Realtors 
1976--1994 - Officer Wash. Air National Guard, Retired Lt. Colonel 
2005 - Instructor - Lannan-Education Services - Eau Claire, WI 
1997 -Licensed General Appraiser, WA# 1100412 
2004-Licensed General Appraiser, ID #CGA 1125 
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SAMPLES OF APPRAISAL ASSIGNMENTS 
OU/"'\ /-.--"1 """"nl-_.,~ _,..,-~,l, ---.....-.o...--4-:.Bn ~-.-. "''n....;....._ .. -Yi' 1or.Ao....-r 
.l~V \_.l\;;'11 \;;\IUUv VVYH\,A~J p.1vp1,,,n1vo £.VI YO.UV\.l~ lvUUv•~ 
Non-conforming properties for various lenders 
Estate Appraisals - Commercial, Land, & Residential 
Internal Revenue Appraisals -All Types 
Feasibility Analysis for -Real Estate Investors 
Insurance Company Valuations -All Types 
Condemnation Appraisals;_ All Types 
No. 4332 P. 23/25 
Qualified as ·an Expert Witness - Superior Court of WA- Counties of 
Spokane; Adams, Grant, & Pend Oreille~. Su_perior Court of ID -
Bonner County 
PARTIAL LIST OF APPRAISAL CLIENTS 
Allied Insurance Company, Spokane Washington 
American States Insurance, Indianapolis, Indiana 
American West Bank, Spokane, Washington 
Burlington Northern Santa Fee Railroad 
Central Pre-Mix, Spokane, Washington 
City of Cheney, Washington 
City of Fairfield, Washington 
Farmers Insurance Group 
Farmers and Merchants Bank, Spokane, Washington 
General'Electric Coiporation, Kent, Washington 
GJobal Credit UnionJ Spokane, Washington 
Kaiser.Aluminum; Spokane,· Washington 
Marsh Insurance, Spokane, ·Washington 
Prudential Insurance Company) San Francisco, California 
SAFECO: Insurance,. Seattle, Washington 
Spokane County· Washington 
Tomlinson Black Realtors, -Spokane, Washington 
Unigard Insurance, Spokane, Washington 
US Bank, Spokane,. Washington 
United States ·Marshals Service 
Wheatland Bank, Spokane, Washington 
Numerous Attorneys & Accountants 
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Via Fax: 208-664-5884 and 
E-,mail: fim@,ramsdenlyons.com 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Nc>rthwest Blvd. 
Coeurd'Alene,Idaho 83814 
Re: ITD v. HJ Gratbol, et al. 
August 24, 201 l 
First Judicial District Court; Kootenai County 
Case No. CVl0-10095 
Dear Doug: 
MaryV. York 
Phone (208) 342-5000 
Fc1x (208) 343,8869 
myork@hollandhart.com 
This letter constitutes our efforts to "meet and confer" regarding the deficiencies in 
your Expert Witness Disclosure received August 19, 2011, prior to seeking intervention by the 
Court. 
First, your expert disclosures do not comply with the Court's Pretrial Order, nor do they 
comply with discQvery requirements. Under Idaho case law and the Court's order, expert 
opinions and the. bases of the. opinions ~ust be disclosed, whether formed for litigation or not. 
The Pretrial Order states: 
2. EXPERT WITNESSES: 
Not later than one hundred eighty (180) days before trial, 
Plantiff(s) shall disclose all experts to be called at trial. Not 
later than one hundrecJ fifty (1S()) days before, Defendalit(s) 
shall disclose all experts to be called at trbd. Rebuttal 
witnesses shall be disclosed by all parties not later than ninety 
(90) days before trial. Such disclo~ure shall consist of at least 
the information required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
26(b)(4)(i). Notice of compliance shall be contemporaneously 
filed with the Court. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b )( 4)(i} requires, among other things, the expert to 
disclos.e a "complete statement of all opinions to be expressed ~nd the basis and reasons 
therefore." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(i) states the following: 
Holland &Hart u.,, 
( 4) Trial preparation--Experts. Discovery of facts known and 
opinions held by experts1 expected to testify, otherwise 
Phone [208] 342:·S.OOO Fax [WSJ 343:8869 www.hollandhart.com 
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MICHAliL li. IIAMSD£N• 
MARC A. LYONS" 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
ATTORNBYS AT LAW 
P.O. BO,C tl!U STRl:'.l!T AD DR.l!SS: 
DOIi GLASS. MARPICI!" 
MICH.Ali!. A. £ALY" 
Ti!llRANCB R. HARRIS• 
CHll.lS'1'0PllllR D, CADDERT 
TH BRON J. Dt SMET 
COliUR D'ALENE, 10 83816-1336 
7 00 NO RT·H.WEST BLVO, 
CDl!UR D'ALl!N£. II> 63814 
TKLBl'HDN1l, (2118) 664-.SOJO 
FACSIMILE; {2011) 66'4·$1184 
&-MAIS.: nrn1@r&n1.rd.,nlyons,co·m 
W!!BSITI!: ,.,..,.,_tatru4~Alfons.c·om 
ALL AT'TORNliVS l;IC6NS£ll IN IOAIIO 
• LICl!tl'SllO IN WASIIINOTON 
WILLIAM F, IIOYD, 01' COUNSBL 
MatyV. York 
Holland & Hal't, LLP 
P .0. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701 
August 29. 2011 
Re: The State of Idaho v. HJ Grathol, et al. 
Kootenai Co. Case No. CV-10-10095 
Dear Mary, 
Viaf(lcsimile (208) 343-8869 
We have reviewed your correspondence dated July 22, 2011 taking exception to 
Defendant Grathol's discovery responses and the letter of August 24, 2011 over your 
signature concerning the expert witness disclosure we filed and served August 19, 2011. I 
will address the points in the ordel' pl'esented in your letters: 
I) Expert witnesses. Grathol's recent expert witness disclosures should have addressed 
your concerns as to the identity of our anticipated testifying opinion witnesses. The 
disclosure filed on August 19, 201 I complies with the Pretrial Order and contains all 
of the information required by Rule 26(b)(4)(i), Referring specifically to the August 
241h letter (signed by Mr. Tollefson on your behalf), nothing in the Pretrial Order or 
the State Court Rules requires a testifying expert to prepare a formal, written repo1t, 
''Full and complete disclosures as required by the Court's Order ...• , were1 in fact, 
made lo the expert witness disclosu1·e. Nevertheless, Skip Sherwood is p1·epat'ing· a 
report, the contents of which will comport to the disclosure and will be pl'Ovided to 
you once it is completed. 
2) Interrogatory No. 8. - We have produced the documents describing the purchase of 
the subject property and all te1·ms related thereto. It appears that you are more 
precisely seeking information regarding the ownership of the property by HJ Grathol, 
instead of the acquisition of the property by Hughes Investments. As such, your 
inquiry focuses on the relationship between the two entities, which have been 
EXHIBIT 
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described in our answer to Interrogatory No. 16, and a supplemental answer dated 
May 16, 2011. If this response does not adequately address the information you are 
seeking please let us know. 
3) Interrogatory No. 9. - The- property has been fully evaluated by Skip Sherwood and 
his opinions and the basis for bis opinions were included in Defendant's Expert 
Witness Disclosure, Because Mr. She1wood is the only retained valuation expert we 
anticipate calling to testify, his opinions and the basis for them are the only facts 
discoverable. Appraisals, if any, prepare b-y non·testifying expert witnesses and 
consultants are not discoverable. 
4) Interrogatory No. 14. - .Your interrogatory was compound. It asked whether 
defendant made any offers to sell m: received any offers to buy the property. Grathol 
reSponded to th~ 1·equest indicating that it has not received any formal, written offers 
for the purchase of the StJbject Property (other than ITD's "offer'} It has, however, 
marketed the property for sale or lease as the answer described. Please make an effort 
to read the subject discove1y before complaining about the adequacy of the response. 
5) Inten·ogatozy No. 16. - Additional information responsive to this l'equest was 
provided to your office on May 16, 20111 via Defendant HJ Orathol's Supplemental 
Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of interrogatories and Request for 
Production of Documents, Please make an effort to read the discovery before. 
including the supplemental r~sponses, befote complaining about the adequacy of the 
response. 
6) Request for Production No. 5. - Discoverable info1mation responsive to this Request 
for Production was set forth in Defehdant's Expert Witness Disclosure. To the extent 
that Defendants specifically retained or consulted with other experts who are not 
expected to testify, such jnfonnation is precluded from discovery by application of 
IRCP 26(b)(4)(B). To the extent the Defendant's anticipated testifying expert has 
appraised other properties; those docQments are not discoverable in this case. 
7) Request for Production No. 9. - lnfonnation re$ponsive to this request was included 
in Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure, including compensation to be paid for 
testimony by the expe1t. Any other compensation agreements with experrs not 
expected to testify are precluded from discovery by application ofIRCP 26(b)(4)(B). 
8) Request for Production No, 13. -There are no discoverable documents responsive to 
this Request. 
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9) Request for Productions Nos, 14 and 16, -As stated, the materials responsive to this 
req~est may contain attomey-clie,i.t privileged materials, if they contained internal 
privileged discussions of the legal implications involved with acquisition, 
development and or/zoning changes. Notwithstanding the stated objection, all 
responsive matel'ials were provided. 




September 1, 2011 
Via Fax: 208-664-5884 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Re: ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al. 
Dear Chris: 
First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County 
Case No. CVl0-10095 
Idaho Court of Appeals Docket No. 38511-2011 
Ted S. Tollefson 
Phone (208) 342-5000 
Fax (208) 343-8869 
tstollefson@hollandhart.com 
Enclosed please find deposition notices for both Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson. 
Given the lack of information provided in your expert disclosure, it is necessary that we 
depose these two expert witnesses so that we may be able to provide rebuttal reports as 
required by Judge Haynes' pretrial order. 
We have set the depositions for the 12th and the 13th of September in Coeur d' 
Alene. Please advise if these dates are impossible for Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson. We 
can move the deposition dates if necessary, but they need to happen quickly so we can 
attempt to comply with Judge Haynes' pretrial order. 




Holland & Hart LLP 
Phone [208] 342·5000 Fax [208) 343-8869 www.hollandhart.com 
# 
Ted S. Tollef: 
of Holland & Hart u.P 
101 South Capitol Boulevard Suite 1400 Boise, ID 83702 Malllng Address P.O. Box 2527 Boise, ID 83701-2527 
EXHIBIT 
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ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
MICIIAl!L I!. RAMSD'l!lf" 
MARC A. I.VONS• 
DOUGA.ASS. MAllfllC1>• 
MICHAEL A, !!ALY* 
tSIIIIANCE lL MAlllts• 
CHRISTOPHBA D. GADBBII.T 
THERON J. o, $M2T 
P.O. 00,l( 1336 
COEUR b'ALEIU!, ID e:J916•i336 
STREET ADOl\&SS: 
7D0 HDltKWBST BLYO. 
CO!UP. D'AL£~£. ID 83814 
'rEL£PHONl!z (208') 664-611.8 
P.ACSIMILli, (208) 664-511114 
l!-f•fAILs fltm•r•maditnlroH.~0111 
W&B'SITEl www.nm1denl7ons.com 
ALL ATTOlltlEYS LICl!tfSED IN IDAIIO 
• l.lCIUIS61) llf WASHINGTON 
WILLIAM P. IO'YD. OP COONSl!t. 
Ted S. Tollefson 
Holland & Hart, LLP 
P.O. Box2527 
Bois·e, l]) 8.3701 
September 6, 2011 
Re! The State of Idaho v. HJ Grathol et al. 
Kootenai Co. Case No. CV-10-10095 
Dear Ted! 
Via facsimile {208) 343-8869 
We are in receipt of your correspondence dated September 1, 201 l and the 
accompanying Notice's of Deposition Duces Tecum for Alan Johnson and GeoffReeslund. 
These wel'e unilaterally scheduled for September 12th and 131b in Coeur d'Alene. Idaho. Both 
persons are owners of the Defende.nt entity and, as such, the duces tecum aspect of the 
deposition Notices are subject to the timing requirements of Rule 34. 
Neither Mr. Johnson nor Mr. Reeslund is available on such short noU-ce to a-nend 
these depositions. Because the deposition Notices do not comply wlth Idaho's Rules of Civil 
Procedu~. we will not be able to produce any documents at the time and place noted. 
Mr. Reeslund is available on October S, 6, 25 or 26 as an alternative. Mr. Johnson 
has additional availability. Please provide your availability and we will work to 
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MARC A. LYONS• 
DOUGLASS, MARPICI!• 
MICHA!iL A. £ALY• 
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CHRISTOPKl!:R D. GABDl!:RT 
THl!RONI.DESMET 
WILLIAM I'- BOYP, 01' COUl'.ISEL 
MaryV. York 
Holland & Hart, LLP 
P.O. Box:2527 
Boise> ID ·83701 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
l'.O, BO.JC 1336 
C08Ull D'AL8MI. ID 1131Jt6·l316 
TBLBPtlONB: (208) ISH•S818 
l'ACSIMILl!i (208) 66"4-S88½ 
Ii-MAIL, flrm~tam.sd~nlyoqs,cor<1 
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September 19, 2011 
Re: The State of Idaho v. HJ Grathol, et al. 
Kootenai Co. Case No. CV-10-10095 
Dear Mary, 
STlll!BT l\l>l>Rl!SSI 
700 NORTIIWl!ST BLVD. 
tOl!UR O'AI.ENE.10 tlJBH 
ALL l'TTORNl!YS LICENSED IN iDAHO 
• LlCllNSl!D IN WASHINCTOII 
Viafacsimile (208) 343-8869 
Letter Only 
This correspondence is in follow up to our telephone conversation on Friday. 
September 9, 2011, regarding various ongoing discovery issues. I will attempt to address our 
discussion in the order presented to the best of my recollection. 
. 1. Ongoing Discovery: 
First, enclosed herewith please find Defendant's Second Supplemental Discovery 
Responses. Included with these responses is a copy of the recently completed appraisal 
report of Dewitt Sherwood. The contents of the report are entirely consistent with the Expert 
Witness Disclosure previously filed. This report should alleviate your client's concerns with 
respect to Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure, dated August 19. 2011. We stand on our 
position that IRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(i) does not require such a report to be created. Further. 
contrary to Mr. Tollefson's letter of August 24, 20111 the Court's Uniform Pretrial Order did 
not require that such a report be created or disclosed by the expert witness deadline. Instead, 
the· Pretrial Order simply requires disclosure of the information listed in Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) 
which we have done. Nonetheless, Mr, Sherwood had completed a report, which you now 
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Second, I included in Defendant's Second Supplemental Discovery Responses some 
additional information in light of our discussions. I included a supplemental response to 
Inte1Togatory No, 8 pertaining to the cash purchase of the property and a reference to the 
Phase I Environmental Site Assessment and Phase II Completion Certificate which were 
previously produced. There are no other terms or conditions related to the purchase of the 
property. I also supplemented our Response to Interrogatory No. 9 that there were no 
appraisals performed on the Subject Property when our client acquired it The supplemental 
response to Interrogatory No. 14 describes marketing discussions and inquiries about the 
property. Again, I reiterated that no offers were made/received. 
With respect to Request for Production No. 5, (appraisals performed by Mr. 
Sherwood during the previous five years). Defendant stands· on its prior response that it does 
not have any documents responsive to this request To the extent such documents exist, they 
would likely either be in the possession of Mr. Sherwood or the persons who commissioned 
them and subject to the ownership interests of whatever client or entity employed Mr. 
Sherwood to conduct them, Howeverl Defendant does not own or have in its possession 
such materials, therefore, canlt produce them. 
With respect to Request for Production No. 13, we will supplement this request with 
additional materials, as necessary. As to Request for Production Nos, 14 and 16, there are no 
additional materials responsive to this request. 
2. Johnson and Reeslund as Opinion Witnesses: 
Defendant disclosed "Mr. Johnson and Mr. R.eeslund as "expert witnesses" m order to 
comply with the Court's Uniform Pretrial Order. However, these individuals are not '~expert 
witnesses,, in the traditional sense of a Rule 26(b )( 4)(A)(i) disclosure. They fall within the 
''actor/viewer exception" possessing information not acquired in preparation for litigation, 
but instead are actors/viewers with respect to the occurrences that are part of the subject 
matter of this litigation- specifically the history, development, construction and value ofthe 
subject property. See, Notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, Subdivision (b){4). 
These "experts" are to be treated as ordinary witnesses1 and as such, Mr, Tollefson's 
assertions that our Disclosure with respect to these individuals fails to comply with Rule 
26(b)(4)(A)(i) is without merit, Out of an abundance of caution. these individuals were 
identified because they will testify as to tlieir opinions concerning the Subject Property, 
including their opinions of its potential· developability and its value before and after 
condemnation. These opinions might constitute what is traditionally thought of as uexpert'1 
testimony because their opinions are based upon specialized .knowledge, experience and 
expertise, but that fact alone does not subject them to Rule 26(b)(4(A)(i) considerations. 
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No. 4778 P. 4 
You indicated that you desire to depose Mr. Johnson and Mr. Reeslund and we 
provided their availability to do so on October 51\ 61\ 25th and 26th• With respect to your 
request that all of their opinions be disclosed to you, that information may be discovered 
through their depqsitions which you are entitled to talce, Their opinions will be based on 
their observations and familiarity with the property, their experience and history in 
commercial developments and on the documentary materials previously produced and 
disclosed to you. 
We do not agree that your request for infonnation concerning other (unrelated) 
projects with which our clients have been involved are either relevant or discoverable, but in 
the interest of avoiding any further arguments, we will produce that infonnation to you and 
are compiling the supplemental information. 
Pl.ease let us know when you would like to take these depositio 
your consideration. 




September 20, 2011 
VIA FACSIMILE 
(208) 664-5884 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Re: ITD v. HJ Grathol, et aL 
Dear Chris: 
First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County 
Case No. CVI0-10095 
Idaho Court of Appeals Docket No.38511.:2011 
Maryv. York 
Phone (208) 342-5000 
Fax (208) 343.-8869 
myork@hollandhart.com 
We received your letter from yesterday afternoon regarding the parties' continuing dispute 
over HJ Grath.ol' s expert disclosures and other discovery issues. Since your faxed letter did not 
include the appraisal report of Mr. Sherwood or Grathol' s supplemental discovery responses, we 
are unable to respond to the sufficiency of the information provided. We will review and respond 
to those documents once they are received. 
With respect to the expert opinions of Mr. Johnson and Mr. Reeslund~ it appears from 
your letter that the discovery responses being produced do not contain the opinions of these 
experts. Your explanation for the reason why the opinions are not being produced does not excuse 
the withholding of these individual's expert opinions. 
The Court's Pretrial Order establishes the minimum requirements for expert disclosures, 
stating that "such disclosure shall consist of at least the information required to be disclosed 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i)." It does not excuse any particular type of expert from the 
requirements of the Order. Instead, it specifically requires that the expert disclosures shall include 
at least the information required llllder Rule 26(b)(4). In ordet for any witness to offer opinion 
testimony, the opinions must be disclosed in advance- as required by the Court's scheduling order 
and the Idaho Rules. 
Additionally, despite your contention that these individuals are "actor/viewer'' exper-1.S 
and are therefore not subject to the requirements of Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i)-a contention with which 
ITD disagrees-ITD has specifically requested in discovery a complete statement of these 
individuals' opinions, the substance of their opinions, the basis and reasons for their opinions, and 
the underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based. ITD's First Set of Discovery, at 
Interrogatory 2. Regardless of how these individuals are characterized, Grathol is still required to 
Holland&Hartu., 
Phone [208] 342-5000 Fax [208] 343-8869 www.hollandhart.com 
EXHIBIT 
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SJ 
Aspen Boulder Carson City Colorado Springs Denver Denver Tech Center Bilfings Boise Cheyenne Jackson Hole Las Vegas Reno Sak Lake City Santa Fe j N 
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comply with the Idaho Rnles of Civil Procedure and to provide supplemental responses to 
discovery. IRCP 26( e )(1 )(B). Moreover~ to the extent that any of these individual's opinions were 
developed in anticipation oflitigation, those opinions are subject to disclosure under Rule 26(b)(4). 
We renew our request that Grathol comply with the Court's Pretrial Order and also 
supplement its discovery responses to provide a complete statement of Mr. Reeslund's and 
Mr. Johnson's opinions, the sµbstance of their opinions, the basis and reasons for their opinions, 
and the underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based. We intend to proceed with 
a motion to exclude these experts from testifying or, in the alternative, to compel the disclosure of 
their opinions. 
If you would like to discuss this matter further, please feel free to contact me. 
'fe tnily yours, _ · 
Mary . ork 




m:Naomi T. Pratt To:Clerk (12084461188) 
LAWRENCEG.WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #S923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-881S 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V. York (ISB #5020) 
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Banlc Pl~ 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-S000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ ORA THOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SA VINOS BANK, a Washinmon 
corporation; and DOES I through S, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF HIARING -1 
Case No. CVI0-1O095 
NOTICE OF liEARIN~ 
232 of 1617
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT the hearing on Plaintiff Idaho Transportation 
Board's ("ITD") Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony or Alternatively, to Compel Expert 
Disclosures is set for Wednesday, October 19, 2011, at 3:30 p.m. Pacific Standard Time, or 
as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, before the Honorable Lansing L. Haynes, located at 
324 W. Garden Ave. Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816. 
DATED this 26th day of September, 2011. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 26th day of September 2011, I caused to be served a true and 
cattect copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d' Alenei ID 83816-1336 
Fax: 208-664-5884 
Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol 
5242358 _I .DOC 
NOTICE OF HEARING· 3 
D U.S.Mail 
D Hand Delivered 
IZI Fax 
0 E-mail 
D Overnight UPS 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Dougias S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
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IN THE DISTRICT COTJRT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GR.ATHOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VINOS BANK, 
a Washington corporation; and DOES 1 
through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
DISCOVERY RESPONSES 
TO: CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 28th day of September, 2011, that Defendant 
HJ Grathol, by and through their attorney, Douglas S. Marfice of the firm Ramsden & Lyons, 
LLP did serve a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol 's Answers and Responses to 
Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production, together with a copy of 
this Notice, upon counsel for Plaintiff by facsimile and/or depositing the same in the United 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES - I ORIGINAL 
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States Mail, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, postage pre-paid. 
DATED this 28th day of September, 2011. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
By: a:,,tL '?5:: ~ 
Doug~ Nfarfice, Of theinn 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 28 th day of September, 2011, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas Vus Mail 
Deputy Attorney General __ Overnight Mail 
Idaho Transportation Department Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 7129 __ Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES - 2 
/US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
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OCT. 3. 2011 3:46PM 
LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V. York (ISB #5020) 
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: 2rnu...a%~,u.__ 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SA VINOS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES l through S, 
Defendants. 
NOUCE OF SERVICE -1 
Case No. CV10~10095 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
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OCT. 3.2011 3:47PM NO. 3356 P. 3 
Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, notice is hereby given by the 
undersigned counsel that a copy of Plaintiff's First Supplemental Responses to Defendant 
HJ Grathol's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Plaintiff, 
along with a copy of this Notice, was served via U.S. Mail upon the attorneys listed on the 
attached Certificate of Service on October 3, 2011. 
DATED this 3rd day of October, 2011. 
NOTICE OF SERVICE • 2 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
B 
ed S. To efs , or the firm 
MaryV. Yo , of the firm 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Idaho Transportation Department 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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OCT. 3. 2011 3:47PM NO. 3356 P. 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of October, 2011, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
f"l.-Mstn-1..e• 'I"\ t"'....,.LL-_. ~~­
._,llh •uj-"il ~ J.', V"UUIJU-, .C.l:iY,, 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Fax: 208-664-5884 
Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol 
5248622_1.DOC 
NOTICE OF SERVICE • 3 
~ U.S.Mail 
0 Hand Delivered 
D Fax 
D E-mail 
D Overnight UPS 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Dougias S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VINOS BANK, 
a Washington corporation; and DOES 1 
through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
DISCOVERY RESPONSES 
TO: CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 6th day of October, 2011, that Defendant HJ 
Grathol, by and through their attorney, Christopher D. Gabbert of the firm Ramsden & Lyons, 
LLP did serve a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol 's Third Supplemental Answers 
and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents, together with a copy of this Notice, upon counsel for Plaintiff by depositing the 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES - I ORIGINAL 
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same in the United States Mail, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, postage pre-paid. 
DATED this 6th day of October, 2011. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
· topher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of October, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas ~ Mail 
Deputy Attorney General __ Overnight Mail 
Idaho Transportation Department Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 7129 __ Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & ILA.RT, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES - 2 
~SMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
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LAWRENCEG.WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STA TE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy Attorney Generai 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise> Idaho 83 707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V. York (ISB #5020) 
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
l O 1 South Capitol Boulevatd 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208)342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ ORA THOL, a California gen~ral partnership;. 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporatiQn~. and DOES 1 through S,_ 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVI 0-10095 
P~TIFF ITD'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S 
MOTION TO COMPEL 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT HJ GRA TBOL'S MOTION TO 
COMPEL-1 
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Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ltD') submits this response to 
Defendant HJ Grathol's ("Grathol") Motion to Compel. 
l. INTRODUCTION 
Grathol has filed a Motion to Compel the production of documents and information 
related to the construction of Sylvan/Roberts Road. Orathol 's Motion to Compel should be 
denied because the Court has already ruled that !TD is l)Ot condemning any property for 
Sylvan/Roberts Road and ITD is not construeting Sylvan/Roberts Road across the Grathol 
Property. Therefore, in continuing to pursue discovery based on Sylvan/Roberts Road, Grathol 
is defying the Court's ruling striking that issue from the case. 
Information related to Sylvan/Roberts Roaq is irrelevant and outside the scope of the sole 
issue to be tried in this matter - the amount of just compensation to be paid for the property lTD 
is condemning for the US 9S Project and severance damages, if any~ to the remaining property 
resulting from the condelilnation of that property. Grathol is barred by law from recovering or 
attempting to recover compensation for properly not being taken or severance damages arising 
from property not being taken. Therefore, Grathol's motion to compel responses to discovery 
relating to its claim based on Sylvan/Roberts Road should be denied. 
Giatho) 's motion also seeks to compel the production of documents related to soil testing 
performed on Grathol's property. This issue has been resolved between the parties. Once 
Grathol clarified the information sought in its discovery requests, ITO produced the requested 
information on October 3, 2011. 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S MOTION TO . . 
COMPEL-2 
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Il. FACTS 
A. Grathol Requests Information Regarding Sylvan/Roberts Road Despite The Fact 
That ITD Is Not Condemning Any Portion Of Gnthol'• Property For 
Sylvan/Roberts Road. 
On May 12, 2011 Grathol propounded discovery in which it sought information relating 
to Sylvan/Roberts Road. Defendant HJ Grathol's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production of Documents to Plaintiff ITD ("GrathQl 's First Set of Discovery"). On July 8, 2011 
ITD served its responses in which it produced 4799 pages of documents. ("Discovery 
Response''). 
As part of its Discovery Response, IID objected to Orathol's discovery requests telating 
to Sylvan/Roberts Road (Interrogatories Nos. 10 and 11 and Requests for Productions Nos. 20, 
27, 28, 29 and 30). JTD's objection is based on the Court's ruling defining the scope of the 
talcing and holding that ITD is not taking any of Graihors property for Sylvan/Roberts Road. 
Specifically, in granting ITD possession of the property being condemned for the US 95 Project, 
the Court ruled that ITD is not condemning any of Grathol's property for the construction of 
Sylvan/Roberts Road and ITD is not constructing Sylvan/Roberts Road across Grathol's 
property. These findings and the Court's ruling are ~sed on the Complaint and administrative 
Order of Condemnation, as well as affidavits submitted by ITD engineers and the sworn 
testimony of the ITD Project Engineer at the possession hearing. See Transcript of Hearing on 
ITD's.Motion for Possession ofReal'Pro.perty-("Possessfon Hearing Tr.j1 at 61:2·25. 
Specifically, the Court ruled~ in part: 
The order of condemnation does not provide or in this court '.s 
1 The relevant exceipt from the Possession Hearmg·transcript is attached as Exhibit A to the 
Affidavit of Mary V. York in Support of Plaintiff's. lTD' s Response to Defendant HJ GratholJ s 
Motion to Compel ('York Aff."). 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S MOTION TO 
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opinion does not provide for the taking of the defendant's property 
for the expansion of the Sylvan Road and Roberts Road. The 
contemplation of the expansion of Sylvan Road to link to Roberts 
Road is certainty mentioned in the order of condemnation, but 
mote importantly, the complaint does not contemplate the 
extension of that road, and that is not the subject of the taking that 
is before this court. The Idaho Department of Transportation has 
offered to expand those roads through Grathol' s property -· rather~ 
the Sylvan Road expansion through Grathol's property, but that 
offer has been declined by the defendant and this has been testified 
to amply before the Court today and in Mr. Minzghor's deposition. 
This court finds; then, that plaintiffs' complaint to comply 
with Idaho code section 7-707. The complaint itself: the 
controlling portions of that complaint, does not show a taking of 
defendants' property for the expansion of Sylvan Road into 
Roberts Road or the expansion of Sylvan Road through the Gra,thol 
property; therefore, this court finds that the scope of the proposed 
taking is adequately defined in the complaint itself. 
Possession Hearing Ti. at 61 :2-25. Further, the Court's Order Granting Possession of Real 
Property granted ITD. possession of the property described in Exhibit A to the Complaint, which 
consists only of the property needed for the US 95 Project and does not include any for 
construction of any portion of Sylvan/Roberts Road. 
Based upon and consistent with the Co\lrt's rulings, ITD objected to Interrogatories Nos. 
10 and 11, as well as Requests for Productions Nos. 20, 27, 281 29 and 30 on the grounds that 
since ITD is not acquiring any of Grathol's property for the construction of Sylvan/Roberts Road 
and the sole issue for trial in this case is the amount of just compensation to which Grathol is 
entitled as a result of the property that is being taken, Otathol's requests were contrary to the 
·Court's ruling. irrelevant, and beyond the -scope of permissible disco.very. 
Grathol. responded to ITD's· objections in a letter of July 21, 2011, in which it argued that 
"[t]he ·expansion and development of additional property belonging to our client on the same 
parcel ofland is certainly within the scope ofpermi$$ible discovery for a valuation on damages." 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S MOTION TO 
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Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Support of Motion to Compel (''Gabbert Aff."), Ex. A. In 
a response letter dated July 29, 2011 ITD corrected several errors in Grathol's July 21, 2011 
letter and also reiterated that, in accordance with the Court's order, ITO is not condemning any 
of Grathol's property for Sylvan/Roberts Road and requests for infonnation related to that road is 
irrelevant and beyond the scope of the case as defined by the facts and the ruling of the Cowt. 
Gabbert AfI., Ex. C. 
After ITD's letter, on August 3,2011, Grathol filed a public records request with Im and 
requested, among other things, the attorney fees incurred by ITO in this condemnation action and 
appeal, and documents related to Sylvan/Roberts Road. Affidavit of Alan Johnson in Support of 
Motion to Compel ("Johnson Aff."), Ex. A. The Office of Communications Manager of ITD 
denied the request based on Idaho Code § 9-343, which fQrbids the use of public records requests 
to "supplement, augment, substitute or supplant discovery procedures" in a civil proceeding, and 
the fact that Grathol' s request was clearly related to the present condemnation action. Id., Ex. B; 
J.C. §9-343. 
B. ITD Complied with Gratbol's Discovery Requests Regard~g Soil Test Logs. 
In addition to seeking information regarding Sylvan/Roberts Road, Grathol also sought 
discovery of ~il testing and soil log information and gravel estimates and value for the property. 
See Requests for Production Nos. 7 and 23. As part oflTD's July 8, 2011 Discovery Response, 
ITD obj~ed to Gtathors Requests for Production Nos. 7 and 23 on the grounds that the 
requests were ambiguous and subject to differing interpretations. York Aff.,, 5. Nevertheless. 
ITO produced more tha,n 3000 pages of environmental documents which ITO believed were 
responsive to Orathol's request. See Response to Request for Production No. 7; York Aff.,.1 S. 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT BJ GRA THOL'S MOTION TO 
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In a July 21, 2011 letter, Grathol requested additional information relating to Requests for 
Production Nos. 7 and 23. Grathol stated, 
Additionally, certain documents and data that were requested were 
not provided. That information includes soil testing infonnation, 
grading and elevation plans, and correspondence/agreements wi'1t 
other public entities relative to Sylvan Road Extension plans. (See, 
Requests for Production Nos. 7, 23, 27, 28 29, and 30). 
Gabbert Aff., Ex. A. 
During a meet-and-confer telephone conference, Grathol's counsel later explained its 
broad request and stated that that it was looking for the results of soil testing done on its 
property. York Aff., 17. Grathol also provided additional detail regarding its requests as part of 
its Motion to Compel. See Motion to Compel at 6-7. Once Grathol had clarified what it was 
seeking in its request, ITO researched. the issue and found that American Geotechnics had done 
testing on Grathol's property as part of the US 95 Project. See York Aff., 'u'il 7, 8. On October 3, 
2011, ITD provided Grathol with the report prepared by American Geotechnics. York Aff. 1 9. 
Ill. ARGUMENT 
A. Grathol is Only Elititled To Pursue Discovery That Is Reasonably Calculated To 
Lead To Admissible Evidence. 
In accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Grathol may obtain discovery 
regarding any matter, not privileged, "which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action." Idaho R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l). Grathol is also entitled to information if it appeais 
·"reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Idaho R. Civ. P. 
26(bX1). 
In Villa Highlands1 UC v. Western Community 111$. Co., 148 Idaho 598,609,226 P.3d 
540, 551 (2010), the ld~o Supreme Court ~held a trial court's denial of a motion to compel on 
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the grounds that the information sought was outside the scope of the issues remaining for trial. 
Id at 609,226 P.3d at 551. Here, Grathol is only entitled to compensation for prQperty that is 
being taken and damages resulting from the taking of that property, and that property alone. No 
property is being taken for the construction of Sylvan/Roberts Road. Therefore, information 
relating to Sylvan/Roberts road is irrelevant and Gtathol's continued pursuit of this issue is 
contrary to the Court's ruling in the case. Accordingly, Grathol's motion should be denied. 
B. The Only Remaining Issue For Trial Is The Amout Of Just Compensation To Be 
Paid For The Property Condemned For The US 95 Projed. 
In an eminent domain proceeding, the Court determines the scope of the taking and the 
nature of the property interest taken. Once the trial court has made these findings, the sole 
remaining issue left for trial is for the jury to decide the amount of just compensation for the 
value of the property taken and severance damages, if any, caused by that taking~ City of 
Lewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 851, 853 P.2d 596 (Ct. App., 1993) (citing Tibbs v. City of 
Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667~ 670,603 P.2d 1001, 1004 (1979)). 
Here, the Court has alread.y determined the scope of the taking and has concluded that the 
taking is limited to property needed by ITD for the Athol lnterchange for the US 95 Project, as 
described in ITD's Complaint. Possession Tr. 61:23-25 ("therefore, this court fmds that the 
.scope of the proposed talcing is adequately defined in the complaint itself."). Thus, the only 
remaining i~sue is the amount of just compensation owed to Grathol for that talcing- that is, the 
taking ofthe property defined in the Complaint, and not any property relating to Sylvan/Roberts 
Road. 
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1. The subject matter of this action and the issues to be tried are limited to a 
determination of just compensation for the property taken and sevennce 
damages to the remainder caused by the taking. 
Consistent with the express provisions ofldaho's Constitution and case law, 
compensation may be had only for property that is ''taken." Idaho Const. Art. I, § 14; Moon v. 
North Idaho FarmersAss'n, 140 Idaho 536, 541-542, 96 P.3d 637, 642-643(2004) (citing 
Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 717, 781, 53 P.3d 828,832 (2002); Powell v. 
McKt1lvey, 56 Idaho 291,307, 53 P.2d 626, 632-33 (1935)). 
ldaho' s eminent domain statutes specifically provide that a landowner is entitled to 
~es only for property taken. I.C. § 7-711. Section 7-711 states, in relevant part: 
7-711. Assessment of damages.- The co~ jury or referee must 
hear such legal tt$timony as· may be offered by any of the parties 
to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess: 
1. The value of the property sought to be 
eondemned, and all improvements thereon pertaining to the realty, 
and of each and every separate estate or interest therein; if it 
consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and each 
estate or interest therein shall be separately assessed. For purposes 
of ascertaining the value of the property, the minimum atnount for 
damages shall be the greater of the assessed value for property tax 
JlwPOSCS unless the court, jury or referee fmds the property has 
been altered substantially, or the plaintiffs highest prelitigation 
appraisal. 
I.C. § 7-711 (emphasis added). If only part of the property is talc.en then the landowner is also 
entitled to <hunages to the remainder which were caused by the taking of a portion of the 
property and the construction of the project in the manner proposed by the plaintiff. I.C. § 7-
711(2). Idaho Code§ 7-711(2), states in relevant part: 
2. If the property sought to- be condemned constitutes only 
a part of a larger parc~l: (a) the damages which will accrue to the 
portion not sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance 
from the portion sought- to be condemned, and the construction of 
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the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff; 
I.C. § 7-711 (2). Thus, once it is established that a taking has occurred and the scope of that 
taking, then only remaining issue is the amount of just compensation for that taking. 
2. The scope of the taking has been fully determined in this case, and there is lio 
taking of Gnthol's property for Sylvan/Roberts Road. 
This Court has concluded that based upon the Complaint, the administrative Ordet of 
Condemnation, testimony at length from ITD Project Engineer Mr. Jason Minzghor, and the 
complete record in this case, that ITD is not condemning any of Grathol 's property for 
Sylvan/Roberts Road and IID is not constructing Sylvan/Roberts Road across Grathol's 
property. Possession Hearing Tr. at 61 :2-25; see also January 27, 2011 Order Granting 
Possession of Real Property. The. scope of the taking in this case has already been established. 
Possession Tr. 61 :23-25 ("therefore, this court finds that the scope of the proposed talcing is 
adequately defined in the complaint itself.''). This Court ruled, in part: 
The order of condemnation does not provide or in. this court's 
opinion does not provide for the taking of the defendant's property 
for the expansion of the Sylvan Road and Roberts Road. The 
contemplation of the expansion of Sylvan Road to link to Roberts 
Road is certainly mentioned in the order of condemnation, but 
more importantly, the complaint does oot contemplate the 
extension of that road, and that is l)Ot the sµbject of the taking that 
is before this court. The Idaho Department of Transportation has 
offered to expand those roads through Grathol's property - rather~ 
the Sylvan Road expansion through Grathol's property, but that 
offer has been declined by the defendant and this has been testified 
to amply before the Court today and in Mr. Minzghor's deposition. 
This court finds, then, that plaintiff's' complaint to comply 
with Idaho code section 7-707. The complaint itsel( the 
controlling portions of that complaint, does not show ·a taking of 
defendants' property for the expansion of Sylvan Road into Roberts 
Road or the expansion of Sylvan Road through the Oratbol 
property; therefore, this court finds that the scope of the proposed 
taking is adequately defined in the complaint it$Clf. 
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Possession Hearing Tr. at 61 :2-25. Therefore, since a taking has been established and the scope 
of that taking has been determined, the sole issue left to be decided is just compensation for the 
property taken - that is, for the acquisition of property for the Athol Interchange on U.S. 95. 
Grathol's Motion to Compel regarding Sylvan/Roberts Road has been brought in disregard of the 
Court's order. To the extent the Motion represents an attempt to re-litigate the issue, it is 
improper, particularly since Grathol bas pursued an interlocutory appeal of the Court's ruling. 
3. Information related to property not being taken is not discoverable because 
no compemation can be recovered for property not taken. 
Grathol's requests for documents regarding Sylvan/Roberts Road are not relevant to illlY 
issue left in the case. The one issue remaining issue for trial is just compensation, and no 
compensation can be recovered for property that has not been condemned. Nor are Grathol 's 
discovery requests reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. As addressed above, 
Grathol mayonly obtain infonnation "which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action" or discovery "reasonably" calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence." Idaho R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l). Since no compensation can be recovered for property not 
taken, discovery concerning property not taken is not relevant to the issue of just compensation 
at trial. 
In its Motion to Compel, Grathol argues that it is also entitled to the details of 
negotiations and cQrrespondence regarding Sylvan/Roberts Road as it relates to other property 
owners. As the Court found, Gratbol refused ITD'·s offer to constr11ct Sylvan/Roberts Road 
across its. property. However, other property owners approached. ITO and requested that ITD 
construct the road across their property so that they CQuld have another means of acc·ess to the 
public road system. As demonstrated at the hearing on 1he Motion for Possession, 
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Sylvan/Roberts Road does not need to extend across the Grathol property in order for other 
property owners to make use of the road across their property. According, Grathol bas not and 
can.not explain how documents relating to negotiations with o1her property owners, who have 
requested that Sylvan/Roberts Road be extended across their properties, are discoverable in 
determining just compensation for the property being condemned by ITD on the Grathol 
property. 
Grathol also argues that the reference to Sylvan/Roberts Road in Jason Minzghor's expert 
disclosure makes discovery on this issue permissible. Jason Minzghor"s expert disclosure makes 
clear that he is prepared to testify regarding Sylvan/Roberts Road only in the event that Grathol 
is permitted t() continue to pursue an issue that the Court has struck from the case, and to clear up 
Grathol's continued confusion on this issue. Mr. Minzghor's expert disclosure st.ates: 
Grathol bas apparently been confused by negotiations among ITD, 
Ll}kes Highwlly District, and. other property owners in the area 
regarding the potential extension of Sylvan/Roberts Road. 
Specifically, Grathol's .neighbors expressed an interest in having 
Sylvan/Roberts Road extended across their properties. Because of 
the benefits of the extended road, those neighbors decided to 
dedicate portions of their property to the Lakes Highway District 
and ITD agreed to construct the Sylvan Road extension for those 
landowners. The construction of extensions of the Sylvan/Roberts 
Road will act as a frontage road for these property owners, wbo 
view it to be beneficial to th~ as additional access to their 
property. 
July 21, 2011 Di.sclosure of Advancing Experts; Gabbert Aff. Ex. B. Grathol3 s c.onfusion and 
ITD's continued attempts to correct this confusion do not make these docwnents discoverable. 
Further, Grathol argues that Sylvan/Roberts Road information is either discoverable or 
should have been produced in response to Grathol's public records.request. Grathol's ·public 
records request wp properly denied ·because ·it was improper given the fact this litigation 
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between the parties is pending. See I.C. § 9-343. Grathol argues that because this information 
was not discoverable in litigation on grounds of relevance then it should have been produced 
pursuant to the public records request because it was not relevant to the litigation. This argument 
is spurious because it is simply an attempt to avoid and do anl&end-run'' around the discovery 
rules in pending litigation. lil aciditio~ Grathol fails to not cite any statute, rule or case in 
support of this argument. 
Moreover, Orathol's argument fails when the applicable statutes and rules are examined. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(bXl) provides that a party may only obtain discovery which is 
"relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." Idaho R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l). As 
described above, information related Sylvan/Roberts Road is not relevant to the subject matter 
involved in this pending action, and on that basis, ~thol's request is not permissible under the 
Idaho discovery procedures. 
Because Grathol was unable to get this non-relevant information as part of discovery, 
Grathol filed a public records request seeking to get what it was not entitled to Uilder Idaho's 
discovery rules. Johnson Aff. Ex. A. This tactic is expressly forbidden by Idaho Code§ 9-343. 
Idaho Code § 9-343 prohibits a party in litigation to attempt to "supplement, augment, substitute 
or supplant discovery proceedings." LC. § 9-343(3). Idaho Code§ 9-343(3) states: 
(3) Nothing contained in $edions 9-337 through 9-348, Idaho 
Code, shall limit the availability of do.cuments and records for 
discovery in the normal coune of judicial or administrative 
adjudicatory proceedings, subject t9 the ~w and rules of 
evidence and of diseo"Very governing such proceedings. 
Additionally, in any criminal appeal or post-conviction civil action, 
sections 9-33S through 9-348, Idaho Code, shall not make 
available the contents of prosecution case _tiles where such material 
has previqusly been provided to the defendant nor shall sections 
9-335 through 9-348, Idaho Code, be available to supplement, 
augment, substitute or supplant discovery procedures in any 
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other federal, civil or administrative proceeding. 
I.C. § 9-343(3) (emphasis added). This statute contemplates that parties to a civil litigation must 
avail themselves of the discovery rules and limitations in the civil litigation and cannot expand 
discovery by use of the public records statutes. See I.C. § 9-343(3). Since Gratbol is party in a 
civil litigation and was seeking to supplement or augment what it was not entitled to in 
discovery, Gtathol's public records request was properly denied under Idaho Code§ 9-3412 
C. ITO Provided the American Geoteehnic Soil Report. 
Grathol served discovery requests seeking documents related to soil testing and soil log 
information and gravel estimates and value for the pro~. See Requests for Production Nos. 7 
and 23; York Aff,, 4. In response to Orathol's discovery requests regarding "soil logs" and 
"gravel," ITO objected that the terms were vague, ambiguous and subject to differing 
interpretations. York Aff, 1 5. 
Grathol' s counsel later explained it was looking for the results of soil testing done on its 
property during a telephone meet-and-confer. York A:ff., 17. Grathol also pl'Qvided additional 
detail regarding its rtquests as part of its Motion to Compel. See Motion to Compel at 6-7; York 
Aff., 1 8. When Grathol filed its Motion to Compel, Grathol explained that it was looking for the 
results of soil testing done on its pro~rty by American Geotechnics. Id With this infonnation, 
ITD was able to find the report done by American Geotechnics regarding its soil testing 
performed as part of the US 9S Project. See York Aff, ml 8-9. Thi$ report was provided to 
2 There can be no question that Grathol' s p\lblic records requ-=st was an attempt ~gment 
discovery in a civil litigation because it asked for the amount of attorney fees and costs lTD had 
paid um connection with Kootenai County Case No. CVl 0-10095, Idaho Court of Appeals Case 
No. 38511-2011 and ITD Project No; A009(791), Key No. 09791, Parcel 19, ITD PID 0044775.~' 
Johnson Aff. Ex. A. 
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Grathol on October 3, 2-011. York Aff. ,9. As a result, ITO has complied with these requests 
and this issue is now moot. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Grathol filed a Motion to Compel the production of documents and infonnation related to 
the construction of Sylvan/Roberts Road -On Grathol's property and the property of others. The 
sole remaining issue in this eminent domain case is the compensation owed for the property 
taken. Because no compensation can be recovered for Sylvan/Roberts Road and because none of 
Grathol's property is being taken for Sylvan/Jtoberts Road, any documents related to 
Sylvan/Roberts Road are irrelevant to and beyond the scope of the issue of just compensation in 
this case, which is the sole remaining i~e left for trial. 
Grathol also sought to compel the production documents related to soil testing on 
Orathol' s property. Once Grathol clarified its discovery requests regarding the soil testing 
report, 11D produced the American Geotechnics testing report on October 3, 2011. 
DA TED this 12th day of October. 2011. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney· General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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correct copy Qf the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol 
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Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile.: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
17:45 10/12/11 GMT-07 Pg 18-26 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ ORA THOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES I through S, 
Defendants. 
CaseNo. CVI0-10095 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARY V. YORK 
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STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
I, Mary V. York, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and say: 
I. I am a partner in the Boise office of the law flffll of Holland & Hart LLP, and I am 
licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho. I make this affidavit based on my personal 
knowledge and to the best of my infonnation and belief. 
2. I represent Plaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") in this 
matter, and make this affidavit in support of ITD1s Response to Defendant HJ Grathol's Motion 
to Compel. 
3. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of page 61 of the official 
transcript ofthe hearing on ITO' s Motion for Order for Possession of Real Property held on 
January 21, 2011. 
4. On May 12, 2011, Gratbol served discovery requests seeking documents related 
to soil testing and soil log information and gravel estimates and value for the property. 
5. In response to Grathol's requests, ITO objected on the grounds that the terms "soil 
logs,, and "graver' used by Grathol were vague, ~biguous and subject to differing 
interpretations. However, subject to its objections ITO produced more than 3,000 documents, 
which included dQCuments it believed were responsive to G.rathors request See ITD's 
Responses to Defendant HJ Grathol' s First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents to Plaintiff. 
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6. On July 21, 2011, Orathol responded to ITD's discovery responses stating that it 
did not receive the requested infonnation regarding the soils testing information. See Affidavit 
of Christopher Gabbert in Support ofGrathol's Motion to Compel, Ex. A Grathol stated that it 
was looking for information that included ".soil testing information, grading and elevation plans, 
and correspondence/agreements with other public entities relative to Sylvan Road extension 
plans. Id. Despite the additional information contained in Grathol' s letter, ITD continued to 
believe that it had produced all relevant discoverable information responsive to Grathol's 
request. 
7. In a meet and confer conversation, counsel for Grathol provided fµrtber 
explanation as to what it was seeking in its discovery requests and indicated that it wanted the 
:results of soils testing performed on the Grathol Property. Upon receiving this additional 
infonnation, I sought to obtain the information from ITO. 
8. However, before I was able produce the infonnation, on September 19, 2011 
Grathol filed its Motion to Compel. Orathol 's motion provided for the first time the specific 
details of the information it was requesting. Upon receiving this information,.! followed up with 
ITO and obtained the information requested in Grathol's motion. 
9. IID produced the Geotechnics Report to Grathol on October 3, 2011. Attached 
as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of the Notice of Service filed by ITD pursuant to which it 
produced to Orathol the requested infonnation. 
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Dated this 12th day of October, 2011. 
~r;ott. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 12th day of October, 2011. 
I hereby certify that on this 12th day of October, 2011, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfic.e, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Fax: 208-664-5884 
Attorneys for Defendant 
5254268_1.DOC 
D U.S.Mail 
0 Hand Delivered 
!ZI Fax 
D E-mail 
D Overnight UPS 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARY V. YORK IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ITD'S RESPONSE 
TO DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S MOTION TO COMPEL. 4 
260 of 1617
m:Ted s. Tc;illefson To:Judge Haynes (12084461188) 17:45 10/12/11 GMT-07 Pg 22-26 
Page 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
--oOo--








vs. ) case No. cv~10-10095 
) 
HJ GRATHOL, a California 
general partnership; STERLING 
SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 














Ko.otenai County Courthouse 
Coeur d'Alene, I4aho 
January 21, 2011, 1:34 p.m. 
The Honorable Lansing L. Haynes 
APPEAR~CES : 
F::>r the Plaintiff: 
TED TOLLEFSON 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1400 
Boise, Idaho 13102 
F::>r the Defendant: 
DOUGLASS. MARFICE 
CHRISTOPHER D, GABBERT 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Boulevard 
Coeur d'Alene, I_qabp 83814 
Reported By: Ke.ri Veare, CSR 675, CDA Reporting 
Exhibit A 
261 of 1617


























January 21, 2011 
State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Boa,d v. HJ Grathcl, et al 
C:V-10-10095 
Page 61 
in Idaho code section 40-315, subs~ctio'ti 1, 
subsection B. The ordez:: o.f condemnation does not 
provide or in this cou.rt' s opinion does not provide for 
the taking of the defendant's property for the expansion 
of the Sylvan Road and Roberts Road. The contemplation 
of the expansion of Sylvan Road to link to Roberts Road 
is certainly mentioned in the order of condemn.ation, but 
more i:nportantly, the complaint does not contemplate the 
extension of that road, and that is not the subject of 
the taking that is before this court. 
The Idaho Department of Transportation has 
offered to expand those roads through Grathol's 
property -- rather, the Sylvan Road expansion through 
Grathol's property, but that offer has been declined by 
the defendant and this has been testified to amply 
before the Court today and in Mr. Minzghor's deposition. 
This c:ourt finds, then, that plaintiffs' 
complaint to comply with Idaho code sectio.n 7-707. The 
complaint itself, the controlling portions of that 
complaint, does not show a taking <>'f defendants' 
property for the expansion of Sylvan Road into Roberts 
Road or the expansion of Sylvan Road through the G.rathol 
property; therefore·, this court. finds that the scope of 
the proposed taking is adequa·tely defined in the 
complaint itself. 
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CLERK D!STnlC:T COURT 
JN TD DJSnUcr C011llTO, TIii l'.IBST ltJDICL\L DISTRICT or 1IIE 
STATE or IDAHO. IN AND FOR TD C01JNTY or KOOTENAI 
THE STATBOP mAHo. 
IDAHO TAANSPORTA'l10N BOAIU), ,.... 
vs. 
HJ GIATROI,, aCafffomiaaual pulUllhip; 
STERUNG SAYINOS BANK. t. Wubiagtoa 
CCIQIDrldon; lad DOBS l 1bra\lah s, 
. Df6lldan1L 
NOIICI or SlllVICB -1 
Case No. CVt0-10095 
NOTICI OJ SIRVICI 
Exhibit B 
263 of 1617
m:Ted S. Tollefson To:Judge Haynes (12084461188) 17:45 10/12/11 GMT-07 Pg 25-26 
Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, notice is hereby given by the 
undersigned counsel that a copy of Plaintiff's First Supplemental Responses t.o Defendant 
HJ Orathol's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Plainlifl: 
along with a copy of this Notice, was served via U.S. Mail upon the attorneys listed on the 
attached Certificate of $ervice on October 3, 2011. 
DATED this 3rd day of October, 2011. 
NOTICE OF SERVICE- 2 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
ed S. To di , or the fi.rm 
MaryV. Yo ofthefirm 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff' 
Idaho Transportation Department 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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m:"!"ed S. T.ollefson To:Judge Haynes (12084461188) 17:45 10/12/11 GMT-07 Pg 26-26 
CERTD'ICATE or SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of October, 2()11, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
11nug!as S Marfii:-.ej Rqq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Fax~ 208-664-S884 
Attorney~ for Defendant, HJ Grathol 
S248622_1.DOC 











c:~-T. 18. 2011 4:06PM 
Oct. 18, 2011 9:30AM 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STA TE OF IDAl-:10 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
J, TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Dep'Uty Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V. York (ISB #5020) 
Ted S. Tollefson (!SB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P .0. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Tim FIRST Jlf.DICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THB STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ GRATHOL, a Califo.rnia general 
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK) 
a. Washington corporation; and DOES I 
through S, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVI0-10095 
STIPULATION FOR 
EXTENSION OF TIME FOR 
PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL 
EXPERTS WITNESS 
DISCLOSURES AND FOR 
"ACARREQUJ OFFER" 
STIPULATION FOR EXTENSION OP TIME FOR PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL 
EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURES AND FOR 1'ACARREQUI OFFER" - 1 
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O~·T.18.2011 4:07PM NO. 34 77 P. 3/5 
0 ct . 1 8. 2 0 11 i : 31 AM No. 5307 P. 3 
Plaintiff, the State of Idaho, ldallo Transportation Board ("ITD") and Defendant 
HJ Grathol (''Grathol") (hereinafter referred to collectively as the ccparties~1), by and 
through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate and agree as follows: 
1. The parties agree to extend the deadline for ITD to identify rebuttal expert 
witnesses and serve their disclosures of opinions to be offered at trial from October 19, 
2011 to November 21, 2011, and request the Court to enter an Order accordingly. The 
Courtss Notice of Trial and Uniform Pretl'ial Order will otherwise remain unchanged. 
a. The Court's Notice of Trial and Uniform Pretrial Order provides 
that all parties are to disclose rebuttal expert witnesses no later 
than ninety days (90) before trial. The trial in this matter is 
scheduled to begin on January 17, 2012, which would require that 
rebuttal expert witness be c]jsclosed no later than October 19, 2011. 
b. The parties agree to a. one-month extension for ITD to disclose 
rebuttal expe11: witnesses and opinions, which would extend ITO' s 
deadline to November 21, 2011. 
2. The parties also agree to eitend by one month the date by which ITD may 
submit an of.fer of settlement in accordance with Ada Counly Highway District v. 
Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983) and succeeding cases and other 
relevant provisions of Idaho law. Under this extension, ITD's i'Acarrequi" Offer will 
be due no later than November 21. 2011 and Grathol m.ay not assert any argument that 
an "Acarregui" offer made on or before Noveniber 21, 2011 is untimely. 
3. Grathol agrees that all opinions of its experts Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, 
Alan Johnson, and Geoff Reeslund have been disclosed, 
STIPULATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR PLAINTlli'F'S REBUTTAL 
EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURES AND FOR "A.CARREQUI OFFER" • 2 
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o:T.18.2011 4:07PM I Oct. 18. 2011 9:37AM N0.3477 P. 4/5 No. 5307 P. 4/5 
4. ITD agrees to withdraw Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony 
or, Alternatively, to Compel Expert Disclosures, currently pending before the Court and 
scheduled for hearing on October 19J 2.011. 
S. The parties respectfully submit that good cause exists for this Stipulation 
and that this Stipulation is not intended to impact other existing deadlines in this case. 
DATED this 16 day of October, 2011. 
RAMSD:SN & LYONS, LLP 
Attorneys for laintiff 
Idaho Transpottation Department 
STIPULATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL 
EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURES AND FOR 1'ACA.RREQUI OFFER,, M 3 
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on. 1s. 2011 4:07PM NO. 34 77 P. 5/5 
Oct. 18. 2011 9: 3 7 AM No. 5307 P. 5/5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
l hereby certify that on this .11...'fl.tay of October, 2011, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the foiiowing: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, 1D 83816-1336 
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I 10-18-'1115:37 FBOM-
LA WRENCB 0. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OP IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3S86) 
Deputy Atto~y General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attomey General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
MaiyV. York(ISB #S020) 
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HARTLLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capilol Boulevard 
P.O. Box2S27 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attomeys for Plaintiff 
T-842 P0001/0002 F-673 
S'!All: 0r ICiAJ-it., . } c:c. 
COUNTY OF K(),JTEN.~ V'-' 
~ 
?01 l on \ 8 PM 3: 36 
CU:RI< DISTR!GT COURT 
i-·-----· -----f.iEPi,: ~ · 
IN TBE DISTRICT COtJRT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTatCT OF THE 
STATE OF mAHo, IN AND FOR TBE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THB STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
H1 ORA THOL, a California general partnership; 
SrERLING SA VlNGS BANK. a Washington 
corporation; and DOES l through S, 
Defendants. 
CaseNo. cv10 .. 1009s 
NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF 
M0110N TO COMPEL AND 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
TESTIMONY AND ·REQlJEST TO 
VACATE BEARING 
NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION TO COMPEL AND MOTION TO 
EXCLUDE TESTIMONY AND UQUEST TO VACATE IIEAIUNG • l 
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Plaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITO"), by and through its 
attorneys ofrecord, Holland & Hart LLP, hereby provides notice of the withdrawal of its Motion 
to Compel and Motion to Exclude Testimony. The parties have resolved the issues presented in 
ITD's Motion and through a separate and contemporaneous filing will file with the Court a 
Stipulation for Extension of Time for Plaintiff's Rebuttal Expert Witness Disclosures and for 
"Acarrequi Offer." Where Ito's Motion is withdrawn., there is no need to hold the hearing on 
ITD's Motion, which is currently set to be heard on Wednesday, October 19, 2011. ITO 
therefore requests that the Court vacate such hearing. 
WHEREFORE, ITO respectfully requests that this Court approve the withdrawal of 
ITD's Motion to Compel and Motion to Exclude Testimony without prejudice and vacate the 
hearing set for October 19, 2011. 
DATED this 18th day of October, 2011. 
MaryYor 
Special 
Attome for Plaintiff 
Idaho Transportation Department 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
NOTICE OF WITHDRAW AL OF MOTION TO COMPEL AND MOTION TO 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 18th day of October, 2011, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol 
5268275 _1.IXlCX 
D U.S.Mail 
D Hand Delivered 
~ Fax (208) 664-5884 
D E-mail 
D Overnight UPS 
NOTICE OF WITHDRAW AL OF MOTION TO COMPEL AND MOTION TO 
EXCLUDE TESTIMONY AND REQUEST TO VACATE HEARING -3 
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o-;r. 21. 2011 11: 18AM 
LAWRENCE 0. WASDEN 
ATIORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #S923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P .o. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334·8815 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
MaryV. York(ISB #S020) 
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HARTLLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attomeys for Plaintiff 
NO. 3493 P. 2/4 
STATE: Or IOAHO } , 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI SS 
~~40C\ 
ZOii OCT 21 AH IQ: 27 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE F1RST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ ORA THOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF SERVICE - 1 
Case No. CVl0-10095 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
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0~ T. 21. 2011 11 : 18 AM NO. 3493 P. 3/4 
Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, notice is hereby given by the 
undersigned counsel that a copy of Plaintiff's Third Set of Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production of Documents to Defendant HJ Grathol~ along with a copy of this Notice, was served 
via facsimile upon the attorneys listed on the attached Certificate of Service on October 21, 
2011. 
DATED this 21st day of October, 2011. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Idaho Transportation Department 
NOTICE OF SERVICE - 2 
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Gd. 21. 2011 11: 18AM NO. 3493 P. 4/4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 21st day of October, 2011, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S, Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Fax: 208-664-5884 
Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol 
5271069_1.DOCX 
NOTICE OF SERVICE - 3 
D U.S. Mail 
D Hand Deiivered 
[81 Fax 208-664-5884 
D E-mail 
D Overnight UPS 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Dougias S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
201 I OCT 25 PM I: 41 
CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST mDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES 
TECUM OF STANLEY MOE 
Date: November 15, 2011 
Time: 9:30 a.m. (PST) 
Place: Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
TO: THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PLAINTIFFS 
AND TO: PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL OF RECORD - JOHN MAGNUSON 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant Coastal Community Bank will 
take testimony on oral examination of STANLEY MOE before a court reporter and notary 
public commencing on Tuesday, November 15, 2011 at 9:30 a.m. (PDT) and continuing 
thereafter from day to day until such time as the taking of the deposition may be adjourned, at 
the offices of Ramsden & Lyons, LLP, 700 Northwest Blvd., Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, at which 
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM OF STANLEY MOE· I ORIGINAL 
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time and place you are notified to appear and take such part in the examination as you may 
deem proper. This deposition shall be taken pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The deponent is requested to bring with and produce the following: 
1. All documents you relied upon in formulating your expert opinion(s) in this 
matter. 
2. Your entire file in the matter of The State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board 
v. HJ Grathol, including, but not limited to, all documents, correspondence, reports, 
memoranda, notes, photographs, drawings, diagrams, and files, and all drafts and versions of 
the same which are connected with or relate to the above captioned case and the matter at issue. 
3. All documents substantiating or otherwise relating to any and all assumptions 
made by you in formulating your opinions in this case. 
4. All reports, summaries, memoranda, notes, correspondence, drawings, diagrams, 
plans, site plans, site proposals, or other documents provided to or reviewed by you, which 
were prepared by or on behalf of State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board or Idaho 
Transportation Department, or its attorneys regarding the above captioned litigation. 
5. All correspondence and/or documents, including emails, between you and the 
State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board, or Idaho Transportation Department, its employees 
or attorneys or any other expert witness or consultant in this matter related to this action. 
6. All correspondence and/or documents, including e-mails, authored or received 
by you related to this action. 
7. Copies of any and all of your written opinions, including all drafts and revisions 
of the same relating to this action. 
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM OF STANLEY MOE - 2 
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8. All literature and publications you have reviewed in connection with this action 
and upon or about which you may testify at trial. 
9. All photographs, of the HJ Grathol property in your possession. 
10. All other documents not specifically referred to herein which you use or reiied 
upon in formulating your opinions in this case. 
11. Copies of any and all exhibits which you may use at the trial of this matter, 
including those in draft form. 
DATED this 24th day of October, 2011. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, 
. is pher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm 
:Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of October, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
~and Delivered 
_· _ Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
~and Delivered 
_· _ Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
on James 
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM OF STANLEY MOE - 3 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Dougias S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
2011 OCT 25 PM I: 4 l 
C~ DISTRICT COURT 
OEP~J 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VINOS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES 
TECUM OF JASON MINZGHOR 
Date: November 15, 2011 
Time: 1 :30 p.m. (PST) 
Place: Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
TO: THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PLAINTIFF 
ANDTO: PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL OF RECORD-MARY YORK 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant HJ Grathol will take testimony 
on oral examination of JASON MINZGHOR before a court reporter and notary public 
commencing on Tuesday, November 15, 2011 at 1:30 p.m. (PST) and continuing thereafter 
from day to day until such time as the taking of the deposition may be adjourned, at the offices 
of Ramsden & Lyons, LLP, 700 Northwest Blvd., Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, at which time and 
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM OF JASON MINZGHOR - I ORIGINAL 
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place you are notified to appear and take such part in the examination as you may deem proper. 
This deposition shall be taken pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
You are further notified that you are requested, pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedures 30(b)(l), 30(b)(5), 34(a), 45(a), and 45(d)(l) to have present at the time of 
the taking of your deposition, the following documents and tangible things described below: 
1. All documents you relied upon in formulating your expert opinion(s) in this 
matter. 
2. Your entire file in the matter of The State if Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board 
v. HJ Grathol, including, but not limited to, all documents, correspondence, reports, 
memoranda, notes, photographs, drawings, diagrams, and files, and all drafts and versions of 
the same which are connected with or relate to the above captioned case and the matter at issue. 
3. All documents substantiating or otherwise relating to any and all assumptions 
made by you in formulating your opinions in this case. 
4. All reports, summaries, memoranda, notes, correspondence, drawings, diagrams, 
plans, site plans, site proposals, or other documents provided to or reviewed by you, which 
were prepared by or on behalf of State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board or Idaho 
Transportation Department or its attorneys regarding the above captioned litigation. 
5. All correspondence and/or documents, including emails, between you and any 
other expert witness or consultant in this matter related to this action. 
6. All correspondence and/or documents, including e-mails, authored or received 
by you related to this action. 
7. Copies of any and all of your written opinions, including all drafts and revisions 
of the same relating to this action. 
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM OF JASON MINZGHOR - 2 
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8. All literature and publications you have reviewed in connection with this action 
and upon or about which you may testify at trial. 
9. All photographs, of the HJ Grathol property in your possession. 
10. All other documents not specifically referred to herein which you use or reiied 
upon in formulating your opinions in this case. 
11. Copies of any and all exhibits which you may use at the trial of this matter, 
including those in draft form. 





Christopher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of October, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
~and Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
_,!Hand Delivered 
_-V_ F :acsimile (208) 343-8869 
NOTICE OF DEPOSITION DUCES TECUM OF JASON MINZGHOR - 3 
281 of 1617
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
Si-,i::T. 'YO i~ 
r-:n u·r\' :j", ..... ' ,.,uU,, I , t uG TENAI ;iS 
FILEJ: 
2011 OCT 26 AM 8: 31 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VIN GS 
BANK, a Washington corporation; and 
DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 
HJ GRATHOL'S MOTION TO 
COMPEL 
This matter came on for hearing before me, the undersigned Judge of the above-
entitled Court, on the 19th day of October, 2011, in Coeur d'Alene, upon the motion of 
Defendant HJ Grathol, for an order compelling discovery made pursuant to Rule 37(a) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, dated September 13, 201. Counsel for Defendant HJ 
Grathol, Christopher D. Gabbert and counsel for Plaintiff the State of Idaho, Idaho 
Transportation Board, Mary York was present. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S MOTION TO COMPEL- 1 
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The briefs of the parties were considered, oral argument was heard, and good cause 
appearing therefore, 
NOW, THEREFORE it is hereby ordered that Plaintiff shall, on or before November 
4, 2011 answer fully and completely, under oath, each part of Interrogatory Nos. 10, 11, and 
20, and Request for Production Nos. 27, 28, 29 and 30 set forth in HJ Grathol's 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents dated May 12, 2011. 
DATED this~ day of October, 2011. 
JrnWo~ili-~ ili'ii? 
District Court Judge 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT HJ GRA THOL'S MOTION TO COMPEL - 2 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the~ day of October, 2011, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
Douglas S. Marfice 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
PO Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Maii 
Hand Delivered 
~acsimile (208) 334-4498 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered -4 Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
~ Facsimile (208) 664-5884 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S MOTION TO COMPEL- 3 
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IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD 
vs. 








Case No: CV-2010-0010095 
UKJJEK ASSlliNlNli SK. UlSTKlCl' J lJUliE 
CHARLES HOSACK FOR TRIAL PURPOSES ONLY 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Honorable Charles Hosack, Sr. District Judge of the First Judicial District of 
the State ofldaho, is hereby administratively assigned to take jurisdiction of the above entitled action for trial purposes 
only. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the District Court of Kootenai County shall cause a copy of this 
Order to be mailed to counsel for each of the parties, or if either of the parties are represented prose, directly to the prose 
litigant. 
DATED: Thursday, October 27, 2011 
ohn T. Mitchell, Administrative District Judge 
I certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows: 
DOUGLAS S. MARFICE 
PO BOX 1336 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816-1336 
-r:-n- iP~t.J -58'8'-f 
MARYV. YORK 
P. 0. BOX 2527 
BOIS]:, ID 83701-2527 a 
V~Y.. - :l.(Jf· ~ L/ 8- ~3'~, 
~'PIA.• \...~~ \l~Vl(,;i.., -:r. o. 
J.17rn 1homa5 
C--N-_ J, of~ ~3l/--LJc../1? 
I ,~1~\ 
[/4-axed 
[ ] Faxed 
Dated: 
By: 
ORDER ASSIGNING SR. DISTRICT JUDGE 
CHARLES HOSACK FOR TRIAL PURPOSES ONLY 
[ ] Mailed [ ] Hand Delivered 
[ 1 Mailed [ ] Hand Delivered 
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FIRST .JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE f\li' IDAHO 
\ND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTl .I 
324 W. GARDEN AVENUE 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816-9000 







Case No: CV-2010-0010095 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
HJ GRATHOL, ETAL. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is set for: 
Status Conference Tuesday, November 08, 2011 08:30 AM PST 
IN CHAMBERS CONFERENCE CALL 
Judge: Charles W. Hosack 
Courtroom: 
I certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on November 2nd, 2011. 
Plaintifrs Counsel: MaryV. York 
P. 0. Box 2527 
Boise ID 83701-2527 
Mailed Hand Delivered 
Defendant's Counsel: Douglas S. Marfice 
PO Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-1336 
Mailed Hand Delivered 
~axed (208) 343-8869 
kaxed (208) 664-5884 
Dated: Wednesday, November 02, 2011 
Clifford T. Hayes 
Clerk Of The District Court 
By: Suzi Sverdsten, Deputy Clerk 
CV Notice Of Hearing 
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m:Naoml l. Pratt ·{o:Clerk (12084461188) 
LA WR.ENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V. York (ISB #5020) 
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy AttOJ:'D.eys General 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Banlc Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
15:1511/04/11GMT-07 Pg 02-04 
20!! NOV -4 PM 2: 17 
CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
~/V11.A 
I r-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SA VINOS BANK, a Wamingtoil 
corparation; and DOES 1 through 5,. 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF SERVICE -1 
Case No. CVI0-10095 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
287 of 1617
m:Naoml :;, Prafi To:Clerk(12084461188) 15:15 11/04/11 GMT-07 Pg 03-04 
Pum,mnt to the Ida,ho Rules of Civil Procedure, notice is hereby given by the 
undersigned counsel that a copy of Plaintiff's Second Supplemental Responses to Defendant 
HJ Grathol's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Plaintiff, 
along with a copy of this Notice, was served upon the attorneys listed on the attached Certificate 
of Service, in the manner indicated, on November 4, 2011. 
DATED this 4th day of November 2011. 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
NOTICE OF SERVICE - 2 
288 of 1617
m:Naomi ·;. Prat\. To:Clerk (12084461188) 15: 15 11 /04/11 GMT-07 Pg 04-04 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 4th day ofNovember, 2011, I cau~ to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing.by the method indicated below, and addressed t<> the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Fax: 208-664-5884 
Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol 
528S400_1.DOC 







FIRST !'"r1lICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF lDAHO 
II ~D FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTEl' 
324 W. GARDEN AVENUE 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816-9000 







Case No: CV-2010-0010095 
AMENDED 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
HJ GRATHOL, ETAL. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is set for: 
Status Conference Thursday, November 10, 2011 11 :00 AM PST 
IN CHAMBERS TELEPHONIC CONFERENCE. PARTIES WILL CALL INTO A PHONE NUMBER 
WHICH WILL BE SUPPLIED. 
Judge: Charles W. Hosack 
Courtroom: 
I certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on November 7th, 2011. 
Plaintifrs Counsel: J. Tim Thomas, Deputy Attorney General 
P. 0. Box 7129 
Boise ID 83707-1129 
Mailed 
MaryV. York 
P. 0. Box 2527 
Hand Delivered 
Boise ID 83701-2527 
Mailed Hand Delivered 
~xed (208) 334-4498 
Kaxed (208) 343-8869 
Defendant's Counsel: Douglas S. Marfice 
PO Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-1336 
Mailed Hand Delivered ~xed (208) 664-5884 
AMENDED CV Notice Of Hearing 
Dated: Monday, November 07, 2011 
Clifford T. Hayes 
Clerk Of The District Court 
By: Suzi Sverdsten, Deputy Clerk 
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KOOTENAI COUNTY CASE NO.: CV 2010-10095 
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H.J. GRATHOL, a California general 
partnership, et al., 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
Notice is hereby given that on November 15, 2011, 
I lodged the original transcript of the Defendant's Motion to 
Compel hearing heard on October 19, 2011, consisting of 22 pages, 
for the above-referenced case with the District Court Clerk of 
the County of Kootenai in the First Judicial District. 
Official Court Reporter for Judge Haynes 
First Judicial District 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 
291 of 1617
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Dougias S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
2011 ~mv I 5 AH g: 4 7 
CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
~f 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
TO: CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 14th day of November, 2011, that Defendant 
HJ Grathol, by and through their attorney, Douglas S. Marfice of the firm Ramsden & Lyons, 
LLP did serve a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol 's Second Set of Interrogatories 
and Requests for Production of Documents to Plaintiff, together with a copy of this Notice, 
upon counsel for Plaintiff by facsimile. 
DATED this 14th day ofNovember, 2011. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
By: ~ (2, s;. Y11-~L-
Dou¥ss.liar?e, 6fth~ 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS - I ORIGINAL 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 14th day ofNovember, 2011, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAL'JD & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS - 2 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Maii 
ft:{and Delivered 
_-----V--_ "R Fa·csimile (208) 334-4498 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
~and Delivered 
_' _ Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
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ST ATE OF IDAHO ) 
County of Kootenai . ) SS 
FILED / / - I & - f f 
AT "3: ID O'clock____.,£_M 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 


















Case No. CV2010-10095 
AMENDED PRETRIAL ORDER 
Pursuant to IRCP 16 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
A court trial for eight (8) days will commence at the Kootenai County 
Courthouse at 9:00 a.m., March 5, 2012. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Pretrial Order is hereby amended as follows: 
1. PRETRIAL MOTIONS: All Pretrial Motions or Motions for Summary 
Judgment shall be timely filed so as to be heard on February 8, 2012, at 10:00 a. m. The 
motions and supporting briefs must be filed on or before January 6, 2012; response briefs 
AMENDED PRETRIAL ORDER: 1 
CV 2010-10095 
294 of 1617
must be filed by January 20, 2012; and any reply briefs by January 27, 2012. 
2. EXPERT WITNESSES: Not later than December 19, 2011, plaintiff(s) shall 
disclose all expert rebuttal witnesses to be called at trial. Such disclosure shall consist of 
any opinions to which the expert is expected to testify. The disclosure shall be 
contemporaneously filed with the Court. 
I,· 
DATED this . ,· .· / day of November, 2011. 
AMENDED PRETRIAL ORDER: 2 
CV 2010-10095 
CHARLES W. HOSACK,ISTRICT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that true copies of the foregoing have been mailed, postage 
prepaid, facsimile, or sent by interoffice mail, this /fo day of November, 2011, to: 
Plaintiff's Counsel: J. Tim Thomas, Deputy Attorney Geneial (fax 208-334-4498) ~ 
Plaintiff's Counsel: Mary V. York (fax 208-343-8869) ¾ 
Defendant's Counsel: Douglas S. Marfice (fax 208-664-5884) ~ 
AMENDED PRETRIAL ORDER: 3 
CV 2010-10095 
--Y9~ 
CLIFFORD T. HAYES 




FIRST :f(J])ICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE f\1<' IDAHO 
\ND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTI .I 
324 W. GARDEN AVENUE 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816-9000 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD 
vs. 




FILED II/ l(c /2011 AT 3: rDp M 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, COUNT OF KOOTENAI SS 
CLERK OF THE DISTRI COURT 
Case No: CV-2010-0010095 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Motion 
All motions. 
Judge: Charles W. Hosack 
Courtroom: 
Court Trial Scheduled 
8 days. 
Judge: Charles W. Hosack 
Courtroom: 
Wednesday, February 08, 2012 at 10:00 AM 
Monday, March 05, 2012 at 09:00 AM 
I certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on Thursday, November 10, 2011. 
Plaintiff's Counsel: J. Tim Thomas, Dep Atty General 
P. 0. Box 7129 
Boise ID 83707-1129 
Mailed 
Mary V. York 
P. 0. Box 2527 
Hand Delivered 
Boise ID 83701-2527 
Mailed Hand Delivered 
Defendant's Counsel: Douglas S. Marfice 
PO Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816-1336 
Mailed Hand Delivered 
}(_]Faxed (208) 334-4498 
[~Faxed (208) 343-8869 
p<)Faxed (208) 664-5884 
Dated: Thursday, November If.;, , 2011 
Clifford T. Hayes 
Clerk Of The District Court 
By: Shari Rohrbach, Deputy Clerk 
CV- Multiple Notice of Hearing 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
STATE OF IDAHO l 
CQUNTY OF KOOTENAlf SS 
FILED: 




IN THE DISTRICT COLlRT OF THE FIRST JUDICLt\L DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VIN GS BANK, 
a Washington corporation; and DOES 1 
through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
DISCOVERY RESPONSES 
TO: CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 5th day of December, 2011, that Defendant 
HJ Grathol, by and through their attorney, Douglas S. Marfice of the firm Ramsden & Lyons, 
LLP did serve a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol's Answers and Responses to 
Plaintiff's Third Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production, together with a copy of this 
Notice, upon counsel for Plaintiff by depositing the same in the United States Mail, Coeur 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES - I ORIGINAL 
298 of 1617
d'Alene, Idaho, postage pre-paid. 
DATED this 5th day of December, 2011. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
By: ad'v.. $' ~/ 
Douglas. Marfice, Df Firm 
, 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of December, 2011, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and a7ssed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas US Mail 
Deputy Attorney General __ Overnight Mail 
Idaho Transportation Department Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 7129 __ Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
Mary V. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES - 2 
~SMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
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m:Naomi T. Pratt To:Clerk (12084461188) 
LAWRENCE 0. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STA TE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civii Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V. York (ISB #5020) 
Steve C. Bowman (ISB #4404) 
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
IO 1 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box' 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701~2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
16:3112/19/11GMT-07 Pg 03-05 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ ORA THOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SA VINOS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
CaseNo. CVl0-10095 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S NOTICE OF 
DISCLOSURE OF REBUTTAL 
EXPERTS 
PLAINTIFF lffl'S NOTICE OF DISCLOSURE OF RED.UTT AL EXPERTS- I 
300 of 1617
m:Naor- 1 T. Pratt To:Clerk (12084461188) 16:31 12/19/11 GMT-07 Pg 04-05 
Plaintiff Idaho Ti'ansportation Department hereby gives notice that it has disclosed its 
rebuttal expert witnesses Jason Minzghor, Stan Moe, Carole Richardson, Ken Geibel, Kevin 
Picanco, Jeff Key, Larry Pynes, George Hedley, and Dennis Reinstein on the date set forth 
below, in accordance with the Court's scheduling orders of April 5, 2011 and November 16, 
20661, and Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this 19th day of December, 2011. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
B 
'f. S. efs r the finn 
Mary V. Y r of the firm 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
ldaho Transportation Department 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S NOTICE OF DISCLOSURE OF REBUTTAL EXPERTS- 2 
301 of 1617
m:Naol"li T. Pratt To:Clerk (12084461188) 16:31 12/19/11 GMT-07 Pg 05-05 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 19th day of December 2011, I caused to be s.erved a true a,nd 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 











PLAINTIFF ITO'S NOTICE OF DISCLOSURE OF REBUTTAL EXPERTS- 3 
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=m:Naoml T. Pratt To:Clerk (12084461188) 15:3812/27/11GMT-07 Pg 03-05 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATIORNBY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy AttQmey General 
Chief, Civil. Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB-#5923) 
Deputy Attc,mey General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ldahe> 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-881S 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V. Yd.rk (ISB #S020) 
Ted S. ToUefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys Oeneral 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. BankPlua 
101 South (;apitol Boulevard 
P.O. :Sox 2$27 
Boise, ldahc;, 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5.000 
Facsimile.: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
•ffl.}ss· . 
Fl.ED: ~ 31/7 Jµo 
2111 DEC 27 PM 2: 36 
IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHOl Case No. CV10-1009S 
IPAHO TAANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff: 
vs. 
HJ GRATff OL, a California general partnership; 
.STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES I through 5, 
ndants. 
NOTICE. OF SERVICE -1 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
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m:Naomi T. Pratt To:Clerk (12084461188) 15:38 12/27/11 GMT-07 Pg 04-05 
Ptn$uant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, notice is hereby given by the 
undersigned counsel that a copy of Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant HJ Orathol' s Second Set 
of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Plaintiff, along with a copy of 
this Notice~ was served upon the attorneys iisted on the attached Certificate of Service, in the 
manner indicated, on December 27, 2011. 
DAtED this 27th day ofDeceniber 2011. 
NOTICE OF SERVICE · 2 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
~-e-fl_rm ______ _ 
Mary V. Yor~ of the firm 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Idaho Transportation Department 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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=m:Naoml T. Pratt To:Clerk (12084461188) 15:38 12/27/11 GMT-07 Pg 05-05 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 27th day of December, 2011, I caused to be served a uue and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
f'h.-ist. nnh- T'\ naLl..:...t ~c,n .....,Ur,6 .. ""'t'U,...,. ....,. '-'iUi""'.1" ~-
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d' Ai.:ne, ID 83816-1336 
Fax: 208-664-5884 
Attorneys /t,r Defendant, HJ Oratlwl 
S342645_1 
NOTICE OF SERVICE - 3 
D U.S.Mail 
D Harid Deliv ... ied 
D Fax 
D E-mail 
~ Overnight UPS 
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JPJ. 6. 2012 4:57PM 
LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V. York (ISB #5020) 
Steven C. Bowman (ISB #4404) 
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HARTLLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343~8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO. 3883 P. 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ GRA THOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES 1 through S, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 10-10095 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -1 
306 of 1617
JAN. 6. 2012 4:57PM NO. 3883 P. 3 
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho 
Transportation Board ("ITD") moves the Court to enter summary judgment in this matter to 
dismiss improper claims for damages by Defendant HJ Grathol ("Grathol") in this condemnation 
case. The claims that are the subject of this motion are barred by law and should be dismissed 
from the case. ITO' s motion is supported by ITD' s Brief in support of its Motion and the 
Affidavit of Mary V, York filed with this motion. 
The hearing on ITD's motion and all pretrial motions is set for hearing on February 8, 
2012 at 10:00 a.m., as set forth in the Court's Pretrial Order dated November 16, 2011. 
DATED this 6th day of January, 2012. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Idaho Transportation Department 
PLAINTIFF rrD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 2 
307 of 1617
HN. 6. 2012 4:57PM NO. 3883 P. 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify th.at on this 6th day of January, 2012, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Fax: 208-664-5884 
Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol 
5361930_1.DOC 
gj U.S.Mail 
0 Hand Delivered 
D Fax 
J8J E-mail 
0 Overnight UPS 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
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'?. 6. 2012 4:57PM 
. LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
J, TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
MaryV. York (ISB #5020) 
Steven C. Bowman (ISB #4404) 
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NU. 3883 P. 5 
STATE OF IDAHO } 
COUNJY OF K;.fyAJ. ss -ti--7 Y? 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SA VINOS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVl0-10095 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
309 of 1617
.-.J. 6. 2012 4:57PM NO. 3883 P. 6 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
I. IN'TRODUCTION ............ 1.,, •••••••••••••••••..••••••••••••••••.••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• , •.••••••••••••••••. 1,, ••••••• 3 
Il. SUMMARY OF GROtJNDS FOR M0110N ................................................... , ........................ 3 
A. Sylvan. Road ........................ , ................... 1. ,, ••••••••••••• , ••••••••••••••• , •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3 
B. Construction Delay .............................................................. , ................. 1 •••••••••••••••••• , ••••••••••• 3 
C. Visibility ............................................. , .................................................................................... 4 
D. Access ......................... , ........................................................ 1 ·· ···············••1 ••······ .................... 4 
E. Lost Profits .............................................................................................................................. 4 
F. Gravel ................ 11,, •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• S 
G. Severance Damages For Impacts On Development Plan ...................................................... S 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................... 6 
A. The IID Project ............... , .. , ................................................................................................. 6 
B. The Grathol Property ............................................................................................................ 6 
C. Procedural Histoey ................................................................................................................ 8 
IV. ARGUMENT ........................................ , ........................................................ ,.,1,, •.••••••••••••••• 9 
A. Grathol's Attempt To Recover Compensation For An Alleged Taking Of Land For 
Sylvan Road Should Be Dismissed ........................................... ,, .......................................... 9 
1. The Court has ruled that ITO is not condemning any property for Sylvan Road 
in this case. 4 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 10 . 
2. The Court's ruling is fully supported by the record and no contrary facts exist ............ 1 0 
3. Grathol's motive for seeking condemnation for Sylvan Road is to improperly 
shift the required costs of its development to the public ................................................ 13 
4. Grathol's claim for damages based on Sylvan Road fails as a matter of law ................. 15 
B. Grathol Cannot Recover Damages Based On Its Allegation Of Delay In 
Construction Of The US-95 Project .................................................................................... 16 
1. Claims for compensation for construction delay in condemnation cases are 
barred by Idah.o law ......................................................................................................... 17 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY .roDGMENT-1 
310 of 1617
V. 6. 2012 4:57PM NO. 3883 P. 7 
2. Other jurisdictions also bar recovery for construction delay in condemnation 
cases ................................ , ............................................................................................... 18 
3. In Idaho,just compensation is measured as of the date of issuance of the 
summons in the condenmation case. This statutory mandate bars recovery for 
compensation based on allegations of construction delay .............................................. 19 
4. Gtathol's claim for compensation based on construction delay fails factually .............. 21 
C. Grathol Cannot Recover Damages for Loss of Visibility. , .. , ................ , ............................. 23 
1. Idah.o law ................................... , ................................ , .. , ................................................ 24 
2. If no recovery can be had for changes in traffic flow, no recovery can be had for 
changes in visibility caused by changes in traffic flow .................................................. 2S 
3. Courts have repeatedly denied claims for loss of visibility ............................................ 25 
4. Grathol's claim ofloss of visibility is not supported by the facts .................................. 32 
D. Grathol's Claim For Compensation Based On Loss Or Impairment Of Access Is 
BaI'I'ed As A Matter Of Law .................. , .................. ,, .............. , .. 1 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 33 
1. Grathol' s claim is contrary to undisputed facts .............................................................. 33 
2. Whether a taking of access has occurred is properly decided on sum.mazy 
judgin.ent ............. , ............... , .................. , 1 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• , ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 36 
3. Grathol's claim for compensation based on alleged loss of access is baned by 
Idaho law ....... , ....................................................... ,,., ...................................................... 36 
E. Grathol Cannot Recover Lost Profits ...................................... , .................. , ................... , .... 3 9 
1. Idaho common law bars recovery of lost profits in condemnation cases .... , .................. 40 
2. Grathol's claim is barred by Idaho's business damage statute ...................................... .41 
3. Grathol's lost profits are based on conjecture and speculation are not 
recoverable un.der ldallo law ........ , .. , .. , ................ , .................... ,,, .................................... 43 
F. Grathol Cannot Recover Compensation For Gravel That May Be Under The 
Condemned Property ............... , ................... , .................... , ................... ,.1, ••••••••••••••••••..••••••• 44 
G. Grathol Cannot Claim Severance Damages For Impacts On Its Hypothetical 
Development Plan Because It Had Knowledge Of The Project When It Bought The 
Property .............................. t ....................... , ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• , •••••••••••••• 46 
V. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 49 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY .TIJDGMENT-2 
311 of 1617
Jf N. 6. 2012 4: 5 8 PM NO. 3883 P. 8 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD"), files this brief in support of 
its motion for summary judgment. ITO has moved for summary judgment to dismiss improper 
claims for compensation or damages by Defendant HJ Grathoi ("Grathoi") in this condemnation 
case. The claims are barred by law and should be dismissed on swnmary judgment. In support 
of this motion, ITD has also filed the Affidavit of Mary V. York with the documents and 
portions of the record cited in this brief attached. 
Il. SUMMARY OF GROUNDS FOR MOTION 
The issue of whether a taldng has occurred in connection with a particular claim for just 
compensation and whether a claim for compensation is permitted by law are legal questions for 
the Court to decide. The following is a summary of improper claims by Grathol has made in this 
case and the legal principles that bar them. 
A. Sylvan Road. 
" Grathol continues to seek compensation for the alleged taking of land for construction of 
Sylvan Road. However, the record is clear and the Court has already ruled that ITD is not 
condemning any property for Sylvan Road and is not constructing Sylvan Road across Grathol's 
property, Therefore, this claim fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed. 
B. Construction Delay. 
Grathol seeks to recover money damages based on what it characterizes as "delay" on the 
part of ITD in constructing the US-95 Project. The law is clear that a condemnee may not 
recover damages for alleaed delay in the construction of a public project. Moreover, Gtathol has 
no factual basis to claim that ITO has failed to meet a construction schedule constituting 
"construction delay" that would support this claim, 
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C. Visibility. 
Grathol seeks to recover severance dam.ages based, in part, on a claim that its proposed 
commercial development will be less visible by cars traveling on US-95 after the Project. Idaho 
does not recognize claims for "loss of visibility.'' idaho law holds that no property owner is 
entitled to a particular pattern or flow of traffic past its property. Therefore, no property owner is 
entitled to a particular level of visibility by passing automobile traffic. For example, no talcing 
would occur ifITD moved US-95 away from the Grathol property entirely, resulting in no traffic 
on US-95 running past the Grathol property. The law does not permit a property owner to 
recover either for a loss of traffic or a loss of visibility from traffic. Courts have repeatedly 
struck down claims for loss of visibility in condemnation cases. 
D. Access. 
Grathol seeks compensation for an alleged loss or restriction of access to its property 
after constructi~n of the US-95 Project. The Grathol property is bare land. Grathol is planning a 
commercial development on the property. It is undisputed that Gtathol did not have any 
commercial access or any permits for commercial access to the property before the US-9S 
Project. Therefore, ITO has not "taken" any commercial access to the property. Moreover, 
Idaho law does not permit compensation for a taking of access unless all access to the public 
road system has been lost or 11destroyed," The record shows that Gtathol will be pennitted 
accesses in the "after" condition. 
E. Lost Profits. 
Grathol seeks to recover as much as $7 million in lost profits in this case. Idaho law bars 
recovery oflost profits except when made under Idaho's eminent domain statute authorizing 
"business damages." Idaho Code§ 7-711(2). Grathol does not qualify under§ 7-711(2) because 
it has not operated a business on the site for 5 years. No business exists on the site. It is bare 
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land. Grathol also did not file an administrative claim for business damages within 90 days of 
service of the complaint, which is a mandatory prerequisite under § 7-711(2). Lastly, Idaho law 
bars claims for lost profits based on new businesses because such claims are inherently 
speculative. 
F. GraveL 
Grathol seeks to recover compensation for the value of gravel it believes is located on the 
property and which Grathol alleges ITD can use for the US-95 Project. This claim fails as a 
matter of law and should be dismissed. !TD is buying the condemned property lock, stock, and 
barrel - including any gravel or anything else of value that may or may not be under the 
property. Grathol cannot recover the fair market value of the property and an additional amount 
for gravel. Secondly, Grathol has no idea whether there is any usable gravel under the property 
or not, how much there is, or what it is worth. It has simply made a demand for $300,000.00. 
Lastly, ITO cannot remove the substructure on the property and then construct a freeway 
overpass on it. If any substructure is removed, it would have to be replaced with like material or 
better, and then re-compacted. Consequently, it would be far more expensive to remove gravel, 
then buy new gravel, truck the new gravel to the site, :fill, and then compact the new gravel to 
restore the site, than it would be to simply use gravel from a supplier. 
G. Severance Damages For Impacts On Development Plan. 
Grathol knew about the US-95 Project before it bought the property. Even though it 
knew the US-9S Project would be built, Grathol developed a "before" development plan after 
buying the property and now seeks to recover severance damages for the Project's impacts on its 
"before" plan. The law does not permit one to buy a piece of property with knowledge of a 
public project, plan a commercial development for the site, and then claim severance damages to 
that plan when the public project is built. Moreover, the law assumes that the purchase price 
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paid by the new property owner reflects the parties' understanding of the value of the property in 
light of the impacts of the impending public project. 
ID. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The ITD Project. 
The Idaho Transportation Department is engaged in a project to widen and improve a 
section of US-95 between the communities of Garwood and Sagle in north Idaho ("the Project"). 
In 2002, ITD initiated a comprehensive study of US-95 between Garwood and Sagle. Affidavit 
of Jason Minzghor ("Minzgbor Aff. "), 1 4 (filed Jan. 18, 2011 ). The study determined that US-
95 should be redesigned and expanded to improve public safety and enable the highway to 
accommodate increasing traffic volumes. Id. 
Due to the size of the US-95 Garwood to Sagle Project, it has been divided into seven 
segments. Id, at 16. The Grathol property is located in the "Athol Segment" of the Project, !TD 
Project No. A009(791 ), Key No. 9791. Id. The Athol Segment will convert approximately 1. 8 
miles ofUS-95 from a two-lane, unrestricted access highway to a four-lane divided and access-
controlled highway. Id., at 1 7. The Athol Segment will also construct an interchange with 
Highway 54 just outside of the town of Athol. Id. 
B. The Grathol Property, 
The Grathol property is located in Kootenai County, outside the town of Athol, at the 
northeast comer of present US-95 and Highway 54. Before the Project, the total area of the 
Grathol property was 56.81 acres. The property condemned, shown in Exhibit B to the 
Complaint, is 16.314 acres, leaving Grathol with 40.496 acres after the taking. Compl., Ex. B. 
A metes and bounds legal description of the 16.314 acres condemned in the Complaint is 
attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint. Id, Ex. A. 
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The construction plan sheets for the US-95 Project specific to the Grathol property are 
attached as Exhibit B to the Complaint. Id, Ex. B. These plan sheets identify and define the 
taking on the Grathol property and the US-95 highway improvements to be constructed on the 
Grathol property. These plan sheets also identify and define the property proposed for 
condemnation in the administrative order of condelllrultion. Id., Ex. C to Complaint (Admin. 
Ord. of Condemn., at 1,112, 3). 
The following is an enlarged view of the primary construction plan sheet contained in 
Exhibit B of the Complaint. It shows the Grathol property outlined in green, with the 
condemned property shaded in yellow. It also shows the construction that will occur on the 
condemned property in the area shaded in yellow. 
J I 
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Below the area shaded in yellow is the location where Sylvan Road would have been 
constructed by ITD if Grathol had agreed to dedicate the land for that purpose, The diagram also 
shows Roberts Road to the right (north) of the Orathol property and the connection of Roberts 
Road with Williams Lane (far right), which provides the additional access to the road system 
sought and obtained by Grathol's neighbors to the north. 
Both the administrative order of condemnation and the Complaint use the construction 
plans to identify and define the property to be condemned from Orathol. As the construction 
plans plainly show, ITD is not condemning any of the Grathol property for construction of 
Sylvan Road. The only property being condemned is shown in yellow and the only improvement 
being constructed is US-95, also shown in yellow. It is undisputed that that the Complaint does 
not condemn any property for Sylvan Road. It is also undisputed that the administrative order 
did not identify any land to be condemned for Sylvan Road. 
C. Procedural History. 
After approving the US-95 Project, its route, and the properties to be acquired, ITD began 
the process of design, right-of-way acquisition, and contract bidding. After good-faith attempts 
to reach agreement with Grathol for the purchase of its property were unsuccessful, ITO initiated 
the administrative process to prepare for condemnation of the property. On November 17, 2010, 
the Idaho Transportation Board issued its Order of Condemnation. ITD filed this condemnation 
action on November 19, 20 l 0. No change in the construction plans or the land to be condemned 
from Grathol occurred in the two days between the administrative order of condemnation by the 
Board and the Complaint filed in this case. 
On December 21, 2010, ITO filed a Motion for Possession of the Grathol property. 
Grathol opposed the motion, in part, on the grounds that ITD was secretly intending to condemn 
land for Sylvan Road in this case. Grathol was apparently confused by the fact that ITD had 
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agreed to construct Sylvan Road to the north of the Grathol property because those property 
owners agreed to dedicate the land for that purpose. That same offer was made to Grathol, who 
declined. Consequently, ITD advised Grathol that Sylvan Road would not be extended across its 
property. 
On January 21, 2011, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on ITD's motion for 
possession. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court held that ITO was not condemning any 
land for Sylvan Road and was not constructing Sylvan Road across Grathol's property. Hearing 
Transcript ("Tr.''), at 61:2-16 (York Aff., Ex. 1). On January 27, 2011, the Court entered a 
written order granting ITD's Motion for Possession, finding that ITD had the power of eminent 
domain and had complied with Idaho's condemnation statutes. On March 4, 2011, the Court 
entered a Judgment on its order granting possession, and Grathol appealed the judgment to the 
Idaho Supreme Court. 
On November 16, 2011, the Court entered an Amended Pretrial Order setting a trial date 
of March S, 2012 and ordering that all pretrial motions are to be filed on or before January 6, 
2012. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Grathol's Attempt To Recover Compensation For An Alleged Taking Of 
Land For Sylvan Road Should Be Dismissed. 
Despite the Court's ruling that ITD has not condemned any land for Sylvan Road and is 
not constructing Sylvan Road across Grathol' s property, Grathol continues to seek compensation 
for a talcing of land for Sylvan Road. This claim should be dismissed on summary judgment 
because the Court has already ruled that ITD is not condemning land for Sylvan Road. This 
r1Jling is supported by the undisputed facts in the record and no contrary evidence exists. 
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1. The Court has ruled that ITD is not condemning any property for 
Sylvan Road in this case. 
ITO filed a motion for possession of the property condemned in this matter, consisting of 
16.314 acres of property to be used for reconstruction and improvement of US-95. The Court 
held an evidentiary hearing on ITD's motion and the scope of the taking in this case on January 
21, 2011. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court rejected Grathol's argument that ITO was 
also condemning property from Grathol for the extension of Sylvan Road across the Grathol 
property. Tr. at 61:2-25 (YorkAff., Ex. 1). As held by the Court: 
The order of condemnation does not provide or in this court's 
opinion does not pro"ide for the taking of the defendant's property 
for the expansion of the Sylvan Road and Roberts Road. The 
contemplation of the expansion of Sylvan Road to link to Roberts 
Road is certainly mentioned in the order of condemnation, but 
more importantly, the complaint does not contemplate the 
extension of that road, and that is not the subject of the taking that 
is before this court. The Idaho Department of Transportation has 
offered to expand those roads through Grathol's property-- rather, 
the Sylvan Road expansion through Grathol's property, but that 
offer has been declined by the defendant and this has been testified 
to amply before the Court today and in Mr. Minzghor's deposition. 
Id., at 61:2-16 (emphasis added), The Court further concluded that "[t]he complaint itself, the 
controlling portions of that complaint, does not show a taking of defendant's property for the 
expansion of Syl"an Road into Roberts Road or the expansion of Sylvan Road through the 
Grathol property; therefore this court finds that the scope of the proposed taking is adequately 
defined in the complaint itself.'' Tr. at 61 : 18-2S. 
2. The Court's ruling is fully supported by the record and no contrary 
facts exist. 
The Court's finding and decision are amply supported in the record, and no contrary facts 
or evidence exists or has been offered by Orathol. The construction plans for the US-95 Project 
do not call for construction of Sylvan Road across Grathol's property. Id., at 12:13-13:16. The 
Project plans show that the property condemned from Orathol is beina used exclusively for the 
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US-95 Project. Id., at 31:7-22; 33:12-34:l. See also Ex. B to Complaint (project plan sheets for 
construction of the US-95 Project on the Grathol property). 
Jason Minzghor, P .E., is the District 1 Project Development Engineer for ITD. As the 
District 1 Project Development Engineer, Mr. Minzghor is responsibie for managing and 
administering the planning and design of state highway projects in District 1. The US-95 Project 
is in District 1, making Mr. Minzghor the engineer with primary responsibility for the planning 
and design of the Project. Mr. Minzghor submitted an affidavit in support of ITD' s motion for 
possession. His affidavit makes clear that ITD is not condemning any portion of Grathol's 
property for the construction of a Sylvan Road extension. 
10. Contrary to the claim in Gra'tb.ol's brief in opposition to the 
motion for possession of the property, ITD is not condemning any 
portion of the Grathol property in order to construct an extension 
of the Sylvan/Roberts Road as part of the US-95 Garwood to Sagle 
Project. ITD's Complaint does not seek to condemn any property 
from Gtathol for construction of any such extension. The only 
property being acquired by ITD in this case is property ne~ed for 
tb.e realignment of US-9S and the construction of the Highway 54 
interchange. 
* * * 
17. In this eminent domain proceeding, ITD is not condemning 
any portion of Grathol' s property for an extension of 
Sylvan/Roberts Road. 
Minzghor Aff., 11 10, 17 (filed Jan. 18, 2011). Gtathol has not presented any testimony or any 
factual evidence to the contrary. 
At the January 21, 2011 evidentiary hearing on ITD's motion for possession, Mr. 
Minzghor testified unequivocally that ITD is not condemning any property from Grathol for 
Sylvan Road. See Tr. at 11: 1-8; 13:9-16; 20:1-25; 21:1-24; 33:1-25; 34: l :23 (York Aff., Ex. 1), 
For example, Mr. Minzghor testified as follows, 
Q. As pan of these project plans, is there any property being condemned for the 
expansion of Sylvan Road? 
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A. No, sir. 
Q. Is the construction or condemnation of property of Sylvan Road necessary to 
complete this project? 
A. No. 
Id., at 11: 1-8. 
Mr. Minzghor also testified that nothing in the administrative order of condemnation calls 
for the condemnation of any property for Sylvan Road. 
Q. Mr. Marfice also had you read a section on page 2, 4( e) ( of the administrative order 
of condemnation]. If you could go back to look at that. And it~- to summarize, it says 
that "In association with the project, the Idaho Transportation Department is in the 
process of extending Sylvan Road to tie into Roberts Road." At some point in time - or 
excuse me, at one point in time it was contemplated that there may be some sort of 
connection? 
A. Correct. 
Q. But there's no plans for that now? 
A. No. 
Q, Anything that Mr. Mar.flee has raised up there that require you or ITD or the project 
to construct Sylvan Road? 
A. No. 
Q, Anything that Mr. Mar:tice has said require ITD to construct Sylvan Road in any 
particular manner or designation? 
A. No. 
Id., at 34:2-20. 
ITD also bas no plans to construct Sylvan Road across the Orathol property in the future. 
Id., at 33:2-23. Since Sylvan Road is a local street, and not a state highway, if Sylvan Road is 
ever extended across the Orathol property in the future, it would be constructed by some other 
entity such as Lakes Highway District. It is not being constructed by ITD as part of the US-95 
Project 
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The Court's findings and conclusions that ITD is not condemning any property fo1 
Sylvan Road, and is only condemning the property identified in the Complaint, are fully 
supported by the record. No contrary facts exist. 
3. Grathol's motive for seeking condemnation for Sylvan Road is to 
improperly shift the required costs of its development to the public. 
Gtathol 's eagerness to have its land condemned for Sylvan Road begs the question -
why? According to Gtathol, "Defendant is an entity versed in the development and construction 
of commercial retail projects for profit. Defendant acquired the subject property, accomplished a 
zone change and has been actively engaged in pursuit of a development plan for the property." 
Grathol Resp. to Mot. for Poss., at 2 (filed Jan. 11, 2011). 
In Idaho, cities and counties generally require developers of residential and commercial 
developments to construct the roads within the developments, and then dedicate those roads to 
the public with the plat. See, e.g. 1 I.C. § S0-1309 (requiring owners of new developments to 
"make a dedication of all public streets and rights-of~way shown on said plat"). The Grathol 
property is in Kootenai County. Kootenai County has adopted specific ordinances requiring 
dedications of roads within new developments. 
Section 9-9-2 of the Kootenai County zoning ordinances regulating commercial zones 
requires that every "Commercial Lot shall have direct access from a public road." See York 
Aff,, Ex. 2 at 2). Thus, every individual lot within the 40~acre commercial development 
proposed by Gtathol will, by law, have to have access from a public road. Similarly, Section 10· 
3-l(B)(4)(e) of the Kootenai County zoning ordinances (identifying the services and 
infrastructure that the developer must construct to serve a commercial subdivision) requires " 
[p ]ublicly~maintained road access to each lot, as approved by the Highway District." See id, at 
p. 33 of Ordinance. Section 10-3-1(0)(2) requires the interior roads constructed by the 
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developer to meet highway district or ITD standards. "Road rights-of-way shall meet the 
requirements of the Highway District or, if applicable, ITD." Id., at p. 35 of Ordinance. Section 
10-3-1 (D)(2) further makes clear that the developer will be required to dedicate the fully 
constructed roads within the development to the county or local highway district: "Except for 
gated communities and common driveways approved by the Board [ of county commissioners], 
roads and associated rights-of-way shall be dedicated to the applicable highway agency." Id. 
(brackets and emphasis added). 
In summary, in order for Grathol to proceed with commercial development of its 
property, Kootenai County will require Grathol to construct internal roads within its 
development that meet highway district standards1 so that each commercial lot will have the 
required direct access from a public road. To make the interior roads "public," Kootenai County 
will require Grathol to dedicate the internal roads within its development to the local highway 
district. 
Therefore, Grathol's motive for trying to force ITD to condemn land for Sylvan Road is 
obvious. Under Kootenai County's ordinances, Grathol will be required to construct the road at 
its expense and dedicate the road and the land to the county highway district as a condition of 
approval for commercial development of its property. By making the claim regarding Sylvan 
Road in this case, Grathol is trying to shift costs of its commercial development onto the public 
that should rightfully and legally be borne by Grathol, the commercial developer. Regardless of 
its motive, Grathol cannot force ITD to condemn property for a local street or property that ITD 
does not need for a state highway project. 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-14 
323 of 1617
JAN. 6. 2012 4: 5 9 PM NO. 3883 P. 20 
4. Grathol's claim for damages based on Sylvan Road fails as a matter of 
law. 
In Idaho, a civil complaint of condemnation defines the nature and scope of the take. 
Winder v. Canyon Vista Family Ud P'shp, 148 Idaho 718,727,228 P.3d 985,994 (2010); Ada 
County Hwy. Dist. v. Sharp, 135 Idaho 888,891, 26 P.3d 1225, 1228 (Ct, App. 2001) (holding 
that the condemnation complaint controlled the scope of the take). 
Here, the Complaint identified and attached the Project plans as Exhibit B. The Project 
plans define the take as 16.314 acres, leaving Grathol with 40.496 acres after the t.aking. 
Nowhere in the Complaint or Project plans is there any suggestion that ITD is condemning any 
portion of the Grathol property for Sylvan Road, 
Grathol admits this fact. Indeed, Grathol agrees that ITD's Complaint and the legal 
description and project plans "show that (ITD] intends on condemning a 16.314 acre portion of 
Defendant's property." Gtathol Resp. to Mot. for Poss., at 11 (filed Jan. 10, 2011). Grathol 
further acknowledges that "the only evidence of Sylvan Road across Defendant's property is 
Plaintiff's imposition of a dotted line indicated some future route of Sylvan Road on Exhibit C 
[to ITD's Complaint].'1 Id, at 12 (brackets added). 
Additionally, Grathol's Vice President of Development, Alan Johnson, testified during 
his deposition that the legal description and project right-of-way plans, which are attached as 
Exhibits A and B to ITD's Complamt, do not include any property for the extension of Sylvan 
Road across the Grathol Property. Johnson Dep., at 92: 17-93:15 (Ex. 3 to the York Aff.). Geoff 
Reeslund, Grathol Is Vice President and Director of Design and Construction, testified that he 
reviewed the construction plans attached as Exhibit B to ITD' s Complaint and stated that he did 
not see any indication that ITD had taken property for the construction of Sylvan Road. 
Reeslund Dep., at 29:4-22 (York Aff., Ex. 4). Orathol has retained Skip Sherwood as an 
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appraiser in this case. Mr. Sherwood testified that it is his understanding that the extension of 
Sylvan Road is not part of this condemnation case. Sherwood Dep., at 193:10-13 (York Aff., 
Ex. 5). Mr. Sherwood testified that the extension of Sylvan Road is not included in the legal 
description attached to ITD's complaint, nor is it included on the right-of-way plans. Id., at 
193:23-194:15. Despite their acknowledgements that ITO is not condemning property for an 
extension of Sylvan Road across the Grathol property, Grathol continues to seek compensation 
for a taking for Sylvan Road. 
The Court has ruled that ITD is not condemning land from Grathol for Sylvan Road. The 
uncontroverted facts show that ITD is not condemning land for Sylvan Road. Grathol has 
admitted that neither the Complaint nor the construction plans for the US~95 Project condemn 
land for Sylvan Road. Grathol cannot force ITD to condemn property, nor can it recover 
compensation for a roadway that ITD is not building and is not needed for the US-95 Project. 
Based on the foregoing, ITO requests that the Court enter summary judgment dismissing 
Gtathol' s claim for compensation based on an alleged taking of land for Sylvan Road. 
B. Grathol Cannot Recover Damages Based On Its Allegation Of Delay In 
Construction Of The US-95 Project. 
Grathol has made an improper claim for compensation based on alleged delay in the 
construction of the US-95 Project. Specifically, Alan Johnson, Grathol's Vice President of 
Development, has claimed that Grathol is entitled to $9471000.00 for the "reduction in value for 
the remainina property while waiting for the completion of construction.'' Orathol's Third Supp. 
Resp. to Discovery, at 11 (York Aff., Ex. 6). 
Grathol's claim for compensation based on an alleged delay in construction ofUS-95 
fails as a matter oflaw for the following reasons. First, the claim is contrary to the Idaho 
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Constitution and established case law by the Idaho Supreme Court. Second, the alleged delay 
does not constitute a "taking" of property and, therefore, no compensation is owed. 
1. Claims for compensation for construction delay in condemnation 
cases are barred by Idaho law. 
In Idaho, the law is clear that "before an owner is entitled to compensation for a violation 
of Article I, § 14 of the Idaho Constitution, his property must be 'taken' and not merely 
'damaged."' Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 140 Idaho 536,541, 96 P.3d 637,642 (2004) 
(holding that damage caused by sensitivity to post-harvest burning did not amount to 
compensable taking of property because grass burning constituted interruption but less than a 
"complete" deprivation of use). 
In Idaho, the landowner has the burden of proving that he has a valid property right and 
that the property right has been taken. Reuth v. State, 100 Idaho 203,218,596 P.2d 75, 90 
(1978). No Idaho statute or case supports the proposition that Grathol has a protected property 
right to have the US-95 Project constructed on a schedule or by a date desired by Grathol. 
In addition, a landowner cannot recover damages where there is "no indication that the 
condition is permanent." Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777, 781-82, S3 P.3d 828, 
832-33 (2002) (emphasis added) (citing Marty v. State, 122 Idaho 766, 769, 838 P.2d 1384, 1387 
(1992)). Likewise, the Idaho Supreme Court held in Moon that "the mere interruption of the use 
of one's property, as it is less than a permanent (complete) deprivation, does not mandate 
compensation." Moon, 140 Idaho at 542, 96 P.3d at 643. See also 4 NICHOLS ONEMINENT 
DOMAIN § 13, 19 ("Under the prevailing rule, the profits a business owner has been deprived of 
by reason of the interruption of operations by the condemnation are not compensable."). 
By its nature, an alleged ''delay" in construction is not permanent. The US-9S Project is 
being built and will be completed, Anything less than a permanent deprivation of property does 
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not amount to a compensable taking. Covington, 137 Idaho at 781, 53 P.3d at 832; Moon, 140 
Idaho at S42, 96 P.3d at 643. See also 3 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN§ 10.02(3), n.61 
(Matthew Bender, 3rd ed.) (citing cases). 
In Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Const. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 {1978), the Idaho 
Supreme Court denied a claim based on construction delay in the course of a public project, and 
highlighted the policy reasons behind the rule that a landowner cannot recover damages for 
construction delay, In Just' s, a business owner brought an action against a contractor who had 
been hired by the City ofldaho Falls to complete a large scale public works project which 
included removal and replacement of portions of the City's streets, sidewalks, and water and 
sewer lines. Id. at 463, 583 P.2d at 998. Among other claims, the business owner sought 
recovery of business damages associated with project delays and annoyances that occurred 
during construction. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the trial court's award of damages 
for the business owner on the project delays. Id. at 470, 583 P.2d at 1005. The Supreme Court 
reasoned that "[t)his plaintiff is surely not the only person who may have suffered some 
pecuniary losses as a result of the downtown renovation project" but '·could conceivably include 
not only all the other business in the area, but also their suppliers, creditors, and so forth, ad 
infinitium." Id Thus, the court reversed the award of damages because such a holding ''would 
unduly burden any construction in a business area." Id. 
In summary, claims in condemnation cases for compensation based on construction delay 
are barred by the Idaho Constitution and case law from the Idaho Supreme Court. 
2, Other jurisdictions also bar recovery for construction delay in 
condemnation cases, 
Other states are in accord. See, e.g., Frank v. Government of City of Morristown, 294 
S.W.3d 566, 570 (Tenn. Ct App. 2008) (reiterating the rule that "[d]amages resulting from 
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inconvenience during construction are not recoverable in a condemnation action"); Hurst v. 
Starr, 607 N.E.2d 1155, 1159-60 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) C'intetference of temporary duration 
during construction of an improvement ... are not permanent in nature as they do not last beyond 
the completion of the project and have no effect on the market value of the property before the 
improvement was commenced and no effect upon the market value of the residue after the 
improvement was completed''; State v. Baken Park Enters., 257 N.W.2d 448, 449-50 (S.D. 
1977) ("losses incurred by property owner in the way of loss of income ·and profits ... together 
with other inconveniences attendant upon the work in progress, are not compensable items of 
damage resulting from a construction project."). 
3. In Idaho, just compensation is measured as of the date of issuance of 
the summons in the condemnation case. This statutory mandate bars 
recovery for compensation based on allegations of construction delay. 
In Idaho, the date of valuation for purposes of determining just compensation is set by 
statute. Idaho Code § 7-712 requires that the value of the property taken in a condemnation 
action and the severance damages that will accrue to the remaining property are to be determined 
as of "the date of the summons." The statute specifically requires that the property's "actual 
value, at that date, shall be the measure of compensation for all property to be actually taken, and 
the basis of damages to property not actually taken, but injuriously affected, in all cases where 
such damages are allowed[.]" Id. See also State ex rel, Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444,449, 
546 P.2d 399,404 (1976). The statute permits no discretion on this issue. Rather, the language 
of the provision speaks in mandatory terms, requirins that the value of the property as of the date 
of summons "shall be the measure of compensation." Id 
If the proper date of valuation is not applied, the validity of the valuation analysis is 
compromised. As stated in Niehols on Eminent Domain, "[i]t is critical that the appraisal 
performed by both parties reflect the legal date of-valuation." 5-18 NICHOLS ON EMINENT 
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DOMAIN§ 18.16 (2011). A party's "[fjailure to appraise according to the correct date of value 
may give rise to a motion to strike the appraisal, or the reversal of the entire verdict." 
5-18 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN§ 18.16 (2011) 
The fact that the date of valuation bars claims for construction delay is reflected in the 
case law. For example, in Oakland County Bd of County Road Comm 'rs v. JBD Rochester, 
LLC, 718 N.W,2d 845, 846-47 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006), a highway district sought to exclude any 
"appraisals of defendants' property that took into consideration a posttaking road construction 
delay caused by congressional funding problems." 718 N.W.2d at 846. The trial court permitted 
introduction of the post-taking road construction delay. Id On appeal, the Michigan Court of 
Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that "[t]he trial court erred in admitting appraisals of 
defendants' property that took into consideration the posttaking road construction delay because 
the claimed severance damages were not caused by the taking." Id. at 848. 
The court explained that "the proper measure of dam.ages in a case involving a partial 
talcing consists of the fair market value of the property taken, plus severance damages to the 
remaining property if applicable." Id. at 847. Relying on Michigan Supreme Court precedent, 
the Oakland County Court emphasized that evidence of post-taking construction delay was 
"irrelevant to the just compensation calculation ... because just compensation must be calculated 
on the basis of the market value of the property on the date of the taking''-not an indiscriminate 
future date as was advocated by the defendants. Oakland County, 718 N.W.2d at 847 (emphasis 
added) (quoting Mich. Dept. ofTransp. 11. Haggerty Corridor Partners Ltd P'shp, 700N.W.2d 
380,387 (Mich. 2005)). 
Likewise, the court held that post-taking construction delay could not be considered as 
part of any severance damage calculation to the remainder because the delay damages were not 
"attributable to the taking." Id The court explained that the "[d]efendants placed an 
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unwarranted reliance on the expectation that the road project would be completed" where 
"[d]elays caused by lack of funding occur with some regularity." Id. at 848 (emphasis added). 
Ultimately, the court found that that any project delay was unrelated to the taking and because 
the "defendants were not deprived of value inherent in the land," they couid not recover 
damages. Id 
Similarly, in Idaho, no taking occurs in connection with a claim for compensation where 
the landowner has not been deprived of all economic use or value of its property. See Covington 
v. Jefferson County, 137 ldaho at 781, 53 P.3d at 832; Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass}n, 140 
Idaho at 541, 96 P.3d at 642 (no taking occurs absent a "complete" deprivation of use). The 
planned US-95 Project has not deprived Grathol of all use of the property nor has it deprived the 
property of all economic value. In fact, Grathol has already developed site plans for construction 
of a commercial development in the "after" condition. (York Aff., Ex. 7.) 
4. Grathol's claim for compensation based on construction delay fails 
factually. 
As previously noted, planning for the US-95 Project began in 2002. Grathol purchased 
the property in May 2008. Grathol' s Third Supp. Resp. to Discovery, at 4 (York Aff., Ex.6); 
Johnson Dep., at 25: 19-21 ('I ork Aff., Ex. 3); Exhibit 44 to Johnson Dep. (York Aff., Ex. 8). 
Grathol's stated intention for the property was "to develop it into a commercial retail 
center/hospitality project." (York Aff., Ex, 6, at 4.) 
OTathol first learned about the property in January 2008. Johnson Dep., at 25:22-25 
(York Aff., Ex. 3), At that time, the listing for the property by the Multiple Listing Service 
provided notice to any prospective purchaser that a highway interchange was planned to be 
constructed on the property, Johnson Dep., Ex. 43 (York Aff., Ex. 9). Specifically, the listing 
for the property stated that "preliminary drawings show future off-ramps and frontage road for 
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[highway] 95 through this property.'' Id The listing notice also advised that the purchaser 
should ''check with [the] Department of Transportation to verify" the details regarding the 
interchange. Id. 
Mr. Geoff Reeslund also confirmed that Grathol was aware of the Project before it 
purchased the Property. Reeslund Dep., at 22:13-23:4; 65:19-24 (YorkAff., Ex. 4). 
A. We were aware that there were plans by ITD to potentially realign and 
improve the freeway. 
Q. And did you know about this prior to purchasing the property? 
A. Yes. 
Id., at 22:25-23:4. 
Additionally, Grathol rnet with representatives oflTD before it purchased the property 
and were shown the preliminary plans for the Project. Johnson Dep., at31:20-32:13; 36:7-14 
(York Aff., Ex. 3); Reeslund Dep., 87:8~88:7 (York Aff., Ex. 4). Through its meetings with ITD 
and its review of the preliminary projeci plans, Grathol knew about the Project and had 
knowledge of details of the Project. Id. 
Given the fact that planning had begun on the US-95 Project in 2002, and construction 
had not started when Grathol bought the property in 2008, with knowledge of the Project, 
Grathol cannot now complain about "delay'' in the completion of the Project. The Project had 
already been in planning and development for 6 years when Grathol bought the property. Since 
construction of the Project had not even begun when Grathol bought the property, it cannot now · 
claim that it is entitled to compensation for a delay in construction, This conclusion is further 
bolstered by the fact that ITD had not even filed its condemnation suit to acquire a portion of the 
Grathol property when Grathol bought the property. Under these facts, Grathol has no basis to 
claim compensation for construction delay. 
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Alan Johnson, vice president of Grathol, states that Gratbol is entitled to $947,000.00 for 
construction delay. However, be provides no foundation and no verifiable methodology to 
support this claim. See Grathol's Third Supp. Resp. to Discovery, at 11 (York Aff., Ex. 6). 
ITD's rebuttal expert, Dennis Reinstein, CPA, highlights the deficiencies in this "construction 
delay" claim. 
Mr. Reinstein notes that Alan Johnson's methodology is inherently flawed, does not 
adhere to any accepted practices or methodology, and is unverifiable. Reinstein Rebuttal Report, 
at 2 (York Aff., Ex. 10). Mr. Johnson's claim also fails to state or consider whether market 
demand existed for a commercial development at this site at the time of the taking and does not 
identify any tenants that were lost or had even given any indication of a desire to locate to this 
site. Id. 
The delay claim does not cite any independent source or verified information to support 
the amount of$947,000.00. Id. at 4-5. The claim also fails to account for the fact that Grathol 
was aware of the project before it bought the property, Id. The claim also fails to properly 
account for market fluctuations (including the steep economic decline that began in 2008) or the 
difficulties in obtaining commercial financing after the crash in 2008. 
Based on the foregoing, ITD requests that the Court enter summary judgment dismissing 
Gtathol's claim for compensation based on alleged delay in construction of the US-95 Project. 
C. Grathol Cannot Recover Damages for Loss of Visibility. 
Grathoi seeks to reeover compensation based on a claim that the remainder of its property 
will be less visible from US~-95 after construction of the Project. This claim is barred by Idaho 
law and should be dismissed on summary judgment 
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1. Idaho law. 
A "right of visibility" or "right to be seen" is not a recognized property right in Idaho. 
Neither the legislature nor any Idaho cases have recognized a compensable property interest in 
"visibility" or a "right to be seen" from a roadway. Nor have any Idaho cases held that uioss of 
visibility'' from a roadway is compensable in eminent domain or inverse condemnation cases. 
Consequently, Grathol cannot establish that its claim for loss of visibility is based on a valid or 
protected property right recognized in Idaho. 
Idaho courts have repeatedly held that a property owner does not have a right to any 
particular flow or pattern of traffic or a right to have direct access to or from a particular 
direction oftraffic. State ex ,el. Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444,447, 546 P.2d 399,402 (1976); 
James v. State, 88 Idaho 172, 178, 397 P .2d 766, 770 (1964) ( citing Villages of Eden & Hazelton 
v. Idaho Bd. of Hwy. Dirs., 83 Idaho S54, 556,367 P.2d 294,301 (1961)). Thus, where 
construction of a road improvement project results in a less convenient or more circuitous route, 
no compensable taking occurs. James, 88 Idaho at 177-78, 397 P.2d at 770. 
This principle has been upheld repeatedly by the Idaho Supreme Court. See, e.g., Brown 
v. City of Twin Falls, 124 Idaho 39, 42-3, 855 P.2d 876, 879-80; Bastian, 97 ldaho at 447, 546 
P.2d at 402; Merritt v. State, 113 Idaho 142, 742 P.2d 397; Powell v. McKelvey, 56 Idaho 291, 53 
P.2d 626 (1936). In each of these cases, the Idaho Supreme Court held that rights of property 
owners abutting a street or highway do not encompass a right to any particular access from any 
particular road, from any particular direction, or a right of any particular pattern or flow of 
traffic. See Brown, 124 Idaho at 41-44, 85S P.2d at 879-81 (analyzing Bastian, Me"itt, and 
Powell), In addition, the Supreme Court has held that mere inconvenience to the public of 
having to drive a greater distance or a more circuitous route to reach the landowners' property 
does not constitute a takina, Id. at 44, 855 P.2d at 881. 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S BRIEF lN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JVDGMENT-24 
333 of 1617
JAN. 6. 2012 5:01PM NO. 3883 P. 30 
Based on these principles, ITD could re-route US-9S entirely so that no traffic travels 
past the Grathol property at all. Or ITO could restrict US-9S so that most traffic travels 
elsewhere. Under either scenario, no taking would occur as a matter of law. In addition9 under 
either scenario, the complete or partial diversion ofttaffic away from Grathol's property wouid 
also necessarily result in a complete or partial loss of visibility of the property by that traffic. 
Since no compensation can be had for a change in traffic flow or pattern under Idaho law, no 
compensation can be had for loss of visibility. 
2. If no recovery can be had for changes in traffic flow, no recovery can 
be bad for changes in visibility caused by changes in traffic flow. 
The issue of visibility is necessarily and inextricably intertWined with traffic flow. See, 
e.g., Dept. ofTransp. v. Marilyn Hickey Ministries, 1S9 P.3d 111, 113 (Colo. 2007) ("We hold 
that because a landowner has no continued right to traffic passing by its property, the landowner 
likewise has no right in the continued motorist visibility of its property"); State v. Schmidt9 805 
S.W.2d 25 (Tex. App. 1991), rev'd 867 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex. 1993) ("Just as a landowner has 
no vested interest in the volume or route of passersby, he has no right to insist that his premises 
be visible to them."); State ex. rel. Missouri Hwy. & Transp. Com 'n v. Dooley, 738 S.W.2d 457, 
468-69 (Mo. App. 1987) (in partial taking case, "any claim as to damages for 'public view' or 
visibility is 'inextricably related' to a property right in the traffic, [and) the decisions have 
consistently refused to 'accord to property owners any right in the continuation of traffic."'), 
Because Grathol has no right to a particular pattern of traffic flow, it necessarily has no 
right to compensation based on loss of visibility of its property by passing traffic. 
·--
3. Courts have repeatedly denied claims for loss of visibility. 
Case law shows that claims in condemnation cases for compensation based on an alleged 
loss of visibility have been repeatedly rejected across the country. In Dept. ofTransp. v. Marilyn 
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Hickey Ministries, 159 P.3d 111 (Colo. 2007), the Colorado Department of Transportation 
constructed a light rail line as part of a project to expand and improve Interstate 25 in the 
metropolitan Denver area. Id. at 112. As part of the construction of the light rail line, COOT 
filed a condemnation action to take a narrow strip of land, 650 feet long, from Marilyn Hickey 
Ministries. Id. The property was located next to a major interchange on I-25, at Orchard Road, 
Id. CDOT constructed a concrete retaining wall on the condemned property to support an 
overpass for Orchard Road. Id. The property owner complained that the retaining wall blocked 
the view of the property by passing motorists on 1-25, and sought $1.9 million for the loss of 
visibility alone. Id. The trial court granted CDOT's motion in limine to exclude testimony on 
loss of visibility. Id. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed that ruling. Id. at 113. The case 
then went to the Supreme Court of Colorado: 
We granted certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals 
erred in ruling that the landowner, part of whose property is being 
taken by eminent domain for a state transportation project, may 
recover damages for the impainnent of passing motorists' view of 
the remainder of the landowner's property. We reverse the court of 
appeals and hold that motorists ' visibility of property is not a 
compensable right under the Colorado Constitution, 
Id. at 112 ( emphasis added). In reversing the court of appeals, the Colorado Supreme Court held 
as follows: 
Generally, freeway visibility is analyzed as an access claim and 
condemnees have been found to have no right to visibility . , . We 
hold that because a landowner has no continued right to traffic 
passing its property, the landowner likewise has no riab,t in the 
continued motorist visibility of its property from a transit corridor. 
Id. at 113 (eitations omitted). The court cited one of its earlier decisions, Troiano v. Colo. Dept. 
of Hwys., 463 P.2d 448, 45S (Colo. 1969), where it concluded that "'[w]ith the majority view 
holding that a property owner has no right to have the traveling public pass bis property, 
logically it would be inconsistent to say that a property owner has a right to have the traveling 
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public afforded a clear view of his property."' Marilyn Hickey Ministries, 159 P.3d at 144 
( quoting Troiano, 463 P .2d at 455). This is precisely in accord with Idaho law and should be 
. applied to Grathol's loss of visibility claim in this case. 
The Supreme Court of Colorado further held: 
[A] public transit corridor like 1-25 is an always evolving multi-
modal point of access to a city's transportation infrastructure. The 
state's police power enables continued modifications to its public 
transportation systems and the "[r)ight of access is subject to 
reasonable control and limitation," Troiano, 463 P.2d at 451,456. 
"[L]ogically it would be inconsistent'' to recogni2e a right to 
visibility but no right to have the traveling public pass one's 
property. Id. at 455. Under Troiano, there is simply no inherent 
property right to continued traffic or visibility along the 1-25 transit 
corridor. 
Marilyn Hickey Ministries, 159 P.3d at 114~15. The retaining wall in Marilyn Hickey Ministries 
was built on the property condemned from the property owner, and the visibility claim was 
denied, 
As additional rationale for the rule, the Colorado Supreme Court explained: 
(W]hile the original construction ofI--25 may have provided a 
benefit of motorist visibility looking toward the [landowner's] 
property, this benefit was constructed with taxpayer funding as part 
of a major public works project. A motorist's view of the 
[landowner's property] was an artificially created condition, 
established in an exercise of the state's police power, which does 
not inhere in the compensable value of the [landowner's] property. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. noted long ago that '4when a benefit is 
conferred upon a landowner, the value of which he does not pay 
for, he takes it upon the implied condition that he shall not be paid 
for it when it is taken away." Stanwood v. Malden, 157 Mass. 17, 
18, 31 N.E. 702, 703 (1892), 
Id. at 116, Here, Grathol puzposefully purchased property near US-95 for the commercial 
benefits of proximity to the highway. Grathol did not pay for those benefits. The highway was 
constructed at public expense. Grathol cannot now claim that it should be compensated when 
changes are made to the highway, again at public expense. 
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In City o/Wichita v. McDonald's Corp., 971 P.2d 1189 (Kan. 1999), the city 
reconstructed U.S. Highway 54 (also known as Kellogg Street) through the City of Wichita. Id. 
at 1192. Wal·Mart owned and operated a Sam's Club at the comer of Kellogg and Dugan 
Streets. Id. As part of the project, the city condemned two strips of land along two edges of the 
Sam's Club property. Id. at 1193. The construction project closed the intersection of Dugan and 
Kellogg, causing Kellogg/U.S. Highway 54 to "fly-over" Dugan Street, and the grade of the 
reconstructed highway rose by 21 feet above the previous grade. Id. In addition, the frontage 
roads alongside the highway were converted to one-way roads, one of which provided primary 
access to Sam's Club. Id. IfITD had taken similar action in this case, it would have closed the 
intersection of US-9S and Highway 54 entirely, and made Highway 54 a one-way road. 
The court in City of Wichita detailed the tortuous route that motorists had to take after the 
project to reach Sam's Club. Id. at 1192-93. The court also set forth the facts showing that the 
visibility of Sam's Club and its signs was now blocked from both directions on the freeway and 
from the on and off ramps at the nearest interchanges from Dugan Street. Visibility fi:om the 
freeway was blocked both by the substantial elevation in the grade of the freeway and by the 
concrete structures supporting the freeway "fly-over" Dugan Street Id. 
Wal-Mart argued that it was entitled to compensation for loss of access, restricted access, 
and loss of visibility. Id. at 1193. Finding that the Sam's Club property had "reasonable" access 
after the project, the trial court excluded expert testimony offered by Wal-Mart on these claims 
on the grounds that "it takes into account, and is based on, access, -view, convenience, and/or 
productivity [which] bear no relation to the valuation of the taking and is not admissible." Id. at 
1194. When it received a compensation award far less than that advocated by its excluded 
experts, Wal-Mart appealed, 
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kansas first distinguished between a "right of access" 
and "regulation of traffic flow." Specifically, the court explained that a "right of access" is 
''traditionally defined as an abutting landowner's common-law right of access from the 
landowner's property to abutting public roads." Id. at 1197. Whereas "'[r]eguiation of traffic 
flow"' or 'circuity of access' ... is an entirely separate concept. An abutting property owner has 
no right to the continuation of traffic flow from nearby highways to the owner's property." Id. 
Although certain of the accesses to Sam's Club were now on a one-way street that had 
previously been a two-way street, and the one-way street no longer connected to the freeway 
near Sam's Club, both the trial court and the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that no access had 
been taken as a matter of law, since the property still had "reasonable" access. Id. at 1198. 
Toe court then addressed the following question: "Did the district court err by ruling 
Wal-Mart's expert witnesses could not consider impairment of access and view, inconvenience, 
change of grade, and interference with the productive use of the subject property in assessing 
damages under K.S.A. 26-513(d)?" The court flatly concluded ''No." Id. at 1192. As to the 
specific issue of "loss of visibility,'' the Supreme Court of Kansas held: 
Wal-Mart also claims damages for loss of view, essentially arguing 
that because Kellogg is now a raised freeway, motorists cannot see 
Sam's from certain vantage points. Wal-Mart's claim finds no 
support as a common-law easement of view. The easement of 
view or "ancient lights" doctrine protected landowners from 
neighbors who would erect structures blocking light or air from the 
landowner. Kansas has never adopted the doctrine. See Anderson 
v. Bloomheart, 101 Kan. 691, 692, 168 P. 900 (1917). Wal~Mart's 
claim also finds no support as a ('right to be seen." A "right to be 
seen" claim for damages (for example the advertising value of a 
location) is generally denied. See 4A Nichols on Eminent Domain 
§ 14A.03[4] (3d ed. rev. 1998). 
City of Wichita, 911 P.3d at 1198. The City of Wichita case is squarely on point, and the 
circumstances faced by Wal-Mart were far more severe than those faced by Grathol. Here, 
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neither access to US-95 or State Highway 54 is being closed, nor is Highway 54 being turned 
into a one-way street. Furthermore, because US-95 is being improved to a divided highway, 
with freeway exits no closer than 5 miles apart, traffic entering and exiting the freeway will be 
concentrated at the freeway interchanges, which will fwmel even more traffic to the Grathol site. 
In State v. Schmidt, 805 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), the court held that the 
landowner whose property was partially condemned could put on evidence of circuity of travel, 
diversion of traffic, loss of visibility, and construction interference. The court held that these 
elements were compensable in detennining severance damages, i.e., the diminution in the market 
value of the remainder after the condemnation. Id. at 29, 35. The Texas Supreme Court 
interceded and specifically reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the decision of the trial 
court excluding the evidence, holding that these elements or items could not be offered or 
considered in determining severance damages, State v. Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d 769, 770 (Tex. 
1993). The Supreme Court of Texas ruled that these alleged damages did not result from the 
taking of the condemnee's property, but rather from the state's new use of its right·of-way, id. at 
777, which is precisely the case here. The court held that the "effect" of the state's 
condemnation on the remainder of the landowner's property is the taking of a small strip of 
property, not the consequences of the state's reconstruction of a highway. Id. The court further 
held that "diversion of traffic, inconvenience of access, impaired visibility of ground-level 
buildings, and disruption of constn1ction activities ... are, by their nature, a consequence of the 
change in Highway 183 shared by the entire area through which it runs." Id. at 781. 
Texas courts have continued to follow these well established principles. See State v. 
Munday Enterprises, 868 S.W.2d 319, 320-21 (Tex. 1994) (no compensation is allowed for 
diversion of traffic, increased circuity of travel, or lessened visibility); State v. Priesmeyer, 867 
S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) ("Priesmeyer is not entitled to recover for damages 
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relating to visibility loss, diversion of traffic, circuity of travel and construction inconvenience to 
his remainder property."). 
Other cases are in accord. See State, Dept. ofTransp. v. Suit City of Aventura, 774 So. 2d 
9, 13-14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (owners of shopping center compiained that increased 
elevation of roadway following partial taking would impair visibility of the shopping center; 
court held that Florida law does not allow compensation for loss of visibility); State ex. rel. 
Missouri Hwy. & Transp. Com'n v. Dooley, 738 S.W.2d 457, 468-69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (in 
partial taking case, "any claim as to damages for 'public view' or visibility is 'inextricably 
related' to a property right in the traffic, [and] the decisions have consistently refused to 'accord 
to property owners any right in the continuation of traffic.'"); Grossman Investments v. State by 
Humphrey, 571 N.W.2d 47, 50-52 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (state closed landowner's direct access 
to interstate highway, reconstructed highway blocked visibility of property, and increase in 
height or grade of highway blocked visibility; court held that no taking of access occWTed where 
property continued to have reasonable access, albeit substantially less convenient; court further 
held that ''[t]his court has never recognized a right to be seen frolll an abutting highway, and we 
decline to create such a right in this case. Accordingly, appellants are not entitled to 
compensation for their loss of view"); 224 Troup Realty, Inc. v. State, 88 A.D.2d 773,744,451 
N.Y.S.2d 510, 511 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (in case involving partial taking by condemnation, 
court held that "loss of visibility of the property to passing motorists" cannot be used as a basis 
for damages). 
These rules are not new. They are long-standing and well-established. For example, in 
State Hwy. Com'n v. Lavasek, 385 P.2d 361 (New Mexico 1963), the Supreme Court of New 
Mexico held: 
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An easement of the right of view in an abutting property owner 
would create a burden on the servient tenement, the highway. An 
abutter's rights in a highway are subordinate to the paramount right 
of the public in the highway and of the public authority to so 
construct a highway as to sexve the best use by the public. The 
state may construct a highway in any manner not inconsistent with 
or prejudicial to its use for highway purposes and the mere 
disturbance of the visibility of an abutter's property from the 
highway by such construction or reconstruction does not give rise 
to a compensable damage in the abutter. 
Id. at 364. (internal citation omitted). See also In re Appropriation of Easement for Highway 
Purposes (Preston v. Weiler), 194 N.E.2d 440, 444-46 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962) (interference with 
visibility of owners' land due to change in street grade did not constitute a taking and did not 
warrant compensation) (rev'd on other grounds 191 N.E.2d 832 (Ohio 1963)); National Biscuit 
Co. v. New York 211 N.Y.S.2d 435,436 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961) (compensation award 
improperly included compensation for loss of visibility of business by users of abutting street, 
and condemnee' s experts improperly testified as to loss of visibility from roadway). 
4. Grathol's claim of loss of visibility is not supported by the facts. 
GeoffReeslund, Grathol's Vice President and Director of Design and Construction, 
testified that the Project will greatly limit visibility and sight lines to the tenant buildings and 
signage on the Grathol property. Reeslund Dep. at 18~19 (Ex. 4 to York Aff.). Yet Mr. 
Reeslund conceded that he has not conducted any study to substantiate his opinion and is not 
aware of any study that supports his opinion. Id, at 19-20. 
Engineers with David Evans and Associates ("DEA") investigated Grathol's claim of loss 
of visibility and determined, by engineering cross-sections of the US-9S Project and the 
remainjng Grathol property, that the OTathol site will continue to be visible from the new US-95. 
Report by DEA, at 8 (York Aff., Ex. 11 ). 
Cross-sections depicting the proposed freeway and interchange 
location and elevation relative to the Grathol site are shown on 
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Figure 12. The cross-sections indicate that site and structures on 
the Grathol site should be visible from the new US95 freeway. 
Id. See also Figure 12 of DEA Report (York Aff., Ex. 12). 
In summary, Grathol's claim ofloss of visibility is barred by Idaho law, and this type of 
claim has been repeatedly rejected by courts in condemnation cases across the country. The 
claim also fails factually, and should be dismissed on summary judgment. 
D. Grathol's Claim For Compensation Based On Loss Or Impairment Of 
Access Is Barred As A Matter Of Law. 
1. Grathol's claim is contrary to undisputed facts. 
Grathol seeks to recover compensation for an alleged loss or restriction of access to the 
property as a result of the taking. Grathol bought the property as bare land. It plans a 
commercial development on the property. It contends that "the configuration and location of the 
land taken for the highway reconfiguration use severely impacts the viability for developing the 
resultant sites by eliminating or drastically limiting the ability to provide effective access points 
critical to successful commercial development." (York Aff., Ex. 6, at 11.) 
Thus, for purposes of clarity, Grathol is not alleging that ITD has condemned existing, 
permitted commercial accesses to the property. Rather, Grathol contends that the US-95 Project 
eliminates or limits "the ability to provide effective access points critical to successful 
commercial development. Id. 
Alan Johnson, vice president of Grathol, states that "[e]asy access [in the before 
condition] is provided by 4 deeded access points at or near the intersection." Id. at 5 (brackets 
added). Mr. Johnson's statement is incorrect and misleading. First, there m:e only three "deeded 
access points" and none of these can be used for "commercial" access. 
The three deeded access points were created by warranty deed, recorded in Kootenai 
County records as Instrument No. 504394. Reeslund Dep. 23:17~26:8 (YorkAff., Ex. 4). See 
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also Warranty Deed (York Aff., Ex. 13). The warranty deed from ITD to a prior owner of the 
Grathol property granted permission for three driveway approaches to the Grathol property from 
Highway 54. However, the deed states that the accesses may only be used "as farm and 
residential approaches." Id. Therefore, none of these three approaches are permitted to be used 
to provide commercial access to the Grathol property. Id. 
It is undisputed that none of the three deeded access approaches were ever built DEA 
Report, at 7 (York Aff., Ex. 11). It is also undisputed that Gtathol had the property re-zoned to 
"commercial" after it bought the property, and it plans to build a commercial development on the 
site. Therefore, because the three deeded access points can only be used for "fann and 
residential purposes" and could not be used to provide "commercial" access to the Grathol 
property, Grathol cannot base a claim for loss or restriction of commercial access on them. 
It is also undisputed that neither Grathol nor its predecessors have ever submitted an 
application for commercial access and deeded commercial access does not currently exist on the 
property. Johnson Dep., at 79-81 (York Aff., Ex. 3 ). Grathol also concedes that none of the 
three deeded access are authorized to be used for commercial access. Reeslund Dep., at 38 
("The project is not developed commercially yet, so no [ commercial] access exists") (York Aff., 
Ex. 4). 
case: 
Mr. Reeslund conceded that ITD is not condemning any commercial access right in this 
Q. So let me see if I understand this con-ect. And please 
correct me if I misunderstand what you're saying. You 're claiming 
that access to the parcel will be limited because of the project, not 
because JTD is taking any cu"ently existing accesses to Old 
Highway 95, but rather because they are putting in cul~de·sacs on 
Old Highway 95? 
A. That's con-ect. 
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Q. What commercial accesses cU1Tently exist on the property? 
A. The project is not developed commercially yet, so no 
access exists. 
Id, at 37-38 (YorkAff., Ex. 4) (emphasis added). 
Grathol claims they have access to US-95 via an existing approach near the intersection 
of State Highway 54 and US-95. However, Grathol does not have a permit or deed for this 
access. In addition, physical access to the majority of the Gtathol property is not possible from 
that approach. The Grathol property consists of two parcels: one small parcel at the comer of 
State Highway 54 and US-9S, and a much larger parcel north and east of the small parcel. The 
way the two parcels are configured, there is insufficient connection between the two parcels for a 
commercial approach and driveway access to be constructed between the two. See York Aff., 
Ex. 14 As explained by Jason Minzghor, District 1 Project Development Engineer for ITO, no 
right of access to US-95 exists at that location and no physical means of access is possible. 
A physical approach to the Gtathol Property to Highway 54 exists 
near the intersection with Highway 54 and US-95. The approach is 
not permitted or approved and it impermissibly encroaches upon 
ITD's right-of-way. Thus, it is an illegal approach. 
The Grathol property does not have any deeded, permitted, or 
approved approaches or rights of access to US-9S. Also, the 
Grathol property has no physical access to US-95. Neither Orathol 
nor any prior owner has requested an encroachment permit for a 
commercial approach to US-95. 
Minzghor Rebuttal Report, at 3-4 (York Aff., Ex. 15) ( emphasis added). 
For purposes of clarification. a "driveway" is the physical construction of a traveled way 
across private property to a public road, An "approach" is also a physical feature located at the 
intersection between private property and the public right-of-way. A "right of access" is the 
right to have an "approach" onto the public road. It is not a physical feature. 
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In summary, Grathol had no deeded commercial access right to either state Highway 54 
or US-95 in the before condition. Grathol has conceded that ITO is not closing or taking any 
commercial access right or any existing commercial approach. Consequently, Grathol cannot 
sustain a claim for compensation for an alleged loss or restriction of commercial access. 
2. Whether a taking of access has occurred is properly decided on 
summary judgment. 
The court has full authority to detennine as a matter of law whether a taking of access has 
occurred. Killinger v. Twin Falls Highway Dist., 135 ldaho 322,325, 17 P.3d 266,269 (2000) 
(granting summary judgment and concluding that landowner's loss of parking and right to access 
did not constitute a taldng under Idaho's eminent domain laws); Brown v. City of Twin Falls, 124 
Idaho 39, 44, 855 P.2d 876, 881 (1993) (affirming summary judgment that, as a matter oflaw, 
the State's limitation of access did not constitute a taking); Merritt v. State, 113 Idaho 142, 144-
45, 742 P.2d 397, 399-400 (1987) (reversing trial court's denial of summary judgment and 
holding that no talcing had occurred where there was no destruction of vebicular access and 
remaining access was reasonable). In Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203,596 P.2d 75, (1978), the 
Idaho Supreme Court discussed this issue at length, and specifically held that it is proper for a 
district court to decide on summary judgment whether a taking has occurred as a result of an 
alleged loss or limitation of access. Id. at 214-23, 596 P.2d at 86R95. 
3, Grathol's claim for compensation based on alleged loss of access is 
barred by Idaho law. 
Articie I, section 14 of the Idaho Constitution provides that private property may be taken 
for public use. Idaho Const., art. I,§ 14. When the government seeks to acquire private 
property, it is required to pay just compensation for the taldng. Id; Covington, 13 7 Idaho at 780, 
53 P.3d at 831; see also U.S. Const. amend V (providing that no person shall "be deprived of 
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life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken fox 
public use, without just compensation"). 
Before a court may address the question of just compensation, it must first determine 
whether a "taking" has occurred for which compensation is owed. See Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 
at 210-11, 596 P.2d at 82-3 (Bakes, J .• concU1Ting specially). Where no taking has occurred, no 
compensation is owed. 
Idaho law holds that a compensable taking of access occurs only when access to the 
property is destroyed and no reasonable access remains. Merritt v. State, 113 Idaho 142, 14S, 
742 P.2d 397,400 (finding that ''there having been no destruction of vehicular access to the 
Dan.downer's] property, and the remaining vehicular access being reasonable, there was no 
tal<lng of the (landowner's) property which would entitle him to compensation."). 
In Merritt, the Idaho Transportation Department engaged in a project to improve an 
interchange in Caldwell. Id. at 142, 742 P .2d at 397. Prior to construction, Merritt had direct 
access to his property from North 10th Avenue via an 18-foot wide curb cut and indirect access 
via an alley that bordered his property. Id In addition to these two approaches, Merritt also had 
access to his property through two additional curb cuts. Id 
ITD imposed access control measures restricting the number and locations of accesses to 
properties within the project boundaries. Id. The purpose of the access control measures was to 
"reduce traffic congestion and promote safety near interchanges." Id. Pursuant to the access 
control requirements, ITD eliminated Merritt's 18~foot curb cut, preventing any access from 
North 10th Avenue, and it constrl.lcted a fence along the Merritt property bloc.king one entrance 
to the alley way. Id at 143, 742 P.2d at 398. 
Merritt complained that the access limitations constituted a taking of property entitling 
him to damages. Id The district court agreed with Merritt and denied ITD1s motion for 
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summary judgment in which it argued that the limitation of access was not a talcing, but a 
regulation for the health, safety and welfare of the public. Id The district court concluded that 
ITD's limitation of access and the physical components of the project that limited access resulted 
in a compensable talcing of property. Id. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court, holding that ''there 
having been no destruction of vehicular access to the Merritt property, and the remaining 
vehicular access being reasonable, there was no taking of Merritt's property which would entitle 
him to compensation." Id. at 145, 742 P.2d at 400. The Supreme Court made this decision 
despite the fact that the primary commercial access to the property bad been closed entirely, 
thereby frustrating the owner's plans to construct a gas station on the property. Id. at 143-45, 
742 P.2d at 398-400. In addition, one end of the remaining alley access had been closed. Id. 
Similarly, in Johnston v. Boise Cityi 87 Idaho 44,390 P.2d291 (1964), the Idaho 
Supreme Court upheld limitations on access as a proper exercise of police powers where the 
landovmers still had access to their property from a public street. Id. at 52·53, 390 P.2d at 295-
96 (citing Foster 1s, Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201,212, 118 P.2d 721 (1941)). 
In the case at hand, Grathol must apply for commercial access permits in order to obtain 
commercial access to its property. Engineers with DEA have analyzed access in the before and 
after condition and are confident that the Grathol property will have good access in the after 
condition. DEA Report, at 17 (York Aff., Ex. 11 ). 
Orathol had no commercial access to either State Highway 54 or US-9S in the "before" 
condition. Thus, ITD has not taken or restricted any right of access or any actual physical 
commercial access from Gratbol. In the absence of a taking, no claim for compensation for loss 
of access can be sustained as a matter of law. 
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In certain, limited circumstances, the state's regulation of access may constitute a taking. 
Weaver v. Village of Bancroft, 92 Idaho 189,193,439 P.2d 697, 701 (1968); Hughes v. State of 
Idaho, 80 Idaho 286, 295-96, 328 P.2d 397,402 (1958); Village o/Sandpointv. Doyle, 14 Idaho 
749, 95 P. 945, 948 (1908). See Merritt v. State, 113 Idaho at 144, 742 P.2d at 399 (discussing 
these exceptional cases). In each of these cases, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that all 
vehicular access to the property had been "destroyed/ and therefore the property owner had a 
"right to regain access to the public road or to be compensated for the taking of access." Id.; see 
also Weaver, 92 Idaho at 193,439 P.2d at 701; Hughes, 80 Idaho at 295·96, 328 P.2d at 402; 
Doyle, 14 Idaho at758-60, 95 P. at947--48. 
Accordingly, if all rights of access to a public road are destroyed- meaning that the 
property is left without any means of ingress or egress to any public street or road - a 
compensable taking of property has occurred. Merritt, 113 Idaho at 144, 742 P.2d at 399. See 
also Brown, 124 Idaho at 43, 85S P.2d at 880 (where there is "no destruction of vehicular access" 
and the remaining vehicular access is reasonable, then there is no taking and no compensation 
owed). 
Applying these principles to the facts set forth above, no compensable taking of access 
has occurred. Gtathol has never applied for or been denied a commercial access to its property. 
No commercial access right or physical commercial access has been taken. Therefore, Grathol' s 
claim for compensation based on an alleged taking or restriction of access should be dismissed 
on summary judgment. 
E. Grathol Cannot Recover Lost Profits. 
Grathol' s vice president, Alan Johnson, has formulated a claim for lost profits in excess 
of $7 million in this case. He states that Grathol is entitled to recover this amount in addition to, 
separate and apart from, just compensation for the market value of the property. 
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Q. Okay. So do you anticipate testifying that this project -- or 
excuse me - that ITD1s condemnation and construction will cost 
you approximately $7,177,000 in profits? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that number is based upon iost profits, not based upon 
the value of the land. Correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Johnson Dep., at 112-13 (York Aff., Ex. 3). 
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Mr. Johnson has admitted that Grathol's $7,177,000 claim is merely one "potential" 
amount of damages, and that ascertaining the "potential" profit loss depends on different factors. 
Id. at 113-14. ITD's rebuttal expert, Dennis Reinstein, CPA, has shown that the claim is not 
based on any recognized or accepted practices or methodologies and has no supported or 
verifiable figures. (See York Aff., Ex. 10). 
Idaho law bars Grathol' s attempt to recover lost profits in this condemnation case. In 
addition, Idaho law bars recovery of lost profits by new businesses, particularly one that has not 
been con~cted and is not in business. 
1. Idaho common Jaw bars recovery of lost profits in condemnation 
cases. 
Orathol cannot recover for its purported "lost profits" because such damages are not 
recoverable in condemnation cases. See State v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444, 448, 546 P .2d 399, 403 
(1976); cf. James v. Stare, 88 Idaho 172,178,397 P.2d 776, 770 (1964) (''[d]amages for 
depreciation in value of abutting landowners' property, by reason of business loss, occasioned by 
the change in route and traffic flow brought about by the construction of new highways are not 
compensable"). 
LongRstanding Idaho case law makes clear that, under the common law, a separate 
monetary award is not recoverable for lost profits, going concern, good will or other 
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characterizations of business damages in condemnation cases. See State v. Dunclick, 77 Idaho 
45, 54, 286 P ,2d 1112, 1117 (195 5) ("going concern1' in a case of partial taking was allowed to 
be considered only as a factor in ascertaining the value of the property); State v. Halverson, 86 
Idaho 242, 247-48, 384 P.2d 480, 483-84 (1963) (in a total taking, the court reaffirmed Idaho law 
that lost profits are ''not an element of damages" but "may" constitute a/ actor in the overall fair 
market value); State v. Bastian, 91 Idaho 444,448, 546 P.2d 399,403 (1976) (in a partial taking, 
lost business profits "are not compensable as such in eminent domain actions," but ''may" be a 
factor in determining fair market value or "the severance damages to the remainder'i. 
In the case at hand, Gtathol has no business and no profits to consider in any fair market 
valuation of the property. In addition, Idaho law will not permit a condemnee to recover both the 
fair market value of the condemned property and a $7 million award for "lost profits." 
2. Grathol's claim for lost profits is barred by Idaho's business damage 
statute. 
Grathol cannot recover lost profits or business damages because it does not and cannot 
meet the statutory requirements of Idaho's business damage statute, See Idaho Code § 7-711 (2). 
See also City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 130 P.3d 1118 (2006) (addressing statutory 
requirements). 
To the extent business damages are available in Idaho condemnation cases such 
compensation is governed exclusively by statute. See Seubert, 142 Idaho at 584, 130 P.3d at 
1122 (2006) ("The right to receive business damages .. , resulting from a taking ofland is strictly 
a statutory right, .. .') (quoting 29A C.J.S. EMINENT DOMAIN§ 150 (2004)); Joslin Mfg. Co. v. 
Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 675 (1923) ("Injury to a business carried on upon lands taken for 
public use , .. does not constitute an element of just compensation, in the absence of a statute 
expressly allowing it"); United States ex. rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v, Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 282 
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(1943) ("absent a statutory mandate the sovereign must pay for only what it takes, not for 
opportunities which the owner may lose."). 
In 2000, the Idaho Legislature amended Idaho Code § 7-711 to allow for business 
damage awards, but only in the limited circumstances set forth in the statue. See Idaho Code § 7 • 
711 (2), In particular, Idaho Code § 7-711 (2)(b) allows recovery of business damages under the 
statute only if the business has been operating on the condemned property for at least S years. Id. 
Moreover, the business owner must substantiate any business damages claim. See Idaho 
Code§§ 7.;711(2)(b)(iii), (iv). To substantiate its claim, the statute requires the business to 
submit copies of business records "for the five (5) years preceding [the take] which are 
attributable to the business operation on the property to be acquired and other records relied upon 
by the business owner that substantiate the business claim." Idaho Code§ 7-711(2)(iv), These 
records include tax records, balance sheets and profit and loss statements. Id 
In addition, the statute requires that the qualifying business first file an administrative 
claim. "If the business owner intends to claim business damages under this subsection, the 
owner, as defendant, must submit a written business damage claim to the plaintiff within ninety 
(90) days after service of the summons and complaint for condemnation." Idaho Code§ 7-
711(2)(i). Here, the Summons and Complaint were filed on November 19, 2010 and Grathol 
accepted service on December 3, 2010. Therefore, Grathol was required to serve any business 
damage claim within 90 days, or by March 3, 2011. No claim was served. In fact, ITD had no 
notice of a claim for iost profits until Grathol mentioned it in discovery responses served in 
October of 2011. The claim was not supported by any documentation. 
Here, it is undisputed that Grathol does not satisfy the statutory requirements to make a 
business damages claim under Idaho Code § 7-711. No business is located on the property, and 
Gtathol cannot meet the requirement of S years of operation on the condemned property. 
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Moreover, Grathol has not substantiated the claim by providing business records, including tax 
records, balance sheets, and profit and loss statements, and other documents necessary to 
substantiate the claim. Lastly, Grathol did not first serve an administrative claim, and did not do 
so within the statutory time limit, both of which are mandatory prerequisites to a claim. for 
business damages in a condemnation case. 
For these reasons, Grathol's claim for lost profits or business damages fails as a matter of 
law and should be dismissed, 
3. Grathol's lost profits are based on conjecture and speculation and are 
not recoverable under Idaho law. 
In Idaho, the law is clear that lost profits are not recoverable for speculative and abstract 
future damages. See, e.g., Inland Group of Companies, Inc. v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 
133 Idaho 249, 257, 985 P.2d 674, 682 (1999) (explaining that "lost profits and future earnings 
must be shown with a reasonable certainty" and that "[d]amage awards based upon speculation 
and conjecture will not be allowed."); Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 761, S19 P.2d 421, 
430 (1974) (same). See also Circle C Ranch v. Jayo, 104 Idaho 3S3, 356, 659 P.2d 107, 110 
(1983) (affuming trial court's holding that claim for lost profits "failed as being speculative" 
where evidence produced at trial tended to show that plaintiff's ability to secure two prospective 
temporary permits was too speculative). 
Moreover, longstanding Idaho law holds that ''(p )respective profits contemplated to be 
derived.from a business which is not yet established, but one merely in contemplation, are too 
uncertain and speculative to form a basis for recovery." C.R. Crowley1 Inc. v. Soelberg, 81 
Idaho 480,486,346 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1959) (emphasis added) (applying rule to deny damage 
claim for future crop loss); Riy,.d/isbaker1 95 Idaho 7S2, 761,519 P.2d 421,430 (1974) (applying 
rule to deny damage claim for future farm operations). See also Head v. Crone, 76 Idaho 196, 
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200, 279 P.2d 1064, 1065-66 (1955) (rejecting plaintiffs' claim for "anticipated profits" because 
at most they alleged "loss of anticipated possible profits to be derived from a business not yet in 
being but only contemplated to be established'' which was simply ''too uncertain and 
speculative" to establish a prima facie case of damage) (emphasis added}. 
As the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, the question is whether the plaintiff "has 
proven the damages for lost profits with reasonable certainty'' and "an established earning 
record" is relevant to proving dalllages with any "reasonable certainty." Clark v. Int 11 Harvester 
Co., 99 Idaho 326,346,581 P.2d 784, 804 (1978). See also Lamb v. Robinson, 101 Idaho 703, 
705, 620 P.2d 276, 278 (1980) (explaining that "the existence of damages must be taken out of 
the realm of speculation'') ( citations omitted). 
Here, Grathol' s claim for anticipated lost business profits is premised on a commercial 
development that has not been built and has never operated or generated any profits. Gratbol' s 
claim for lost business profits is inherently speculative and too uncertain to support a claim for 
recovery. 
For all of these reasons, G:rathol' s claim for lost profits necessarily fails as a matter of 
law and should be dismissed. 
F. Grathol Cannot Recover Compensatiou For Gravel That May Be Under The 
Condemned Property, 
Grathol seeks to recover $300,000.00 for the value of gravel it believes is located on the 
property and which Grathol alleges ITD can use for the US-95 Project. This claim fails as a 
matter of law and should be dismissed. 
ITD is buying the condemned the entire property in its entirety, including any gravel or 
anytJ1ing else of value that may or may not be under the property. Grathol cannot recover the 
fair market value of the property and an additional amount for gravel. 
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In making this claim, Orathol has admitted that it has no idea whether there is any usable 
gravel under the property, how much there is, or what it is worth. It has simply pulled out a 
dollar figure and demanded that it be paid. Geoff Reeslund testified that: 
We felt, from information that we had about the property out there, 
that there was significant amount of gravel contained in the soil 
and that there may be a value to ITD in mining that for base rock 
for the freeway construction, as opposed to purchasing it 
somewhere else and trucking it to the site. 
Reeslund Dep., at 134 (York Aff., Ex. 4). He cannot point to any study or any analysis of either 
the quality, quantity, or monetary value of any gravel under the portion of property being 
condemned from Grathol. Therefore, Grathol has no basis or support for its claim for 
$300,000.00. 
Next, ITD cannot remove the substructure on the property and then construct a freeway 
overpass on it. If any substructure were removed, it would have to be replaced with like or better 
material. Consequently, it would be far more expensive to remove gravel from the site and then 
buy other gravel and bring it back in as fill, than it would be to simply use gravel from a supplier. 
See Rebuttal Report of Jason Minzghor (York Aff., Ex. 15). 
As explained by Jason Minzghor: 
First, no soils or materials testing conducted by or on behalf of 
ITD shows any quantity or quality of gravel that may be located on 
the property condemned from Grathol Also, Grathol has not 
provided any reports showing whether usable gravel is located on 
the property or the quantity or quality of usable materials. No 
support or documentation has been provided to assign or 
substantiate any dollar figure to any alleged amount of usable 
material on the subject property. 
Second, ITD is constructing an elevated interchange with on and 
off ramps on and adjacent to the condemned property. The 
subsurface material in this area must be left in place to provide 
sub-grade support for the infrastructure to be constructed on the 
property. If the contractor were to remove subsurface material on 
the property, it would then have to replace that material with like-
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kind fill material with the same support characteristics. In short, it 
would make no sense to remove material simply to have to replace 
it. 
Third, the contract for the Project provides that ITD will not pay 
the contractor for rock excavation that is made below the top of 
sub-grade. This means that if the contractor were to remove any 
material below sub-grade, it would be required to incur the 
associated costs, as well as the costs to replace with similar type 
and grade of fill material. 
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Lastly, the property has been rezoned as "commercial." Kootenai County's zoning 
ordinance prohibits gravel mining in commercial zones. Reinstein Rebuttal at 5 ("Grathol's 
rezoning of the property has now precluded mining of any gravel from the Site'1 (York Aff., 
Ex. 10). 
Based on the foregoing, Grathol' s claim for compensation for gravel should be dismissed 
as a matter of law. 
G. Grathol Cannot Claim Severance Damages For Impacts On Its Hypothetical 
Development Plan Because It Had Knowledge Of The Project When It 
Bought The Property. 
Grathol cannot recover severance damages where it is undisputed that Orathol had 
knowledge of the Project before buying the property. Planning for the US-95 Project began in 
2002. Grathol purchased the property in May 2008. Gtathol's Third Supp. Resp. to Discovery1 
at 4 (York Aff., Ex. 6); Johnson Dep.; at 25:19-21 (York Aff., Ex. 3); Exhibit 44 to Johnson Dep. 
(York Aff., Ex. 8). Grathol's stated intention for the property is ''to develop it into a commercial 
retail center/hospitality project." (York Aff., Ex. 61 at 4.) 
Gtathol first learned about the property in January 2008. Johnson Dep., at 25:22-25 
(York Aff., Ex. 3 ). At that time, the listing for the property by the Multiple Listing Service 
provided notice to any prospective purchaser that a highway interchange was planned to be 
constructed on the property, Johnson Dep., Ex. 43 (York Aff., Ex. 9). Specifically, the listing 
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for the property stated that "preliminary drawings show future off-ramps and frontage road for 
[highway] 9S through this property.11 Id. The listing notice also advised that the purchaser 
should "check with [the] Department of Transportation to verify" the details regarding the 
interchange. Id 
Mr. GeoffReeslund also confirmed that Grathol was aware of the Project before it 
purchased the Property. Reeslund Dep., at 22:13-23:4; 65:19·24 (York Aft, Ex. 4). 
A. We were aware that there were plans by ITD to potentially realign and 
improve the freeway. 
Q. And did you know about this prior to purchasing the property? 
A. Yes. 
Id., at22:2S-23:4. 
Additionally, Grathol met with representatives of ITD before it purchased the property 
and were shown the preliminary plans for the Project. Johnson Dep., at 31 :20-32:13; 36:7-14; 
(York Aff., Ex. 3); Reeslund Dep., at 87:8-88:7 (York Aff,i Ex. 4). Through its meetings with 
ITD and its review of the preliminary project plans, Grathol knew about the Project and had 
details about the Project. Id 
Grathol starting working on its application to change the zoning of the property before it 
actually purchased the property. Reeslund Dep., at 91:5-19; 189:13-19 (YorkAff., Ex. 4). 
Grathol submitted its rezone application to Kootenai County on May 30, 2008-just two days 
after it completed the purchase of the property on May 28th. Reeslund Dep., Ex. 16 (York Aff., 
Ex. 16). Grathol's rezone application acknowledged the U.S. 95 Project and included the Project 
as one of the reasons why a zoning chanae was warranted for the property. Id. The application 
stated that "I-95 is soon to begin improvement to full freeway status, and will be realigned to 
cross this property, providing on and off.ramps at the Hwy S4 intersection." Id. at A-3. 
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Under Idaho Code § 7-711 a landowner may be entitled "to severance damages when the 
taking results in separate parcels of land." C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Hwy Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 
75 P .3d 194 (2003). "However, where a landowner purchases with notice of the intended taking, 
he may not claim severance damages in a condemnation proceeding." United States v. 99. 66 
Acres of Land, 970 F.2d 651, 6S7 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Mattox, 37S F.2d 461, 
463-64 (4th Cir. 1967)). 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in 99. 66 Acres of Land is directly on point. In 99. 66 Acres 
of Land, a landowner appealed a condemnation decision, "contending that the district court erred 
in excluding valuation and damages testimony" including severance damages. 970 F.2d at 653. 
Factually, the district court detemrined there was evidence that the landowner was aware of and 
had in fact contacted the condemning governmental agency prior to the sale seeking information 
about the governmental water project. Id at 653-54. The Ninth Circuit affinned the district 
court,s decision excluding any severance damage testimony because the landowner "had notice 
that the water project would likely run through the property before purchasing the option on the 
property." Id. at 657 (emphasis added), The Ninth Circuit held that "where a landowner 
purchases with notice" of a condition or event affecting the value of the property he may not 
claim damages for loss of value. Id 
Similarly, in United States v. 173S N. Lynn Street, 676 F.Supp.693 (E.D. Va. 1987), the 
court held that: 
Id. at 699. 
A purchaser who knows that the government's perspective partial 
taking will damage the residue and reduce its value will 
presumably ensure that this prospect is reflective in a reduction of 
the purchase price. If so, to award severance damaaes to such a 
knowing purchaser is to award double compensation for the same 
harm, once in the form of the reduced purchase price ai,.d then 
again, in the award of severance damages. 
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After buying the property, Grathol drafted a site plan for a commercial development. It 
now points to hypothetical development plan and says that it cannot build what is on the site plan 
because ITD is making changes to US~9S. It is undisputed that Grathol was well aware of the 
Project before it purchased the property and had knowledge of details about the Project, Grathol 
should not now be allowed to claim severance damages to a hypothetical development plan that 
was drafted with knowledge that would be impacted by the US-95 Project. 
In addition, IDJI2d Instruction 7. 14 states that the fact finder "may consider the owner's 
particular plan for development and use of the property only for the purposes of determining uses 
for which the property is adaptable." IDJI2d 7.14. In other words, Grathol cannot seek damages 
by pointing to an un-built site plan and claiming ccwe cannot build this here now," or "this 
building will have to be smaller," and ask that specific dollar amounts be assigned to such 
alleged "losses" or "severance" damages. 
Based on the foregoing, ITD requests that all claims for severance damages based on or 
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V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, ITD respectfully requests that the Court grant ITD's motion 
for summary judgment and dismiss the claims by Grathol addressed above. 
DATED this 6th day of January, 2012. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Idaho Transportation Department 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
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corporation; and DOES 1 through S, 
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Plaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD'') hereby moves the Court 
for an order instructing Defendant HJ Gtathol ("Grathol"), its counsel, representatives, and 
witnesses to refrain from giving any testimony, presenting any evidence, or making any 
argument based on the subjects identified below, either directly or indirectly, during its opening 
statement, interrogation of witnesses, objections, arguments, closing statement, or at any other 
time during the trial of this matter. 
Specifically, the following subjects and references should be excluded from testimony, 
evidence, and argument at trial: 
1. Valuation opinions of Grathol's experts Skip Sherwood ("Sherwood") and Alan 
Johnson ("Johnson") that violate Idaho law and fail to apply the statutory date of 
valuation as required by Idaho Code§ 7-721. 
2. Valuation opinions of Sherwood that fail to apply proper valuation methodology 
relating to the "larger parcel'' analysis of the Orathol property. 
3. Valuation opinions of Sherwood that fail to disclose specific adjustments made to 
comparable sales. 
4. Valuation opinions of Johnson that include damages for property not being taken 
as part of this condemnation action. 
5. Evidence of Sherwood's Sale No. S, which is a transaction between a condemning 
authority and a landowner under threat of condemnation, and not a valid 
comparable sale. 
ITD's motion is made on the grounds that the matters identified above are inadmissible 
for any purpose and have no bearing on the sole issue to be tried - the amount of just 
compensation to be paid to Grathol for the taking of their property. Accordingly, ITD 
respectfully requests the Court grants its motion. 
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!TD' s motion is supported by ITD' s Brief in support of its Motion In Limine and the 
Affidavit of Mary V. York, which will be filed with ITD's Motion, as well as the pleadings and 
documents on file with the Court in the matter. 
DATED this 6th day of fanuary, 2012. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This is a condemnation action brought by Plaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation 
Department ("ITO"), to acquire certain real property owned by Defendant, HJ Grathol 
("Grathol"), as part ofITD's highway project ("the Project") to widen and improve U.S. 
Highway 9S C'US-95") between the communities of Garwood and Sagle. The Grathol property 
is a 56.8 acre parcel of land located in Kootenai County, just outside the city limits of Athol at 
the intersection of US-95 and State Highway 54 (the "Property"). ITD requires 16 .314 acres of 
land for the Project, which will leave Grathol with a 40.496-aere remainder property, consisting 
of two small parcels on the west side of the take area (3.829 acres and 0.419 acres) and a larger 
remainder parcel on the west side (36.248 acres). The case is scheduled for a bench trial to begin 
March 5, 2012. The sole issue to be determined at trial is the amount of just compensation owed 
to Gtathol for the taking of a portion ofits Property. 
Based upon the expert disclosures, ex.pert depositions, and discovery responses produced 
by Grathol, it is anticipated that Grathol will seek to offer evidence, testimony and argument at 
trial that is improper and inadmissible. Accordingly, ITD files this Brief in Support of its Motion 
in Limine and seeks an Order from the Court instructing Orathol, its counsel, representatives, 
and witnesses, to refrain from giving any testimony, presenting any evidence, or making any 
argument based on the inadmissible evidence. ITD' s motion is also supported by the Affidavit 
of Mary V. York ("York Aff.") filed with its motion, 
Specifically, ITD asks that the Court exclude testimony, evidence, and argument at trial 
on the following subjects: 
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1. Valuation opinions of Orathol' s experts M. Dewitt "Skip'' Sherwood 
("Sherwood") and Alan Johnson ("Johnson") that violate Idaho law and fail to 
apply the statutory date of valuation as required by Idaho Code § 7-721. 
2. Valuation opinions of Sherwood that fail to apply proper valuation methodology 
relating to the "larger parcel" analysis of the Grathol Property. 
3. V aiuation opinions of Sherwood that fail to disclose specific adjustments made to 
comparable sales. 
4. Valuation opinions of Johnson that include damages for property not being taken 
as part of this condemnation action. 
5. Evidence of Sherwood's Sale No. S, which is a transaction between a condemning 
authority and a landowner under threat of condemnation, and an improper and 
invalid comparable sale. 
These subjects are improper and inadmissible for the reasons discussed below and should 
be excluded. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The Court Has Broad Discretion To Exclude Evidence Through Motions In 
Limine. 
Motions in limine seek an advance ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Warren 
v. Sharp, 139 Idaho 599, 605, 83 P.3d 773, 779 (2003). Such motions are recognized by Idaho 
courts as an important tool in litigation and trial preparation. Davidson v. Beco Corp., 112 Idaho 
560,563, 733 P.2d 781, 784 (Ct. App. 1986),partially overruled on other grounds, 114 Idaho 
107, 753 P.2d 1253 (1987), Motions in llmine are encouraged because the trial court's pretrial 
rulings enable both sides to make strategic decisions before trial concerning the content and the 
order of evidence to be presented. Id (citing E. CLEARY, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE§ 52 (3d ed. 
15>84)). A trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence and rulini 
on motions in limine. Appel v. Page, 13S Idaho 133, 13S, 15 P.3d 1141, 1143 (2000). 
---------- -- -
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B. The Valuation Opinions of Skip Sherwood And Alan Johnson Are Inadmissible 
Because They Failed To Apply The Appropriate Date Of Valuation As Required By 
Idaho Law. 
ITO requests that the Court enter an order excluding the opinions of Sherwood and 
Johnson on the grounds they applied the wrong "date of valuation" in violation of!daho Code§ 
7· 712 and basic principles of eminent dam.am law. By applying valuation dates other than the 
date mandated by § 7-712, each of their value conclusions violate Idaho law and the 
requirements of Idaho's eminent domain laws. Accordingly, their opinions axe inadmissible. 
In Idaho, the date of valuation for pwposes of defining just compensation is mandated by 
statute. See I.C. § 7-712. Idaho Code§ 7-712 requires that the value of the property taken in a 
condemnation action and the severance damages that will accrue to the remaining property are to 
be determined as of "the date of the summons." Id The statute specifically requires that the 
property's "actual value, at that date, shall be the measure of compensation for all property to be 
actually taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually taken, but injuriously affected, 
in all cases where such damages are allowed[.]" ld.;1 see State ex rel. Moore 11. Bastian, 97 
Idaho 444,449,546 P.2d 399,404 (1976); State ex rel. Symms v. Collier, 93 Idaho 19, 21-22, 
454 P.2d 56, 58-59 (1969). There is no discretion permitted by the statute, rather the language of 
the provision uses mandatory terms that require that the value of the property as of the date of 
summons "shall be the measure of compensation." Id. 
1 The full text of Idaho Code§ 7-712 provides, "For the ptup0se of assessing compensation and 
damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the summons, and its 
actual value, at that date, shall be the measure of compensation for all property to be actually 
taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually taken, but injuriously affec~ in all 
cases where such damages are allowed, as provided in the last section. No improvements put 
upon the property subsequent to the date of the service of summons shall be included in the 
assessment of compensation or damages. The compensation and damaaes awarded shall draw 
lawful interest from the date of the summons." 
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Idaho's statutory requirement that the date of value be the date of summons is clearly 
reflected in Idaho's Civil Jury Instructions. See IDJI2d 7.05, 7.05.1, 7,05.5, 7.07, 7.16, 7.18, 
7 .20. Most plainly, Idaho's jury instructions provide that "just compensation means the fair 
market value of the property taken measured as of ___ [date]." IDJI2d 7.05.2 Subsection 
7. OS .1 states "just compensation means the fair market value of the property taken, including all 
permanent improvements thereon, measured as of ____ [date]." IDJI2d 7 .05.1. 
For partial ta.kings, as in the present case, Idaho's jury instructions provide that "just 
compensation means the fair market value of the property t:aken including all permanent 
improvements thereon, together with any direct damages suffered by the defendant, all measured 
as of ____ [date].'' 1Dn2d 7.0S.5. Further, the con1ments to instruction 7.05.5 leaves no 
question that the property is to be valued as of the date of summons, as required by Idaho Code § 
7-712. The comments state that "in a direct condemnation action, the date inserted in the 
instruction will be the date of issuance of the summons -J.C.§ 7~712." Comments to IDJI2d 
7.05.5. 
Moreover, other Idaho jury instructions are similarly unambiguous in their requirement of 
a date-of~summons valuation date. See, e.g., IDJl2d 7.07 (fair market value determination to be 
assessed as of date of summons, as required by§ 7-712); IDJl2d 7.16 Oust compensation to be 
determined based upon before-and-after valuation, measured as of date of summons); IDJI2d 
7.18 (proper methodology for determining just compensation, measured as of the date of 
summons); IDJI2d 7 .20 (improvements made on property after date of summons should not be 
considered). 
2 IDJI2d 7.05 applies to total takings, but the requirement that the property be valued as of the 
date of summons is identical to the other provisions relating to partial takings. See e.g., IDJI2d 
7.0S.S. 
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If the proper date of valuation is not applied, the validity of the expert's valuation 
analysis is necessarily compromised. As stated by the pre-entinent authority on eminent domain 
law, Nichols on Eminent Domain, "[i]t is critical that the appraisal performed by both parties 
reflect the legal date of valuation." 5-18 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN§ 18.16 (2011). A 
party's "(fjailure to appraise according to the correct date of value may give rise to a motion to 
strike the appraisal, or the reversal of the entire verdict." Id 
Jurisdictions across the nations are unifo.nnly in accord. See, e.g., Heldenbrandv. 
Executive Council of Iowa, For Use and Benefit of State, 218 N.W.2d 628,637 (Iowa 1974) 
(reversing jury verdict where the jury was told the wrong date for the date of the taking and 
assessment of damages.); Continental Pipe Line Co. v. Irwin Livestock Co., 625 P.2d 214, 216~ 
217 (Wyo., 1981) (reversing jury verdict because there was no appraisal testimony regarding the 
change in value immediately before the date of taking and the time after such taking). 
In the present case, the date of summons, and therefore the date of valuation, is 
November 19, 2010. Grathol's experts~ Sherwood and Johnson, ignored Idaho's statutory 
requirement and instead used different and inconsistent dates. Sherwood, in his before-and-after 
valuation analysis, used a date of value of September 20103 for the "before condition'' of the 
Property, and he improperly used valuation dates of March 2012 and March 2013 for his "after 
condition" valuation. Sherwood Report, at 10-12 (York Aff., E:ic. 18); Sherwood Dep., at 41:11-
44:10; 66:10-14; 66:15-19 (YorkAff., Ex. 5). The valuation date used by Sherwood for the 
"after condition" of the Property is based upon Grathol's expectations of when the Project would 
be completed. 
3 Even though Sherwood's date of value in the before condition was three months prior to the 
date of summons in this case, ITO does not challenge Sherwood's use of this date, since it is 
relatively close to the actual date required by Idaho Code§ 7-712 and conditions relating to the 
Property did not change significantly between August and November 2010. 
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Similarly, Johnson also used an improper date of valuation. Johnson's valuation only 
used an "after condition" date of valuation, but like Sherwood, Johnson valued the Property as of 
the estimated completion date of the US-95 Project. Grathol's Third Supp, Discovery Resp., at 7 
(York AtT., Ex. 6) C'It is Mr. Johnson's opinion that the remainder property, after the take, would 
be worth $3,669,300 (at the time of completion and the opening of the interchange) calculated as 
follows: .... ") (emphasis added). Neither Johnson, nor Sherwood use the date of the summons 
as is required by Idaho law. And for that reason, both of their opinions are improper and 
inadmissible. 
The case of Oakland County Bd. of County Road Comm 'rs v. JBD Rochester, LLC, 718 
N.W.2d 845, 846-47 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006), illustrates application of these rules and the 
importance of excluding the value opinions of Johnson and Sherwood. In Oakland County, a 
highway district sought to exclude any "appraisals of defendants' property that took into 
consideration a posttaking road construction delay caused by congressional funding problems." 
Id. at 846. The trial court permitted introduction of the posMaking road construction delay. Id 
However, on appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that "[t]he 
trial court erred in admitting appraisals of defendants' property that took into consideration the 
posttaking road construction delay because the claimed severance damages were not caused by 
the taldng." Id. at 848. The court explained that "the proper measure of damages in a case 
involvin& a partial taking consists of the fair market value of the property taken, plus severance 
damages to the remainina property if applicable." Id. at 84 7. 
The Oakland Count)) court emphasized that evidence of post-taking construction delay 
was "irrelevant to the just compensation caleulation ... because just compensation must be 
calculated on the basis of the market value of the property on the date of the taldng"-not an 
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indiscriminate future date as was advocated by the defendants. Oakland Count)), 718 N.W.2d at 
847 (emphasis added) (quoting Mich. Dept. ofTransp. v. Haggerty Corridor Partners Ltd 
P'shp, 700 N.W.2d 380, 387 (Mich. 2005)), Likewise, the court held that post-taking 
construction delay could not be considered as part of any severance damage calculation to the 
remainder because the delay damages were not "attributable to the taking. 11 Id. The court 
explained that the ''[ d]efendants placed an unwarranted reliance on the e,cpectation that the road 
project would be completed" where "[ d]elays caused by lack of funding occut with some 
regularity.'' Id. at 848. Ultimately, the court found that that any project delay was unrelated to 
the taldng and because the "defendants were not deprived of value inherent in the land or made 
to suffer noxious effects of the tal<ing," they could not recover damages. Id 
Sherwood and Johnson make similar arguments to those of the landowners in Oakland 
County, and they attempt to use a date of valuation other than the required "date of the talcing," 
Sherwood and Johnson use the date of completion of the Project for their valuation dates to claim 
post-taking damages, including an alleged delay in the Project. Grathol's Third Supp. Discovery 
Resp., at 6-8 (York Af.f., Ex. 6) (assessing a significant claim for damages based on alleged 
construction delays); Sherwood Report, at 10-12 (YorkAff., Ex. 18) (same); JobnsonDep., at 
102:9"13 (confirming that $947,000 of damage claim was for "the time it'll take ITD to complete 
the construction of the project") (York Aff., Ex. 3); Id. at 102:23-103:12 (summarizing Gtathol's 
alleged $3,779,578 damage claim). 
Both Sherwood's and Johnson's valuations ignore Idaho's statutory requirement for 
determining just compensation in a condemnation case and, as a result, their reasonina and 
methodology are contrary to Idaho law and therefore are improper and inadmissible. ~ in 
--- - - - ----·-··-· ···-··-·· ---- - -------- .. ---- ........ . 
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Oakland County, Sherwood and Johnson's :flagrant attempt to avoid the requirements of Idaho 
Code § 7-712 and seek damages not compensable in a condemnation action should be rejected. 
Additionally, Sherwood's valuation should also be excluded because he used two 
different dates of valuation. Idaho Code § 7-712 requires that one date be used to determine the 
amount of compensation owed -the date of summons. Sherwood uses two, neither of which is 
the date of summons. He uses August 2010 for his before valuation dates, and he uses different 
dates for bis after valuation dates. By doing so, Sherwood not only violates the mandate of§ 7-
712, he artificially inflates his value conclusions by making a false comparison between the 
before and much later after conditions. Sherwood's analysis and methodologies are inherently 
flawed in the extreme and his valuation should excluded. 
In sum, Sherwood's and Johnsons opinions of value of this case are inadmissible and 
should be excluded from evidence at trial. 
C. Sherwood's Opinions Related to Determination of Gratbol's Larger Parcel Are 
Inadmissible Because They Are Based On Unreliable And Improper Methodology. 
Sheiwood applies an improper methodology to value the Grathol Property as it relates to 
the "larger parcel." The larger parcel is a significant issue in condemnation cases because the 
definition of the larger parcel directly affects the valuation of the property being acquired. As 
explained by the California Supreme Court in City of San Diego v, Neumann, when "the property 
acquired [by eminent domain] is part of a larger parcel/' in addition to compensation for the 
property actually taken, the property owner must be compensated for the injury, if any, to the 
land that he retains. Neumann, 863 P.2d 72S, 746 (Cal. 1993) (citing to eminent domain statute 
that is substantially the same as Idaho Code§ 7-711) (citations to statute omitted, bracketed text 
in original). And "fb]ecause severance damages are intended to compensate the property owner 
for the destruction of the integrity of his land the property owner must be able to demonstrate 
- --- --- - - - ------···-------·-··----·--·-·--- --·-·-·· 
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both how his property functions as an integrated unit and how the value of what remains has 
been injured by the taking of a part." Id 
Here, Sherwood has improperly used a 30-acre larger parcel to value Grathol's S6-acre 
Property. Sherwood,s misapplication of the larger parcel analysis is improper, and his valuation 
opinions are therefore inadmissible. State ex rel. Symms v. City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 
528,531,493 P.2d 387, 390 (1972) e'If, as a matter of fact, the parcel taken is part of a larger 
tract held by the same owner, it is error to consider such parcel as if it constituted an entire tract 
separate and apart from other property in the possession of the same owner."), 
Idaho Code provides that the trier of fact must ascertain and assess the value of the 
property to be condemned, and if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of 
the larger parcel, the trier of fact must also ascertain severance damages to the portion not 
condemned. I.C. § 7-711; Btg Lost River I". Distv. Zollinger, 83 Idaho 401,411,363 P.2d 706, 
711 (1961). The tenn "parcel" under Idaho Code§ 7-711 means "a consolidated body ofland." 
City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho at 532,493 P.2d at 391 (citation omitted), If the parcel taken 
is part of a larger parcel, then it is error not to consider the larger parcel. Id at 531, 493 P .2d at 
390. As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in City of Mountain Home, 
If, as a matter of fact, the parcel taken is part of a larger tract held 
by the same owner, it is error to consider such parcel as if it 
constituted an entire tract separate and apart from other property in 
the possession of the same owner; the amount awarded for the land 
taken must reflect any enhanced value arising from its availability 
for use in conjunction with the land not taken. 
Id (citations omitted), 
The question of whether two pieces of land constitute a single parcel is typically a factual 
question for the trier of fact. Id. at 532,493 P.2d at 390. However, the larger parcel becomes a 
-_-__ -_____ -_______ :::-:-:: .... :·:.:::·:.·:::_· __ -_ ··.::_--:::.-·:-.·.:-:..::-_·-_·::::.--:-::.:·::--::···- ... --· -······-- -- --···-···--·--· -·--·-· --····-·:::-::-::-:.:.:·_ -:·::=-·------·-····· 
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question of law when no reasonable mind could differ on the issues. 4A-14B NICHOLS ON 
EMINENTDOMAJN § 14B.04[1] (2011). 
To determine the larger parcel, the court must examine three elements (1) the unity of 
ownership; (2) contiguity; and (3) unity of use. Id, at§ 14B.03[1] (2011). Ordinarily lands will 
not be considered a single tract unless there is unity of use. Id "It is the unity of use which is 
the controlling factor, not merely the contiguity, the latter being evidentiary but not controlling." 
Id, at§ 14B.05[1] (2011). 
Here, no dispute exists that all three elements are present and the entire 56-acre Gtathol 
Property constitutes the larger parcel in this case. The parties agree that the entire 56 acres me 
owned by Grathol; the entiie 56 acres are contiguous; and both the existing use and the proposed 
development of the Property contemplate use of the entire parcel. See Grathol's Third Supp. 
Discovery Resp., at 4 (York Aff., Ex. 6); Sheiwood Report, at 2, 4 (York Aff., Ex. 18); Grathol's 
Rezone Application (York Aff. Ex. 16) (acknowledging size, ownership, and development plans 
for entire Grathol Property). In fact, Sherwood testified during his deposition that "[t]he larger 
parcel is approximately 57 acres." Sherwood Dep., at 77:12-13 (York Aff., Ex. 5). 
Yet, despite the lack of dispute that all elements are present to establish the larger parcel, 
Sherwood only considered the west 30 acres in his valuation-the acres closest to the Hwy 54 
and US-95 intersection-and ignored the remaining 26.8 acres. Sherwood Report, at 6, 9 (York 
Aff.,Ex.18); ShenvoodDep., 119:12-22; 120:12-15 (YorkAff.,Ex. 5). By using a smaller 
segment ofGrathol,s Property for his valuation, Sherwood's entire analysis is skewed upward in 
an artificial and improper attempt to reach a higher value. It is commonly known that smaller 
properties sell for more than larger properties. Sherwood acknowledged that tenet of real estate 
principles in his deposition. 
- ---·-- --·--· --··· ---··--·-- -····- ---
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Q. And you're familiar, I assume, with the notion that smaller 
properties typically sell for more on a per-acres basis than larger 
properties. 
A. Yes. 
Q. So would it be fair to assume that if you're looking at 16-
acre parcels or 16 acre comps, that you're going to be looking at 
properties with higher values than you would be if you're looking 
at comps for a larger piece of property? 
A. Typically that is correct, yes. 
Sherwood Dep,, at 222:19-223:3 (York Aff., Ex. 5). 
Thus, when Sherwood used a 30-acre larger parcel, he looked for sales that were 
comparable to a 30-acre parcel, made adjustments for a 30-acre parcel, and reached a value 
conclusion for a 30-acre parcel-which by Sherwood's own testimony is typically higher than 
values for a larger, 56-acre parcel, which is the size of Grathol's property, Id Sherwood's 
analysis fails to value the entire 56-acre Property. As a result, his analysis is biased and hi us 
and adjustments to allegedly "comparable" (but much smaller) sales results in an improper and 
inflated valuation of the Grathol Property. See Sherwood Dep. 222:4-225:10 (York Aff., Ex. 5); 
Sherwood Report (York A:ff., Ex. 18). Sherwood's value conclusions are misleading and 
improper and should be excluded. 
The standard in Idaho for the admissibility of expert testimony is that ''(u]nder the rules, 
ex.pert opinion testimony is only admissible when 'the expert is a qualified expert in the field, the 
evidence will be of assistance to the trier of fact, experts in the particular field would reasonably 
rely upon the same type of facts relied upon by the expert in forming his opinion, and the 
probative value of the opinion testimony is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect."' Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 140-41, 219 P.3d 453, 464-GS (2009) (quoting Ryan 
v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 47,844 P.2d 24, 29 (Ct. App. 1992)); see also Idaho R. Evid. 702, 703, 
& 403. "[B]xpert opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the 
-- ------ -- -- -----
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record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict, and therefore is inadmissible.'' 
Ryan, 123 Idaho at 46-47, 844 P.2d at 28-29; see also Idaho R. Evid.702. Stated otherwise, the 
admissibility of an expert's opinions ''depends on the validity of the expert's reasoning and 
methodology, rather than his or her ultimate conclusion." Id at 46-47, 844 P.2d at 28-29. Thus, 
"so long as the principles and methodology behind a theory are valid and reliable, the theory 
need not be commonly agreed upon or generally accepted." Coombs, 148 Idaho at 140,219 P.3d 
at 464. And conversely, if the principles and methodology that are applied are not valid or 
reliable, the opinions are properly excluded. 
Here, Sherwood has failed to apply the proper methodology to value the Grathol Property 
as it relates to the larger parcel analysis, and thus his opinions are inadmissible. 
D. Sherwood's Comparable Sales Are Inadmissible Because He Has Failed to Disclose 
Specific Adjustments For Each Sale. 
In his valuation analysis, Sheiwood failed to make any specific adjustments to the 
"comparable" sales he used. His report contains no analysis, explanation or computation of the 
adjustments he made to the 10 comparable sales he used to value the Grathol Property. See 
Sherwood Report (York Aff., Ex. 18). 
In condemnation proceedings, adjustments made to comparable sales should be well 
supported by logic and reason and should also be documented in the appraisal. 7-04 NICHOLS 
ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 04.03 (2011). Thus, for a comparable sale appraisal to be admissible, 
the appraiser must disclose the specific adjustments made to each of the comparable sales, See 
Bell v. Village of Poland, 722 N.Y.S.2d 194i 194 (N.Y, App. Div, 2001) (appraisal considered 
flawed because appraiser failed to include necessary figures and calculations to account for 
adjustments made); State Highway Comm 'n v. Callahan, 410 P.2d 818, 819 (Or. 1966) 
(upholding trial court's exclusion of testimony on comparable sales for lack of specific 
- -·----------- -- -----·-------·-------------------------- --·····-·------···. --
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adjustments for sales and concluding that it would have been improper for the court to admit 
comparable sales until the adjustments were explained). 
When an appraiser fails to specify and quantify the adjustments made to the comparable 
sales, any probative value of the appraisal is eliminated. Johnson v. Town of Haverstraw, S18 
N.Y.S.2d 433,433 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (icThis obvious failure to specify and quantify the 
aforementioned adjustments vitiated the probative value of the appraisal.") (citations omitted). 
And absent any quantified adjustments, an appraisal is inadmissible. Matter of Acquisition of 
Real Property by County of Dutchess, 588 N.Y.S.2d 936,937 (N.Y App. Div. 1992) (upholding 
rejection of appraisal where expert appraiser failed to "include dollar or percentage adjustments" 
made to comparable sales). As stated by the court in County of Dutchess in response to 
petitioner's challenge to the rejection of their expert's appraisal. report and the acceptance of the 
·claim.ant's report, 
We find no error in either determination. Supreme Court rejected 
petitioner's appraisal because the expert who prepared it failed to 
include dollar or percentage adjustments to the comparable sales 
and rentals used in the appraisal.. "[A]n appraiser is expected to set 
forth his explanations and adjustments" including the necessary 
facts, figures and calculations to account for the adjustments. A 
lump-sum adjustment is improper. The failure of petitioner's 
expert to specify and quantify the various adjustments made in his 
appraisal. vitiated its probative value. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). See also John P. Burke Apartments, Inc. v. Swan, 528 N. Y.S.2d 
718, 720 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). 
Since Sherwood's appraisal does not set forth, explain or quantify any of his adjustments 
to comparable sales, his analysis is likewise deficient, and the appraisal and opinions should be 
excluded. Sherwood apparently made adjustments to the comparable sales he used, but he failed 
to provide any basis for determining what adjustments were made, how he made the adjustments, 
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or the amount of the adjustments. In fact, according to Sherwood he does not make 
individualized adjustments. According to Sherwood, 
A lot of appraisers love to make grids and plus and minus and that. 
I typically don't. I take all the things into consideration, look at 
them as a whole, and make my estimate based on those things. 
Sherwood Dep., at 233:16-19 (York Aft., Ex. S), When asked how he determined size 
adjustments for the sales he used in his analysis, Sheiwood testified that "[y]ou put it all in the 
hopper when you look at the sales, and I realite it's going to be- size is certainly going to reflect 
a higher value.'' Id at 234:4-6. Sherwood's 'tlack-box" method of making his adjustments 
does not involve attributing any particular amount for a given size adjustments or quantifying the 
adjustments in any way, Sherwood does not have any formula for coming up with his 
adjustments. Id at 235:4-5 ("You've asked me several ti.mes and I'm telling you I don't have a 
fonnula. "). He does not make his adjustments in adherence to any accepted appraisal principles, 
formula, or methodology, but simply "[b]y looking at it and making my judgment based on the 
sale.,, Id at 235 :9~ I 0. When asked how he knew whether his size adjustments were consistent 
as between his comparable sales ifhe did not quantify the adjustments, Sherwood's response was 
merely, 
I guess that's why I get paid to be an appraiser. I feel that I'm 
entitled to an opinion of looking at a lot of factors and trying to 
quantify specific ones for size. I don't have a specific formula. 
Id at 234: 14-23, When asked to summarize his processes for making adjustments to his 
eomparables sales and whether he reached an adjusted value for the sales he relied upo~ 
Sherwood testified, 
A. No, I didn't adjust them as I st.arted from square one, there's 
no •• these are sales I considered, I considered location, size, other 
things, in forming my estimate for the subject property. 
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Q. And then based on all of that, you just sort of found $2.25? I 
don't understand how you got to $2.25. 
A. That was my best estimate based on the comparables that I 
looked at, the research I did in this particular case. 
Q. Okay. Anything more specific than that? 
A. No. 
Id, at 236:22-237:10. 
Sherwood's utter disregard for the appropriate process-or any process-of making 
meaningful and appropriate adjustments to his comparable sales eliminates the probative value of 
the comparable sales he relies on. In sum, the methodology used by Sherwood to create his 
opinion of value for the Grathol Property is improper, contrary to established condemnation and 
appraisal principles, and establishes clear grounds to exclude his opinions in this case. 
E. Johnson's Opinions Are Inadmissible Because They Include Damage Estimates For 
Property That Is Not Being Taken By ITD As Part Of This Case, 
Johnson's valuation analysis includes acreages for Sylvan Road, and his damage 
conclusions contain damages for the construction of Sylvan Road across the Grathol Property, 
Johnson Dep. at 92:6~16; 93:16~94:2; 94:8-10; 102:14-103:3 (York Aff., Ex. 3); Gratbol Third 
Suppl. Discovery Resp., at 6 (York Aff., Ex. 6). As discussed in detail in ITD's motion for 
summary judgment, ITD is not acquiring any of Grathol' s Property for Sylvan Road and the 
Court has concluded that the taking in this case does not include any taking for Sylvan Road. 
ITD's Mem. in Supp. ofMtn. for Summ. Judg., at 6-12. Itis a basic principle of condemnation 
law that where no taking has occurred, no compensation is owed. See Merritt 11. State, 113 Idaho 
142, 145, 742 P.2d 397,400 (1987). Thus, Johnson's valuation and resulting conclusions should 
be excluded for the reason that it includes compensation for property that is not being taken. 
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F, Evidence Of Sherwood's Sale No. 5 Is Inadmissible Because The Transaction Was A 
Settlement And Compromise Of A Threatened Condemnation Between ITD And 
The Landowner And Was Not A Bona Fide, Voluntary, Open Market Sale Between 
Willing Participants. 
In support of bis valuation, Sherwood relies upon 10 sales of property that he contends 
are sufficiently comparable to the Grathol Property to provide a substantive basis for the value of 
the Grathol Property. As the proponent of the comparable sales data used to support its claims 
for just compensation in this case, Gtathol has the burden of satisfying the "strict foundation 
requirements [that] apply when evidence of comparable sales is offered as substantive proof of 
the value of the property taken." See State ex rel. Symms v. Collier, 93 Idaho 19, 23,454 P.2d 
56, 60 (1969). In order to satisfy its burden to establish that its comparable sales are relevant and 
thereby admissible in evidence, Grathol must show that the sales are "bona fide, voluntary, 
sufficiently recent in time and substantially similar in physical characteristics to the subject 
property." 7A NICHOLS ONEM1NENTDOMAIN § 013.02[2] ("[A]lljurisdictions recognize that a 
comparable sale, in order to be relevant and thereby admissible in evidence, must be bona fide, 
voluntary, sufficiently recent in time and substantially similar in physical characteristics to the 
subject property.''); see Collier, 93 Idaho at 23, 454 P.2d at 60 (holding that comparable sales 
must have "sufficient criteria of similarity to be admitted as independent substantive evidence of 
the value of property taken."). 
ITD takes issue with each of the 10 sales used by Orathol and the adjustments made to 
the sales and intends to challenge those issues at trial, depending upon the foundation-or lack 
there of-presented by Grathol, However, for purposes of the present motion, ITD only seeks an 
order in limine excluding evidence of one Grathol's sales, specifically Sherwood's Sale No. S. 
Sheiwood Report, at 8 (York Aff., Ex. 18). Sale No. 5 involved a parcel ofland located at the 
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intersection of Highway 95 and Garwood Road and was "the sale of the Garwood Saloon 
property to Idaho DOT." Id The sale is irrelevant and inadmissible because the transaction was 
the settlement and compromise of an anticipated condemnation action to be brought by the Idaho 
Transportation Department against the land owner and was not a bona fide, voluntary, open 
market sale between willing participants. 
As a general rule, damages for the taking of an interest in property are measured by the 
fair market value of the property taken plus severance damages to any remainder. Canyon View 
Irrigation Co. v. '/'win Falls Canal Co., 101 Idaho 604, 614~ 619 P.2d 122, 132 (1980) (citing 
State v. Duncliclci Inc., 77 Idaho 45, 286 P.2d 1112 (1955)). In Idaho, the term "fair market 
value" is defined in Idaho's model jury instructions for eminent domain cases as ''the cash price 
at which a willing seller would sell and a willing buyer would buy the subject property, in an 
open marketplace free of restraints, taking into account the highest and most profitable use of the 
property." IDJI2d 7.09 (emphasis added). The definition of "fair market value" further requires 
that the tenn "presumeO that the seller is desirous of selling, but is under no compulsion to do so, 
and that the buyer is desirous of buying, but is under no compulsion to do so." IDJI2d 7.09. 
Thus, where the property is acquired as part of the compromise between a condemnor and a 
landowner, the sale is not voluntary because the parties are under compulsion to buy or sell the 
property. As such, the sale is irrelevant as to the market value of property, and courts uniformly 
exclude evidence of the sale as inadmissible. State v. DeTienne, 701 P.2d 534, 537-38 (Mont. 
1985) ("it is generally held by the weight of authority that evidence of the sale of a parcel of land 
subject to condemnation to the proposed condem:nor or to another potential condemnor may not 
be admitted as evidence of the value of the land condemned.") (quoting S NICHOLS ON EMINENT 
DOMAIN § 21.33); Dean v. Board of County Sup 'rs of Prince William County, 708 S.E.2d 830 
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(Va. 2011) (upholding trial court's exclusion of sale involving condemnor and landowner where 
sale was not "voluntary and free from compulsion and not by way of compromise''); Jordan v. 
Department ofTransp., 342 S.E.2d 482,483 (Ga. App. 1986) (holding that sales of land to 
condemning authorities were inadmissible as either direct or indirect evidence in condemnation 
proceedings as to the issue of value of the land sought to be condemned); City of Portland v. 
Holmes, 376 P.2d 120, 124 (Or. 1962) (upholding exclusion of evidence of involuntary sale of 
property sought to be condemned despite proximity of sale to subject property and stated that 
"(a] sale which is not voluntary has no tendency to prove market value"). 
Sherwood's Sale No. 5 is inadmissible for just this reason. It was not a voluntary sale 
because it was the property sold to ITD under threat of condemnation and was the com.promise 
of anticipated litigation. See ITD Offer Letter (July 22, 2008) and Right of Way Contract (July 
23, 2008), (York Aff. Ex. 17). 
No dispute exists regarding the facts surrounding the transaction. Indeed, Sherwood 
acknowledges in bis report that "this sale was negotiated under threat of condemnation and 
courts have ruled that these sales may not represent true market value for this reason." 
Sherwood Report, at 8 (York Aff., Ex. 19). Similarly, Sherwood testified during his deposition 
that sales under threat of condemnation may not be admissible in court because they are not 
representative of market value. Sherwood Dep. 228:1·21 (York Aff., Ex. 5). Sherwood also 
testified that his Sale No. S was not an open market sale and that such sales are not typically used 
as a coµiparable sales. Id, at 229:19·231:6. Yet despite his acknowledgement of the sale's 
inherent lack of reliability and that courts regularly exclude such sales, Sherwood used the sale 
as the basis to support his value conclusions and placed "primary emphasis" on the sale. Id, at 
228:1-21; Sherwood Report, at 8-9 (York Aff., Ex. 18), 
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Sherwood's reliance on the condemnation transaction is improper. The transaction was 
not a voluntary sale between a willing buyer and seller, and as such, does not reflect the market 
value of the property. The sale is irrelevant to the issue of the value of Grathol's Property and 
should be excluded. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, ITD respectfully requests that the Court enter an Order excluding 
evidence of: 
1. Valuation opinions ofGrathol's experts Skip Sherwood ("Sheiwood") and Alan 
Johnson ("Johnson") that violate Idaho law and fail to apply the statutory date of 
valuation as required by Idaho Code § 7-721. 
2. Valuation opinions of Sherwood that fail to apply proper valuation methodology 
relating to the ''larger parcel" analysis of the Gtathol Property. 
3. Valuation opinions of Sherwood that fail to disclose specific adjustments made to 
comparable sales. 
4. Valuation opinions of Johnson that include damages for property not being taken 
as part of this condemnation action. 
5. Evidence of Sherwood's Sale No. 5, which is a transaction between a condemning 
authority and a landowner under threat of condemnation, and not a valid 
comparable sale. 
These subjects are improper and inadmissible and are properly excluded from evidence at 
the trial of this matter. 
DATED this 6th day of January~ 2012. 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
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VS, 
HJ ORATHOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVfNGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
Mary V. York, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am a partner in the Boise office of the law firm of Holland & Hart LLP and am 
duly licensed to practice law in the State ofldaho. 
2. I am counsel of record for Plaintiff, Idaho Transportation Department ("ITD") in 
the above-captioned matter, and I make this affidavit in support of ITD's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Motion in Limine. 
3. Attached as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of the relevant portions from 
transcript of the Possession Hearing held on January 21, 2011. The cited portions have been 
highlighted for ease of reference. 
4. Attached as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of excerpts from the Kootenai 
County Zoning Ordinance. The cited portion has been highlighted for ease of reference. 
5. Attached as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of relevant- portions of the 
deposition of Alan Johnson taken on November 18, 2011. The cited portions have been 
highlighted for ease of reference. 
6. Attached as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of relevant portions of the 
deposition ofGeoffReeslund taken on November 17, 2011. The cited portions have been 
highlighted for ease of refer-ence. 
7. Attached as Exhibit 5 is a true and correct copy of the deposition of Dewitt M. 
"Skip" Sherwood taken on November 16, 2011. The cited portions have been highlighted for ease 
of reference. 
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8. Attached as Exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of relevant portions of Defendant 
HJ Grathol' s Third Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories 
and Requests for Production of Documents served October 6,2011. The cited portions have been 
highlighted for ease of reference. 
9. Attached as Exhibit 7 is a true and correct copy of the "after" design plan of the HJ 
Grathol Development created by CLC Associates. 
10. Attached as Exhibit 8 is a true and correct copy of the Buyer's Settlement Sheet 
dated May 23, 2008 for the purchase of the subject property. Exhibit 8 was produced in discovery 
by HJ Grathol and was submitted as Exhibit 44 to the Alan Johnson deposition. 
11. Attached as Exhibit 9 is a true and correct copy of the Multiple Listing Service 
information for the sale of the subject property. Exhibit 9 was submitted as Exhibit 43 to the Alan 
Johnson deposition. 
12. Attached as Exhibit 10 is a true and correct copy of the rebuttal report prepared by 
Dennis R. Reinstein dated December 19, 2011. This report was produced as part of ITD 's rebuttal 
expert reports on December 19, 2011. 
13. Attached as Exhibit 11 is a true and correct copy of the relevant portions of the 
rebuttal report prepared by David Evans and Associates dated December 16, 2011. This report 
was produced as part of ITD's rebuttal expert reports on December 19, 2011. 
14. Attached as Exhibit 12 is a true and correct copy of Figure 12 from the David 
Evans and Associates rebuttal report dated December 16, 2011. This figure was produced as part 
ofITD's rebuttal expert reports on December 19,2011. 
15. Attached as Exhibit 13 is a true and correct copy of Warranty Deed 504394. 
E,dubit 13 was submitted as Exhibit 6 to the Dewitt M. "Skip" Sherwood deposition. 
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16. Attached as Exhibit 14 is a true and correct copy of the ALTA map produced in 
discovery by HJ Grathol. Exhibit 14 was submitted as Exhibit 12 to the GeoffReeslund 
deposition. 
17. Attached as E:xhibjt 1S is a true and correct copy of excerpts from Plaintiff ITD 's 
Disclosure of Rebuttal Experts dated December 19, 2011. This report was produced as part of 
ITD' s rebuttal expert reports on December 19, 2011. 
18. Attached as Exhibit 16 is a true and correct copy of the Findings of Fact Applicable 
Legal Standards, Comprehensive Plan Analysis, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation for In 
the Matter of the Application of Hughes Investments/or a Change in the Zoning Classification on 
Approximately 56 Acres From Agricultural to Rural and Hughes Investment's (HJ Gtathol) 
Application for Rezoning. Exhibit 16 was submitted as Exhibit 16 to the GeoffReeslund 
deposition. 
19. Attached as Exhibit 17 is a true and correct copy of the July 22, 2008 ITD Offer 
letter and Right Right-of-Way Contract executed in lieu of condemnation, between ITD and 
Garwood Saloon and Arena, LLC. 
20. Attached as Exhibit 18 is the true and correct copy of relevant portions of the 
August 2S, 2011 appraisal report prepared by of Dewitt M. "Skip" Sherwood on behalf of HJ 
Grathol. Exhibit 19 was submitted as Exhibit 3 to the Dewitt M. "Skip" Sherwood deposition. 
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DATED this 6th day of January, 2012. 
SUBSCIUBED and SWORN to before me this 6th day of JanuaryJ 2012. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
My Commission Expires 5;/q .. zo, 'I 
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Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
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Post Office Box 1336 
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--000--








vs. ) Case No. CV-10-1009S 
) 
HJ GRATHOL, a California 
general partnership; STERLING 
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ON: January 21, 2011, 1:34 p.m. 
BEFORE; The Honoratile Lansing L. Haynes 
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For the Plaintiff: 
TED TOLLEFSON 
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lOl South Capitol Boulevard, 
Boise, Iaaho 83702 
For the Defenaant: 
DOUGI.AS S. MARFICE 
CHRISTOPHER n. GABBERT 
m!SOEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Boulevard 
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Page 2 Page 4 
l INDEX 1 prepared to proceed, your Honor, today. We have 
2 For. Proceedings Januery 21, 2011, 1:34 p.m. 2 witnesses to testify to the value and to the scope of 
3 OPENING STA"I'EMENTS: PAGE 3 the taking. But we believe that based upon Idaho code 
4 Mr. Tollefson .................................. 3 4 7-721, Idaho Transportation Department is onJy required 
5 Mr. Marfioe .................................... s 5 to show four elements. First, that it has the power of 
s 6 eminent domain. The defendants in this case have 
1 INDEX OF BXAMINATIONS 7 already stipulated to that fact •• or excuse me, 
8 PLAINTIFF WITNESSES; DllWC'r caoss REDIRECT RECROSS 8 admitted in their answer. 
9 Jason B. Minzghor 7 22 31 9 No. 2, that the project is a public project 
10 Stanley Moe 3S l O that is authorized by law. They have also admitted that 
11 Dl3PBNDANT WITNESSES: 11 in their answer. Specifically, in this case it's the 
12 (Nowirnesscs) 12 realignment of Highway 95 and the construction of the 
13 13 interchange at 54. 
14 INDEX OF EXHIBITS 14 And No. 3, the third element that ITO needs to 
15 PLAINTIFF EXHIBITS: MARKED OFFERED AOMITI'ED RF.JECTEI 15 prove that the property is necessary for that project. 
16 Exhibit I 11 16 And again, they have not presented any evidence contrary 
11 Exhibit 2 11 1 7 to ITD's assertions both in the comp1aint and in the 
1a Exhibit3 32 18 affidavit of Jason Minzghor. The Idaho Transportation 
1.9 DEFBNDANT EXHIBITS: 19 Department's district engineer - project development 
20 (No exhibits) 2 o engineer, excuse me, that this property is necessaJY. 
21 21 And four, that ITO conducted good-faith 
22 CLOSING ARGUMENTS; 22 negotiations for the purchase of the property. In this 
23 Mr. Tollefson ................................. 40 2 3 case, ITD hired an independent appraiser, Mr. Stan Moe, 
24 Mr. Marfice ................................... 44 2 4 an MAI-certified appraiser, who appraised the property 
2s Mr. Tollcfi.-on ................................. 53 2 s necessary and detennioed that the just comi,ensation 
Page 3 Page s ~ 
l January21,20Jl; I:34p.m. 1 wouldbe$571,000forthepropertysought,andITD l 
2 P RO C E E D I N G S 2 offered that amount. It is undisputed, that amount, ! 
3 THE COURT: We're on the record in First 3 plus an additional 10 percent. So therefore, you; 'j; 
4 District Court fox- Kootenai County. I'm District Judge 4 Honor, we believe that at this point in time, none of : 
5 Lansing Haynes. This is the time set for a hearing in s the issues raised by defendants actually impacts any of I 
6 the matter of State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board 6 those four elements; and therefore, ITD is entitled to ~ 
7 versus HJ Grathol, et al. It is civil case 10-10095, 7 an order forpossessioo at this time. ! 
a Plaintiffs in the matter are represented by Ted ... 8 However, we have prepared. We have witnesses 
9 MR. TOLLEFSON: Ted ToJJefson, your Honor. 9 here to testify to all those elements if necessary. And 
l O THB COURT= Ted Tollefson, thank you. I saw l O so I guess, your Honor, I would just - it would be the 
ll another name there, as well. Defendants are represented 11 most efficient use of the Court's time, we believe, is 
12 by Mr. Doug Marfice and Mr. Chris Oabbert. 12 if the Court would direct the state as to-- rm as to 
13 This is a hearing on plaintiff's motion for 13 how - what evidence this court would like to hear, I 
14 order &ranting possession of real property. It's a 14 guess. 
is complaint that is brought pmsuant to Idaho code 15 nm COURT: Well, I don't think I'll be 
16 section 7-721 and other statutes. And are the parties 16 teUing you what it is I think I need ro hear. That's 
1 7 ready for this hearing? l 7 for the advocates to put on the proof they think 
18 MR. TOLLEFSON: Yes, your Honor. 18 necessaiy. Let me tum to HJ Grathol and find out. Do 
19 MR. MARFICE: Yes, your Honor. 19 you have any response to that legal argument made by the 
2 o THE COURT: All right. Plaintiff, do you 2 o State ofldaho? 
21 intend to call any witnesses at today's hearing? 21 DEFENDANT OPENING STATEMENT 





2 3 MR. TOLLBFSON: Your Honor, ifl could 2 3 presume what the Court was doing was with the question 'j 
.2 4 approach it in this manner. I have a brief opening 2 4 about calling witnesses is a predicate to what kind of 1. 
2 s statement that I'd like to make and then the state is 2 s time do we need, what order of proof are we going to 1 
2 (Pages 2 to 5) 
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1 identified? 1 MR. TOLLEFSON: Q. I'm handing you two pieces I 
2 A. Correct. 2 of pa.per which have been marked as Exhibit 2. Do you 
3 Q. l'd like you to move to the second page of the 3 recognize those? 
4 exhibit. Now, can you describe briefly what you see on 4 A. Yes. 
s that second page? s Q. And what are those? 
6 A. Highlighting in pink is the Gratbol portion of 6 A. These were the exhibits in my affidavit. 1 
7 US-95 that we're condemning from. 7 MR. TOLLEFSON: Okay. And, your Honor, I have ! 
s Q. And on this piece of paper here, does it - s additional copies if you would like a copy to look at '1 
9 what does it depict? What do the lines depict moving SI THE COURT: That would be fine. Thank you. 
10 sideways across the property on that piece of paper? J.0 MR. TOLLEFSON: Q. Were these exhibits 
11 A. Okay. On the farleft it shows the outline ll attached to your affidavit? 
12 shape of the right-of-way necessacy for the interchange 12 A. Yes. 
13 and the ramps required, and then as it goes across the 13 Q. Can you please tell me what-- on the first 
14 page, the next down to what's the four•lane divided 14 page ofExhibit 2, what the blue line represents? 
15 roadway. 1s A. The blue line represents the Grathol ownership 
16 Q. And what does the pink colorrepresent? lti boundary. 
l 7 A. This is a highlighted color representing the 17 Q. And on the second page, there's another blue 
18 graphical portion of the entire Orathol propertY needed 18 line. What does that represent? 
19 for the highway and the interchange. 19 A. That also represents a second parcel of 
2 O Q. And can you describe why is that pink shaded 2 o Grathol boundary. 
21 part necessary for this project? 21 Q. Thank you. At the top of the page, there's a 
22 A. This is necessary to have a separated 22 series of white lines. Can you tell us what those white 
23 highway/freeway standard for the traveling public to 23 lines are? j 
2 4 increase safety and mobility for this entire co1Tidor 2 4 A. Yes. They are various outlines of different 
I 



























Q. As part of these project plans, is there any 
property being condemned for the expansion of Sylvan 
Road? 
A. No, sir. 
Q, Is the construction or condemnation of 
property of Sylvan Road necessary to complete this 
project? 
A. No. 
:MR. TOLLEFSON: I'm now handing you·· aod, 
your Honor, for •• I'm not sure how your court likes to 
run it, but would you like to make these premarked 
before he looks at them, or do you have a preference? 
THE COURT: It's easier if they're premarked. 
MR. TOLLEFSON: Let's do it that way then. If 
I could have the clerk mark this as Exhibit 1. 
(Exhibit l marked.) 
THE COURT: And is that what - the 
condemnation exhibit? 
MR. TOLLEFSON: Correct That's Exhibit B to 
t.'ie complaint of condemnation that was filed in this 
case. 
THE COURT: Now Exhibit I. 
MR. TOLLEFSON: Thank you. And ifI could 
have these two just marked as Exhibit 2, please. 


























Page 13 : 
i 
Q. In the middle of this page-- excuse me, is 
there anything on this •• bow is this document -prepared, 
exhibit ... 
A. It was prepared by a consultant working for 1 
ITO using an aerial and CAD overlay. The CAD files are i 
on the aerial to give a visual representation of what is 1 
OCClllTing in the field. I 
Q. And is it generally accurate as to what the I 
project plans will construct? l 
A Yes. 1 
Q. Is there any construction on the Orathol i 
property, which is outlined in blue, any contemplated ; 
eonstruction on the Gm'ihol property for any section of : 
Sylvan Road? 1 
A. No. i 
Q. And just for the Court and Counsel's i 
convenience, can you describe where Sylvan Road is on , 
this exhibit? : 
A. Sylvan Road is approximately on the first page 
in the middle left road that's on the edge of the 
aerial. 
Q. On the left-hand side of the document, there 
is a -- what I believe is a construction on Highway 54. 
Do you see what I'm looking at there? .. .,.., .. ,., .. , .. ____ .... ---~ .J~... ... • \ ... 
4 (Pages 10 to 13) 
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l number, where that number came from? l A. Two parcel -- two property oWners, Jameson 1 
2 A. ITO sought out an independent appraisal, and 2. Mortgage •• 'the owners of Jameson Mortgage and Frederick i 
3 through that process we solicited an appraisal, and an 3 Krasnick (phonetic), had approached ITD and had beard 
4 appraisal was done, and that's where we started with our 4 that we were in negotiations wltb them and they wanted 
s offer, plus an incentive •• an incentive was included in s the Roberts Road extended south, which would eventually I 
6 that offer. 6 connect to Sylvan Road, and they wanted to donate their 
7 Q. Would it refresh your recollection if the ? property in exchange for the frontage road being built 
8 offer made to GrathoJ in June of2010 was $628,000 - 8 and. asked us to discuss this also with Grathol. 
9 $628,000and$100-628,100? 9 Q. Okay. Justforthesakeofelarityofthe 
10 A. Yes. 1 o record, the two neighbors you were talking about were 
11 Q. I think I got it right that time. And after 11 Krasniek Frededck and Jason (sic) Mortgage. Are they 
1.2 this offer was made to Gratho~ were you aware - did 12 indicated on Exh:ibit 2? 
13 they respond? 13 A. Yes. 
14 A. Yes,theydid. Ibelieveitwaslater,the 14 Q. ThelocationoftheirparceJs,arethey 
15 last couple weeks of June they responded back with -- 15 indicated on Exhibit 2? 
lG rejected the offer. lG A. Yes. 
17 Q. Do you recall how much they counter proposed? l 7 Q. And where are they in relation t.o the Orathol 
1 B A. It was anywhere - it was a range on their 18 property to the big blue section? 
19 rejection and it was 2.5 to 3 million. 19 A. They are just north of the Kootenai County 
2 0 Q. So it was approximately $3 million? 2 o Farragut Trail parcel. 
.21 A. Correct. 21 Q. So ifrm readingthis document, they're to 
.2 2 Q. Did you - after Grathol's counter proposal, .22 the right of the blue Grathol property? 
2 3 did you have any meetings personally with Grath- - with 23 A. Correct. 
.24 any representatives of HJ Grathol? 24 Q. And those two nejghbors had approached lTD to i 
2 S A. Yes. On Au1mst l st, we met with Oratbol aod 2.5 see if lTD would constr.uot a S:?lvan/Roberts Road j 
Page 19 
j 
Page 21 1 
i 1 their representative. 2 Q. And who is ''we"? 
3 A. It was myself, Ron Harvey, and Yvonne Lima. 
4 Q. And who was present on behalf of Grathol? 
s A. I forgot their name. Those two guys and the 
' 
Q. And now back to your meeting with Gratho!. ] 
, How djd your meeting with Gratbol come about because of l 
5 ypur meetings or your agreement with these two l 
1 extension on their property? 
2 A. Cotrect. 
3 
6 two owners. 6 neighboring property owners? I 
7 Q. So just Jet the record reflect that you 7 A. My understanding is that Grathol was- working 1 
a pointed to the defendants' table? 8 with those two neighbors and they found out that they J 
9 A. Yes. 9 didn't accept the offer, and they had called my staff 1 
1 o Q. And was that -- was the amount of just lo engineer and myself to say that we needed to make sure j 
l l compensation, was that discussed at this meeting? 11· that they understood what we were proposing was Sylvan ] 
12 A. Yes. 12 Road. 
13 Q. And were the parties able to reach an 13 Q. And so did you go to Grathol with that 
14 agreement? 14 proposai? 
15 A. No. 15 A. Ye.s. 
16 Q. Was also the issue of Sylvan Road discussed at 16 Q. And the prop0sal being if they dedicated their 
l 7 this meeting? l 7 property, ITD would construct a frontage road for them? ! 
18 A. Yes. 18 A. Correct. '1 
19 Q. And can you briefly tell the Court what was 19 Q. And did they accept that offer? / 
.2 o discussed regarding Sylvan Road at this August 1st, 2010 2 0 A. No. 
21 meeting? 21 Q. After they rejected ITD's offer, did ITO have 
2 2 A. ITO was presenting Grathol with an option to 2 2 any plans to condemn any portion of their property to 
.23 build the road, the county-funded road, in exchange for 23 construct this Sylvan Road? 
24 a dedication ofrigltt~of-way. .24 A. No. I 
... 2':"":', :~~-=Q==. =An=d-:: __ w:-:,}~ .. y=di='d=I=ID=mak=e=~=:~~-~ o~. ~~-:~.~===·-·~--=-=-~-=~==-=~-=-MR'!:'"~':, TO=LL=EF==!_=~=~~="=:~~.a~.~e!";!',. n'=o:":':.~==rth=er=q-~~e~.-~-::-:.on"'!"':. ~~: =-=!.....J 
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1 yourHonor. l eonstructingSylvanRoad. j 




MR. MARFICE: Very brief, your Honor. 3 across the Grathol property, does it? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 4 A. That is correct. 
MR. MARFICE: Q. Mr. Minzghor, you1ve been s Q. There's no road oh the1ground, there's no 
G involved in this project since 2002, correct? G right-of-way, there's no ownership by the Slate or any 
7 A. Correct. 7 county or municipality, is there? 
B Q. And there were various alignment alternatives 8 A. Correct.. 
9 that ITO had under consideration over the course of the 9 Q. Okay. Now, you said that after August 1 of 1 
lo planning phase; is that a fair statement? lo 2010, when the proposal was made to build the frontage J 
11 
12 
A. Correct 11 road, you were referring to Sylvan Road, were you not? l 
Q. And with respect to the ultimate alignment 12 A. Coi:rect. 1 
13 that was decided on, is it called the Brown Alternative 13 Q. After that-- j 
14 in the area where the Grathol property is located? 14 A. The extension of Sylvan Road. 
15 A. Correct 1s Q. The extension of Sylvan Road across the j 
16 Q. Y9u made mention of the first study thatthen lEi Grathol property. You said after that date there was no : 
17 got incorporated into what you call the·· a STIP. 17 plan for 1he construction of Sylvan Road as part of this l 
1 B That's a State Transportation Improvement Plan; is that 18 project. Did I Wlderstand that correctly? I 
19 right? Is that what STIP stands for? 19 A. Across the Grathol property, yes. 
2 o A. That's what STIP stands for, yes. 2 O Q. Okay. Have you seen the order of condemnation j 
21 Q. Okay. And with respect to this Brown 21 that was attached to the complaint in this matter? 1 
22 Alternative, the State Transportation Improvement 22 A. I'm not sure what... j 
23 Plan- are you able to see this from where you are 23 MR MARFICE: May I approach, Judge? ; 
24 there? 24 THECOURT: Youmay. l 
25 A. Yeah.lean. 25 MR.MARFICE: Q. Okay, Iiusthandedyoua l 
Page 23 Page 25 j 
1 Q. It contemplated a frontage road where Sylvan l document. I have not marked it. It's in the record as i 
2 Road essentially lies, did it not? 2 Exhibit C to the plaintiffs1 com.plaint Have you seen ! 
3 A. Yes. 3 that before? i 
4 Q. Okay. And to orient you and the Court, this 4 A. Briefly, yes. j 
5 is Highway 9S, Have you seen this document before? 5 Q. And that's an order of condemnation I 
6 A. Yes. 6 referencingthekeyNo.9791 thatyoutestifiedabout. / 
7 Q. This is an Idaho Transportation Department 7 That's this project? ! 
a document? a A. Yes. j 
9 A. Yes. 9 Q. And it references HJ Grathol and it has a I 
10 Q. Okay. And this is the Grathol property 10 parcel ID number on the front page there. Do you see 
ll outlined in blue here; is that correct? ll that? l 
12 A. I think it's blue. 12 A. Yes. / 
13 Q. Kind of hard to see the blue. 13 Q. And that parcel nwnber is this large ! 
14 A. Yeah. 14 rectangular piece that the defendants own; is that your ! 
15 Q. And you've already testified these white lines lS understanding? I 
16 depict the proposed construction and the area of the 16 A. Yes. i 
1 7 condemnation; is that right? l 7 Q. Okay. Now, this order of condemnation says on I 
18 A. Yes. 18 page2,subpartE,youseethat? : 
19 Q. This would be Sylvan Road to the south of US 19 A. Did you say D? ,! 
20 Highway 54? 20 Q. E as in- ! 
21 A. Yes. 21 A. Oh, okay. i 
22 Q. Or Smte Highway 54, I'm sorry. 22 Q. -- elephant 'j 
23 And it depicts nothing here. Do you know why 23 A. Yeah. 1 
24 that is? 24 Q. What does that first sentence read, sir? 1 
2.~~· .... ~.: ... .!~~!~-~-~~: no_~ans in 2::. __ ,.,-~:- ''In association ~~~.~r~~~~t~e I~~o-~ ___ J 
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1 across the Grathol property, doesn't it? l MR. MARFICE: It's not marked -
Page 321 
2 A. Correct. 2 MR. TOLLEFSON: Marked •• 
3 Q. Okay. You testified in response to 3 MR. MARPICE: ~- Counsel. 
4 Mr. Tollefson's questions about your familiarity with 4 MR. TOLLEFSON: May I have it marked, your 
s how the offer that was extended to HJ Gratho~ how that 5 Honor? 
G number wa., achieved. Do you recall those questions? 6 MR. MARFICE: That one's got some scribbles 
7 A. Yes. 7 and highlighting on it. If you have a clean copy. 
8 Q. And you've testified that the Transportation 8 MR. TOLLEFSON: I do. 
9 Department selected an appraiser and an apprmser 9 MR. MARFICE: Thank you, 





A. Yes. 11 MR. TOLLEFSON: Should have had these 
Q. You read that appraisal, didn't you? 12 prema,ked for you. 
A. Portions of, yes. 1:3 Q. I'm handing you what's been marked as 
Q. Did any portion of that appraisal discuss or 14 Bxhibit 3, which you've previously looked at. And just 
1s contain any treatment of evaluation for what would be ls for the sake of the record, this js Exhibit C to the 
Hi necessary to create Sylvan Road across the Orathol lEi complaint of condemnation. 
17 property? 1 7 In your duties at ITD, do you have any role in 
18 A. I don't recall the •• I don't know what you're 18 diafling the order of condemnation? 
19 asldng. 19 A. No. 
2 o Q, Let •• that was poorly phrased. 2 O Q. However, Mr. Marti~ had you read a section of 
1 
I 
21 From your recollection of the appraisal 21 that condemnation order, so J'm soing to have you to do J 
22 report, did it contain any discussion or treatment of 22 the same, but I must apologize, mine is a little longer. j 
2 3 Sylvan Road, valuing a part of the Orathol property 2 3 If you will take a second to read paragraphs 2 and 3 out i 
2 4 where Sylvan Road would lie if it were built? 2 4 loud. I 
2 s A. It was not •• Svlvan Road was not evaluated as 2 5 A. On the first oaee? i 
Page 31 
l a part of the appraisal. 
2 MR. MARFICB: Okay. Thank you. That's all I 
3 have, your Honor. 
4 THB COURT: Redirect? 
5 MR. TOLLEFSON: Yes, your Honor. 
6 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
7 MR. TOLLEFSON: Q. Jason, these documents 
a that Mr. Marfice put up here, do any of these documents 
9 dictate or control what I'ID is going to condemn or 
1 o co11811UOt? 
11 A. It does not. 
12 Q. What does control what ITD is going to 
13 construct? 
14 A. T'ne project plans that we have designed. 
lS Q. I'd like to tum your attention back to 
l6 Exhibit 1, which I believe are the right-of-way plans. 
17 A. Okay. 
18 Q. Are these project plans for this project'? 
19 A. Yes. 
2 O Q. And does this control what will be constructed 
21 on the project? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. I'd like to tum your attention oowto the 
2 4 order of condemnation to which Mr. Marfioe referenced. 
2 S l don't believe we had that numbered, did we? 
~--···-~·1- -,-.. -· ·--·-·---~-- ....... 1""1.•, .. , .... ·-- ·-
Page 33 I 
I 
1 Q. Yes, please. 1 
2 A. Okay. "That the right-of:.way ne1:essacy for I 
3 the proposed project consist!, in part, of certain real 11 
4 property locat.ed in the county as noted above and which 
s property bas been designated and shown a!I above parcel ' 
6 number on the plan and said project now on file in the 1 
7 offi1:e of the Idaho Transportation Department; that the f 
e par1:el so designated and shown on said project plan is 
9 necessary for the construction: of said pn,jeot and the 
lo construction of said project is impossible without the 
11 acquisition of this said parcel." 
12 Q. Okay. So is it m to say you read those 
13 that the property that is necessary is depicted on 1he 
14 project plans? 
15 A Correct. 
16 Q. And if you look at the top of the order 
1 7 condemnatfon, what is the project number? 
1B A. 9791. 
19 Q. I would like to tum your attention baek to 
20 :Exhibit No. 1. What are the project plans of this 
21 project? 
22 A. 9791. 
23 Q. Andagam, does an}'thiDgou these project f 
2 4 plans show condemnation of property for the construl:tion I 
2 5 of Sylvan Road? 
..C...,-..t,,..,.., • .)'o, •• ~_..._...~-0,--·-----"'-•••- I • ••• ~-
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l, A No. l Montana, Wyoming, California, and Washington. , 
4 Q~ Mr, Marfic;e ~lso had you read a section on 2 Q. Do you hold any degrees or certificates 
S page~ ~e). If you could.go back to look at tbat. 3 re]ated to your occupation as an appraiser? 
, '!: Arid it .. ~ to SJJµuµatize~ it says that •i1n assoeia~9n 4 A. Yes. I have the MAI designation. It's issued 
, $. 'Witll the ;J>,;ojecti the ldah.o Transportation DeparJ:tn~ is. s by the Appraisal Institute. 
· ·6 in the proqess of ,extendin$ Sylvan Road to tie mto, . , 6 Q. Is that the highest certification awarded by 
7 · Rob.e.rls !oacl, 1~ At some point .in time •" ·or ~XeU$e me1 7 the Appraisal Institute? 
-~ at orie·poinl·in time it was .c~~P~~ted that tbei-e :m,y 8 A. Yes. 
9 · be some so.rt of etn111-ectlon? 9 Q. And we-· after discussion with Mr. Marfice, 
1 o A. · C01rect. · · 10 we're going to make this short and to the point here. , 
1'l · Q. , Buf there's :no plans for that !!OW'?' 11 Did you appraise property - the HJ Grathol property ; 
l~' A. No. . 12 that is at issue in this case? l 
1;3., · Q, Anydring;that Mr. Mar.lice b.as raised up th~ 13 A. Yes, I did. 1 
l ~. .~~t tequite You. ~r l'.I'P or il:1~ pr~ject ~ ~~Sl:nlct: 14 Q. And who contacted you ~- excuse me. l 
·1$ $ylvan R0s.d? 15 Did ITO contact you to appraise this property? 1 
:J,6 A. No, . . . . . . . . . Hi A. Yes. ! 
17 · Q: Atiythin,g that Mr. Marfi'ee,bas 3aid requi.te IT.I) 1 7 Q. And generally, what were the instructions you} 
1-s· ~ QOJ\Sttµci Sylvan Road in any partieutat .tnannl}r or l 8 were given? 1 
l. ~ designation? 19 A. Well, the only instructions are to do a 
zo A. No. 20 before-and-after appraisal in a fully documented, 
21 Q. So even if it were aotl$l'!'Q.cted. we don't know 21 self-contained appraisal repon. 1 
' 22 whatroute it would take? 2 2 Q. And no other instructions about directions as 
23 A.. Correct 2 3 to come in high, come in low, anything like that? 
2 4 MR. TOLLEFSON: I have nothing further, your 2 4 A. No. 
25 H~.!:.---~--~-------------2_5 __ 0~ ...... An~d-..iu_s_t_re_al_b--'--riefu'..L.\!4~t:::.is=a ______ _ 
Page 35 Page 37 · 
THB COURT; Any recross? 1 before-and-after appraisal? 





MR. MARFICE: No. Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may step down. sir. 
MR. TOLLEFSON: ITD will call Stan Moe. 
3 appraising. The before appraisal addresses the value of 
4 the property as exists today, before the project is 
5 THE COURT: If you'd come fOtWard, please, S built. The after appraisal is a second appraisal, 
6 sir. Please face our clerk and raise your right hand 6 separate appraisal. Assumes the project was built and 
7 for an oath. 
8 
7 the right-of.way had been acquired, so it appraises what 






called as a witness herein, 9 Q. All right. And did you conduct the 
having been duly sworn on oath, 1 O before-and-after appraisal on this property? 
testified as follows: 11 A. Yes. 
DIR.ECT EXAMINATION 12 Q. And what was your designation of .. did you 
MR. TOLLEFSON: Q, Could you please identL.~ 13 come to a designation of what the highest and best use 
14 yourself and spell your last D8D'\C for the record l 4 of this property would be? 
ls A. StanJey Moe, M-O-B. l S A. Yes, I did. It was to hope for future 
16 Q. And what is your occupation? 16 commercial development. 
1 7 A. I'm a real estate appraiser. I own my own 1 7 Q. Is that in the before condition? 
18 company known as Columbia Valuation Group. l B A. Yes. 
19 Q. How long have you been a real estate 19 Q. And do you recall how much you valued the 
2 o apptaiser? , 2 O property at in the before condition? 
21 A. About 40 years. I 21 A. It was $35,000 an acre. 
2 2 Q. Forty years. And where and what general j 2 2 Q. And then in the after condition, after the 
2 3 geographic location are you a real estate appraiser? 2 3 project was •• the project, as contemplated, was 
2 4 A. I focus on North Idaho, but I'm licensed in 2 4 constructed, did you do another appraisal, the after 
25 Washinaton. I've appraised properties throuahoutlclaho, 25 aooraisal? 
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l memorandum decision, but the findings and the 1 Department. This coun fiods that the Idaho I 
2 conclusions articulated today are the findings and 2 Tra0Sportation Department and its director are entities 
3 conclusions that support the CoUrt's ultimate order 3 that are beneath, in the umbrella sense, the ldaho 
4 today. 4 Transportation Board 
5 The Court is p1·ofoundly aware of the need to 5 The board voted to approve this policy at its 
6 protect individual property rights, rights of property 6 May 14, 2007 and August 201 2008 regular meetings. 






a Property ownership is one of the foundations 8 that the director or gives the director of the Idaho 
9 on which our society is built and the inviability of 9 Transportation Department the authority to exercise all 
1 o property ownership is something to be cared for deeply l O necessal'y incidental powers and enforce all rules and 
11 by the courts. 11 regulations of the board. 
12 It is th.is court's opinion, if not holding, 12 On November 17 of20l0, the director of the . 
l 3 after reviewing the statut.es involved in this particular 13 Idaho Transportation Department exercised that granted j 
14 action, that the people of the State ofldaho, through 14 authority and issued or entered an order of condemnation 
15 its legislature, has also taken seriously the rights of 15 regarding defendant's property. That order of 
16 property owners, both individuaJs and corporate 16 condemnation has now become part of and attached to by 
1 7 entities. l 7 th.e State ofldaho, Idaho Transportation Department in 
18 It has taken into consideration the public 18 the particular matter before the Court. 
19 good and the need for the state to, from time to time, 19 The board has approved this particular project 
2 o condemn a property for the taking for necessary projects 2 o in 2005 and bas approved the project eveiy year since by l 
21 if that taking is done according to Jaw. 21 approving in its regular meetings the state j 
22 It is this court's opinion that the 22 transportation·· or the STIP, as it's referred to, J 
2 3 controlling statutes place a high burden on the state to 2 3 State Transportation Improvement Project. i 
:24 satisfy legal requirements in that taking so that a 24 The Idaho legislature has approved Garvee, J 
25 takin~ is not done in an arbitrarv or capricious manner :2S O-A-R-V·E·E, funding for the 1>roi~ which is codified j 
Page 59 Page 61 I 
I 
1 and is not done in a way that the state can easily, and 1 in Idaho code section 40-315, subsection 1, i 
2 I go back to the word capriciously. decide to force the 2 subsection B. The order of condemnation does not j 
3 sale of property when an owner maybe doesn't want to 3 provide or in this court's opinion does not provide for i 
4 sell their property. 4 the taking of the defendant's property for the expansion 1 
S And so the review of7-72l has been important 5 of the Sylvan Road and Roberts Road. The contemplation 1 
6 to the Court. Idaho code section 7-721, subsection 2, 6 oftbe expansion of Sylvan Road to link to Roberts Road I 
7 requires as its first element that the Court shall first 7 is certainly mentioned in the order of condemnation, but i 
a determine whether the plaintiff has the right of eminent B more importantly, the complaint does not contemplate the I 
9 domain. 9 exteniion of that road, and that is not the subject of jl 
1 o In the particular case before this court, that 1 o the taking that is before this court. 
1 
11 matter is not contested in the nature of the right of ll The Idaho Department of Transportation bas j 
12 eminent domam, but the defendants have raised an issue 12 offered to expand those roads through Grathol's ·! 
l 3 as to whether thar right has been properly exercised. 13 property- rather, the Sylvan Road expansion through I 
14 This court finds that the board, the plaintiff 14 Grathol's property, but that offer has been declined by I 
15 in the matter, does have the right to condemn property. 15 the defendant and th.is has been testified to amply I 
16 Idaho code section 40-3 ll provides that the board bas 16 before the Court today end in Mr. Minzghor's deposition. · 
:i. 7 the authority to condemn property. Idaho code section 17 This court finds, then, that plaintiffs' ! 
18 40-314 provides that the board has the authority to 18 complaint to comply w.itb Idaho code section 7-707. The J, 
19 exercise any powers deemed necessary to fully implement 151 complaint itself, the controlling portions of that 
I 
2 o and carry out the provisions of title 40 which relate to 2 o complaint, does not show a taking of defendants' , 
21 bipways or bridges, the subject matter of this 21 property for the expansion of Sylvan load iDto Roberts ' 
2 2 particular litigation. 22 Road or the expansion of Sylvan Road through the Grathol ! 
2 3 The board's policy B-03·0 I delegates the 2 3 property; therefore, this court finds that the scope of 1 
24 authority to condemn a property to the director of the 24 the proposed taking is adequately defined in the 
25 Idaho Department of·· or Idaho Transportation 25 com-plaint itself. j 
~-~ •. ~ ..• :-= .... :=-:-=_:::c:::. =·=.:':"-~. ~-,.\""=". ":". -=-:-=-::"::-====::i:-.~-.. ~ .. ~. ~ ...:--:.~---~==:=::r: ..... ,:: ..,:-,,..:-::===-~·=-=·~-=-·~· ,":';:' ... -:0:,-~ •. :-=::z::==-==-~- ' 
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RECRBA TIONAL VEHICLE PARK PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 
SPECIAL NOTICE PERMITS 
NO. 3876 P. 19 
9-9-1: GENERAL COMMERCIAL ZONE DEFINED: The "General Commercial zone" is a land use 
classification for a district suitable for wholesale and retail sales and services. 
9-9-2: PERFORMANCE STANDARDS: In the Commercial zone, no building or premises shall be used, nor any 
building or structure be hereafter erected or altered, unless otherwise provided in this title, except for one (1) or 
more of the fol1owing uses in accordance with the following standards. A Commercial lot shall have direct access 
from a public. road. 
All uses shall meet the following standards: 
A. Requirements of Chapter 17 of this title, Design Standards 
B. Requirements of Chapter 19 of this title, Supplementary Regulations 
C. Anticipated traffic impacts will be determined for all commercial uses using the most current edition of the 
"Trip Generation Manual." A Special Notice Permit shall be required for commercial uses or buildings that 
are anticipated to generate traffic impacts in excess of the following thresholds: 
1. For sites which access directly onto a State or Federal Highway- 25 cars per hour, or 250 vehicles per 
day. 
2, For sites which access onto other public roads - SO ears per day. 
0. Uses on all Jots or parcels in the Commercial zone which front on a state or federal highway shall require a 
Special Notice Permit. 
E. Requirements of the applicable Highway District and Idaho Transportation Department or if the site is within 
an area of city impact, the city's standards for access, approaches, and street design, whichever is the higher 
standard. 
F. If an existing community water system within 1,000 feet of the site is willing and able to provide water setvice 
to the use, connection to that system shall be required. 
0. Requirements of the Panhandle Health District for sanitary sewage disposal. 
H. Requirements of the Panhandle Health District's Critical Materials Regulation. 
May24,2007 Ordinance No. 401/ Cas11 No. OA· J33-06 (Zoning OrdiJ\ance Amendments) Paae 37 ofl28 
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An Ordinance in and for the unincorporated areas of Kootenai County, Idaho, amending the following 
sections of Kootenai County Ordinance Number 344: to clarify definitions of common driveway, gated 
community and Wetland Specialist, l.06 (B) Exemptions, 2.01 (A) Application Requirements- Preliminary 
Subdivision Approval, 2.01 (B) Application Requirements- Final Subdivision Approval, Table 2-1, 2.01 {C) 
Approval Process and Requirements, 2.02 Minor Subdivisions, 2.01 (B) Approval Process and 
Requirements, 3.01 (B) Levels of Utilities and Services, 3.01 (E) Subdivision and Lot Design, 3.01 (E) 
Roads and Trails, 4.01 Bonus Densities, 4.04 Conservation Design Procedure, 4.05 Additional Requirements 
for Conservation Design Subdivisions, and renumbering sections and making stylistic changes in language 
for purposes of codification; adding Appendix S. Natural Resources Report and Map· Requirements for 
Bonus Densities with Conservation Design Subdivisions; establishing subdivision regulations; providing 
purposes, definitions, and applicability; application requirements and approval procedures; design, 
improvement and maintenance requirements; standards for Conservation Design Subdivisions; 
administration and enforcement procedures; Appendices; repealing conflicting Ordinances; providing for 
severability; providing an effective date. 
NOW THEREFORE BE IT ORDAINED BY THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF 
KOOTENAI COUNTY, IDAHO: 
SECTION 1. That former Titles l0A and l0B, Kootenai County Code, be, and the same are hereby 
combined as Title 10, Kootemu County Code, the provisions of which shall read as set forth in this 
Ordinance. 
SECTION 2. That Kootenai County Ordinance No. 344, adopted on December 29, 2004, be, and the same 
is hereby designated as Title 10, Kootenai Cowity Code, and is hereby amended to read as follows: 
CHAPTER! 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Section 10-1 • l Title 
Section 10-1-2 Authority 
Section i0-1-3 Purpose 
Section 10-1-4 Definitions 
Section 10-1-S Acronyms 
Section 10-1 ~6 Applicability and Exemptions 
10-1-1: TITLE: 
This Title shall be known as the Subdivision Ordinance of Kootenai County, Idaho. 
10-1-2: AUTHORITY: 
These regu.Jations are authorized by Title 31, Chapter 7, Title SO, Chapter 13, and Title 67, Chapter 65 of 
Idaho Code; and Article 12, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution, as amended or subsequently codified. 
10-1-3: PURPOSE: 
The purpose of this Title is to promote and protect the health, safety, and general welfare of the public and 
to: 
• Ensure that development is in confonnance with Idaho Code, with the goals and policies of the 
Kootenai County Comprehemtve Plan, with 'the requirements of County ordinances, and with the 
requirements of other agencies. 
• Provide for orderly development of land. 
• Ensure that development mitigates negative environmental, social and economic impacts. 
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• Create buildable lots of reasonable utility and livability. 
• Preserve, protect and enhance ground and swface water quality. 
• Establish a transportation system for vehicles, bicycles and pedestrians that is safe, efficient, and cost 
effective and that minimizes congestion. 
• Provide for adequate and affordable fire, water, sewer, stormwater and other services. 
• Encourage the conservation of open space and environmentally sensitive areas. 
• Provide for the administration of these regulations. 
10-1-4: DEFINITIONS: 
Words used in the present tense include the future tense. Words used in singular number include the plural, 
and vice versa. The wo~d "shall" and "must" are mandatOJY, and the word "may" indicates the use of 
discretion. Unless clearly stated otherwise, the following words and phrases shall have the following 
meanings: 
Affected Person - One having an interest in real property that may be affected by a decision. 
Agent - One who acts for or in the place of another. 
Agency - Any city or political subdjvision of the State, including but not limited to counties, school districts, 
highway districts, any agency of State government, and any city or political subdivision of another state. 
Amended Plat - A plat that has minor cOJTeCtions or modifications. 
Approach - An access point onto a public or private road. 
Best Management Practices (BMP's) • Land management practices, approved by the State of Idaho or 
other Idaho public agency, designed to minimize the discharge of sediment and other pollutants. These 
include, but are not limited to, the Idaho Forest P,.o.c'dcea Rules, the Rules Go,;eming Solid Waste 
Management, the Rules for lndi'tJidual and Subsurface Sewage Disposal.Systems, the Rules eurd Minimum 
Standard, for Stream Channel Alterations, the Rathdrum Prairie sewage disposal and critical materials 
regulations, the Rules Governing Exploration and Sur-face Mining Operatiom in Idaho, the Idaho Well 
Construction Standards Rules, the Rules Governing Placer Qlld Dredge Mining in Idaho, the Rules 
Governing Dairy Wastes, Best Management Practices for Containing Critical Materials During Above 
Ground Storage and Handling. and the Catalog of Storm Water Best Management Practices for Idaho Cities 
and Counties. 
Boanl -The Kootenai County Board of Commissioners. 
Building Envelope - A designated area, shown on a plat, within which all structures must be located. 
Consenration Design Subdivision · A subdivision design that maximizes the conservation of open space 
and the natlltal, cultural or historic eharactedstics of an area. The subdivision name for a consenration 
design subdjvision will be followed by the suffix "CDS". 
Conservation Easement · A non-possessory interest of a holder in real property, imposing limitations or 
affirmative obligations for retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or open space values of real property; for 
assuring its availability for agriculture, forest, recreation or open space use; for maintaining or enhancing air 
or water quality; or for preserving the historical, architecturai., archeological or cuitural aspectS of real 
property (Ida/to Code §SS-2101). 
Ordinance No, 394 (Subdivision Ordinance Text Amc.ndments) Page 4of60 
406 of 1617
JAN. 6. 2012 3:34PM NO. 3876 P. 24 
B. Approval Requirements 
The Director may grant the extension providing: a) a complete application was submitted, b) the 
project is in compliance with the requirements of the County and other agencies (those that were in 
place at the time a complete preliminary application was received by the Department), and c) the 
project is in compliance with its conditions of approval. Unless otherwise approved by the applicant, 
the Director shall make a decision within five (S) weeks of the receipt of a complete application. The 
Director's decision may be appealed in accordance with Section 10·SM2 of this Title. 
10-2-6: CONDITION MODIFICATION: 
At any time prior to expiration of subdivision approval, a modification of a condition of approval may be 
requested according to the foHowing procedure: 
A. Application Requirements. The following items constitute a complete application: 
1. Application Form. 
2. Fees as adopted by Board resolution. 
3. A Narrative explaining why a condition modification is necessary. 
4. As part of a complete application, the Director may require additional infonnation to determine 
compliance with County ordinances, or the requirements of other agencies. 
B. Approval Process and Requirements 
For Major Subdivisions, the approval process and required findings are the same as that for 
preliminary approval of the subdivision, as presented in Section 10-2-l(C)(l). 
For Minor Subdivisions the approvaJ process and required findings are the same as the original 
approval process, presented in Section l()..2-2(B). 
CHAPTER3 
DESIGN, IMPROVEMENT AND MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS 
Section I 0-3-1 Design Requirements 
A. General Requirements 
B. Levels of Utilities and Services 
C. Utility and Service Standards 
D. Basements and Rights-of-Way 
E. Subdivjsion and Lot Design 
F. Roads and Trails 
G. Sensitive Area Requirements 
Section 10-3-2 lmprovement Requirements 
A. Installation of Improvements 
B. Plan Approval and Site Disturbance Permit 
Section 10-3-3 Maintenance Requirements 
A. Mmntenance Required 
B. County Authority to Maintain Private Systems 
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Section 10-3-4 Financial Guarantees 
A. Financial Guarantee in Lieu ofhnprovements 
B. Warranty 
C. Subdivision Completion and Warranty Agreements 
D. Types of Financial Guarantees 
E. Failure to Complete Improvements 
F. Release of Financial Guarantee 
10-3-1: DESIGN REQUIREMENTS: This section delineates the minimum, on site design requirements for 
both major and minor subdivisions. White off site improvements may also be required to mitigate the effects 
of the development, these will be considered project by project. 
A. General Requirements 
1. Land Suitability. No land shall be subdivided which the Board finds to be unsuitable for building 
sites because of potential hazards, such as flooding, inadequate drainage, severe erosion 
potential, site contamination, excessive slope, rock falJ, landslides, subsidence (sinking or 
settling), high ground water, inadequate water supply or sewage disposal capabilities, high 
voltage power Jines, high pressure gas lines, poor air quality, vehicular traffic ha1Ards, or any 
other situation that may be detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of residents or the public, 
unless the hazards are eliminated or adequately mitigated. 
2. Within the Kootenai County Airport Overlay Zone, the proposal must be in conformance with 
the Airport Master Plan and the plat must include an Avigation Easement approved by the 
Airport Director. 
3. For lots that will not be used for habitable structures, such as open space, unmanned utility lots 
and dock lots, the Board may waive the requirements for some services and facilities listed in 
Chapter 3, providing the public, agencies, infrastructure, and future Jot owners will not be 
negatively affected. 
B. Levels of Utilities and Services 
Development of land shall occur in conjunction with services and facilities that are appropriate for the 
size and density of the development, with urban services being provided for urban size lots. Services 
and facilities necessary to serve the subdivision must be feasible, available and adequate, and the 
proposal must include on and off site improvements to mitigate the impacts of the development so that 
the e"isting quality of services is not compromised, and so there is no substantial increase in the cost of 
services to existing residents. If authorized by law, mitigation may include payments and fees, 
donation of land, or off site improvements. Required improvements shall be directly related to the 
subdivision wider consideration, shall be located in the vicinity of the subdivision. and shall be 
commensurate with anticipated impacts. 
The following are minimum requirements. Other services and facilities may be required on a project 
by project basis. 
I. For lots Jess than one (1.00) acres, the following services are required: 
a. A sewage disposal system meeting the requirements of Panhandle Health District or DEQ. 
b. A shared water system that can. provide flre flows Oj water storage, if required by the Fire 
District. Shared water systems may require DBQ approval. The Director may waive the 
shared water system requirement if the constraints of the site warrants a modification to 
the requirement. 
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c. Electrical service to each lot. 
d. Fire protection from a Fire District. 
e. Road access to each new lot meeting the standards of Section 10-3-l(F) of this Title. 
f. For subdivisions with thirty (30) or more lots, garbage collection after the construction of 
fifteen (15) homes. 
2. For Jots between one (1.00) and 4.99 acres, the following services are required: 
a. A sewage disposal system meeting the requirements of Panhandle Health District or DEQ. 
b. Reasonable assurance of an adequate and reliable water source for each lot. 
c. Electrical service to each lot. 
d. Fire protection from a Fire District. 
e. Road access to each new lot meeting the standards of Section 10~3· 1 (F) of this Title. 
f. For subdivisions with thirty (30) or more lots, garbage collection after construction of 
fifteen (1S) homes. 
3. For lots of 5-00 acres or more, the following services are required: 
a. A sewage disposal system meeting the requirements of Panhandle Health District or DEQ. 
b. Reasonable assurance of an adequate and reliable water source. 
c. Fire protection from a Fire District. 
d. Road access to each new Jot meeting the standards of Section 10-3-l(F) of this Title. 
e. For subdivisions with thirty (30) or more lots, garbage collection after construction of 
fifteen (15) homes. 
4. The following services are required for subdivisions in Commercial, Light Industrial and 
Industrial Zones: 
a. Adequate infrastructure for the proposed use, including treatment of non-domestic 
wastewater in a wastewater treatment plant approved by DEQ. No subsurface discharge of 
non-domestic wastewater is permitted. 
b. A water system that meets the State requirements for a public water system and can 
pro\'ide fire flows, as requi.l'ed by the Fire District. 
c. Electrical service to each lot. 
d. Fire protection from a Fire District. 
e. Publicly maintained road access to each Jot as approved by the Highway District. 
f. Garbage collection. 
Note: For lots equal to or greater than S.00 acres. the size of the lot may be figured using gross 
acreage (including ½ of adjoining rights-of-way). All other lot sizes are based on net demity, being 
the amount of land per dwelling wiit excluding the area for roads1 parks, common open space, utility 
facilities, and any other nonresidential use. 
C. Utility and Service Standards 
1. Domestic Water Systems. 
a. When a water district or utility regulated under Idaho Code Title 61 (Public Utility 
Regulation) provides a ''will serve" letter for a subdivision, annexation and/or coMection 
may be required. If not required, for shared water systems serving 10 or more lots, the 
applicant shall form a. water district or utility corporation (non~profit or for profit) to own, 
operate and maintain the system. Water districts and utility corporations must be 
established in confonnance with applicable law, and cooperative corporations such as 
homeowners associations must also meet the requirements of Section 10-3-3 and 
Appendix B of this Title. 
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b. The new components of a water system and any necessacy improvements to an existing 
system, must be designed and constructed in conformance with the requirements of the 
Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, the Idaho Division of Public Works, Idaho 
Standards for Public Works Construction, the fire district, and if applicable, the water 
district, utility or corporation. Distribution lines shall be installed to each lot. 
2. Fire Protection Systems 
Subdivisions shall meet the requirements of the Fire District, including those pertaining to roads, 
driveways, fire flows, hydrants, water storage and defensible space. In addition, each lot shall 
have a building site capable of being accessed by a driveway meeting the minimum standards of 
the Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance or the Fire District. 
Subdivisions shall also minimize the hazards associated with wildfire, and major subdivisions in 
timbered areas shall provide a Fire Mitigation Plan, developed by a professional forester1 that 
meets the requirements of Appendix A and is approved by the Director, the Fire District, or the 
Idaho Department of Lands. The Plan must be implemented as part of the required 
improvements for the subdivision. 
3. Sewage Dlsposal Systems. If a public sewage system is available and provides a "will serve" 
letter, connection shall be required. If a private, shared sewage system is available and provides 
a ''will serve" letter, connection may be required, providing the cost of service is commensurate 
with that charged to existing customers. If connection to a shared system is required, collection 
lines shall be installed to each lot. All sewage disposal systems shall meet the standards of the 
Panhandle Health District and/or DEQ. If required, shared sewage systems shall be installed and 
approved, or the necessacy improvements secured by a financial guarantee, prior to final 
approval of the subdivision. Individual septic systems may be installed after final subdivision 
approval, in conjunction with building permits. 
4. Underground Utility Placement. Unless utility providers detennine that site conditions preclude 
underground utility installation, all utilities shall be installed underground. 
S. Stormwater Management. Lots shall be laid out to provide drainage away from building sites. 
Storm.water management and erosion control shall meet the requirements of the Kootenai County 
Site Disturbance Ordinance in accordance with best management practices approved by the 
County. Infiltration of storm water in small quantities is preferred. The collection and 
concentration of stormwater in detention and retention basins, wet ponds, constructed wetlands 
or similar facilities is discouraged and shalt only be allowed when there is no feasible alternative. 
The installation of curbing is also discouraged because it concentrates runoff. Discharge of 
untreated stormwater into streams1 lakes, natw-al wetlands or groundwater is prohibited. 
6. Under Road Utilities. Whenever a utility is proposed to be installed under a road, the utility's 
location and construction shall meet the requirements of the Highway District, ITO or the road 
owner(s), In all instances, placement of utilities shall be coordinated with proposed road 
improvements and shall be installed before the road is completed. 
D. Easements and Rights-of.Way 
1. Utility Basements. A minimum ten (10) foot general utility easement shall be provided to each 
lot. Any shared components of sewage, water, stonnwater or other infrastructure systems, shall 
either be within the general utility wement or an easement dedicated or conveyed to the entity 
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responsible for maintenance. :Easements must also be provided for individual sewage Jines and 
dmnfields that will not be located on the same parcel as residences. 
2. Road rights-of-way shall meet the requirements of the Highway District or, if applicable, ITO. 
Common driveway easements shall be at least 40 feet in width. Cut and fill slopes and 
stormwater systems adjacent to roads and driveways must either be shown as easements or 
rights-of-way, in favor of the maintenance entity. When future access may be needed to adjacent 
parcels of land, road easements and rights-of-way shall extend to the property line of the 
subdivision. Except for gated comm.unities and common driveways approved by the Board, 
roads and associated rights-of-way shall be dedicated to the applicable high.way agency. Private 
roads and common driveways shall be dedicated to the maintenance entity. 
3. Public trail easements or rights-of-way may be required, depending on the location of the 
subdivision and the need for pedestrian trails and/or sidewalks. If required, they shall be 
dedicated or conveyed to Kootenai County or to the entity that will provide maintenance as 
approved by the Board. The width of trail easements and rights~of-way shall be adequate for the 
intended use, and shall meet the requirements of the County or maintenance entity. When future 
access may be needed to adjacent parcels of land, trail easements and rights-of-way shall extend 
to the property line of the subdivision. 
4. Public Access, Parks and Facilities. Public access easements or the conveyance of land for 
public access, parks or facilities may be required for subdivisions that are contiguous to: a) 
public lands, b) streams, lakes, ponds, wetlands or similar areas, or c) for areas designated in a 
County facilities acquisition plan. If so required, the property owner shall be paid fair market 
value for the easement or land. 
5. The Board or Director may require that Hydrologic Protection Areas be shown as easements or 
rights-of-way. 
6. Required easements and rights-of-way shall be depicted on the face of the plat. 
E, Subdivision and Lot Design 
1. Subdivisions shall be designed to be compatible with existing homes, businesses and 
neighborhoods, and with the natural characteristics of the area. Subdivisions shall minimize 
grading, road construction and disturbance of the terrain, vegetation, soils, and drajnageways, 
and shall prevent soil erosion. To achieve this, the Board may require building envelopes, No-
disturbance Zones, height restrictions and planting or retention of vegetation. 
2. Lot Design. Subdivisions shall result in lots of reasonable utility and livability. Irregular 
configurations that result in unusable ]and, or that may cause future land use conflicts, are 
prohibited. All building Jots must have at least one building site that can meet required setbacks 
and be accessed with a driveway meeting the standards of the Zoning Ordinance or Fire District. 
3. Lot Access. AU new lots shall have frontage and direct access onto a road or common driveway 
meeting the standards of Section 10-3-1 (F) of this Title. A lot with an existing residence shall 
not be consjdered a new lot. For irregularly shaped subdivisions, or sites with severe physical 
constraints, the Board may allow access to individuaJ lots via an easement. Driveway 
approaches to public roads must be approved by the Highway District or ITD. No new accesses 
to individual lots are permitted from State Highways or arterial roads as shown on the highway 
district's current Functional Classification Map. In some cases ITO or the highway distri~ may 
require relocation, reconfiguration, consolidation or elimination of existing approaches. 
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l THE DEPOSITION OF ALAN JOHNSON, was taken on 
2 behalf of the PLAINTIFF, on NOVEMBER 18, 2011, at the 
3 offices ofM & M COURT REPORTING, 816 SHERMAN A VENUE 
4 COEUR. D'ALENE, IDAHO, before M & M Coun Reponing 
s Services, Inc., by JULIE MCCAUGHAN, Court Reporter and 
6 Notary Pubiic within and for the State ofidabo, to be 
7 used in an action pending in the District Coun of the 
a First Judicial District for the State ofldaho, in and 
9 for the County of Kootenai, said cause being Case No. 
10 CVI0-10095 in said Col.111. 
11 AND THEREUPON, the following testimony was 
12 adduced, to wit: 
13 ALAN JOHNSON, 
14 having been first duly swor.n to teU the tnltb, the 
1 s whole rnlth, and nothioe but the math, relating to said 
16 cause, deposes and soys: 
17 EXAMINATION 
19 QUBSTIONS BYMR, TOLLEFSON: 
l 9 Q, Can you please state your name and Spell 
2 o your last name for the record? 
.21 A. Alan JoM$0J1, 1°0°h0n°s-o-n. 
:22 Q, And you're here today for a deposition. 
23 Have you ever had your dep0sition taken before? 
24 A. Yes. 
2S Q. And how many times7 
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Page 22 
1 value added type project where you buy an existing 1 
Page 24 'j 
a commercial retail center/hospitality project." What · 
2 shopping center that perhaps is blighted or isn't 2 
3 properly leased. You can take that project, you can 3 
4 rehabilitate the project through adding, you know, paint 4 
commercial retail center/hospitality project were you 
envisioning when you purchased the property? 
A. If you look at some of the preliminary 
s or facades, resurfacing parking Jots, changing parking S site plans, we see this as a grocery anchored shopping 1 
G lots, re-merchandising the shopping center, leasing 6 
7 vacant space. And turn the center arowid. ? 
a Q. Any other ways that you would develop a 
9 property? 9 
10 A. Yes. Raw land. We've many occasions -- 10 
ll and primarily take raw land, entitle it, lease it, build 11 
12 it, manage it. 12 
13 Q. Are you involved with the designing part 13 
14 of the development of raw land? 14 
1s A. To some extent, yes. 15 
16 Q. Can you just briefly describe what usually 16 
1 7 your general involvement is with the development •• or l 7 
1a excuse me •• with the design ofa project? 18 
19 A. Geoff is the expert. Geoff's an 19 
2 o architect. I'm not an architect. I rely on Geoff for 2 o 
center. There certainly is service-related uses, such 
as service stations. I believe there's demand -~ in my 
conversations during some of OlD' conventions with - we 
call it travel centers. Maybe that's a churched-up word 
for a truck stop. Fast food, Bank pads. The area is 
underserved. 
Q. And when you say ''preliminary site plans," 
were those -· would those have been the site plans that 
Mr. Reesltmd submitted to Kootenai County? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now-
A. Let roe clarify. And I apologize. There 
may be other site p]ans that be did not submit to 
Kootenai County that we've used as preliminary site 
plans. We have not drafted a formal site plan. 
21 the technical aspects of it. Geoff has a tremendous 21 
2 2 amount of history with municipalities, governmentaJ 2 2 
2 3 agencies, in obtairung approvals. I oversee that 2 3 
Q. Right. But when you say - when you 
purchased the property, you had Mr. Reeslund draft some 'j 
preliminazy site plans, and those were the ones that 1 
24 process with Geoff. rn be invoJved with meetings with 24 
2 s the cities and counties, as well. 2 s 
were sent to Kootenai County. Is that correct? j 
A. There are many prelimimuy site plans. 1 
Page 23 Page 25 l 
Q. And what about leasing? What's your l The1·e are some plans that were sent to Kootenai County. i 
2 involvement with leasing of the project? 2 Q. Is it fair to say that the documents that I 1 
3 A. I do all the leasing. 3 were sent to Kootenai County, atthe time those were 
4 Q. When you say you do all the leasing, does i sent to Kootenai County, those were the plans that you 'i 
s that entail finding tenants, finding potential tenants 5 anticipated developing from? 
6 and finding potential pa.-rners? G A. No, those were preliminary pians. 
7 A. Not partners, but finding potential 7 Q. Would you have created final plans based 
a tenants, or buyers, for that matter. Sometimes it will 8 upon those preliminary site plans? 
9 be done through a broker. We'll hire brokers to assist 9 A. Those preliminazy site plans would be 
lo us in that. But the negotiations would be through me. lo modified to create a formal plan. 
11 Q. And when you say "potential buyers," what 11 Q. But the preliminary site plans would have 
12 kind of buyers are you looking for? 12 served as the basia for a final plan? 
13 A. We'll look for end users. We're not 13 A. They could have, but again, that depends 
14 interested in having other developers buy pieces of our 14 on tenant mix. 
1s property. We've never done that where another developer 15 Q. Do you recall when this ... why did you 
16 buys a pad within your shopping center and builds a lG subtnitthose particular site plans to the county? 
1 7 project, you know, maybe a shop pad building. We are 17 A, That was the most cWTent site plan that 
1 B looking for end users such as gas stations, fast food, 18 we had at that time. 
19 grocery stores, department stores, home improvement. 19 Q. Do you· reea.11 when the property was 
2 o I've done deals with all those different types of 2 o purchased? 
I 
21 merchants. 21 A. It was purchased I believe in May of 2008, j 
.2 2 Q. It says down here that Hughes 2 2 Q. A.id when did you :first become aware - let ; 
2 3 Investments •• l1m Sot'J)'. I'm still on page 4 of 2 3 me back up. When did you first become aware 1hat this I 
24 Exlu"bit 11. It says, "Hughes Investments purchased this 24 property was for sale? 
2 5 property in 2008 with the sole intent to develop it into 2 5 A. I believe it was in January of 2008. 
'-c:--,::!·=-=-~--~ ...-::.,::-_ =====,_.=-~---~,.~::-::-":"=,-:P;":-~~-=-=======~--~=====--=·=·""~~ ... ~--=-=· ===~-~--~-~-=-=-·======' 
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j l Q. How did you determine whether or not you l the plans were. But we've seen plans like this all the 
.2 got it for a good price? 2 time, too, that never come to fruition. But his 
3 A. We had been looking at other projeots jn 3 indication was that they were going to put a •• they I 
4 Coeur d'Alene, and obviously, you know, Coeur d'Alene 4' wex-e going to rwign the project. It was going to 
5 land is going to be more valuable. We thought the price 5 be •• at that time, it was not going to be an ovezpass. 
6 was a bargain. 6 It was going to be an at-grade inteJSection with traffic 
7 (Exhibit 43 was marked.) 7 signals. I guess similar to what Gaiwood and 95 is now. 
8 BYMR. TOLLEFSON: 8 He indicated that there were no plans to build an 
9 9 Q. I'm banding you what's been marked as interchange •• a freeway interch8.Jl3e wjtb an overpass. 
10 Deposition Exhibit No. 43. Are you familiar with the lO And he did inditate that actually 95 would be at the 
1 11 MLS or the Multiple Listing Service? ll same - approximat:ely the same grade that it is at now, 
12 A. I'm familiar with what it is. I'm not a 12. and 54 would be depressed under it. He said there were 1 
13 member of it. 13 no plans to consider that until 2020. At least 2020. i J 
14 Q. Do you have access to the MLS? 14 Q. And you had this conversation before you ' 
lS A. No, Ido not. 15 acquired the property? 
16 Q. Do you know if any of the brokers that you 16 A. Yes, we did. 
17 would work with, would they have access to the MLS? 17 Q. On this MLS document here, halfway down on ~ 18 A. The broker that I worked with on this 18 the left-hand side, it says, "Days on the market: 344." 
19 particular property did not have 8"ess to MLS. 19 Does that seem accwate to you or do you know how long 
20 Q. And who was that? 20 this property had been on the market? 
21 A. Brett Terrell. 21 A. I'm sorry. Oh. I see it. I had no idea 
22 Q. And bow do you know he did not have access 22 how long it was on the market. I believe it was priced 
23 toMLS? 23 higher - oh, it was priced at a million seven. They I 24 A. We've talked about it before. He's not a 24 dropped the price, and I believe shortly after they 
25 realtor. 25 dropped the price, we were under contract. 
Page 31 Page 33 
1 Q. So if you take a minute to look at this 1 Q. And was the price Sl,4S0,000? 
2 document. So you've never seen this document before. 2 A. That's what we paid for the property. 
3 Is that correct? 3 (Exhibit 44 was marked.) 
4 A. I don't believe I have. I may have. It 4 BY MR. TOLLEFSON: 
s may have been part of discovery from lTD. S Q. I'm handing you what's been marked as 
6 Q. And just we'll go through here. It says, 6 Deposition Exhibit No. 44. Have you seen this document J 
7 "Excellent visibility with commercial potential." Do 7 before? I 
a you feel that's an accwate description of the property? 8 A. I have. I 
9 A. As it was at that time, yes. SI Q. And what is this document? , 
10 Q. Then it says, "Preliminary drawings showed lo A. Buyer's Settlement Statement I 
11 future off.ramps and fronm.ge roads for Highway 95 11 Q. And at the top •• and this is the Buyer's 
12 through this property." Does that also appear to be l 2 Settlement Statement for GracaJ Corporation's 
13 accurate? 13 acquisition of the subject property. ls that correct? 
14 A. It appears to be accurate. 14 A. That js correct. 
15 Q. So at the timetha:Uhis property was up l!S Q. Andjust before we move on, do you know 
16 for sale, it was known 'that there were some preliminary l G why the property was purchased by Oracal Corporation and I 
17 drawings showing future off-ramps and frontage roads foi l 7 not one of the other entities? i 
18 Hiahway 9S? 18 A. I do not. Hughes Investments does not : 
1.9 A. We did know that, yes. 19 al.':quire property .. we'll go under contract with the 1 
2 o Q. And when did you find outabout this 2 o right to assign to an entity that we form. Gracal may , 
l 21 potential future off-ramps and frontage roads? 21 have been an entity that had already been formed but , 
2 2 A. We met •9 and I'm not positive of the 2 2 maybe was DO longer being used, but I can't be certain I 
23 date •• before we closed escrow with ITD. Don Davis, 23 of that. I 
24 and·· I don't recall if there was anybody else in the 24 Q. But the property was purchased. by OracaJ 
2 s meeting. He'd indicated that, you know, these were what 2 s and at some point transferred to HJ Grathol; is that --=-~-·~====~--= .. ~--=~-::-::.~=====-=-=-~-"!':--~---~---=--= ...~--====:=::-~~ ... ":"::.-:::=::::::~ ... ~-·~":-=-.-==*::"l,~~-~--:"!'!' .. "!":-,-~ •• :-=:=::-=-=-::-:-~) 
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1 correct? 1 MS. YORK: Can you say that again? Someone was 
2 A. That is coxrect. 2 driving by. 
3 Q. And do you know why it was transferred to 3 THE WITNESS: Oh, I'm sorry. 
4 HJ Grathol? 4 MR. MARFICE: It's on the closing statement 
5 A. I do not. 5 MS. YORK: Okay. 
6 Q. Under •• in the top left-hand comer under 6 BY MR. TOLLEFSON: 
7 the box, it says, "Consideration: Total Consideration: 7 Q. You said you'd had a meeting with ITD 
8 Buyer Charge $1,4S0,000." Do you see that? 8 pri.orto your acquisition of the property. Andljust 
9 A. Yes, I do. 9 forgot to write down who was at1hat meeting. 
10 Q. Is that an accurate statement of how much 10 A. I believe it was Don Davis. 
l l money you paid for the property? ll Q. And who was Don Davis? 
12 A. It is. 12 A. I bclieve he's a project engineer with 
13 Q. Wastbereanyotherconsiderationgiven 13 lTD. Idon'tknowhisti.tle, Hewasthegentlemanthat 1 
14 for the property? 14 we were told to meet with from I!D. 
15 A. No, there was not. 15 Q. Andyourearliertestimonywas, if! 
16 Q. Sorry. Before I move on, I forgot to ask 16 recall correctly, that you had seen plans like these 
1 7 you a question. The seller was North Alpine 1 7 before, but they don't always happen. 
18 Development, LLC. Who is that or what is that entity? 18 A. Yeah. I mean, I think I've seen many 
19 Do you know? 19 instances here, some in California, where there's 
! 
2 0 A. It is an entity ~- I believe the owner of 2 0 potential for freeway oveq,ass or potential off-ramp or 
21 that entity •• and I don't know the structure - is a 21 potential new freeway that's coming through, and they 
22 gentleman named Shawn Montee. 22 don't happen. 
23 Q. And have you had any dealings with Shawn 23 Q. So sometimes they get built and sometimes 
2 4 Montee before? 2 "1 they don't? 
2 5 A. No. 2 5 A. That's correct. 1---;.;._----------------1---------------------1, 
I 
Page 35 Page 37 1 
1 Q. Or since? 1 Q. And do sometimes the plans change? 
2 A. No. 2 A. Could you rephrase the question? 
3 Q. Before you purchased this property, what 3 Q. Sure. You said sometimes that these 
4 due diligence did you do? 4 improvement projects, these overpasses, get built and 
5 A. We did environmental investigation. We S sometimes they don't. Does that mean sometimes the 
6 had an ALTA survey prepared. I believe that was the 6 pians change for those overpasses or those highway 
7 extent of the due diligence. 7 projects? 
8 Q. Did you talk to anybody about this 8 A. Well, it depends at what point in time you 
9 ptoperty before you. purchased it, people in the area? 9 see the plans. You know, preliminary, yes, plans are 
1 O A. Other than the brokers that were involved 1 O changed. If it's a final plan or approved by X and X 
11 in the transaction. And like I said, possibly -- 11 agency, then typically the plans are pretty close to 
12 possibly Mike Winger. No, I don't believe so. 12 what are shown to the public. 
13 Q. What brokers were involved in the 13 Q. In May of 2008 or prior to the purchase of 
14 transaction? 14 this property which would have been in I guess the 
15 A. Paul Bielec represented the seller, and 15 spring of 2008, were ITD1s plans -- were they final and 
1 6 his daughter Dani Bielec, Dani !C1'8.mer now. And Brett 16 approved by agencies or were they still in the 
17 Terrell represented us. Motion Realty. 17 preliminary stage? 
18 Q. When you purchased the property, do you 18 A. They were in the preliminary stage at that 
19 know what its zoning was? 19 time. 
2 0 A. It was zoned, I believe, rural 2 0 MR. TOLLEFSON: We've been going for about an 
21 agricultural. 21 hour. Do you want to take a quick break? 
22 Q. Your broker, hov, do you spell 1-Js name? 22 ryfa_ ?v1AR.FICE: Sure. 
23 A. B-r-e-t-t T-e-r-r-e-1. 23 (Recess taken.) 
2 4 Q. How do you spell Paul's name? 2 4 BY MR TOLLEFSON: 
2 5 A. B-i-1-e-c, I believe. 2 5 Q. Real quick, let's finish up talking about 
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A. I don't have any experience in that. l commercial access? 
Q. You've been provided through discoveiy-- 2 A. No. 
3 have you had a chance to talce a look at any of the 3 Q. Why not? 
NO. 3876 P. 35 
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4 project plans that have been submitted by ITO? 4 A. Mr. Reeslu.nd is better at answering that 1 
5 A. I have gone through discovery for the most 5 question. That's his responsibility. We did make an j 
6 part. I think there were probably close to 4,000 pages. 6 application with the county, and it was called •• not l 
7 So I do not have those committed to memory. 7 Special Use Permit- Special Notice Permit. We took in i 
8 Q. Okay. And you said you had conflicting 8 site plans of what was proposed by ITD and asite plan ~ 
9 evidence as to what access you'd be provided in the 9 of what would happen if the freeway did not take place. jl 
10 after condition. What evidence do you have that 10 We tried to process that application with the county. 
11 conflicts with the project plans that were provided to 11 The county said you can only process based on what is ;1 
12 you by ITD? l2 existing today, meaning that we could not take into i 
13 A. Weti we've had various plans provided by 13 aeeountthe freeway interchange. They said with that-
14 ITO. I've had conversations with Jason Minzghor and 14 and again, Geoff is mote of the expert in this -that 
15 Justin Weist regarding an extension of Sylvan Road. 15 the first thing we would have to do is we'd have to have 
16 Those were on the earlier documents. The final 16 a 1raffic study done. Hired a traffic engineer. He I 
1 7 enviroJWental impact statement has Sylvan Road as a 1 7 talked to ITD. ITD was less than cooperative, Said j 
18 frontage road We're just not sure. 18 that it was pointless having the conversation and 1 
19 Q. So based upon -- you were provided some - 1.9 drafting a traffic stu(ty if the freeway was going to be J 
2 o the project plans. What do you have that conflicts with 2 o realigned, because it would change all the numbers. 
21 the project plans? 21 Q. As the property sits now, is ther:e 
22 A. The final project plans? 22 commercial ~ess to the property? 
2 3 Q. Correct. 2 3 A. There are three deeded access points 20 
24 A. We]), as an example, the appraisal that we 24 feet wide. I believe, and rm paraphrasing, that it 1 
1-2_s_r_ec_e_iv_ed_th_ro_u,,:;,.gh_IT_D_'s_ap...1:..,.!o.P1nu_·s_er_, _St_an_M_o_.e,_I_b_el_ie_ve--11-2_s_s-=ay~s_fo_r_re_s_id_en_ti_·a1_and _ farm __ us_e_. _An_d_b_ec_aus_e_of_th;,;.;.;;.,e --11 
Page 79 Page 81 J 
1 indicates that there wm be no access whatsoever off of 1 time that the access was granted, that was the zoning of l 
2 54 and access will come off existing access in Howard 2 the property. There would be no sense in zoning 
3 R.oad. There is no existing access on Howard Road. 3 commercial access to the property if it was zoned rural. 
4 Q. So the project plans that were submitted 4 Q. So there's no commercial access to the 
s to you by ITD, do you recall if those had accesses on s property right now? 
6 them? 6 A. Of those three deeded access points, "they 
7 A. I'd have to look at them again. I don't 7 are not deeded as or deemed to be, to my understanding, 
8 recall. I believe that it had -- Sylvan Road kind of 8 commercial access points. I can't tell you what the 
.9 nubbed into the property, but didn't show us access. 9 access point is to the smaller half-acre parcel that's 
10 Q. So while you're·· just to loop back to 10 actually located in the Cily of Athol. 
11 where we were, if you're not clear what the access is 11 Q. Is it fair t.o say that there's no deeded 
12 going to be, bow do you know it won't be remotely as 1~ commercial access to the property as it exist.s now? 
13 good as what is presently available? l3 A. No deed- that is correct 
14 A. From the plans that we have from ITD, 14 Q. I want to go now to page 6 on Exhibit 11. 
15 there's a bad scenario and there's a worse scenario. 15 At the top, there's a paraeraph where you reference a 
16 Q. All right. What's the bad scenario? lG meeting with Roa Harvey and Jason Minzghor ofITD. Do 
1 7 A. The bad scenario is Sylvan Road just :i. 7 you see that? 
18 dead--ending into the south side of our property. 10 A. Yes, I do. , 
Wh '? kn h th 1,1 1.9 Q, at's the worst scenano. 19 Q. Do you ow w en at meeting took place? , 
2 o A. The worst scenario is Sylvan Road not .2 O A. I believe it was in the summer of 2010, 1 
I 
2 l dead-ending into the property and that we're landlocked 2 :i. but I may have the date wrong. i 
2 2 and we don't have any access off of S4 or Howard Road. 2 2 Q. Do you recall \\'ho was present at that l 
23 We don't know where access will be provided in that 23 meeting? i , 
2 4 scenario. 24 A. Myself, Mr. Marfice, Tom Vandervert, Jason i 
--~~~~!~o~~~e.~~~!~~-~~- -~~~~ever j 25 Q. Have you submitted any applications for ____ . .,.,. .... 
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1 roughly the same as 16 acres? 1 percent. I was trying to be somewhat conservative in 
2 A. 29 acres is significantly larger. 2 this by saying it was at least 20 percent 
3 Q. It says you believe that this property, 3 Q. So is it fair to say that this 20 percent 
4 referring to land sale No. 4, is far inferior to the 4 number is based upon your experience? 
s property at issue in this case because, contrary to 5 A. Yes. 
6 ITD's appraisal, this property did not have sewer 6 Q. The you next write, "This factor 
7 service. And by this property you mean land sale No. 4. 7 effectively places the value of1TD1s mke of Hughes 
B Is that correct? 8 Investments' property at plus or minus $3 .23 a square 
9 A. That is correct. 9 foot or $2,532,578 for the prime 18 aeres being 
10 Q, And how do you know it had no sewer 10 acquired." Whete did you get the 18 acres number? 
I 11 service? 11 A. We were taking Sylvan Road. Sylvan Road 
I 12 A. I contacted City of Sagle. 12 was about an acre and a half. .Agaio, there's 
~ 13 Q. Who did you talk to at the City of Sagle? 13 conflicting evidence or conflicting information that we 1 
14 A. 1 did it online. l4 ;received. Even in the Record of Decision I believe it 
1 15 Q. And what did you look at online? 15 references an additional 1.8 acre take on Sylvan Road or 
Sewer availability, and there was no sewer 16 for right-of-way of frontage roads. 16 A. 
l7 availability. l7 Q. Handing you what's been marked as 
18 Q. You also point out, it says, that "Sagle 18 Deposition Exhibit No. 13. It's the Complaint filed in 
19 Road is not a 'hard comer.'" What did you mean by 19 tms matter. Have you seen that document before? 
20 that? 20 A. Yes, IbaV'e. 
21 A, There's no traffic sigruu at the road. 21 Q, If you could please flip to - I think 
22 Sagle road is more ofa T intersection. As a. matter of 22 it's Exhibit A on there. j 
23 fact, I don't believe it aligns directly with the street 23 A. Okay, l 
24 to the west of Highway 95, and it leads to a school. 24 Q. And Exhibit A, is that the legal I 25 It's a county road. I don't believe it's a dirt road1 2S description of the property to be acquired? 
I 
Page 91 Page 93 ~ 
I 
l but it's certainly not an improved road like Highway 54. 1 A. I would assume so. ·I 
2 Q. You write, "Experienced developers wilt 2 Q, What's the acreage listed that's in ihe i 
3 pay at least a 20 percent premium for property located 3 upper right-hand comer? l 
4 at a signalized intersection of two highways." On what 4 A. 16.314 acr~s. j 
S do you base that 20-percent premium number? s Q. And if you'll flil) tQ - I think it's l 
I 
G A. I said at least 20 percent. You look for 6 Exhibit B. I believe those .8{e the right-of-way pjans? J 
7 the value of an expanded trade area to population 7 A. Yes. j 
s centers because you've got highways which provide better 8 Q. And there is a colored section. : 
9 access than county roads or dirt roads or gravel roads 9 A. Yes. j 
lo or city streets, for that matter. Based on that, 1 o Q. Is there any property that's being 'i 
l l merchants, tenants, buyers, end users, will pay more to 11 acquired according to that right-of-way plans for Sylvan ! 
12 be at your site. 12 Road? i 
13 Q. Will they pay 20 percent more? 13 A. Is that the plan you're refening to? ! 
14 A. They'd probably pay significantly more 14 Q. It's easier to look at this page. ! 
1~ than that. There's certain sites that if it's a lS A, Okay. No. t 
lG mid-block location that they just flat out will not 16 Q. So ifwe do the math here, if there's 
1 7 take. 1 7 nothing in the Complaint or in the right-of-way plans 
lB Q. And what do you base the 20 percent number 18 that references 18 acres or acquisition of Sylvan Road, 
19 on? Is there any reports or studies that show that 19 why would you include it in the 18 acres - why would I 
2 o people will pay at least 20 percent more for a property 2 o you include it in your oalculation for damages? I 
2 l located at a signalized intersection? 21 A. It's my opinion that ITD is pushing off I 
I 
22 A. Again, rve been doing this for 27 years. 22 Sylvan Road. We've bad many discussions with them. I l 
23 rm involved in ICSC. We have panels and comJJ1ittees aod 23 had several discussions with Justin Weist and Jason ! 
2 4 discussions about these sorts of things. Is there a 24 Minzghor about building Sylvan Road through the : 
2 s hard number? I'm guessing it's probably more like so 2 s property, Those conversations went away. I don't know l 
,.,. ·"·-~,,II~\ ,...,._, .... 
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1 why. We feel that they're pushing off Sylvan Road on 1 appears, then, that you list a series of factors. Are 
2 us. 2 these all factors that are based upon the length and 
3 Q, Why do you feel that? 3 time it would talce ITD to complete the project, complete 
4 A. They've had conversations with the highway 4 construction? I'm looking at specifically, just for 
5 district saying that, you know, Sylvan Road should be 5 your reference, where it says it would be worth 
6 extended through the property. I think they're trying 6 $31669,300 and there's a number 1 through 4. 
7 to push Sylvan Road a$ a responsibility on us. 7 A. I'm looking at that. And your question, 
8 Q. So you believe that l'ID should pay you for 8 sir? 
9 construction of Sylvan Road? 9 Q. The question is: These damages here, are 
10 A. Yes. 10 these based upon the time it will take ITD to complete 
11 Q. You write next on page 7, it says, "It is 11 construction of the project? 
12 estimated that the value in the subsurface gravel for 12 A. Yes. 
I 
13 road construction materials located underneath Hughes 13 Q. And it says this will be worth $3,669,300 ' 
14 Investments property is approximately $300,000." Where 14 at the time of completion and opening of the 
: 
I 
15 did you get tho $300,000 number? 15 interchange. And how did you reach that number? ! ' 
16 A. Mr. Reeslund is more able to discuss that, 16 A. I assumed that the opening of the 
17 but we did have conversations with Allwest, and I 17 interchange would be three years from now. ' ' 
18 believe there was a grading contractor that they 18 Q. And then you calculated it as follows. I i 
19 contacted or not - a materials supplier. I think the 19 You said No. 1, "3.87 acres west of the take is given a 
' 
20 number is actually more than $300,000. But again, we 20 value of $674,300 (value is reduced due to 1he inability r 
21 were nying to be somewhat conser\'ative in there and put 21 to provide sewer to the parcel across ITD's ' 
22 the number of$300,000. ITD was supposed to supply us 22 right-of-way.)" Do you see that? 
23 with material data as part of our agreement to let them 23 A. Yes, I do. ., 
24 come onto the property, and to my knowledge, until maybe 24 Q. Now, I believe this is probably the 
' 25 just recently, we never got that data. I don't think we 25 easiest way to do this. If you flip to -- I believe 
Page 95 Page 97 
1 got a chance to analyze it. 1 it's Bates No. 1414, at the end. 
2 Q. Is it fair to say, though--you bad said 2 A. Yes. 
3 that Mr. Reeslund was the expert one who I should talk 3 Q. And 1415. Are these documents showing 
4 ro about this. You were present yesterday for the 4 your calculations of these damages? Is that what's 
; 
s deposition where I asked him a series of questions about 5 going on there or can you explain what's going on there? , 
6 the gravel and his coordination and commuuication with 6 & I believe there's - 1413 and 1414 that I'\., 
7 Allwesl Do you recall that testimony? 7 show the pricing of the project. And I refer to the 
8 A. Yes. 8 project as our site. Before and after the condemnation. 
9 Q. Is there anything about that testimony 9 Q. Okay. So let's just make sure we're 
10 that you would change or add to? 10 clear. On Bates No. 1414, that's showing the project 
ll A. No. 11 before condemnation? 
12 Q. The next line that you write here is, 12 A. Correct. 
13 "However, the most important component to the 13 Q. And 1415 is showing after condemnation? 
14 determination of the value of the take is the time 14 A. 1413 shows it after. 
' 15 period still needed w complete construction." What do 15 Q. I apologize, 1413? ' 
16 you mean by that? l6 A. Yes, 
17 A. We don't know when the freeway will be 17 Q. Shows after condemnation. So the munbers ' 
18 complete. I don't believe I'ID knows when the freeway's 1B that you're using here on the indented 1 through 4, : 
19 going to be complete. 19 those are reflected on 1413. Is that correct? 
20 Q. And how is that the most important 20 A. That is correct, yes. 
21 component to the determination of value of the take? 21 Q. Do you know what the value of the property 
22 A. Until the project is complete, we cannot 22 was - is right now before the taking? Excuse me. 
23 start our project. We 01UU1otbuild our shopping center. 23 Strike that. Let me rephrase that. What is the value 
24 Q, And rm trying to U11derstand what you've 24 of the property before the taking? 
25 got going on here for this next- on page 7. It 25 A. What is my opinion of the value of the 
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1 A. Right. 
2 Q. So then the difference between that, 
3 between the $3,669,000 number and the $2,722,000 is the 
4 $974,000. Correct? 
s A. Correct. lfl can use your calculator, I 
6 can confirm that. 
7 Q. That's okay fornow. 
e A. Okay. 
9 Q. And so this $947,000, those are damages 
10 that you believe you're entitled to because of the 
11 length it'll take- the time it'll take ITO to complete 
12 the construction of the project? 
13 A. That's correct. 
14 Q. And then you went back and added nwnbers 
15 altogether, the $2,S32,000, which was forthe 18 acres 
16 which is for the 16.34 acres plus Syl\lan R9ad. Correct? 
l 7 A. Please state that again. 
1 e Q. I apologize. Right now rm going to run 
lSI 1hrough - you had a calculation here at the end. I 
2 o just want to nm through that really quick so we've got 
21 all those numbers worked out. 
22 A. Okay. . .... 
2 3 Q. '.You said, to summarize, you added the 
24 · $225.32,578, which you got from -- which was calculated 
·2s onpa:ge 6, which included the 16.34 acres being acquired 
'Page 103 
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l is no value to the gravel. You know, obviously we can't 
2 ask for that and we won't ask for that. But those are 
3 the nwnbers that are the most accurate as of this date. 
4 Q. And other than the factors you've just 
s listed, what other factors would cause you to change 
6 your anticipated testimony as to value? 
7 A. I don't know. 
a Q. The next •• and you'll have to bear with 
9 me here. It says in the alternative you provide this 
10 alternative analysis here, the next paragraph. Do you 
ll seethat? 
12 A. Yes, I do. 
13 Q. What was the purpose of providing that 
14 alternative analysis? 
15 A. To give a different perspective as to if 
16 we were to develop the property what the anticipated 
1 7 value would be of the site if it was developed as it 
18 exists today without the take. 
l9 Q. And just to save us some time, are you 
2 O anticipating testifying to this alternative theory? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q, Okay. Let's go through it then. It says, 
2 3 "In the alternative, looking at the development 
24 potential before the take for the property's 'highest 
2 s and best use' the value is significantly higher. The 
Page 105 
l plus Syl".an Road, 1 potential profit, as is shown in the pre-take budget, is l 
2 A. Right. 2 estimated at just over $8,670,000." Is that correct? I 
3 Q. Correct? 3 A. That's correct j 
4 A. Correct. 4 Q. And where did that $8,670,000 number come 1 
5 Q. And then you added the $300,000 for the s from? ' 
6 construction materials, which would be the gravel. 5 A. Bates sheet 1416 has a project budget. j 
7 Correet? 7 Q. Okay. I think that's also been previously l 
8 A. That is correct. 8 introduced as Deposition Exhibit 34. Can you just I 
9 Q. And then you added that to the $947,000, 9 confirm that that's the same one? I 
lo which is the damages you believe you're entitled to for 1 o A. Yes, it is. , 
I 
11 the length it'll, take ITD to complete the project? 11 MR. TOLLEFSON: And Doug, if it's all right with : 
12 A. Correct. 12 you, I'd like to push back for a few minutes so we can i 
13 Q. That's how you arrived at $3,779,578? 13 get this section done before we break for lunch. j 
14 A. Correct. 14 MR. MARFICE: Sure. 
l5 Q. And is that the amount you're going to 15 BY MR. TOLLEFSON: 
16 anticipate testifying to at trial? 16 Q. So it might be easier to look at Exhibit 
1 7 A. I'm not sure yet. 1 7 No. 34. 
18 Q. Why are you not sure? 18 A. Okay. 
19 A. The number could change. 19 Q. And then flip back to page 8 of Exhibit 11 ! 
2 o Q. Why would the number change? 2 o so we've got those two in the same place, That might be j 
21 A. lfITD delayed construction of the road. 21 the easiest way to go about doing this, : 
22 Q. What other reasons would cause you to 22 MR. MARFICE: Just for my edification, is .Bxbibit ! 
23 change your anticipated testimony? 23 34 the same as Bates -
24 A. If the size of the take increased or 24 MR. TOLLEFSON: Yes. 1 
25 decreased for that matter. If we detennine that there 25 MR. MARFICB! Okay. Thank you. ! 
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1 Q. Okay. How does that number relate to the 1 profit after the take. 
2 $8.6 potential profit number? 2 Q. Potential profit after the take. And the 
3 A. In its highest and best use as it is 3 potential profit without the take is $8,670,000. 
4 today, the potential profit, we have the potential of 4 Correct? 
5 $8,671,994. 5 A. That's couect. 
6 Q. How does the $3,293,000 number relate to 6 Q. So to get what you believe - what you'll .l 
7 the $8,671,000 number? 7 be damaged by the take is you would take the 8.67 numbe1 1 
a A. That is our - after the take, that's the a and subtract the S 1,493,000. Is that correct? 
9 anticipated value of what we think the potential profit 9 A. That would be legitimate, yes. 
10 would be. 10 Q. Is that what you anticipate testifying to 
11 Q. So if I'm understanding you correctly, 11 regarding tbis alternative theory? 
12 what you're saying is that this $3,293,000 number, 12 A. Yes. 
13 that's, you believe, what the potential profit will be 13 Q. So then ifmy numbers are correct, if you 
14 after the talce? 14 subtract those two numbers, that's approximately 
1s A. The potential profit, but you've gotto 15 $7,177,000 in Jost profits. 
1 G subtract $ 1.8 million for the value of the property when 16 A. rve not done the calculation, but I will 
17 we bought it and our costs to date. 17 agree to use your number. 
18 Q. And where does that 1.8 million dollars 18 Q. Okay. So do you anticipate testifying 
l 9 come from? 19 that this project - or excuse me - that ITD's 
2 o A. The value of the property, 1,450,000, and 20 condemnation and construction will cost you 
.21 the budget soft costs that we've discussed earlier. And 21 approximately $7,177,000 in profits? j 
22 it's rounded down. It's probably closer to two million 22 A. Yes. , 
23 dollars now. 23 Q. And that nlllllber is based upon lost ~ 
24 Q. So even just- we'll use the numbers 24 profits, not based upon the value of the land. Correct? I 
2 s you've got Hsted here. That if you take the 2 s A. That is correct. ! 1-----==~---~------:---------1--------------------11 
ll3 ' 
I 
Page lll Page 
1 $3,29.3,000, and then you would subtract the 1.8 million l Q. So ifI understand your proposed testimony 
2 from that. Correct? 2 con-ectly is that you'll be testifying to both a 
3 A. That's correct. 3 $3,779,000 number and a $7,177,000 number? 
4 Q. And then you would get - your potential 4 A. Cortect. 
s profit after the take you believe would be approximately s Q. And you believe that both of those shouJd 
6 $1,493,000? 6 be compensated·· excuse me. Wouid you add those two 
7 A. That's correct. 7 numbers together to get your ultimate just compensation 
s Q. And so then if I'm understanding this B or are those two separate valuations? 
9 testimony correctly, then, in order to get under this 9 A. They're two separate valuations. 
10 alternative-· what we're calling alternative theory 10 Q, So you believe that-· is it fair to say 
11 here - is that you would subtract or you would take the 11 that your anticipated testimony will be that HJ Grathol 
12 8.6 million and then you would subtract the 1.493 12 should be compensated somewhere between 3. 7 million and l 
l3 million, and that would be the number that you would be 13 7.1 million dollars in damages? j 
l4 testifying to. Is that correct? 14 A. That would be my testimony. j' 
15 A. Please state that again. 15 Q, Is that not accurate? 
16 Q. Sure. No problem. All right. So we've 16' A. It is accurate. Thai is my testimony, i 
1 7 got what we'll call your after-take profits, which is l 7 Q. Do you believe that that's how much HJ' 
18 the 3.293 minus 1.88? lB Grathol has been damaged? 
19 A. Correct. 19 A. I believe we have potential to be damaged 
20 Q, Andtbat,Ihavewrittendownas 20 thatmuch,yes. 
21 $1,493,000. So we'll say, according to this alternative .2l Q. When you say potential u, be damaged that 
22 theory, in the after condition, or after the project's 22 muchJ what do you mean by potentia1? 
23 completed - let me rephrase that How would you .23 A. Again, it depends on, again, timing of the 
24 characterize that l .493 million dollars? 24 freeway, is the take going to be larger/smaller, acce.ss 
2 S A. 1 would characterize that as the potential 2 s off of 54, those sorts of things. I mean, just even as 
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1 of today, it's changed a little bit in the potential 
2 offer from ITD to provide access to one of our remainder 
3 parcels providing sleeves for utilities. I mean, that's 
4 going to cause an adjustment, We're trying T.O be mir. 
5 Q. And you believe that the •• scratch that. 
G All right. Why don't we take lunch now. 
' Does that work for you, Doug? 8 MR. MARFICE: Sounds good. 
9 (Whereupon the luncheon :recess was taken 
10 at 12:lS p.m., resuming at 1:30 p.m.) 
11 (Ms. York is not present after lunch.) 
12 (Exhibit 46 was marked.} 
13 (Bxhibit47 was marked.) 
14 BY MR. TOLLEFSON: 
15 Q. I'm handing you what's been marked as 
lG Deposition Exhibit No. 46. We only have the one copy. 
l? I just want to confirm that those were documents that 
18 were in your file that we made some copies of. 
19 A. Yes, that's conect. 
20 Q. And then handing you what's been marked as 
21 Deposition Exhibit No. 47, was that document also in 
22 your files? 
23 A. Yes, it was. 
24 Q. And what is that document? 
25 A. "Conceptual Site Plan, Stimson Timber 
Page 11s 
1 Company Property, Oood Hope Road, Kootenai Caunty, 
2 Idaho." 
3 Q. Why was that document in your files? 
4 A. I had met years •• well, two years ago, 
5 three years ago -- with a broker that represented this 
6 residential subdivision. I wanted to get infonnation on 
7 what was going on on that project and he wanted to get 
8 information as to what was happening with our projeQt 
9 Obviously people that would wiU live in the area would 
1 o have a need for services and - goods and services. 
11 Q. Do you recall when you had your meetings 
12 withhim? 
13 A. I think it was two, two and a half years 
14 ago. It was after we had acquired the property. 
15 Q. What is the status of that development? 
16 A. I have not followed up with the broker, sc 
1 7 I don't know. 
18 Q. Do you know if it's still going forward? 
19 A. I don't know. 
2 o Q. Do you know if it's been tenninated or 
21 stopped? 
22 A. Idon'tknow. 
2 3 Q. Ifit went in, would that be a good thing 
24 for your project? 
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Q. I'm handing you what's been marked as 
Deposition Exhibit No. 25. Previously marked as 
Deposition Exhibit No. 2S. This appears to be some 
e-mail correspondenee between YoU and Mr. Reeslund. Is 
that correct? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. At the bottom of the pace there's an l. 
e-mail from Mr. Reeslund dated January 28, 2010, and he 
says, "Have you seen a proposal from Sc:ott Auble yet?" j 
What proposal is Reeslund asking about? ~ 
A. We were going to engage Mr. A1.1ble to do an 1 
appraisal for the project. 1 
Q. And you responded back, ''No. After j 
another meeting, we may want somebody else." Do you see l 
that e-mail? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What meeting were you referring to? 
A. I had a meeting, and I don't remember 
exactly who it was with. I think it could have been 
with a bioker. And Mr. Auble at that time had some 
issues that he may not have been able to complete his 
assignment. 
Q. What issues? 
A. I think there were some personal issues. 
Q. Who·· do you recall what those personal 
Page 11? 
l issues were? 
2 A. I believe he had partnered -- and aaain, 
3 this is pure speculation on my behalf, and hearsay. He 
4 had invested or had been an appraiser in some investment 
S properties that maybe the appraisals weren't done 
6 correctly, and there was some legal ramifications to it. 
7 Q. It looks like Mr. Reeslund responds to ,: 
B your e-mail and he says, "A bad recommendation?'' Do you J 
9 see that e-mail? ! 
A. Yes. '! 
Q. And then you respond by saying, "I met j 
10 
11 
12 someone yesterday that said that he is too l 
13 conservative." Who was that someone? j 
14 A. I believe it was a broker. Somebody that ; 




Q. Do you recall which broker it was? 
A. I don't. It possibly could have been 
19 Brett Terrell. 
20 Q. And when you say he's too conservative, 
21 what do you mean by that'? 
22 A. Meaning that he would - you know, the 
23 numbers that he would use in his appraisal would side 
2 4 too much on the side of caution and not be a fair 
2 s appraisal. 
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l see where I read that? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. rm tJying to make sure we're on the same 
4 page, literally. Now, what rm going to do is I'm going 
s to ~o thro11gb these next couple pages 'and lafk about 
6 what's Jisted here as your anticipated testimony, Does 
7 that m.ake sense? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. All right. On page 8 here, it says that 
io you intend to testify that the proposed ele11ated :freeway 
l.l as it traverses the site will greatly limit visibility 
12 and sight Jines t.o the tenant buildings and signage in 
13 the development: ~ you explain what you mean by, that-? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Would you please? 
16 A. Yes. 
l '7 Q. Would you do that now for me, please? 
19 A. Yes. The :freeway1 as it, I'll say I enters 
19 the site .at the north end is approximately nine feet 
20 above th~ existing grade of the site, As itp:roceeds 
21 southerly, it reaches aa elevation of approximately 30 
22 feet above the existing grade with tn avei:age of about 
23 19 feet With commercial buildings that we would 
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visibility, is there any site studies or anything that 
would support what you're telling me here now? 
A I1ve done site studies for projects 
before~ not 1his specifieally. 
Q. So there's not a study that you1re aware 
of for this project that would support what you're 
telling me? 
A No. 
Q. Andjust for - so we're all on the -
have something w Jook at, rm going to hand you what's 
been previously marked as Exhibit 4, just so if we need : 
to point or reference to a part of the project or part 
of the property, tben we can--I would just suggest 
that we use this as a base so we al) know what we're 
talking about. Does that work ~ot you? 
A. Yes, 
Q. So looking here at this first paragraph 
tbatljust asked you about on page 8 of Exhibit No. 11~ 
is this a full and complete and accurate statement of 
what you anticipate you'U be testifying to regarding 
retail commercial site planning and design including 
building orientation, sight line and 'Visible criteria? 
A. You're referring to the first bullet item? , 
Q. Yes. j1 
1---=---------'-------------t ___ A_. _A_t_thi_._s P .. o_in_t, __ y_es_. _______ --1· 25 generally about 24 feet, which means the signage on 2S 
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1 those buildings generally ranges between 18 and 22 feet 
2 When someone is driving and - I'll say right now from 
3 the north headed south -- if you look at a site plan of 
4 the way the freeway is configured, it begins an easterly 
s traverse from its existing alignment as it starts to 
5 cross our site and then go back to the southerly 
'7 direction again. If a vehicle is proceeding south, 
8 there's a partial occlusion of buildings, blocking of 
9 visibility, by that curve. And as the freeway rises, it 
10 further blocks visibility. From the southern southbolltl,~ 
ll Janes, the width of the freeway further blocks the 
12 Yisibility of the buildings because of the width of the 
13 freeway from the northbound lanes. So that is a 
14 detriment to the visibility of the buUdings. If those 
15 'buildings become visible as the vehicle rises 011 the 
16 freeway, it's already past the off-ramp, so they've 
l 7 missed the opportunity to pull off and stop at the 
18 project. That is a little less limiting for the 
19 buildings on the small westerly parcels of the project 
20 created by the freeway which front on Old 95. But 
21 conversely, if you're coming from the south headed 
2 2 north, those tenantt, those buildings, are not visible, 
2 3 and there's still a limit of visibility to our buildings 
24 on the east side of the freeway due to the elevation. 
2 s Q. And this information about the limiting of . ..._ •... , .... """' 
Page 21 ' 
1 Q. What do you mean by "at this point11? 
2 A. If some more information becomes available 
3 between now and trial, it may change or alter my 
4 testimony. 
s Q. What additional information would you 
6 beiieve may become avaiiable? 
7 A I don't know. 
s Q. Do you anticipate any additional 
9 information becoming available? 
10 A. Not at this time. 
11 Q. What kind of infonnation would make you 
12 change your opinion? 
13 A. Changes in the freeway design that might 
14 lower the elevation, for instance. 
15 Q. Anything else? 
16 A. Not that I can think of. 
l 7 Q. You had said that one ofyour duties is 
18 that sometimes prior to purchasing a property, you will 
19 engage in some research. Did you engage in any research 
2 o or development pJans for this project before it was 
21 purchased? 
2 2 A. In what regard are you referring? 1 
2 3 Q. When head you what your duties were, you 1 
24 gave a long list of things that you do, and one of them. 1 
2 5 was providing preliminary design plans. Did you do j 
~ ... _ •• J.~,, .w.:.---~· ..... _ 
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1 anything like that for this project before it was l 
2 purchased? 2 
3 A. Yes. 3 
4 Q. Can you please describe that for me? 4 
5 A. I did a number ·of preliminary site studies 5 
6 for various altemative.s of the project. 6 
7 Q. And when you say "site studies,'' can you 7 
8 describe what you mean by 1hat7 B 
9 A. Plans that would incorporate potential 9 
1 o users or tenants in various configurations based on the lo 
11 property configuration and potential freeway dewlop~ent 11 
12 ~r not freeway development. 12 
13 Q. So when you purchased this propeny, 13 
14 you're saying you presented -you made alternative site 14 
1S, studies? 15 
16 A. Yes. l°G 
l 7 Q. And what alternatives did you consider? 1? 
18 A. We considered a combination of commercial 18 
19 retail U$es, hospitality uses, potential freeway tr~vel 19 
2 o oriented uses. 2 o· 
21 Q. Did the site studies in.elude the 21 
22 realignment of the highway? 22 
23 A. Some did, yes. 23 
24 Q. And why did the.y include those? 24 
2 s A. We were aware that there were plans by the , 25 
NO. 3877 P. 6/48 
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MR. TOLLEFSON: Can we go off the record just for , 
a second? 
(Off the record.) l 
BY MR. TOLLEFSON: j 
b liQ. 't'Allbeeright. l'.m h1andinarkg yed.ou wbadt ~- I hat' ,1 e eve 1 s n previ'Ous y m Han mg you w s 
been previously marlced as Deposition Exln'bit No. 6, have ' 
you seen that document before? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what is it? 
A, 'fhu; is the deed referenc:ed on our AL TA 
survey regarding the three deeded access points. 
(Exhibit 12 was marked.) 
BYMR. TOLLEFSON: 
Q. I'm handing you what's been marked as 
Deposition Exh;tbit No. 12. Do you recognize this 
,document?' 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is it? 
A. This is a reduced copy of our AL TA sW'V'ey. 
'Q, And by "reduced copy," what do you mean b)' 
that? 
A. It is in 11-by.-17 format. The original 
copy w,e reteived. from our engineer was 30-by-42. 
Q. Thanks. rd like you to tum to the 
Page 23 Page 25 
l ITD to potentially realign and improve the fteeway. l second page, please. And briefly you •• when I had j 
2 Q. And did you know about this prior to 2 asked you about DeJ>Osition Exlu'bit No. 6, you said this 1 
3 purchasing the property7 3 was the deeded insttwnent that was reflected on yolll' j 
4 A. Yes. 4 ALTA survey. Can you see where that's reflected. on this 1 
s Q. Alt right. I'd like to now move down to s ALTA swvey here? ! 
6 the next buJiet point you've got down here. "Division 6 A. Yes. .I 
7 of property/parcel configurations.'' Do you see that? 7 Q. And probably the easiest way to do this, 
8 A. Yes. B if I could just hand you a pen. if you could just circle 
9 Q. You write the public bas better access in 9 with 1he pen tho.se deeded accesses. 
10 the before condition. How so? 10 A. (Witness complies.) 
ll A. Before the freeway? 11 Q. Thank you. And those deeded accesses, 
12 Q. Yes. 12 they reference warranty deed instrument 504394. Is that 
13 A. We have three access points deeded off of 13 correct? I 
14 Highway 54. We have access off of95 -- I'll say Old 9S 14 A. That's correct. l 
l 5 for clarity's sake. And a signalized intersection at 54 15 Q. Now I'd like to tum back to Exhibit No. 1 
16 and 95. 16 61 which is the wammty deed, S04l94. And on the j 
17 Q. Okay. Now I want to talk about this - 17 second page, I'm going to read a sen~ce down there. I i 
18 you said you have three deeded accesses. Do you know if 1 a wanted to ask yw ifl read it correctly. It says, J 
19 there's any limitations on those deeded accesses? 19 ''Except for three 20-foot approaches on the north side J 
2 o A. Limitations in what way? 2 o of the roadway at the following stations: 27+ I 0, 29+80 ! 
' 21 Q. Limitations of use, what1hose accesses 21 and" - looks like that's·· "17+50, to be used as farm 1 
22 can be used for. 
23 A. I am not aware of limitations. I know 
24 that 1hey are specified as 20-foot wide, but I don't 
25 know that there is a limitation on use. 
22 and residential approaches." Did I read that 1 i 
2 3 accurately? 1 
I 
24 A. It appears, except for the last number, i 
I 
25 which is illegible. i ~--~--====· ::::_,,=--~--:::-•• M:::-::,~~-~~~-=====--:=::--. -::-:~-===·~-.:-:-.==:z::::-:: ..... ::~====~--:":=-~-,===~--:"l""!· .:-:-~.==· -~-_ ... ,I 
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1 Q. And the accesses that you circled on 1 A. Not for sure. I can only guess. 
2 Deposition Exhibit No. 12, those are the accesses that 2 Q. Why do you say that Sylvan Road is going 
3 are referenced here on Deposition Exhibit N(?. 6. Is 3 to go through your property? 
4 that correct? 4 A. Because we've never been told by ITO what 
5 A. It would appear so. s the alignment would be. ~ 
6 Q. Are you aware of any other deeded accesses 6 Q. Do you know if any of your site plans took 
7 to the property? 7 into account Sylvan Road? 
8 A. No. 8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. You also referenced that you had access ~ 9 Q. And did they? 
io ·the Old 95 in the before condition. Can you please 10 A. Yes. 
11 4~scribe that for me? 11 Q. How come? 
12 A. There is an existing building that we own 12 A. 1n other versions of documents similar to 
13 on the small parcel at the comet of 94 - rm sorry. 13 this Exhibit 4 that we have received from ITD, they show 
14 95 and 54- that has access atthe comer off of 95. l4 alignments of Sylvan Road going across our property. 
15 Q. Could you circle that, as well, for me, 15 And in different versions, there are two different . 
16 please? 16 alignments that have been shown. 
17 A. Access at this point. I'll circle that. 17 (Exhibit 13 was marked.) 
18 And there's access at this point. 18 BY MR. TOLLEFSON: 
19 Q. And just let the record reflect you made 19 Q. Handing you what's been marked Deposition 
20 marks, again, on Deposition Exhibit No. 12. Is that 20 Exhibit No. 13, have you seen this document before? 
1 21 correct? 
21 A. No, I don't remember seeing this document 
22 A. Yes. 22 before. 
23 Q. Thanks. And are those accesses deeded? 23 Q. Okay. Ifl represent to you that this is 
24 A. Not to my knowledge. 24 the Complaint that's filed by the Idaho Transportation 
25 Q. Do you know if there's any permits for 2S Department against HJ Gratbol and Sterling Savings Bank 
Page 27 Page 29 J 
1 those accesses? 1 that started this condemnation action, would you have j1 
.2 A. No, I do not know. 2 any reason to doubt that? 
3 Q, And on Deposition Exhibit No. 12, you said 3 A. Probably not. I 
4 you owned a small parcel that had access to Highway 95. 4 Q. I'd like you to take a minute to go to j 
s Is that correct? s &hibit B, please. Here these are the US-9S Garwood to 1 
6 A. Yes. 6 Sagle, Athol Stage, Federal Aid Project No. A009(791), j 
., Q. From that small parcei is it possible to 7 what are commonly referred to as the right-of-way plans. J 
8 get to the main parcel? Is there a road or access 8 If you could flip to the second page ofE'Xbibit B. Do l 
9 between those two? 9 you see where the HJ Gtathol property is repl'esented on l 
10 A. An unimproved road, yes. 1 o this document? j 
11 Q. Do you know if there's any deeds or l1 A. Yes. 
12 pennits pennitting that road? 12 Q. And do you see that I believe there is ! 
13 A. I don't know. l3 a- I want t0 callit magenta colored section in there? ' 
1.4 Q. Do you know if that unimpr0ved road 14 A. Yes. 
15 requires the use ofITD's right-of-way? 1S Q. Are you aware thatthat1s the right-of-way 
16 A. rm not sure. 16 thatITD iucquiring as a result ofthls condemnation 
17 Q, You further write down on page 8 of 17 action or is attempting to acquire? 
l 8 Deposition Sxhibit No. 11 that, "A third parcel will be 18 A. It looks like it. 
19 created when right-of-say" -· but I imagine that means 19 Q, Do you ste any indication on these 
2 o right-of-way? 2 o right-of-way plans that show that ITD has taken property 
21 A. Right. 21 for the const,Uction of Sylvan R.oad? i 
22 Q. - "is acquired for the Sylvan frontage 22 A No. , 
2 3 road use." And tuming back now to Deposition Exhibit 2 3 Q. rd like to turn to the next page. j 
24 No. 4, can you show me where Sylvan Road's going to go 2 4 A. In E::ichibit B? 1 
2~ ... ~?ughyourproperty? -~- ... - ... , .. __ _ ..... 2S Q ...• ~~~~~~~- Backto~~~~!-~:~f:_d 
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32 I l But before we move o~ what makes you •• or what do you l Sylvan :tload extension? 
2 base your opinion on that ITD is going to acquire 2 A. Yes. There were copies ofmy meeting 
3 propeny for Sylvan Road? 3 minutes provided with discovery. 
j 4 A. We have been •• that they're going to 4 Q, I might have them in here at some point, 
s acquire it? 5 but do you re-call what those meeting minutes said? 
6 Q. Uh-hub, 6 A. Patdonme? 
7 A. We have been •• it was our understanding 7 Q. Do you recall what those meeting mirtutes 
from meetings that wt had with ITO that Sylvan Road 8 .said? ' 8 
9 would be extended from Highway 54 to Roberts ~oad across 9 A. Basically what l've already said, plus 
I 
10 our property in some fashion. 10 aclclitional information about the c~t scheduling of 
11 Q, when were those meetings? ll the construction of the freeway and some infonnation 
12 A. The one meeting was in 2009 and one 12 regarding Jason providing us with copies of plans for 
13 ~eetingwas in 2010. 13 our engineers to work with. 
14 Q. The meeting io 2009, who was present? 14 Q. Do you know when the. Sylvan Road is going 
is A. I believe that was myself, Alan Johnson, 15 to be constructed across your property? 
16 two of our tr,ttfic consult.an~, Jason Mimghor from ITD, 16 A. We have not been told that. 
17 and another one Qt two gentlemen ftom !TD whose names I 17 Q. Do you know by whom? . 
18 can't reoall right now. 18 A, We were told in one of those meetings that 
19 Q. And what was told to you at that meeting? 19 ITO would build the road and tum it over _to Lakes ' 
20 A. That Sylvan Ro~d was to be ex.tended across 20 Highway District to maintain. l 
2l our propi!lrty but that -there was no curtent funding for 21 Q. And which meeting was that? I 
22 it. 22 A. l'm not sure-, but I belie.v~ it was the 
23 Q. So you were told jn 2009 that there was no 23 2009 meeting. 
24 funding to construct Sylvan Road acro9s HJ Gratbol's 24 Q. And who told you that? 1 
25 property? 2S A, I believe it was Jason Minzghor that said l 
Page 31 Pi;l.ge 3-3 ] 
l A. At that titne, that is what they said. l that. 
2 Q. Then you said the second meeting was in 3 Q. All right. I'd like to go back now to 
3 2010. Who was present-at that meeting? 3 your Deposition Exhibit No. 11, which is the third 
l 4 A. I believe that was myself; Alan Johnson, 4 supplemental answers and responses, on page 9, first 
5 Jason Minzghor and the right-of-way agent for - I think s bullet point. It says, "Access and circulation on and i 
6 he was .a right-of-way agent fo,; tm. He's named Ron ,. off site." Could you take a quick moment to read that? j g 
7 Harvey. And Chris Gabbert :from Ramsden & Lyons. 7 And have you read that? j 
a Q. And what was told to you at that meeting? 8 A. Yes. I 9 A. It was basically an update on the schedule 9 Q. Is that a complete statement of what you 
10 of the construction of the freeway, and it was again 10 anticipate testifying to at trial in this matter I ! 
ll represented that there was no cwtent funding for Sylvan 11 regarding that bullet point? i 
12 Road constnlcti.on. 13 A. At this point, yes. 1 
13 Q. At either of these meetings ,,... strike 13 Q. And I'm sorry to ask these questions 4 i 
14 that. You had earlier said that Sylvan Road was going 14 again, but when you say "at this point," what do you I 
15 to 'be QOnscructed in some fashion. What did you mean by 15 mean by that? ' I 
16 1hat? Hi A. Between now and - well, I'd say between l I 
17 A. As I mentioned, we had seen two vaiying 17 the time this was provided and written and the time I 
18 alignments of Sylvan Road. 18 trial occurs, if additional information becomes ' ' I 
19 Q. But it's your understanding that ITD 19 available, such as changes in ITD's plans, that might I I 
20 doesn't have the fimding to construct the Sylvan Road at 20 change the access accessibility to our property. That I 
21 tbistime? 2l might change this testimony. 
22 A. At that time, in 2009 and 20 lo, tl-.at is .2.2 Q. Other than ITO changing its plans, what 
33 what we were told. 23 else would cause you to change your testimony? 
24 Q. Do you have any documents in the file 24 A. Nothing that I can think of. I I 
2$ fegarding these meetings or regarding this extension •• 25 Q. And maybe if we do this, this might save l 
,.,., •• ,l,lofll~ -"'·-·· ... ----- _.,.,..~,.,"'··-~-~--"'""" .... _..__....,___ --a.-........ __._.2 
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l time down the road for each of these bullet points. If 
2 we maybe just take a minute and look at these next few 
3 bullet points on the next two pages. And if we can 
4 get -- because I'm going to ask you the same question 
s about each one of those bullet JX)ints about what would 
6 cause you to change your testimony. So rm hoping that 
7 we can just avoid having me ask that every single time, 
e and ifwe canjust agree that it sounds like you would 
9 change your testimony if ITO changes its plan, but other 
lo than that, you wouldn't anticipate any reason why you 
11 would change your testimony. 
12 A. Essentially, yes. There would be - I 
13 would offer that relative to the bullet item that 
14 discusses a lack of a recorded map, if a recorded map 
1s was provided, that might change, as opposed to a change 
16 in their freeway plans. 
1 7 Q. Anything else that might cause you to 
18 change your testimony? 
19 A. Relative to bullet item that says, 
2 o "Infrastructure and utility needs/provisions, 11 that 
2 l would probably still be accurate. Changes in their 
22 plans might be that we see that they are providing 
23 provisions for us to cross under the right-of-way to 
24 serve both properties with utilities. Other than that, 
2 5 I would agree that the statements are accurate. 
Page 35 
1 Q. And hopefully that'll save us some time, 
NO. 3877 P. 9/48 
Page 36 1 
l Q. What accesses would be eliminated? 
2 A. It appears that - and I'll refer to 
3 Exhibit 12. It would appear that the two westerly 
4 accesses might be eliminated or impacted, but it's 
s uncertain if the middle one is in that area without 
6 seeing further information. 
7 Q. Okay. So ifl understand this correetly, j 
a your testimony is that the - you're not sure which of j 
9 these two access points that are circled on the AL TA map 1 
10 would be eliminated, but they could be? 
11 A. It is apparent that the westerly most 
12 access would be eliminated, and potentially the second 
13 one; but without seeing an overlay of the freeway 
14 right-of-way, I cannot answer that. 
lS Q. And what about the third access you've 
16 circled on the AL TA map? 
1 7 A. That is clearly out of the range of the 
18 area they told us that we would not have access. 
19 Q. So do you have any reason to believe that 
2 o that access would be eliminated? 
21 A. No. 
2 2 Q. What other accesses do you believe would 
2 3 be eliminated? Let me rephrase that. Are there any 
24 other accesses you believe would be eliminated as a 
2 5 result ofITD's project? 
Page 37 
1 A. It's unclear from the improvement plans 
2 then. 2 that I have seen, but there is a question relative to 
3 A. Good. 3 access of the comer parcel. There have been no 
4 Q. You claim here that the access and 4 approaches shown on ITD's plans that would continue to ! 
s circulation on and off site - on page 9 •• that the s serve that tJroperl:y. 11 
6 reconfiguration use severely impacts the viability for 6 Q. But again, you're not sure if that would 
7 developing the resultant sites by eliminating or 7 be eliminated? j 
a drastically limiting the ability to provide effective e A. It is unclear at this point. 1 
9 access points critical to successful commercial 9 Q. And why is it unclear? • 
10 development What access points wiJJ be limited? 10 A. ITD1s plans do not address that. '1 
11 A. With the freeway development, we have been 11 Q. And when you say 11ITD's plans," what are 
12 told that we would not be allowed access between the 12 you referring to? 
13 northbound onramp and the Sylvan Road location. 13 A. The improvement plans that we received l 
14 Q. Handing you what's been previously marked 14 copies ofin discovery. 1 
15 as Deposition Exhibit No. 4, can you just point to what lS Q. Have you had a chance to review those 
16 you've just referenced? Let's not circle yet on this 16 improvement plans? 
l 7 one. l 7 A. I ba-ve. 
18 A. (Witness indicating.) 18 Q. And it's my understanding that after your 
19 Q. Were you told if ITD would grant any 19 review, you're not sure whether or not that would 
2 o accesses off of S4? 2 o eliminate. th-e access to that smallei parcel? 
21 A. We were only told that they would not 21 A. That is correct. 
2 2 ailow aecess between the onramp and Sylvan Road. 22 Q, Are there any other accesses you believe 
2 J Q, Were you told that you would not get any 2 3 would be eliminated or drastically limited as a result 
24 accesses off of Highway S4? 24 of11D1s project? 
25 A. Not ln the meetings I was in. 25 A. Yes. I -=--=-=--=,===-::::=i:·-~.:::-4 .. ~-~-~---~-~--~·-·'='======~ .. ~ ..... =-: ... ====·~-~-... :":",-======--~-·~--~hl,~-":-:--~-==:r:-!:':!-... ~--~-~==---
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1 Q. And what accesses are those? 1 A. It appears to be. j 
2 A. Because of the cul-de-sac design of Old 9S 2 Q. Is it possible to use that? j 
3 toward the northern end of our property, the resultant 3 MR. MARFICE: Sure. 1 
4 property that we have remaining on the west side of the 4 MR. TOLLEFSON: And I don't want to steal your 
s right-of-way would be limited in the aspeot of there 5 copy, but is it possible to get it marked? l 
6 wi'll be no through traffic on that road. 6 MR. MARFICE: Do we have another copy of that? j 
7 Q, Okay. 7 MR. JOHNSON: No, I don't. And it's part of 1 
s A. Which would limit the number of potential 8 discovery. ;1 
9 customers that would have access, .9 MR.. TOLLEFSON: So don't mark on that yet. 
10 Q. So let me see ifl understand this 10 Q. So maybe what we could do is if you want 
11 correct. And please con;ectme if I misunderstand what 11 to use the large ALTA map to maybe orientate where it 
12 you're saying. You're claiming that access to the 12 could be-
13 parcel will be limited because of tb.e project, not 13 A. And this mark on this small plan? Yes. 
14 because lTD is taking any currently existing accesses to 14 Q. Would that work for you? 
lS Old Highway 95, but rather because they are putting in 15 A. Yes, it will. 
lG cul-d~sacs on Old Highway 95? lG Q. I appreciate. Thank you. 
1? A. That's correct. l 7 A. I'm marking a six-inch gas line across the 
18 Q, What COlllJJ)ercial accesses currently exist 18 frontage on Highway 54 based on what is shown on the 
19 o~ the property? .. . 19 larger copy of the plan. 
2·0 A. The project is not developed commercially 2 o Q. And what would it take to get aeeess to l 
21 yet, so no access exists, 21 that gas line? 
22 Q. I would like to move down-· we're still 22 A. Working with the gas company to establish 1 
2 3 on page 9 of Exhibit 12. Excuse me. Exhibit 11. And 2 3 a connection and e'Xtension onto our site. 'i 
24 move down to the next bullet point. "InfrastrUcture and 24 Q. Have you had contact with the gas company? I 
25 utility needs/provision." What utilities currently 25 A. No. l 
I 
Page 3 9 Page 41 ' 
1 exist on the property? 1 Q. Do you know what requirements this 'j 
2 A. It is my recollection that there is gas 2 particular gas company may have? l 
3 available, there is electricity available, water is 3 A. No. j 
4 available in US-95 for extension to our property. 4 Q. Okay. Next you said that electricity was 1 
s Q. Any other utilities? s available. On what do you base that? I 
6 
7 
A. Not to my knowledge. 6 A. The information shown on the ALTA survey, ] 
Q. And I'll start at the top. You said gas 7 Q. Okay. And if we could use the same 
8 is available. I-low is gas avaHable? s procedure, find it on the large map and then mark it on l 
9 A. It's my recolleotion that there is a gas 9 the smaller one. 1 
10 line in the frontage along Highway 54. 10 A. I should also add there's telephone 
11 Q. And what do you base this information on? 11 service I didn't mention before, across the frontage of 
12 A. From the ALTA survey information. 12 the property. There are indications of power poles and 
13 Q. Can you point out to me where that is 13 power vaults on the survey. Indicating that the lines 
14 located on Exhibit No. 12? I'll hand you a highlighter. 14 run parallel - you want to use a different color of 
A. I cannot, because this is illegible. 15 highlighter? 15 
16 Q. Okay. 1G Q. I think Ms. York may have one. 
l 7 A. But I will point out that in the legend, 1 7 A. I have red. It's brown. Which we may 
18 there is an indication of a •• what is called a gas 1 e need, also. 
19 witness post, which is related to gas service. So if I 19 MR. MARFICE: Here. It's not a highlighter, but 
2 o were able to read this plan, I could locate that. 2 o that may work. 
21 Q. Understood. So let the record reflect you 21 MR. TOLLEFSON: Thank you, Mr. Marfice. 
22 highlighted•• what did you highltght on Exhibit 12? 22 THE WITNESS: Okay. 
23 A. I highlighted a graphic representation in 23 BY MR. TOLLEFSON: 
2 4 the legend of what is called a gas witness post. 2 4 Q, So what does the red line that you just .! 
._2-=-===Q=·=I=s=~~~~-~~--~~~~~-=--~~~~~~r~.s~:-:-~n~.~~!=-=~=e:-i:A::::L=T='A::i:m:::::a::::p=?=-~---=2-=s=· drew==-:-:~=:.~:":"T.,"l'::~!.._==es=th=~=r~~~~-~~-~-~~-=-=~~==-==-~-~---:-,-::~~::::-=-=:=! .• ; 
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1 A. The overhead power poles and power lines. l Q. And did the city reach a decision? 
2 Q. And what would it take to get access to 2 A. At that meeting, they said they were not 
3 those overhead power poles and power lines? 3 interested. 
4 A. Working with the electric company to 4 Q. Did they give a reason why? 
5 extend the power onto the property. s A. Not specifically. ~ 
6 Q. And do you know what this electric company 6 Q. Did they give general reasons? 
7 would require for you to get access to that electricity? 7 A. The only answer they gave us was relative 
8 A. No. 8 to septic service. 
9 Q. Do you know the name of the electric 9 Q. And what did they say about septic 
10 company? 10 service? 
ll A. Kootenai Electric. 11 A. That we would not be getting any of their 
12 Q. Next you said that you believe water was 12 ERs. 
' 13 available on the property. On what do you base that? 13 Q. And what is an ER? 
14 A. Water is available to extend to the 14 A. It is an equivalent unit for measuring 
15 property. That is based on a meeting that we had with 15 deposit into a septic system. I'm not sure of the 
16 the City of Athol before we purchased the project, 16 actual •• what it stands for, but it's based •• it's 
1? indicating that there was a 10-inch line in US-95 that 17 what is used to determine what a septic system deposits 
18 could be extended to the site and what they call looped, 18 into the groundwater system. 
19 which would provide for the fire service. 19 Q, So ifl understand this correctly, the ' 
20 Q. And did you get an agreement from the City 20 City of Athol denied your application for annexation and 
21 of Athol to get that water? 21 told you that you couldn't use their septic system? 
22 A. A fonnal agreement? No. 22 A. They have an allocation through •• I can't 
23 Q. Is your property located in the city 23 remember the name of the sanitation district But they l 
24 limits of Athol? 24 have an allocation for a certain number ofERs that, 
25 A. No. I take it - part of it. One parcel 25 based on their representation to us, were limited for 
Page 43 Page 4S J 
l is located. The small comer parcel. 1 the size of their city and perhaps felt that a project l 2 Q. Which comer parcel? 2 of this size might hamper their ability to use further 
1 .3 A . At the northeast corner of 9S and 54. 3 units. 
4 Q. Was there an attempt to get the whole 4 Q. Because your project would require some I I 
5 property annexed? s sort of septic system? I 
6 A. There was. 6 A Some sort of sewer service1 yes. fl, 
? Q. And what was the result of that attempt? ? Q, When you say "sewer service," what do you 
8 A. The City of Athol was not interested. 8 mean by that? 
~ Q. And were you involved in that attempt to 9 A A1i.. ability to dispose of sewage. 
~ 10 get the property annexed? 10 Q. So as the property sits now, it's not 
ll A. Yes. 11 annexed in the City of Athol. Does it have access t.o a 
12 Q. And just briefly, what was your 12 sewer system? 
l3 involvement in that process? 13 A. Not an µnderground sewer system, no. 
l4 A. After our meeting with the city, before we 14 Q. Does it have access to an overground sewer I 
15 purchased the property, we very shortly thereafter 15 system? I l 
l6 applied for annexation and met with their city council. 16 A. It has access to basic septio use. 'I j 
17 Q, And what was your role? 17 Q. What do you mean by "basic septie use"'! j 
18 A. I filled out the application. I went to 18 A I don't recall the actual ratio, but it is 
19 the city council hearing and made a presentation. 19 something on the order of it's based on the size of the 
20 Q. And do you recall what the basis of your 20 property how many septic tanks or systems you can have. 
21 presentation was? 21 Q. In order to develop the property, do you 
22 A. That we were planning to develop the 22 have to have access to some sort of sewer system'! 
23 property for commercial retail use and it wouJd be a 23 A. We have to have some means of disposing of 
' 24 benefit to the city for tax dollars to have that as part 24 sewage. 1 
25 of their city. 25 Q. What means currently do you have to I l 
.. ""'- •••• .,. fh. •-• ••• ,I-~ I-~' -11,.,,. ,1,/M,, -· '""" -· -~ I 
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1 dispose of sewage on the property? l which system they would pennit, I 
2 A. We have been in the process of design of a 2 Q. Do these have names, just so we're on the 
3 on-site sewage treatment system. 3 same page when we discuss them? 
4 Q. Have you been mvolved in that process? 4 A. No. 
5 A. Yes. 5 Q. So the first one, the 20-by.-20 building 
6 Q. What is your involvement in that process? 6 that you said that would not reqUire the treattnent pond, 
7 A. I have .met with the consultant that we 7 how much space would that take up on the property? 
8 have hired to design the system several ti.mes over a A Above ground, perhaps 400 square feet. 
.9 several years that we'\/'e been worldn:g on this. 9 Q. How about below ground? 
10 Q. Who is the consultant? 10 A, It would involve the distribution of 
11, A. The name of the firm is Coleman 11 underground perforated pipes and irrigation pipes for 
12 Engineering. 12 disposal and reuse of the tl'eated groundwater. .. 
13 Q. And when did you first have contact with 13 Q. And haw big would the under~ound area be? 
14 Coleman Engineering? 14 A. That's to be detennined. 
15 A. . I don't recall exactly, but I believe we 15· Q. Do you have an estimate? 
16 brougbt him under contract in 2009. It could have been 16 A. It would be depending on the development 
i 17 earlier. l"I area of inigation, It would depend on the number and 18 Q. Did you bring him on before or after the 18 size of ~e tenantS. 
19 City of Athol rejected -your application for annexation? 19 Q., Do you have a range at all? ! 20 A. 'This was after. 20 A. No. 
21 Q. And what did you. task Colem~ Engineering 21 Q, What about the - I'll just call it option 
22 with doing? 22 No. 2 for now, the 20-by-20 treatment building plus the 
.23 A, Conceptualizing and designing a system 23 pond. You said at least a one-acre pond. How much 
24 that would serve our project. 2~ space woulcl that tako up of the property? 
1 25 Q. And did they do so? 25 A. The •• probably the same size building, 
Page 47 Page 49 1 
I 
l A. We've been working with them on that for a l but perhaps, as I said, as much as one acre for a 
2 few years, and yes, there is a system that we are 2 treatment pond. And as far as to anticipate your next 
3 proposing, 3 question, underground distribution may be less because 
4 Q. Can you just tell me briefly about that 4 of the treatment pond use. 
s system? s Q, Do you. have estitnated costs for either of 
6 A. It is a faidy complicated trea..'lnent t!. these iwo alternatives? I .., 
7 system involving filtration and reuse of filtered. sewage 7 A, Rough estimates currently are between j 1 
8 water for irrigation purposes as well as tanks for 8 .$700,000 and $1,000,000. :I 
9 disposal of solid waste. g Q. Is that for option 1 or option 2? I 
10 Q. If you were -- and this is maybe just 10 A, Both. l 
11 because I'm a layman. If you were driving by and saw 11 Q. Has Coleman Engineering produced any j 
I 
12 1his sewage system comple~ what would it look like 12 studies or reports? I 
' 13 ftom the outside? Or do you know, I guess? 13 A. I don't recall if we've had a formal I I 1• A, There are currently two possibilities. 14 repi.irt from them. I could perhaps be confusing it With I 
15 One would involve nothing mote than perhaps a 20-by-20 l.5 another project they designed a system for us on. So ' 
16 building abo\/'e ground. Nothing else woUld be visible. 16 I'm not sure. I 
17 Second possibility would be a similar building but 17 Q. What about corrdlpondence and l 
18 perhaps a small treatmel1t pond. :i.e communications with Colranan Engineerina? Are you aware I 
19 Q. When you say "small treatment pond," how 1.9 ~~~tho~ J 
20 b' ? lg. 20 A. Yes. 
21 A. Perhaps as much as one acre. 21 Q, And do you know if those have been 
22 Q, So cWTently it sounds like there are two 22 produced in discovery'? 
23 plans that you guys are looking at Is that correct? 23 A. I'm not certain. 
24 A. We're cuuently in negotiations with the 24 Q. Is it in these - anything related to --
2S state Department of Bnvirotul\ental Quality to finali1.e 25 excuse ine - Coleman :Engineering and the sewage ..... ___ :. . .:. , ........ .., ...... , ......... ________ ,.,.., .. ,, .,...,, 
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l would build their own building and then you build the 
2 smaller ones, or the major tenant·· or you would build 
3 both the major building and the smaller buildings. 
4 Which method is being used for tlris property? 
s A. Those are only detennined at the time 
6 · leases or purchase and sale agreements are negotiated 
7 and signed. 
8 Q. Are there any negotiated leases? 
9 A. Not at this time, to my knowledge. 
lO Q. Are there any negotiated purchase and sale 
ll agreements? 
12 A. To my knowledge, no. 
13 Q. Who would have knowledge? 
14 A. Alan Johnson would have knowledge. 
1 s Q. So is it fair to say, without the purchase 
16 and sale agreements or these leasing agreements, that 
l 7 you don't know what requirements these tenants would 
18 have? 
19 A. That's correct. 
2 o Q. Is it also fair to say that you don't know 
21 what infrastructure needs they would have? 
22 A. It depends on the tenant. 
2 3 Q. So without having a purchase and sale 
2~ agreement or a leasing agreement, you would be able to 
25 detennine what their infrastructure needs would be? 
Page 63 
1 A. As they serve specific tenants. In 
2 general, for a retail development, the infrastructure 
3 needs are defined As they would branch off to serve 
4 individuaJ tenants, that's yet to be defined. 
s Q. I see. So·· and correct me if I'm wrong. 
6 My understanding, then, is that certain categories of 
7 tenants or certain classes of tenants, whatever you want 
8 to call them, each of them will have a general 
9 infrastructure need and you'll be able to figure those 
l 0 out without knowing the specific tenant. Did that make 
11 sense or did I totally mangle that question? 
12 A. Only generally. 
13 Q, So let me ask this question, then. What 
14 general tenants is the property .,. strike that. What 
15 general types of tenants is the infrastructlll'e currently 
16 on the property able to support'? 
1 7 A. there is no CUJTent iofrasll'lloture on the 
18 property, 
19 Q. All right. Moving down on page 9, it 
2 o says, "Further, that the land use development potential 
21 is now limited due to the splitting of the prime 
2 2 commercial site by the taking." What do you mean by the 
23 splitting of the prime commercial site? 
2 4 A. By the path or routing that the freeway 
2 s takes as it traverses our site, it ttlc.es the prime - we 
NO. 3877 P. 13/48 
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I 
1 call -- what I call prime commercial property, which j 
2 before the taking would have been all of the propeny as ~ 
3 it fronts cUrrent US.,95 and Highway 54. When you put 
4 the new freeway configuration through the site, it 
s splits that property in two, creating a fairly isolated 
6 piece of property on the Old 95 side and another piece 
7 of property on the east side which would further be ~ 
8 impacted if and when Sylvan Road gets extended across I 
9 the property. 1 
10 Q. Okay. Why do you say that the property • 
ll before the taking that fronted 95 and 54 was the prime 
12 location? Prime commercial site. Excuse me. 
13 A. That is a prime commercial intersection 
14 location. 
Q. Howcome? 15 
lG A. Two fairly •• well, one very busy highway 
l 7 and one fairly busy highway. 
18 Q. Were there accesses off of these two busy 
19 highways in the before condition? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Were those the accesses we described 
2 2 earlier on the AL TA map? 
23 A. Yes, and the presumed access off of Old 95 
2 4 for the property fronting that portion. 
2S Q. The presumed--I'm sorry. rro not 
Page 6S 








l 2 A. Right There is no defined -· there are , 
3 no defined approaohes off of Old 95 at this 'POin.t. It i 
4 is unimproved roadway edge, So the access at this point 1 
s for properties fronting 95 is where people enter and \ 
6 exit. So it's not defined. 1 
7 Q. . So you're not aware of any •• I think 1 
a welve been over this before, and I don't want to repeat ! 
9 myself, but you're not aware of any deeds or permits ! 
10 that allow access off of the Old Highway 95 in the ! 
11 before condition? 1 
12 A No deeded accesses, rm not aware. ! 
' Q. But you're saying you do have access, l 
14 though? : 
13 
15 A Presumptive access, in 111.y opinion. 
16 Q. What do you base that opinion on? 
l 7 A. The fact that there is no defined roadway 
18 edge that limits the access. 
19 Q. When you -- the ptoperty was l)\ll'Chased in 
2 o May of 2008. Is that comet? 
21 A. I believe so. 
22 Q. When it was purc!wed, were you aware 1:bat 
2 3 ITD had a J)roject that would impact the property'? : 
2 4 A. Yes, !said that. t 
' 2 s Q. All right. Let's go to the next page, 1 
--....Ji,, ~-b - .. "'··------J 
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I apologize. I thought I brought it. 
Page 74 










As soon as I get back to the office. 
And where's the office? 
Southern California. 
Is that where Hughes Development is 
10 located? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. What city? 
13 A. Newport Beach. 
14 MS. YORK: Doug, can you coordinate getting that 
1s for us? 
16 MR. MARFICE: Yes. 
1? (Off the record.) 
18 BYMR. TOLLEFSON: 
19 Q. So what documents did CLC provide you? 
2 o A. They provided the AL TA swvey. They 
21 provided site plan alternatives in CAD, and some 
2 2 supporting documents for our application to Kootenai 
2 3 County for the rezone. 
24 Q. How many different alternatives did they 
25 provide? 
Page 75 
1 A. I can't recall exactly. Four or five. 
2 Q. Do you recall when? 
3 A. It was over a period of time between 2008 
4 and 2010, I guess. I don't know exactly. 
5 Q. Have all the documents that you received 
6 from CLC Consultants been produced? 
7 A. I believe so. 
a Q. What about the environmental consultant, 
.9 Intennountain7 
1 O A. No$ that's 'the traffic consultant. 
11 Q. I'm sorry. I apologize. Intermountain 
12 Traffic. Have all the documents been produced that they 
13 provided to you? 
14 A. I believe so. I believe so. 
15 Q. Andwbat about LFR, the environmental 
1 G consultants? 
17 A. Yes, I believe so. 
18 Q. Are they in the orange file? 
19 A. No, I believe they would be in what was 
20 previously provided with discovery. 
21 Q. And what about the Coleman Engineering 
22 documents? Have those all been provided previously in 
2 3 discovery? 
24 A. I believe so, but I c:an't be certain. 
2 s Certainly the more recent documents in the folder have 
,1., ,., _,. .... --· - --~---
NO. 3877 P. 14/48 
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1 notbeen. 
2 Q. But to your knowledge, everything else has 
3 been produced in discovery? 
4 A. That's my understanding. 
5 Q. What about your documents from the general 
6 contractors? 
7 A. There really has been no documentation 
e from general contractors. 
9 Q. Other than that e-mail we were just 
10 djscussing? 
11 A. CoJl'ect. 
12 Q. Okay. Moving on down to the next bullet 
13 point, "Land use entitlementS processing." It says you 
14 worked closely with consultants and Kootenai County to , 
15 process the rezone. When you say "consultants," to whom, 
16 are you referring? ' 
1 7 A. CLC Associates as architects and 
18 engineers. 
19 Q. Any other consultants? 
2 O A. Not for the rezone. 
21 Q. And can you tell me what your involvement 
22 was in the rezoning process? 
2 3 A. I worked with CLC Associates to complete 
24 and submit the application. I met with and coordinated 
25 with the city planner during the processing. I attended 
Page 77 ~ 
1 and made a presentation at the hearing examiner's 
2 bearing, and also at the Board of Commissioners' 
3 subsequent hearing. 
4 Q. And what was the purpose of your 
5 applic:ation? 
6 A. It was for rezone to commerciai use. 
7 Q. And why did you want it rezoned to 
B commercial use? 
9 A. Because Hughes Investments is a commercial 
10 developer. 
11 Q. Does the property need to be commercially 
12 zoned before you can develop on it? 
13 A. Yes. It was previously zoned agricuJrural 
14 residentia~ something like that. I don't recall the 
15 exact zoning that it was previously. 
1 G Q. And with the agricultural zoning, would 
1 7 you have been able to build your development? 
18 A. That would not have supported a retail 
l 9 c:ommerciat development that we were hoping to cle\,elop. 
2 o Q. If it was zoned agricultural -- strike 
21 that. In its zoning priot to its commerc:ial zoiring, 
22 what, if anything, could you have developed on that 
23 piece of property? 
24 A. I don't know exactly. Low density, 
2 S farming, residential uses. We dicln't investigate that : __ ;
It ,, •• ~,---- __ , ..... ~ ... -
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Pag-e 78 Page so l 
l because that's not our business. 1 A. That wasn't the main reason. j 
2 (Exhibit 1S was marked.) 2 Q. What in paragraph 2 was the main reason? i 
3 BY MR. TOLLEFSON: :3 A. The main reason is the location at the . f 
4 Q. I'm handing you what's been marked as 4 intersection of US-9S and 54. The fact that the freeway 
s Deposition Exhibit 15. If you could just take a moment s was going to be rerouted through the project was not the 
G to look at that. lf you'd take a moment and look at the 6 reason that we asked for the rezone. 
7 second page, please. The second page is Bates numbered 7 Q. What was the reason you asked foT the 
B ITO·HJGRA THOL S 1, and on top of it the document says, B rezone? 
9 11Zone Change Application, 11 and there appears to be a 9 A. Its location at the intersection ofUS-95 
1 o signature there at the bottom that says - dated May 30, 1 o and 54 made it a good commercial property. 
11 2008. Is that your signature? 1J. Q. But it appears from paragraph 2 here that 
12 A. Yes. 12 you were aware that 1-9S was going to c.ross the Grathol 
13 Q. And what is this document? 13 property, was going to be realigned to cross the Grathol i 
14 , A. This is the application to Kootenai County 14 property? l 
1 s to 1rezone the property. 15 A. That's correct 
16 Q. And was this application filled out by l6 Q. What plans did you have to accommodate the 
l 7 you? 1 7 utilities at this time? 
18 A. It was. 18 A, Clarify that question. 1 
19 Q. I'd like you now to tum to - I believe 19 Q. Fair enough. You had earlier testified I 
2 o it's Exhibit A3, Bai:es No. ITO-HJORA THOL 54. And at the 2 o that you talked to two general contractors about the 
21 top oftbe page it says, "Zone Change Application Hughes 21 expenses and costs it would take to get the utilities 
22 Investments." Do you see that? 22 from one section of your parcel through the ITD's l 
23 A. Yes. 23 right-of-way to your other section of the parcel. At 1 
24 Q. And. then narrative responses. What is 24 the time that this zone change application was filled J'. 
2 s this docUil'lent? 2 s out, what was your plan for that utility line? 1-------------------1------------,.__-----=--------1 
Pag-e 79 Page Bl 
l A. The zone change application has categories l A. At the time of this application, it was 
2 of standard questions that need to be answered as part 2 our belief that, as part of the taking and construction 
3 of the application that the county requires to show what 3 of the freeway, that ITD would cooperate with us and l 
4 the applicant is justifying as support for his 4 provide for those means of utility crossings. ! 
5 application. S Q. And what do you base that on? 1 
6 Q. And did you fill out this application? G A. That we felt ITO was going to be a i 
7 A. Yes. 7 cooperative party since they needed our property and we j 
a Q. If you'd talce a moment and read paragraph s needed to develop our property. l 
9 No. 2. Was this paragraph No. 2 -- was that true and 9 Q. Do you have any documents or I 
1 o accurate to the best of your knowledge at the time it l 0 correspondence which show that ITO would provide you ; 
11 was filled out? ll with these utility lines? l 
12 A. Yes. 12 A. No. We had no discussionsat that time. 
1
, 
13 Q. And ifl understand paragraph No. 2, it 13 Q. You had had no discussions with ITO, but 
14 says that I-9S is soon to begin improvement to full 14 yet you believed that they would provide these utility I 
1s freeway status and be realigned across this property is Unes? I 
16 providing on and off.ramps at the Highway 54 l G A. That was our belief. Mayr clarify 1 
l 7 intersection. Do you see that? l 7 something? ·j 
18 A. I do. 1 s Q, Of course. 
19 Q. Was the infonnation contained in paragraph 19 A. It may not have been that we assumed they 
2 o 2 -- was that the basis for why you wanted this 2 o would install the lines, but that they would allow us to 
21 property-· or excuse me·· the basis you gave to 21 ins1all the lines before they built the freeway. 
22 Kootenai County to have this property rezoned 22 Q. And again, what was that assumptioo based 
2.3 commercial? 23 upon? , 
A. No. 
Q. These are not the reasons? 
24 
25 
24 A. The fact that they needed our property and I 
25 we were proceeding with development of the property. We I 
I.to', .... ·--- ..... .,. __ .,. - .., __ __ ,,1-~o(l,l"OI'~-- ' ,,.:.._..,.,.. h I I ... if' 
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1 Q. If you're not hotel developers, why did 1 Q. And do you recall the date of those I 
i 2 you propose A-Sa that proposed a hotel? 2 documents? 
3 A. Because the site is appropriately -- an 3 A. No, I do not recall the date of those I 
4 appropriate location and use for potential hotel 4 documents, j 
5 development. 5 Q, Did you have those documents in your ! 
6 Q, Did you have any intention of pursuing the 6 p.ossession before o~ after the property was purchased? l 
i i hotel hospitality proposed development on A-Sa? 7 A. Before, I 
8 A. I can't answer that a Q. And you were aware that those weren't I 
' 9 Q. How come? 9 final plans? I I 
10 A. That's not my decision. 10 A. That's correct ' ' 11 Q. Whose decision would that be? 11 Q. Why was •• to your understanding, could ' 
i 12 A. That would be Alan Johnson and Bill 12 this site have been developed without Sylvan Road? I 
I 
13 Hughes' decision. 13 A. Certainly. We didn't need Sylvan Road. I 
14 Q. I'd like to draw you your attention -- on 14 Q, How come? I t 
15 both of these documents A-8a and A-Sb, they both have a 15 A. It doesn't provide any benefit to our l 
I 
16 Sylvan Road running through the middle of them. Do you 16 property. It's a frontage road for people who own i I 
17 see that? 17 property to the north to get to Highway 54 once 95 I 
18 A. Ido. 18 removes any access they had from its frontage. ! I 
19 Q. Did you draw that Sylvan Road on these 19 Q. You said a minute ago that it was your ! 
20 documents? 20 understanding at the time the property was purchased I 
21 A. I drew these documents. 21 that some of the construction wouldn't be completed ! 
I 
22 Q. And why did you put Sylvan Road in this 22 until 2020. Was that correct? ' 
I 
23 configuration? 23 A. Based on the first initial meeting with ! 
24 A. That was the input we bad received from 24 ITD, that was what their estimate to us was, that the i I 
25 ITO as to how a frontage road was going to be provided, 25 ultimate freeway improvements would not be completed 1 
I 
Page 87 Page 89 : 
l Q, And when you say "was going to be 1 until that time. 
2 provided," provided by whom? 2 Q, But however, Hughes Investments still 
3 A. Plaos we had received from ITD for what's 3 purchased the property? 
4 called, I believe, the Athol brown alternative, which 4 A. That's correct. 
s was the preferred a)temative, showed in blue on one of 5 Q. I'd just draw your attention real quick to 
6 those aerial photograph exhibits. A frontage road in 6 A· 1. It's on Bates No, 458. I believe it's another 
7 approximately this configuration. 7 copy of the zone change application that you signed. Do 
8 Q, Did you know if·· did you know when that 8 you see that? 
9 Sylvan Road was going to be oonstructed? 9 A. Yes, 
10 A. At this point that this was drawn, there 10 Q. The date on that is May 30, 2008. Is that 
ll had only been one meeting, preliminary meeting. w.ith 11 correct? 
12 ITD, in Febl'llalY of that year. And the timeline for 12 A. That's correct. 
13 construction of the freeway was told as this plan 13 Q, Do you recall when this property was 
14 indicates that 1-95 was going to be developed as a 14 purchased? 
lS four-Jane at-grade signalized int:exsections between 2009 15 A. I believe it was May 2008, but I don't 
16 and 2011, and then the ultimate full freeway would be 16 know the e;<a.ct date. 
17 developed with grade separation at Highway 54, and it 17 (Exhibit 17 was marked.) 
18 was our w,,derstanding that Highway 54 would be depressed 18 BY MR. TOLLEFSON: 
19 llnder an at-grade freeway and that that development 19 Q. Handing you what's been marked as 
20 would occur by about 2020. 20 Deposition Exhibit No. 17, on this first page, it has a 
21 Q. Okay. And what did you base these 21 warranty deed dated May 22, 2008. And then if you flip 
22 assumptions on of how the project was going t.o be 22 back seve..ral pa.:,oes to Bates No. 737, there is a.11other 
23 constructed? 23 warranty deed dated October 15, 2009. Do you see those? 
24 A. The Athol brown documents that we received 24 A. Yes. 
25 from ITO. 25 Q . Have you seen these documents before? .......  -..-.. -. -. ----.----.-. -.. -. -, ____ -.-.. -.-.. ----------------·----. -.-. .....i----,-. ....;.. __________________ ~---.. ----... , 
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l A. Probably. 1 July 2, 2008, Planner Donald Davis stated that the 
2 Q. I want to draw your attention to the first 2 Higbway 9S improve.men~ in 'the area are currently in the 
3 page, Bates No. 793. It says1 "For value received, 3 design phase so the exact footprint of the new alignment 
4 North Alpine Development"·· I'll paraphrase -- "North 4 has not yet been determined 11 Do you see that sentence? 
s Alpine Development sells and conveys unto Gracal S A. I do. 
6 Corporation." Do you see that paragraph? 6 Q. Does that accurately reflect your 
? A. Yes. 7 understanding of the situation as it existed at this 
8 Q. And again, I apologize. How do you 8 time? 
9 pronounce - 9 A. Yes. 
10 A. Gracal. 10 Q. l'dlikctomovedowntothenext 
11 Q. Gracal. Is it your unclerstandingthat 11 paragraph, also in section2.12, and it start9, "In a 
12 this was the warranty deed which transferred the 12 letter dated July 28, 2008. Litkes Highway District 
13 interest from North Alpine Development to Gracal 13 .Engineer Eric Shanley stated that the developer of this 
14 Coiporation? 14 project should be ieq_uited to dedicat.e sufficient 
1 s A. That would be my understanding. ls right--of-way for the focal :frontage roads as defined by 
16 Q. And the date is May 22, 2008. And how 16 the Highway 9S project. fl Do you see that? 
17 does Gracal Coiporation figure into the Hughes 17 A I do. 
1 e Development/HJ Grathol structure? 18 Q. Does that accurately reflect your 
19 A. GracaJ •• I can't answer that clearly. I 19 Ubderstanding of the situation as it existed at the time 
2 o know Grac:al is an entity of Hughes Investments, but I 2 o this cloc~ent was created? 
21 don't know the details. 21 A. That.reflects Lakes Highway District's 
2 2 Q. But it's fair to say that Hughes .2 2 desire. 
2 3 Investments through Gracal purchased the property on May 2 3 Q. And did you not believe that developers of 
24 22 of 2008? 24 the product should be required to dedicate sufficient 
25 A. Correct 25 right-of.way for the local :frontage roads? 
Page 91 Page 93 
1 Q. And then that property was subsequently 1 A. We didn't believe that was our 
2 transferred to HJ Grathol on or about October 15, 2009. 2 responsibility, but the application. it's my 
3 Does that seem accurate to you? 3 understanding •• and it proved to be true •• this 
4 A. I guess. 4 application was not the venue for conditions of approval j.· 
5 Q. Fair enough. So just ifl understand this S such as that. j 
5 correctly, the warranty deed is dated May 22, 2008 and G Q. What would be the venue for conditions of j 
7 the zone change application was dated May 30, 2008. Is 7 approval? 1 
a it fair to assume that prior to purchase of the property a A. I don't know. j 
9 that you had already started to work on the documents 9 Q. So when you say ''conditions of approval," , 
lo and infonnation necessary to create the zone change lo conditions of approval to build your project. Is that 'j 
11 application? 11 cor.rect? I 
12 A. That would be correct. 12 A, Entitlement or discretionary action / 
13 Q. Do you recall when you started working on 13 procedures often come with conditions attached that are j 
14 the zone change application? 14 the basis for the approval of the project. I 
15 A. I don't recall-when we started working on lS Q, So in order to build the proj~ as you 
16 the actual application, but it was between March and 16 wanted to see it developed, do you know what conditions 
1 7 May. 17 would be placed upon that project? 
18 Q, Before the property was purchased? 18 A. Are you talking about this specific I 
19 A. Yes. 19 project? , 
2 o Q, I'd like you asain to stay on this Exhibit 2 o Q. rm talking about the project that HJ : 
21 No. 16. And I'd like t.o draw your attention to this 21 Grathol or Hughes Investments intends on developing on I 
22 page 2 of 6, Bates No. 4S3. And on s~tion 2.12 whioh 32 this property? 
23 says "Aooess," do you see that paragraph? 23 A. We're not aware that any conditions of 
24 A. Yes, 24 approval will be levied on the project. We received the 
25 Q. And it says here, ''In an e~mailreceived as rezone, and our next aoplication we arenotaware would . 
-- •••-lelt ...,., ___ , __ _,,__ +-~--~-~-~""'' 9"' ___ , __ ,,I,,,-,,..,__~ 
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1 be subject to conditions of approval. 1 
2 Q, And what would that next application 2 
Page 9G j 
Q, How far along in the process did you get? 
A. The process requires the subroiltal of a 
transportation investigation analysis. We hired '· 3 consist ofl 3 
4 A. It's called a Special Use Permit. 4 
5 Q. And what entity would YC?U send that 5 
6 Special Use Permitto? 6 
7 A. Kootenai County. 7 
8 Q. And Kootenai County, could they impose s 
9 'COijditions? 9 
10 A. I'm not familiar enough with the Special 10 
11 Use Permitprocessto know that. 11 
12 Q. ls it possible that they could impose 12 
13 conditions? 13 
14 A. I suppose it's ,possible. 14 
lntennountain Transportation Resources to prepare that. 
We only got so far before ITD essentially stopped the 
process because they said they could not comment on our 
report until an application had been submitted So we 
were kind of in a Murphy's law situation. 
Q, And when was this - when did ITO 
essentially put a halt to it? 
A. I don't recall. ru say 20101 but I 
don't know for sure. 
Q. Do you recall any communications or 
conversations you bad with ITD to that effect? 
1s Q, Is itpoS'siblethattheycouldimposetbe 1s 
16' C!)nditions requested by Lakes Highway District? 16 
A. Our engineer bad met with them a couple of 1 
times. ~ 
l 7 A. I don'.t Jmow that, but I suppose it m,ig,bt 1 7 Q, And who was your engineer? ' 
1a be possible. . . . 1s 
19 Q. Have you had any contact with Kootenai 19 
2 o County about any Special Use Permits or any permits to 2 o 
21 finish your development? 21 
22 A, We have had discussions and meetings with 22 
23 Kootenai County about movn,g forward with that 2 3 
A. Intermountain Transportation Resources. 
Q. Do you know who at Intermountain 
Transportation Resources met with ITD? 
A. It was either Bill White or his partner. 
Q. So ifl understand this correctly, 
24 application, yes. 24 
2 s Q. And wh~n were those discussions held? 2 s 
Intermountain Transportation Resources, either Bill 
White or his partner, came back and said that you 
couldn't move through the Special Use Permit until ITD } 
Page 95 Page 97 ~ 
l 
l A. Probably 2009 when they started. I can't 1 had commented on your transportation plan, but ITO 
2 give you the exact dates. I don't know for sore. 2 wouldn't do it until you actually filed the claim? I'm 
3 Q. And who did you have those conversations 3 trying to understand where •• 
4 with? 4 A. ru clarify it as best as I can. 
s A Kootenai County Planner. s Q. Thanks. 
6 Q. And who is that? 6 A. We couldn'tsubmit the Special Use Penn it 1 
7 A. I don't recall his name. 7 application until the TIA, transportation investigation 1 
B Q. Do you recall where these discussions took 8 analysis, had been completed, which would be part of the 1 
9 place? 9 application. We could not complete the report, because 
1 O A. In the offices in the Kootenai County 1 o IID would not go further on commenting without us having 
11 Planning Department. 11 an application on file such that the county sent it to 
l2 Q. And generally, do you remember when? 12 them to comment on. 
13 A. Like I said, I don't remember when. We 13 Q. I see. So the county •• what other steps 
14 bad more than one meeting over a period of time, and I 14 did you take to create this Special Use Pennit? 
:L! don't know when those were. 15 A. That was the first major step. The rest 
16 Q. And what were disQ:issed at 1hese meetings? 16 of it is merely an application fonn and providing site 
l? A. The ~ussion centered around what would 1 7 plans that we already had. 
18 be necessary to proceed with the formal development and 1B Q. Did you fill out any applications? 
19 construction of our project. :L9 A. No. The application completion proce,s is 
2 o Q, And did the Kootenai County Planner·· did 2 o jUit before submitta~ and we didn't get to that point. 
21 they tell you what was going to be needed? 21 Q. What required ITD's comments on your 
2 2 A. They told us a Special Use Permit would 2 2 transportation study I your TIA. Exeu3e me? 
23 need to be processed. 23 A. Pardon me? 
l 
2 4 Q, Have you created a Special Use Pennit? 24 Q. What required ITD's input on the TIA? 1 
25 A. We started the process. 2S A. We needed their input relative to the I 
.. ~.i.,.-w.,;.,.,, ·-·--· -·-- - . w\ __ ....._..,... ...... ..,.___ '.-.(,,.'."' ,., ..... \-~==!tJ 
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l design of our project, the traffic counts, locations of 
Page 100 ~ 
l that that Special Use Permit you were talking about? , 
2 access points, et cetera. 
3 Q. So you say that you needed their input 
2 A. Yes. I told you it was something ] 
3 different. Special Notice, not Special Use. I'm sorry. J 
4 I misspoke, It's Special Notice Permit. 4 Was this a requirement from Kootenai County that you 
S have ITD's input? 
6 A. It was our consultant's input that be 
5 Q, So that's the permit that we were talking 
6 abou:t previously? 
7 A. Itis. 7 could not complete the report accurately until he had 
B certain information from IID. 8 Q. And you doti't know what conditions could l 
9 be placed on that Special Notice Permit'? ·, 9 Q. So Intermountain Transportation, either 
10 Bitl White or his partner, they said they couldn't 
11 complete their study until they had gotten input from 
12 ITO? 
13 A. Correct. 
14 MR. MARFICE: Do you need a break? 
1s THE WITNESS: I'm good. 
16 MR. MARFICE: Okay. 
17 MR. TOLLEFSON: Doug, my plan is as soon as rm 
18 done with this document, take lunch. Does that work for 
19 you? 
20 MR.MARFICE: Okay. 
21 BY MR. TOLLEFSON; 
22 Q. All right. Still on page 453, let's move 
23 up one section. It says, "2.11, Water and Sewage 
2 4 Disposal." Do you see that paragraph? 
25 A. Yes. 
1,0 A. No. 
11 Q. What is your understanding of the reasons 
12 why Kootenai County approved the rezone application? 
13 A. They agreed with our application that they 
14 felt it was an appropriate use of the property. 
15 Q. On what basis? 
16 A. Based on the staff analysis presented in 
1 7 their staff report. 
1a Q. And that's the one we were just looking at 
19 on page 5 of 6? 
20 A. Itis. 
21 Q. What reasons did the Kootenai County give 
22 for approving your application? 
2 3 A. They would be stated in this document 
24 Q. Do you have any independent knowledge of 
25 why they approved your application? 
Page 101 I 
1 Q. And it says there, "Water service and 1 A. Nothing other than what was shown in the 
Page 99 
2 sewage disposal have not been specifically addressed in 2 staff report and the hearing examiner's approval. 
3 this application." Is that accurate? 3 Q. So anything that •• so to the best of your 
4 A. Yes. 4 knowledge, any reasons for why Kootenai County approved j 
5 Q. I'd like to now twn to page S of 6. It's s your application, they would be contained in the 
6 Bates No. 456. Do you see that? Are you there yet? 6 Kootenai County documents? 11 
7 A. 456? ? A. My understanding they would have to be. 
s Q, Yes. 8 MR. TOLLEFSON: Well, I don't think I have any 
9 A. Yes. 9 further questions before lunch, so it's a good stopping 
10 Q, Okay. Thank you. Here in the first 10 point before I get another document out. 
ll paragraph, it says, "The Lakes Highway District and the 11 MR. MARFICB: Sure. What's your estimation for 
12 Idaho Transportation Department are concerned with 12 time this afternoon? 
13 accesses to any future development'' Do you see that 13 MR. TOLLEFSON: We're making progress actually, so 
14 sentence? 14 a couple hours. 
1S A. I see it. lS MR. MARFICE: Okay. I need to be done by 4:30. 
16 Q. Do you know what was meant by that 16 MR. TOLLEFSON: That should be okay. Depending. 
1 7 sentence? 1 7 We're not talcing like a really long Junch, are we? 
18 A. I believe, relative to Lakes Highway ie MR. MARFICE: An hour? Is that enough? 
19 District, it was reflecting their concern about the 19 MR. TOLLEFSON: That should be fine. No, I should 
2 O requirement that the county •• the request that the 2 o be done by 4:30. Ii'II be close, but we can make this 
21 requirement for dedication of right-of-way be placed 21 work. 
22 uponus. 
23 Q. The next sentence or down here in the same 
24 paragraph, it says, "Furthermore, if this request is 
22 
23 
MR. MARFICE; Okay, Tha11.k you. 
MR. TOLLEFSON: Off the record. 




I 2 s approved, Sp~ial Notice Permits will be required." Is 25 at 12:10 p.m., resuming at 1:15 p.m.) 
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l the type that would be of value for them to mine as base 
2 to save them money?" Do you see that e-mail? 
3 A. I do. 
4 Q. What were you talking about in tenns of 
5 value of them to mine as base to save them money? Wha1 
6 were you ta~ng about there? 
7 A. We felt, from information that we had 
a about the prop~ out there, that there was significant 
9 amount of gtavel contained in the soil and that there 
10 may be a value to ITO in mining that for base rock for 
11 the freeway construeti~ as opposed to purchasing it 
12 some~ere-el~ and tracking it to the site. 
13 Q. And you said you had infonnation that 
14 there was gravel. Where did you get that information? 
15 A. Our geotechnical consultant told us that 
l G that area was known for its gravelly soils. 
1 7 Q. And when you say "geotechnical 
18 consultant," do you mean Allwest Testing and 
l9 Engineering? 
20 A Ido. 
21 Q. And did they ever perform a report for you 
22 or give you a summary of their findings? 
2 3 A. I don't remember a report. 
24 Q. Do you recall them giving you any 
2 s documents that support that conclusion that there was 
Page 135 
1 some value in the gravel? 
2 A. No. No documents that would support that 
3 They were based on conversations, and based on those 
4 conversations I contacted a local contractor to find out 
5 what base is worth, the value of base, and purchasing it 
6 versus mining it. 
7 Q. And what local contractor did you contact'? 
B A. Unless it's written here, I don't recaU 
9 the name of the contractor, but it was a company in 
lO Rathdrum whose name I was given that was one of the main 
11 providers of base material in the area. 
12 Q. Okay. On page 2, Bates No. 6, it appears 
13 to be an e-mail dated April 7, 2010 from Andy Eliason. 
14 Am I saying that correctly? 
lS A. I think so. 
16 Q. Okay. To you. Jn this he says, "The 
17 unknown"·· this is third sentence •• "The unknown is 
18 the quality ofthe gravel and cobbles they encountered. 
19 If you encountered lightweight, porous rock, it could 
2 o still meet the physic.al classification as gravel but not 
2 l have much work as a structural fill.'' Do you see that 
2 2 senten..ce? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Did Mr. Eliason ever give you a report 
2 S that said that the gravel on the property could be used 
--'-~- ·-·"'··-·'· ....... -
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2 A. I don't believe he did. 
3 Q. Did Mr. Eliason or anyone from Allwest 
4 Testing and Engineering tell you that there was gravel 
s such on the property that ITO could use? 
6 A. As I previously said, based on the 
7 characteristics of the soil in the area, that we were 
8 told there was gravel on the site. 
9 Q. And who told you that there was gravel on 
10 the site? 
11 A. The geotechnfoal consultant, Allwest, Andy 
12 Eliason. 
13 Q. And did the Allwest Testing and 
14 Engineering •• did they tell you that that type of 
15 gravel Wa.5 the type that ITO could use? 
l G A. They had not tested that type of gravel, 
l 7 so they weren't aware. That's why they wrote this 
18 e-mail. 
19 Q, Okay. So back to the first page, then, -j 
2 O page 5. It appears to be an ewmail at the bottom. It's 
21 from you, appears to be to Alan Johnson and Bill Hughes 
22 dated April 8, 2010. It says, "Follow up to his 
2 3 voicemail." Do you know who "bis" voicemail would be? 
24 A. By the way the e-mail is written, I would 
25 guess it was Andy Eliason's voicemail. 1 
Page 137 
l Q. And you then write, "My bet would be that 
2 ITD will have their engineer do a separate test on the 
3 gravel material and report subsequent to the one that 
4 they 'share' with us, so as not to play their hand." 
s Why did you put "share" in quotes? 
6 A. It was my opinion that any geotechnicat 
7 report we would receive from ITD would not have any l 
B information on testing the gravel or its quality to 
9 reuse as base. 
10 Q. And why wouldn't it? j 
ll A. Because if there was value in using the : 
12 gravel as base, they perhaps, in my opinion, would not • 
13 want us to know about it. j 
14 Q. All right. The next e-mail up, it says I 
15 from Bill Hughes to you, and it says, ''How valuable is 
16 the gravel, presuming it is the right kind?" Do you 
17 know what Mr. Hughes meant by the "presuming it is the 
18 right kind''? 
19 A. He had read the e-mail string to date, and 
2 O based on what Andy had said about the quality of one 
2 l gravel versus another, there would have been a right i 
I 22 kind and a wrons kind, a.T}d Bil! ,va.s curious to know if i 
2 3 the gravel was the kind that could be reused, what value ]1 
2 4 it might provide. 
I 
25 
Q. so,!~-~~-~.:~.-~! at the ti~: --. -~ ,, _,n 
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1 Q. It says, "Approved for two hotels, l in touch with the property owner. l 
2 restaurant, fast food, gas." What does that mean? 2 Q. On the next line down it says, ''The J 
3 A. The project is approved as what is called 3 Crossings (CDA, ID, Appleway/Northwest Boulevard.)" Is j 
4 a master plan resort in conjunction with Cabela's rettil 4 that a location here in Coeur d'Alene? ·1 
s development in Post Falls, and we have processed it for s A Yes. j 
6 a hospitality element of a master planned resort. 6 Q. Are you familiar with this project? l 
7 Q. And I think we had already discussed you 7 A. I'm sure I am. I just can't place which l 
8 weren't aware of any•• or you wouldn't know if there e one it is right now. The Crossings. Oh. Yes. I'm ~ 
9 were leases or tenants in this development? 9 familiar with that. j 
10 A. I do not know the status of the marketing lo Q. How big was that project? 
11 of that site. l l A If it's the site -- I think it's the site 
12 Q. Next one down it says, "Spokane Street: 12 where Wince Foods is supposed to go, but they have yet 
13 Spokane Street and 1-90, Post Falls, Idaho." Are you 13 to build their project. They graded it. I'm not sure 
14 familiar with this project'? 14 of the exact size, but it's·· I'm guessing between 20 
15 A. I am familiar with that project. 15 and 30 acres. 
16 Q. It says, "Escrow terminated due to lack of 15 Q. It says, ''Negotiations terminated." Do 
1 7 tenant demand." Do you see that? l 7 you know what that means? 
18 A. Yes. l 8 A I'm not certain what that means. 
19 Q. So "escrow tenninated" what does that lSl Q. Does that mean that p,oject is not going 
20 mean? 20 foJWard? 
21 A. We were jn an agreement to purchase some 21 A. l don't know that that's what that means. 
22 property in Post Falls. I had done some plans. Alan 22 You'd have to ask Alan. 
23 had talked with and marketed to various tenants. But 23 Q. And the next one down is ''Riverstone." 
24 due to the economy, tenant interest was not forthcoming 24 And it looks like also in Coeur d'Alene, and Hughes is l 
2 s and we dropped the project and did not continue to buy 2 s under contract to buy a one-acre pad site in the 1 




1 Riverstone Center. Are you familiar with this project? J 
Q. Do you know how big that property was? 2 A. I am. , 
A. Approximately four acres, but I'm not sure 3 Q. And it appears that someone else bought J 
4 of the exact size. 4 it? I 
s Q. Next one down says, "Plaza Coeur d'Alene s A. Correct. j 
6 (CDA, ID.)" Is it "9S/Agua"? 6 MR. TOLLEFSON: Here's what I propose to do, Doug, , 
7 
8 
A. Yes. 7 if we can take like a five-minute break, and I'm going ij 
Q. What does that mean? 8 to go through my notes and make sure I've covered 
9 A. That's Highway 9S and Aqua Road in Coeur SJ everything, and ifit is, we'll call it a day. I 
lO d'Alene. 10 MR. MARF'ICB: Okay. Good. 
I 
l l Q. All right. And are you familiar with this 11 (Recess taken.) !' 
12 project? 12 BY MR. TOLLEFSON: , 
A. I am. 13 Q. Priorto Hughes Investments purchasing the J 
Q. It says, "Proposed project." What is the 14 property, what was your involvement wjth the •• did you 1 
13 
14 
1 s proposed project? 15 participate in any af tbe mvesusation prior to 
16 A. We have been working on that for years, 16 pu~a.sing the property? 
l? have done several site plans, have talked to several 1 "J A. Between.Februaey of'08 and May of '08 
1 e tenants; but again, because of the economy, no tenants 18 when we purchased the property, I did the site plan 
1.9 have committed to the site yet, so we are still in the .19 studies. 
20 mix for that, but we don't have .. it's a proposed 20 Q. Were you aware if Hughes Investments or 
21 project. We don't have any deals pending and we are 21 any other entity had any apprailats done on the 
22 not, as far as! know, in escrow. 22 property? 
2 3 Q, And it appears that Hughes Investments 2 ~ A. Other than what was done froi:n Scott Auble, 1 
24 does not own that property? :24 no. , 
2 S A. No, we do not. We keep an •• Alan keeps 2 s Q. Do you know what Scott Auble did? 1 ~=-==========-=======--~--~-~--~.":": ..~ .. -~ ..~~.~-,=====i==:c .....-:::-=.= ... ~ ..~ .•• ::":' .. -=,,-"":',":":,.-:--= ...=·-=-=-=-=~ ...~ .... ' 
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3 MARY V. YORK. Attorney at Law, of the furn of HOLLAND & 
HART, Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza, Boise, Idaho 
4 83701-2527, appearing for and on bchalfoflhe 
Plaintiff. 
5 
J, TIM THOMAS, Deputy Attorney General, Idaho 
6 Transportation Department, Post Office Box 7129, Boise, 
Idaho 83707-1129, appearing for and on bcholf ohhe 
7 Plaintiff. 
8 DOUGLAS S. MARFICE, Attorney at Law, of the finn of 
RAMSDBN & LYONS, 700 Northwest Boulevard, Post Offi«: 
9 Box 1336, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336, appearing for 
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l THE DEPOSITION OF DEWITT M. "SKIP'' SHERWOOD, ws 
2 taken on behnlfof'the PLAINTIFF, on NOVEMBER 16., 2011, 
3 at the offices ofM & M COURT REPORTING, 816 SHERMAN 
4 A VENUE, COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO, before M & M CoW't 
5 Reporting Seivices, Inc., by JULIE MCCAUGHAN, Court 
6 Reporter and Notary Public within end for the State of 
7 Idaho, to be used in an action pending in the District 
8 Court of the First Judicial District for the State of 
9 Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, said cause 
10 being Case No. CV10· 1009S in said Court. 
n AND THEREUPON, the following testimony was 
12 adduced, to wit: 
13 (Exhibit 2 was marked.) 
14 DEWITTM ''SKIP" SHERWOOD, 
15 having been first duly sworn to tell the truth, the 
16 whole truth, and nothing but the truth, relating to said 
l 7 cause, dep0ses and says: 
18 EXAMINATlON 
19 QUESTIONS BY MS. YORK: 
2 o Q. This is the time set for the deposition of 
21 DeWitt M ... Skip is the name you go by? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Sherwood. And it is November 16. aboul 
24 9:40 a.m. And Mr. Sherwood, I am going to hand you 
2 5 what's been marked as Deposition Exhibit 2. Have you 
l seen this document before? 
Pages 
2 TESTIMONY OF DEWITT M. "SKIP" SHERWOOD 
3 Examination by Ms. York 4 
PAGE 2 y I'--· A. es, 1m.ve. 
4 
s DEPOSITlON EXHIBITS: PAGE 
6 2 Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum for 4 
Dewitt M, "Skip'' Sheiwood 
7 
3 Appraisal 47 
B 
9 
4 Aerial Photograph with Overlay 167 
S Concept Site Plans Bates Stamped. 

















Comps for Kootenai County 
Approximate Values and Sizes 
over the Past Pour Y cars 
169 





3 Q. And I guess before we get to the document, 
4 would you mind stlting yow- name and spelling your last 
s name for the record? 
G A. De Witt M. Sherwood, D-e-w-i-t-t, middle 
7 initial M, S-b-e+w~o-d. 
8 Q, And what is the address of your residence? 
9 A. Bast 8916 Parkside Lane, Spokane, 99217. 
10 Q. All right. In your deposition notice, it 
11 is a Duces Tecum Notice, and you were requested, 
12 pursuant to this notice, to bring with you to this 
13 deposition a number of documents. Did you do that? 
14 A Yes1 I did. 
1s Q. What did you bring, if you could swnnuuize 
lG formi? 
17 A. It's what I would call my entire wOTking 
18 file in this case. Notes, everything to date that rve 
19 accomplished on it. 
2 o Q, Is this the entire file? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. ls there anything that you reHed upon in 
23 this case that you did not bring? 
24 A. There may be times that I have phone 
2 5 conferences with somebody that could have been from a 
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l A. WeJl, typically, more often than not, 1 A. Sure. Just to help me clarify, 
2 they're before-and-after valuations which is completely 2 Q. We're talking aboUt the condition in a 
3 different. Sometimes there are total takes, but •• so 3 before-and-after appraisal report, what consideration do 
4 you're viewing a property two ways versus one. 4 you give to the improvements that are anticipated to be 
S Q. Any other differences? S constructed on the project? 
6 A. Depending on the type of property, there 6 A. Well, that's going to be what happens to 
7 are lots of other considerations that go into a ? the properties, not the true before situation. 
8 condemnation appraisal than the typical appraisal. a Q. Okay. So would it be fiur to say that 
9 Q. Like what? 9 when you're looking at a property in the before 
lo A. If you're dealing with an improved l O condition, you are to look at the property without any 
11 property, oftentimes it involves taking of anything from 11 consideration of the project that's to be built? 
12 landscaping to parking that would impact the remainder 12 A. That's correct 
J.3 of the property. 13 Q. So to say it more concretely, with respect 
14 Q. Any other COJ1siderations other than the 14 to the Grathol property, there's going to be an 
15 type of property that's being taken how you value the 15 interchange constructed on the property. Correct? 
16 various improvements? 16 A. Yes. 
17 A. Each case is oftentimes specific to what's l 7 Q. So in the before condition, you look at 
1 B being done, but they are definitely different than a 18 the property, assuming that that interchange is not 
19 typical appraisal assignment. 1 ~ going to be constructed. 
20 Q. Any other differences other than different 2 O A. That is correct. 
21 considerations and the before-and-after approach to 21 Q. And that's bow you would look at it in 
22 valuation? 22 its, as you stated i~ the true before condition? 
23 A. Oftentimes it might be a case that we have 2 3 A. Co,rect. 
2 4 a cost to cure which would be something different than a 2 4 Q. In addition to assuming that the project's 
25 typical appraisal. 25 not being construct~ when you're looking at a property 
Page 39 Page 4l 
I 
l Q. Any other differences? l in the before condition, do you also assume that it's I 
2 A. Those are the primary that come to mind. 2 not intended to be constructed, so you're looking at the j 
3 Q. Severance damages? 3 property as if it's not planned and it's never going to ; 
4 A. Sometimes associated with damage to the 4 be constructed? j 
s remafader, yes. 5 A. Yes. The true before situation. ·1 
6 Q. Would you describe what is involved in 6 Q. I hadn't heard that tenn before, the true , 
7 doing a before-and-after valuation? 7 before situation, but I like it. So the true before ' 
a A. Well, a before-and-after is where there's 8 situation is, assuming the project is not being built. J 
9 a taking and there's property left in the after. 9 Correct? j 
10 Q. And what are the assumptions - start with 10 A. Yes. i 
11 the before condition. What are the assumptions that you l1 Q. All right. When we tum to the Qfter , 
J 
12 are to take into account when looking at a property in 12 condition, what are the assumptions that you take into !' 
13 the before condition? 13 accowtt when looking at the property in the after 1 
14 A. In its true condition what it is in the 14 condition? 1 
15 before situation. 15 A. Understanding what's being taken, j 
l 6 Q. What does that mean in the before 16 elevation changes, the access that the property has. a 1 
17 true look at your best picture of what it will be in the l l 7 situation? 
18 A. It's prior to taking any of the property. 
19 Q. What consideration do you give or not give 
2 0 to the proposed project or improvement th.at is to be 
21 constructed on the project when you're looking at a 
22 property in the before condition? 
2 3 A. I think I understand your question, but 
24 maybe-
2 s Q. Do I need to rephrase that? 
18 future when something is constructed. ! 
1.9 Q. So you look at the property as if the I 
2 o project is completed and done? I 
21 A. Yes. 




A. When it gets completed. 1 
Q. What do you mean by that? ! 
A. Well, in this case, if we're building an j 
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1 interchange, we may have a map that shows us what's letl 1 
2 over today, but the real after value occurs at the point 2 
Q. And that's your after value date of value? 
A Yes. 
3 that that improvement is complete and it is what it is 
4 in the after situation. 
s Q. . All right. So I appreciate that, but what 
6 date are you looking at that? What dat~ are you valuing 
7 itas of? 
8 A. In the report that I made jn this case, I 
9 projected out into the future two different dates, 
lo They're contained in that report that I Mote. 
11 Q. We'll turn to the actual date ofvalue. 
12 So you're saying it's your testimony that in the after 
13 consideration, you are to value the property as of the 
14 anticipated completion date? 
15 A. That's what I think is the relevant date. 
16 It isn't just like we give you the property today and 
17 we've got a remnant pi~e her.e, but there's no road, so 
18 the piece that's left over might be out in the :field as 
19 the property's still sitting there, 
2 o Q. So is your testimony that the after value 
21 is to be valued as of the date that the project's to be 
22 completed? Correct? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. And for the Grathol property, you valued 
25 the property in the after condition as of the 
Page 43 
l anticipated completion date. Correct? 
2 A. That is correct. 
3 Q. And what was that anticipated completion 
4 date? 
5 A. rd have to look in the report, and we can 
6 go there, if you'd iike, at this point. 
7 Q. We will go there in a second, but does it 
8 sound right that you estimated about a year and a ha1f 
9 to two years out? 
lo A. That is my recollection, yes, 
3 Q. Is it your testimony that that date of 
4 valuation is what's required by Idaho law? 
5 A. I don't know that any state would have a 
6 law that specifically addresses that. If they do, I am 
7 not aware ofit. 
8 Q. So you're not aware ofldaho's law 
9 governing date of valuation? 
lo A. With regard to a specific date in an after 
11 situation, no. 
12 Q. When were you hired in this case? 
13 A. I would have said it would have probably 
14 been early spring of 2010. 
15 Q. Who hired you? 
16 A. Mr. Marfice. 
1 7 Q. And what were you asked to do? 
18 A. I think at the initial meeting, we met at 
19 his office. I think he had a copy of Mr. Moe's i 
20 appraisal of the property. I think Mr. Johnson was at l 
21 that meeting. Just a brief discussion of the case in ! 
2 2 general. : 
23 Q. And what were you asked to do? 
2 4 A. I think from the first meeting, basically j 
2 s we wa I think Mr. Johnson was auite famiHar with the 
Page 45 J 
1 appraisal of the property. It was a first look to me, j 
2 but my recollection was to review and report back. i 
3 Q. Review what? i 
4 A. Just review - look at the appraisal of I 
s the property, consult, give some ofmy opinions with : 
6 regard to the valuation. ! 
7 Q. In early spring of 2010 when you were i 
B hired, were you asked to do your own independent j 
9 appraisal? , 
10 A. Not atthattime. I 
I 
ll Q. Okay. And just so I'm clear on the date, l1 Q. When were you asked to do your own 
12 you're estimating the after value as of one and a half 12 
13 to two and a half years from the date of your appmsal. 13 
14 Correct? 14 
15 A. That is correct 15 
16 Q. And the date of your appraisal is A!_!guSt 16 
17 25,2011? 17 
18 A. It was actually back in ... . . 1 s 
19 Q. rm sorry. 2010. Excuse me. 19 
20 A. 2010, yes. 20 
21 Q. Is that right? 2011. 21 
22 A. I wwpleted that as of September 151 2010. 22 
23 Q. Okay. Soitwouldbeayearandahalfto 23 
.24 two and a half years from September 15, 2010? 24 
25 A. Co1Tect. 25 
.__... •••• - • ~-.i ......... __ .. ·- .. ,v.-,., • 
independent appraisal? 
A. That would have been probably a couple , 
months after that. i 
Q. So summer of 2010? 1 
A. Roughly. i 
Q. When you were asked to do you, independent ,I 
appraisal of the Grathol property, had you already ! 
reviewed Mr. Moe's appraisal? ! 
A. Y~- I 
' · Q. And had you already formulated your , 
! opinio!'.s with respect to Ms appraisal.? 1 
A. I don't know that I had -· there were j 
certainly some notes and things that we discussed, i 
f 
strengths of the report, weaknesses of the report. i 
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1 (Recess taken.) l A. I do not. 



























Q. We're back on the record now. Before the 
quick break, we were mlking about at what point in time 
you were going to be finalizing your appraisal report 
And you indicated that you may be finalizing yow- report 
and your opinions possibly up until a week before trial. 
Is that accurate of what you stated? 
A . I believe so. 
Q. Okay. You testified earlier that the date 
of value in this case in the before condition you stated 
it was September of2010. Correct? 
A, For the date of my report? 
Q. Yes. 
A. When this was completed, yes. 
Q. And then in the after condition, you 
stated that the date of valuation was the completion 
d~e of the project Is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So with those date ofvaluations, how can 
anything that happens after the date of valuation be 
relevant to your opinions ofvalue? 
A. Please ask that one more time just to 
clarify. 

























Q. Can you tell me what your definition is 
that you used in this case for market value? 
A. It would be what I describe as the typical 
market value definition with willing buyer, willing 
seller, open market, neither party under undue stress, 
both acting in their own best interest to procure a 
piece of real estate that ultimately closes. 
Q. And what is the source of that definition 
that you've relied upon for market value? 
A. That's an FDIC definition is my 
recollection. A federal definition. 
Q. And what is the definition that you use 
for the tenn "just compensation"? 
A. The difference in the before~and-afte,: 
value. 
Q. And what is the calculation or process 
that you go through, in general terms, to arrive at a 
'1ust compensation" figure? 
A. You prepare your before valuation and your 
after valuation, and the difference between the two 
represents the compensation. 
Q. And what is included generally in the 
amount of just compensation? 
MR. MARFICE: Bxcuse me. I want to interpose an 
Page 67 Page 69 
l you use for your dates of value. And my question to you l objection. Are you asking for the witness' definition 
2 is: How can anything that happens after the date of the 2 of the legal term "just compensation'' or the term ·~ust 
3 valuation with respect to the Grathol property affect or 3 compensation" as it's used in the report? 1 
4 change your value conclusions? 4 MS. YORK: As he used it in his report. 1 
s A. Wel~ I believe I testified earlier that 5 MR. MARFICE: Okay. Is it used in the report? J 
6 it's my opinion that I'm viewing as after value when 6 MS. YORK: Well, I asked him how be O& what his l 
j 
7 this project is completed. So that we know is a moving 7 definition is for that term. I 
8 target on its actual completion date. So that could be 8 Q. Did you use that term in this report? 
9 relevant to changing the way I analyze the property. 9 A. Did I use the term "jUSt compensation"? I 
1 o Q. So is your testimony that you use two l O don't believe that I did. I think I reported a 
11 different dates of valuation in your before-and-after l l before-and.after valuation. 
12 analysis? 12 Q. Okay. What is the goal or purpose of your 1 
13 A. Yes. My after value is predicated upon 13 report? I 
l4 the assumption of when that date is completed. 14 A. To assist Mr. Martice in this case with my ! 
1s Q. You used two different valuation dates 15 opinion of the before-and-after value oftbis property i 
I 
J.6 between the before condition and the after condition. lG due to this condemnation. ' 
17 Correet? l 7 Q. Okay. And what is the end value that you 11 
18 A. That is correct. 18 reached? What's the tenninology that you would use to 
19 Q. Is that in accordance with USP AP? 19 describe what your figure that you arrive at to 
2 o A. I don't know that USP AP has anything that 2 o detennine what the amount of compensation that is owed 
21 covers that situation. 21 in this oase to Grathols, to HJ Grathol? 
22 Q. Is that in compJiance with Idaho !aw, as 22 A I'm sorry, That's a long question. 
2 3 fur as you're aware? 2 3 Q. Sure, !appreciate that. I'm just trying J 
24 A. That, I do not know. 24 to make sure that we're on the same Pllie, referring to 
2: ___ _.,~:. :~~-~~~~~-~.~~~~---~-~-~~~,,same tenninolo~. !~ ~~~~~~ d_~o~~~ur 
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l end figure, the ultimate amount of compensation you 1 there's that discounting sum that's included in your 
2 believe is owed in this case? 2 figure. Is that correct? 
3 A. How would I describe it? It's the 3 A. That's correct. 
4 difference between the before-and-after value. 4 Q. Is there any other severance damages? 
5 Q, Okay, So that in the course of this s A. Not at this point in time. 
' 
6 deposition, should e1tery time we refer to that number, 6 Q. Do you anticipate to include any other 
7 we should say it's the figure you arrived at that's the 7 severance damages? I 8 difference between the before-and-after conclusion, or 8 A. There may be. 9 can we say that that's your determination of value, 9 Q. In what respect? 
10 that's your detennination of just compensation? I don't 10 A. There's I think the last meeting that I 
11 care what we call it. 11 had on this case, and I did some more reading with 
12 A. If '1ust compensation'' is an easier word, 12 regard to Sylvan Road that appears to be up in the air 
j 13 let's say that 13 whether or not •• it certainly doesn't look like it's 
14 Q. Okay. Fair enough. And just so we're 14 anticipated to be completed, but there are a lot of 
15 clear, that number that we're going to call "just 15 indications that it will be built. And it's unknown who 
16 compensation" is your determination of the before value 16 would build it and whose road it would be. 
17 minus the after value, and that's bow you reached that l '7 Q. Oby. So at this point, yaur opinion of 
18 end number that we're calling just cornpeasation? 18 value and your amount ~termination of just compensation ·1 
19 A. That is correct. 19 does not include any sums relating to sylvan Road? j 
20 Q. Okay. What, generally speakiog, goes into 20 A. That's correct 
21 or is included in that figure of just compensation? And 21 Q, What else •• this goes back to my earlier j 
22 what I mean by that question •• typically it's the value 22 question that you stated that there may be some 
23 of the property being taken and any severance damages 23 severance damages to be added tO your amount of just 
24 that are caused to the remainder. Would you agree with 24 compensation at some point in the future. In addition 
2S that? 2S to Sylvan Road, what other types of severance damages do 
Page 71 Page '73 
1 A. Yes. l you think could be inclucled in your opinions of value? 
2 Q. Okay. In your opinion, is there anything 2 A. I think those are primary. Mr. Johnson 
3 else that's included in that figure of just 3 relayed something in a communication that they have 
4 compensation? 4 built their own private sewer system on it and some of 
s A. I think that summarizes them all, but as 5 the property that would be on the west side of this 
6 we taiked earlier, many cases have many elements to them 6 after the take wouldn't be capable. of using that sewer 
7 that aren't just raw lan~ and there are improvements, 7 system because it would have to cross the right of way 
8 cost to cure items, in cases, which are, in fact, 8 for the freeway. There may be some issue with regard to 1 
9 severance damages, I guess, but there are other 9 that. That's not contained in my analysis. I 
lo considerations depending on the type of property. 1 o Q. 'Why wouldn't that be contained in your I 
l l Q. For the Orathol property, what's jncluded ll analysis? Isn't that information you would have known j 
12 in the just compensation figure, generally speaking? l 2 before you prepared your report? J 
l 3 A. The before-and-after land value, and 13 A. I don't think that I - I wasn't aware of / 
14 there's some discounting in there for the fact that, 14 that until after. 
1 s although the possession of this property was granted, 15 Q, WoUldn't that have been information that 
16 the project is not completed and my after value is 16 would have been important to know before you concluded 
1? predicated upon the presumption that it will be l.? your report? 
l 8 completed as to the best of my understanding of what 18 A. It eould have. 
19 rve seen in the docwnents. 19 Q. Is that a consideration that you took into 
2 o Q. So your figu.re of just compensation 2 o account before your report, the fact that there may be a 
2 l includes value for the property taken, Correct? 21 sewer treatment plant and what the impacts would be as a 
22 A. Yes. 22 resu1t? 
2 3 Q. And then as you described it, a value for 2 3 A, I knew they were building a treatment 
2 4 discounting of values due to your use of the after value 24 plant That was just a consideration that was discussed 
2 5 being the date that the project's to be completed1 so 2 s after the fact that I didn't include in this analysis i 
~. -:::.~ .~ ...~ ..-=-~· -=-~-=:-:i:. ====~ ..~ .. ~--~, -=·==::::::;:=~-~~--~ ..-:.-;::,.:'!"., = .. ~=====:=-":1" .. =-:::: .. ,,:'I'.,,.::-::: •• :=-=::.:,~-=~::"";. -::-:::·~====~--:"':,.~~·· 
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l before-and-after. 
2 Q. So I think perhaps - oh, let xne just 
3 finish off that l~t line of questioning. So in 
4 addition to Sylvan Road, possibly any additional damages 
s that you think might be out there as a result of-- how 
G did you characterize it7 The sewage treatment plant on 
7 the property? 
8 A. It was regarding the fact that a parcel 
, 9 that would have been able to utilize that sewer 
lo treatment system won't be able to utilize it in the 
11 after situation, but still the number would be that it's 
12 a parcel of land that I valued at the same rate. There 
13 might be a -- certainly would be a benefit i! it had use 
14 of a sewer treatment plant, but it wouldn't be a 
15 consideration in this. 
16 Q. So in addition to those two items, any 
l '7 additional severance dam.ages that you think might be 
18 included at so.me future time in your values? 
1.51 A- Not at this time. 
20 Q. So just tho.se two. And when will you know 
21 for certain whether you're going to be including those 
22 aspects of potential damages in your opinions? 
23 A. As we get closer to trial and ifwe leam 
24 anything more about tbe Sylvan Road issue. 
25 Q. Are you aware that there was an expert 
NO. 3877 P. 29/48 
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1 versus the individual segments of the GatWood-to-Sagle 
~ project. The Garwood~to-Sagle project is being divided 
3 into a number of separate segments. One of those 
4 segments is the one that involves the Grathol property. 
S That's referred to as the Athol segment. So can we have 
6 a common understanding that, betWeen you and I, when we 
7 refer to the project, that we're just referring to the 
s Athol segment of the project and not the entire 
9 Garwood-to-Sagle project? 
1 o A. I think I understand and agree. 
11 Q. Okay. Just because there's some 
12 confusion, and I just want to make sure that the 
l3 record's clear. So unless we say otherwise, we are just 
14 referring to the portion of ITD's project that relates 
15 to the construction of the Athol segment of the project. 
l6 Now, are you familiar with that segment oftbe project 
17 and what it entails? 
18 A. I know that it's being done in segments. 
19 I don't know exactly how many, I've looked at other 
2 o properties along the way. I know some of it has been 
21 constructed south of this loeation. And I understand 
22 those things. 
2 3 Q. Okay. With respect to the Athol segment, 
24 which we'll now be referring to as "the project," what's 
25 your understanding of what improvements are being made 
Page 75 
I 
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l 
l disclosure deadline in this case? l by Ito to U.S. 9S? 
2 A. rm sure there typically are, but I don't 2 A. Weli at this .. with regard to this 
3 know what date it was. 3 specific location, there will be an interchange with 
4 Q. So when you were preparing your report, 4 Highway S4 that the new highway will cross Highway 54, 
5 you weren't aware that there was a specific date by s And there are on- and off-ramps associated with it. 
6 whieh you were supposed to have your report finalized? 6 Q. Okay. Fair enough. Would you. describe, 
7 A. I didn't know what it was. I'm assuming 7 in general terms, the Oratbol property, where it's at, 
s Mr. Marfice did. a general topography, surrowiding uses? Can you just give 
9 Q. Let's tum now to the Grathol property in 9 me a general description of the Grathol property? 
10 particular. And before we start this conversation, I 10 A. Sure. It's the intersection of Highway 95 
11 think we better get on board with the same terms so that ll and 54. It's a signaled intersection. There are tum 
12 we're not confusing terms back and fonh. When I refer 12 lanes in all directions. The larger parcel is 
13 to the Grathol property, what I'm meaning by that is the 13 approximately S7 acres. It's generally level. The 
l4 property that's owned by HJ Grathol, previously owned by l 4 times I've been, the first couple trips to the property, 
1 s Grathol Corporation. So are we square that when I say 1 s it's generally treed with smaller ponderosa pine. I 
16 "the Grathol :property," that's what I'm refening to? 16 visited the site last Friday. The segment that is under 
1 7 A. Yes. 1 7 condemnation has now been cleared. I tbmk I have the 
18 Q. Also, I'd like to make sure we have a 18 dimensions in the report here, but we have highway 1 
19 common understandins about "the project,'' and using air 19 frontage along both 9S and 54. There's a segment of the 1 
2 o quotes to say "the project." As you're aware - or if 2 o Highway 95 frontage that's a different ownership, but 
21 you're not, let me inform you--that ITO is in the 21 there are two points of this property that touch 95. 
'.3~ process of constructing a projei;t from. Garwood to Sagle. 2 2 And then it's longer distances along Highway S4 in terms j 
23 That highway project is to widen and improve U.S. 9S 23 of dimension, , 
24 between those two cities, and so sometimes there's 24 Q. And then it's bounded on the eastern encl ! 
2 s confusion about that being referred to as "the project," 2 S by a county road called Howard Road? , -=== .. ==-====~-~===--,=-=-~--:":", =-='-=========·~-=!:%!:• ,.::;-. ~~.:"":l,~:r..-; .~-:-:=-===s===~--~-":"'o '11':M.:-:":o ~=•• == ... :-::-::0.~., .. ~.,:-:,-::!..J 
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1 that tile. l terms of development. J 
j 
2 Q. Do you know whether there were any 2 Q. Is that determination and the exclusion of 
3 contingencies on the zoning change? 3 the east half of the GrathoJ property in compliance with 
4 A. Typically with regard to zoning changes, 4 USP AP? 
I s there are some •• I want to say facts that need to be S A. I wouJd say I don't think it's covered by 6 complied with to make the zoning change complete. 6 USP AP. There are •• in some cases I've been involved 
1 7 Q. What sort of contingencies are typically 7 in, there are -- there's a lot of discussion of the 
e applied to a zoning change? 8 larger parcel theocy and what is the larger parcel. And J 
9 A. They spell out various aspects of how it 9 there are several legal tests, that it's contiguous, 1 
1 o can be developed. Sometimes access is discussed. It's lo owned by the same property owner, similar use, things of t 
11 not uncommon that they may ask for some improvements tc ll that nature. I 
12 adjoining roads to pay some impact fee to somebody for 12 Q. .And what, in your opinio~ is the larger · 
13 the ability to have the property zoned. 13 parcel? . 
14 Q. And you don't know whether any 14 A. I valued this, the west 30 acres, as the 
independent parcel. 15 contingencies were required for the completion of the 15 
16 zoning change for the Grathol property? 16 Q. And where in ygur report do you indicate 
l 7 A. No, I do not l 7 that the Jarger parcel is different than the total 
parcel size? And that's Exhibit 3. 18 Q. Do you know whether there were any 18 
19 additional permits that needed. to be requested and l 9 A. Page 6 paragraph 3. 
2 o obtained? 2 O Q. The third full paragraph or the ~. 
21 A. I don't. 21 A. "In viewing the subject'' --
2 2 Q. Do you know whether any improvements 2 2 Q. Okay. 
23 needed to be made? 23 A. •• "as a lighted intersection with 
2 4 A. That, I don't. 2 4 commercial zoning as it exists, I view the site as being 
developed in two phases." And there's a discussion of 25 Q. Wouldn't that infonnation be important for 25 
Page 119 
l your analysis? 
2 A. I was given the information that it was a 
3 commercially zoned piece of property and I knew the 
4 location. 
s Q. And you accepted that fact and did no 
6 further investigation on your own? 
7 A. That's correct. 
8 Q. I'd like to run through really quickly -
9 just so I have the numbers in front ofme •• can you 
10 tell me what your conclusion for the before value of the 
11 propeny is? 
12 A. My ~alyais of the property is viewing it 
13 as the west 30 feet is all I considered in my analysis. 
14 Q. West 30 acres? 
15 A. The west 30 - I think it's approximately 
16 30 - was how I analyzed this in terms of its highest 
1 7 and best use and things of that nature, So with regard 
18 to that, I conoluded value was S2,2S a square foot for 
19 that portion of the property. 
2 o Q. And yow- before value for the east half of 
21 the property? 
2 2 A. That wasn't included in this valuation. 
23 Q. Why not? 
24 A. Because that's-· I viewed that as the 
2 s prime value of that particuJar piece of property in 
, ... -.. ~- --, •••• .Jo• 
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1 it there. i 
2 Q. I don't see any reference to larger ' 
3 parcel. Where do you refer to the larger parcel? l 
4 A. "With the site containing approximately 51 / 
S acres prior to the taking, I considered that J 
6 approximately 30 acres closest to the intersection wouJd i 
7 be valued at a different rate than the remaining 27 j 
a acres." 1. 
9 Q. You don't state, do you, that that 30 : 
lo acres closer to the intersection is, in fact, your I 
ll larger parcel. Is that correct? i 
I 
A. I don't see a statement to that effect, 1 
! 
12 
13 but that's the assumption in bow I valued it. , 
14 Q. But like you said, there's no statement to j 
1s that effect? 1 
lG A. That's correct. ! 
1 7 Q. Where's your analysis as to why your 
l8 larger parcel determination is different than the size 
19 of the total parcel? 
20 A. Because that's the prime piece. I did •• 
21 through disoussion, part of that rear of the property 
2 2 was going to be used for their sewer treatment p]ant. I 1 
2 3 view it as that it would have to1ally different use and ! 
2 4 that the prime commercial would be limited to 'the 30 ! 
2:._,_ ~-~:~.~~-the corner. __ ,,~-- ·--- ....... 1 
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1 the anticipated completion date of the project, because l that were incorporated into the final record of decision l 
2 it was all preliminary at the time. Correct? 2 for the environmental impact statement? 
3 A. Anticipated completion of what project? 3 A. I don't know that I have. 
4 Q. The highway project. 4 Q. Have you seen any final maps of the ll 
5 A. Yes. 5 highway project for the Athol segment as it's going to . 
6 Q. In your analysis, you discuss, on a number G be constructed on the Grathol property? 
7 of occasions, Sylvan Road. And you state, for example, 7 A. Well, I believe some of these maps that 
8 on page 2, that plans that you've seen regarding the new 8 we're discussing are reflecting that final. 
9 interchange planned at this location show Sylvan Road 9 Q. Did you review any of those final 
10 being extended. It's in the paragraph one up from the 10 documents in the preparation of your appraisal report? ·1J 
11 bottom. 11 A. No. 
12 A. Yes. 12 Q. So you reHed entirely on the 2005 
13 Q. And you make a couple other statements in 13 documen~s? 1 
I 
14 your analysis about Sylvan Road being constructed. What 14 A. That and discussions with Mr. Marfice and J 
15 is the basis for your statements that Sylvan Road is 15 Mr. Hughes. J 
lG being constructed as part of this project? lG Q. And what did Mr. Marfice te1l you about 1 
1 7 A. I think that was discussed early on in our l 7 what was going to happen with respect to Sylvan Road? ~ 
18 meetings on this project. I have seen several maps of 18 A. We've had several discussions that we ] 
19 different alternatives to this project, several of them 19 believe that that road will be connected. I've seen j 
2 o showing that road being extended. These are some of the 2 o appraisals of these two properties that the extension of I 
21 documents in the file. 21 it, it's called·· there's another name up there, but 
22 Q. Let me take a look. And where did you 22 that right away was purchased for these two properties. 
23 obtain copies of these documents? 23 Q. These two properties being? 
24 A. They may have been given to me early on in 2 4 A. The two contiguous to the north. 
2 5 this project. I can't honestly say that I recall :2 s Q. Of the Grathol property? 
Page l9l Page 193 j 
l specifically where they came from. 1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Were they given to you by Mr. Marfice? 2 Q. And I guess the big question is: If it's 
3 A. Likely. 3 going to be ex.tended, when? 
4 Q. So we have four documents, so I can 4 A. That, I don't know. 
s identify them. One of them is a map entitled "Initial s Q. And by whom? 
6 Construction Phase Option 7. U.S. 95 from Remington 6 A. That, I don't know. 
7 Road to Trinity Road." I believe this is one of the 7 Q. You don't know whether ITO is going to do 
e documents we talked about yesterday during Mr. B it? 
9 Minzgbor's deposition. The second one is an aerial 9 A. No. j 
10 photograph. I think I described the first one. It's an 10 Q. Do you know whether the extension of 1 
11 aerial photograph with an overlay of the U.S. 9S ll Sylvan Road is part of 11D's cUIJ'ent condemnation case? ·1· 
12 project The second one is entitled "DEIS Alternative" 12 A. Ifs not, t.o my understanding. . 
13 dated December 2nd, 2005. Correct? The third one has 13 Q, And what is your understanding based upon? 1 
14 two maps on it. One of them is entitled "DEIS 14 A. The documents that I've been provided, 
15 Alternative December 2nd, 200S." It's the yellow 15 what I've seen, what the take in this particular case 
16 alternative. The first one I was referring to just a 16 is. It's not identified on those. 
1 7 moment ago is the brown alternative. The second aerial 1 7 Q. When you perform a condemnation appraisal, 
18 . photograph is entitled "OBIS Alternative December 2nd, 18 what do you typically look at to determine what property ! 
19 200S, Blue Alternative." And the third- or the fourth l9 is being taken? l 
2 O document is entitled "D:EIS Alternatives Map Dated 2 O A. Normally that's provided the map and l 
21 December 2nd, 200S." Do you know what DEIS stands f01? 21 descriptions and all items to understand what will be l 
22 A. Specificaliy the acronym, no, I don't. 22 taken. I 
23 Q. I'll represent to you that it stands for 23. Q. Were you provided the legal description of 1 
2 4 draft environmental impact statement. Have you seen any 2 4 the property that's being taken by ITO in this case? I 
25 docurnents-~at~~~-~?~.: ~:.~xcuse me .. an~~~~ ..• ~ 25 A. __ ,.:~:,.~!~~~ Je~~~riptio~ __ J 
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1 in th.ere. rve certainly seen documentation to it. 
2 Q, And did you plat out that legal 
3 description? 
4 A. No, I did not. 
'5 Q. Based on that legal description, what is 
C, yout understanding with respect to whether that legal 
7 description describes an e1'tension of Sylvan Roaci? 
8 A. I don't believe it addresses it at all. 
9 Q. And were you provided with a copy of the 
10 right of way plans for the Grathol property? 
ll A. I believe I was. 
12 Q. And in your -- based on your 
l.3 ~derst.anding, what do the right of way plans show? 
14 A. The maps that rm seeing do not sho~ the 
15 extension of that road. 
16 Q. So what was the basis for your inclusion 
17 of Sylvan Road in your analysis? 
18 
I 
A. That they're obviously building an access 
19 off this road. I know that they all had some hearjngs 
20 with regard to it, and it's been described as a 
21 pedestrian access, but by all indications and even on 
22 these draft impact statements, it's identified as 
23 something that, you know, potentially will be built. 
24 Q. But you just testified that it's not 
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property in this case? 
A. Because it's another potential 
condemnation if they talce it. 
Q. But it's not a condemnation in this case. 
Correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. If it is taken by ITO, that would likely 
be a separate condemnation. Correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And in that instance, then you would 
consider Sylvan Road. Is that correct? 
A. rm saying it's something 1 considered in 
this case simply because it appears by some 1 
documentation in this other taking that by all 
appearances and some other documents I've looked at, it 
looks like it certainly has been earmarked for 
potentially building the road, but it's certainly not 
part of the condemnation, but rm saying that it's , 
something that a knowledgeable purchaser would take into 1 
consideration, because they're looking at who's going to j 
build it, what's the cost and do I get compensated for 
my land? Who knows? j 
Q. Baek to your date of valuation. So you're 1 
freezing time, if you will, to the date of valuation. I 
Correct? 
Page 197 
1 A. That's correct. l A. Yes. 
2 Q. And it's not included in the right of way 2 Q. And as of that date, you're supposed to 
3 plan. Were )IOU also provided with the complaint that 3 look at the value of the property without the project. 
4 ITO filed in this case? 4 Correct? And then in the after condition you look at 
s A. I don't know that I have seen that. s lhe value of the property, at least in your estimation, 
6 Q. rn represent to you that it's not 6 as of the completion date of the project. Correct? 
7 included in the complaint. So let me ask this question. 7 A. Correct. 
8 To what extent do you rely on planning documents to make s Q. But you can't say for certain, can you, 
9 your determination of what property's being taken? 9 whether Sylvan Road will be constructed as of either of 
1 o A. There's certainly something that's 1 o those dates? 
11 provided and that in a condemnation case that you're l l A. That is correct. 
12 looking at what's being condemned. 12 Q. And you can't say whether ITO is going to 
13 Q. And in how many instances have you relied 13 be the entity constructing it. Is that correct? 
14 upon preliminary or draft plSMing documents to trump 14 A. That is 001Tect. 
15 the legal de.,cription and the right of way plans 15 Q. So why, in your estimation, should the 
16 identified by the condemning authority as to what 16 property be impacted or why should the impacts that you 
17 property is being taken? 17 believe are caused by Sylvan Road appear in a I 
18 A. rm not saying that that's being taken. 18 condemnation appraisal report where you're supposed to 1 
l 9 I'm sayjng that I considered it and it appears to me 19 be assessing the value of the property as impacted by 
2 o that in my best esdmation that it looks like that this 2 0 this condemnation? 
21 road will be constructed. It's not part of this 21 A. Because in my opinion, it's a potential. 
2 2 condemnation, but it is something that impacts the .2 .2 There's a lot of documentation whic:::h makes it appear 
23 property that any knowledgeable purchaser of.hat 23 that it's very likely, and I'm saying it's certainly 1 
2 4 property would take into consideration. 2 4 somethjns a knowledgeable purchaser would consider. The j 
2 s Q. Why are you saying that it will impact the 2 5 comments were made and that's •• I let it stand at that. I 
'-'-•---1-......... ,,_11,.~.41,-,,, \ ·----... - - ----·-- ---··''""'~--, --•••• ,., •• _ .... ,.,,.,1- ___ =!l 
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l cut o~ but I believe it is the property on Ramsey and 1 Q. What is unusual about a 3O~ac~ 1 
~ Appleway that's identified as No. 1 on Exhibit 7? 2 commercially zoned property? 
3 A. It appears to be, yes. 3 A. That .something sells in that size isn't 
4 Q. Okay. There's a note on Exhibit 8 that 4 too common in the market. 
S also appears to be in Mr. Johnson's handwriting that s Q. When in your appraisal assignment did you 
6 states, "They are 'laking 16 acres. Comps should be 6 receive the document at Exhibit 77 ~ 
7 based upon that number. '1 Do you see that statement? 7 A. That ~igbt have been in the July time ji 
B A. Yesfido. B frameof2010. 
9 Q. Do you agree with that? 9 Q. Okay. So it was right about the same time 1 
A. No. 10 that you received your assignment to perform an )I 10 
Q. Why not? 11 appraisal? ii 
12 
13 acres, so it's not 16. 13 some comparable research and data, correct 
A. In my analysis, rm valuing it as 30 12 A. It would have been the start of forming l 
l~ Q. And if you based your comps on 16 acres, 14 Q. How much did you rely upon this document 
15 W(?uldn't that result in looking at s~aller properties? 15 at Exhibit 7 and the comps that were provided to you? l 
16 A. Yes. 16 A. Ilooked through the listatwhatl l 
1? Q. Than what's involved in this case? 1 7 thought would be relevant out of that. In my opinion, 
1a A. Yes. 18 it would be the better comparables of the group. 
19 Q. And you're familiar, I assume, with the 19 Q. How many of the comps on '.Exhibit 7 did you · 
2 o notion that smaller properties typically sell for more 2 o end up using in your appraisal? 
21 on a per-acre basis than larger properties? 21 A. Five. Maybe six. 
22 A. Yes. 22 Q. Just so I'm clear, on Exhibit 7, you used 
23 Q. So would it be fair to assume that if 23 comps No. 1, No, 2, 3, 4, Sand 6? 
24 you're looking at l<i-acre parcels or 16-acre comps, that 24 A, I believe they're included, yes. 
25 you're going to be looking at properties with higher 25 Q. Did you use 7, 8 or 9? 
~age 223 
l values than you would be if you're looking at comps for l A. No. 
Page 225 ·1 
2 a larger piece of property? 2 Q. How many toial comps did you use? 
3 A. Typically that is correct, yes. 3 A. I believe six of these are comparables 
4 Q. Is it typical for someone you're working 4 that were included in my report. 
s for to give you comps to use in your report? 5 Q. And you used 10 total? 
6 A. Sometimes. G A. Yes. 
7 
8 
Q. How often has it happened? 7 Q. So the majority of the comps that you used 
A. Not too often. Depends on the property. 8 were ones that were pro\tided to you by Mr. Johnson? 
9 Q. How many times would you say it happened? 9 A. They were on this list, yes, that is 
lo One? Five? 1 o correct. 
l l A. A few times if it's very specific and 11 Q. Describe for me the process you used in 
12 something unique. 12 deciding which 10 comps to use. Let me start with this 
13 Q. Is this, the Grathol property, something 13 question. How many comps do you use typically in an 
14 very specific and very unique? 14 appraisal report? 
15 A. Yes. is A. It's on a case--by-case basis. l don't 
16 Q. How so? 16 know that there is a definitive number. Sometimes you 
1 '7 A, It's a large tract and we're valuing it as l 7 have this many, sometimes you have far fewer, sometimes 
18 a 30-acre piece, so there's going to be definitely less le you have a similar amount. 
19 data for that type of sale. 19 Q. Is 10 considered a lot that you would use 
2 o Q. What's unusual about that, that you have a 2 0 or is it not considered very many? 
21 large parcel and you're valuing a smaller segment of it 21 A. Yeah, JO would be more than typical. 
2 2 or the fact that you're valuing only a 3O-acre parcel? 22 Q. On average, what is a typical number that 
23 A. That rm valumg 30 acres as a commercial 2 3 you use? 
24 piece. There will be definitely more limited data for 24 A. Could be three, four, five. 
2 s that type of a sale. 2 s Q. Okay. So in that range? How did you ._,__ __ .:., ____ ,, ....... ,..,,,,.,,,'\ ___ ,. _ .. ___ ,, .. ,.. 
., • .....tw ... , ... ;. ..... '" 
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1 decide on the 10 comps that you did use in your 
2 appraisal? 
3 A. Well, they're larger tract sales in the 
4 general neighborhood. Two are larger and four are 
5 smaller than the subject. 
6 Q. They're larger tract sales in the general 
7 neighborhood. Is that what you said? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 
10 
Q. Is a nine-acre tract considered large? 
A. That's considerably smaller than the 
11 subject. 
12 Q. But do you consider it large, small or 
13 medium sized parceJ? 
14 A. It's smal]er than subject, but nine acres 
15 is a fairly good-sized commercial size purchase. 
16 Q. What was the parameters that you were 
l 7 looking for when you were looking for larger tracts in 
18 the general neighborhood? 
19 A. rm just looking for commercial type sales 
2 o that are larger in nature. So nine would be the 
21 smallest one on this list, and we've got 20, 17. The 
22 Four Square purchase. 
2 3 Q. You do have a four-acre parcel, too. 
24 Correct? I'm looking in your report. So we've shifted 
25 from Exhibits 7 and 8 back to Exhibit 3, so we're 
Page 2.2? 
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l Q. So why did you give that sale more weight 
2 than your other comps in your analysis? 
3 A. It is on the same highway. It's certainly 
4. a far smaller piece so1d for a far higher rate per foot, 
s but it is on the same highway and it was a lighted 
Ei intersection. 
7 Q. Although you also state that it's a sale 
8 that's not likely admiMible. Cortect7 
9 A. I have seen 1hat before where they have 
10 not been allowed in court. 
ll Q. And why wouldn't they ~ allowed in court, 
12 based on your experience? . 1 1a A. BeQause of the classic story of definition I 
14 of mai-ket :value. Neither party under undue duress and a '1 
i 5 c.onde?DXlation •• I've seen actually bona fide sales by · 
lG government entities that have not been allowed for the , 
1 7 same reason. 
1B Q. But yet you still put significant weight 
19 on this parcel? 
2 o A. It was something I considered, yes, in my 
21 final discussion. 
22 Q. I think you did more than consider it. ln 
2 3 fact, you stated that •• this is on page 9 of your : 
24 report- ''I considered the values of the comparable , 
2 5 sates with primary emphasis on comparables S and 7." I 
Page 2291 
1 looking at your appraisal report. 1 You gave it significant weight, didn't you? J 
2 A. Oh, this was one other bit of information, 2 A. The fact that it was on the same road down ~ 
3 yes, that was discussed on the front end that I had 3 the street, it certainly was •• I had one other one on ~ 
4 knowledge of that - this was obtained through Joel 4 95 that was north of this and that they intend to •• 1 
s Hazel. I understand this purchase was made through the 5 one's north and one's south of it, but I considered it. I 
6 threat of condemnation. We had some discussion earlier 6 Q. But like you said, it's not as reliable as i 
7 in this deposition about probably the nearest similar 7 some. Correct? 1 
a location to some degree to this property, and this was e A. I'm assuming that certainly there were l 
9 the next lighted intersection south of the subject 9 negotiations made and that was the estimated value of 
10 property. 10 the property. My concluded value's certainty far, far 
11 Q. And the question I was getting at is in 11 less amount than that, but it was something I , 
12 regards to the size of the property, you were saying 12 considered, yes. j 
13 that nine was considered relatively on the smaller side, l.3 Q. Do you lmow whether a condemnation case , 
14 and you said, in fact, that this was the smallest 14 had actually been filed in that regarding that property I 
15 property that you used, and I was pointing out that your 15 for comparable No. S? I 
16 comp sale No. S is only four acres. Is that accurate? 16 A. I don't know if it was formally filed or 
1 7 A. That is correct. 1 7 not. I do know that I called Joel Hazel on this, and 
1s Q. Back to your comment about - sh,ce we're 18 the discussion was with him. 
19 going to be hopping into these comp sales anyway, why 19 Q, If, in fact, a condemnation case had been 
2 o don't we start with No. S. You said that this was a 2 O filed and this was a settlement of a lawsuit, what 
21 piece of property four acres that is relatively close to 21 effect does that have on your use of that sale? 
i 2.2 the subject property at the next lighted intersection, 22 A. It was infonnation I considered. i 
2 3 but you also note that it was negotiated or it was under 2 3 Q. But it's not an open market sale. : 
2 4 threat of condemnation? 24 Correct? : 
... 2-::!:::::::c.::A::c.=-=!-=~:-:a!~·~-~~~~~~-~:'l":.~:0:-: .. -='='.======·-=,=====2::s~.Mn~O•,~~-::-. ~=-=-=-=· =Th=at=1=·s:r.~.:it:-:!"~--=~:-:-:~:_~-~ •. l':'::,,~'T.· ==~ ... -= ..~,:-:. ===J 
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1 Q. And you wouldn't use it or it's not a sale l Q. Any other adjustments? 
2 that should be used. Correct? 2 A. It's at a lighted intersection. In that 
3 A. T)'J>ically not. l could teU you that I've 3 regard, it's similar. It doesn't have a - it's a 
4 had experience. recwly with several condemnations in 4 lighted intersection, but it's a county road versus the I 
s SpokaQe where in-house appraisers at Wash DOT are using 5 state highway, so in that regard it would be slightly j 
6 some of those acquisitions, so I haYe c«tainty seen it G inferior. I think there are tum lanes in all 
1 "I done very recently by other condemning authorities and 7 directions, not maybe as wide as they are at the subject 
8 appraisers in house. 8 property. , 
9 Q. They're using condemnation settlements as 9 Q. Other adjustments? ~ 
10 comparable sales? 10 A. Those would be the primary considerations. 
11 'A. They wm using, yeah, their actual 11 Q. The property of sale No. S was improved, 
12 purchases of property thatwas to be condemned, 12 wasn't it? 
13 Q. I'm not talking purchases. rm talking 13 A. Yes, there was a saloon on the property. 
14 condemnation settlements. 14 Q. And what adjustment did you make for the 
'15 A. One~ been _identified as a condemnation 15 improvement? 
:LG property, lG A. That's why I talked to Mr. Hazel about it. 
_17 Q. Was a condemnatio~ case filed? 17 In his estimate of how the property was settled, that 
10 A. No. 18 was deemed to be land value only and that was the 
19 Q. And as you stated, if there's a sale l9 concluded land value estimate. 
20 that's not truly reflective of an open market sale, does 20 Q. Again, you said it was a settlement, 
.21 it not •• that does not meet the definition of market 21 however, not reflective of market value? 
22 value. Correct? 22 A. Yes. 
23 A. Yes. 23 Q. Did you make an adjustment for the fact ~ 24 Q. Because part of that definition requires 24 that it didn't reflect market value? i 
25 that it be with a willjng buyer and a willing seller. 25 A. I considered what I learned from him, and ' 
Page 231 Page. 233 
l Correct? l there maybe •• there maybe was an adjustment, but that 
2 A. That's correct. 2 was the number that he gave me 1hat it was settled on. I 
Q. And when you have s. sale under threat of 3 Q. Okay. So let's go through those ! 
4 condemnation, you do not have a willing buyer and a 4 adjustments. The indicated price for this condemnation ! 
s willing seller. Correct? s settlement was three dollars a square foot. What j 
6 A. That is correct. 6 adjustments did you make for size? 1 
7 Q. So do you believe your use of sale No. S 7 A. What are we talking about now? 
a is proper in this case? 8 Q. How muoh of an adjustment did you make for 
9 A. I thought it was germane because it was 9 size? 1 
lo the only other sale that I knew at a lighted 1 o A. For what? I 
11 intersection on this highway, so it's relevant 11 Q. We're still talking about No. 5. Sale No. I 
12 information in that regard. I do understand all the 12 5. j 
13 rules. We oftentimes as appraisers will use a 13 A. You said three dollars a foot j 
14 lender-owned sale. Again, that doesn't technically meet 14 Q. Oops. I'm sorry. $5.30 a square foot. I 
ls the term of willing buyer/willing seller, but at times ls Thanks for the clarification. j' 
16 those are considered. l G A. A lot of appraisers love to make grids and 
l 7 Q. What discount did you give to the sales l 7 plus and minus and that. I typically don't I take all 1 
18 price for the fact that it may not be reflective of 18 the things into consideration, look at them as a whole, I 
l 
19 market value? 19 and make my estimate based on those things. ' 
2 o A. As I said, my concluded value is far less 2 o Q. So you ballpark it? ! 
l 21 than the concluded estimate that was listed there. 2 l A. I wouldn't call it ballpark. I would call i 
2 2 Q. Weil, iet's taik about that. w'hat 22 it judgment. 
3 
2 3 adjustments did you make to sale No. S? 2 3 Q. How do you know - so we've got a little 
24 A. It would be certainly size. It's a far 24 bit down for size and a little bit up for intersection, 
25 smaller piece. 25 adjustments for the fact that it doesn't reflect market 
----~-~--\ ·--
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1 value. We've got some improvements - although, I stand 1 on No. S? 
2 corrected. That it's just land value. How do you 2 A. I said my concluded value for the subject 
3 quantify all of those? 3 was $2.25, so the difference between those two is in 
4 A You put it all in the hopper when you look 4 excess of three dollars. 
S at the sales, and I realize it's going to be - size is 5 Q. Okay. So your adjusted value for parcel 
6 certainly going to reflect a higher 'V8lue. I liked it 6 No. S is $2.25 a square foot? 
i because it was a lighted intersection with something I 7 A. No, you were asking something specific. 
8 knew about that I thought was relevant to this B I'm just trying to answer that the best I could 
9 particular case. 9 Q. Right. And so when you said that your 
1 o Q. So how much do you adjust it if you like 1 O adjusted value .w let me make sure I understand what you 
11 it a little versus like it a lot? 11 said. I want t.o know - you have a sales price at $5 .30 
12 A. As I said, that's looking at the sale and 12 a square foot. I want to know after you make all your 
13 concluding a vajue based on inputs that - l 3 adjustments, a little up here and a little down there 
14 : Q. How do you lmow~hethetyour size l 4 and the adjustments for this, that and the other, what 
l S adjustments ere consistent? If you don't have a 15 is the adjusted value, the adjusted price per square 
1,6 quantified amount that you're adjusting for size, bow eta 16 foot for sales No. S7 
1 i you know that your size adjust,m~~ts are consistent l 7 A. I don't have an adjusted value for the 
18 between and among your sales? 18 sale of No. 5 in that regard. 
l 9 A.. I guess tha't's why I get paid to be an 19 Q. Is it the same for each of your 10 comps 
2 0 appraiser. I feel that I'm entitled to an opinion of' 2 0 that you use? 
21 looking at a lot of factoIS and trying to quantify 21 A. Is what the same? 
2 2 specific on~ for size. I don't have a specific 2 2 Q. Do you have a11 adjusted v.alue for any of 
23 formula. 23 the 10 comps that you use? 
2 4 Q. Do you provide more of a size adjustment 2 4 A No, I didn't adjust them as I started from 
2S if the difference is a SO-percent difference versus 25 square one, there's no -these are sales I considered, '. 1--------.._.:l..----------1-------------_;_...,;_., _____ _:...,_--1: 
Page 235 Fage 237 
1 200-percent difference in size? 1 
2 A. Certainly. 2 
3 Q. Howmuchmore? 3 
4 A. You've. asked me several tlmes and l1m 4 
5 telling you I don't have a fonnula. 5 
6 Q. Okay. But I'm just wondering how you 6 
7 know, how do you arrive -- how do you go from $5.30 a 7 
8 square foot down to an adjusted value? 8 
9 A By looking at it and making my judgment 9 
l 0 based on the sale. 1 0 
11 Q. So based on your judgment, how much of 11 
12 a -· how much of a total adjustment did you make on the 12 
13 sales price for sales No. 5? 13 
14 A. It would probably be in excess of·· for 14 
l S whatever my concluded value is -· $3 .25 a foot •• to 15 
16 $5.30 a foot - so three dollars is well over fifty 16 
17 percent 
18 Q. Is that how you do all of your 
19 adjustments, your indicated value per square foot is 





I considered location, size, other things, in forming my ' 
estimate for the subject property. ! 
i Q. And then based on all of that, you just : 
sort of found $2.2S? I don't understand how you got to 
$2.25, I 
A. That was my best estimate based on the 
comparables that I looked at, the research I did in this 
particular case. 
Q. Okay. Anything more specific than that? 
A. No. 
Q. S0W1ds very fuzzy. frankly. 1 
A. Maybe I can give you a better description. ' 
I was a navigator in the Air Force for years. You're 
flying an airplane at 450 nauts. rve got a line from 
my sun line that says this. Then I've got some other : 
pressure line that tells me this. I have something else , 
that tells me that. I take all those into consideration 1 
and this is my most probable p0sition. I feel it's very 
similar in appraisal work. You're looking at a lot of 
information, you weigh what you know and men.tally ' 
2l A. No. 21 compare those to the property that you're looking at, 





Q. And what's your adjusted value, the price 
2 2 and form an opinion from that. 
23 Q. How does - did you make any adjustments 
2 4 on No. 5 for demographics? 
2 5 A. I think there's a comment in here that I 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
NO. 3877 P. 38/48 
ORIGINAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VINOS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
s, 
Defendants. 
TO: THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PLAINTIFF 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S 
THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL 
ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
OF DOCUMENTS 
COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol and hereby responds to Plaintiff's First Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents as follows: 
INTERROGATORIES 
Interrogatory No. 2: For each expert witness identified in response to Inten-ogatory 
No. 1, please provide the subject matter upon which the expert witness is expected to testify, 
a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the reasons therefore, 
DEFENDANT HJ ORATHOL'S THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWBRS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTWOGATORJES M'P REQUESTS FOR.PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTs • I 
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the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions, the 
underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based, and all information 
referenced in and required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civi1 Procedure. 
ANSWER: Defendant anticipates offering expert opinion testimony in this matter, 
including testimony concerning the plan, design and engineering of portions of the Plaintiffs 
project across or adjacent to Defendant's property, as well as testimony concerning valuation 
of the property. The witnesses offering opinion testimony as actor-viewers may include the 
following: 
(1) Bill Hughes 
(2) Alan Johnson 
(3) Geoff Reeslund 
(4) Scott Taylor 
(5) Brent Heleker 
(6) John Beutler 
(7) Mark Johnson 
(8) JeffBond 
(9) Donald Smock 
(10) Paul Daugharty 
(11) Brett Terrell 
(12) Mike Winger 
As an actor/viewer "expert," Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover the testimony of such -
persons. See1 U.S.C.A., Fed. R Civ. P. 26 Notes of Advisor/ Committee on Rules, 1970 
Amendment at 114 (West 1995). 
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(1) Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, CGA 
(2) Ed Morse, MAI 
With respect to these valuation experts, as of the date of the Answers to these 
Inte1Togatories, no formal appraisal reports have been completed. Therefore, the remainder 
of the information requested in this Interrogatory cannot be provided. If and when fonnal 
appraisal reports are prepared, the information in the above InteITogatory will be contained 
within those appraisal reports. 
Supplemental Answer: See, Appraisal Report of Dewitt ''Sldp: Sherwood, CGA, 
prodnced herewith and Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure dated August 25, 2011. 
Sl!J!Plemental Answer: Defendant's actor/viewer witnesses are still in the process of 
formulating their opinions and testimony for trial. As discovery and investigation continues 
in this matter, Defendant's witnesses are expected to revise their opinions in their respective 
areas of expertise. Defendant reserves the right to update and supplement these discovery 
requests accordingly. However, the following summary sets forth the (presently} anticipated 
testimony of these witnesses. 
Alan Johnson anticipates testifying, generally as follows: 
Hughes Investments and its various partnerships is a cornmerciaJ real estate developer 
not a land speculator. Since the company was formed in 1977, Hughes Investments emities 
have acquired, entitled, developed, constructed, leased and managed over 5,000,000 square 
feet of OLA. Hughes Investments has never purchased a-piece of property, either raw land or 
ai, income producing asset for the purpose cf quickly flipping it for a profit. Hughes 
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Investments and its entities have and always will make our income from developing property. 
Hughes Investments mission statement provides: 
"Hughes Investments is a reputable, retail commercial development company 
whose purpose is to generate equity and cash flow by developing high-quality 
shopping centers. We firmly believe that this approach translates into the 
highest return for long term ownership for ourselves and our partners while 
providing the highest quality shopping environment for our merchants and the 
communities they serve." As highly experienced commercial developers, we 
convert a piece or raw land using our capabilities in design, entitlements, 
leasing, construction, financing and management. to create significant value 
and a financeable asset that provides cash flow over long periods of time. 
Idaho, Hughes Investments purchased this property in 2008 with the sole intent to develop it 
into a commercial retail center/hospitality project Hughes InveStments acquired and 
immediately rezoned the property to a commercial designation, invested in engineering a 
sewage treatment system that would be approved by the Idaho DEQ, coll1Jllenced discussions 
with merchants and tenants for prospective sales or leases, met with and filed site plans with 
Kootenai County and commissioned the prerequisite traffic study for further development 
evaluation. Hughes Investments has spent significant amounts of money on consultants, 
engineers, and carl')'llli costs in order to develop this property. As of the date of this writing, 
the costs for development of this property have exceeded $428,000. 
Hups Investments bas a long history of successfully developing retail shopping 
centers. Huibes Investments has been designing, buildins and leasing shopping centers for 
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nearly forty years. With any sophisticated shopping center, developer, a signalized "hard 
comer" with high traffic counts, high visibility, easy ingress and egress at the comer of two 
major streets is always the most sought after location. A "Hard Comer" is recognized by the 
International Council of Shopping Centers as a signalized intersection at the comer of two 
shopping, a hard comer is always preferred by developers, merchants and tenants. In rhe case 
of HWY 95/S4, the current configuration offers excellent visibility and slows traffic at the 
lighted intersection. Easy access is provided by 4 deeded access points at or near the 
intersection. 
In contrast, from the materials I have been provided by ITD, the proposed overpass 
will be at an elevation well above the current grade of the property at an assumed speed of 55 
to 65 MPH. It is important to note that the new interchange is not expected to increase traffic 
counts by the site. While access has not been finalized at this time, it won't be remotely as 
good as what is presently available. As difficult as it is to work around the issues caused by 
the overpass, Hughes Investments has still not been provided the date for the start of 
construction, let alone an estimated date for completion of this project. Without either 
completion, or realignment dates and timelines, Hughes Investments is unable to start 
development. All of the merchants that we have been in discussions with will not move 
forward with any kind of commitment until the interchange is complete or it is determined 
that the highways will keep their current alignment, 
Please refer to previous correspondence submitted from Mike 'Wmger of URM. (See 
Bates Nos. 000016-000024, 000030-000031, 000040-00004S, and 000053-000055.) 
Additionally attached are several newspaper articles "A bwnp hl the road" 11/23/08 and "US 
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95 widening in N. Idaho hits another snag" 11/22/08 both referring to the !TD slashing its 
request for funding for widening HWY 95 between Coeur d'Alene and Sandpoint. To further 
the uncertainty of this project in a meeting with Ron Harvey and Jason Mingzhor with ITO, 
Jason indicated that ITD would take our property through a condemnation action and if they 
didn't receive funding for construction, "they could sit on the property for 15 years" and 
effectively halt any development of our remaining property. This was perceived as threat. 
ITD's delays and indecision to date may have cost Hughes Investments potential tenants and 
has put the entire development in jeopardy. A delay in construction or re-alignment of even 
two more years will cause significant financial damages through increased holding costs, lost 
opportunity and the inability to develop and market the remaining property resulting in an 
almost complete loss of value as a development parcel. 
The estimated value of the property being taken by ITD is based on the values of 
similarly available property with the potential for commercial development. The most sirn ilar 
comparable in ITD's appraisal, being that it is the only commercially zoned property on 
HWY 95, is at Sagle Road and HWY 95. This 29 acre site sold on 3/08 for $2.69/sf. Mr. 
Johnson believes this Sagle property is far inferior to the property at issue in this case. 
Contrary to notes in IID's appraisal, this property did not have sewer service. Also, Sag]e 
Road is not a "hard comer.'' In fact, it is actually a T intersection leading onJy to a school to 
----------~--------the east of Highway 95 and into a small housing tract to the west. It is not at a signalized 
intersection Jike the comer at HWY 9S/S4. Experienced developers will pay at least a 20% 
premium for property located at a signalized intersection of two highways. This factor 
effectively places the value of ITD's take of Hughes Investments' property at :1: $3.23/sf or, 
$2,532,578 for the prune 18 acres being acquired. 
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It is estimated that the value in the subsurface gravel for road construction materials 
located underneath Hughes Investments property is approximately $300,000. However, the 
most important component to the detennination of the value of the take is the time period stiJl 
needed to complete construction. 
It is Mr. Johnson's opinion that the remainder property, after the take, would be worth 
$3,669,300 (at the time of completion and the opening of the interchange) calculated as 
follows: 
(1) 3.87 acres west of the take is given a value of $674,300 (value is reduced due 
to the inability to provide sewer to the parcel across ITD's ROW; 
(2) 3.19 acres east of the ROW and west of Sylvan road at a value of $625,300; 
(3) Travel Plaza east of Sylvan, 7 acres at $1,219,000; and 
(4) Remaining 26.42 acres with limited commercial viability priced at $1,150,000. 
Hughes Investments factors in the value for the remaining property on the assumption 
of at least an additional three year delay in the ability to sell by reason of construction. Also, 
it should be noted that spreading the cost of the $1,000,000 sewer system to significantly 
fewer users will greatly decrease the value of the remainder land. At a discount rate of 10% 
per annum, the NPV of the remainder property is $2,722,000, a reduced value of $947,000. 
To summarize $2,532,578 in the land value of the take+ $300,000 for construction materials 
+ a reduction in value for the remaining property waiting for completion of construction of 
$947,000 = $3,779,578. This is the absolute minimum value that should be used as just 
compensation for the take. 
In the alternative; looking at the development potential before t.'1e take fer the 
property's "highest and best use" the value is significantly higher. The potential profit, as is 
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shown in the pre-take budget, is estimated at just over $8,670,000. This approach provides 
Hughes Investments with the investment strategy required in our projects, developing and 
holding of at least a portion of the asset, The expected value after the take is: ITD 
condemnation $571 9000 + NPV of the remainder property $2,722,000 = $3,293,000. 
Subtract the land and expenses to date of approximately $1,800,000 and the potential profit is 
only about 15% of that of the "highest and best use". 
GeoffReeslund anticipates testifying in the following areas: 
• Retail/commerdal site ~lanning and design, including building orientation, 
sight line and visibility criteria: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that the proposed elevated 
freeway, as it traverses the site, will greatly limit visibility and sight lines to the tenant 
buildings and signage in the development. Without at-grade pass-by visibility and identity, 
many po'refitial customers may sunpty speeaby me site without sfoppmg. Conversely, 'ttie 
current at-grade highway with its signalized intersection provides superior visibility to the 
traveling public and aJso provides better access and an opportunity for encouraging 
customers to pull off the highway and patronize the project. 
• Division of property/parcel configurations: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that 
the land t.aken for the freeway coostruction bifurcates the most usable portion of the property 
into two pieces, one of which is very small with limited use applications, poor access and 
----- ·-----vist"bility; the other with poor visibility and ve-ry poor access opportunities. A third parcel will 
be created when right-of-say is acquired for the Sylvan ftontage road use, further isolating a 
large portion of the property from :the remainder and limiting the amount of property that _ 
could be developed for (highest and best-use) retaiVcommercial t.enantse 
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• Access & circulation - on and offwsite: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that the 
configuration and location of the land taken for the highway reconfiguration use severely 
impacts the viability for developing the resultant sites by eliminating or drastically limiting 
the abilit;yto provide effective access points critical to successful commercial development. 
• Infrastl'UCture and utility needs/provisions: Mr. R.eeslund intends to testify that 
the taking of this property for highway reconfiguration creates a severe hardship by 
impacting the ability to provide an effective and economical utility infrastructure for the 
resulting properties, and will require significant additional expenses due to the potential 
installation of redundant systems. such as sewer, water and electrical facilities. 
• Development process and SAAuencing, from initial planning to constnlction 
completion: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that the lack of a recorded map defining the 
properties with which Hughes Investments are left after the taking has significantly delayed 
the development of the remaining property and has likely cost Hughes Investments tenants 
who were willing to proceed if the development were pennitted to occur with legally defined 
parcels. 
• Land use potential: Mr, Reeslund intends to testify as to the various potentiaJ 
plans for development of the subject property and its s1.titability given its reconfiguration, 
location and infrastructure needs. He will also testify about Tenant leasing issues relative to 
division of construction between Tenant and Landlord, includin& implementation of 
requirements to affect Tenant openinas. 
• Further that the land use development potential is now limited due to the 
splitting of the prime com.rnercial site by the taking, 
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• Predevelopment planning and research including A&E consultant 
management: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify as to his familiarity with the property and his 
work with various consultants for the three years Hughes Investments have owned the 
property, including architects, civil engineers, environmental consultants, traffic engineers, 
waste water engineers, general contractors and others. Hughes Investments has spent 
significant dollars and prepared numerous commercial site plans, environmental studies and 
reports, AL TA site surveys, traffic studies and waste water treatment system designs, all to 
prepare for and support the development of this property. 
• Land use entitlements processing: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that he 
worked closely with consultants and Kootenai County to process the Commercial rezone and 
allow for the development of the property by Hughes Investments. During this process, 
Reeslund also worked and/or coordinated with the City of Atho~ Lakes Highway District, 
Kootenai Metropolitan Planning Organization, and numerous local residents as well as ITO 
on several occasions. 
• On and off-site deyelopment and construction. including agenc)! coordination • 
consultant management permit processintt and construction management. Mr. ReesJund 
intends to testify as to his qualifications to manage the project A &E team in preparing the 
required improvement plans for the construction of the planned commercial project, 
including processing the required ministerial construction permits, managing the bidding and 
construction for the on and off-site improvements and buildings for construction and leasing; 
Mr. Reeslund will also be coordinating with various tenants who will construct their ov.n 
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facilities and ensuring that tenants' design and construction teams produced an effective and 
timely completion of construction to meet timelines for the project opening. 
Additional detail in support of Mr. Reeslund1 experience and qualifications in these 
areas, are attached as a copy of his Statement of Qualifications. 
Interrogatozy No. 7: (Severance Damages) Please identify and state any witnesses' 
opinion, including your own opinion, as to whether any severance damage will result from 
the tal<lng of a portion of the Subject Property by Plaintiff. If the response is "yesu, descdbe 
the amount of severance damages, the method used to calculate the amount of damages, and 
all facts and documents used or relied upon, including the comparable sales used or relied 
upon, as a basis for that opinion. 
ANSWER: Yes, Defendant believes severance damages will result Defendant does 
not know at this time the precise amount of severance damage it will suffer by reason of 
Plaintiff's actions in this matter nor is it possible to articulate "all facts and documents" used 
to calculate Defendant's view of severance damages. Discovery and evaluation in this matter 
is ongoing and all facts supporting severance dam.ages may not be fully known until after the 
project is completed or at least construction is initiated. 
Supplemental Answer: See, Supplemental Answer to Interrogatory No. 2, above. 
Reguest for Production No. 1: Please produce all documents identified, used, 
referenced or relied7lpon in responding to the interrogatories above. 
RESPONSE: Defendant has compiled the voha-minous documents responsive to these 
Requests for Production and will make them available for im;-pection and/or copying to 
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INTRODUCTION 
I was engaged by ITD to review the claim(s) for damages/lost value by Defendant Grathol in 
conjunction with ITD's action to take and condemn real property owned by Grathol. 





The State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board 
David Evans and Associates, Inc. 
Stanley Moe 
George Hedley 
Land acquired by Grathol near Athol 









Site or Property 
Project 
Documents and information relied upon in support of the opinions contained herein are noted in 
each opinion and/or are listed in Table 1 which follows the opinions. 
In addition to documents referenced in my report, I may summarize information contained in 
those documents in exhibit form to assist the explanation of my opinions. 
As additional information or testimony becomes available, I may find it appropriate to revise or 
supplement my opinions, analyses and conclusions stated herein. I may also be called upon to 
provide testimony with regard to additional data or records and/or data received from or testified 
to by other parties and/or their witnesses. 
'"' .. °". r:> .. -A,, ~~t~
Dennis R. Reinstein, CPA/ABV, ASA, CVA 
1 




The methodology utilized by Johnson to support Grathol's claim is deficient and not reliable. 
This opinion is based upon: 
Proper Approach 
1) I have worked with a wide range of clients across many industries, including construction 
and development, in preparing business valuations and assisting with the development 
of project feasibility studies. 
The "normal" process in developing reasoned and economically supported conclusion(s) 
is to consider all relevant information as of the date of the conclusion(s) and to follow 
appropriate procedures to collect and analyze all information relevant to the 
conclusion( s ). 
2) Additionally, I have worked with a wide range of clients across many industries, including 
construction and development, in preparing or evaluating various claims for 
loss/damages. Again the "normal" process in calculating a claim is to identify, document 
and analyze all relevant information. 
Approach used by Johnson 
1) Johnson does not rely on generally recognized methods or procedures to develop his 
loss claim. 
a) I have not seen any comprehensive business and/or marketing plans/studies 
prepared or considered by Grathol in advance of the proposed Project that would 
have established a contemporaneous base for financial expectations. 
b} On a number of occasions, Johnson's response to questions about support for his 
position was answered by replying that "the matter" was based on his "experience." 
While experience is a valuable factor, it is not a substitute for proper analysis of 
verifiable economic data or known and accepted methodologies for evaluating 
economic data. Experience helps one to analyze and interpret valid data - not 
automatically know what the data is or what it will reveal. 
c) Specific deficiencies are further addressed below in the opinions that follow. 
SUPPORTING DATA 
This opinion is based upon the above noted sources and information and/or documents 




The foundation and documentation both leading up to the conclusions and supporting the 
conclusions are inadequate to provide a reliable basis for those conclusions. 
This opinion is based upon: 
1) Though Grathol has developed other properties - the subject Site was a "new" business 
venture, in a new location. 
However, according to the deposition testimony of Johnson (35/3 - 35/7) the due 
diligence prior to acquisition of the Site was very limited. 
In order to maximize the chances of success, any new business venture will precede 
their start up with a deliberate and thorough analysis of conditions that are important to 
success of the venture. This would include, by way of example, an investigation of the 
following factors, none of which appear to have been completed to any reasonable 
degree: 
a) An analysis of the community profile and demographics. 
b) An analysis of population densities, market demand and tenant profiles. 
c) An analysis of general economic conditions affecting the relevant market area. 
d) Engineering studies to properly understand conditions and requirements related to: 
i) soils 
ii) water systems, sewer systems, and other utilities 
iii) road requirements, access and right-of-ways 
iv) set-asides and dedications 
v) landscape and open area requirements 
vi) other development and code requirements 
e) An analysis of required approvals from various governmental agencies. 
f) Prepare a time-line, illustrating activities, cash flows and financing or funding 
requirements over the entire Project's development. 
SUPPORTING DATA 
This opinion is based upon the above noted sources and information and/or documents 




Johnson's damage calculations reflecting a loss from real estate in the amount of $3,779,578 is 
speculative, overstated and unreliable. 
This opinion is based upon: 
Johnson's calculations consist of three components: 
Property Taken - ($2,532,578) 
1) Johnson asserts a Property value of $3.23 a square foot, apparently based on what 
appears to be generalized reference to a 29 acre parcel sold near Sagle Road for $2.69 
a square foot. Then he cites that "experienced developers" would pay at least a 20% 
premium for property at a signalized intersection. A 20% premium applied to the $2.69 
price yields a value of $3.23. 
It is unclear on what empirical data Johnson bases his 20%+ premium assertion and I 
am unaware of any supporting market or other data that has been provided to confirm 
his assertion. 
Further, it is unclear how Johnson correlates solely the sale of the Sagle Road property 
to the subject Property, as he has provided no supporting analysis. 
2) Johnson's calculation is based on 18 acres. This appears to be a combination of 
approximately 16.3 acres identified by ITD and additional land related to Sylvan Road. 
It is unclear what Sylvan Road has to do with ITD's condemnation. Based on the 
comments from other experts involved in this matter, it appears that any modification to 
Sylvan Road has more to do with access requirements associated with development of 
the Property - requirements in play regardless of the actions of ITD. 
Based solely on Johnson's value of $3.23 per square foot, including the land associated 
with Sylvan Road amounts to a loss overstatement of approximately $237,200. 
Construction Delay- {$947,000) 
1) It is unclear how delay damages are applicable, when Grathol was aware of the planned 
ITD highway work before they entered into the Property acquisition. 
2) Johnson provides no independent or verified information to support the values he 
assigned to the Property not taken. The value assigned to the Property not taken 
impacts his present value and associated loss calculation. 
3) Johnson's calculation of present value, based on the numbers he uses, is 
mathematically incorrect and understates his present value, which overstates his 
asserted loss by approximately $34,500. 
4) Johnson asserts that the Property not taken by ITD would remain at the same value over 
his alleged delay period of three years. Accordingly, his calculation of the delay damage 
4 
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does not consider, and would be overstated based on any potential increase in value of 
the underlying real estate that occurred over the time period covered by his calcuiation. 
5) Johnson's calculation of value of the Property not taken - which is the basis for his 
present value calculation, or delay damages, - is in conflict with, or duplicative of, his 
listing of acreage of the Property taken. Effectively he includes the acreage and value of 
the Sylvan Road Property in both calculations. To the extent that "excess" land is 
included in the retained Property value, and depending on how this Property is valued, 
his calculation of the present value loss will be further changed. 
Value of Gravel - ($300,000) 
1) Johnson provides no independent or verified basis for his assertion that there is 
$300,000 of gravel that will be lost. 
2) Based on the comments of other experts retained in this matter, it appears that Grathol's 
rezoning of the property has now precluded mining of any gravel from the Site. 
This would effectively overstate this portion of the claim by $300,000. 
SUPPORTING DATA 
This opinion is based upon the above noted sources and information and/or documents 




Johnson's conclusion on the Project's total development profit potential is speculative, 
unreliable and improper. 
This opinion is based upon: 
1) The factors discussed in Opinions 1 and 2. 
2) Johnson assumes 100% success on all land development and related sales, and 100% 
success on the build out and full occupancy of all lease units. 
These assumptions are aggressive and not supported by any independently developed 
corroborating data. 
3) In addition, some specific problems associated with Johnson's analysis and conclusions 
include the following, which further indicate that his calculations are overstated: 
a) There is no independent data or analysis to support the underlying calculations 
contained on Exhibit 34. This relates to all aspects of his projections including; sale 
prices, lease rates and costs. 
b) The potential development profit illustrated in Exhibit 34 reflects "profits" that will be 
realized at some future point in time. A proper economic analysis would require 
calculating the present value of these amounts - taking into account both the time 
value of money and, more importantly, the risk inherent in achievement. 
Johnson's use of a value for the retained Property (adjusted for present value) which 
he compares to his calculation of development profits (not adjusted for present 
value), is an improper match of amounts and significantly overstates the alleged 
loss. 
c) Part of Johnson's development loss calculation is based on the present value of 
Property not taken. As addressed in Opinion 3, to the extent there are errors in the 
calculation of the present value of that Property, those errors will also impact the 
conclusions of the potential development profits. 
d) Johnson's calculation includes development cost incurred to date, but no supporting 
documentation or detail has been provided. 
e) As discussed in Johnson's deposition (67/3- 67/12) Grathol's Project faced potential 
competition from the opening of stores by Winco and Walmart. 
f) There was no commercial access to the Site. (Johnson 81/4 - 81/13) 
g) An email dated November 14, 2008 noted that Super 1 Foods was previously looking 
in the area a year or two ago but were turned away by no sewer availability. 
(Johnson 146/5 -146/9) 
6 
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h} Discussions with prospective tenants never proceeded past the point of discussions. 
(Johnson 176/3- 176/7) Grathol has produced no demonstrable commitments from 
prospective tenants. 
4) Grathol had knowledge of the condemnation prior to their purchase of the Site, and 
thereby implicit knowledge of the ITD project and potential delays and uncertainty 
associated with the acquisition and development of the Site. 
5) I am not aware that Grathol has provided any substantive documentation to illustrate 
their alleged success in similar projects. 
6) Johnson's final conclusion compares the difference between his projected developed 
value and the remaining Property's undeveloped value. This is not a proper comparison 
as it presumes that the Property remaining after the highway project cannot or will not be 
developed. This could have a substantial impact on his loss calculation. 
SUPPORTING DATA 
This opinion is based upon the above noted sources and information and/or documents 




Review of the reports and conclusions of Hedley, Evans and Moe; reinforce my conclusions that 
Johnson's loss assertions are speculative and unreliable. 
This opinion is based upon: 
1) Grathol took on many significant risks in conjunction with their acquisition of the subject 
Property. It is a generally recognized economic principle that risk reduces value. 
The additional risks appear to have put Grathol in a position of incurring additional and 
likely unexpected costs. 
2) As noted in the report of Evans, mmmg is not a permitted use based upon current 
property zoning. This brings into question the validity of the gravel loss portion of 
Grathol's claim. 
3) Many other factors and cost outlays will potentially impact the economic viability of the 
Site development: 
a) Zoning. 
b) Impact fees. 
c) Public road development - Sylvan Road. 
d) Commercial access to the Site. 
e) Water systems will have to be developed as a prior attempt by Grathol to have the 
Property annexed into the City of Athol was turned down. 
f) There are no public sewer systems available. Additionally, location of the Property 
over the Rathdrum Prairie Aquifer limits options and increases their expense. 
g) Population density. 
h) Competitors' proximity to larger communities will likely cause challenges for the 
Project due to competitive factors. 
4) Moe notes in his report that it is unlikely, in the foreseeable future, that a 56+ acre 
development could be sustained on the Site. 
SUPPORTING DATA 
This opinion is based upon the above noted sources and information and/or documents 




Grathol is complaining about a process (the US95 project) they understand, and more troubling, 
were aware of before they closed on the Property. It seems they now want to change the "rules 
of the game" they knowingly and willingly entered. 
This opinion is based upon: 
1) In the Defendant HJ Grathol's Third Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's 
First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, they note: 
a) Hughes Investments and its various partnerships is a commercial real estate 
developer not a land speculator. 
b) With respect to the property at the northeast comer of Highways 95 and 54, in Athol 
Idaho, Hughes Investments purchased this property in 2008 with the sole intent to 
develop it into a commercial retail center/hospitality project. 
c) Hughes Investments has a long history of successfully developing retail shopping 
centers. 
d) Hughes Investments has been designing, building and leasing shopping centers for 
nearly forty years. 
2) According to the deposition of Johnson (31/15 - 31/19) Grathol knew the property would 
be impacted by the US95 project. 
SUPPORTING DATA 
This opinion is based upon the above noted sources and information and/or documents 




The Opinions of Moe, Sherwood and Johnson are widely divergent. The Opinions of Sherwo
od 
and Johnson appear to be inconsistent with the economic times. 
This opinion is based upon: 
1) Schedule 1 illustrates the opinions of value set forth in this matter, compared to the 
original purchase price. 
2) From an outside perspective and from one who has seen many involved in the real 
estate business fall on hard times and go out of business since the "Great Recession" 
began in late 2007 - early 2008, the values asserted by and on behalf of the defendants 
appear excessive. This is especially true in light of the recession's impact on property 
values, the demand for commercial development and the purchase price paid by 
Grathol. 
SUPPORTING DATA 
This opinion is based upon the above noted sources and information and/or docume
nts 
identified in Table 1. 
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TABLE 1 SUPPORTING DATA 
1) Complaint 
2) Defendant HJ Grathol's Answers and Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents. 
3) Defendant HJ Grathol's Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set 
of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents. 
4) Defendant HJ Grathol's Second Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's 
First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents. 
5) Defendant HJ Grathol's Third Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiffs First 
Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents. 
6) Letter to Ronald Harvey from Douglas Marfice dated June 28, 2010. 
7) Letter to Mary York from Douglas Marfice dated October 27, 2010. 
8) Deposition of Alan Johnson dated November 18, 2011 and related Exhibits. 
9) Bates documents numbered 0964 -1416 inclusive. 
10) Defendant HJ Grathol's Expert Witness Disclosure 
11) Property appraisal prepared by Dewitt Sherwood dated August 25, 2011. 
12) Property appraisal prepared by Stanley Moe dated April 29, 2010. 
13) Report of David Evans and Associates, Inc. dated December 14, 2011. 












DENNIS R, REINSTEIN, CPAIABV, ASA, CVA 
University of Idaho 
BS Agri-business, 197 4 
BS Business (Accounting), 1975 
Licensed in Idaho as CPA, 1976 
CVA designation, 1995 
ABV designation, 2001 
ASA designation, 2003 
Hooper Cornell, PLLC 
Partner January, 2002 - Present 
Presnell·Gage Accounting & Consulting 
Firm-wide supervisory responsibilities for business consulting services and 











Professional experience includes: 
January, 1996 - December 31, 2001 
October, 1991 - January, 1996 
July, 1989- September, 1991 
October, 1983 - June, 1989 
May, 1980 - September, 1983 
1979 - 1980 
1975- 1978 
(1) Valuation of small businesses and professional practices. 
(2) Assistance to clients with the analysis of business operations and significant 
business transactions. These include negotiations on purchase and sale of a 
business or business segments, including assistance with valuation of 
business entities. 
(3) Design and assist with implementation of financial accounting and control 
systems for various clients served by the firm. 
(4) Supervision of accounting and auditing services provided by the firm's 
professional staff and consultation on procedures and methods of providing 
client services. 
(5) Member of team conducting review of complex mainframe and 
microcomputer accounting systems. 
(6) Co-authored and presented eight-hour course on cash management. 
Presented other client educational seminars and seminars to other service 
professionals such as bankers and aftorneys. 
(7) Duties as a partner-in-charge included the responsibility for managing an 











DENNIS R. REINSTEIN, CPAIABV, ASA, CVA (Continued) 
Farmer's Home Administration -Assistant County Supervisor, 1974. 
Duties included: 
(1) Evaluation of credit applications and preparation of application packages 
for review and approval. 
(2) Residential real estate and farm appraisals. 
Idaho Society of CPAs, member 
Chairman of Management of an Accounting Practice Committee 
Member of Committees on 
Public Relations 
Continuing Professional Education 
Relations with Bankers 
Northern Chapter of Idaho Society of CPAs, president 
American Institute of CPAs, member 
American Society of Appraisers, member - Business Valuation 
National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts, member 
The Institute of Business Appraisers, member 
Continental Association of CPAs, Past Chair of Litigation Services Committee and 
Information Technology Committee 
Boise Estate Planning Council, member, President and Treasurer 
Past Vice President, Secretary and Program Chairman 
Boise Chamber of Commerce 
Member of Small Business Recognition Sub-committee 
Member of Small Business Education and Advisory Sub-committee 
Chair of Small Business Committee 
Member of Garden City Chamber Council 
Discovery Center of Idaho, Vice President of Board 
Kiwanis 
Moscow Chamber of Commerce 
Past-President, V. Pres. Treasurer & Board member 
Moscow Executive Association 
Moscow Rotary 
Lewiston Chamber of Commerce 
Lewiston Jaycees 
Held various offices & a member of Board of Directors 
Prepared and presented accounting seminars for Human Advancement's 
Inc., Minority Contractors Awareness Seminars and the Lewis-Clark 
~Homebuilders Association. 
Taught night classes in bookkeeping at the Clarkston Branch of Walla Walla 
Community College. 
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PRIOR DEPOSITION OR TRIAL TESTIMONY 
The following is a list of cases in which I have given recorded testimony in the last four years. 
1) Idaho State Department of Agriculture v. Wheatland Agribusiness, Inc., et al. 
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - April 2008 
2) J.R. Simplot Company v. Nestle USA, Inc. 
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - May 2008 
3) United States of America ex rel. Cherri Suter and Melinda Harmer v. National Rehab 
Partners, Inc. and Magic Valley Regional Medical Center 
Deposition - Boise, Idaho -August 2008 
4) Hobson Fabricating Corp. v. SEIZ Construction, LLC, et al. 
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - September 2008 
5) George C. Turner. v. Russell E. and Victoria F. Turner 
Trial - Murphy, Idaho - July 2009 
6) Ronald R. McCann. v. William V. Mccann, Jr., et al. 
Hearing on Motion to Compel - Boise, Idaho-August 2009 
7) Dare! Hardenbrook, et al. v. United Parcel Service, Co. 
Trial - Boise, Idaho - January 2010 
8) Jean-Michel Thirion, et al. v. Brenda E. Sangster. 
Hearing on Fees - Boise, Idaho - December 2010 
9} The City of Meridian v. Petra Incorporated 
Trial - Boise, Idaho - March 2011 
10) Tim Hopkins v. Advantage Sales and Marketing Holdings, LLC 
Trial - Boise, Idaho - December 2011 
QUALIFICATIONS 
See curriculum vitae attached. 
COMPENSATION 
Hourly rate of $295 plus out-of-pocket costs. 
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PUBLICATIONS/PRESENTATIONS 
The following is a list of publications I have authored or co-authored over the last 10 years. 
1) litigation Questions, Problems & Solutions: The Bench, Bar and Clients Speak Out. 
Participant on the client panel - presented to the Idaho State Bar Litigation Section on 
January 10, 2003. 
2) Using Business Valuations To Build An Estate - presented to the Boise Estate Planning 
Council on November 3, 2003. 
3) Business Valuation Basics - presented to the Boise Wells Fargo Business Bankers meeting 
on December 5, 2003. 
4) Business Valuation Basics: How to Use Valuation/Financial Theory to Increase the Value of 
Your Business - presented to TechHeip, Manufacturers Luncheon on January 28, 2005. 
5) Tax Planning for Sales of Real Estate - sponsored by Premier Alliance on March 16, 2005. 
6) Valuation and Credit Analysis: Similarities and Differences - presented to Boise area U.S. 
Bank business bankers on May 11, 2005. 
7) The Guideline Publicly Traded Company Method and The Market Value of "invested" 
Capital: Should Market Value of "Stakeholder" Capital be the Appropriate Reference -
Business Valuation Review; Summer, 2006. 
8) A Hybrid Restricted Stock/Pre-I PO Data Point Lack of Marketability Discount for ESOP's. -
Business Valuation Review; Summer, 2007. 
9) Pension Plans and Closely-Held Companies: Valuing Tricky Assets in Divorce - presented to 
the Idaho State Bar Association on May 9, 2008. 
10) Considerations in Starting a Dental Practice -
a) Presented to Idaho State University Dental School, November 11, 2008 
b) Presented to Idaho State University Dental School, January 12, 2010 
c) Presented to Idaho State University Dental School, June 20, 2011 
11) Co-presenter on damages in Personal Injury litigation to various Treasure Valley area law 
firms - 2009. 
12) An Update on Proposed IRS' Appraiser Penalty Procedures - published in ISCPA Adjusting 
Entry, April 2010. 
13) Co-presenter in "Accounting 101 Seminar for Attorneys" - sponsored by the National 
Business Institute, Boise, Idaho August 12, 2010. 
14) Co-presenter in "Buy-Sell Agreements: Recipe for Success or Roadmap to Ruin?" -
a) Presented to the Idaho State Bar - 2010 Advanced Estate Planning Seminar, September 
11, 2010. 
b) Presented to the Business and Corporate Law Section of the Idaho State Bar, September 
14, 2011. 
c) Presented to the Business Group of Holland & Hart, LLP, September 28, 2011. 
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PUBUCA TIONS/PRESENTA TIONS - continued 
15) Co-presenter in "So You Think You Want To Be An Expert Witness?" - sponsored by the 





ITD v. Grathol 
SUMMARY OF ASSERTED VALUES - DAMAGES or LOSSES 
Cost of 56.809 acre site - May 2008 1,450,000 
Date of Value 5/28/08 4/7/10 9/15/10 
Stanley Moe Skip Sherwood Alan Johnson 
Original Land 
Purchase Land Low High Land Development 
16.314 acres taken (see below) a 416,401 571,000 1,598,543 1,598,543 2,532,578 
Time delay 179,103 285,044 947,000 
Gravel 300,000 
Project Budget - Bates 1416 8,671,994 
Profit after take (1,493,000) 
Rounding {2,646) {3,587) (1,994) 
Totals 416,401 571,000 1,775,000 1,880,000 3,779,578 7,177,000 
Calculation for value of 16.+ acres 
Acres 16.314 16.314 16.410 18.000 
Square feet per acre 43,560 43,560 43,560 43,560 
Value per square foot 0.59 0.80 2.25 3.23 
Calculated value 416,401 570,990 1,608,344 2,532,578 
Rounding 0 10 (9,801) (0) 
Concluded value a 416,401 571,000 1,598,543 2,532,578 
1 of 1 
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DAVID EVANS 
ANO ,ASSOCIATES INC. 
BACKGROUND 
David Evans and Associates, Inc. (DEA) has been retained by the Idaho Transportation Departmen
t (ITD) to 
provide litigation support and rebuttal expert witness testimony on the case ofITD vs. HJ Grathol.
 The case 
involves condemnation proceedings associated with right of way acquisition for construction of a 
new freeway 
interchange near the intersection of US Highway 95 (US95) and State Highway 54 (SH54). 
The following DEA personnel have worked on this assignment and participated in the preparation
 of this report: 
Carole Richardson, PE, Senior Project Manager/Transportation Planner 
Ken Geibel, PE, Senior Civil Engineer 
Kevin Picanco, PE, Senior Transportation Engineer 
DEA has also worked with George Hedley, CEO of Hedley Construction and Development, Inc., i
n the 
preparation and analysis of site plans on the subject property. 
DEA' s responsibilities in support of ITD include: 
2 
co Review property site, zoning, existing and proposed land uses, and development regulations. 
e Review selective pleadings in the litigation, including: 
o Order of condemnation (11-17-2010) 
o Complaint (11-19-2010) 
o Order granting possession ofreal property (1-27-2011) 
o HJ Grathol answers and responses to first set of interrogatories and requests for production of 
documents (4-15-2011) 
o HJ Grathol supplemental answers and responses to first set of interrogatories and requests for 
production of documents (5-16-11) 
o HJ Grathol second supplemental answers and responses to first set of interrogatories and 
requests for production of documents (9-19-2011) 
o HP Grathol third supplemental answers and responses to first set of interrogatories and 
requests for production of documents 
• Review ITD right of way file documents, including: 
o Title datedown and title reports 
o Property legal description 
o Appraisal for Right of Way Acquisition (Stanley Moe, Columbia Valuation Group, Inc., 4-7-
2010) 
o Revised official right of way plans (3-5-20 l 0) 
• Review documents produced by HJ Grathol, including: 
o All west cost estimate for geotechnical evaluation (4-14-2010) 
o Kootenai County Commissioners findings of fact for zone change application and order of 
decision (11-20-2008) 
o CLC Associates, Inc. proposal for professional services (6-8-2009) 
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Intermountain Transportation Solutions (ITS) traffic impact study scope, schedule and 
probable cost estimate (7-16-2010) 
ITS Trip Generation and Initial Operations Analysis (9-10-2010) 
o Rezone Documents: 
01 Hearing Examiner's report (9-2-2008) 
" Zone change application (5-30-2008) 
• Public hearing notices 
e Kootenai County correspondence with Lakes Highway District, KMPO, and ITO 
,. Misc email correspondence between Hughes Investments, Kootenai County, Jim 
Coleman, and others 
e Work with ITO to analyze before and after development plans prepared by HJ Grathol, i
ncluding 
claims of land values, value ofland taken, and damages. DEA's role in this analysis is to co
nfirm or 
refute the legitimacy of facts and assumptions used by HJ Grathol pertaining to development
 code 
requirements, traffic access and circulation, and infrastructure costs. 
" Work with ITD to develop and analyze alternate development plans for the site. DEA's 
role in this 
portion of the assignment is to provide information on land use regulatory compliance, traffi
c and 
access issues, and site civil infrastructure costs in support of development plans for the site p
roposed 
by Mr. Hedley. 
GENERAL DEVELOPMENT PARAMETERS AND ASSUMPTIONS USED FOR 
ANALYSIS 
ZONING 
The HJ Grathol site is located in Kootenai County, and falls within the Commercial Zone. K
ootenai County 
Ordinance No. 401 provides county zoning code requirements, and is available on line at 
http://www.kc gov. us/departments/planning/ ordinance.asp 
ALLOWABLE tAND USES 
Hospitality businesses, eating and drinking establishments, and wholesale, retail and s
ervice businesses are 
expressly permitted uses within the commercial zone. 
While "Mini Storage" is not expressly identified as a permitted or conditional use in the C
ommercial zone, the 
County considers mini-storage to be a "service business," which is expressly identified as a p
ermitted use. 
Warehouse and storage facilities arc allowed, although all outside storage (such as RV stor
age) is required to be 
enclosed behind a site obscuring fence. 
A "Recreational Vehicle Park" is an expressly permitted use within the Commercial-Zone. 
Mining, including the development of surface mines for gravel production, is not a perm
itted use listed in the 
County's regulations for the Commercial Zone. 
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AND ASSOCIATES INC, 
COUNTY DEVELOPMENT STANDARDS 
Developments in the Commercial Zone must comply with Design Standards (Chapter 17) and Sup
plementary 
Regulations (Chapter I 9) of the zoning code. 
Uses on all parcels in the Commercial Zone fronting on a State Highway ( or any commercial use a
nticipated to 
generate more than 50 vehicle trips per day on other public roads) require a Special Notice Permit,
 subject to 
conditions as may be imposed through that process. Developers must also comply with requireme
nts of the 
applicable Highway District and ITD. 
Salient development requirements that would apply to the Grathol site are listed below. 
Required Setbacks in Commercial Zone 
Front yard: 35 feet 
Side yard: none 
Flanking street: 20 feet 
Rear yard: 15 feet 
Design Standards 
Building Coverage: 
® 50% of the area of all sites must be left in open spaces free of structures 
Parking Stall Requirements: 
® Offices: 3/1,000 sq. ft. 
11 Retail Sales: 1/250 sq. ft. 
® Hotels/Motels: ]/rental unit, and 1/per regular employee on the largest shift 
0 Restaurants: 1/250 sq. ft. 
e Warehouse & Wholesale: 1/800 sq. ft. 
11 1 Handicapped Accessible parking stall required for every 35 parking stalls 
Parking Lot Standards: 
e Parking Lots shall be paved 
0 Parking must be located within 300' ft. of the building being served 
111 Parking lots shall be paved with plant mix asphalt concrete or traffic rated concrete pavers 
" Each parking space shall be delineated w/ a 3" line; 
• Stall size 8' x 18' 
e Up to 25% oflot can be "compact only," 7.5' x 15' 
c Aisle width: 
o 90° - 24' for one- or two-way 
o 60° -18' one-way, 23' two-way 
o 45°-15'oneway,2l'two-way 
e Turnarounds shall be 24' wide 
Landscaping Requirements 
• Irrigation is required for all landscaped areas 
.. 1 tree is required per 300 sq. ft. of landscaped area ( except as otherwise indicated) 
o minimum 20 ft. in height, at maturity 
o Minimum 2 inch caliper for deciduous 
o Minimum 5 feet in height for evergreens 
,. Landscaping must include 100% ground coverage within 5 years 
• Around primary structures: Strip of 25 feet of landscaping in front, with 15 feet of landscaping
 along all other 
sides; may include walkways ofup to 6 feet in width 
4 
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@ Pedestrian walkways shall be landscaped for their entire length 





o Landscaping area of a minimum depth of 15' running entire length of public road frontage; 
o Frontage buffers shall require a minimum of 3 trees and 3 shrubs for every 30' of public road frontage 
® Parking Lot Landscaping 
o Lots 1- 50 spaces, 10% of area 
o Lots 51-99 spaces, 15 % of area 
o 100 or more spaces, 15% of the area 
o No parking space can be further than 75' from a landscaped area 
Multiple Structures per Lat 
More than one structure housing a permitted principal use may be erected on a single lot, provided that the open 
space and other requirements of the Design Standards (Chapter 17) and Supplementary Regulations (Chapter 19) 
of the zoning code are met for each structure as though it were on an individual lot. 
Commercial Signs and Effect 011 Property Subdivision 
The county's zoning ordinance prohibits off-premise signs in all zones. For commercial zones, one pole, 
projecting or banner sign is permitted per parcel, and one monument sign is permitted for each side of the parcel 
that adjoins a roadway. The effect of this requirement for highway-reliant commercial development is that 
individual parcels tend to be established for each distinct land use. 
Public Road Requirements (Including Internal Streets) 
Kootenai County zoning ordinance requires each commercial lot to have direct access to a public road. The 
County's subdivision ordinance further requires that roads and associated rights-of-way be dedicated to the 
applicable highway agency. ln order to fully develop the Grathol site with commercial uses consistent with the 
current zoning, a roadway would need to be constructed to provide access to interior parcels and dedicated to 
Lakes Highway District as a public roadway. 
IMPACT FEES 
Impact fees for the Grathol site would include tees for Sheriff~ Jail, Emergency Medical Services, and Timberlake 
Fire District. Lakes Highway District is non-participating. Total impact fees of$2.07/sq. ft. for non-residential 
construction on this site is due at the time of building permit issuance. (See Kootenai County Ordinance No. 451 
provided in Appendix A). 
LAND USE DENSITIES AND GROWTH ASSUMPTIONS 
The HJ Grathol site is located near the City of Athol, in a rural portion of northern Kootenai County. The US 
Census indicates a population of 676 in 2000, and 688 in 2009 for Athol, notably low growth during a period 
when rapid expansion was observed elsewhere in the region. The surrounding area consists primarily of 
undeveloped land and rural residential properties with a minimum lot size of 5 acres. 
,~-.. .The small resort community of Bayview, located on Lake Pend Oreille approximately eight miles east of the H
J 
Grathol site, has a current self-stated year-round population of 276. This community has a high proportion of 
second homes and vacation properties. 
Figure I shows existing population densities within a five-mile radius of the Grathol site. 
5 
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The Kootenai Metropolitan Planning Organization (KMPO) is responsible for long range transportation planning 
within Kootenai County, including the development of growth projections and land use assumptions for future 
year analysis, Figures 4 and 5 show 2005 actual and 2030 forecasted housing and commercial/industrial land use
 
density maps from KMPO's adopted long range plan, Existing land use densities around the Grathol site are very
 
low, and are not anticipated to change appreciably over the next 20 years, 
EFFECT OF HIGHWAY IMPROVEMENTS ON LAND VALUES 
Although land use densities surrounding the Grathol site do not appear conducive to development in the near 
term, it is reasonable to anticipate that the site will benefit through increased property valuation over the long term
 
as a result of the US95 highway improvements, The National Highway Cooperative Research Program provides 
guidelines for estimating changes in business productivity related to highway improvements, 
1 Research indicates 
that new freeway facilities can increase market accessibility for commercial development by improving safety and
 
reducing travel times for potential customers, These effects have been shown to facilitate business growth and 
productivity, resulting in increased profitability that typically translates to increased commercial property values 
over time, 
Several case studies have been performed to examine the general effect of highway improvements and highway 
access management measures on property values: 
" A case study of!ong-term business and land development impacts associated with I-394 freeway 
development in Minnesota found that "the corridor economic impacts of upgrading the highway from an 
arterial facility to a freeway were largely - in fact almost entirely-positive in nature,, ,Commercial land 
values increased significantly,"2 
"' A case study of the Superstition Freeway Corridor (US60) in Arizona found that non-residential 
development, especially retail, increased much more rapidly after freeway development than other areas 
of the Tempe region, and vacant commercial land appeared to be valued more highly than expected, 
3 
., A study of the effects oftransp01iation projects on property values in Washington State found that 
commercial and industrial land owners cited freeway proximity as a reason for purchasing property or 
locating their business, yet still tended to underestimate anticipated prope1iy value benefits of the freeway 
improvments, Following construction of l-405, freeway corridor property values were shown to 
appreciate 17% faster than similar areas that were uninfluenced by highway changes,
4 
., Additional research conducted on highway access changes in Texas, Iowa, and Florida found that 
perceived negative impacts claimed by commercial property and business owners were far greater 
1 Forkenbrock, David and Weisbrod, Glen, NCHRP Report 456, Guidebook for Assessing Social and Economic E
ffects of 
Transportation Projects, Transportation Research Board 2001, 
2 Plazak, David and Preston, Howard, Long-Term Business and Land Development Impacts of Access Manageme
nt: 
Minnesota Interstate 394 Case Study, Center for Transpmiation Research and Education, Iowa State University 
(S;inthesized 
by authors from their June 2007 1394 Business Impact Report prepared for Minnesota Department ofTtansport
ation,) 
3 Carey, Jason, Impact of Highways on Property Values: Case Study of the Superstition Freeway Corridor, Prepa
red for the 
Ari zonal Deparmtnet of Transpo1iation, October 200 l, 
4 Palmquist, Raymond B,, Impact of Highway Improvements on Property Values in Washington, Washington Sta
te 
Transportation Commission in Cooperation with US Department of Transportation, March, 1980. 
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"before" highway improvements were completed than actually experienced "after" the highway projects 
were complete.5 
TRAFFIC AND ACCESS REQUIREMENTS 
JTD Access Management Policy 
Under existing conditions, US-95 and SH-54 site frontages are classified by ITD as access control Type IV. Aft
er 
construction of the Athol Interchange and reroute ofUS-95 the remaining portions of the subject site that front th
e 
new US-95 alignment will be classified as access control Type V. 
Private driveway approaches are not allowed under Type IV Access Control as detailed in ITD's Access 
Management Standards. Public roadway intersections are allowed at a spacing of0.5 miles for urban conditions
 
and 1.0 miles for rural conditions. Under Type V access control conditions, no private access approaches are 
allowed and public roadway intersection spacing is 1.0 mile for urban conditions and 3.0 mi-les for rural 
conditions. 
ITD's Access Management Standards include a variance and appeal process for projects applying for new 
highway accesses. ITD may consider variances if the project or proposed approaches meet certain criteria or 
conditions spelled out in the Access Management Standards. 
Lakes Highway District Access Policy and Requirements 
Lakes Highway District uses access policy guidelines provided in the Local Highway Technical Assistance 
Council (LHTAC) Manual.for Use of Public Right-of Way Standard Approach Policy. According to this manual,
 
approach spacing should be 330 feet minimum and the number of approaches should be limited to the minimum 
number required to adequately serve the needs of the property. The standard policy is to allow no more than two
 
approaches for any single property frontage. 
Other Access Considerations 
In approving site plans for new developments, Kootenai County encourages developers to connect new roadway
s 
to the existing roadway network at logical points to facilitate local traffic circulation and reduce dependence on 
state highway facilities for short trips. 
The County also consults with emergency responders on access needs during the subdivision process. Emergenc
y 
response agencies typically desire at least two ways into and out of large developments for efficent ingress and 
egress of emergency vehicles. 
Access to ll] Grathol Site 
Based on records provided there are currently no permitted commercial accesses to the subject site from US-95 o
r 
SH-54. 
A warranty deed executed January 3, 1967 by ITD and a prior owner of the Grathol site provided for three 20-fo
ot 
wide driveway approaches to SH54. However, these accesses are limited to residential and agricultural use. 
(None of the three approaches described in the warranty deed has actually been constructed.) Given that the 
property now has Commercial zoning, the deed restrictions for residential and agricultural uses of the access 
5 Williams, Kristine, Economic Impacts of Access Management, Center for Urban Transpo1iation Research, Univers
ity of 
South Florida, January 28, 2000. 
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points described in the warranty deed mean that none of the deeded access points may be const
ructed and used for 
commercial access. 
There is one public road access along the SH-54 frontage of the subject site shown in ITD's con
struction 
documents for the US95 interchange project for future Sylvan Road. As discussed below, Gra
thol would be 
required to construct and dedicate Sylvan Road on the Grathol property as a condition of develo
pment approval. 
Access to the Grathol site could also likely be permitted from Howard Road under Lakes Highw
ay District's 
current access standards. 
A developer seeking additional commercial highway access for the Grathol site beyond the pub
lic road approach 
provided for Sylvan Road would need to apply to ITD for a commercial approach permit. A pr
ivate driveway 
approach to either US95 or SH54 would be inconsistent with the state's highway access manag
ement policy. An 
additional public road approach to the Grathol site from SH54 would likely not meet the spacin
g requirements in 
the state's access management policy. 
Sylvan Road 
As part of the freeway project, lTD is constructing a frontage road for properties north of the G
rathol site that 
would otherwise be landlocked after losing access to US95. The Grathol property, however, w
ill not be 
landlocked after freeway construction. The Grathol property fronts Howard Road on the cast, a
nd ITD has 
provided for a new public road approach from SH54 to the Grathol site at the location indicated
 for future 
connection of Sylvan Road. 
Under the County's subdivision code, a new public roadway such as Sylvan Road would be req
uired for 
subdivision and commercial development of the Grathol property. The costs for constructing a
nd dedicating new 
public roadways required for development are typically borne by the developer. Because Sylv
an Road is not 
needed to cure a landlock condition caused by the freeway project for the Grathol site or surrou
nding private 
properties, the public should not be responsible for the construction costs of this roadway. 
LINE OF SIGHT FROM FREEWAY TO PROPERTY 
Cross-sections depicting the proposed freeway and interchange location and elevation relative t
o the Grathol site 
are shown on Figure 12. The cross-sections indicate that site and structures on the Grathol site
 should be visible 
from the new US95 freeway. 
INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS 
Water Availability 
No public water system is currently available at the HJ Grathol site. The closest public water sy
stem is located 
west ofUS-95 within the city limits of Athol. The Grathol property falls outside the city limits 
and service 
boundaries of Athol. Therefore obtaining city water service would require annexation of the pr
operty into the 
City of Athol. Annexation of the subject property was attempted by Hughes Investments in Fe
bruary of2008 
and denied by the City of Athol in March of 2008. 
Without annexation, development of the prope1ty will require the establishment of a community
 water system in 
accordance with applicable state iaw. The developer will be required to acquire adequate water
 rights with the 
Idaho Depaitment of Water Resources (IDWR) and design and construct a system in conforman
ce with the 
requirements of the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ). Permitting and constr
uction of a 
8 
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commercial well, appropriate water storage, and a booster pump station would be required to mee
t domestic and 
fire protection requirements. 
Sewer Requirements 
The Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DRQ) and the Panhandle Health District (PHD
) are responsible 
for the review and permitting of onsite wastewater treatment and disposal facilities within Kooten
ai County. 
Currently no public sewer systems are available to provide service to the Grathol property. With 
the lack of an 
existing municipal sewer system, large scale development of the property will require constructio
n of an onsite 
treatment and disposal system to serve the new development. 
The property is located over the Rathdrum Prairie Aquifer (RPA) and as such there are limitation
s and special 
requirements associated with the disposal of the treated wastewater. The RPA has been designate
d by EPA as a 
sole source aquifer which means it is a principal source of drinking water for an area. Adhering to the b
oundary 
defined by EPA, the state of Idaho has additionally categorized the aquifer as a sensitive resource
 aquifer 
affording it special protection. Through the sensitive resource designation, DEQ has established 
that all activities 
that could impact the water quality of the aquifer must be carried out so that they maintain or imp
rove the existing 
quality of the ground water. 
In addition to DEQ, the Panhandle Health District also recognizes the EPA aquifer boundary and
 has adopted 
rules governing the infiltration of treated wastewater. Under the "one to the five" rule, septic sys
tems over the 
RPA are limited to the equivalent of one dwelling per five acre parcel. When applied to facilities
 other than 
dwellings, 250 gallons of wastewater per day per every 5 acres of property is allowed. 
To assure ground water protection, DEQ requires commercial projects generating more than 2,50
0 gallons per day 
of wastewater or anyone wishing to land-apply treated wastewater to complete a nutrient-pathoge
n evaluation of 
the proposed wastewater system as part of their application for a permit. This evaluation helps pr
edict whether 
effluent from the treatment system will be treated to a sufficient level so as to prevent ground wat
er 
contamination. As part of the pennitting process, DEQ will also require that a hydrogeologic stud
y be completed 
to show that there would be zero degradation to the groundwater up to 1,000 feet downstream of 
the property. 
Based on discussions with DEQ, the only permitted means of disposing of treated wastewater for 
a project of this 
size and nature over the RPA would be through treatment of the waste stream to a Class A or Clas
s B treated level 
and reuse of the wastewater for irrigation and vegetated land application throughout the growing 
season. (Land 
application of treated wastewater over vegetated areas is commonly referred to as "crop irrigation
," or "crop 
application," even if there is no intent to harvest the vegetation for other purposes). Storage of tre
ated wastewater 
would be required during the non growing season in a lined lagoon. 
Roadway lnfh,stmcture 
The HJ Grathol property currently is bordered by Highway 54 on the south, US-95 on the west, an
d Howard Road 
on the cast. Sylvan Road would intersect and terminate at Highway 54 from the south at the appr
oximate midway 
point between US-95 and Howard Roads. 
With or without the interchange project, any development of the property will trigger roadway im
provement 
requirements. Within the property boundaries, the extension of Sy Ivan Road will be needed both 
to serve the 
development and to provide consistency in the overall area road network. Depending upon the fin
al configuration 
of the development, improvements to Howard Road as well as additional interior public roadway 
may also be 
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If development were to occur without the interchange, additional roadway improvements to US-95 and Highway 
54 in the form of acceleration\deceleration lanes and turn pockets would likely need to be constructed by the 
developer. With the interchange project, the improvements to Highway 54 as well as the modifications to US-95 
will be constructed by ITD as part of the overall interchange project. 
GENERAL DEVELOPMENT PARAMETERS· SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
• Retail, restaurant and motel land uses proposed by HJ Grathol are consistent with County zoning 
regulations. 
• Surface mining for gravel production is not a permitted use in the Commercial zone. 
• Current population densities in the surrounding are very low, fluctuate seasonally, and do not 
appear adequate to support significant commercial development in the near term. 
• Based on national case studies, the US95 freeway improvements can be anticipated to contribute to 
future property value increases at the HJ Grathol site. 
• There are no existing deeded access points to the HJ Grathol site which may serve commercial uses. 
Previous access points provided by warranty deed were limited to residential and agricultural uses, 
and are not valid for access to future commercial developments. 
• An on-site wastewater treatment system including land application of treated wastewater in the 
growing season and storage for winter wastewater flows would be needed for any significant 
commercial development at the HJ Grathol site. 
• Water service from the City of Athol is not available without annexation, and a previous attempt at 
annexation of the HJ Grathol site was rejected by Athol. Development of a commercial water 
system would be needed to serve any new development. 
• The HJ Grathol site will not be landlocked by the new freeway project. An interior public road, 
such as Sylvan Road, is therefore not needed to address a landlocked condition, but would be 
required by the County for commercial subdivision and development of the HJ Grathol site. 
• Without the new freeway project, the developer would be responsible for constructing turn lanes 
and other improvements to US95 and SH54 in order to accommodate traffic impacts at the site. 
The new freeway project will construct a new public roadway intersection at Sylvan Road and 
additional developer-constructed highway improvements are not anticipated to he needed. 
• The freeway interchange and Type V access control will serve to gather on and off traffic on US95 
at the Grathol site, enhancing its value and utility for commercial development. 
HJ GRATHOL SITE PLAN ANALYSIS 
Before and after site plans provided by HJ Grathol are shown in figures 6 and 7. 
PROPOSED LAND USES 
Grathol site plans show only slight variations in proposed land uses "before" and "after" the freeway project: 
10 
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40,000 sf grocery 
3 buildings 




fast food or similar 
1.3 acre site 
7 acre site 
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Given current and projected population densities for the area, the ability of the area to support th
e size and number 
of retail uses proposed by Grathol is questioned. Figures 2 and 3 show representative population
 densities of 
comparable areas used by Grathol for land valuation purposes. Population densities in the vicin
ity of the Grathol 
site are lower than comparable properties selected by HJ Grathol for appraisal purposes, in some
 cases 
significantly lower. 
DEVELOP ABLE AREA 
In review of the Grathol "before" or "after" site plans it appears that neither condition has shown
 adequate space 
to meet the code requirements for addressing landscaping and stormwater needs. The site has b
een maximized 
for building and parking layout without consideration of landscape codes requirements. Additio
nally, no area has 
been identified or set aside to address disposal of treated wastewater. 
Based on discussions with DEQ, HJ Grathol is proposing a wastewater disposal system that wou
ld use recycled 
wastewater for irrigation during the summer months and simply infiltrate during the winter mon
ths. However, at 
this time DEQ has never approved this type of system within Idaho over a sensitive resource aqu
ifer. Approval of 
such a system would be precedent-setting and is considered unlikely. 
For the purpose of evaluating the HJ Grathol plans, as well as development of alternative concep
ts prepared by 
DEA and George Hedley, we have assumed that disposal of the treated wastewater would be acc
omplished 
through landscape irrigation and crop application during the growing season. 
Commercial wastewater flows can vary significantly based on the type of facility that is being de
veloped and the 
expected use. Estimated daily wastewater flows were based on typical design standards for larg
e systems other 
than residential development: 
Land Use Design Unit Flow (gpd) 
Retail (shopping center) per 1,000 sf of floor space 200-300 
Motel per room 130 
Restaurant (interstate or per scat -·-··-~. 180 
through highway) 
Gas Station per vehicle served 10 




ITO v. HJ Grathol 





AND ASSOCIATES IMC. 
When applied to the "before" and "after" proposed land uses as shown on the HJ Grathol plans, estimated 
wastewater flows of 67,600 gpd and 86,700 gpd respectfully could be anticipated. 
Proposed Land "Before" Est. Flow (gpd) "After" Est. Flow (gpd) 
Use 
Major Retail 40,000 10,000 same 10,000 
Small Retail 3 buildings 3,750 1 building 1,250 
approx 5,000 sf each approx 5,000 sf 
Motel 2 buildings 26,000 same 26,000 
200 rooms 
Restaurant 3 buildings 21,600 6 buildings 43,200 
120 total seats 240 total seats 
Gas Station 250 vehicles per day 2,500 same 2,500 
Travel Plaza 50 parks 3,750 same 3,750 
Totals 67,600 86,700 
The combination of uses in the "after" condition shown by HJ Grathol would result in higher wastewater 
infrastructure needs than those shown in HJ Grathol's "before" condition. This is an inconsistency that skews the 
perceived cost impacts of the right of way taking. 
In the "before" condition, our analysis indicates 32 acres would be needed for land application of wastewater. 
The uses shown in HJ Grathol's "after" site plan would require 43 acres for land application of wastewater. 
However, since similar uses have been proposed by HJ Grathol in the "before" and "after" scenarios, a more 
defensible estimate may be obtained by assuming the same number, type and intensity of uses in both "before" 
and "after" scenarios. We have therefore assumed 32 acres for wastewater land application would be needed in 
both before and after Grathol scenarios. 
In the "before" condition, approximately 24 acres are available for land application of wastewater, so an 
additional 8 acres would need to be acquired by HJ Grathol to support the development shown in the "before" 
condition. In the "after" condition, 17 acres are available, and HJ Grathol would need to acquire an additional 15 
acres. 
Therefore, if HJ Grathol's development proposal was deemed feasible, HJ Grathol would need to acquire 7 acres 
more in the "after" condition for wastewater land application than in the "before" condition. 
In addition to the crop area needed, lagoon storage of between 1.2 million and 1.6 million cubic feet would be 
necessary to store the treated wastewater through the winter months. 
ACCESS AND CIRCULATION 
Before 
Grathol's "before" condition site plans show two new private driveway accesses to US-95, two new private 
driveway accesses to SH-54, and a public road approach to SH54 for Sylvan Road. The new private accesses to 
SH-54 and/or US-95 would not be consistent with ITD's Access Management policy. The developer would have 
to apply for a variance or appeal a denial of access and generally demonstrate that the proposed accesses would 
12 
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not diminish traffic operations or safety along the highways. In our opinion, one access at most could be 
permitted for the US-95 frontage (likely with tum restrictions) through the variance or appeal process. One to two 
commercial access points (possibly with turn restrictions) may be permitted through the variance or appeal 
process for SH-54. 
After 
Grathol's "after" condition site plan shows no private approaches to SH-54, with primary site access for the 
prope1iy east of the new freeway provided by one public road approach to SH54 for a new n01ih-south roadway 
(Sylvan Road). This proposal provides a good and sufficient primary access point for commercial development. 
Provided that Sylvan Road is connected at its north end to a new county roadway, it is reasonable to expect that 
the developer's proposed scenario will be accepted by ITO, Lakes Highway District and Kootenai County. 
The remainder piece fronting old US-95 (Blair Castle Road) shows two new accesses. According to Lakes 
Highway District's approach manual guidelines, only one access would be permitted; however, given the 
expected low traffic volumes on Blair Castle Road, it may be reasonable for the developer to apply for two access 
points. 
INFRASTRUCTURE COSTS 
Development costs were estimated for both "before" and "after" conditions for the HJ Grathol layouts and are 
summarized below. The cost of the wastewater treatment system in both the before and after condition was 
estimated based on anticipated flows for the long-term fully developed condition. In both Grathol's before and 
after condition there is inadequate property available to accommodate land application of the wastewater that 
would be generated, and additional property would need to be acquired. An acquisition cost of the additional 





Sylvan Road utilities (sewer, water, pwr, tele, gas, cable, street lights) 
US-95 and Hwy 54 Improvements (accel-decel lanes) 
Commercial Water system 






$2,138, 740* * 
$3,584,100 
*Currently no public water system is available without annexation. The developer would need to develop a commercial water 
system to serve the property. 
**The land application area needed to support the quantity of wastewater that would be generated by the uses shown on Grathol's 
"before" site plan exceeds the area available. 
A&E Fees (Geotech & Eng. Design) (15%) 
Platting and Survey 
Inspection/Testing/Staking ( 10%) 












!TD v, HJ Grathol 
December 16, 2011 
ITDX0000-0084 
~ -DAVID EVANS AN0ASSOCIATE$1NO. 
On-site 
Private Drive 
Private Drive Utilities (sewer, water, pwr, tele, gas, cable, street lights) 
A&E Fees (Geotech & Eng. Design) (15%) 
Inspection/Testing/Staking (10%) 













Summary of Costs (before) 
$671,646 
Off-site 
Total Off-Site Improvements 









Sylvan Road utilities (sewer, water, pwT, tele, gas, cable, street lights) 
Commercial Water system 







*Currently no public water system is available without annexation. The developer would need to develop a commercial water 
system to serve the property. 
**The land application area needed to support the quantity of wastewater that would be generated by the uses shown on Grathol's 
"before" site plan exceeds the area available. 
A&E Fees (Geotech & Eng. Design) (15%) 
Platting and Survey 
Inspection/Testing/Staking (10%) 











Summary of Costs (after) 
14 
Total Off-Site Improvements 





***In the "after" condition, all anticipated commercial parcels are served by a public road, therefore on-site costs (private drives 
and private drive utilities) are zero. 
****Costs do not include acquisition costs of additional land needed to accommodate land application of wastewater for the uses 
shown. 
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HJ GRATHOL SITE PLAN ANALYS[S - SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
15 
@ Substantial questions exist as to the ability of the surrounding area to support the number and 
intensity of commercial land uses shown on both "before" and "after" site plans provided by HJ 
Grathol. 
"' Site plans provided by HJ Grathol show relatively modest differences in the size, number and types 
of proposed hmd uses "before" and "after the freeway project, indicating that the freeway project 
does not significantly change their stated development plans. 
® While the land use types are similar, the combination of uses in the "after" condition shown by HJ 
Grathol would result in higher wastewater infrastructure needs than those shown in the "before" 
condition. This is an inconsistency that skews the perceived cost impacts of the right of way taking. 
" HJ Grathol is proposing a wastewater treatment system that has not previously been approved by 
the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) over the Rathdrum Prairie aquifer. Under 
current DEQ requirements, the level of development proposed by HJ Grathol in both "before" and 
"after" scenarios could not be accomplished with the land owned by HJ Grathol. Without a 
precedent-setting variance from DEQ, HJ Grathol would need to acquire additional property for 
land acquisition of wastewater in both their "before" and "after" scenarios. 
.. We estimate that HJ Grathol would have to acquire 7 acres more in their proposed "after" 
condition than in their "before" condition for wastewater land application. 
"' Water service from the City of Athol is not available without annexation, and the City has rejected 
a prior annexation application for the HJ Grathol site. A commercial water system would need to 
be developed to serve the property. 
" The highway access scenario shown in HJ Grathol's "before" condition is inconsistent with ITD's 
access management policy. HJ Grathol would have been required to apply for commercial 
approach permits for all commercial highway access points shown in their site plan, and would 
have had to request variances from ITD since the approaches would not have complied with 
applicable access management standards. 
o The access scenario shown in HJ Grathol's "after" site plan is reasonable and sufficient to serve 
commercial development on the site. The "after" access scenario shown would likely receive 
required approvals by ITD, Lakes Highway District and Kootenai County. 
" For commercial access to Blair Castle Road (Old US95) in the "after" condition, HJ Grathol would 
be required to apply for commercial approach permits from Lakes Highway District. 
" ITD is providing a public road approach to SH54 for Sylvan Road, so no permit application should 
be required of the developer for this highway access point. A single public road approach to SH54 
(for Sylvan Road) will provide reasonable, safe and sufficient access for commercial development 
on the portion of HJ Grathol property east of the new freeway, provided that Sylvan Road does not 
dead-end on the Grathol property. Sylvan Road will need to bewnnected to the new county road 
north of the HJ Grathol site in order to provide good local street connectivity and adequate 
ingress/egress for emergency vehicles. 
e HJ Grathol would be required to design and construct Sylvan Road in order to commercially 
subdivide and develop the property. The developer would be required to coordinate the design of 
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Sylvan Road with Lakes Highway District, and also to obtain commercial driveway approach 
permits from Lakes Highway District for accesses to private properties from Sylvan Road. 
o Once completed, HJ Grnthol would be required to dedicate Sylvan Road on its property to Lakes 
Highway District. 
ALTERNATE SITE PLANS PROPOSED BY GEORGE HEDLEY AND DEA 
Alternate "before" and "after" parcel layouts and development concepts prepared by DEA in consultation with 
George Hedley are shown in figures 8 thru 11. 
SUGGESTED LAND USES 
In reviewing the realistic potential development for this site, substantial questions were raised as to the ability of 
the area to support the development scenarios proposed by HJ Grathol in the near term given current and 
forecasted population densities. The near-term development potential of the property has been further reduced by 
the recent economic downturn, an unfortunate turn of events unrelated to ITD's highway improvement project. 
DEA discussed potential alternate land development scenarios in consultation with George Hedley of Hedley 
Construction, and Stan Moe of Columbia Valuation Group. Our team determined that ifwe were the owners of 
the property, realistic options would be to a) sell the undeveloped property as-is, orb) hold it on speculation for 
the longer term, deferring development plans until the economy turns around and background growth in the area 
reaches sufficient population densities to justify improving the property. 
Given these considerations, Mr. Hedley proposed a long-term development scenario for the prope1ty, beginning in 
approximately 10 to 15 years, with buildout anticipated beyond a 20-year horizon. For this analysis, we examined 
land uses similar to those suggested by HJ Grathol, scaled to address wastewater disposal constraints. Our build-
out proposal includes a retail anchor such as a grocery store, along with smaller retail, a motel, restaurant, gas 
station and travel plaza. 
DEVELOPABLE AREA 
For both the "before" and "after" site plan scenarios prepared by Mr. Hedley and DEA, the developable area was 
generally driven by the proposed type of use and the land needed to accommodate the wastewater that would be 
generated from those proposed land uses. Estimated daily wastewater flows were based on the typical rates 
previously indicated. 
When applied to the "before" and "after" proposed land uses as shown on the DEA/Hedley site plans, estimated 
wastewater flows of 40,000 gpd and 35,000 gpd respectfully could be anticipated. 
Suggested Land "Before" Est. Flow (gpd) "After" Est. Flow (gpd) 
Use 
Major Retail - --40,000 sf 10,000 same 10,000 
Small Retail 2 buildings 3,750 same 3,750 
approx 15,000 sf 
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40 total seats 

















As with the prior analysis presented for the Grathol site plans, treated wastewater would be used for irrigation of 
landscape areas within the development, with remaining wastewater disposed through vegetated land application 
during the growing season. Based on the estimated flows outlined above, approximately 17 acres of irrigated crop 
area would be needed in the "before" condition and 14.5 acres in the "after" condition to dispose of the recycled 
wastewater. Additionally approximately 750,000 cubic feet of lagoon storage would be necessary to store the 
treated wastewater through the winter months. 
ACCESS AND CIRCULATION 
Before 
ITD Access Management guidelines include a variance and appeal process. For the purposes of our site analysis, 
we assumed that in the "before" condition, the site developer would apply for a variance or approval to construct 
one right in/right out private driveway approach to US 95 that does not comply with the Type IV access 
guidelines. Left turns to and from US95 would not likely be permitted by ITD for safety reasons and to prevent 
adverse impacts on traffic flow. 
In the "before" condition, we further assumed a new public road would be constructed by the developer through 
the site, for access to commercial parcels presumed to be created through the subdivision process. This public 
roadway through the site would connect to SH54 in two locations, providing adequate ingress and egress for 
emergency vehicles. The developer would need to seek and obtain a variance on the access spacing requirements 
in order for two public road approaches to SH54 to be permitted. We further assumed that turning restrictions 
may be imposed by ITD at one or both of these approaches to SH54. 
After 
Property East of New Freeway. In the "after" condition, the construction of the interchange precludes the 
possibility of a direct driveway approach to US95, instead allowing safer access to the site via freeway offramps 
to SH54. 
In the "after" condition, one public road approach from SH54 (for Sylvan Road) is assumed to provide primary 
access to the portion of the Grathol site east of the new freeway. Interior access to new commercial parcels that 
are presumed to be created through the subdivision process is provided off Sylvan Road. Sylvan Road could be 
extended northerly through the Grathol property to connect to a new public roadway at the north edge of the 
property. This would support good local north-south connectivity for local traffic, reducing reliance on the state 
highway for short trips, and providing adequate access to the Grathol property for emergency response vehicles. 
Property West of New Freeway. The small remainder piece west of the new US95 alignment will continue to 
have frontage on existing US-95 (Blair Castle Road after completion of the freeway project). This p01tion of 
existing US95 will be relinquished by ITD to Lakes Highway District upon completion of the new interchange. 
17 
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Under Lakes Highway District approach guidelines, the remainder parcel would be permitted one access on Blair 
Castle Road. Given the expected low traffic volumes on Blair Castle Road, our team assumed it would be 





Sylvan Road utilities (sewer, water, pwr, tcle, gas, cable, street lights) 
interior Public Road 
interior Public Road utilities (sewer, water, pwr, tele, gas, cable, street lights) 
US-95 and Hwy 54 Improvements (accel-decel lanes) 
Commercial Water system 
Wastewater Treatment System (system, lagoon, land app) 
A&E Fees (Geotcch & Eng. Design) (15%) 
Platting and Survey 
inspection/Testing/Staking (I 0%) 




















*Currently no public water system is available without annexation. The developer would need to develop a commercial 
water system to serve the property. 
On-site 
Private Drive 
Private Drive Utilities (sewer, water, pwr, tele, gas, cable, street lights) 
Sub-total 
A&E Fees (Geotech & Eng. Design) (15%) 
Inspection/Testing/Staking ( I 0%) 
Permits & Fees (3%) 
Contingency (I 0%) 
Sub-total 
Total On-Site 
Summary of Costs (before) 
18 
Total Off-Site Improvements 
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Sylvan Road utilities (sewer, water, pwr, tele, gas, cable, street lights) 
Commercial Water system 
Wastewater Treatment System (system, lagoon, land app) 
A&E Fees (Geotech & Eng. Design) (15%) 
Platting and Survey 
Inspection/Testing/Staking (I 0%) 

















*Currently no public water system is available without annexation. The developer would need to develop a commercial 
water system to serve the prope11y. 
Summary of Costs (after) 
Total Off-Site Improvements 





**In the "after" condition, all commercial parcels are served by a public road, therefore on-site costs (private drives and private drive 
utilities) are zero. 
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• Based on existing and forecasted population densities, it does not appear the surrounding area will 
support significant commercial development at the HJ Grathol site within the next 10 to 15 years. 
• As a long-term (15 to 20-year) development scenario, commercial uses similar to those proposed by 
Grathol were suggested by George Hedley, with the condition that the proposed uses would need to 
be reduced in scale. 
• Water service from the City of Athol is not available without annexation, and the City has rejected 
a prior annexation application for the HJ Grathol site. A commercial water system would need to 
be developed to serve the property. 
• For commercial access to Blair Castle Road (Old US95) in the "after" condition, HJ Grathol would 
be required to apply for commercial approach permits from Lakes Highway District. 
• ITO is providing a public road approach to SH54 for Sylvan Road, so no permit application should 
be required of the developer for this highway access point. A single public road approach to SH54 
(for Sylvan Road) will provide reasonable, safe and sufficient access for commercial development 
on the portion of HJ Grathol property east of the new freeway, provided that Sylvan Road does not 
dead-end on the Gratbol property. Sylvan Road will need to be connected to the new county road 
520 of 1617
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north of the HJ Grathol site in order to provide good local street connectivity and adequate 
ingress/egress for emergency vehicles. 
• HJ Gratbol would be required t9 design and construct Sylvan Road in order to commercially 
subdivide and develop the property. The developer would be required to coordinate the design of 
Sylvan Road with Lakes Highway District, and also to obtain commercial driveway approach 
permits from Lakes Highway District for accesses to private properties from Sylvan Road. 
• Upon completion, HJ Grathol would be required to dedicate Sylvan Road to Lakes Highway 
District. 
• After the,l'ight of way take, the HJ Grathol site still has ample room to accommodate the 
wastewater iand application needs of the 15 to 20-year development scenario suggested by Mr. 
, Hedley, 
'', 
• Looking at ultimate buildout (beyond 20 years), the property in the "before'' condition had the 
ability to accommodate S,000 gallons· of wastewater production per day more than the "after" 
conditjon. This adverse impact may be roughly estimated as the loss of oppportunity to add 35 
· motel 1·ooms, or a small (25 seat) restaurant, in the distant futm·e. 
• The ·iucreme~tal reduction in long-term development opportunity due to the right of way take will 
likely be offset by long-term property value increases anticipated as a result of the highway 
Improvements. 
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.: . ·; ~:-, . 
his id:fe _,_ . ...J •• , • ,/ :_, , ·:.·· ;.. : •• 
A parcel ·.of land being 0n-·~a: · 
line of .State .l:f:1;~ Na,, ·5~ · 
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sncl being tbe South 28010 a 
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:of liho r!r&t ~. 
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And the a31d Granl!Ol'.5.. do_ hereey cbvmant to and with tbo &DJd State Dt 
ldaho, b)' ancl thrcush its StaTre Hip'llllY lJe~, ~Ilea, I.ts suc:c11s&02'G 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST.ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
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vs. 
HJ ORA THOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SA VINOS BANK, a Washington 
cosporationj and DOES 1 throqh S, 
Defendant$, 
Case No. CVl0-10095 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In accordance with the Amended Pretrial Order dated November 16, 2011, Plaintiff Idaho 
Transportation Department ('GJID") submits its disclosure of rebuttal experts and testimony. 
ITD's disclosures are made in rebuttal to Defendant HJ Orathol's ("Grathol11) disclosure of three 
expert witnesses, Dewitt M. SheIWOod, Geoffrey Reeslund, and Alan Johnson. Orathol 's 
disclosures of its experts are set forth in its Expert Witness Disclosure (Aug. 19, 2011 ), its 
Second and Third Supplemental Answers and Responses to ITD' s first set of discovery (Sept, 19, 
2011 and Oct 6, 2011 ), 8lld the deposition testimony of these witnesses (Oct. 16-18, 2011 ), 
In its rebuttal disclosure, rm may address issues that have previously been ruled upon by 
the Court and are law of this case, For example, on January 21, 2011 during the hearing on 
ITD's Motion for Order Granting Possession of Real Property, the Court ruled that the extension 
of Sylvan Road across the Gtathol property ''is not the subject of the taking that is before this 
Court'' and that "the scope of the proposed taking is adequately defined in the complaint itself." 
Hrg. Transcript, at 61:11-2S (Jan. 21,2011). Nevertheless, Grathol continues to attempt to assert 
claims based on Sylvan Road. By addressing these and other claims already dismissed from the 
suit, ITD does not concede that the issues remain part of the case or waive its rights under the 
rulings by the Court. 
In its discovery responses, as well as during each expert's deposition, Grathol reserved 
the right to supplement its expert disclosures. Any attempt by Grathol to supplement it'S expert 
disclosures at this late date would be untimely and barred by the Court's scheduling order. 
Orathol's deadline for identifying experts and disclosing their opinions has long passed. 
ITD makes the following disclosure of rebuttal witnesses Jason Minzghor, Stan Moe, 
Carole Richardson, Ken Geibel, Kevi..n Picanco. Jeff Key, Larry Pynes. George Hedley, and 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S DISCLOSURE OF REBUITAL EXPERTS- 2 
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Dennis Reinstein. These disclosures are made in accordance with the Court's Amended Pretrial 
Order and Rule 26(bX4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Il. REBUTTAL EXPERT: MR. JASON MINZGHOR 
A. Statement of Testimony: 
1. Introduction: 
ITD incorporates by teference herein the previous disclosure by ITD of advancing eXpert 
testimony by Mr. Minzghor. Mr. Minzghor may be called upon to testify in rebuttal on the 
subjecij and based on the anticipated testimony set forth in ITD's advancing expert witness 
disclosures. 
Mr. Minzghor's background, qualifications, materials relied upon, compensation, prior 
testimony, and publications are set forth in ITD's disclosures of aavancing expe~ and are also 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
2. Aeeess to and from the Gratbol Property~ 
A portion of the Grathol property is needed for the realignment of US-95 and the 
construction of the Highway 54 Interchange. The Orathol prop;rty before the taking had no 
access rights to US .. 95. The Grathol property before the taking had three deeded access rights to 
Highway 54. The deeded access rights are limited to farm.and residential uses, and cannot be 
used for commercial purposes. No ph.yS'ical accesses or approaches have ever been cons1ructed 
pursuant to the deeded access rights to Highway S4, Likewise, neither Orathol nor any prior 
owner has ever requested an encroachment permit for my access to Highway 54. 
A physical approach to the Orathol Property to Highway S4 exists near the intersection 
with Highway 54 and US-9S. The approach is not permitted or approved and it impermissibly 
encroaches upon ITD's right-of-way. Thus, it is an illegal approach. 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S DISCLOSURE OF REBUff AL EXPERTS - 3 
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The Grathol property does not have any deeded, pennitted, or approved approaches or 
rights of access to US-95. Also, the Grathol property has no physical access to US-95. Neither 
Grathol nor any prior owner has requested an encroachment permit for a commercial approach to 
US-9S. 
5. Material and Gravel on the Grathol ProPHtf: 
Grathol has made a claim for $300,000.00 for gravel on the property that it contends ITO 
could use in conjunction with the US-95 Project. This claim is unfounded and improper for the 
following reasons. 
First, no soils or materials testing conducted by or on behalf of ITD shows any quantity 
or quality of gravel that may be located on the property condemned from Orathol. Also, Grathol 
has not provided any reports showing whether usable gravel is located on the property or the 
quantity or quality of usable materials. No support or documentation has been provided to assign 
or substantiate any dollar figure to any alleged amount of usable material on the subject property. 
Second, ITD is construeting an elevated interchange with on and off ramps on and 
adjacent to the condemned properly. The subsurface material in this area must be left in place to 
provide sub-grade support for the infrastructure to be construeted on the property. If the 
contnwtor were to remove subsurface material on the property, it would then have to replace that 
material with like-kind fill material with the same support characteristics. In short, ·it would 
make no sense to remove material simply to have to replace it. 
Third, the contract for the Project pnmdes that ITO will not pay the contractor for rock 
excavation that is made below the top of sub-grade. This means that if the contractor were to 
remove any material below sub-grade, it would be required to incur the associated costs, as well 
as the costs to replace with similar type and grade of fill material. 
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B. Additional Data and Other Inforaiation. Considered in Formiog Testimony: 
In addition to the materials identified in ITD' s disclosure of advancing experts, Mr. 
Minzghor has relied on the following data and documents in this matter. 
Environmental docU111ents related to the Project. 
Materials and soils documents relating to the Project, 
Deeds and documents pertaining to access to the Orathol property, 
Project design, right-of-way, and construction documents and plans. 
Personal inspection of the site of1he Project and the Orathol property. 
Grathol,s expert disclosures, 
Deposition testimony by Grathol witnesses. 
C. Exhibits that May Be U1ed as a Summaa of or Sup.port for Testimony: 
Mr. Minzghor may use some ot all of the documents and information identified above 
and in the prior expert disclosure by ITD as exhibits to summarize, illust?ate, or support his 
testimony. 
m. REBU'ITAL EXPERT: MR. STANLEY D, MOE, MAI, RM 
A. Statement of Testimonx: 
Mr. Moe is a MAI-certified real estate appraiser licensed in the State ofidaho. He will 
testify in accordance with his rebuttal report, which is attached hereto as Exhibit A and his 
appraisal report, which was previously provided to Orathol. 
B, Data and 0th~ Information Considered in Forming Testimom:: 
The da~ documents, and information relied on by Mr. Moe in fonnulating his opinions 
are identified in his report. In addition, Mr. Moe has reviewed and considered the following data 
and documents in this matter: 
Planning documents related to the Project. 
Environmental documents related to the Project. 
Project design, right-of.way, and construction documents and plans. 
Personal inspection of the site of the Project and the Grathol property. 
Applicable federal, state, and local regulations and specifications. 
Planning and zoning documents. 
Engineering standards and guidelines. 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S DISCLOSURE OF REBUTIAL EXPERTS-S 
535 of 1617




JAN. 6. 2012 3:49PM NO. 3879 P. 17/51 
'"' . 
BEFORE THE HEARING EXAMINER OF KOOTENAI COUNTY, IDAHO 
IN THE MATTER OF TIIE APPLICATION 
OF HUGHES INVESTMENTS FOR A 
CHANGE IN THE ZONING 
CLASSIFICATION ON APPROXIMATELY 








CASE NO. ZON08..0008 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
APPLICABLE LEGAL 
STANDARDS, COMPREHENSIVE 
PLAN ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS 












COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On June 10, 2008, the Building and Planning Department received an appUcation for a zone 
change. 
The Building and Planning Department issued a Notice of Public Hearitlg on this application, 
Case No. ZON0S-0008, with the hearing to be held onAugust21, 2008. On July 21 1 2008, notice 
was pub1ished in the Coeztt d'Alene Press. On July 9, 2008, notice was provided to adjacent 
property owners wjthin 300 feet of the project site. On July 21 1 notice was posted on the site. 
Based on signed affidavits in the file, the requirements for publi~ notification have been met. 
FINDINGS OP FACT 
Applicant. Hughes Jnvesnnents, 23 Corporate Plaza, Suite 245, Newport Beach1 CA 926S8-
8700. (Exhibit A-11 Application) 
Owner. Gracal CoJJ). 23 Corporate Plus, Suite 2451 Newport Beach, CA 926S8-8700. 
Proposal. The Applicant is requesting a change in the zoning classification of approximately 56 
acres from Rural to Commercial. The narrative explains that because of the Highway 9S 
jmprovements in the area, resulting in an eventual fully interstate-Uke interchange at Highway 54, 
the area is much better suited for commercial development The Applicant further states that with 
increased population growth. a commercia) center at this location would provide needed goods 
and se,vices to area residents. (Exhibits A-31 Narrative; A-Sa and b, Conceptual Site Plans) 
Location and Legal Description, The site is located at the northeast intersection of Highway 95 
and Highway 54, on the west sjde of Howard Road in the Athol area. The site is described as a 
portion of the SW¼ of Section 10, Township 53 North, Range 3 West, B.M., Kootenai County, 
Idaho. The parcel numbers are 53N03W-l0-SOOO and 51N03W-10-61001 and the serial numbers 
are 121649 and 21227. 
Surrounding Land Use and Zoning. The suJTounding ·land use in the area consists of single 
family dweJlings and accessory buildings on parcels five acres and larger. The Athol city limits 
are adjacent to ttJe sl.lbject propert)i an tM southwest comer. This uses consist of commercial 
establishments. The Hackney Airfield is approximately ½ mil to the northeast The subject 
property borders property zoned Rural on the north, east and o There is Commercial zoned 
property on the southeast comer of Highway 9S and Highway 54. e is Agricul\'1Jral Suburban 
zoning approximately ½ mile to the northeast. (Exhibit S-1, Zone Map 
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2.07 Comprehensive Plao, The Kootenai County Comprehensive Pl.an Future Land Use Map 
designates this area. as Rural. Rural designations are given to areas of the County which are not 
close to population centers and in areas where continued spars settlement is encouraged due to the 
difficulty of providing services. Services and infrastructure are not expected to be improved in 
the near future. 
2.08 Physical Characteristics, The Soil &rvey of Kootenai County Area, Idalia identifies the soil in 
the area to generally be Bonner silt loam. This is a ve-ry deep, weU drained soil that is mainly 
used for woodland. Penneability is moderately rapid, runoff is slow to medium and the hazard of 
erosion is slight to moderate. Topography: the site is flat throughout. Vegetation: the majority 
of the property is vegetated with thick timber and brush, (Exhibit A-4, Photographs) 
2.09 Flood Zone and Wetlands. According to the Flood Insurance Rate Map panel number 160076-
00S0C, the subject property is not located within an area of special flood hazard. There do not 
appear to be any wetlands on the site. 
2.10 Area of City Impact. The subject property is located within the City of Athol's Area of City 
Impact. The city was asked to comment on this request, but has not done so at this time. The 
Applicant did submit a copy of an AMexation into the City of Athol, but it appears that the city 
was not interested in annexation at the time. (Exhibit A~ 10, Annexation Information) 
2.11 Water and Sewage Disposal. Water s~rvice and sewage disposal have not been specifically 
addressed in this application. Although asked to comment, the Panhandle Health District has not 
done so at the time of this writing. 
2.12 Access. The subject property fronts U.S. Highway 951 State Highway 54 and Howard Road. The 
state and federal highways are maintained by the Idaho Transportation Department and Howard 
Road is maintained by the Lakes Highway District. In an e-mail received July 2, 2008, Planner 
Donald Davis stated that the Highway 95 improvements in the area are currently in the design 
phase so the exact footprint of the new alignment has not yet been determined. lTD anticipates a 
full interstate-like interebange at this location and also anticipates that properties in close 
proximity to this interchange will seek changes in the zoning classification for commercial uses. 
Once the final design is approved for Highway 95, 11D recommends that access to the property 
be restricted to the proposed frontage roads on the east and west sides of the new alignment and 
Howard Road. (Exhibit PA-2, E-mail) 
In a Jetter dated July 28. 2008, Lakes Highway District Engineer Eric Shanley stated that the 
developer of this project should be required to dedicate sufficient right.of~way for the local 
frontage roads e.s defined by the Highway 95 project. Mr. Shanley :further stated that access to 
the future development should access either Howard Road of the future frontage roads. Future 
development on this property may require Howard R.oad improvements. Fina1Jy, the District 
recommends that the developer address public utilities necessary to seive the proposed request. 
(Exhibit PA-5, Letter) 
In a letter dated July 7, 2008, Carole Richardson of the Kootenai Metropolitan Planning 
Organization (KMPO) stated that major-development proposals not necessarily consistent with 
the furure land use designation may have significant impacts on the regional transportatf on 
system. · I<MPO suggests that traffic impacts from this proposal be analyzed prior to the issuance 
of permits, and also suggests that a Comprehensive Plan amendment ma) be order. 
(Exhibit P A-3, Letter) · 
000453 
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2.13 Fire Protection, The subject property is within the bouncfaries of the Timberlake Fire District 
Although requested, no comment from the District has been received. 
2.14 Zoning Ordinance, Section 9-51-2·D ofthe Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance requires that all 
"lots or parcels in the Commercial zone which front on a state or federal highway shall require a 
Special Notice Permit" If this request ts approved, the Applicant wiJl then b1:1 required to apply 
for and receive approval on. the Special Notice Permit prior to the start of coDStruction. 
2.15 The Application Requirements. Section 9-21-4 of the Kootenai Councy- Zoning Ordinance 
states that an application for a change of zone must show the folJowing: 
a. The date the existing zoning became effective (January 3, 1973). 
b. The changed tonditions which are alleged to warrant other or additional zoning. 
c. Facts to justify the change on the basis of advancing the public health, safety, and general 
welfare. 
d. The effect the zone change wm have on the value and character of adjacent property. 
e. The effect on the property owner if the request is not granted. 
f. Such other information the Hearing Body shall require. 
g. The effect the zone change will have on the Comprehensive Plan. 
The AppUcant's narrative in~ludes responses to these items. 
(Exhibit A-3, Narradve) 
? 
Idaho Code requires that in the course of deciding zone change request, "particular consideration ? 
shall be given to the effects of any proposed zone change upon the delivery of services by any 
political subdivision providing public services, including school distTicts, within the plaMing 
jurisdiction. 
2.16 Public Comment. The Building and Planning Department received three comments in support 
of this request, one neutral comment and one opposed. (Exhibits P-1 through p.5, Comment!!) 
111 APPUCAJJLB LEGAL STANDARDS 
3.01 Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance No. 401 Chapter 21, Amendments. 
Chapter 21 of the Zoning Ordinance 01.1tlines the application requirements, process and review 
standards for zone amendments. lt requires thar the request be considered by the hearing body for 
their recommendation. The hearing body recommendation goes to the Board of Commissioners, 
who must bold a public bearing prior to making a final decision and signing the associated 
ordinanc8 amendment. This article requires that the Applicants show that a proposed amendment 
is reasonably necessary, is in the best interest of the public, and is in accordance with the 
Comprehensive Plan. Notice must meet the requirements of Idaho Code, or for larger zone 
amendments1 those given in the Ordinance. 
3.02 Kootenai County Ordinance No. 3SS. 
This Ordinance establishes Hearing Examiners and a PJanning and Zoning Commission, and 
outlines procedures for the conduct of hearings. 
000454 
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3.03 1994 Kootenai County Comprehensive Plan. 
The Comprehensive Plan establishes long range plans for growth. development, land use, and 
environmental protection in Kootenai County. The plan outlines goals, objectives and policies 
that provide fundamental decision-making guidance for other County ordinances and for future 
development. Included in the Comprehensive Piao is a Future Land Use Map that provides a 
general outline of areas of suitable projected land uses. with approximately ¼ mile wide transition 
areas between designations. 
3.04 Idaho Code §67-6502, Local Land Use Planning; §67-6509, notice and Hearing Procedures; §67-
65011, Zoning Ordinance; §67-6S19-§6520, Permit Process; §67--6521, Actions by Affected 
Persons; §67-6S3S, Approval/Denial Requirements; §67-2343, Notices of Meetings; §67-8003, 
Regulatory Takings Analysis. 
Idaho Code §67-6502 outlines the purpose of local land use planning in promoting the heal~ 
safety and general welfare of the people of the state in the following ways: a) protect property 
rights while making accommodations for other necessary types of development such as low cost 
housfag and mobile home parks; b) ensure that adequate public facilities and services are 
provided at reasonable costs; c) protect the economy of the state and localities; d) protect the 
important environmental features of the state and localities; e) encourage the protection of prime 
agricultural. forestry and mining lands; f) encourage urban and urban.type development within 
incorporated cities; g) avoid undue concentratio11 of population and overcrowding of land; h) 
ensure that the development on land is commensurate with the physical characteristics of the 
land; i) protect life and property in areas subject to natural hazards and disasters; j) protect fish. 
wildlife and recreation resources; k) avoid undue water and air pollution; I) allow local school 
districts to participate in the community planning and development process so as to address 
public school needs and impacts on an ongoing basis. 
Idaho Code §67-6511 requires that notice and hearing procedures be in accordance with Idaho 
Code §61-6S09 requires a public hearing before the Planning Commission or Hearing Examiner. 
At least 1 S days prior to the hearing. notice must be published in the newspaper and be provided 
to all political subdivisions providing services. A public service notice must also be made 
available to other papets and radioffV stations. lf the Board holds a second public hearing. 
notice and hearing procedures are the same, except the notice must include the recommendation 
of the Hearing Body. 
Idaho Code §67~6511 requires that the proposed zone change be in accordance with the 
Comprehensive Plan and that it not have a negative effect on the delivery of public services by 
political subdivisions. A public hearing must be held before the Planning Commission or 
Hearing Examiner prior to consideration by the Board. In addition to the notice procedures 
outli!Jed in Idaho Code §67-6509, notice must be mailed to property owners or purchasers of 
record within the land being cons;dered, with in 3 00 feet of the external boundaries of the land, 
and to any additional area that may be impacted by the proposed zone change. Notice must be 
posted on the premises not less than one week prior to the hearing. 
Idaho Code §61·6519-§6520 outline's the permit and the decjsfon specifications. The application 
must first go to the Planning Commission or Hearing Examiner for their recommendation. 
Recommendation and/or decisions must specify the ordinance and standards used in evaluating 
the application, the reasons for the approval or denial, and, if the decision js a denial, the actions, 
if any, the Applicants could take to obtain a permit 
nnn .. 11::,: 
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Idaho Code §67-6521 defines an "affected person'' states that an affected person may request a 
hearing on any pennit authorized under Chapter 6S, outlines the actions the Board may take, and 
provides for judicial review, if requested, within 28 days after all remedies have been exhausted 
ur.der local ordinances. 
Idaho Code §67--6535 requires that the approval or denial be jn wrjting and be accompanied by a 
reasoned statement that explains the criteria and standards considered relevant, the relevant 
contested facts, and the rationale for the decision based on the factual information contained in 
the record, applicable provfaions of the Comprehensive Plan, relevant ordinances and laws. 
Idaho Code §67-2343 provides general requirements for meeting notices such as the 
Commissioner's weekly deliberations. 
Idaho Code §67-8003 provides that applicants for site-specific land use requests may ask for a 
regu_latory taking analysfa. 
Amendments to Zoning, Idaho Code Title 67 Chapter 65-1 l(d) states that if a governing board 
adopts a zoning classification pursuant to a request by a property owner based upon a valid, 
existing Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance. the governing board shall not subsequently 
reverse its action or otherwise ch.a:nge the zoning classification of said property without the 
consent in writing of the current property owner for a period of four (4) years from the date the 
go:veming board adopted said individual property owner's request for a zoning classification 
change. 
/JI COMPREHENSIVE PLAN ANALYSIS 
(Rese7'Vedfor the Hearing Examiner.) 
V STAFF ANALYSIS 
It appears that one of the more pressing issues regarding this request is access. The site plan shows the 
preliminary Jocations of the future Highway 95 alignment as well as the locations of the future :frontage 
roads, The Lakes Highway Djsttict and the Idaho Transportation Department are concerned with access 
to any future developmenl Staff feels confident that if this request is approved. access issues will be 
addressed when development plans are review. Furthermore, if this request is approved, a Special Notice 
Permits will be required. Upon application of that permit, more definitive development plans will be 
submitted for agency review. 
Another issue of concern. is the future )and use designation for this property. The current Comprehensive 
Plan was adopted in 1994 and reflects the rural character of the area at that time. However, with the 
population growth of the County as well as amount of traffic utiHzing Highway ~S, this particuJar area 
may not be as ruraJ as it was in 1994. Furthermore, it is anticipated that the Highway 9S improvements 
wi1J facilitate more traffic. Staff wonders if it appropriate to encourage rural development, including ruraJ 
residentiaJ .uses along this in~reasingly busy transportation conidor. 
One Jast .issue regarding this request is its location adjacent to the Cjty of Athol. It js Staff's 
wderstanding that the City Js not interested in amexing properties into its city limits. It seems 
appropriate that the property owner pursue annexation, and, mdeed, there is information m the file that the 
owner clid apply for annexation. However, the City detemiined that it was not interested. 
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VI CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(Reserved/or the Hearing Examiner.) 
J/11 RECOMMENDATION 
(Reservedfo,. the Hearing Examiner J 
Prepared by: 
'h,oA' 'tvt~ ---
Mark Mussman, Planner m Date 
-
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ZONE CHANGE APPLICATION 
l{oot!nal Counl)' Building & PlenmngOeparnnent 
PO Box 9000, Co6u.r d'Aleni; ID ~8l~900D 
1'ho11e: (208) 4~6-1070 
APPLICANT: liughea Investments, Attention~ Geoff R.eeeluncl 
ADDR.BSS: 23 corponte Plaza, Suite 245 &w:ya,-4· b«,h I C.A 'IZ'9S8-876t> 
PHONB~S49l 759-9531 X24'.fAX: (949) 7O6•OS13 EMAJL;9%"HBlund@hughesinv.com 
OWNE!t: Gtaoal Co%p. 
AOCRESS: SAME AS ABOVE 
PHONE! (949) 7S9-953l.X242FAX: (9491 '706•0513 E,MAlL~ greeslund.@hughuinv.com 
CONSULTA'NT(!fopplicable) cr..i: Associate1a1, Actention: Tom Vandenre:rt 
ADDRESS: 12730 E, M:Lrabeau pkwy,, Suite 100 
PKO$: !SD9)4SB•6B40 FAX: (S09)458-6844 E-MA.It.: evandervart@clcassoc.com 
CONTACT HRSON: (pi~ one) o OWNER ll APl'LICANT o CONSDt.TANT 
Dl'RECTIONSTOSITS(m:imCoeurd'A.lsne)Norch on l-.95 to Hwy s,, site is at the 
northeast ~uaarant of tha~ intersection. 
PARCBLNUMBER(S);\PNs:53NO3WlOSOOO;S3N03WlO61O0sect_Twp,_Rng_ 
TOTAL ACREACl£ Of' SUBJE!CT SlTB: .. S:.::6;.:.•;;;.:39;;..;,A;,;;e;,;:.r.;;;.es~-----------
CUJit!!ENT ZONE: Rural PROl'OSED ZONt: Commer,;ial 
COMPRBH!NSJVB PLAN'D!STGNATION: _n.ur_a_1 _______________ _ 
ARU.,OFc:ttYlMPAtn _A_t_h_o_l ________________ _ 
ATIACHM!NTS: 
SiroPlan 
Legat Descrlption of Subject Site 
Pictur~ of Sill: (pafli:,rarni~) 
~se.ssor's Mlp(s) , 
Narrative ~ responses to the toUowins as per Ani~~ 27 ohhe ~ootenal County Zo11ing Orclin1111ce): 
1-~ date the existing ioning became elfectfve.. , ~ "1 ~ 
2-Wbal 1?0ndillons w81111nt a ohi.nge io 20oo1g2 , 
3-How would 1he 20nc chango ~the public health, Sl!Cc!y, and welfare? 
4-ttow would the value Md diaract&r of .adjai;cnt propetl}' be alfec\eo? 
S - What woulcl be the cffecr on 1hc propetty owncr(s) i! not gran1td? 
6- What would be the effca on the Compr=hsnsi11e Plan? 
1 UNDERSTAND THAT: 
I, This application is su"bjm to acccplillce by the Kootenai Co11niy !luilding & Pla!ming ~artml!llt 11pon 
tbt.dctcrmination 1hiu !his ap,Plicatioo packagt. is ;omplc1e, 
2. Th~ hearing da~ are tetJtativc and subject to lhe number of applications received. Bach applica\ion wiU 
be pro~ in lhc ordlt' rooci\led. Stair will dCTomliDc th• n\lmbcr,af appti,ations to be placed on tile 
naict t11ailabla agend11. · 
All ti,, b,Jbrmalion, ttol4mcntt, aaocl1nu1111J, tWL a/116,'U tnuuttdtr" l,erewitl1 are""' 101/11 tir11 O/f/lJ lmo1llle"6~ 
'""''"""'~ ~12L l)A!E, .. y , ..... , 
to, .. , .... ~..... *•++f••,...,.04• .. ••••• .. ••• .. •• .. •~•••;• ......... •.•••••••-'••,••••-.w.• 
FOtlOPPIC! USE ONLY _ 
l:)AT!RECBMD; ,,/fJ •08 R.EC£1VSDS\': ~- M.ff1s@n 
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N~rrative Rese,o(ls~s 
ZONE CHANGE APPLICATION __ 
Hughes Investments 
1. The date· the existing :zoning became effective? 1973 
NO. 3879 P. 24/51 
2. What conditions warrant a change in zoning? The site is located at the 
intersection of US Interstate 95, a heavily trafficked artery connecting Canada 
to Coeur d'Alene and beyond, and Hwy. 54, the major route serving the 
Bayview area. In addition, 1-95 is soon to begin improvement to full freeway 
status, and will be realigned to cross this property, providing on and off•ramps 
at the Hwy 54 in~ection. Existing properties both immediately adjacent and 
to the south fronting on Hwy. 54 are also currently zoned commercial, and 
both the NWC and SWC of this intersection have commercial designations as 
well. TherefQre, in such a location, commercial zoning is the most appropriate 
designation. Continued population growth along this corridor also warran1s 
this zoning1 which wo1:tld allow the provision of needed goods and services to 
residents and travelers alike. 
3. How would the zone change advance the public health, safety and welfare? 
Designating commercial uses fronting on major traffic arterials provides a 
protective buffer for other less intensive potential uses, SllCh as residential, 
agricultural or other rural uses, thus enhancing the health, safety and welfare 
of · those users. Properly developed commercial uses would not have 
detrimental effects on those other potential users. 
4. How would the value and character of adjacent properties be affected? The value 
Qf these properties would be enhanced by buffering them from the busy 
highways, and also by fostering a further pattern of development and growth 
in the area. 
5. What would be the effect on the property owner(s), if not granted? It would create 
future financial hardship by not allowing for appropriate uses on the property, 
perhaps rendering the site unusable for any meaningful development. 
6. What would be the effect on the Comprehensive Plan? It would designate an 
appropriate· use and zoning for the property, and lead to an intelligent and 
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KUGHES INVESTMENTS5 "' 
~~__:;;~- Sl:lOPI'l.NG CEN'l"EltS 
GEOFF FIE!.Slt.J~'O. AtA 
VICE PRESIDENT. IJIRECTOFI OF DESIGN ANO CONSTRUCTION 
£.MAil.: greeah,N@~.ughasl"v.tom 
July 31, 2008 
Mark Mussman, Planner Ill 
Kootenai County Building & Planning Department 
451 N. Government Way 
Coeur D'Alel'le, ID 83614-2988 
NO. 3879 P. 33/51 
{208) 446-1082 Via: FedEx Overnight 
Re: Rezone Application Case No. ZONOB-0008 
Athol Project 
US 95 & Highway 54 
Kootenai· County, Idaho 
Dear Mark: 
You may recall that at our first meeting wi~h you to discuss this project on March 21, 2008, we 
mentioned that we had recently submitted an application to the City of Athol, requesting that 
our property be annexed into the City. We subsequently had appeared before the Athol City 
Council on Tuesday, March 4, 2008 to review this application, and were told that the City 
would not support anne,cation of this property at that time. I have enclosed a copy of the 
application that was submitted for your use and inclusion in the file regarding our rezone 
application to Kootenai County. · 
If you have any questions, comments or need anything further, please do not hesitate to 
contact me: · 
Sincerely, 
Geoff Reeslund, AIA 
Vice President 
Director of Design and Construction 
GBR/jpm 
Enclosures 
cc: Mt. Doug Marfice - Ramsden & Lyons, LLP w/ enclosures 
Alan Johnson - Hughes Investments 
G;\JilllAlhol, ldaho\MussmanLtr073108.cioc 
-
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RIGHT-OF-WAY CONTRACT r;,,Ld~ cP V 
'(09 1,, J t 
f\~r.,.\'v 
ProjectNo. A009(870) 
Parcel No. 3S 
Parcel ID No. 0043879 
KeyNo. ~o,786 .-
County Kootenai 
TillS AGRE,EMENT, nwlo this '9 3-cJ day of j ~ ,a~ between the 
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEi,TMENT, by and through the . 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, by its Chief Engineer or the authorized representative, 
herein called "STATE", and Garwood Saloon and Arena, LLC. , herein 
called "GRANTOR". 
NOW THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
l. State shall pay Grantor and the Lien holder(s)1 if any, such sums of monies as set out below. 
Grantor agrees to pay all mxes and assessments due and owing, including those for years 2007 
and 2008; upon payment of 2008 property taxes, the grantor may request a pro-rata 
reimbursement for the portion ofthe'year 2008 that the stat.e owned the properly, and Grantor 
shall execute and deliver to State a notarized instrument of conveyance cotTesponding to the 
:interest being acquired. 
2. This contract shall not be binding unless and until executed ~Y the Chief Engineer or the 
authorized representative. 
3. The parties have herein set out the whole of then- agreement, the perfonnance of which 
constitutes the entire consideration for the grant of said right-of-way and shall relieve the 
State of all future claims or obligations on that account or on account of the location, 
grade and construction of the proposed highway. 
4. Gran.tor represents that to the best of their knowledge no hazardous materials have been 
stored or spilled on the subject property during their ownership or during previous 
ownerships at least insofar as they observed or have been informed. In the alternative, if 
the Orantor has lmowledge of storage or spill of hazardous materials on the subject 
property, that imormation is set out below. This sale is conditional upon titll disclosure 
of any such information. 
5. Grantor hereby grants the State or its contractor a Temporary Basement of ingress and 
egress for construction of any item requiring a Temporary Easement, Said Easement to 
terminate upon completion of construction, 
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. -•• f) , 
Right-of~ Way Contract 
Page2 of2 · 
Key No. 09870 
Parcel No. 35 
Parcel ID No. 0043879 
6. Granter agrees to give the State legal and physical possession· of the property herein 
being purchased bythe State OJi cu:, (' loslnq , or upon Gran.tors receipt of 
payment, whichever {s later. · 
7. State will pay Grantor for right-of-way, improvements and control of access as follows: 
~ 4j} acre(•) of land and J'mprovemmdE $ !,Ol'i ,200.QO . 
Total Just Compensation $1,017,200.00 




1N WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement the day and year first 
above 'Written. 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT 
Recommend for Approval 
By~ 
ClP Right-cf-Way Coordinator 
Approved for Chief Engineer 
0n=.4r-;ed,,c ,A411! 
By~= 
David S. Sho~ 
CIP Bight-of-Way Prograai Manager 
G.RANTOR: 
Garwood Saloon and Arena, LLC 
000-t~ Q4 
D. D. Darwood .. Member 
¼£~-~ 
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July 22, 2008 
Gaiwood Saloon and Arena, UC 
17800 N. Hwy 95 
Hayden, JD 83835 
Re: US-95, Gatwood to Sagle Corridor 
SH-S3 to Ohio Match 
Project No. A009(780) 
Key No. 09780 
Parcel ID No. 0043879, Parcel No. 35 
Revised Offer Letter 
Dear Garwood Saloon and Arena, LLC: 
NO. 3879 P. 37/51 
The Idaho T!'ansporration Department (ITD) in conjunction with Connecting Idaho Partners 
(CJP), is in the process of acquiring properties along US..9'5 between Garwood and Sagle for 
highway improvements. Construction plans have detenn1ned that it will be necesslll)' to purchase 
your property identified as a portion c1f land in the N ½NW¼ of Section 25, TS2N, R4W, in 
Kootenai County. The property has been appraised by an independent, state certified appraiser 
and reviewed by another qualified appraiser to arrive at the ''Just Compensation''. 
Jt is important to know that tbe offer does not include any increase or decrease in the value of the 
property due to the influence of the Project. 
On behalf of CIP, U:ruversaJ Field Services is authorized to present an offer to you in the 
amount of $1,017,200.00 to purchase the fee simple interest in your property, 
If the offer to acquil'e is accepted within 4S calendar days of receipt oftbis offer letter, you will 
receive an incentive payment for an additional 10% of the offer not to exceed $100,000.00. 
Should the offer to acquire be accepted witliin 46 to 60 calendar days :from receipt of the date o.n 
this offer Jetter, the incentive payment will be an additional S% of the offer or $S0,860.00, After 
60 days, the incentive payment no longer applies. See breakdown below: 
J 91,92S sf (land reguired} $ 1,017,200.0.Q 
Just Compensation S 1,017,200.00 
OOOROINA TED RIGHT OF WAY SERVICES SINCE 1958 
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Garwood Saloon and Arena, LLC 
Parcel ID No. 0043879 
Paree) No. 3S 
Offer Letter 
Page 2 of2 
Attached you will find the following doeuments: 
Right of Way Contract (duplicate orjginaJ) 
Warranty Deed 
Project Plan Sheet 
Acquisition Brochure 
Copy of Appraisal 
Advice of Rights Form 
Claim for Right of Way Payment 
Internal Revenue Form W-9 
NO. 3879 P. 38/51 
If this offer is satisfactocy, please sign the dupJicate 01iginal contracts, retumjng both contracts to 
my atrention in the envelope provided for your convenience. One fully executed. original contract 
will be returned to you for your records. 
If there are other parties of interest (liens, mortgages, etc.) on your property, the necessary 
clearances wm be obtained prior to your receipt of payment. Title insurance, olosing costs, 
exoluding pro-rations of taxes, and recording fees wm be borne by ITD. 
It is the intent of CIP to assist you in every way possible in conveying your property. To this en~ 
as your acquisition agent, I will contact you within ten days ftom the date of this letter if J do not 
hear from you before then. 
I am available at your convenience to answer any questions y011 may have. J can be reached at 
208/95S-7972. 
Sincerely, 
(~fMu/!J_ ·n, -f ~on 
Tanya M. Johnson 
Universal Pield Services 
Enclosures 
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August 25, 2011 
Doug Marfiee 
Ramsden & LyoDS 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeurd1A1>ene, Idaho 83816 
RE: HJ' Grath.ol Condemnation 
Highways 95 & 54 NEC 
Athol, Idaho 
Dear Mr. M-arfice; 
NO. 3879 P. 40/51 
As requested, I have made an inspection and completed an appraisal of the 
ab'ove mentioned property. The purpose of the -aplJl'aisal i$ to estimate a 
before and after valu:atiort of the property for a proposed condetnnation by 
Idaho DOT. The date of valuation in this case will be as of the latest date of 
inspection of the property OX). September IS~ 2010. This appraisal has been 
prepared under the Unifonn Stau.dards of Professional Appraisal Practice 
(USP AP), is limited in scope as agreed, and presented in a restricted 
a:ppraisal format -according to USP AP teporting requirements. It should be 
noted that the restricted report is the most abbreviated of the report formats 
and as suoh may be difficult to clearly 'Ullderstmd by a third party without 
additional data contained in my working files. 
Idaho is a non-disclosure state and comparable sales are only verified by 
parties to the transaction ,and not official records as in other states. Th'e 
comparable data I am presenting to you in this mattet is believed to be 
correct and obtained fiom sources considered reliable,. but cannot be verified 
byrecordSw 
The subject property is legally described in ''Exhibit A~' in the addenda 
section of this appraisal. The ptoperty was tracsfetted to Gracal Corpotation 
on Ma.y 22, 2008 :from Nortb. Alpine Development LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability corporation on May 22, 2008 ,and subsequently from Or.aeal 
Corporation to HJ Grathol, a California. general partnership on October 15, 
2009. According to the broker who sold the site in May 20-08, tht sale price 
was $1,450,000; however, he relayed that there was a lien on the property 
from a local lender for a far higher amount and the seller was highly 
motivated due to financial problems. At the time of the sale the property 
l 
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was zoned residentiaL I Uildersta:nd the owners have paid for a rezol'le of the 
site, ~gineering costs fot site development plans, approval ·of city water to 
the site, an.d work for an onsite sewage system. 
County records indicate the properey is identified under three parcel 
numbers: A-00.00..:010-6350, 53N03Wl06100, and 53N03W10SO-OO. 
Assessed values for each oftbe parcels for 2010 are as follows: 
A000OOl 06350 Land $58,500 Improvement $59,944 
53N03W106100 Land $79,395 
53N03Wl05000 Land$150o469 
The property is located on the NE Cornet of 'Highway 95 and Highway S4 in 
Kootenai County, Idaho and contaitis approximately 56.8 acres. In viewing 
the county assessor's records l noted tha:i parcel S3N03WlOSOOO is 
indicated as a 6j.24 acre parcel, which appears to be an error based on all 
the other data I have reviewed on this site. Parcel A00000106350 has .419 
acres and includes a stnall commercial buildingt but it is also the SW corner 
of the site at the intersection <>f the bighw~ys and therefore considered an 
important part of the entire propertr. The subject property ~ currently zoned 
Commercial by the Kootenai County Planning Department and this zoning 
was obtained by the ciln'ent owners since their purchase of the property in 
2008. 
The site is approximately 16 miles north of Interstate 90 in Coeur d'Alene, 8 
miles east of Spirit Lake, 5 miles west of Bayview, and 30 miles south of 
Sandpoint. The intme'ction cUttently consists of a convenience stor~ on the 
S.W-com~r, a restaurant/bar on the NW corner, vacant land on the SE Gomer, 
and the subject a.lQng with some other comineroial uses on the NE cornet 
along Highway 95. Although site is contiguous a,t this &le, plans I have 
seen regarding the new interchange planned at this lOa\tion show Sylvan 
Road being extertded n0rth thro-ugh the subject site when the interchange is 
built, splitting the subject site. A map showing this extension is included 
with this report. 
Major attractions in the immediate area incl,ude Panagu.t State Park to the 
-east of this location and Silverwood Amusement Park two mUes sou.th of 
this location. Lake Pend Oreille is aceessible via publie and commercial 
launch facilities at Bayview, F~ or Sandpoint. Smi.dpo-mt !s also the 
location of'Sweitzer Mountain, the largest ski ar~a. in the Inland Northwest. 
2 
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The ·site has approximately 75~ feet of frontage along Highway 95 and 2,090 
feet alo:ng Highway 54 with 4 deeded access points. Access is also available 
along Highway 95 as all three p'arcels include frontage along µie highway. 
There is another property containing 1.58 acres that is l'acated north of the 
comer parcel that has 417 feet of frontage along Highway 9S as well. Water 
to the site is available from the City of Athol and according to the owner's 
representativ~ Alan Johnson, Coleman Engineering is working on 
development of a modular waste treaunent plant to meet n~s for onsite 
sewage. Other site utilities include natural gas from Avist~ electric from 
Kootenai Electric, and fiber optic from Verizon. The site is generally leveJ 
and at grade with both highways. The ·site is boonded b:y Howard Road to 
the east. The site is treed with small sized pine trees at this titn~ but these 
trees h~ve no marketable tiinber value. 
Market conditions for Kootenai County were sitnilar to other areas in the 
It>.land Northwest and set records for the number of properties sold as. well as 
appreciation rates from 2002 through 2006. The number of residential units 
sold in 2002 through the Coeur d1 Alene MLS was 2,958 artd that number 
peaked at 5,035 units in 200S declining to 2,821 units in 2006. The average 
sale price through these same years was $138,.908 in 2002 and it increaseclto 
$271,192 in 2006, an increase of 95% in a four year period. In 2007 and 
2008 the number of units sold. continued to drop to 2,007 units in 2008 with 
the average sale price dropping to $269,120. In 2009 the total number of 
units sold increased to 2,216 with the average price dropping to $209,415. 
One of the reasons fur the large drop in 2009 was a tax credit for first time 
ho:tnebuyers~ and purchasers of first homes generally buy lower price 
propertit,ts. 2010 has continued to see f$wer residential sales with price:s 
continuing to decline; however~ there has been continued commercial 
development in Kootenai County in the past two yea.ts. Two Wal-Mart 
Supercenters have been built in addition to a new Super l Foods store. and a 
Lovefs Travel Plaza is being built. 111 addition the Highway 95 corridor has 
seen the 'Construction of a U.S. District Court Faoility and a 55~000 square 
foot Wes.tern States Cat facility in Hayden. 
Census data indicates that the population of Athol doubled between 1990 
and 2000 and similar population patterns are -evident in Spirit Lake and 
Bayview- area as welL 
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Other sectors of the real estate market follow the residential trends an(l have 
slowed as well. With the slowing market, capitalization rates have risen, 
vacancy for many types of real estate increasing and demand declining. 
In completing this appraisal I consideted the highest and best use of the 
subject property and this use simply stated is the ide.al use of vacant land or 
an .irrtproved property that results in the highest value. The use needs to be 
legally permitted, pliysicruly possible, financially feasible. and maximally 
productive. The subject is a large tract of vicant commercially zoned land 
(with the exception of a small commercial building) m1 a nlighted'1 at grade 
inter'section of two highways. The large size of 56.8 acres is much larger 
thap. typically utilized for a "big bo~" retail user which can range from 
approximately 10 to 30 acres in size. The ~latively remote location of this 
property would also dictate th;n immediate development of the site would be 
limited unless some major attraetion would inea:ease demand for cormnercial 
use in this area. Silverwood .Amusement P~k south of the subject occupies 
a bu-ge site including parking, but this is a unique use. that has grown over 
the past 20+ years and recently an application has been made by Silvenvood 
to rezone an additiortal 90+ acres tt, the south of its exi$1:ing facilities. 
Nevertheless, as population growth in this area continues., convenience 
issues will no doubt spur residents t~ patronize locally situated commercial 
establishment~ 
The comer location and zoning of the sUbject suggest commercial uses that 
can take advantage of the 1l'atlic flow at this locatian that presently exists on 
flighway 9S. I understand from the ownerJs representative that they were in 
negotiation with URM for a sale of a portion of the site for a Super One 
Grocery store. Mike Winger of UR.M confirmed that he had been involved 
in discussions with Hugh's Investments for a store at this location that was 
delayed by the condemnation. He also relayed that with the opening of a 
new WINCO in Coeur d'Alene and a Wal-Mart Super Center in the City of 
Hayden the likelihood of a new groc-ery store at the subject site is less 
probable due to new competition that was not there when negotiations were 
going on with Hughes, but that chat'lging economic oonditiom hav-e n.ot 
eliminated this possibility, Other po,tential uaes inelude a travel plaza/1:tuok 
stop, "big box" retail, specialized retail use such as "Big R" or "D & B" 
(local fann/rmch supply stores), motel, and a ccmvtnience store; however, in 
my opinion only about½ of the subject site would be utilized for these uses, 
The balance of the site might include some self storage, residential uses, or 
perhaps some type of light industrial use. 
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Current plans for the subject site included a new freeway irtterehange. The 
taking in this condemnation will bisect the property taking 16.31 aetes 
leaving remnant$ on both sides of the new ~rchange. Remna:ats on the 
west side of the new interchange include the .419 comer parcel and a 3.&7 
acre parcel fronting the Qld Highway 9$. On the east side of the new 
interchange will be the balance of the site containing 36r61 acres. The 
property enjoyed access fi'om both hi'ghways in the before situation and I 
understand that in the after will only have limited access from Highway 54, 
Sylvan Road when built, and Howard Road which bounds it to the east As 
discussed earlier m this repOf½ the planned Syl'Van Road extension will 
bisect the site effectively eha.nging the original highest and best use analysis 
oftb.e site. With the site bisected, only the 8.85 acres to the east of the new 
interchange and west of Sylvan Road in addition to the 3.87 acres on the 
NW 'COtner of the site, and the .419 acxe site on the SW eo:rner will be 
available for development out of the original west half of the site. There will 
also ll"kely be a condemnltion of land needed for the new Sylvan Road as it 
does not currently exist. The cost of constructing Sylvan Road is also 
unknown at this time whi'ch may also be an additional item of 
rehnbursement to the ownets of the property if-Idaho Dor makes them pay 
for the road improvements. 
I have completed research on various appraisal cases with regard to large 
commercial tra.ct sales in the Spokane, Tri Cities, Coeur d'Alene, and Mo.ses 
Lake areas and am familiar with prices fc,r sales in these areas for users such 
as Home Depot, Safeway, Target, Lowes, Kohl's, Yokes, Albertson's, 
Costco> Sam's Club, and Wal-Mart. Retail users prefer a lighted intersection 
in most cases for locations as is a: benefit fot customers to ac.cess stores 
easier. Freeway interchanges are often lo~a.tjons of retail development, but 
general1y these developments us,ually occur in higher density residential 
areas. 
I also have recently completed some research in Moses Lake, Washington 
and reviewed development at the intersection of Interstate 90 ·and ffiShway 
17. Much of the development at this location has only been completed in the 
past l O years even though Interstate 90 has been completed for over SO 
years. 
An ex:ample of how cotftmereial property ean be infl.ueneed by a freeway 
interchange is in Pasco, Washington. Sevetal years ago a new inte~hange 
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was built at Kartebner Avenue intersection with Highway 395. Prior to the 
interchange there had been a Ughted intersection with Hillsboro Street a few 
blocks south and there had been much cotnmercial development at this 
lighted intersection. The development included a motel, restaura~ two fast 
food restaurants, a truck stop, ~d some other retail uses. Prior to the 
announcement of the new interchange there were offers on several parcels 
on the SW corner of the Hillsboro intersection including McDonalds and a 
national motel. The construction of the new interchang~ led to offers from 
McDonalds and the motel being terminated in addition to all of the 
businesses that were t'Ut'tently operating suffering ,substantial losses in 
revenue. due to the new interchange being built. In short, although 
interchanges assist the flow of traftic0 they are often of little ot no benefit to 
development or retail uses follo'Wing their oonstruction. 
In attempting to estimate the impact -on the property in the after value 
situation, I considered multiple examples from the local area in concluding 
that it may take many years for any oQmmetcial development to occur at this 
location, particularly if the freeway construction is delayed. 
In viewing the subject as a lighted intersection with commercial zoning as it 
exists, I viewed the site as being developed in two phases. With the site 
containing approximately 57 actes prior to the taking, I considered that 
approximately 30 acres closest to the intersection would be valued at a 
different rate than the remaining 27 acres. A 30 acre site would likely fit 
several anchors such as grocery stores or other "big box'' retail users. The 
30 acres would also likely accomt11odate oth'er pad users such as banks, fast 
food uses, or convenience stote uses in addition to some additional dfnline" 
retail uses associated with the big box users. Big box us,ers often pay $4 to 
as high as.-$9 per s.quare foot for sites. as in the recent WINCO purchase in 
Coeut d'Alene. The subject location is inf-erior to most of the comparables 
discussed in this report in that it is located in a more remote area and it 
doesn't presently enjoy the same demo~apbics; however, the lighted 
intersection of two state highways offers excellent exposure for commercial 
uses and as traffic increases this location will become the "go top' location. 
between Hayden and Sandpoint. 
In the after scenario, the 16..31 acre take wi11 leave thtee p.atcels; an 8.85 
acre parcel on the east side of the new ih.terchange1 a 3 .S 1 acre parcel on the 
west side, and the ..419 acre parcel in the SW comer of the site. The balance 
of the site will be east of the newly planned Sylvan Road. Acces.s to these 
6 
565 of 1617
JAN. 6. 2012 3:54PM NO. 3879 P. 46/51 
sites will be limited to the old Highway 9S for the 3.87 acre parcel ~d 
Highwa., 54 and Sylvan Road for the 8.SS acre parcel.. Estimating values in 
the after situation will be, contingent 'Upon when the project is completed. 
Upon c01;i1pletion the property will likely develop differently that in the 
before situation and although the property on the east side of the freeway is 
still large enough to accommodate some big b'o"* retail uses, bt,1t not stores as 
large as W al·Marl, Costco, or Home Depot. Examples given above indicate 
that development may take many years. Without an accurate estimate of the 
completion of this project projecting values into the future is extremely 
difficult. 
In a-ssisting you with this case I have considered the following comparable 
sales: 
Idaho Comparables 
1. l 601 W Appleway Coeur d'Alene..., Sale Pric,e. $1,528,360 - Sale Date 8/09 
Size 9 AC (392,040 sq ft)-Price P~ Foot $9.00 
Comments: Tors was a former m-avel pit site that was sold for a. new \VINCO 
Otocery Store. The sellers paid to level the site for tbe pw·chnsers and granted 
easements to Ramsey Road to the west for additional access. The site included all 
utiltties. This property would b.e considered superior to the subject for location 
and size. 
2. Seltice Way &1.d I 90 Post Falls - Sale Price $20,456,747 - Sale D¢e 11/06 
Size 235 AC - Price Per~ $2.00 
.Comments~ Foursquare Properties, developem, bo,'Qght tbi.8 slte :which consisted 
of numerous parcels· from two other dev-elopers mid Cabela's oormnitted. to 
pmclmse 40 a,cres for a new store at the same time frame. Althollgh the site had 
utilities, tht developers paid to build all the intetior stteets and provide·access to 
the Cabela's parcel S~ the purchase another parcel has been sold fur a aew 
Wal-Mart which recently opened. This parcel is far larger than the subject and 
would be considered at a lower rate for s~ but a superior rate for location. The 
purchasers paid for bringing utilities to the site 1lS well as significant costs for 
grading on the property to acc.o:mmodate the new buil~ $ites and roads. 
3. lUghway 41 &Prairie Post Palls-Sale Pri=Sl,936,161-Sale Date 11/06 
8,ize 13.5 AC (588,060 sq ft)-Price Per Foot SS.00 
Comments: This sale is. in the City Qf Pest Falls and utilitie$ were availabJe, It 
was pU1'ehUed with the intention of retail development, nus Is 1he SB comer of 
tile intersection. T~ sale is a sn'l81.ler parcel than the snbject Which wonld 
indicate a lesser price for the subject, but somewhat similar for loeatioD at a 
lighted niter.section, but also a superior location demographiealty) although the 
subject has highertraffte counts. 
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4. Highway 41 & Prairie PosL Falls - Snle Price $6,591,S91 - Sale Date J 0/07 
Sfae 50.44 AC (2, J 97,197sq ft)- Price Per Foot $3.00 
Comments: This involved the same purchaser as comparable 3 (Post Falls Swion 
LLC) and it is the NE comer of the same intersection and outside the City of Post 
FalJs. The site was not zoned for commercial development, but the purchaser was 
confident that they could develop the site. This is an exceJJent comparable for the 
subject in tenns of overall size and a similar location at a lighted intersection, but 
a superior location demographlcally, The property bas no sewer which likely ma) 
need to be purchased from the City of Post Falls. 
5. Highway 95 & GarwoodRoad-SalePriceSl,017,200-SaleDate 7/0B 
Sile 4.41 AC (J°92,l00 sq ft)-Price Per Foot $5.30 
Comments: This was th~ sale of the Garwood Saloon property to Idaho DOT. 
The sale price was confirmed witb the attorney for the property owner and he 
relayed that it represented land value only. The site was zoned commercial like 
the subject and jt is the next "lighted'' h1terseetion south of the subject on 
Highway 95. This intersection is with a county road versus another state highway 
like the subject. The site is smaller than the subject which would indicate a higher 
value and it is also a superior location being closer t-0 Coeur d'Alene. 1 
understand this sale was negotiated under the threat of condenination and courts 
have ruled that these sales may not represent true market vaJue for this reason. 
6. Ramsey & Appleway-Sale Price $7,800,000-Sale Date 11/07 
Size 17 AC apx (740,520 sq ft)- Price Per Foot SJ 0.53 
This sale was confirmed with the owner who sold the properly to the Coeur d' 
Alene Tribe. The site is near tomparable 1 and considered superior to the subject 
in that it is a smaller parcel and located in a better location. 
7, Highway 95 & Sagle Road - Sale Price $3,400~000- Sale Date 3/08 
Size 29 AC (J,263,249 sg ft)-Priec Per Foot $2.69 but no sewer 
This sale was confumed with the broker who sold the property. The site was 
zoned for commercial use and it included utilities. The agent who handled the 
sale relayed that the property is cwrently for sale as S lots. This parcel does not 
have access to Highway 95 like the subject and it is not a lighted intersection like 
the subject. Tms is an excellent comparable sale to the subject in terms of size 
and it would be considered slightly superiol' for location being closer to 
Sandpoint, but inferior as it does not ha'Ye a lighted intel'Section and it does nol 
have access to Highway 95. 
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Washington Comparables 
8. 9527 N Nevada- Sale Price $4,813,685 -Sale Date 7/07 
Size 18.71 AC (815,100 sq ft)-Price Per Foot SS.91 
This was the site of a new WINCO in Spokane that has been built and it included 
additional pads. This site is smaller than the subject indicating a higher value and 
also a superior location. 
9. 21801 E Countl')' ViSta- Sale Price $3,045,405 - Sale Date 6/0S 
Si2e 18.98 AC (608,969 sq ft)- Price Per Foot SS.00 
This is a dated sale for a new Home Depot store at Liberty Lake off Interstate 90 
that bas been built onsite. This sjte is smaller indicating a higher value and also a 
superior location. 
1 0. 4315 E Sprague - Sale Price $7,559,686 - Sa1e Date 9/06 
Size 22.98 AC (1,000,000 sq ft) - Price Per Foot $7.SS 
This is a WaJ-Mart site purchased for a new Sam's Club that bas not yet been 
built. The purchasers paid for rezoning and access to Sprague as the site didn't 
have sufficient access as purchased. The site was purchased from Union Pacific 
Railroad and required extensive work for development The site is somewhat 
similar in size, but considered a superior location and also located adjacent to 
COSTCO, 
SaJes of commercial/retail sites in Washington differ from Idaho with regard 
to economic issues regarding tax implications, but they were included as 
they reflect prices for big box retail uses. 
V ALOE PRIOR TO POTENTIAL CONDEMNATION 
In considering an estimate of the west 30 acres of the subject site with 
commercial zoning and without the planned interchange I considered the 
values of the comparable sales with primary emphasis on comparables S and 
7 as they are on the same highway and located north and south of the 
subject Comparable 4 is also another good comparable which was given 
more weight like comparables S and 7. I also considered the siz.es and 
locations of the other comparables in completing my estimate of the subject 
1 also considered the purchase price of the subject as well as the motivation 
of the seller when the property was sold for $1,4S0,000, but as mentioned 
earlier, the seUer was distressed and the site was not zoned at the time of the 
sale. Even considering the sale price of $.59 per foot the majority of the 
value would have been to the 30 acres on the west side of the site, Based 
on these considerations, it is my opinion that the west 30 acres would have 
had a value in the range of$2.25 per foot or $2,940,300. 
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VALUE AFTER TB'.E POTENTIAL CONDEMNATlON 
In the after simation, the west 30 acres will be biseo.ted by the taking as 
described earlier in this report, This taking will result in the loss of 16.41 







There will still be sufficient land in the original 30 acres to develop some 
cOIIlltlercial developtnents, but th~re will be three parcels of 8.85, 3.8,7, and 
.419 acres. These remaining parcels can accottunodate various uses, but the 
chances of any big bOk retail use on the west 30 acre site a.l.'e gone. With the 
planned Sylvan Road forming a bounda;ty for the remaining property the 
remaining property is also bisected as described earlier. I know of no cases 
where a developer or user VJilt buy a property for development not knowing. 
when a planned highway that will provide access to the property will be 
built. This same scenario occurred in a case I was involved in that happened 
when WSOOT condemned a si~ north of Spokane on Hatch Road and 
Highway 395. All of the experts who testified in dlis case agreed that 
without knowledge of when the plamed interchange would be built there 
was no way to :estimate a value due to the unoettainty of its completion. 
This property also contained approximately 30 acres and has been a'C/ailable 
since the state :fin.ished the interchange approwmately 12 years, ago. The 
owner has been attempting to sell or develop the site since then with no 
success; again this is an example of why interchanges do not add value when 
they are completed. An aerial photo of this interchange with Hatch Road 
and Highway 395 has been included with this teport to show all the 
residential development that has occurred around this interchange since it 
was constructed and yet the 30 acre commercial tract is still vacant despite 
the· owner's attempts to develop the site. 
Until a definitive CQmpletion date of the planned interchange at the subject 
intersection can be established, it will be very difficult to estimate a value 
fur the remaining parcels due the unknowns of the .anticipated project. 
Utilizing the anticipated construction date for the freeway improvements as 
published by IDT' s website> an assumption can be made th«t the best case 
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scenario for project construction would be the summer of 2011. Assuming 
this construction date is accurate, the project might be completed in the 
spring of 2012. lfthe planned construttion d~te is latet,1, the completion date 
will be moved farther into the future. 1n my opitu-Qn!I. no potential user of the 
remaining pro·perty would have any interest in using any of the remaining 
parcels until they know for oertain when the project will 'be completed. 
Assuming the completion can be completed as forecast above in the spring 
of 2012, the value of the land would need to be discounted from the present 
date. The discount is applicable as no one would pay for something today 
that they can't receive until a future date. This same principal applies to 
valuing a subdivisi® that is slated to be developed in the future or the 
purchase of an incotne stream like a real estate contract. 
In attempthig to "{alUe the rettlaining pa,rcels, I have made the assumption 
that they will have a similar value to the before scena:l"io at $2.25 per square 
foot. l have also assumed that they will be available for use upon 
cornpletton oftb.e new freeway at the earliest in the spJ.ilng of 2012 and the 
latest in the spring of 2013. This results- in a dis¢ount titne frame of 1.5 to 
2. 5 years· from the date of this vatu,ation, Using this scenario, the ~ture 
value of the remaining parcels of Sl,344,457 would be discounted to a 
present value. 
Tbe discount rate is basical]y a rate of return that someone is looking for on 
a given investment. It is based on risk and that risk is affected by the rates 
of safe investments, market conditions, and other factors. In this case, we 
ate dealing with undeveloped land in uncertain economic times. For this 
reason, I selected a rate higher than typical capitalization rates in the ·current 
mark.et and utilize4 a rate of 10%. The higher rate 11Sed to. discount the 
future value in this case is due to all the unknowns ·eoucemi.ng this 
condemnation including the unknown timing of the project being finished, 
issues with regard to access, Sylvan Road being built, the cost of who will 
be responsible for the ,cost of Sylvan Road,. and the pending condemnation of 
the right of way for Sylvan Road. Applying this discount rate to the 
antieipated after value of $1,344,457 yielded the following pres.ent values 
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Utilizing these estimates and the original before estimate the final concluded 
value estimates were completed as follows: 
Before Value 
After Present Value l .S years 





= $1,775,,000 • $1,880,000 
This difference in value does not addtess· tbe value of the Sylvan R-oa~ cost 
of' construction of Sylvan Road, o.t loss of access td Highway 54 which are 
all potential additional items of compensation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L~./4-,,wtl 
Dewitt M. Sherwood, 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
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VS, 
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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Department 
("ITD") by and through its attomeys of record, Mary V. York, Holland & Hart LLP, will call up 
for hearing its Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion in Limine before The Honorable 
Charles Hosack at the Kootenai County Courthouse, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho on the 8th day of 
February, 2012, at the hour or 10:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. 
DATED this 10th day of January, 2012. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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I hereby certify that on this 10th day of January, 2012, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol 
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Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, notice is hereby given by the 
undersigned counsel that a copy of Supplemental Responses to Defendant's Second Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Plaintiff, along with a copy of this 
Notice, was served upon·tlitrattorneys listed on the attached Cemfl~te of Service·; in-the manner 
indicated, on January 17, 2012. 
DATED this 17th day of January 2012. 
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Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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HJ GRATHOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VINOS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, Defendant HJ Grathol, by and through its counsel of record, Ramsden 
& Lyons, LLP, and respectfully submits this Response to Plaintifrs Motion to Exclude Expert 
Testimony or Alternatively to Compel Expert Disclosures. 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a partial taking case. Plaintiff is acquiring, via eminent domain, approximately 
16 acres of Defendant's commercial property. Plaintiff will build upon the part taken an 
elevated freeway interchange leaving Defendant's property split into two smaller parcels 
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separated by the elevated interchange. At issue, of course, is the amount of monetary just 
compensation to which the Defendant is entitled as a result of this partial taking. As early as 
the 19th century, the United States Supreme Court made clear that "just compensation" in 
partial takings cases must include compensation for loss of value to any portion of the 
property not taken. In Bauman v. Ross, the court stated that "when the part not taken is left 
in such shape or condition as to be in itself of less value than before, the owner is entitled to 
additional damages on that account." (emphasis added) See, Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 
574 (1896). Idaho Code§ 7-71 l(A)(3) codifies the property owner's right to these additional 
damages. 
The owner of private property to be acquired by the condemning 
authority is entitled to be paid for any diminution in the value of 
the owner's remaining property which is caused by the taking 
and use of the property taken . . . this compensation, called 
'severance damages' is generally measured by the value of the 
property before the taking and the value of the property after the 
taking. ( emphasis added) 
This "before and after" measure of damages is not, however, the only way to calculate 
severance damages. In fact, there are no "formulas, artificial rules, or easy mechanistic 
approaches" to determine changes in value to the remaining property before and after a 
partial taking. See, State Highway Commission v. Minckler, 62 Mich. App. 273,233 N.W.2d 
527 (1975). In simplest terms: 
Id. 
... where there is a partial taking, just compensation is measured 
by the amount that the value of the remainder of the parcel has 
been diminished. 
Numerous factors can cause a reduction in a remainder's value, depending on the 
property affected and the nature of the project for which the condemnation occurs. In 
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determining just compensation, a court must consider "all the multiplicity of factors that go 
into making up value." Id. With respect to partial takings, "a wide range of factors is 
relevant to determining any change in value and identifying those factors is essentially [an] 
ad hoc factual inquiry." 26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain § 368 (1996). Several common 
factors that reduce remainder values are illustrated in the jury instructions used in various 
jurisdictions. One fine example is the Michigan Supreme Court's model civil jury instruction 
which reads in relevant part as follows: 
In valuing the property left after the taking you should take into 
account various factors, which may include: (1) its reduced size, 
(2) its altered shape, (3) reduced access, (4) any changes in 
utility or desirability of what is left after the taking, (5) the effect 
of the applicable zoning ordinances on the remaining property, 
and ( 6) the use that the condemning agency intends to make of 
the property it is acquiring and the effect of that use upon the 
owner's remaining property. Further, in valuing what is left after 
the taking, you must assume that the condemning agency will 
use its newly acquired property rights to the full extent allowed 
by the law. 
The note on use to this model instruction emphasizes that this is not an exclusive list of 
factors that reduce the remainder's value, but merely illustrates some of the factors that can 
reduce value. While arguably less "instructive," Idaho's model jury instructions effectively 
say the same thing. See, IDJI 7.16.1 and 7.16.5. In short, all of the factors and possibilities 
that would affect the price that a willing buyer would offer to a willing seller for the 
remainder land must be taken into account, and must be quantified and included in the 
property owner's just compensation award. 
Although severance damages are generally measured by the reduction in value of the 
remaining property; this general measure of damages can be replaced by a cost to cure 
approach. See, e.g., Mulkey v. Division of Admin., State of Fla., Dpt. of Transportation, 448 
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So. 2d 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). One way in which the cost to cure method of 
measuring injuries to the remainder can be calculated is by determining the cost of any 
alteration to the property, any consequential damages due to the alteration and adding that to 
the value of the property actually taken. See, Department of Transportation v. Sherburn, 196 
Mich. App. 301, 306, 492 N.W.2d 517 (1992). This methodology is significant here because 
it potentially addresses that which Plaintiff desperately wants to sweep under the rug: that is 
the undeniable fact that this taking harms the Defendant in ways greater than the mere 
"value" of the land being taken. Plaintiff behaves, and argues, as if it believes that "just 
compensation" consists of only the value of the land physically appropriated from the 
Defendant. That is not the case. It never has been and never will be. 
What the law requires is that just compensation starts with the value of the land 
taken. Added to that are both severance damages and consequential damages. Severance 
damages are those damages that occur to the remainder of the property simply by virtue of 
the fact that the part taken is no longer owned by the condemnee. For example: If because of 
the part being taken, the shape, size or configuration of the remainder parcel makes it less 
usefully or marketable, that loss of value is part of the just compensation which must be 
added to the value of the part taken. 
Consequential damages ( those that are not severance damages) refer to harm that the 
condemnee suffers by reason of the use to which the portion taken is to be put; in this case a 
freeway. For example: If a partial taking is for a sewage disposal plant or a landfill or an 
airport runway, that use would affect the remainder property in a much different way than if a 
partial taking were for a park; greenbelt or conservative area. This is different than the 
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rudimentary issue of severance damage caused by changes in the configuration of a property 
impacting its usefulness after the taking. In this case, the Plaintiff stubbornly refuses to 
acknowledge these distinctions and insists that the only compensation due to the Defendant is 
the market value of the 16.3 acres Defendant is losing, and that Defendant's remainder 
property is unaffected by the project. 
However, as a direct consequence of this condemnation, the undeniable, 
uncontroverted fact that Grathol's property will be bisected once by the freeway and then 
again in the future by a freeway "frontage road" (Sylvan Road) which will cut through the 
Grathol property to connect US Hwy 54 on the south to Roberts Road to the north. The 
inevitable extension of Sylvan Road, while not being physically taken "as part of the Project" 
(something that Plaintiff repeats ad nauseum), is nevertheless a direct consequence of "the 
Project." Put another way, "but for" the condemnation at issue and the construction of the 
project for which the condemnation is occurring, there would be no necessity or requirement 
that Sylvan Road be extended through the Grathol property. The property could be 
successfully developed with Sylvan Road, or it could be successfully developed without 
Sylvan Road; the choice belongs to the property owner/condemnee. However, because of 
this condemnation, there will be no choice for Grathol. Sylvan Road will be extended for 
frontage road connectivity. Plaintiff acknowledges as much in its briefing, but adding insult 
to injury, claims that the cost of extending Sylvan Road will (and should) be foisted upon the 
property owner, even though it would never have been necessary were it not for the project. 
That, by definition, is a damage for which Grathol is entitled to be compensated. For the 
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Plaintiff has adopted the utterly disingenuous mantra that it is not "taking" Sylvan 
Road, that Sylvan Road is not part of "the Project" and that Grathol is therefore not entitled 
to any discovery or damages associated with Sylvan Road. Hogwash. If Plaintiffs position 
were true, it would verily emasculate Idaho Code§ 7-711(A)(3) and 100 plus years of well 
established jurisprudence on the issue of severance damages in eminent domain cases. 
Plaintiff continually repeats the obvious: "in Idaho a civil complaint of condemnation defines 
the nature and scope of the take" citing Winder v. Canyon Vista Family Ltd. Partnership 
( citations omitted). See, Plaintiff ITD 's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
p. 15. No one is arguing that point. It is not at issue what is being physically taken. What is 
at issue is the effect of the take upon the remainder of the Defendant's property. Plaintiff 
contends there is no effect. Defendant's evidence and common sense, dictates that there is. 
Plaintiffs motion attempts to isolate, compartmentalize and attack specific 
components of Grathol' s severance and consequential damages, arguing that such damages 
are not recoverable. These arguments fail however; because they ignore the long standing, 
universal rule that when there is a physical taking of private property for public purposes all 
incidents of property ownership are subject to an assessment of value, not just those which 
the condemnor deems worthy of consideration. State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 
328 P.2d 60 (1958). 
Plaintiff filed fifty pages entitled "Plaintiff !TD 's Brief in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment." However, in reviewing the substance of the motion (not just its ironic 
title), it is apparent that Plaintiffs motion is not a proper motion for summary judgment. 
Instead, it is a verbose argu..rnent in limine seeldng to keep out adverse evidence at trial. 
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Plaintiff's motion does not seek judgment on any true legal issues. Disputed damages is a fact 
issue, not appropriate for summary judgment. Plaintiff's own submissions both create and 
admit substantial factual disputes that must be resolved at trial. In fact, all of the issues raised 
basically go to the weight of the evidence on damages. This Court, as the trier of fact, is 
certainly capable of considering and weighing the evidence and giving it appropriate measure 
in arriving at the ultimate determination of value. 
Also, as a point of order, the Plaintiff in this matter is the Idaho Transportation Board. 
In its Motion and Briefs, Plaintiff's counsel terms the Board as "ITD." Such an abbreviation is 
confusing and misleading since "ITD" refers to the Idaho Transportation Department, which 
department is not a litigant in this proceeding. This blurs the lines of separation between the 
Board and ITD and treats the two interchangeably. However, the Board is the only entity with 
the power to condemn real property under Idaho Code § 40-311 and must be stylized as the 
Plaintiff in the Complaint. IC.§ 7-707. While the Board may choose to disregard the roles of 
the two entities, the Idaho Code does not, and each have their own separate enabling provisions 
ai.1d statutes. 1 
Additionally, this illustrates the confusing and haphazard way that the Plaintiff initiated 
and prosecuted this action, beginning with the Board's failure to include a clear identification of 
all property rights to be acquired in an Order of Condemnation and in the Complaint as required 
by Idaho Code. The Board's inability (or refusal) to clearly set forth its plans for "the Project" 
and to properly identify all of the property rights affected has adversely impacted both 
1 This significant legal distinction that the Board has historically ignored is one of the issues presently on appeal in 
Supreme Court No. 3 8511. 
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Grathol's ability to use its property and to measure its damages. Even now, after more than a 
year of litigation and discovery, the Board is apparently still unable to accurately identify its 
own plans and intentions with respect to the Grathol property. For example, at page 7 of its 
Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the Board inserts a copy of a "plan sheet" 
which it indentifies as having been previously attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "B." The 
Board asserts that the plan sheet provided the property owner notice of the property rights 
implicated. However, the plan sheet attached by Plaintiff at page 7 of its Brief is not the same 
as the one originally attached to the Complaint or to the Order of Condemnation! 
The accurate identification of property rights in the Complaint is intended to give the 
landowner sufficient notice of exactly which property rights are implicated through the 
condemnation action. IC. § 7-707. The legislative purpose for requiring that such a 
description be included in the Complaint via the Order of Condemnation is to prevent the 
public entity from shifting gears mid-stream and presenting a moving target of its intentions 
with respect to the condemnation. See, A.ff. C. Gabbert, Ex. A. Here, the plan sheet attached at 
page 7 of Plaintiffs Brief is not the sa..rne one originally attached to the Complaint. This "new" 
plan sheet conspicuously omits the intersection/approach at S.H. 54 and Sylvan Road. 
Additionally, the depiction of right-of-way acquired has been modified from the original plan 
sheet to reflect that the Board has extended Roberts Road right of way all the way south, dead-
ending at the north property line of the Grathol property. The original plans attached to the 
Complaint did not show this extension of the Roberts Road right of way, and its late appearance 
in the Brief exhibit further evidences what Grathol has contended all along: the State intends to 
run Sylvan Road right through Grathol's property, preferably at Grathol's expense. 
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What is apparent from Plaintiffs own submissions is that it continues to revise its plans 
and continues hiding the ball as to its intentions with respect to the extension of Sylvan Road. 
Plaintiff is not even able to keep its own "approved" plans straight, raising the obvious 
question: How can a landowner reasonably be expected to evaluate the property rights being 
taken when the condemnor itself cannot? Plaintiffs actions and inconsistent representations in 
this case demonstrate why it is imperative that the condemnor do its homework first and 
concretely identify all the property rights implicated before it rushes to condemn private 
property. The Constitution requires nothing less. 
1. Sylvan Road 
Plaintiff virtually begins and ends all of its arguments by claiming that this Court has 
already ruled that it is not condemning any property for the extension of Sylvan Road across the 
Grathol property. In doing so, the Board mischaracterizes the Court's earlier ruling and 
disregards the context in which that ruling was made. Despite the Board's arguments, it is 
undeniable that if it were not moving forward with the Project, the highway realignment and the 
taking of a portion of Grathol's property; then there would never be the need for Sylvan Road 
to be extended as a local frontage road. That is, but for the Board's actions, Sylvan Road would 
never have to be built. The necessity for the extending of Sylvan Road directly flows from the 
take. Therefore, the damages that Grathol will incur by reason of the Sylvan Road extension 
are directly attributable to Plaintiff and are therefore relevant in determining just compensation. 
When the Plaintiff requested early possession of the Grathol property under Idaho Code 
§ 7-721 in December 2010 (only 30 days after the Complaint was filed and before Grathol had 
even filed its A_nswer), the Board argued that it (a) had the right of eminent domain; (b) that the 
use of the property was authorized by law; ( c) that the taking was necessary to such use; and ( d) 
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that Plaintiff had negotiated in good faith without success. Grathol resisted the early possession 
motion arguing inter alia that the Board failed to exercise its powers properly under Idaho 
Code § 7-707 in filing its Complaint, that the Board's actions were ultra vires, and that the 
failure by the Board to consider and evaluate the impacts of a Sylvan Road extension in its 
offers, precluded a finding that it engaged in good faith negotiations. Judge Haynes ultimately 
decided that the Board had met its burden under I.C. § 7-721 in order to be entitled to early 
possession of the part taken, but the ultimate issue of damages was reserved for the finder of 
fact at trial. 
The Court never ruled and certainly never intended that Grathol would be precluded 
from presenting evidence on damages related to the impact of Sylvan Road. Instead, Judge 
Haynes merely held that such issues did not prevent him from ordering immediate possession. 
While Grathol respectfully disagreed with the Court's finding that the Board had satisfied the 
requirements of LC § 7-721 (and has appealed that decision), the Court clearly never pre-
determined the measure of damages to be presented at trial. 
At that stage in the litigation, only several weeks aftei the Complaint was filed, no 
discovery had been conducted and there was no evidence presented regarding the scope of the 
take in terms of severance or consequential damages. Indeed, it is impossible to expect a 
condemnee defendant to put on evidence of the scope of severance damages at that early stage, 
since they could not be prepared to do so. 
If the hearing on a motion for early possession were meant to be preclusive on the scope 
of damages, then there would be no legitimate point in continuing the condemnation case 
beyond that hearing. Instead, the motions and arguments made by the Board were only that it 
should be granted early possession. There was nothing in that motion practice to suggest that 
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Grathol would be precluded from arguing at trial for the full extent of its damages by reason of 
the take. To hold otherwise would impinge on Defendant's constitutional due process right to 
have damages determined at trial. The Court's ruling on the possession hearing was limited to 
the Board's motion for possession and cannot now be expanded to prejudice Grathol's rights. 
The Board's trys to separate out each "category" of damages and have this Court 
systematically dismiss them instead of evaluating the effect upon Grathol's property rights of 
the project as a whole. The Board's piece meal treatment and compartmentalization of the 
damage issues is not proper. Each of the categories of damages that Grathol claims is allowed 
and is supported by evidence. 
Idaho Court's have uniformly held that when there is a physical taking of private 
property for public purposes all incidents of property ownership are subject to an assessment 
of value. State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d 60 (1958). The Fonburg Court 
held: 
These elements of damage consist of the reasonable market value 
of the land taken, together with . . . severance damages to the 
remainder, through which the road runs due to its severance from 
the whole, ... 
*** 
The section inter alia provides that the court, jury or referee, after 
hearing the evidence, must assess the value of the property sought 
to be taken ... and each and every estate and interest therein 
Id. at 280, 365 P.2d 66 (emphasis added). The Fonburg decision comports with prevailing 
authority that all damages incurred as a result of a condemnation action are compensable. That 
is what the term "just" compensation means. Damages aie not limited to only the physical take. 
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Instead they extend to each and every "estate and interest" impacted. The issue of extension of 
Sylvan Road across Grathol's property certainly fits this description. 
All objective evidence demonstrates that the Board will require Sylvan Road to be 
dedicated and constructed in the future. The Board has acquired Roberts Road right-of-way to 
the north and has dead-ended Roberts Road directly at Grathol's property. See, A.ff. C. Gabbert, 
Ex. B. The Board also included in its right-of-way plan2 improvements to the intersection of 
Sylvan Road and Highway 54. While the Board has cleverly substituted a different plan in its 
most recent briefing, it can't hide the fact that Sylvan/Hwy 54 intersection improvements are 
contemplated as shown in the plans attached to the Complaint and numerous other "plans" 
produced in discovery. See, A.ff. C. Gabbert, Ex. C. 
What's more, the clear language of the Order of Condemnation, as well as testimony 
from the Board's speaking agent Jason Minzghor, indicate beyond a shadow of a doubt that the 
Board's future plans are for the extension of Sylvan road across Grathol's property. See, A.ff. C. 
Gabbert, Ex. D (J. Minzghor Depa, pp. 59, 70-73 and 75-76). In its brief, the Board bluntly 
admits that development of Sylvan Road will be "required" for any future development by 
Grathol. In fact, Plaintiff tried to orchestrate such a dedication even prior to the current 
condemnation. See, A.ff. C. Gabbert, Ex. H. While it argues that development concessions like 
dedication of roads are ordinarily required of developers, the Board glosses over the undeniable 
fact that a dedication would never be necessary if it were not for the Project. In other words, if 
the Board were not moving forward with the Hwy 95 realignment, then there would be no 
2 Meaning the plan attached to the Complaint, which plan, as addressed at page 7 infra, is different from the plan in 
Plaintiff's Motion papers. 
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necessity for a local frontage road to be dedicated or developed. Ever. It is only because of this 
project that Grathol's parcel will have to be divided by another road. 
Because the need for development of Sylvan Road is caused by the partial physical 
taking of Grathol's property for the US 95 realignment, Grathol is entitled to present evidence 
of severance and consequential damages related to Sylvan Road. 
2. Construction Delay 
Plaintiff argues that Grathol cannot claim damages for the impairment of the use of 
property caused by the construction delays. Plaintiff basically argues that such inconveniences 
are non-compensable, no matter how great or pervasive because they are not causing a physical 
taking of property. Plaintiff cites Moon v. N Idaho Farmers Ass 'n, 140 Idaho 536, 96 P.3d 637 
(2004). Plaintiffs reliance on Moon is misplaced. Moon was not a physical condemnation 
case. Moon involved claims of trespass and negligence for the intrusion of smoke caused by 
field burning. It was, in part, an inverse condemnation issue, but not one involving a direct 
take. 
Piaintiffs argument that a taking must involve a permanent deprivation in order to be 
entitled to compensation is flat wrong. Permanency of a take may come into play with a 
regulatory taking, but when there is an associated physical taking of a private party's property, 
there is no such limitation on just compensation. Moon v. N Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 140 Idaho 
536, 541-42, 96 P.3d 637, 642-43 (2004), citing Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777, 
53 P.3d 828 (2002). 
Plaintiff also erroneously relies on Just 's Inc. v. Arrington Const. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 
583 P.2d 997 (1978) for the proposition that a property mvner ca.m1ot recover damages for 
construction delay. Just's Inc., like Moon, was also not a condemnation case. It involved 
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causes of action based on negligence and contract. The Idaho Supreme Court found that the 
plaintiff could not sustain a claim for purely economic losses resulting from the negligent 
diversion of customers because liability for all the economic repercussions of a negligent act 
would be virtually open ended. Id. at 470, 583 P.2d 1005. The Just's Inc. Court further 
recognized that the bar on purely economic damages in tort should not be mechanically applied 
and various exceptions existed involving a special relationship between the parties. Id. 
Consider this: Business interruption damages are absolutely compensable in eminent 
domain. When, as here, the condemnor is taking a portion of private property and because of 
that taking a condemnee is unable to use the remainder of its property until the project is 
completed, damages incurred by the delays in the project are compensable. For example, a 
commercial business owner is subjected to a taking of a utility easement running directly 
through his parking lot. Until the construction is complete, the business cannot operate and 
must sit idle. The use of the remaining property is not directly taken, but the damage to the 
business in terms of lost revenue is a proper component of just compensation as it flows directly 
Here, a prime portion of Grathol's property is being taken in order to construct a 
substantial elevated highway interchange. Grathol cannot develop the remainder of its property 
until the condemnation and the construction is complete - which may take years. This is an 
element of damages to be considered in awarding just compensation. 
Grathol has attempted to proceed with the development of its property, but Plaintiff and 
its agents have resisted these efforts, even refusing to cooperate in preparing a Traffic Impact 
Study as required for development application under Kootenai County's ordinances. The 
Board wants to argue that in order to be compensable, there must be a complete and permanent 
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impairment of a property right. However, this is not a regulatory takings analysis. The Board is 
physically condemning a substantial portion of Grathol's property and impairing the use, utility 
and development of the remainder. 
The Board's citation to non-Idaho cases even fails to support its arguments. Frank v. 
Government of City of Morristown, 294 S.W.3d 566 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2008) did not involve a 
physical taking of the plaintiffs property. It was an action for nuisance caused by dust, noise, 
dirt and debris complained of by a tenant in a building adjoining the construction. It was 
essentially a "proximity damage" case by a landowner who was losing no physical property. 
The Frank court even recognized that its holding was limited to cases in which there was not a 
corresponding physical take: 
Owners of land, no part of which has been taken for public 
purposes, are not entitled to compensation for damages naturally 
and unavoidably resulting from the careful construction and 
operation of the public improvement which damages are shared 
generally by owners whose lands lie within the range of the 
inconveniences necessarily attending that improvement (internal 
citation omitted). 
Frank v. Gov't of City ofAforristown, 294 S.W.3d 566 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). 
The Board also argues that damages to the remainder by reason of construction delay 
are somehow not permitted because Idaho Code § 7-712 sets the date of valuation of 
compensation on the date of the summons. Again, the Board confuses the separate property 
rights at play. Idaho Code § 7-712 sets the date of the issuance of the summons for the 
determination of value for real property actually taken. It does not impose a "cutoff date" for 
severance damages accruing to the remainder or for consequential damages. Indeed, if other 
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\,,I """'OV.1.J.ViJ V.L ...... .1..1. '-'i...J LJU.V.1..1. LA.U .1..1..1..1.f-1 .1..1..L.L.LV.L.1.1,, V.L ............... -.u- V.L 1...1..1.- .l.-.&..L.I.-.L.1..1.--.1. V.L 1,.1.JL- .t' ... ....,_!-'...,,. ".J ........... _ "'-' 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 15 
593 of 1617
be determined on that date, any number of damages could never be compensated because the 
consequences of the partial taking would not yet be identifiable. 
The Board's argument is also belied by Idaho Code§ 7-711 allowing the condemning 
authority to present evidence of "special benefits" accruing to the property by reason of the 
proposed construction improvements. These types of special benefits are allowed in order to 
offset or mitigate against severance damages. However, on the date of the issuance of a 
summons for condemnation - no construction will have occurred, so the benefits (if any) 
cannot be calculated. Section 7-711 cannot be rigidly interpreted to disallow compensation 
for damages by reason of the severance from the remainder, if the condemning authority is 
expressly allowed to present evidence of how a completed project will specially benefit the 
property in the future. 
Last, the Board argues that Grathol cannot claim damages based on construction delays 
because it was aware when it purchased the property that condemnation was to occur. This 
argument is absurd. Using the Board's logic, all use and development of property could be 
stymied and delayed for decades, yet no compensable interest would exist by reason of a 
condemning authority's pre-take announcement of intent to construct something, at some time 
in the future. The Board's arguments might be more persuasive in the context of a total take, 
wherein the property owner will not retain any property interest in the remainder which could 
be impacted by delay. However, when there is only a partial taking, the Board's argument is 
logically unsound. 
Many jurisdictions have held that a landowner is entitled to damages, independent of 
respect to announcing its intent to condemn. See e.g., Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N Las Vegas, 
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124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 670, 672, (2008). A landowner may show that the public agency 
acted improperly by unreasonably delaying an eminent domain action after announcing its 
intent to condemn the landowner's property. Id. See also, Jones v. People ex rel. Dep't of 
Transp., 22 Cal.3d 144, 151, 583 P.2d 165, 148 Cal.Rptr. 640 (1978). 
In the instant case, the Board has argued that it "approved the condemnation" of the 
Grathol property long, long before the administrative Order of Condemnation was executed. 
See, Aff. C. Gabbert, Ex. E at p. 6. In fact, according to the Board, it has approved this 
condemnation annually, beginning in 2005. (Id. at p. 5).3 The Director of ITD then 
authorized and executed an Order of Condemnation on November 17, 2010 which was 
attached to the Complaint. According to the Board's own timeline, at least five years passed 
between the Board's first "action" to condemn the Grathol property and the filing of its 
Complaint for condemnation. In fact, the planning for the Project has been in the works for 
over a decade. Additionally, even prior to the filing of the condemnation Complaint, the 
Plaintiff took steps to prevent Grathol from developing its own property. Sufficient evidence 
certainiy exists to demonstrate that the Board's deiay in bringing the eminent domain action 
after first announcing its "decision" to condemn the Grathol property has caused Grathol 
damages, and these delay damages are compensable. 
3. Pre-purchase knowledge of the project. 
The Board argues that Grathol is precluded from claiming severance damages because 
Grathol knew before purchasing the property that it was subject to condemnation. This 
3 The Board relies on this date as the date for its "approval" of the Grathol condemnation in order to argue that it 
need not take an action to approve the Order of Condemnation under LC.§ 7-707(6). 
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argument factually fails, because the scope, extent, location and impact of the project both on 
and off of Grathol's property, changed significantly after Grathol purchased the property. 
Despite the Board's claims that Grathol had knowledge of "the Project," the actual design 
and impact on the property turned out to be much different from what was being proposed 
when Grathol acquired the property. One of Grathol's owners, Alan Johnson testified: 
A. We met -- and I'm not positive of the date -- before we 
closed escrow with ITD. Don Davis, and -- I don't recall if there 
was anybody else in the meeting. He'd indicated that, you know, 
these were what the plans were. But we've seen plans like this 
all the time, too, that never come to fruition. But his indication 
was that they were going to put a - they were going to realign 
the project. It was going to be -- at that time, it was not going to 
be an overpass. It was going to be an at-grade intersection with 
traffic signals. I guess similar to what Garwood and 95 is now. 
He indicated that there were no plans to build an interchange -- a 
freeway interchange with an overpass. And he did indicate that 
actually 95 would be at the same -- approximately the same 
grade that it is at now, and 54 would be depressed under it. He 
said there were no plans to consider that until 2020. At least 
2020. ( emphasis added) 
A. Johnson Depa, p. 31, ll. 22-25 top. 32, I. 13, See, Ajf. C. Gabbert, Ex. F. 
Grathol's knowledge of the possibility of a future development in the vicinity of its 
property does not extinguish recognized property rights. Being aware that someday, maybe, a 
project, of some form, might be built does not prohibit a buyer of the property from receiving 
compensation once the property is ultimately taken. The Board's actions here have effectively 
eliminated any productive use of the property since the pre-take announcements. Further, it is 
still uncertain just when the construction of the new highway overpass will be completed. This 
renders all other development on the remaining property virtually impossible. These are facts 
which result in damages. 
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While the Board may argue that Alan Johnson's testimony is unreliable and his 
methodology for determining damages is "flawed," such arguments only go to the weight of the 
testimony and create a factual issue to be resolved at trial. Indeed, the Board proposes rebuttal 
testimony from Dennis Reinstein, CPA, to attack the Defendant's testimony in support of 
construction delay damages. Mr. Reinstein's report simply challenges the testimony of 
Johnson, but does not establish an entitlement to summary judgment as a matter oflaw. 
Idaho law recognizes that each and every incident of property ownership is to be 
evaluated in determining just compensation for a taking. Severance damages to the remainder 
of the property after the physical take include damages from loss of use of the remainder caused 
by construction delays and damages to its development rights. The Board's motion(s) must be 
denied on this issue. 
4. Loss of Visibility. 
Contrary to the Board's argument, Idaho does not limit the types of damages available 
for just compensation when a physical taking occurs. All incidents of property ownership are 
subject to an assessment of value. State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d 60 
(1958). The Board fails to cite a single Idaho case that has denied a commercial landowner the 
right to present damages for loss of visibility caused by a partial taking of its property. 
Instead, the Board compares loss of visibility to a claim of a right to a particular off-site 
traffic pattern, and cites several Idaho cases for the argument that a claimant cannot demand 
damages from traffic changes. However, these cases are easily distinguishable as none of them 
save State ex rel. Moore v. Bastian, involved a direct taking of any portion of the landowner's 
that the landowners did not have a right to any particular pattern of traffic flow and therefore no 
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impairment of access. However, Moore does not preclude evidence of damages to the 
remainder and in fact, recognizes that the State is required to pay compensation not only for the 
value of the strip actually taken, but is also required to compensate for damages, if any, which 
that severance will cause to the remainder portion of the property. Id. at 446, 546 P.2d 401. 
Grathol's damages related to loss of visibility for their commercial development have nothing 
to do with traffic patterns, traffic control or loss of traffic cirquity offsite.4 
Loss of visibility as a condemnation damage has been recognized by other jurisdictions. 
In 8960 Square Feet, More or Less v. State of Alaska, 806 P.2d 843 (1991), the Alaska 
Supreme Court considered a landowner's claim to compensation for loss of visibility caused by 
the construction of earth berms on an adjacent railroad right-of-way and caused by the 
widening and lowering of the road through the portion of their land being taken. The trial court 
granted summary judgment to the State based on the premise that loss of visibility is not 
compensable. Id. at 844. On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the construction of the 
earthen berms on the railroad right-of-way (which was not property condemned) could not form 
the basis for a claim as the landowner did not have any property interest in off-site 
improvements and could not complain about the loss of visibility occasioned by its use. Id. at 
846. 
However, the Court found that the loss of visibility from widening and lowering of the 
road was accomplished through the taking of part of the landowner's property and that this 
4 The issue of access and cirquity of travel as severance damages is presently on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court 
in Transportation Board v. HI Boise, LLC, S.Ct. No. 38344 (2011). See, The Advocate, January 2012, p. 38. This 
appears therefore to be a matter of first impression in Idaho. 
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distinction was significant. 
Ownership of land gives the owner the right and ability to limit 
any obstructions from being placed on that land. In particular, 
ownership of land abutting on a road gives the owner the right to 
control the visibility of all adjoining land further off the road. This 
obviously can be an important commercial asset. Thus when the 
state takes a parcel which abuts the road, it also takes the 
potentially valuable right to control the visibility of the remaining 
parcel. For this reason, we believe that the best rule in light of 
reason and policy is that loss of visibility to a remaining parcel 
is compensable where that loss is due to changes made on the 
parcel taken by the state. 
Id. at 846. (emphasis added) 
The 8960 Square Feet Court even considered the state's argument that the right to 
visibility was similar to the right to demand traffic flow and flatly rejected the argument, 
finding that the state could restrict off-site traffic flow because it was not using the landowner's 
property to achieve that purpose. Id. at 848-49. 
Other courts have similarly allowed evidence of visibility damages. Very recently, in 
Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 2011 WL 5110962 (2011 ), the Utah 
Supreme Court overturned an earlier decision (Ivers v. Utah Department a/Transportation, i 54 
P.3d 802 (2007)), which had held that a landowner who had a portion of his property physically 
taken could only recover severance compensation for "recognized" property rights, which don't 
include visibility. Id. at 4. The Admiral Beverage Court found that its decision in Ivers was 
contrary to the long-standing rule that the measure of severance damage is the diminution in 
market value of the remainder property and in assessing fair market value in the context of 
severance damages the Court has always allowed evidence of all factors affecting market value. 
Id. The Admiral Beverage Court also recognized that Utah. Code Gust like Idaho Code) 
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specifically provides for an assessment of severance damages. It wrote: 
... the Ivers rule runs afoul of this statutory framework because it 
would not allow Admiral to place on the "harm" side of the 
equation all of the damages which will accrue to the portion not 
sought to be condemned by reason of its severance . . . and the 
construction of the improvement. 
Id. at 9. The Admiral Beverage Court found that because the statutory scheme allowed the 
condemning authority to subtract from just compensation for any increase in value to the 
remainder by reason of the improvements, then precluding a landowner from presenting 
evidence of the same damages would contravene the statutory intent. Other states have 
similarly allowed evidence of severance damages for loss of visibility on this basis. See e.g., 
Shileds v. Garrison, 91 Wash.App. 381, 957 P.2d 805 (1998); People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 
390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943); State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Salles, 387 So.2d 1278 
(La.App. I st Cir, 1980). 
Distinguishing from the Alaska and Utah cases discussed above, here the Board is 
attempting to compare the loss of visibility damages to claims for a specific off-site traffic 
pattern. However, the ioss of visibility here is not created by off-site improvements but instead 
is a direct consequential damage caused by the improvements (i.e. a full elevated freeway type 
interchange) constructed directly on the land being condemned. That taking and planned 
construction causes the loss of visibility to the remainder of Grathol's property and, therefore, is 
an element of damages for which just compensation must be paid. Because Idaho does not 
restrict the severance damages which may be presented and (like Utah) has a statutory structure 
in place to specifically require compensation for severance damages, such damages are to be 
properly considered. 
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As a last gasp, the Board simply attacks the opinion of Geoff Reeslund that the 
remaining property will have limited visibility as a result of the construction and taking. The 
Board presents a report by one of its many rebuttal "experts" that claims "structures on the 
Grathol site should be visible from the new US95 freeway." This unswom opinion, at best, 
partially supports the Board's contention, but this evidence is merely a difference of opinion on 
whether damages will be incurred due to loss of visibility. As such, the Board has only 
managed to create an issue of fact to be resolved at trial. 
5. Access 
Once again, the Plaintiff stubbornly insists that if deeded access is not being "taken," 
Grathol cannot seek any damages related to access. Once again, this argument ignores the fact 
that Grathol is entitled to recover for all damages to the remainder which would not have 
occurred but/or this partial taking. Presently, Grathol's property is undeveloped. It has had for 
years several deeded accesses off of Hwy 54. It also has had the right to request access off of 
US Hwy 95. But for this project, Grathol would certainly be granted direct access off of US 95. 
In the immediate corridor area both north and south of the Grathoi property, there are 
numerous direct ingress and egress points from Hwy 95 to properties for various uses, 
residential, commercial and industrial. Because of this project, the realignment of the highway, 
the elevation of this interchange, and the very nature of the project creating a "limited access 
highway" it is axiomatic that Grathol's remainder property and its rights in that property 
relative to access will be different than they would have been if this project had never been 
conceived. 
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Clearly there are contested issues of fact as to the scope and extent of the limitations on 
access, but that is a matter for the trier of fact to determine based upon the evidence at trial. 
6. Lost profits 
The Board next argues that Idaho "common law" flatly precludes any claim of lost 
profits in a condemnation proceeding.5 The Board argues that Idaho Code§ 7-711(2) provides 
the exclusive basis for such claims. Again, the Board mischaracterizes the nature of Grathol's 
damages and the applicable Idaho law. 
Although the loss of business profits are not compensable as such 
in eminent domain actions, evidence thereof may be admissible if 
it bears upon the fair market value of property actually taken and 
the severance damage to the remainder. 
State ex rel. Moore v. Bastain, 97 Idaho 444, 448, 546 P.2d 399,403 (1976). (emphasis added) 
It is not clear if the Board is intentionally trying to mislead the Court or it is merely zealously 
advocating its position. Regardless, it is clear that lost profits are certainly admissible evidence 
of severance damages to the remainder in partial takings cases or where they bear upon the fair 
market value of the property. 
The damages for lost profits to be offered by Grathol at trial relate to the reduction in 
value, use and marketability to the remaining property by reason of the severance of the prime 
comer acreage being taken and use to which that acreage will be put. These damages go to the 
value of the impairment by reason of the limitations now in place on the development of the 
remainder as a commercial development site. These damages are not the same as those 
"business profits" contemplated under Idaho Code § 7-711(2) as they are not damages caused 
by the interruption of an ongoing business. 
5 Query where this notion comes from as there simply is no "common law" of eminent domain. 
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7. Gravel 
Plaintiffs brief contends that "ITD [the Board] is buying [italics original] the 
condemned the [sic] entire property in its entirety, including any gravel or anything else of 
value that may or may not be under the property." See, Plaintiff's Brief in Support, pg. 44. 
What?! Put more cogently, the Board believes that Grathol cannot recover the fair market 
value of the property and an additional amount for gravel deposits. There are no reported cases 
in Idaho speaking to this issue. However, the very issue of valuation of mineral/gravel deposits 
on condemned property was addressed in State of Nevada, ex rel Nevada Department of 
Transportation v. Las Vegas Building Materials, Inc., 104 Nevada 479, 761 P.2d 843 (1988). 
In that case, the Nevada Supreme Court held a condemnee landowner did not make a "double 
valuation" by separately valuing minerals and then adding that value to the market value of the 
land being taken. Citing from Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain Section 13.22 at 126-130, 
the Nevada Supreme Court noted that in a condemnation action, the existence of mineral 
deposits in or on the land is an element to be considered in determining the land's value. The 
court noted that where the property is not taken for the purpose of obtaining the minerals or as 
an ongoing business it is improper to appraise the mineral deposits separately and add the 
mineral value to the value of the land. However, where "the fair market value of the subject 
parcels, is determined by the comparable sales approach ... " the value of the mineral deposits 
could be considered separately. While the State of Nevada argued that the minerals were 
separately valued from the land resulting in an improper "double valuation," the Nevada 
Supreme Court ruled otherwise stating, "Although the argument has appeal on its face, it is 
flmved." Because the comparable sales figures dealt with similar lands without the presence of 
minerals, the appraisers in that case added what they concluded was the value of the minerals to 
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the comparable sales figures to determine the market value of the land taken. This said, the 
Nevada Supreme Court, is not a double valuation. Quoting Nichols, "If the extent and quality 
and value of the [gravel] as it lies on the land may not be considered, there would be no way by 
which the value of the land with the [gravel] could be shown. All legitimate evidence tending 
to establish value of the land with the [gravel] in it is permissible ... [C]onsideration may be 
given to the quantity of the mineral that can be extracted and the value thereof, purely as 
evidence for arriving at the value of the land." 
Here, not surprisingly, Plaintiff's valuation appraiser completely disregarded any 
treatment or consideration of gravel value in all of the comparable sales he evaluated. 
Moreover, the Plaintiff resisted at every tum Defendant's efforts to pursue discovery of 
Plaintiff's geotechnical data gathered, not only from the property taken but elsewhere on the 
Defendant's remainder property. Like all of the other issues that Plaintiff hopes will not see the 
light of day, the issue of gravel value is a disputed factual matter and certainly not subject of 
summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the multitude of reasons set forth above, each and every issue raised in Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment constitutes a genuine, dispute and material issue of fact to be 
determined by the Court upon the evidence adduced at trial. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
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DATED this 20th day of January, 2012. 
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Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRATHOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN 
LIMINE 
COMES NOW, Defendant HJ Grathol, by and through its counsel of record, Ramsden 
& Lyons, LLP, and respectfully submits this Response to Plaintiff's Motion in Limine. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff, Idaho Transportation Board ("Board") has filed a Motion in Limine to exclude 
certain testimony from being introduced at trial in this condemnation action. In addition to, and 
simultaneous with, its Motion in Limine, the Board also filed a voluminous Motion for 
Summary Judgment which is also a limine motion of sorts. Despite the oppressive page count 
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of these filings, Plaintiffs arguments can be summarized: Simply put, Plaintiff does not like 
any of Defendant's evidence that contradicts its own myopic theory of damages. There is, in 
essence, nothing more than that. However, despite Plaintiffs apparent disagreement with the 
substance of the evidence, there is no legal basis to exclude any of it, as all of Plaintiffs 
objections simply go to the weight of the evidence, which can and will be considered by the 
Court acting as the trier of fact. 
Idaho courts have held that there is no precise formula or methodology required for an 
expert in arriving at valuation of property in condemnation proceedings. In City of McCall v. 
Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 130 P.3d 1118 (2006), the City argued (on appeal) that a new trial 
should have been granted because the jury improperly relied on the "flawed" methodology of 
the landowner's appraiser. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the methodology 
used was not flawed, just different from that of the City. Relying on Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 
74, 78, 644 P.2d 1333, 1337 (1982), the Seubert court found that weighing the testimony of 
expert witnesses was uniquely within the competence of the trier of fact. "The information, 
theory or methodology upon which the expert's opinion is based need not be commoniy agreed 
upon by experts in the field, but it must have sufficient indicia of reliability to meet I.RE. 702 
requirements." Id. at 585, 130 P.3d 1123, citing State v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410, 417, 3 P.3d 
535, 542 (Ct.App.2000). The Seubert court expressly rejected arguments that disagreement 
with the methodology used could form the basis for a new trial: 
A review of the trial transcript indicates there is support for 
Richey's valuation methodologies and opinion. The fact that his 
opinion was disagreed with by the opposing experts does not 
call his conclusions into question and the City presents no other 
argument as to why Richey was not a qualified expert. In 
essence, the City merely argues that its expert's appraisal of the 
Seubert's property is more reliable than Seubert's and, therefore, 
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the jury erred in relying on Seubert's expert's valuation of the 
land. It is within the province of the jury, however, to weigh the 
testimony of witnesses and there is nothing to suggest the jury's 
consideration of Richey's testimony was improper. 
Id. at 586, 130 P.3d 1124. Similar arguments were rejected in Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 
644 P .2d 1333 (1982). 1 
Similar to the arguments rejected in Seubert and Rueth, Plaintiff moves in limine to 
exclude Defendant's expert opinion testimony on value simply because it disagrees with the 
opinions. In fact, at Section C, of its Brief in Support of Motion in Limine, Plaintiff takes the 
exact same tack used in Seubert, stating that Skip Sherwood's opinions are inadmissible 
because they are based on a flawed methodology. Plaintiff disagrees with Sherwood's opinion 
of the damages based on a 30 acre parcel wherein it based its own evaluation on a 56 acre 
valuation. Sherwood based his valuation opinion, in part, on the western portion of the Grathol 
property, from which the Plaintiff was actually physically taking 16.314 acres. In a marathon 
deposition of over seven hours, Plaintiffs counsel interrogated Sherwood on his methodology, 
essentially trying to "brow beat" Sherwood into "admitting" that his approach was invalid. 
Plaintiff similarly complains under Section D of its Brief that Sherwood fails to explain 
or quantify the adjustments he has made to comparable sales and therefore his appraisals and 
opinions should be excluded. Again, Plaintiff is merely arguing that Sherwood's methodology 
is "improper." These arguments only go to the weight of the opinion, but do not go to the 
admissibility, and the trier of fact retains the discretion to weigh the testimony. 
1 "The Department's argument overlooks the fact that weighing the testimony of expert witnesses is uniquely within 
the competence of the trier of fact... Simply stated, each side's expert presented differing opinions to the district 
court based on differing methodologies, and it was with the sound discretion of the district court to accept or reject 
each expert's opinions." Id. at 78, 644 P.2d 1337. 
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While some sorts of expert opinion testimony is properly subject to the formulaic, rigid 
strictures of Daubert and it progeny, other types of opinion testimony does not fit that mold. 
Perhaps no better example exists than real estate valuation opinions. Opining on the value of, 
and harm to, real estate is not a matter of applying a mathematical formula. 
While Plaintiff clearly disagrees with Sherwood's valuation, such disagreement does not 
establish grounds under I.RE. 702 to make his testimony inadmissible. Instead, these 
arguments simply go the weight of the testimony and the trier of fact is in a position to assign as 
much or as little weight to the opinion as it deems necessary. 
Plaintiff also argues that both Sherwood and Alan Johnson's value opm1ons are 
inadmissible because they are not linked to the date of the Summons. Plaintiffs arguments are 
again without support, because their opinions include valuation for severance and consequential 
damages which cannot be limited to the date of the Summons. 
Plaintiffs appraised valuations attributed zero dollars to severance or consequential 
damages. Affidavit of C. Gabbert, Ex. G (Depa. Stan Moe at pp. 58-59, 11. 25, 1-6). As such, 
Plaintiff only values the real property physically taken. That is what this entire case is all about 
Plaintiffs failure to consider condemnation damages to which Defendant is entitled by law. 
Idaho Code § 7-712 does require that the date of the summons be the basis for assessment of 
compensation for all property actually taken. Section 7-712 doesn't speak to other damages, 
however. This lock-in valuation date makes sense when there is a physical taking of property. 
However, the date of the issuance of the summons does not provide a cut-off date for severance 
and consequential damages, since the extent of such damages would not be known, as there was 
no physic~! t~k-e ~t th~t timP. 
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It is undeniable that Idaho law allows a property owner to present evidence of severance 
damages after the value of the part taken has been established. 
When such reasonable market value of the part taken has been 
determined and fixed, appellant is then entitled to further recover 
the damages to the remainder. This latter sum is determined by 
the market value of such remainder before and after the taking. 
The difference in value is the severance damage. 
State ex rel. Rich v. Dunclick, Inc., 77 Idaho 45, 55-56, 286 P.2d 1112, 1118 (1955). (emphasis 
added) However, the Plaintiffs argument would limit all evidence of severance damages to the 
date that the summons was issued, thus effectively precluding any evidence of damages caused 
to the remainder. For example, as briefed in Defendant's Response to Plainitffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment, one type of recognized severance damage is damage caused by delays in 
construction. If a landowner's remaining parcels are prevented from being put to use by reason 
of the condemnor's delay, then their remaining property has been damaged by such delays and 
the landowner is entitled to compensation. In order to present evidence of damages caused by 
the delay, the damages must be quantifiable and since they are time determinative, the damages 
can't be quantified until the extent of the delay is known. If the snapshot date of issuance of the 
summons is when those damages must be shown, the delay damages might not have even been 
suffered yet. In those circumstances, Plaintiffs argument would virtually preclude any such 
damages and would set an arbitrary cut-off date for all severance damages, even those that are 
continuing. This result would be contrary to Idaho's recognition that all incidents of property 
ownership are subject to compensation and would contravene the Code's intent in allowing 
evidence of damages other than the mere value of the part taken. Idaho Code § 7-711(2) 
provides for a separate valuation of the property to be conderru1ed a.11.d that of a remai.11.der in a 
partial takings cases like this one: 
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If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a 
larger parcel: (a) the damages which will accrue to the portion 
not sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance from the 
portion sought to be condemned, and ... ( emphasis added) 
Plaintiff's theory directly contravenes Idaho Code's express recognition that damages 
which will accrue ("will" - meaning at some future time) to the remainder are to be 
compensated for. How can a landowner be expected to present evidence of damages which 
will accrue to the remainder by reason of its severance, if its expert opinions of such severance 
damages are arbitrarily locked in on the date of the summons? Plaintiff's arguments are 
illogical. Further, Plaintiff's arguments are contradicted by virtue of Idaho Code §7-711(3) 
wherein a condemnor is entitled to present evidence of "special benefits" accruing to the 
remainder by reason of the proposed construction as an offset against the severance damages. 
If the severance damages that will be incurred are not recoverable because they are 
unquantifiable when the summons is issued, the same would have to be true with respect to 
special benefits which are not quantified on the date of the summons. What's good for the 
goose .... 
Here, Plaintiff attributes no value to any severance or consequential damages to the 
remainder of Grathol's property after the taking and, therefore, Plaintiff's expert opinions are 
limited to the portion of the property taken on date of the physical take (issuance of the 
Summons). However, Plaintiff's decision to ignore Grathol's severance damages does not act 
as some unilateral bar to Defendant presenting evidence of the darnages which it believes win 
accrue to the remainder after the take. For these same reasons and those briefed in Defendant's 
Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff's arguments to exclude the 
testimony regarding the damages caused by the Sylvan Road expansion are without merit. The 
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direct effect of Plaintiffs actions in this condemnation upon the remainder property is 
compensable as both severance and consequential damages. Just because Plaintiff refuses to 
recognize Defendant's property rights does not make evidence of those rights inadmissible at 
trial. 
Finally, Plaintiff makes much ado about "excluding" evidence of Comparable Sale No. 
5 referenced in Sherwood's valuation, because that sale was made under threat of 
condemnation by the Plaintiff itself. Comparable Sale No. 5 was one of ten (10) comparable 
sales considered by Sherwood. Sherwood testified that Comparable Sale No. 5 may not 
represent a true "market value" by reason of the threat of condemnation, but he still considered 
the property anyway, based on its proximity and similar zoning to the Grathol property. 
Sherwood also adjusted the stated sale price downward based on these differences to assist/help 
in arriving at his opinions of value. While Plaintiff complains that this sale does not represent 
"market value," Sherwood has not exclusively relied on that sale as the basis for his opinion. 
Instead, it is merely one of a collection of comparable sales based on the size, location, zoning 
ai1d proximity to the Grahtol property to help forni the basis for his expert analysis. 
Comparable No. 5 is a singular "data point," nothing more. Again, Plaintiff is simply arguing 
that it disagrees with Sherwood's methodology, but such disagreement in opinion does not 
make Sherwood's testimony inadmissible. If the Court elects to entirely disregard any 
consideration Sherwood gave to Comparable No. 5, so be it. Frankly, it just isn't very 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Defendant requests that Plaintiffs Motion in Limine BE 
DENIED. 
DATED this 20th day of January, 2012. 
B·~,,.._ ___________ _ 
1///c Stopher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTOPHER 
D. GABBERT IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN 
LIMINE 
CHRISTOPHER D. GABBERT, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. I am an attorney of record for the Defendant HJ Grathol in this action and 
therefore am aware of the facts surrounding this matter. 
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2. On January 20, 2012, I accessed the Idaho Legislature's website located at 
http:llwww.legislature.idaho.govlindex.htm in order to obtain the legislative history for 
Senate Bill No. 1243, which amended Idaho Code§ 7-707 to include subsection (6) in 2006. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit A, is a true and correct copy of the Senate Bill No. 1243, its 
amendment and the Statement of Purpose/Fiscal Impact. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B, is a true and correct copy of the Plan Sheet 
included in Exhibit B to the Complaint filed by Plaintiff on November 19, 2010. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit C, are true and correct copies of plan sheets and 
right of way plans produced by Plaintiff through discovery as Bates Nos. 006025, 006027 
and 006055. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit D, are true and correct copies of portions of the 
deposition transcript of Jason Mingzhor, taken November 15, 2011. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit E, are true and correct copies of portions of the 
Plaintiff's Brief on Appeal, dated November 4, 2011. 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit F, are true and correct copies of portions of the 
deposition transcript of Alan Johnson, taken November 18, 2011. 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit G, are true and correct copies of portions of the 
deposition transcript of Stanley Moe, taken November 15, 2011. 
9. Attached hereto as Exhibit H, is an e-mail dated July, 2008 from Donald C. 
Davis to Mark Mussman produced by Defendant through discovery as Bates No. 000505. 
II 
II 
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FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
/ 
yiopher D. Gabbert 
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J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
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P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
~:~n~~~i~;i:~ 334-4498 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
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Bill Status 
Sl243aa ........................................................... by BRANDT 
EMINENT DOMAIN - Amends existing law relating to eminent domain to require 
that a complaint shall contain an order of condemnation, or resolution, or 
other official and binding document entered by the plaintiff which sets 
forth and clearly identifies all property rights to be acquired, including 
rights to and from the public way, and permanent and temporary easements 








Senate intro - 1st rdg - to printing 
Rpt prt - to St Aff 
Rpt out - to 14th Ord 
Rpt out amen - to engros 
Rpt engros - 1st rdg - to 2nd rdg as amen 
2nd rdg - to 3rd rdg as amen 
3rd rdg as amen - PASSED - 34-0-1 
AYES -- Andreason, Brandt, Broadsword, Bunderson, Burkett, 
Burtenshaw, Cameron, Coiner, Compton, Corder, Darrington, Davis, 
Fulcher, Gannon, Geddes, Goedde, Hill, Jorgenson, Kelly, Keough, 
Langhorst, Little, Lodge, Malepeai, McGee, McKenzie, Pearce, 
Richardson, Schroeder, Stegner, Stennett, Sweet, Werk, Williams 
NAYS -- None 
Absent and excused -- Marley 
Floor Sponsor - Brandt 
Title apvd - to House 
03/21 House intro - 1st rdg - Held at Desk 
03/23 Ref'd to St Aff 
03/27 Rpt out - rec d/p - to 2nd rdg 
03/28 2nd rdg - to 3rd rdg 
04/11 3rd rdg - PASSED - 67-0-3 
AYES -- Anderson, Andrus, Barraclough, Barrett, Bastian, Bayer, 
Bedke, Bell, Bilbao, Black, Block, Boe, Brackett, Bradford, Cannon, 
Chadderdon, Clark, Collins, Crow, Deal, Denney, Edmunson, Ellsworth, 
Eskridge, Field(18}, Field(23}, Garrett, Hart, Harwood, Henbest, 
Henderson, Jaquet, Kemp, Lake, LeFavour, Loertscher, Martinez, 
Mathews, McGeachin, McKague, Miller, Moyle, Nielsen, Nonini, 
Pasley-Stuart, Pence, Raybould, Ring, Ringo, Roberts, Rusche, 
Rydalch, Sali, Sayler, Schaefer, Shepherd(2}, Shepherd(8}, Shirley, 
Skippen, Smith(30}, Smith(24}, Smylie, Snodgrass, Stevenson, Wills, 
Wood, Mr. Speaker 
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NAYS -- None 
Absent and excused Bolz, Mitchell, Trail 
Floor Sponsor - Moyle 
Title apvd - to Senate 
04/11 To enrol - Rpt enrol - Pres signed - Sp signed 
To Governor 
04/14 Governor signed 
Session Law Chapter 450 
Effective: 07/01/06 
Bill Text 
l l l l LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO l l l l 
Fifty-eighth Legislature Second Regular Session - 2006 
IN THE SENATE 
SENATE BILL NO. 1243 
BY BRANDT 
1 AN ACT 
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2 RELATING TO EMINENT DOMAIN; AMENDING SECTION 7-707, IDAHO CODE, TO REQUIRE 
3 THAT A COMPLAINT SHALL CONTAIN AN ORDER OF CONDEMNATION, OR RESOLUTION, OR 
4 OTHER OFFICIAL AND BINDING DOCUMENT ENTERED BY THE PLAINTIFF WHICH SETS 
5 FORTH AND CLEARLY IDENTIFIES ALL PROPERTY RIGHTS TO BE ACQUIRED INCLUDING 
6 RIGHTS TO AND FROM THE PUBLIC WAY, AND PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY EASEMENTS 
7 AND TO MAKE A TECHNICAL CORRECTION; AND AMENDING SECTION 40-506, IDAHO 
8 CODE, TO PROVIDE A CORRECT CODE REFERENCE AND TO MAKE A TECHNICAL CORREC-
9 TION. 
10 Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
11 SECTION 1. That Section 7-707, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
12 amended to read as follows: 
13 7-707. COMPLAINT. The complaint must contain: 
14 1. The name of the corporation, association, commission or person in 
15 charge of the public use for which the property is sought, who must be styled 
16 plaintiff. 
17 2. The names of all owners and claimants of the property, if known, or a 
18 statement that they are unknown, who must be styled defendants. 
19 3. A statement of the right of the plaintiff. 
20 4. If a right=of=way be sought, the complaint must show the location, 
21 general route and termini, and must be accompanied with maps thereof. 
22 5. A description of each piece of land sought to be taken, and whether 
23 the same includes the whole, or only a part, of an entire parcel or tract. All 
24 parcels lying in the county, and required for the same public use, may be 
25 included in the same or separate proceedings, at the option of the plaintiff, 
26 but the court may consolidate or separate them to suit the convenience of the 
27 parties. 
28 6. An order of condemnation, or resolution, or other official and binding 
29 document entered by the plaintiff which sets forth and clearly identifies all 
30 property rights to be acquired including rights to and from the public way, 
31 and permanent and temporary easements. 
32 2.:... In all cases where the owner of the lands sought to be taken resides 
33 in the county in which said lands are situated, a statement that the plaintiff 
http://legislature.idaho.gov/legislation/2006/S 1243 .html 1/20/2012 
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34 has sought, in good faith, to purchase the lands so sought to be taken, or 
35 settle with the owner for the damages which might result to his property from 
36 the taking thereof, and was unable to make any reasonable bargain therefor, or 
37 settlement of such damages; but in all other cases these facts need not be 
38 alleged in the complaint, or proved. 
39 SECTION 2. That Section 40-506, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
40 amended to read as follows: 
41 40-506. COMPENSATION FOR TAKING CERTAIN PROPERTY. (1) The department is 
2 
1 authorized to acquire by purchase, gift or condemnation, all advertising dis-
2 plays and any property rights pertaining to them, when those advertising dis-
3 plays are required to be removed under the provisions of chapter 19, title 40, 
4 Idaho Code. 
5 (2) In any appropriation for this purpose the department shall pay com-
6 pensation under existing eminent domain law only for the following: 
7 (a) The taking from the owner of a sign, display, or device of all right, 
8 title, leasehold, and interest in the sign, display or device; and 
9 (b) The taking from the owner of the real property on which the sign, 
10 display, or device is located, of the right to erect and maintain signs, 
11 displays and devices on that property. Where setback easements restricting 
12 the erection of structures or advertising displays have been recorded by 
13 the state on land where those structures have been erected, the landowner 
14 of the land shall be deemed to have been fully compensated for them. 
15 (3) In any action at law instituted by the department under this section 
16 the state shall not be required, as a prerequisite, to the taking of or appro-
17 priation to comply with section 7-704~2~+ or section 7-707-+6-rL_, Idaho Code. 
Amendment 
l l l l LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO l l l l 
Fifty-eighth Legislature Second Regular Session - 2006 
Moved by Brandt 
Seconded by Davis 
IN THE SENATE 
SENATE AMENDMENT TO S.B. NO. 1243 
1 AMENDMENT TO SECTION 1 
2 On page 1 of the printed bill, in line 31, following "easements" insert: 
3 "known or reasonably identifiable to the condemning authority". 
4 CORRECTION TO TITLE 
5 On page 1, in line 6, following "EASEMENTS" insert: "KNOWN OR REASONABLY 
6 IDENTIFIABLE TO THE CONDEMNING AUTHORITY". 
Engrossed Bill (Original Bill with Amendment(s) Incorporated) 
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l l l l LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO l l l l 
Fifty-eighth Legislature Second Regular Session - 2006 
IN THE SENATE 
SENATE BILL NO. 1243, As Amended 
BY BRANDT 
1 AN ACT 
2 RELATING TO EMINENT DOMAIN; AMENDING SECTION 7-707, IDAHO CODE, TO REQUIRE 
3 THAT A COMPLAINT SHALL CONTAIN AN ORDER OF CONDEMNATION, OR RESOLUTION, OR 
4 OTHER OFFICIAL AND BINDING DOCUMENT ENTERED BY THE PLAINTIFF WHICH SETS 
5 FORTH AND CLEARLY IDENTIFIES ALL PROPERTY RIGHTS TO BE ACQUIRED INCLUDING 
6 RIGHTS TO AND FROM THE PUBLIC WAY, AND PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY EASEMENTS 
7 KNOWN OR REASONABLY IDENTIFIABLE TO THE CONDEMNING AUTHORITY AND TO MAKE A 
8 TECHNICAL CORRECTION; AND AMENDING SECTION 40-506, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE 
9 A CORRECT CODE REFERENCE AND TO MAKE A TECHNICAL CORRECTION. 
10 Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
11 SECTION 1. That Section 7-707, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
12 amended to read as follows: 
13 7-707. COMPLAINT. The complaint must contain: 
14 1. The name of the corporation, association, commission or person in 
15 charge of the public use for which the property is sought, who must be styled 
16 plaintiff. 
17 2. The names of all owners and claimants of the property, if known, or a 
18 statement that they are unknown, who must be styled defendants. 
19 3. A statement of the right of the plaintiff. 
20 4. If a right=of=way be sought, the complaint must show the location, 
21 general route and termini, and must be accompanied with maps thereof. 
22 5. A description of each piece of land sought to be taken, and whether 
23 the same includes the whole, or only a part, of an entire parcel or tract. All 
24 parcels lying in the county, and required for the same public use, may be 
25 included in the same or separate proceedings, at the option of the plaintiff, 
26 but the court may consolidate or separate them to suit the convenience of the 
27 parties. 
28 6. An order of condemnation, or resolution, or other official and binding 
29 document entered by the plaintiff which sets forth and clearly identifies all 
30 property rights to be acquired including rights to and from the public way, 
31 and permanent and temporary easements known or reasonably identifiable to the 
32 condemning authority. 
33 'J....:.. In all cases where the owner of the lands sought to be taken resides 
34 in the county in which said lands are situated, a statement that the plaintiff 
35 has sought, in good faith, to purchase the lands so sought to be taken, or 




the taking thereof, and was unable to make any reasonable 
settlement of such damages; but in all other cases these 
alleged in the complaint, or proved. 
bargain therefor, 
facts need not 
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40 SECTION 2. That Section 40-506, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
41 amended to read as follows: 
2 
1 40-506. COMPENSATION FOR TAKING CERTAIN PROPERTY. (1) The department is 
2 authorized to acquire by purchase, gift or condemnation, all advertising dis-
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3 plays and any property rights pertaining to them, when those advertising dis-
4 plays are required to be removed under the provisions of chapter 19, title 40, 
5 Idaho Code. 
6 (2) In any appropriation for this purpose the department shall pay com-
7 pensation under existing eminent domain law only for the following: 
8 (a) The taking from the owner of a sign, display, or device of all right, 
9 title, leasehold, and interest in the sign, display or device; and 
10 (b) The taking from the owner of the real property on which the sign, 
11 display, or device is located, of the right to erect and maintain signs, 
12 displays and devices on that property. Where setback easements restricting 
13 the erection of structures or advertising displays have been recorded by 
14 the state on land where those structures have been erected, the landowner 
15 of the land shall be deemed to have been fully compensated for them. 
16 (3) In any action at law instituted by the department under this section 
17 the state shall not be required, as a prerequisite, to the taking of or appro-
18 priation to comply with section 7-704~2~+ or section 7-707-f-6+1.:..., Idaho Code. 
Statement of Purpose / Fiscal Impact 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS 15562 
This amendment to existing code shall require condemners to 
clearly set forth in the complaint a description of the property 
and property rights to be acquired. This will remove any 
ambiguity about which rights are being acquired as part of the 
condemnation, and shall give the condemner the right to make that 
decision, via an order or other resolution entered by the 
condemner. This will prevent any ambiguity or argument about 
what is or is not being taken via condemnation. 
FISCAL NOTE 
This will not impose a cost at the State or local level; it 
merely requires the condemner to incorporate into the complaint 
some evidence of what the condemner seeks to acquire. There may 
be a cost savings to condemners as property owners would be on 
notice regarding exactly what is being taken and any ambiguity or 
argument over that issue will be eliminated by requiring the 
complaint to state the taking expressly. 
Contact: 
Name: Representative Mike Moyle 
Phone: 332-1000 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE/FISCAL NOTE 
REVISED REVISED REVISED 
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Page 58 Page 60 
1 shutdown, no earth work after November 15th, or ground 1 A. Yes. 
2 disturbance, if they can't do work that's on their 2 Q. What's your understanding of an Order of 
3 critical path, which is the shortest duration, then we 3 Condemnation? 
4 shut them down. So a working day would be days that 4 A. It is a document signed by our -- It Is a 
5 they can work, excluding Sundays -- Saturdays and 5 document that ITD uses to enter -- to put the property 
6 Sundays and holidays. 6 owner on notice that we will be basically going to 
7 Q. Okay. 7 court. 
8 A. So 355 days, I mean, there's 30 to 31 days in 8 Q. Okay. It's kind of the starting point for a 
9 a month -- well, there's only five working days a week, 9 formal condemnation process; is that --
10 so it's 20 in a month, versus a completion contract, 10 A. Correct. 
11 which we have on the Chilco-Silverwood project, they 11 MS. YORK: Object to the form of the 
12 need to complete the project by a certain date or 12 question. If you know. 
13 they're going to be charged liquidated damages and 13 BY MR. MARFICE: 
14 penalties. 14 Q. There was an Order of Condemnation that was 
15 Q. Okay. And purely, if you know, why a working 15 issued relative to the Grathol property. You've seen 
16 day contract on this segment versus a completion date 16 that document? 
17 on the next adjacent segment; any reason for that or 17 A. Yes, I saw that document when we testified. 
18 just what's negotiated? 18 Q. At the quick take hearing? 
19 A. This -- we use different contracts for 19 A. Yeah. 
20 different reasons. For this one, the majority of our 20 Q. Were you, as the project engineer, involved 
21 contracts are working day. The Chilco-Silverwood had 21 in the preparation of that Order of Condemnation; did 
22 some issues concerning work times that we wanted to 22 you draft that or your staff? 
23 make sure that the contractor completed it as short as 23 A. I did not draft those, the actual document. 
24 possible. 24 Q. Okay. Do you know who did? 
25 Q. Okay. So with a 355-day work day contract, 25 A. I do not. 
Page 59 Page 61 
1 you equate that in your mind with potentially three 1 Q. That specific document, do you know who 
2 building seasons, perhaps shorter if weather is 2 normally would draft an Order of Condemnation; is that 
3 cooperative? 3 a staff person? 
4 A. Correct. 4 A. It doesn't occur out of my section. 
5 Q. Okay. From the standpoint of the project 5 Q. Okay. Is there going to be any section of 
6 engineer on this segment, and mindful of what you've 6 the Garwood to Sagie project that will not be served by 
7 testified to previously regarding the intention of 7 frontage roads, or, I should say, will not have 
8 utilizing frontage roads, is it your expectation that 8 frontage roads associated with it? 
9 at some point in the future Sylvan Road and Roberts 9 A. Can you repeat the question? 
10 Road will be connected up? 10 Q. The entirety of the Garwood to Sagle project 
11 MS. YORK: Object to the form of the 11 runs from Garwood Road to Sagle, correct? 
12 question. 12 A. Correct. 
13 THE WITNESS: Can you clarify the question? 13 Q. Is it contemplated that that entire span of 
14 BY MR. MARFICE: 14 highway, once it's reconfigured, realigned, will have 
15 Q. Yeah -- well, I think. 15 frontage roads parallel to it? 
16 From your standpoint as the project engineer, 16 MS. YORK: Can you clarify as to what time 
17 would it be your expectation that Sylvan Road and 17 frame? 
18 Roberts Road will connect, one or the other, through 18 BY MR. MARFICE: 
19 the Grathol property at some point In the future? 19 Q. When it's done. 
20 MS. YORK: Same objection. 20 A, The ultimate build-out? 
21 THE WITNESS: Per our planning document, It 21 Q. Yes. 
22 will be -- It is expected to be there. 22 A. Okay. In the ultimate build-out, there are 
23 BY MR. MARFICE: 23 several sections that may not have frontage roads. To 
24 Q. Okay. You know what an Order of Condemnation 24 look that up, we'd look at the EIS, 
25 is? 25 Q. Okay. Those sections that will, at least by 
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1 Q. Okay. And do you remember what your response 1 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. Restate the 
2 was? 2 question. 
3 A. I don't. 3 BY MS. YORK: 
4 Q. Can you clarify whether Sylvan Road is going 4 Q. Is ITD condemning any property for the 
5 to be extended across the Grathol property by ITO as 5 extension of Sylvan Road across the Grathol property? 
6 part of a future project? 6 MR. MARFICE: Same objection. 
7 A. We don't know who Is going to be doing the 7 THE WITNESS: We are not. 
8 extension of Sylvan Road. It may be part of the 8 BY MS. YORK: 
9 development, it may be Lakes Highway District, it could 9 Q. You're familiar, are you not, as the project 
10 be a number of agencies that actually do the 10 manager -- that's not the right term -- as the project 
11 construction. ITO at this time is only focused on the 11 manager for the Athol segment (sic); is that correct? 
12 construction of what is in our project plan. 12 A. Yes, 
13 Q. Now, in the planning documents, the 13 Q. And you're familiar with what property ITD 
14 Environmental Impact Statement, there's been discussion 14 needs for the construction of its project? 
15 on how the extension of Sylvan Road across the Grathol 15 A. Correct. 
16 property is shown on some of the diagrams in the early 16 Q. Does ITD need any property for Sylvan Road? 
17 planning documents; is that correct? 17 A. We do not. 
18 A. Correct, 18 Q. Let me clarify. Does ITD need any property 
19 Q. However, can you describe what the ROD says 19 across -- or does ITO need for Its Athol segment any 
20 about the extension of Sylvan Road across the Grathol 20 property for Sylvan Road across the Grathol property? 
21 property? 21 . A. No, we do not. 
22 A. The ROD looks at the extension of Sylvan 22 Q. And Is ITD, as part of its project to 
23 Road -- there was several options. There was four 23 construct the Athol segment of the Garwood to Sagle 
24 options on frontage road involving properties to the 24 project, is it building a frontage road across the 
25 north of 54 and east of existing 95. 25 Grathol property? 
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1 There was two proposed general locations for 1 A. No, we are not. 
2 Sylvan Road with respect to the Grathol piece. The 2 Q. Another line of questioning or discussion 
3 first one would be going straight across, going 3 point that you had with Mr. Marfice was in relationship 
4 basically in a straight line extending Sylvan to 4 to the Stewardship Agreement. 
5 Roberts. Another one would be to follow the 5 Can you describe what that is? 
6 interchange general layout and connect into Trinity 6 A. The Stewardship Agreement is an agreement 
7 Lane to the north. 7 that we have ITD has with the Federal Highway 
8 The ROD specifically selects which option 8 Administration basically outlining the protocol of how 
9 that would be, and it selected the best option would be 9 ITD operates and administers federal funds. 
10 to extend Sylvan Road straight Into Roberts. 10 Q. And in the context of that discussion, you 
11 Q. Did the ROD say anything about when the 11 referenced ITD's work on the SEP -- the SEP-15 program? 
12 extension -- or If, I guess I should say -- if or when 12 A. Correct. 
13 the extension of Sylvan Road might occur? 13 Q. Did ITO violate its own agreement, the 
14 A. The ROD specifically states that the 14 Stewardship Agreement when it went through the SEP-15 
15 construction is unknown at this time. 15 process with respect to the Grathol property? 
16 Q. Is Sylvan Road -- is ITO extending Sylvan 16 A. No. The SEP Is approved by the Federal 
17 Road across the Grathol property as part of the Athol 17 Highway Administration. They actually sign -- it's an 
18 segment of the Garwood to Sagle project? 18 experimental program that they signed with ITD in the 
19 A. We are not. 19 hopes that we can_ better our system. And one of those 
20 Q. Is ITO condemning any properties for Sylvan 20 SEPs gave us the ability to purchase early 
21 Road to cross the Grathol property? 21 right-of-way, and another one gave us the ability to go 
22 MR. MARFICE: Object to the form. Calls for 22 iiftv i11tol dt::::::.iy11 t,J1iva LV hav~,,~ 011 c-11v;1v1111,c11tal 
23 a legal conclusion. 23 document approved. 
24 MS. YORK: You can answer. 24 Q. Okay. So as part of that work, ITD did not 
25 MR. MARFICE: You can answer. 25 violate its Stewardship Agreement with FHWA? 
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1 A. It did not. 
2 Q. And then the last follow-up questions that I 
3 had for you was with respect to the bike path that's 
4 part of the Farragut Trail land exchange. 
5 Do you recall that discussion you had with 
6 Mr. Marfice? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. You were asked the question of whether ITD 
9 was taking or acquiring more property for that bike 
10 path. 
11 Do you recall that question? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Can you explain when the bike path became 
14 incorporated into the design for the Athol segment? 
15 A. The bike path has always been a part of the 
16 entire corridor from Garwood to Sagle. The Farragut 
17 Trail portion was designed -- final design around 2010, 
18 September of 2010. 
19 Q, And can you explain, then, with that 
20 background, what you meant by your testimony -- your 
21 prior testimony stating that ITD was taking more 
22 property for the bicycle path across the Grathol 
23 property? 
24 A. Well, our first -- the EIS does not depict 
25 the bike path so -- for the entire corridor, so when 
Page 75 
1 people look at the EIS, it appears that we are 
2 acquiring additional land, but it's just not depicted. 
3 So there is property being taken for the bike 
4 path, but in regard to Grathol, it has always been in 
5 the offer that we made to them as far as the amount of 
6 acreage has been the same throughout the project. 
7 Q. So ITD has not changed the amount of property 
8 it's taking from the Grathol for its Athol segment? 
9 A. It has not changed. 
10 Q. And that amount has always included the bike 
11 path? 
12 A. Correct. 
13 MS. YORK: I don't have any further 
14 questions. 
15 FURTHER EXAMINATION 
16 BY MR. MARFICE: 
17 Q, Two follow-ups. 
18 Mr. Minzghor, with respect to the Record of 
19 Decision questions that Ms. York just asked you about 
20 concerning the extension of Sylvan Road, your testimony 
21 was that the Record of Decision contemplates extension 
22 of Sylvan Road to connect to Roberts Road through four 
23 alternatives considered, one being a straight shot 
24 right across the Grathol property, right? 




















































Q. Why isn't ITO condemning for the extension of 
Sylvan Road across the Grathol property to connect to 
Roberts Road? 
A. The -- because they have access now. We --
the extension of Roberts Road was to ensure -- to the 
south was to ensure all properties that had access in 
the before has access in the after. Grathol has access 
in the before and in the after. 
Q. Is that the only reason? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I'm going to show you the Record of Decision 
that was included in your materials. The final page of 
that Record of Decision, what is that? 
A. This is a letter from Lakes Highway District. 
Q. To whom? 
A. To Jerry Wilson. 
Q. Who is Jerry Wilson? 
A. He's my staff engineer. 
Q. Okay. And what's the substance of that 
letter? 
A. This is regarding the Sylvan Road extension. 
Q. And paraphrasing that, that's Lake Highway 
District's request as part of the Record of Decision 
record to ask ITD to extend Sylvan Road across Grathol, 
correct? 
Page 77 
A. It is. 
Q. All right. 
MR. MARFICE: That's all I have. Thanks. 
(Deposition concluded at 3:22 p.m.) 
(Signature requested.) 
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admits that the administrative order also did not identify any land to be condemned for Sylvan 
Road. 
D. The Idaho Transportation Board Approved The US-95 Project. 
The Idaho Transpo1tation Board repeatedly approved the US-95 Project. R. at 166-167, 
,r,r 6, 9-12 (Vogt Aff., ,r,r 6, 9-12). The Board approves state highway projects (construction of 
new highways, reconstruction and improvement of existing highways, and major maintenance 
projects) tlu·ough adoption of the annual Idaho "Statewide Transportation Improvement 
Program" ("STIP"). R. at 155, ,r 10. 
Grathol mischaracterizes the STIP program as a "funding mechanism." h1 fact, the STIP 
program is an exhaustive, year-long process culminating in the selection and approval of state 
highway projects by the Idaho Transportation Board. The process includes public hearings by 
the Board and the solicitation of public comment from state and local governments, business 
interests, and private individuals. It is the process th.rough which the Idaho Transportation Board 
decides which projects will be built, when, and in what order. In addition, prior to adoption of 
the STIP each year, the Board affinns that all federal requirements for public involvement and 
comment have been met. See, e.g., R. at 191. 
Every year, after months of preparation, public hearings, and public comment, the Board 
approves a STIP. This decision constitutes the Board's fmmal decision on and ap_P.roval of the 
state highway projects that are to be undertaken for the next five years. R. at 167, ,i 11. An 
approved project is generally included in the STIP for five years, marking its progress from 
design and dete1mination of route, to 1ight-of-way acquisition, through construction and 
completion. The US-95 Garwood to Sagle Project has been approved by the Board in each 
annual STIP since 2005. R. at 166-170. See also R. at 175-260 (Vogt Aff., Exs. 2-11) (Board 
approvals and adoptions of annual STIPs for fiscai years 2005-2010). 
Idaho law requires the Board to hold public hearings before making its final decision on 
the location and route of an individual state highway project. LC. § 40-310. The Board is 
required to serve ,vritten notice of these hea1ings, by certified or registered 111ail, on all private 
RESPONDENT ITO'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - 5 
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property owners like Grathol whose prope1ty will be acquired for the project, either through 
purchase or condemnation. LC. § 40-310(1 )(a). This process is controlled and directed by the 
Board and occurs long before an administrative order of condemnation is executed. Id. The 
Board must also satisfy federal requirements for public hearings and comment. See, e.g., R. at 
191 ("Whereas, the STIP was developed in accordance with all applicable federal requirements 
including adequate oppmtunity for public involvement and comment."). 
E. The Board Approved The Acquisition Of All Properties Needed For Tile US-95 
Project. 
The Idaho Trm1sportation Board approved both the route of the US-95 Project and the 
acquisition of each parcel of land needed for the Project, including the Grathol property. See 
infra Section IV(B)(6). The Board's approval of the condemnation of a pmtion of the Grathol 
prope1ty occurred long before the administrative order of condemnation was executed by the 
Director oflTD. Id. 
F. Events Prior To Condemnation Of The Gmthol Property. 
After approving the US-95 Project, its route, and the prope1ties to be acquired, ITD began 
the process of design, right-of-way acquisition, and contract bidding. ITD's record of right-of-
way negotiations show that ITD served the right-of-way acquisition packet on Grathol's 
representatives on June 19, 2010. This packet included the statement of property owner rights 
required under I.C. § 7-711A, plans showing the location and route of the project across the 
Grathol prope1ty and specifically showing the portion of the Grathol property to be acquired, and 
a copy of an appraisal of the Grathol property commissioned by ITD. With the packet delivered 
on June 19, 2010, !TD conveyed to Grathol its offer to purchase the portion of property needed 
for the US-95 Project for $628,100. Tr. at 17-18. Grathol rejected the offer in late June, 
demanding instead the payment of between $2.5 and $3 million. Tr. at 18. 
After being unable to reach agreement with Grathol for the purchase of its prope1ty, 
ITD initiated the administrative process to prepare for condemnation of the prope1ty. The legal 
department of ITD prepared the administrative order of condemnation. The Director of ITO 
signed the administrative order of condemnation on November 17, 2010, aiong with the Right of 
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authority to authorize and execute the administrative order of condemnation. The Director did 
not exercise the power of eminent domain. He did not file the complaint, and did not seek to 
condemn prope1ty in his name or for his use. 
The propeliy identified in the administrative order of condemnation is identical to the 
propeliy condemned two days later in ITD's Complaint. The uncontroverted facts show that 
ITD is not condemning any propeliy other than the property identified in the Complaint needed 
for constrnction of the US-95 Project, and is not condemning any property for Sylvan Road. The 
district couit's mlings are amply suppo1ted in the law and by the facts in this case, and should be 
upheld on appeal. 
DATED this 4th day of November, 2011. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board 
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1 Q. How did you determine whether or not you 
2 got it for a good price? 
3 A. We had been looking at other projects in 
4 Coeur d'Alene, and obviously, you know, Coeur d'Alene 
5 land is going to be more valuable. We thought the price 
6 was a bargain. 
7 (Exhibit 43 was marked.) 
8 BY MR. TOLLEFSON: 
9 Q. I'm handing you what's been marked as 
10 Deposition Exhibit No. 43. Are you familiar with the 
11 MLS or the Multiple Listing Service? 
12 A. I'm familiar with what it is. I'm not a 
13 member of it. 
14 Q. Do you have access to the MLS? 
15 A. No, I do not. 
16 Q. Do you know if any of the brokers that you 
17 would work with, would they have access to the MLS? -
18 A. The broker that I worked with on this 
19 particular property did not have access to MLS. 
20 Q. And who was that? 
21 A. Brett Terrell. 
22 Q. And how do you know he did not have access 
23 to MLS? 
24 A. We've talked about it before. He's not a 
25 realtor. 
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1 Q. So if you take a minute to look at this 
2 document. So you've never seen this document before. 
3 Is that correct? 
4 A. I don't believe I have. I may have. It 
5 may have been part of discovery from ITD. 
6 Q. And just we'll go through here. It says, 
7 "Excellent visibility with commercial potential." Do 
8 you feel that's an accurate description of the property? 
9 A. As it was at that time, yes. 
10 Q. Then it says, "Preliminary drawings showed 
11 future off-ramps and frontage roads for Highway 95 
12 through this property." Does that also appear to be 
13 accurate? 
14 A. It appears to be accurate. 
15 Q. So at the time that this property was up 
16 for sale, it was known that there were some preliminary 
17 drawings showing future off-ramps and frontage roads for 
18 Highway 95? 
19 A. We did know that, yes. 
20 Q. And when did you find out about this 
21 potential future off-ramps and frontage roads? 
22 A. We met -- and I'm not positive of the 
23 date •• before we closed escrow with ITD. Don Davis, 
24 and -- I don't recall if there was anybody else In the 




















































the plans were. But we've seen plans like this all the 
time, too, that never come to fruition. But his 
indication was that they were going to put a -- they 
were going to realign the project. It was going to 
be -- at that time, it was not going to be an overpass. 
It was going to be an at-grade intersection with traffic 
signals. I guess similar to what Garwood and 95 ls now. 
He indicated that there were no plans to build an 
interchange -- a freeway interchange with an overpass. 
And he did Indicate that actually 95 would be at the 
same -- approximately the same grade that it is at now, 
and 54 would be depressed under it. He said there were 
no plans to consider that until 2020. At least 2020. 
Q. And you had this conversation before you 
acquired the property? 
A. Yes, we did. 
Q. On this MLS document here, halfway down on 
the left-hand side, it says, "Days on the market: 344." 
Does that seem accurate to you or do you know how long 
this property had been on the market? 
A. I'm sorry. Oh. I see it. I had no idea 
how long it was on the market. I believe it was priced 
higher -- oh, it was priced at a million seven. They 
dropped the price, and I believe shortly after they 
dropped the price, we were under contract. 
Q. And was the price $1,450,000? 
A. That's what we paid for the property. 
(Exhibit 44 was marked.) 
BY MR. TOLLEFSON: 
Q. I'm handing you what's been marked as 
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Deposition Exhibit No. 44. Have you seen this document 
before? 
A. I have. 
Q. And what Is this document? 
A. Buyer's Settlement Statement. 
Q. And at the top -- and this is the Buyer's 
Settlement Statement for Gracal Corporation's 
acquisition of the subject property. Is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And just before we move on, do you know 
why the property was purchased by Gracal Corporation and 
not one of the other entitles? 
A. I do not. Hughes Investments does not 
acquire property -· we'll go under contract with the 
right to assign to an entity that we form. Gracal may 
have been an entity that had already been formed but 
maybe was no longer being used, but I can't be certain 
of that. 
Q. But the property was purchased by Gracal 
and at some point transferred to HJ Grathol; is that 
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2 A. Yeah. It was someone out of the Boise 
3 office, but the function of the reviewer is to go 
4 through my appraisal, check all the calculations, see 
5 that it meets the requirements for !TD report 
6 standards. And if there are some problems, it will 
7 come back to me for changes. And if not, he'll go 
8 ahead and write his recommendation for the offer. 
9 Q. Okay. So this is -- the reviewer, to your 
10 knowledge, is somebody within ITD? 
11 A. Uh-huh. This was, yes. 
12 Q. Okay. Was your report, prior to it being 
13 finalized, sent back to you at any point for revisions 
14 on this parcel? 
15 A. I don't -- I don't think so. If it was, it 
16 was something very minor, change in spelling or 
17 something of that nature. But there was no changes to 
18 my values. 
19 Q. Okay. The second portion of that table, 
20 there's an upper portion and a lower portion. The 
21 lower portion pertains to value of the remainder after 
22 the acquisition. 
23 Do you see that? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. There's a category called Damages to the 
Page 59 
1 Remainder, and underneath that are two sub-categories, 
2 Severance and Proximity. Do you see that? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Now, you allocated -- if I'm reading this 
5 correctly, you allocated zero severance damages? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. And you allocated zero proximity damages? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Is that still your opinion today? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. On the following page, 46 of your report, 
12 there's a brief explanation of damage or benefit. 
13 Do you see that? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Okay. And I'm just going to summarize here 
16 the final sentence or so. lt says: We have concluded 
17 neither damages nor special benefits will accrue to the 
18 subject property as a result of the proposed 
19 acquisition. 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Do you see that? 
22 And then it says: This opinion is on!y 
23 applicable as of the date of the appralsal and could 
24 change over time. 
25 A. Right. 
Page 60 
1 Q. Has it changed over time? 
2 A. I haven't seen anything that would cause it 
3 to change at this point. 
4 Q. Have you been asked to evaluate or give any 
5 opinion on that topic? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. Do you have some project plans there 
8 underneath your pink binder I think you were looking at 
9 earlier? 
10 A. These? 
11 Q. Yeah. Do you want to flip to the diagram on 
12 the subject property? 
13 A. There's two pages. This is the main part of 
14 it. Do you want the overall? 
15 Q. Yeah, the overall would probably be best. 
16 I'm just going to refer to this diagram that's in 
17 multiple areas in the record. 
18 This is the Grathol property that you 
19 identified? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Now, among your file materials is this Parcel 
22 19.1 that was separately appraised, and that's the 
23 Farragut Trail? 
24 A. No. The Farragut Trail is Parcel 21. That 
25 was a totally separate issue. 
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1 Q. Okay. Did you appraise in terms of -- in 
2 terms of the scope of your work, the rerouting of the 
3 Farragut Trail --
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. -- adjacent to the improvements across 
6 Grathol? 
7 A. Yes, and I believe that was 19.1. 
8 Q. Okay. Tell me about that, if -- just how'd 
9 that come to be; what was going on there? 
10 A. Well, it's -- I appraised it as a taking. 
11 It's within the taking, as I understood it. So rather 
12 than an easement, it was just an additional parcel that 
13 was going to be acquired as it shows the right-of-way 
14 on the outside of that to connect up with the trail. 
15 Q. Okay. And that was a separate and distinct 
16 review process from your appraisal of the Grathol 
17 property proper? 
18 A. It was, yeah. 
19 Q, Okay, When did that issue first come up, to 
20 your knowledge? 
21 A. When I was doing the -- at the same time I 
22 was working on t'1ree of those parcels. 
23 Q. So this little narrow parcel Identified on 
24 this diagram as Farragut Recreational Trail, did you 
25 actually create an appraisal report for that? 
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Don Davis IDon.Davis@itd.ldaho.gov] 
Sent! wecfnesday, July 02. 2008 3:49 PM r: , . -. v, ... ._ 
To: Mark Mu&sman 
Cc~ joe@lakeshwy.com ........... - • : • t J".:i!..f'-:-. ~, ·- ·.,:,.;:: . 
Subject: ZONOS-0008 Hughes Investment 
Mark. 
District 1 of the Idaho Transportation Department has the folIOWing eomments on the proposed zone change: 
The subject property is at 1he location of a grade separamd interchange at 1he junction of LfS-95 and SH-54 and a 
frontage road as shown as the preferred attemative ln the Garwood to Sagle Draft Environmental _Impact 
statement (The OEtS and the alt.ematives can b8 viewed at 
htt_p:/lwww.conn~idaho.gov/ProjectslUS95Garwoodm$qgl§CorrldorJU$95GatWoodtoSagleEmtirgnmentalSty(j 
A Final EIS wilJ be issued for public review tater this year and a RB00Td of Decision on the entire project is 
expected by the end of the year. 
The DiSttiCt does not object to commercial 20ning on the property. however. at the present time we recommend 
that there be acknowlgement on the h"igfwnrf plal\s through the land use process. The Gaawood to Sagle EIS 
acknowledges that it is likely that property owners at each pre>posed interchange will pursue some sort of 
commerciaf zoning and $1.lbsequent land U6e. Access to any land use on the subject property, with the 
interchange and frontage road in place may be fu>m the property's exi81ing frontage on existing US-95 (which 
could become tM west side frontage road) and/or from the new, east stde frontage road or frOm Howard Roacl 
Once the record of decision is issued by the Federal Higtrway Administration and right of W:J'/ plans are approved, 
ITO may be purchasing right of way for the freeway, ioten:hanges and frontage roads. 
The Garwood to Sagle project is presently in the prefimlnary design phase so an exact footprint of the highway 
layout - not yet been finaled. Once the record of decision is ISsued fmal design can proceed and alignments 
will be confirmed and will be the basis of rigbt of way plall$. Untfl that time we can not fully determine the effect of 
the project on the ptoperty proposed for zone change. If the county approves the zone change we recommend 
that the rights of way areas o1 the interchange, freeway lanes and trontage road be considered and and that 
access to the commercial zoned area be limited to existing US-95, the new, easterly frontage road and Hr;iward 
React. 
Donilld C. Dovis, P .e. 
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO 
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Limine, before the Honorable Charles W. Hosack. 
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J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
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HJ ORA THOL, a California general partnership; 
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Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") has moved for summary 
judgment to dismiss unlawful claims for compensation or damages by Defendant HJ Orathol 
("Grathol'') that are barred by Idaho law. On January 6, 2012, ITD filed its opening brief and the 
Affidavit of Mary V. York (''York Aff.") with documents and portions of the record attached. 
The undisputed facts supporting ITO' s motion are set forth in its opening brief ("ITD Opening 
Brf."), at 6-9. ITD now files this reply brief in support of its motion. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, Orathol paid $1.45 million for its 56-acre property outside the City of Athol. 
ITD is condemning 16.3 acres, or less than one-third of the property, Grathol is attempting to 
recover as much as $7 .1 million for the ta1cing of 16. 3 acres, even though it only paid $1.45 
million for the entire S6 acres. To reach this number, Grathol has asserted damage claims that 
are batted by Idaho law and have no factual basis. These claims are the subject ofITD's motion. 
Gtathol' s response brief is markedly caustic and sarcastic. ITD will not respond in kind 
except to say that the opposition brief does not represent or engender the civility sought by 
Idaho's courts and bar. 
Grathol's brief fails to address almost all of the Idaho statutes and case law cited by ITO 
that bar Grathol's claims. Grathol has also failed to come forward with facts to support its 
claims, as required by Rule 56 once a motion for summary judgment is filed. 
In its brief, Grathol makes many legal assertions and conclusions without citation to any 
authority, Consequently, this reply brief must set forth both the proper legal foundation and 
explain why Grathol's assertions and conclusions are incorrect and contrary to Idaho law. 
Grathol also relies on cases from a minority of jurisdictions whose constitutional 
"takings" clauses differ substantially from Idaho's constitution and those of the majority of 
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states. Therefore, the first segment of ITD's reply brief will set forth the fundamental Idaho 
legal standards governing Grathol' s damage claims. 
11, IDAHO STANDARDS GOVERNING RECOVERY OF JUST COMPENSATION 
A; · ··· ·The Issue Of Unlawful Damage Claims Should Be Addressed On Summary 
Judgment Before Trial. 
At a trial in a condemnation case, the only issue to be decided is the amount of just 
compensation to be paid to the property owner for the land taken, any improvements taken, and 
severance damages to the remainder property. As explained inIDil2d 7.01.1, "[t]he sole issue 
for your determination is the just compensation to be paid to the defendant by the plaintiff[.]" 
All other issues are to be decided by the court in advance of trial. "[A]ll issues, whether 
legal or factual, other than just compensation, are for resolution by the trial court.'' City of 
Lewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 851, 857, 853 P.2d 596, 602 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing Reuth v. 
State, 100 Idaho 203, 222-23, 596 P.2d 75, 94-95 (1978); Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 
667, 670, 603 P.2d 1001, 1004 (1979)). The court, and not the jury, is to determine "whether a 
taking occurred, the nature of the property interest taken, and when the taking occU1Ted." 
Lindsey, 123 Idaho at 857, 853 P.2d at 602. 
Gtathol suggests that fact questions exist that bar summary judgment on the issue of 
whether certain of its claims for severance damage are legally compensable. This contention is 
contrary to Idaho law. In a condemnation action, the Court is charged with resolving all issues 
prior to trial except for the amount of just compensation. Therefore. "sun-unary judgment is 
appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be 
responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences." Killinger v. Twin Falls 
Highway Dist., 135 Idaho 322, 325, 17 P.3d 266, 269 (2000) (quoting First Sec. Bank of ldaho1 
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N.A. v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 790, 964 P.2d 654, 657 (1998)); see also Riverside Dev. Co. v. 
Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657,661 (1982). 
Contrary to Gratbol's response brief, ITD's motion does not ''go to the weight" to be 
given"tb.e evidence offered in support of Grathol's damageelaims. Rather, ITD's motion is 
brought on the grounds that Grathol does not have the legal right to pursue these damages, 
regardless of what their proffered evidence may be. This is the proper subject of a summary 
judgment motion. 
B. Idaho Law Requires Individual Damage Claims In Condemnation Cases To Be 
Separately Identified And Quantified. 
Idaho Code§ 7-711(5) states that "[a]s far as practicable, compensation must be assessed 
for each source of damages separately." I.C. § 7-711(5). This statutory provision drives the 
summary judgment process in condemnation cases. The property owner cannot put on a free-
ranging litany of "severance damages" at trial and then ask for a lump sum as compensation. 
Rather, as far as practicable, "compensation must be assessed for each source of dam.ages 
separately." Id. 
"-7here, as here, a landowner gives notice that it intends to seek recovery for fom1s of 
severance damages that are barred by law, summary judgment must be brought to have the legal 
issues surrounding the disputed claims resolved before trial. 
C. The "Takings" Clause Of The Idaho Constitution And Implementing Legislation, 
Under Idaho's constitution, a landowner is entitled to compensation when property is 
''taken" for public use. IDAHO CONST. art. I,§ 14. Idaho's Constitution is one of the majority of 
states whose constitutions provide for compensation only when property is "taken," as opposed 
to the minority of states whose constitutions pennit compensation when property is taken and 
when property is merely "damaged." Compare IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 14 (requires 
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compensation for taking of private property); OR. CONST. art. I, § 18 (requires compensation for 
taking of private property), with MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13 (requires compensation for taking, 
destruction or damage caused to private property); W. VA. CONST, art. Ill, § 9 (requires 
compensation for taking or damage causedto private property):'See also discussion of Idaho's 
"taking" provisions in the Idaho Constitution in Idaho-Western Ry. Co. v. Columbia Conference 
of Evangelical LutheranAugustana Synod, 20 Idaho 568, S83-85, 119 P. 60, 65 (1911). 
The Idaho Legislature has enacted legislation implementing the takings clause of the 
Idaho constitution. See I.C. § 7-711. Under§ 7-711, a landowner is entitled to compensation for 
(1) the value of the property taken, and (2) damages to the remaining property in partial taking 
cases (commonly refetred to as "severance damages"). See Idaho Code§ 7-711(1) and (2). 
State ex rel. Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444,446,546 P.2d 399,401 (1976). 
D. Not All Forms Of Alleged Severance Damages Are Legally Compensable. 
Grathol contends that since ITD is physically taking a portion of the Grathol property, 
Gratbol is entitled to compensation for all forms of damages it can suggest. Grathol contends 
that the law makes no distinction between compensable forms of severance damages and claims 
for damages that are barred as a matter of law. 
Contrary to Grathol's contention, the Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that a 
landowner is not entitled to receive compensation for every type of damage to its property. The 
Idaho Supreme Court has issued a series of decisions over many decades which define what is 
and is not legally compensable in condemnation cases in Idaho. Under these cases, certain forms 
of damages are specifically barred as a matter oflaw, including claims that are the subject of 
ITD's present motion. 
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E. Fonburg Does Not Support Grathol's Contention That All Claims Of Daanages Or 
"Inconveniences" Are Legally Compensable, 
In an attempt to recover damages barred by Idaho law, Grathol relies on an isolated quote 
from State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269,328 P.2d 60 (1958): 
Where a part of the owner's contiguous land is taken in a 
condemnation proceeding, all inconveniences resulting to the 
owner's remaining land, including an easement or access to a road 
or right of way formerly enjoyed, which decrease the value of the 
land retained by the owner, are elements of severance damage for 
which compensation should be paid. 
Id. at 278,328 P.2d at 64. Grathol contends that this statement allows it to recover any and all 
forms of "damages" it claims to have suffered, even if Idaho law bars the damage claims and 
even if the Project did not cause the alleged "damages." 
In addition to being contrary to many more recent Idaho Supreme Court cases, Grathol's 
argument is contrary to the actual holdings in Fonburg, In its rulings on severance damages in 
Fonburg, the Idaho Supreme Court denied recovery for most of the "inconveniences" for which 
the property owner sought compensation. Therefore, the quote relied on by Grathol is simply 
dicta. 
In Fon burg, the property owner's farm abutted and had access to State Highway 95. Id. 
at 274, 328 P.2d at 61. The State was engaged in a project to construct a new four-lane limited 
access highway. Id. at 274,328 P.2d at 61-62. As part of the project, the State condemned 12.76 
acres of Fonburg's land for the construction of the new highway. Id. The new highway was 
re!oca..ted a..nd did not follow the route of the old highway, but instead ran along "the north side of 
defendant's land and south of the Cam.as Prairie Railroad." Id. at 62,328 P.2d at 274. As part of 
its acquisition, the State condemned Fonburg's right to access the new highway. Id The project 
also eliminated the old highway where it abutted Fonburg's land: 
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The new road, when constructed, will eliminate the section of 
highway No. 9S, where it now abuts and crosses defendant's land, 
and will destroy the existent for easement for ingress and egress 
from his land to said highway No. 95, and connecting points, 
formerly enjoyed. 
NO. 4063 P. 8/46 
/d; The facts in Fonburg contrast sharply to the present case. · Here, no access to the Grathol 
property is being taken, closed, or restricted. In Fonburg, the property owner was denied access 
to the new highway and all access to the old highway was destroyed, leaving Fonburg with no 
access. The opening ofFonburg's brief before the Idaho Supreme Court shows that the State 
condemned all access: 
The State filed its Complaint herein asking condemnation of the 
fee simple title to a strip of land extending the full length of 
appellants' farm, 300 feet in width on the west end where the 
easement for ingress and egress to and from appellant's land to 
public roads, including U.S. Highway No. 95 exists, and is in use 
and which wide right-of way takes the entire possible access from 
appellant's land to existing public highways and narrowing 
considerably on the east end where no access is possible. 
(Appellant's Opening Brief in State v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d 60 (1958) (emphasis 
added). 
On appeai, Fonburg challenged the refusal of the district court to instruct the jury on a 
number of forms of severance damages he sought to recover based on loss of access. The only 
claim the Idaho Supreme Court agreed withi however, was that the jury should have been 
instructed on "claimed severance damages because of destroyed or curtailed access to highway 
No. 95, as formerly enjoyed .... " Id. at 65, 328 P.2d at 279. 
Contrary to Grathol' s argument in this case, Fonburg was not allowed to recover for 
"all inconveniences" caused by the project. For example, Fonburg's residence was located on 
the other side of the railroad tracks that ran through the middle of his land, and he sought 
severance damages for the loss of convenient access to his property on the other side of the 
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railroad. Id. at 277, 328 P.2d at 64. The Court ruled that Fonburg could not recover the 
severance damages sought because the two parcels were not contiguous, being split by the 
railroad line. Id. 
· Next, the Court ruled that Fonburgwas nct entitled to severance damages for not being 
able to have access to the new highway, which was certainly an inconvenience to the remainder 
property: 
Nor is the condemnee entitled to damages because he is not 
granted unrestricted access to the new part of the road being 
constructed. There is no inherent right of access to a newly 
relocated highway. The new highway not being in existence prior 
to the present construction, the landowner would suffer no 
compensable damages because his access to the new construction 
was denied him. The condemnee never having had access to the 
new highway there is no easement or access taken in this 
proceeding. 
Id at 277,328 P.2d at 64. 
The Idaho Supreme Court also rejected claims by Fonburg ''to recover various severance 
damages for non-contiguous parcels of land and matter not within the pertinent issues." Id. at 
278, 328 P.2d at 64. Thus, the holdings in Fonburg make clear that almost all of the 
"inconveniences" for which Fonburg sought recovery were denied and held not to be takings of a 
property right or compensable as severance damages. 
The Court in Fonburg denied most of the property owner's claims for damages. The 
actual holding in the cases establishes that the quote relied on by Grathol is merely dicta. See, 
e.g., McCannv. McCann, _Idaho....,_; _P.3d_, 2012 WL 98540, at *6 (Idaho Jan. 10, 
2012) (discussion not embodied in court's holding is dicta). Thus Fonburg, and in keeping with 
many subsequent decisions by the Idaho Supreme Court on the issues presented here, provides 
no iegal basis for Orathoi to recover forms of severance damages that are barred by Idaho law. 
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F. Severance Damages Must Be Based On A Protected Property Interest And Must Be 
Caused By The Taking, 
Severance dam.ages must be based on a protected property interest. The determination of 
whether a taking of a protected property interest has occurred for which just compensation is 
required is a question of law for the Court to decide. KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 
577,581, 67 P.3d 56, 60 (2003); Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777, 780, S3 P.3d 
828,831 (2002); Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667,670,603 P.2d 1001, 1004 (1979); 
Ada County Highway Dist. v. Sharp, 135 Idaho 888, 892, 26 P.3d 1225, 1229 (Ct App. 2001). 
The landowner has the burden of proving that he has a valid property right and that his 
property right has been taken. Reuth v. State, 100 Idaho 203,218,596 P.2d 75, 90 (1978). 
Because all issues in a condemnation case, other than the amount of any compensation, are to be 
determined by the court, they are proper for resolution on a motion for summary judgment. See 
Brown v. City of Twin Falls, 124 Idaho 39, 40-41, 855 P.2d 876, 877-78 (1993); Reisenauer v. 
State, 120 Idaho 36, 41, 813 P.2d 375, 380 (Ct. App. 1991). 
In Idaho, "[i]t is a well-established principle that where the public's use of the 
condemned land diminishes the value of other adjoining, untaken property, the owner is entitled 
to recover this loss (typically referred to as 'severance damage') in addition to the value of the 
invaded land." C&:G. Inc. v. Canyon Hwy. Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 148, 75 P.3d 194,202 
(2003) (parentheses in original). 
Idaho's civil jury instructions define "severance damages" as: 
a. A diminution in the value of the remainder caused by the 
talcina or severance of the parcel taken from the remainder; or 
b. A diminution in the value of the remainder caused by the 
construction upon and use put to the property taken. 
IDJI2d 7.16-5. 
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Thus, "severance damages" encompass only those damages that arise from the "public's 
use of the condemned land." In Idaho, a landowner is only entitled to compensation for damages 
to the remaining property "by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned." 
Idaho Code § 7-111 (2). To recover severance damages, the alleged severance damages must 
have accrued "because of' the take. See Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Walker, 80 Idaho 
105,109,326 P.2d 388,391 (1958) (emphasis added). 
Thus, severance damages are only recoverable if they are actually "caused by the public 
use." See C&G, Inc., 139 Idaho at 148, 75 P.3d at 202 (Hohnhorst, specially concWTing); See 
also 8A Nichols, Eminent Domain§ 16.02(1] (3d ed.2002) (stating "severance damages may be 
defined as damages or diminution in the value of the remainder resulting from the taking of a 
portion of a tract of land" (emphasis added)). 
In this case, ITO condemned 16.3 acres ofland adjacent to US-95. Any damages claimed 
by Grathol must be caused by the physical severance of the condemned property from the 
remainder (and not subsequent events that may or may not happen, separate and apart from the 
physical severance). Any claimed severance damages must also be compensable under Idaho 
law. Damages not caused by the severance are bmed as a matter of law. Damages that are not 
based on a protected property right are barred as a matter of law. 
G. Grathol Cannot Recover "Consequential" Damages. 
In its response brief, Grathol contends that severance damages can include 
"consequential" damages. At other times; it makes the more general statement that it may 
recover consequential damages in a condemnation case. BLACKS LA w DICTIONARY defines 
"'consequential dam.ages" as "Losses that do not flow directly and immediately from an injurious 
act but that result indirectly from the act -Also termed indirect damages." BLACKS LA w 
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). Idaho law requires severance damages to be the direct result of the 
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physical severance of the condemned property from the remainder. Indirect or consequential 
damages are not allowed. 
Idaho law is clear that a landowner is not entitled to consequential damages. Idaho· 
Western Ry. Co. v. Columbia Conference-of Evangelical Lutheran Augustana Synod, 119 P. 60, ,.., 
65 (Idaho 1911 ). In Idaho-Western, a railway company brought an eminent domain action to 
condemn a strip of land on the southwest side of the landowner's premises. Id at 61. The Idaho 
Supreme Court explained that "the Constitution of this state provides simply for the payment of 
'a just compensation' for the 'taking' of private property, and does not require the payment for 
damages sustained." Id. The Court took note that: 
The omission of the damage cause is significant ... And when the 
convention in Idaho framed the Constitution of that state, omitting 
such clause, and it was so adopted, the conclusion must be that the 
omission was deliberate and because the people of that state 
believed that, owning to the conditions there existing, the public 
interest demanded that the additional burden of paying 
consequential damages should l'H:!J. be imposed on those taking 
property for public uses, And there is nothing in the Idaho 
Constitution requiring compensation except for the taking of 
property. 
Id ( emphasis added). The Court remarked that the Legislature is not prevented from ''adding the 
requirement that compensation be made for damage sustained to the remaining property by 
reason of the takint' and noted that the Legislature had in fact adopted legislation allowing for 
the recovery of severance damages. Id. See Idaho Code§ 7-711(2)(a). 
7-711: 
The forms of compensation available in condemnation cases are set forth in Idaho Code § 
1. The value of the property sought to be condemned, and all 
improvements thereon pertaining to the realty, and of each and 
every separate estate or interest therein[.] 
2. If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a 
part of a larger parcel: (a) the damages which will accrue to the 
PLAINTIFF ITD,S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY .n.JDGMENT-10 
659 of 1617
JAN. 27. 2012 5: 24PM 
portion not sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance 
from the portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of 
the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff[.] 
NO. 4063 P. 13/46 
I.C. §§ 7-711(1) and (2)(a). The statute also allows recovery for business damages under 
specified circumstances not applicable here. Under the ''universally recognized rule of 
construction [] where a constitution or statute specifies certain things, the designation of such 
thlngs excludes all others." See Local 1494, lnt'l Ass 'n. of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 
99 ldaho 630,639, 586 P.2d 1346, 1355 (1978) (quoting Peckv. State, 63 Idaho 375, 120 P.2d 
820,822 (1941)). Since Idaho Code§ 7-711 lists the types of compensation and damages 
available in condemnation cases, but does not include consequential damages, consequential 
damages cannot be recovered. 
No authority exists for recovery of consequential damages in condemnation cases in 
Idaho. More generally, consequential damages are not allowed in condemnation cases in any 
federal courts and in most states across the country. See, e.g., Dobbs, HORNBOOK ON 
REMEDIES,§ 3.4 (2nd ed. 1993) (''Legal rules forbid consequential damages completely in some 
kinds of cases, notably in eminent domain takings cases."), 
III. GRATHOL HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN IN RESPONDING TO 
THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In response to ITD's motion for summary judgment, Grathol has offered conclusory 
assertions rather than competent evidence to support the damage claims at issue. Grathol has 
therefore failed to meet its burden on summary judgment. 
If the moving party challenges an element of the nonmoving 
party's case on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists, the burden then shifts to the nonm.oving party to present 
evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material 
fact. When presenting affidavits, they "shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein." The nonmoving party must 
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submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of 
material fact exists to establish a genuine issue. 11[A] mere scintilla 
of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts" is not sufficient to 
create a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of sununary 
judgment. 
Northwest Bee-Corp v. Home Living Ser>J., 136 Idaho 835, 8-38-39) 41 P.3d 263i 266-67 (2002) .. 
(internal citations omitted) (holding that the non-moving party's conclusory affidavit did not 
meet their burden to defeat swnmary judgment). 
In Van Velson Corp. v. Westwood Mall Assoc.) 126 Idaho 401, 884 P.2d 414 (1994), the 
district court on a motion for summary judgment disregarded a "highly conclusory" affidavit 
from the non moving party. Id. at 405, 884 P .2d at 418. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed: 
Id 
The district court correctly ruled that [the] "affidavit is more in the 
form of closing argument, highly conclusory, both as to fact and 
law, and although interspersed with some facts, and the conclusion 
that the contract was conditional is contradicted by the other facts 
that the court has been provided." 
IV, GRAfflOL'S CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION BASED ON SYLVAN ROAD 
FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW 
A, Grathol Concedes That ITD Is Not Taking Land For Sylvan Road. Therefore 
Summary Judgment Should Be Entered On The Claim For Compensation For The 
Alleged Taking Of Land For Sylvan Road. 
In its opening brief, ITO established that Grathol has continued to seek compensation for 
the alleged talcing of land for construction of Sylvan Road. ITO further demonstrated that the 
Court had already ruled that ITD was not condemning land for Sylvan Road. ITD Opening Brf., 
at 10. See also Tr. at 61:2-16 (YorkAff., Ex. 1). 
In its response brief, Grathol now concedes that land for Sylvan Road is "not being 
physically taken 'as part of the project."' Gtathol Brf., at S. Therefore, summary judgment 
should be entered that ITD is not taking land for Sylvan Road and Grathol cannot recover 
compensation for a taking of land for Sylvan Road. 
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B. Gratbol's New Argument That It Should Be Allowed To Recover Severance 
Damages For Construction Of Sylvan Road Should Also Be Dismissed. 
After conceding that ITD is not condemning any land for Sylvan Road, Grathol now 
argues that it is entitled to "severance damages'' based on Sylvan Road: 
"but for,,, the condemnation at issue and the construction of the 
project for which the condemnation is occurring, there would be no 
necessity or requirement that Sylvan Road be extended through the 
Orathol property. The property could be successfully developed 
with Sylvan Road, or it could be successfully developed without 
Sylvan Road; the choice belongs to the property 
owner/condemnee. 
Grathol Brf., at 5 (emphasis in original). This argument has no merit. If Sylvan Road is ever 
needed, it will be the result of or caused by Grathol' s construction of a large commercial 
development on a 40-acre parcel after the Project. The US-9S Project is not the cause of any 
future conS1l'Uction of Sylvan Road, if it is ever built. Grathol' s planned commercial 
development and the commercial rezone it obtained from Kootenai County are the "but for" 
cause for any future construction of an interior roadway and the alleged damages. 
C. Grathol's Revised Claim For Compensation Based On Sylvan Road Fails As A 
Matter Of Law. 
1. ITD has shown that construction of Sylvan Road would be required for 
commercial development in both the before and after condition, regardless of 
the US-95 Project. 
In its opening brief, ITD established that construction of Sylvan Road by the developer of 
any commercial development of the Grathol property will be required by Kootenai County. 
Section 9-9-2 of the Kootenai County zoning ordinances regulating commercial zones requires 
that every "Commercial Lot shall have direct access from a public road." See York Aff., Ex. 2 at 
2. Similarly,§ 10-3-l(B)(4)(e) of the Kootenai County zoning ordinances (identifying the 
services and infrastructure that the developer must construct to serve a commercial subdivision) 
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requires "[p )ublicly-maintained road access to each lot, as approved by the Highway District." 
See id, at p. 33 of Ordinance. 
Thus, every individual lot within the 56-acre "before" commercial development and the 
40.-acre "after" commercial development will have to have-access from a public road, All of the-- . 
lots on a 56-acre development in the before condition could not have had frontage on US~95, 
with dozens of individual driveway accesses a few feet apart on US-95, 
Section 10-3~1(0)(2) of the Kootenai County zoning ordinances also makes clear that the 
developer will be required to dedicate the fully constructed roads within the development to the 
county or local highway district: "Except for gated communities and common driveways 
approved by the Board (of county commissioners], roads and associated rights-of-way shall be 
dedicated to the applicable highway agency." Id. (brackets and emphasis added). 
In support of its motion, ITD submitted a report from engineers and land planners with 
David Evans and Associates ("DEA"). (York Aff., Ex. 11 ). DEA reported that construction of 
interior roadways within the Grathol commercial development would be a requirement of 
commercial development approval in either the before or after condition. Id. at 5, The report 
also states that interior roadways within the Grathol development would have to be dedicated to 
Lakes Highway District as a public roadway. Id. See also, I.C. § 50~1309 (requiring owners of 
new developments to "make a dedication of all public streets and rights-of-way shown on said 
plat''· 
It is undiSputed that Grathol applied to Kootenai County and obtained a rezoning of its 
property to ''commercial." Otathol Resp. to ITD's Mot. for Poss'n, at 3 (Jan. 10, 2011). During 
that process, and before the ITD condemnatio11i the Kootenai County hearing examiner cited 
correspondence from the Lakes Hishway District Engineer, stating that "[t]he Developer should 
be required to provide all accesses to this development from either Howard Road or the future 
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Highway District frontage road." See Grathol's Rezone Application, at 12.12, Exhibit PA-5, 
Letter (York Aff., Ex. 16). This evidence shows that public road access will be required and it 
will be Kootenai County and Lakes Highway District that will require it. This correspondence 
was sent well before the condemnation action by ITO, and-was applied to the proposed 
development in the "before" condition. 
No site plan bas ever been produced by Grathol in discovery that shows how the 56-acre 
property could be developed with commercial uses with no interior road(s). In opposition to 
ITD's motion, Grathol has not offered any testimony or evidence that the property could be 
commercially developed in the before condition without any interior public road. It only offers a 
conclusory statement in its brief. The statement is not supported and no citations are made to the 
record. The conclusory statement is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment on this claim. 
Grathol also failed to address the Kootenai County zoning ordinances and requirements 
cited in ITO' s Opening Brief. Therefore, Grathol has not met its burden on summary judgment 
of coming forward with competent evidence to establish that a genuine issue of material fact and 
its claim based on Sylvan Road should be dismissed. 
2, Gratbol has made no showing that Sylvan Road will be built, when, by 
whom, who will pay for it, or what type or amount of damages it would 
suffer. 
Grathol argues that it should be awarded severance damages based on Sylvan Road. 
However, it has not made any showing of when the road would be built, the dimensions or 
location of the roa~ the cost of constriJction, who will build it, or who will pay for it. Nor has 
Grathol stated what damages will be caused by the road or what the source of the damages is. 
Gtathol also has not given a dollar value for its damaae claim, as required by Idaho Code § 7-
711 (5). As such, the claim is purely speculative and therefore barred by Idaho law against 
speculative damages. 
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The deadlines for expert witness disclosures and the factual bases for a claim of this 
nature have passed. Having failed to provide a factual basis for the claim, particularly in the face 
of a motion for summary judgment, and given the inherently speculative nature of the claim, 
·· · Gtathol's claim for severance damages,should be denied. -.,. 
3. Grathol is not entitled to any severance damages for Sylvan Road because 
the alleged damages were not caused by the US-95 Project. 
As set forth above, any claim for severance damages must be caused by the physical 
severance of the condemned property from the remainder. See Section II.(F) above. 
In the instant case, ITD has condemned 16.314 acres of Grathol' s property. The public 
use the 16.314 acres is to be used for is construction of the Athol Segment of the US-95 Project. 
The only damages Grathol is entitled to recover are damages that arise from that use. See C&G, 
Inc., 139 Idabo at 148, 75 P.3d at 202. The taking did not cause the construction of Sylvan 
Road. Grathol's successful application for a commercial re2one by Kootenai County subjected 
the land to the infrastructure requirements of commercially zoned property, Those requirements 
apply to both the before and after condition, 
V. GRATHOL CANNOT RECOVER DAMAGES BASED ON iTS ALLEGATION 
OF DELAY IN CONSTRUCTION OF THE us .. 95 PROJECT. 
Grathol's response to ITD's argument that Gtathol cannot recover damages for a 
purported delay in the construction of the US-95 Project is premised on faulty and unsupported 
assumptions. Gtathol claims, without any support or cited legal authority, that once there is a 
physical taking of any sort there is no limit to the type of damages can be recovered in an award 
of just compensation. Grathol Br., at 13. Specifically, Orathol contends that "[p]ermanency of a 
take may come into play with a reauJatory taking, but when there is an associated physical taking 
of a private party's property, there is no such limitation on compensation." Id. Gtathol's 
unsupported statement misstates long-standing eminent domain law in Idaho. 
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Contrary to Grathol's contention, Idaho Courts have regularly held, in both direct and 
inverse condemnation cases, that certain types of damages are not compensable. 
• Damages that are contingent, speculative or remote damages are not recoverable. 
Palmer;,, Highway Dist. No. 1, Bonner County, 49 Idaho 596,602,290 P. 393, 
394 (1930) (direct condemnation action). 
• Future claims for damages based on possible negligent operation of public project 
are improper and not recoverable. Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Waller, 80 
Idaho 105, 109,326 P.2d 388, 390-91 (1958) (direct condemnation). 
• Noise damages "should not be considered as an element of damage in the 
ordinary case." Idaho-Western Ry. Co. v. Columbia Conference of Evangelical 
Lutheran Augustana Synod, 20 Idaho 568, 119 P. 60, 62 (1911) (diiect 
condemnation), 
• Damages caused by the restriction of access or the diversion of traffic held not 
recoverable. State ex rel. Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444,447,546 P.2d 399,402 
(1976) (both direct condemnation and inverse condemnation); Brown v. City of 
Twin Falls, 124 Idaho 39, 85S P.2d 876 (1993) (inverse condemnation). 
• Damages resulting from lost business profits held not recoverable. Bastian, 97 
Idaho at 448,546 P.2d at 403 (direct condemnation and inverse condemnation); 
State ex rel. Rich v. Halverson, 86 Idaho 242,246,384 P.2d 480,482 (1963) 
(direct condemnation). 
• Damages that are shared in common with the rest of the general public held not 
recoverable. Canady v. Coeur d'Alene Lumber, Co., 21 Idaho 77, 120 P. 830 
(1911) (inverse condemnation). 
• Damages caused by the temporary obstruction of access, unless the action is 
WU"easonable, unnecessary, arbitrary or capricious held not recoverable. Hadfield 
v. State ex rel. Burns, 86 Idaho 561,566,388 P.2d 1018, 1021 (1964) (inverse 
condemnation). 
• Damages that are barred by law or that are not caused by the taking of a 
compensable property right are not recoverable in a condemnation action. State 
ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269,328 P.2d 60 (19S8) (direct condemnation). 
Thus, contrary to Gratbol's plain misstatement of the law and its misuse of Fonburg, there is no 
carte blanche for damage awards in condemnation cases merely because a physical taking has 
occurred. 
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Adclitionally, and equally significant, is Grathol' s erroneous statement that "business 
interruption damages are absolutely compensable in eminent domain." Grathol Brf., at 14 
( emphasis added). Rather than provide legal authority for its statemen4 Grathol presents a 
hypothetical scenario involving a lando'"vvner who is unable to operate its business because of the- _ 
construction of a utility line. Id. According to Grathol, this landowner is entitled to ''damage to 
the business in terms of lost revenue." Id. Once again, Gtathol misstates Idaho law. Under the 
correct application of the law, set forth below, the landowner in Gtathol's hypothetical would not 
be able to recover any damages as a result of the construction delays. 
In Idaho, the type of business damages described by Grathol are expressly prohibited by 
statute. Idaho Code § 7-711 states in no uncertain terms that "[b ]usiness damages under this 
subsection shall not be awarded . .. for damages caused by temporary business interruption due 
to construction[]" (emphasis added). Thus, contrary to Grathol's statement that such damages 
are "absolutely compensable,'' in fact they are expressly barred by statute, and Grathol's 
hypothetical and unsupported conclusion are simply incorrect. 
Additionally, Grathol's assertion regarding the compensability of temporary business 
interruption damages is similarly refuted by Idaho case law. In Idaho, there is no "taking," and 
therefore no claim for damages, for temporary obstructions caused by highway construction. 
Hadfield v. State ex rel. Burns, 86 Idaho 561, 567, 388 P.2d 1018, 1022 (1964)1 (holding that 
there is no claim for damages unless "the temporary obstruction is a result of unreasonable, 
unnecessary, arbitrary or capricious acts or conduct by the one in charge of the improvement or 
construction). Grathol's contention that "business intemlption damages are absolutely 
1 ITD did not cite to the Hadfield case in its opening brief because Grathol is not cJaiming damages for a 
physical obstruction to its property that int.erferes with an existing business, Grathol does not operate a 
business on the property, and it is not claiming damages to an existing business due to the construction of 
the project. However, ITD cites to the Hadfield case to demonstrate Grathol's incoITect statement of 
Idaho law. 
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compensable in eminent domain law" is not the law in Idaho, and its attempt to rely on its own 
incorrect version of Idaho law to support its claim for consf:rl.lction delay damages is equally 
invalid. 
Grathol attempts to distinguish""t.hree of the cases cited by ITD on the grounds that the -r · 
cases are inapplicable because they did not involve a direct, physical taking of property. In 
particular, Grathol challenges the cases of Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 140 Idaho 536, 
96 P.2d 637 (2004), Just's Inc. v. A"ington Const. Co., 99 Idaho 462,538 P.2d 997 (1978), and 
Frankv. Government of City of Morristown, 294 S.W.3d 566 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). Grathol's 
attempt to distinguish Moon, Just 's and Frank fail because Idaho cases do not distinguish 
between physical takings cases and non-physical taldng cases. The only difference between the 
two types of cases is that an inverse condemnation action is "an eminent domain proceeding 
initiated by the property owner rather than the condemner." Reisenauer v. State, Dep 't of 
Highways, 120 Idaho 36, 39,813 P.2d 375,378 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 
203,220, n.4, 596 P.2d 75, 92, n.4 (1978). Other than this distinction, "the principles which 
affect the parties' rights in an inverse condemnation suit are the same as those in an eminent 
domain action." Reisenauer, 120 Idaho at 39,813 P.2d at 378. See also Brown v. City of Twin 
Falls, 124 Idaho 39, 41, 855 P.2d 876, 878 (1993) (holding that the claims asserted in Brown, 
which was a "non·physical" taking case was "indistinguishable" from the claims asserted in 
State ex rel. Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444, S46 P.2d 399 (1976), which was a "physical" 
taking case); see Hughes v. State, 80 idaho 286, 328 P.2d 397 (1958), rev 'din part on other 
grounds in Moon v, North Idaho Farmers Ass 'n, 140 Idaho 536, 96 P .3d 63 7 (2004) (holding 
that there is no distinction between the valuation analysis for direct condemnation actions and 
inverse condemnations actions). Grathol's attempt to suggest otherwise is directly contradicted 
by Idaho law. 
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Grathol has failed to challenge any of the other cases cited by ITD. Thus, Grathol 
concedes the applicability of Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777, 781-82, 53 P.3d 
828, 832-33 (2002) (a landowner cannot recover damages where there is "no indication that the 
condition is permanent"); Hurst v. Starr,- 607 N .E.2d 11S5,-1159..60 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) ( direct _ 
condemnation action where court held that "interference of temporary duration during 
construction of an improvement ... [is] not permanent in nature as they do not last beyond the 
completion of the project and have no effect on the market value of the property before the 
improvement was commenced and no effect upon the market value of the residue after the 
improvement was completed"); State v. Baken Park Enters., 257 N.W.2d 448, 449-50 (S.D. 
1977) (direct condemnation action where court held that "losses incurred by property owner in 
the way of loss of income and profits ... together with other inconveniences attendant upon the 
work in progress, are not compensable items of damage resulting from a construction project.''). 
These cases bar recovery for construction delay damages in condemnation cases, and the same 
result reached in those cases should be reached here. 
The only cases Orathol cites as authority for its argument that it is entitled to construction 
delay damages are Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of North Las Vegas, 181 P .3d 670 (Nev. 2008) and 
Jones v. People ex rel. Dep 't ofTransp., 22 Cal. 3d 144, 583 P.2d 165 (1978). Grathol Brf., at 
17, Neither case is applicable here. 
In the Buzz Stew case, the City of North Las Vegas adopted a resolution announcing its 
intent to condemn land owned by Buzz Stew. ld. 672. Buzz Stew sold the land, but the City of 
North Las Vegas never initiated eminent domain proceedings or took the land in any fashion, due 
to a lack of funding. Id The announcement of the City's intent to condemn the land was never 
retracted, withdrawn, or rescinded. Id Buzz Stew brought a tort claim against the City of North 
Las Vegas to recover 0 precondemnation damages." Id The Nevada Supreme Court approved of 
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the claim, holding that "a landowner may bring a cause of action for ,precondemnation damages 
based on allegations that the municipality acted improperly in announcing that it intended to 
condemn the landowner's property." Id at 672~73. 
Thus, Buzz Stew stands for thel)roposition that in Nevada a party can file a tort claim t°' ·. 
recover delay damages for actions that occurred prior to the filing of a condemnation. But it 
does not support Grathol's argument that such tort-based damages are available in a 
condemnation action. Significant to the court's decision in Buzz Stew was the fact that there was 
no taking and no direct condemnation initiated. As stated by the court, "[i]n this opinion, we ... 
allow a landowner to assert a cause of action for precondemnation damages, independent from 
the taking of its property." Id. at 673 ( emphasis added). Additionally, the Buzz Stew Court 
quoted the Jones case cited by Grathol for its conclusion that "a taking has not occurred under 
these facts because BU.%2 Stew has failed to show 'the invasion of a property right which directly 
and specially affects him to his injury." Id. at 674, n.16. Thus, the damages sought were 
separate and apart from any taking of Buzz Stew's property and also separate from any 
corresponding damages that might be available as a result of a taking. 
An alleged tort-based claim for precondemnation damages cannot be applied to the 
present condemnation case and the statutorily-based valuation requirements for detennining just 
compensation. See I.C. § 7-711. In addition, Idaho Code § 7-712 provides: 
For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages1 the right 
thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the 
summons, and its actual value, at that date, shall be the measure of 
compensation for all property to be actually taken, and the basis of 
damages to property not actually taken, but injuriously affected, in 
all cases where such damages are allowed, as provided in the last 
section. 
I.C. 7-712 (emphasis added). See also Spokane & Palouse Ry. v. Lieuallen, 3 Hasb. 381, 29 P. 
8S4, 8S4 (Idaho 1892) (the value of the land at the time it is taken is the measure of damages). 
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Moreover, a tort claim and a condemnation action are wholly distinct, and Orathol has 
not asserted a counterclaim or even an inverse condemnation claim, in tort or otherwise, for 
precondemnation damages. Indeed, even if Grathol had done so in this case, it would still not be 
able to recover the Buzz Stew-type precondemnation damages either in tort or in an inverse .- ~ 
condemnation action in Idaho. As was made clear in City of Lewiston v. Lindsey, 
precondemnation damages are not available under Idaho law. 123 ldaho at 858,853 P.2d at 603 
(holding that (1) where the landowner can still use the property, no compensable taking occurs as 
a result of precondemnation activities relating to the construction of road proj eet, including 
designing and planning the project, obtaining approvals for the project, and negotiating with 
property owners for the purchase of their property and (2) the City's precondemnation planning 
activities were within the discretionary function exception of the Idaho Tort Claims Act and 
landowner's negligence claim for damages was properly dismissed). 
The second case cited by Gtathol is Jones v. People ex rel. Dep 't of Transportation, 22 
Cal. 3d 144, S83 P.2d 165 (1978). Grathol relies on Jones for the proposition that a "landowner 
may show that the public agency acted improperly by unreasonably delaying an eminent domain 
action after announcing its intent to condemn the landowner's property." Orathol Brf., at 17. 
Grathol's misstates the holding of Jones. 
In Jones, the plaintiffs purchased land in 1963, and became aware in 1964 of the State of 
California's intent to condemn for freeway purposes a major frontage road abutting their 
property. Id, at 148. Tne plaintiffs attempted to obtain county approval to divide their land into 
a subdivision, with access to the major frontage road; approval was repeatedly denied due to the 
future f.reeway project Id. at 149. The freeway project was delayed numerous times, and had 
not begun when the plaintiffs brought suit in 1974, Id. at 149-50. One of the plaintiffs' theories 
of recovery was premised on the allegedly unreasonable delay on the part of the state in bringing 
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an eminent domain action, but the California Supreme Court ruled that the case was actually one 
of inverse condemnation and acknowledged that the landowners were entitled to compensation 
because they were denied access to their land from Fair Oaks Boulevard, and this denial 
·prevented development of the land att subdivision." ~d;·-at 151. --,,.- , 
The present case is factually distinguishable from the Jones case. First, unlike the 
plaintiffs in Jones who became aware of the highway project after they purchased the land, here 
Grathol was aware of the project months before they bought the property. See ITD's Opening 
Brf., at 21-23, Grathol was provided copies of the proposed project plans, and they met on a 
number of occasions with representatives ofITD before it purchased the project. Id Second, 
Grathol cannot favorably avail itself of the Jones ruling because it has not alleged that ITD' s 
prior, announced intent to condemn directly resulted in substantial impairment of access to its 
land. It is undisputed that Grathol did not have any permitted or approved commercial accesses 
prior to the project. Id. at 33-34. It is further undisputed that neither Grathol nor its predecessors 
have ever submitted an application for commercial access. Nor can Grathol show that ITO has 
in any way prevented Grathol from access to their property. Accordingly, the California court's 
rulings in Jones are not applicable to this case. 
Grathol' s next argument focuses on the requirements of Idaho Code § 7-712, which 
Grathol contends-again without supporting legal authority-does not apply to severance 
damages or consequential damages. Grathol's argument is incorrect. ITO has addressed the 
issue of consequential damages in Section II.G. supra, and it discusses the requirements of§ 7-
712 in its reply brief in support ofITD's motion in limine. Those arguments will not be repeated 
here, but merely swnmarized. 
Grathol's argument ignores the express lansuage of§ 7-712, which specifically states 
that both "compensation and damages" shall accrue as of the date of summons and that the 
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actual value of the compensation and damages "shall be the measure of compensation for all 
property to be actually taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually taken, but 
injuriously affected." I.C. § 7-712 (emphasis added). Grathol's argument similarly disregards 
Idaho case law that reaffirms the plain language of the statute. See, e.g., Lieuallen, 3 Hasb. 381,. 
29 P. at 8S4 ( quoting the prior but identical version of § 7-712 and holding that in condemnation 
proceedings "the value of the land at the time it is taken is the measure of damages, and it is error 
to admit evidence of value at time of trial."). Thus, based upon the plain and unambiguous 
language of the statute, § 7-712 applies to the assessment of compensation and dam.ages alike, 
and Grath.ol's suggestion to the contrary has no basis. The statute mandates that compensation 
and damages are to be valued as of the date of summons. 
In summary, Grathol has failed to provide legal support or authority for its contention 
that it construction delay damages are recoverable in this case. As discussed above, the law in 
Idaho directly contradicts the propositions suggested by Grathol. Damages for delays in 
construction-even assuming that such delays occurred in this case-are not recoverable in 
condemnation actions, and Oratb.ol's claim for such damages fails as a matter of law and should 
be dismissed. 
VI. GRATHOL CANNOT RECOVER DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF VISIBILITY. 
Grathol seeks to recover compensation based on a claim that the remainder of its property 
will be less visible from US-9S after construction of the Project. This claim is barred by Idaho 
law and should be dismissed on summary judgment. 
A, Idaho Law Does Not Recopize A Right To Visibility, 
A "right of visibility" or "right to be seen" is not a recognized property right in Idaho.· 
The landowner has the burden of proving that he has a valid property right and that his property 
right has been taken. Reuth v. State, 100 Idaho 203,218, S9<.i P.2d 75, 90 (1978). Since no right 
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of visibility is recognized in Idaho, Grathol cannot meet this burden, and the claim should be 
dismissed. 
B. Existing Idaho Law Bars Grathol's Visibility Claim, 
As shown in ITD's opening-brief, the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a; 
property owner does not have a right to any particular fl.ow or pattern of traffic or a right to have 
direct access to or from a particular direction of traffic. See !TD Opening Brf., at 24. Based on 
these principles, ITD could re-route US-95 entirely so that no traffic passes Grathol's property at 
all and no compensable taking would occur. A complete diversion of traffic away from 
Grathol's property would also result in a complete loss of visibility of the property from US-95 
traffic. Since no compensation can be had for a change in traffic fl.ow or pattern under Idaho 
law, no compensation can be had for loss of visibility. 
C. Idaho Law Barring Recovery For Changes In Traffic Flow Or Pattern Applies Io 
All Cases In Which A Claim For Compensation For Such Changes Is Made. 
Grathol attempts to avoid this controlling Idaho authority by arguing that some of the 
Supreme Court cases barring claims for compensation based on changes in traffic pattern were 
"regulatory'' or "non-physical" takings cases. Grathol's argument is again contta..,y to Idaho law. 
As shown in the Idaho Supreme Court cases on this issue, the rule barring recovery of damages 
based on changes in traffic flow or pattern applies in all condemnation cases where such claims 
are made. 
In State ex rel. Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444, 546 P.2d 399 (1976) involved a physical 
taking and traffic control measures. In denying a claim for compensation based on a change in 
traffic flow and pattern, the Idaho Supreme Court relied on non-physical takings cases such as 
James v. State, 88 Idaho 172, 397 P .2d 766 (1964), and Mabe v. State, 83 Idaho 222, 360 P .2d 
799 (1961 ), in holding that a property owner in a physical taking case has no right to a particular 
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pattern of traffic flow. Bastian, at 447, 546 P.2d at 402. Thereafter, non-physical takings cases, 
such as Brown v. City of Twin Falls, 124 Idaho 39,855 P.2d 876 (1993) have relied on Bastian 
for the same proposition. Id, at 43, 855 P .2d at 880 (holding that the claim for loss of access in 
-Brown based on raised medians was,"indistinguishable" from the claim in Bastian where a ... , 
physical taking occurred in addition to construction of raised medians). 
In Brown v. City of Twin Falls, a non-physical takings case, the property owners argued 
that the city's placement of raised medians in the road adjacent to their property constituted a 
taking without just compensation. Relying on Bastian and Powell v. McKelvey, 56 Idaho 291, 53 
P .2d 626 (1935), the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that no taking had occurred and that the claims 
in Bastian and Brown were ''indistinguishable." 
We find the Browns' claim to be indistinguishable from the claims 
made in Bastian and Powell. Although the Browns characterize 
their claim as one involving a limitation of access, they are 
primarily asserting the right to have traffic traveling south on Blue 
Lakes Boulevard and west on Addison Avenue access their 
property by making a left hand turn across oncoming traffic instead 
of traveling an additional block or two which the medians now 
require. Since that "right" has been interfered with, the Browns 
request damages for a taking of their property. However) similar 
to the plaintiffs in both the Bastian and Powell cases, the Browns . 
do not have a property right in the way traffic flows on the streets 
abutting their property ... We find the situation in this case to be 
indistinguishable from those of Bastian and Powell. 
Brown, 124 Idaho at 43,855 P.2d at 880 (emphasis added). 
This ruling by the Idaho Supreme Court is dispositive of Grathol' s argument that so-
called "regulatory'' or "non-physical" condemnation cases are treated differently from "physical 
taking' cases on the issue of whether a property owner can recover damages based on an alleged 
riaht to a particular pattern of traffic flow or damages arising from changes in traffic flow or 
pattern. In Brown, a "non-physical" ta.king case, the Court held that the claim in Bastian, a 
"physical" taking case, and the claim in Brown were "indistinguishable." 124 Idaho at 43, 855 
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P.2d at 880. Thus, the rule in Idaho is universal: no property owner has a property right "in the 
way traffic flows on the streets abutting their property," id, at 43, 855 P.2d at 880, or, as phrased 
in Bastian, "a right to any particular pattern of traffic flow or a right of direct access to or from 
· both directions of traffic .... " Bastian, 97 Idaho at 44 7, '546 P .2d at 402. 
Since a change in traffic pattern and flow necessarily changes visibility of adjoining 
property by passing traffic, Grathol has no protected property right "in the way traffic flows on 
the streets abutting [its] property," and no "right to any particular pattern of traffic flow or a right 
of direct access to or from both directions of traffic," and its claim for loss of visibility that may 
occur as a result of such changes is barred as a matter of law. 
D. If No Recovery Can Be Had For Changes In Traffic Flow, No Recovery Can Be Had 
For Changes In Visibility Caused By Changes In Traffic Flow. 
The issue of visibility is necessarily and inextricably intertwined with traffic flow. For 
that reason, courts with constitutional provisions like Idaho's constitutional "takings" clause 
have uniformly denied claims for visibility. See, e.g,, Dept. of Transp. v. Marilyn Hickey 
Ministries, 159 P.3d 111, 113 (Colo. 2007) C'We hold that because a landowner has no 
continued right to traffic passing by its property, the landowner likewise has no right in the 
continued motorist visibility of its property"); State v. Schmidt, 805 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. App. Ct. 
1991), rev'd 867 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex. 1993) ("Just as a landowner has no vested interest in the 
volume or route of passersby, he has no right to insist that his premises be visible to them."); 
State ex. rel. Mtssouri Hw)J. & Transp. Com 'n v. Dooley, 738 S.W.2d 457, 468-69 (Mo. App. Ct. 
1987) (in partial taking case, "any claim as to damages for 'public view' or visibility is 
'inextricably related' to a property right in the traffic, [and] the decisions have consistently 
refused to 'accord to property owners any right in the continuation of traffic."'). 
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Because Orathol has no right to a particular pattern of traffic flow, it necessarily has no 
right to compensation based on loss of visibility of its property by passing traffic. 
E. The Majority Of Courts Have Barred Claims For Loss Of Visibility. 
In its opening brief, ITD cited extensive authority demonstrating that most jurisdictions .. 
do not permit recovery for loss of visibility, including cases where the structures alleged to block 
visibility are constructed on the property acquired in the condemnation. See ITD Opening Brf., 
at 25-32, and cases cited therein. The majority rule and the rationales applied by the courts in 
those cases bar Grathol's claim in this case. 
F. The Cases Relied On By Grathol Are From A Minority Of States Whose 
Constitutional Takings Provisions Differ From Idaho's Constitution And The 
Constitutions Of States Following The Majority Rule. 
Grathol's reliance on case law from Alaska, Utah, California and Louisiana to support its 
visibility claim is misplaced. All of these jurisdictions have state constitutions that provide that 
''[p )rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." 
Compare ALASKA CONST., art. I,§ 18 with UTAH CONST. art. I,§ 22. See also Calif. Const. art. 
I, § 19 ("Private property may be taken or damaged for a public use and only when just 
compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, the 
owner''); LOUISIANA CONST. art. I, § 4 ("Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or 
its political subdivisions except for public purposes and with just compensation paid to the owner 
or into court for his benefit"). By contrast, Idaho's Constitution, like those of the majority of 
states and the U.S. Constitution, only provides compensation for the "ta.ldng" of private property. 
Compare U.S. CoNST. amend. V ('1(P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.") (emphasis added) with IDAHO CONST. art. I,§ 14 ("Private property may be 
taken for public use, but not until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed 
by law, shall be paid therefor.") (emphasis added). 
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The Utah Supreme Court in Admiral Beverage noted this distinction and stated that: 
"[ c ]onsistent with the plain language of article I, section 22, this court has interpreted the 
eminent domain provision of the Utah Constitution as being distinct from, and providing greater 
·· protection than, those constitutionalprovisions that pro\tide compensation for the 'taking' of~ -
private property." Utah Dep't o/Transp., v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 2011 UT 62,120, 2011 
WL SI 10962, at *S (2011) (emphasis added). The Alaska Supreme Court has recognized a 
similar distinction, holding that "(t]he requirement that the condemnor pay just compensation 
when property is damage provides broader protection for private property rights than the fifth 
amendment to the United States Constitution." Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Anchorage Sek Dist., 
791 P.2d 610,614 (Alaska 1990) (cited in 8,960 Sq. Feetv. Dept. o/Transp., 806 P.2d 843,845 
(Alaska 1991)) (emphasis added). Likewise, the California Supreme Court explained that "the 
addition of the words 'or damaged' embraced more than the 'taking' provided for" under the 
previous constitution. People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, 399-400, 144 P.2d 799, 804 (1943) 
( emphasis added). 
Grathol's reliance on eminent domain law from these jurisdictions is unavailing. The 
authority to establish a statutory scheme premised on just compensation necessarily derives from 
the state constitution. See, e.g., Blackwell Lumber Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 28 Idaho 556, 1S5 P, 
680, 685-86 (1916) (explaining that the "power of eminent domain and the taking of private 
property for a public use" ultimately emanates "from a higher powel' than the Legislature-the 
people themselves" and directs the legislature to detennine the manner in which a landowner 
may seek recourse to recover just compensation for the taking of his property), A state 
constitution premised on a broader conception of compensable damages necessarily 
contemplates a broader scope of recoverable damages, See, e.g., Admiral Beverage, 2011 UT 
62, ,r 21, 2011 WL S 110962, at * S, Accordingly, Orathol' s reliance on states in the minority as 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-29 
678 of 1617
JAN.27.2012 5:27PM NO. 4063 P. 32/46 
to the form of their constitutions and follow the minority rule on loss of visibility is unavailing. 
The law of those jurisdictions is fundament.ally different from Idaho's constitution and case law. 
1. Grathol's Claim Of Loss Of Visibility Is Not Supported By The Facts. 
GeoffReeslund, Grathol's.:Vice President and Director of Design and Constructio~ba$ 
made the conclusory assertion that the US~95 Project limit visibility of the remainjng Grathol 
property. Reeslund Dep. at 18· 19 (York Aff., Ex. 4), Mr. Reeslund conceded that he had not 
done anything to substantiate his conclusion and was not aware of any study that supports his 
opinion. Id., at 19-20. 
ITD retained independent engineers to study Mr. Reesland's clann. They prepared 
engineering cross-sections of the US-9S Project and the remaming Orathol property, and 
determined that the Project would not block visibility of Orathol' s remaining property. See 
Report by DEA, at 8 & Fig. 12 (York Aff., Ex. 11). 
In response to ITD' s motion for summary judgment, Grathol has not come forward with 
any competent evidence to support a claim for loss of visibility, as required under the Idaho 
Supreme Court cases cited in Section III. supra. Conclusory assertions are not sufficient to 
withstand summary judgment. Nor has Grathol made any attempt to identify the alleged impacts 
or the amount of monetary damages that might be caused, as required by Idaho Code § 7-711 (5). 
Based on the foregoing, Grathol's claim for severance damages based on loss of visibility 
should be dismissed on summary judgment. 
VII. GRATHOL'S CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION BASED ON LOSS OR 
IMPAIRMENT OF ACCESS IS BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
In its opening brief, ITD established the following undisputed facts. The Grathol 
property is bare ground. It has no physical access to State Highway S4. It has an illegal access 
to US-95 near the comer of State Highway 54. That access is to a small portion of the Grathol 
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property that is barely contiguous with the larger part of the property, and could not serve as 
access to the larger parcel. Grathol has deeds reserving access to State Highway 54, but those 
deeds only authorize access for farm or residential use. Grathol' s property is now zoned 
commercial. Therefore, it needs commercial accesses and cannot construct or use the --~. ; 
residential/farm accesses reserved by deed. ITD is not taking any access to the Gtathol property 
in this condemnation. See ITD Opening Brf., at 33-36, 
In its opening brief, cited a number of Idaho Supreme Court cases which have held that 
the issue of whether a compensable taking of access or a compensable limitation of access has 
occU1Ted is properly decided by the trial court on summary judgment. Id. at 36. 
ITD also cited the Idaho Supreme Court cases that have addressed whether and Wlder 
what circumstances a compensable taking or limitation of access has occurred. Id. at 36-39. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized a compensable taking of access in only three 
cases: Weaver v. Village of Bancroft, 92 Idaho 189,193,439 P.2d 697, 701 (1968); Hughes v. 
State of Idaho, 80 Idaho 286, 295-96, 328 P.2d 397,402 (1958); Viii. o/Sandpointv. Doyle, 14 
Idaho 749, 95 P. 945,948 (1908). See Merritt v. State, 113 Idaho 142, 144, 742 P.2d 397, 399 
(1987) (discussing these cases). In each of these cases, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that 
all vehicular access to the property had been "destroyed," and therefore the property owner had a 
"right to regain access to the public road or to be compensated for the taking of access." Id.; see 
also Weaver, 92 Idaho at 193,439 P.2d at 701; Hughes, 80 Idaho at 295-96, 328 P.2d at 402; 
Doyle, 14 Idaho at 758-60, 95 P. at 947-48. 
Thus, the legal standard in Idaho for whether or not a compensable taking or limitation of 
access has occurred is as follows. If all rights of access to a public road are destroyed - meaning 
that the property is left without any means of ingress or egress to any public s'freet or road- then 
a compensable taking of access has occurred. Merritt, 113 Idaho at 144, 742 P.2d at 399. 
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In its response brief, Grathol suggests a different standard: 
Because of this project, the realignment of the highway, the 
elevation of this interchange, and the very nature of the project 
creating a "limited access highway" it is axiomatic that Grathol's 
remainder property and its rights in the property relative to access 
NO. 4063 P. 34/46 
will be different than they would have been if this project had ·· ~ -, 
never been conceived. 
Orathol Brf., at 23 (emphasis added). 
The suggested standard that a compensable talcing or restriction of access occurs if access 
will be different is contrary to the standard set by the Idaho Supreme Court, which requires that 
all access must be destroyed before a compensable taking occurs. Gtathol cannot make that 
showing and has made no attempt to do so. 
Based on the foregoing, ITD requests that the Court dismiss Grathol' s claims for 
compensation based on an alleged taking or restriction of access. 
VIII. GRATHOL IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER LOST PROFITS BECAUSE ITS 
CLAIM IS SPECULATIVE AND BARRED BY IDAHO LAW. 
Idaho law bars Grathol's attempt to recover lost profits because it is well settled that lost 
profits are not compensable in eminent domain cases in Idaho. It is also well settled that alleged 
lost profits from a new business are inherently speculative and caMot form the basis for 
recovery. Here, Grathol does not have a "new business." It only has a planned business. 
A. Idaho Law Bars Grathol From Recovering Lost Profits In A Condemnation Case, 
In its opening brief, ITD cited Idaho Supreme Court cases barring recovery for lost 
profits in condemnation cases. See ITD Opening Brf., at 40-41. These cases were decided prior 
to enactment ofldaho's business damage statute. I.C.§7-711(2)(b). 1TD also showed that 
Grathol cannot recover lost profits under the business damage statute. ITD Opening Brf., at41 • 
42. 
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B. Gratbol Now Concedes That It Cannot Seek A Separate Recovery For Lost Profits. 
In its response brief, Grathol has backed way from its prior demands on ITD for a 
separate payment for lost profits. It now argues that 11[t]he damages for lost profits to be offered 
by Grathol at trial relate to the reduction in value, use and marketability" of the remainder .. , .. 
Orathol Brf., at 24 ( emphasis added). Therefore, summary judgment should be entered 
dismissing Grathol's claim for recovery of lost profits in this case. 
C. Grathol's New Argument For Lost Profits Should Also Be Dismissed. 
Grathol is barred by law from seeking any recovery based on a showing of lost profits. It 
is undisputed that the Orathol property is bare ground. Grathol has no business on the property, 
and has not yet begun construction of any business on the property. Therefore, there are no "lost 
profits." Lost profits necessarily assume an ongoing business that has been interrupted or 
damaged and has suffered a total or partial loss of profits as a result of the interruption or 
damage. 
In this case, ITD' s condemnation has not interrupted or damaged an ongoing business 
operation or caused it to lose profits. No business has started, and no profits and no lost profits 
have occurred. 
In Idaho, the law is clear that no recovery can be based on speculative and abstract future 
damages. See, e.g., Inland Group of Companies, Inc. v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 133 
Idaho 249,257, 985 P.2d 674, 682 (1999) (explaining that "lost profits and future earnings must 
be shown with a reasonable certainty' and that "[ d]amage awards based upon speculation and 
conje<:tu.re will not be allowed."); Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 9S Idaho 752, 761, 519 P.2d 421,430 
(1974) (same). See also Circle C Ranch v. Jayo, 104 Idaho 353, 3S6, 659 P.2d 107, 110 (1983) 
(affirming trial court's holding that claim for lost profits "failed as being speculative" where 
evidence produced at trial tended to show that plaintiff's ability to secure two prospective 
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temporary permits was too speculative). Here, Grathol's evidence of''lost profits" is inherently 
speculative, because no business has been fanned. 
In addition, longstanding Idaho law holds that "[p ]rospective profits contemplated to be 
derived.from a business which is-not yet establishei but one merely in contemplation, are too 
uncertain and speculative to form a basis for recovery." C.R. Crowley, Inc. v. Soelberg, 81 
Idaho 480,486,346 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1959) (emphasis added) (applying rule to deny damage 
claim for future crop loss); Rindlisbaker, 9S Idaho 752, 761, 519 P.2d 421,430 (1974) (applying 
rule to deny damage claim for future farm operations). See also Head v. Crone, 76 Idaho 196, 
200,279 P.2d 1064, 1065-66 (1955) (rejecting plaintiffs' claim for "anticipated profits" because 
at most they alleged "loss of anticipated possible profits to be derived from a business not yet in 
being but only contemplated to be established" which was simply "too uncertain and 
speculative" to establish a prima facie case of damage) (emphasis added). 
As the Idaho Supreme Court bas explained, the question is whether the plaintiff ''has 
proven the damages for lost profits with reasonable certainty" and "an established earning 
record" is relevant to proving damages with any "reasonable certainty." Clarkv. lnt'l Harvester 
Co., 99 Idaho 326,346, 581 P.2d 784,804 (1978). See also Lamb v. Robinson, 101 Idaho 703, 
705,620 P.2d 276,278 (1980) (explaining that "the existence of damages must be taken out of 
the realm of speculation") ( citations omitted). 
Here, Orathol's claim for anticipated lost business profits is premised on a commercial 
development that has not been built and has never operated or generated any profits. Grathol's 
claim for lost business profits is inherently speculative and too uncertain to support a claim for 
recovery. 
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ITD's motion for summary judgment on this issue does not "go to the weight" of the 
evidence. The question presented is whether Grathol has a legal right to pursue a recovery, in 
the form of an enhanced just compensation award, based on a showing of alleged "lost profits." 
Based on the foregoing, n~D,requests that summary judgment be entered barring CJr-athol 
from pursuing any recovery in this case based on alleged lost profits. 
IX. GRATHOL'S ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF ITS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES FOR 
LOST GRAVEL IS CONTRARY TO BASIC VALUATION PRINCIPLES IN 
EMINENT DOMAIN CASES, 
In its motion for summary judgment, ITO' s demonstrated that Grathol has no legal or 
factual basis to recover $300,000 for the value of gravel that Gtathol believes is located on the 
subject property and believes that ITD can use for the US-95 Project. As with its other 
arguments in response to ITD's summary judgment motion, Orathol has shifted its position now 
that its original position has been shown to be unsustainable. 
Gtathol's original position focused on the potential benefit that it believed could be 
gained by ITD or its contractor by its alleged use of the gravel material located within the take 
area. See, e.g., Reeslund Dep., at 134 (York Aff., Ex. 4). However, when !TD pointed out that 
Gtathol had no information regarding the quality and the quantity of the gravel under the take 
area, that there was no economic value to !TD or the contractor to use the gravel, and that the 
mining of the gravel was prohibited by Kootenai County Ordinances, Grathol 's position 
changed. Under its newly-crafted argument, Grathol now contends that it is entitled to 
compensation based upon two inconsistent and mutually exclusive uses of the property-first as 
a multi-use commercial development and as an operating gravel pit/mining operation. Grathol's 
assertions are leially unsupportable and are in direct conflict with long-established valuation 
principles. 
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Contrary to Grathol' s suggestion, the owner of condemned property does not have a 
general right to compensation for minerals on his land. Rather, the sole context in which the fair 
market value of condemned land may permissibly take into account mineral deposits within the 
property is when the highest and· best use of the land is shown to be extraction of the minerals in 
question. See Eagle Sewer Dist. v. Hormachea, 109 Idaho 418, 420-21, 707 P.2d 1057, 10S9-60 
(1985); see IDJ12d 7.07, 7.09, 7.11, 7.16.1. 
Basic valuation principles in eminent domain cases require that the amotmt of 
compensation to be paid is based upon the "highest and best use" of the property at the time of 
the taldng. State ex rel. Moore v. Bastian, 98 Idaho 888, 891, 575 P.2d 486, 489 (1978) ("The 
owner is entitled, of course, to be compensated for the highest and best use to which the property 
might be put."), This foundational rule was set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Symms v. 
City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho S28, 531,493 P.2d 387,389 (1972). There, the Symms Court 
stated that: 
The compensation which must be paid for property taken by 
eminent domain does not necessarily depend upon the uses to 
which it is devoted at the time of the taking~ rather, all the uses for 
which the property is suitable should be considered in determining 
market value. 
Id (citations to Idaho and U.S. Supreme Court cases and NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN 
omitted). According to the Symms Court, the determination of "all the uses for which the 
property is suitable" requires consideration of the "highest and best use" of the property, which 
the court described as follows: 
The highest and best use for which the property is adaptable and 
needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future is to be 
considered, not necessarily as a measure of value, but to the full 
extent that the prospect of demand for such use affects the market 
value of the property. 
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Id Thus) where the landowner can show that the "use for which the property is claimed to be 
adaptable is reasonably probable" and that the suggested use is "economically feasible/' then 
evidence of damages relating to the suggested use is admissible. Id And, where the suggested 
use is not reasonably probable cr,economically feasible, evidence of such damages is not -
admissible. 
This rule was applied in the context of mineral deposits in the case of Eagle Sewer Dist. 
v. Hormachea, 109 Idaho 418, 420-21, 707 P.2d 1057, 1059·60 (198S). The Eagle Sewer Dist. 
case involved a condemnation action by the Eagle Sewer District to acquire property for an 
infiltration facility. At trial, appraisal testimony from both parties concluded that the highest and 
best use of the land was for a feedlot. Id. at 420, 707 P.2d at 1059. However, the landowners 
argued that the property should have been valued based upon a dual use as both a feed lot and a 
sand and gravel operation, and that the award of fair market value should have taken into account 
both potential uses. Id at 421, 707 P.2d at 1060. The district court disagreed and established the 
fair market value of the land based on its highest and best use as a feedlot. Id. at 421, 707 P .2d at 
1060. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the landowners' argument that the property 
should have been valued and damages assessed using two highest and best uses. Id at 420-21, 
707 P.2d at 1059-60. The Court held that ''[t]his argument is in direct contravention of the 
general rule of law set forth in Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain which provides in part: 
While valuable mineral deposits on condemned land constitute an 
element of damages to be considered, if the development of such 
deposits is inconsistent with the highest and best use upon the 
basis of which tha land i8 valuedi such deposits may not be 
considered. 
Id. (emphasis added). In reaching this conclusion, the Court quoted the Symms case and quoted 
the general rules cited above .. Accordingly, the Court upheld the district court's decision, stating 
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that "[t]he district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award extra damages for the 
value of the land as a potential sand and/or gravel mining operation." Id. See also In re 
Condemnation by the Commonwealth of Penn., 404 A.2d 725, 728 (Pa. 1979) ("What is obvious, 
of course, is that the highest and- best use of [the landowner's] property could not be for g:ravel 
production and residential development. It must be one or the other.''). 
The same conclusion applies here. No dispute exists that "the uses for which the 
[Orathol] property is suitable" is for a multi-use commercial development." See, e.g., York Aff., 
Ex. 6, at 4, 6; Ex. 18, at 4·5, Consistent with the agreed-upon highest and best use, both ITD and 
Gratbol valued the property based upon a futute commercial development on the site. Id 
Additionally, as noted in ITD's opening brief, Kootenai County's zoning ordinance prohibits 
gravel mining on commeicially zoned property, like the Grathol property. York Aff., Ex. 10. 
Grathol' s claim for additional damages is not based upon "uses for which the property is 
suitable," or uses which are reasonable probable as required under Idaho's valuation rules for 
eminent domain cases. Symms, 94 Idaho at 531,493 P.2d at 389. The valuation of the Grathol 
property as both a commercial development and as a gravel pit is "in direct contravention of the 
general rule of law" for eminent domain cases and "may not be considered." Eagle Sewer Dist., 
109 Idaho at 420-21, 707 P.2d at 1059·60 (quoting Nichols on Eminent Domain,§ 13.22 (1981)) 
("While valuable mineral deposits on condemned land constitute an element of damages to be 
considered, if the development of such deposits is inconsistent with the highest and best use upon 
the basis of which the land is valued, such deposits may not be considered.") (emphasis added). 
Orathol tries to support its position by citing a single Nevada case, State of Nevada ex rel. 
Nevada Dep't o/Transp, v. Las Vegas Bldg. Materials, Inc., 761 P.2d 843 (1~88). Grathol's 
reliance on Nevada Dep 't of Transp. is misplaced because it is based upon Orathol 's selective 
reading of the case and Grathol's failure to address the foundational principles that formed the 
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basis of the court's decision. Instead of supporting Grathol's argument, the case actually forces 
the conclusion that Orathol's claim for gravel damages is improper. 
In its analysis of the case, Grathol focuses on the valuation methods discussed by the 
court, but Orathol overlooked the-first step in the court's analysis of determining when these 
methods should be applied. In the opening paragraph of the court's discussion on the evidence 
concerning the valuation of the land, the court set forth the applicable principles of eminent 
domain law, which states that "where property is not taken for the purpose of obtaining the 
minerals or as an ongoing business it is improper to appraise the mineral deposits separately and 
add the mineral value to the value of the land" Id. at 845. For purposes of the present case, that 
rule of law starts and ends the analysis. Here, the Orathol property is not being t.aken for the 
purpose of obtaining the minerals, nor is there an ongoing business relating to the mineral 
deposits. Thusi "it is improper to appraise the mineral deposits separately and add the mineral 
value to the land," and Orathol's argument to the contrary fails. 
Grathol's claim for $300,000 in damages for alleged lost gravel on the property is based 
upon its fundamental misunderstanding and misapplication of the basic principles of eminent 
domain law. The valuation of property is to be based upon the highest and best use of the 
property, and Grathol's attempt to claim damages based upon two mutually inconsistent uses is 
improper and would result in a double-recovery-one for the value of the property as a 
commercial development and a second time as a mining property. The Grathol property cannot 
legally or physically be developed for both uses, and Grathol cannot recover damages for both 
uses. 
As a secondary part of its argument, Orathol contends that ITD is somehow to blame for 
Orathol' s own lack of understanding and knowledae about the material resour<:es under its own 
property. Grathol states that ITD has "resisted at every turn [Gtathol's] efforts to pursue 
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discovery of [ITD's] geotechnical data." Def. Resp. Br., at 26. Grathol's assertions have no 
basis in fact; ITD has provided full and complete responses to Grathol' s discovery requests and 
provided all information ITO has relating to geotechnical information and test pits located on its 
property. Furthermore, it is notITD's responsibility to perform this sort of work for Grathol, at 
public expense. 
Grathol's arguments about not having information underscore what is acknowledged by 
all parties-that the property is not being developed as a material resource, nor is such a use the 
highest and best use for the property. If that were the case, not only would Grathol's appraiser 
have valued the property as a gravel pit or mining operation, but Gtathol would have obtained 
information about the type, quality and quantity of the resources located on the property. 
Grathol's own actions confirm that the highest and best use of the property is not as a gravel pit 
or mining operation, and therefore its attempts to claim damages for such a use is not permitted 
under eminent domain law. 
In summary, Grathol has no factual basis for its claim. It has not met its burden on 
summary judgment to come forward with competent evidence to support its claim. And 
Grathol's claim is contrary to conttolling Idaho case law and fundamental principles of real 
estate valuation in eminent domain proceedings. Accordingly, summary judgment should be 
granted on thls claim. 
X. GRATBOL CANNOT CLAIM SEVERANCE DAMAGES FOR IMPACTS ON 
ITS HYPOTHETICAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN, PARTICULARLY SINCE IT 
HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROJECT BEFORE IT BOUGHT THE 
PROPERTY, 
ITD has moved for summary judgment barring Orathol from seeking damages based on 
its "before" site development plan, In support of its motion, ITD established that Orathol first 
learned about the property in January 2008. Johnson Dep., at 25:22-25. (York Aff., Ex. 3). The 
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property was listed for sale at $1.45 million in the Multiple Listing Service. York Aff., Ex. 9. 
The MLS listing provided notice to all prospective purchasers that a highway interchange was 
planned to be constructed on the property. Id. The listing said that construction plans for the 
US-9S Project showed future freeway off-ramps "through this property." Id. Gtathol c-enfinned 
that it knew about the highway project before they purchased the property. Reeslund Dep., at 
22:13-23:4; 65:19-24 (York Aff., Ex. 4). 
Grathol met with representatives of ITD before it putchased the property and were shown 
the preliminary plans for the Project Johnson Dep,, at 31:20-32:13; 36:7-14 (YorkAff., Ex. 3); 
Reeslund Dep., at 87:8-88:7 (York Aff., Ex. 4). Through its meetings with ITD and its review of 
the preliminary project plans, GTathol knew about the Project and had details about the Project. 
Before Grathol purchased the property they began work on their application to rezone the 
property to commercial. Reeslund Dep., at 91:5-19; 189:13-19 (YorkAff., Ex. 4), On May 28, 
2008, Grathol purchased the entire 56 acre property for $1 .45 million. Gtathol submitted its 
rezone application to Kootenai County two days later, on May 30, 2008. Reeslund Dep., Ex. 16 
(York Aff., Ex. 16). 
Gratbol's rezone application acknowledged and praised the virtues of the U.S. 95 Project, 
and it relied on the Project as a primary reason why a zoning change was justified. Id The 
zoning application also reflected accurate knowledge of the Project, stating that "I-95 is soon to 
begin improvement to full freeway status, and will be realigned to cross this property, providing 
on and off-ramps at the Hwy 54 intersection." Id at A-3. 
As part of its application to Kootenai County for rezoning, Gtathol presented a 
development plan that showed a reconstructed US-95, in other words, an "after" site plan. Id. at 
A-8a & A-8b (York Aff., Ex. 16 at A-8a & A-Sb). 
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Sometime after its zoning application, Grathol prepared another site plan. This plan is a 
"before>' site plan, as though no changes were to be made to US-95. Grathol now seeks to use 
this "before" plan as a basis for recovering severance damages from ITD. 
In response to ITO' s motion for s1.mmuu'Y judgment dismissing damage claims based on 
Orathol's hypothetical "before" site plan, Grathol argues that the motion should be denied 
because the US-95 Project changed after they bought the property. The change cited by Grathol 
is that the interchange will have an overpass rather than having State Highway 54 go under US-
95. 
The fact that the Project changed does not permit Grathol to present a hypothetical site 
plan in the "before" condition - as though no changes were ever to be made to US-95, and then 
use that plan as a basis for recovering severance damages because it cannot now built that plan. 
Grathol could never have built that plan, and it knew that when it bought the property. The 
"before" plan was created solely in an attempt to increase severance damages in this case, and 
Grathol' s claims for severance damages based on that plan should be dismissed on summary 
judgment. 
IDJI2d Instruction 7 .14 states that the fact finder "may consider the owner's particular 
plan for development and use of the property only for the purposes of determining uses for which 
the property is adaptable." IDJI2d 7.14. In other words, Grathol cannot seek damages by 
pointing to an un-built site plan and claiming "we cannot build this here now," or "this building 
will have to be smaUer," and ask that specific dollar amounts be assigned to such alleged 
"losses,, or "severance,, damages. 
Based on the foregoing, ITD requests that all claims for severance damages based on or 
tied to alleged adverse impacts on a "before" commercial development plan created for this 
litigation be dismissed on summary judgment. 
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XI. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, ITO respectfully requests that the Court grant ITD's motion 
for summary judgment and dismiss the claims by Grathol addressed above. 
DATED this 27th day of January, 2012. · 
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Plaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") hereby submits this reply 
brief in support of its Motion in Limine in which it seeks an order from the Court instructing 
Defendant H1 Grathol ("Grathol"), its counsel, representatives, and witnesses to refrain from 
presenting expert testimony and evidence that violates Idaho-law and eminent domain principles. · · 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ITD' s Motion in Limine seeks to exclude certain expert testimony and evidence offered 
by Grathol that fails to meet the legal standard for admissibility in Idaho. Eminent domain 
principles and Idaho law provide a clear framework for what is admissible in an eminent domain 
proceeding. Grathol's Response to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine ("Grathol Resp. Brf.") contends 
that ITD's motion is premised on its disagreement with Grathol's anticipated expert testimony 
and that any deficiencies with its experts' methodology goes to the weight of the testimony and 
not its admissibility. Grathol Resp. Brf. at 3. 
Underlying Grathol's argument is the suggestion that ITD's motion is a mere dispute 
between the methodologies used by the respective experts. Grathol Resp. Brf. at 2-3. Grathol's 
assertions mischaracterize ITO' s motion. ITD' s motion is not premised on a dispute between 
accepted methods for valuing property in a condemnation action; rather, it seeks to exclude 
expert testimony employing an improper methodology that violates well-established principles of 
eminent domain and Idaho law. 
Specifically, the following subjects and references should be excluded from testimony, 
• • , ,. • ., • . 1 eV1aence, ana argument at mai: 
1. Valuation opinions of Grathol' s experts Skip Sherwood ("Sherwood'') and 
Alan Johnson ("Johnson'') that violate Idaho law and fail to apply the statutory 
date of valuation as required by Idaho Code§ 7-712. 
2. Valuation opinions of Sherwood that fail to apply proper valuation 
methodology relating to the "larger parcel II analysis of the Grathol property. 
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3, Valuation opinions of Sherwood that fail to disclose specific adjustments 
made to comparable sales. 
4. Valuation opinions of Johnson that include damages for property not being 
taken as part of this condemnation action. 
,: 
;),. Evidence of Sherwood',~ Sale No. S, which-is a transaction between a 
condemning authority and a landowner under threat of condemnation, and not 
a valid comparable sale. 
This testimony and evidence is improper and inadmissible, and should be excluded. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Gratbol's Response Does Not Address The Requirements For Admission Of Expert 
Testimony In Idaho, 
In its response brief, GTathol attempts to characterize ITD' s Motion in Limine by 
claiming that ITD's objections are solely based on ITD's "apparent disagreement with the 
substance of the evidence." Grathol Resp. Brf. at 2. According to Grathol, a mere disagreement 
about expert methodology does not constitute grounds for exclusion. Grathol Resp. Brf. at 2-3. 
If that were the standard, no expert testimony would ever be excluded because the offering party 
could simply claim that the dispute was simply a disagreement over methodology. 
From the outset. Grathol's characterization of!TD's argument is incorrect. !TD's motion 
is not a simple disagreement with the methodologies used by Orathol' s experts; it is based on the 
legal requirements for eminent domain proceedings. Furthennore, Grathol fails to acknowledge 
that ITD's motion also challenges testimony by Grathol's experts on the grounds that the 
testimony fails to meet the threshold requirements for admissibility. See ITD's In Limine Brf. at 
11-12, Grathol has not responded to IID's arguments on this issue. It should be noted, 
however, that the cases cited by Grathol in its response brief set forth the foundational 
requirements for the admissibility of expert testimony, stating that the proposed expert testimony 
must "have sufficient indicia of reliability" to be admissible, but Grathol skips over these 
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requirements. City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 585-86, 130 P.3d 1118, 1123-24 (2006) 
(citing State v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410,417, 3 P.3d 535,542 (Ct. App. 2000); Rueth v. State, 
103 Idaho 74, 78, 644 P.2d 1333, 1337 (1982)). Grathol's failure to apply or acknowledge the 
foundational requirements for the admissibility of expert testimony nullifies its entire argument -,, 
Moreover, Grathol fails to explain how the methodologies of its experts are sound. 
Likewise, it fails to provide any citation to legal authority that permits its experts to use a date of 
valuation different than that required by Idaho Code § 7-712, or that allows its eXperts to define 
the "larger parcel'' as less than the entire property owned by Grathol, or that allows its appraisal 
expert to hide, or not use, adjustments to his comparable sales. Instead Grath.ol argues th.at its 
experts should be allowed to testify regardless of their methodology. That is certainly not the 
standard for admissibility of expert testimony. In short, Grathol's assertions have no factual 
basis or legal support. Grathol' s proposed expert testimony violates established legal principles 
that are applied in Idaho condemnation cases and should be excluded. 
B. The Valuation Opinions Of Sherwood And Johnson Violate Idaho Law By Failing 
To Apply The Statutory Date Of Valuation Required By Idaho Code§ 7-712 And 
Eminent Domain Law. 
Grathol's valuation experts, Sherwood and Johnson, both use a valuation date that is not 
the date of summons as required by Idaho Code § 7-712. The date of summons, and therefore 
the date of valuation, in this case is November 19, 2010. Instead of using this date, Johnson 
values the Property as of the estimated date of completion of the US-95 Project Orathol's Third 
Supp. Discovery Resp. at 7 (York Aff., Ex. 6)1 Sherwood, in his before-and-after valuation 
analysis, uses valuation dates of March 2012 and March 2013 for his "after condition" valuation. 
1 "York Aff,'' refers to the Affidavit of Mary York in Support of PlaintifflTD's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Motion in Limine filed January 6, 2012. 
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Sherwood Report at 10-12 (YorkAff., Ex. 18); Sherwood Dep. at 41 :11-44:10, 66:10-14, 66:15-
19 (York Aff., Ex. S). 
In its response, Gra.thol does not dispute that these "after" valuations are not values as of 
the·date of the summons, and Gtathol agr~s that "Idaho Code § 7-712 does require that the date···-- · 
of the summons be the basis for assessment of compensation for all property actually taken." 
Grathol Resp. Br. at 4. However, Grathol argues that the opinions of Sherwood and Johnson are 
admissible valuations because severance and consequential da.mages2 "cannot be limited to the 
date of the Summons." Id. Grathol's argument misstates and mischaracterizes Idaho law. As 
discussed in more detail below, Idaho law requires that the date of valuation for all ju.st 
compensation, including damages, be the date the summons is issued. I.C. § 7-712. Grathol' s 
experts violate this rule of law by refusing to apply the date mandated by statute for valuing 
compensation and damages and instead selecting an indetenninate date in the future as their date 
of valuation. 
1. The language of Idaho Code § 7-712 encompasses the entirety of just 
compensation and sets the date of value for both the property taken and 
damages. 
Grathol acknowledges that Idaho Code § 7-712 requires the date of summons to be the 
date for assessing the value of the property actually taken, but argues that the statute does not 
2 It is not clear what Grathol means by "consequential" damages. Grathol does not cite to any 
authority which explains "consequential" damages or that it is entitled to such damages, To the 
contrary, general consequential damages are not allowed in a condemnation case. "While the 
rule may appear unjust, it is well settled that the landowner is not entitled, at least within the 
framework of a condemnation suit to be compensated for such consequential damaies as loss of 
business, relocation expenses, and the like." United States v. 91.90 Acres of Land, 586 F.2d 79, 
87 (8th Cir. 1978); see also U.S. v. 15,478 Square Feet of Land, more or less, situate in tht City 
o/Norfolk, JIA,2011 WL2471S86,4(E,D.Va.)(E.D.Va.2011),; U.S. v. SOAcresofLand,469 
U.S. 24, 33, 105 S.Ct 4S1, 4S7 (1984). 
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require that date to be used to detemrlne severance damages. Grathol Resp. Brf. at 4. According 
to Grathol, the statute "does not provide a cut-off date for severance and consequential damages, 
since the extent of such damages would not be known" as of that date. Id Grathol further 
· contends that "[ s ]ection 7 • 712 doesn,t speak to other damages.'' Id Orathol' s statements are 
incorrect. The plain language of§ 7-712 provides otherwise. 
Idaho Code§ 7-712 states in no uncertain terms that "compensation and damages" are to 
be determined as of the date of summons. The full text ofldaho Code§ 7-712 provides: 
For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right 
thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the 
summons, and its actual value, at that date, shall be the measure of 
compensation for all property to be actually taken, and the basis of 
damages to property not actually taken, but injuriously affected, in 
all cases where such damages are allowed, as provided in the last 
section. No improvements put upon the property subsequent to the 
date of the service of summons shall be included in the assessment 
of compensarion or damages. The compensation and damages 
awarded shall draw lawful interest from the date of the summons. 
I.C. § 7-712 (emphasis added). The language of the statute could not st.ate more clearly that the 
value of the property taken and damages to the property not taken shall be determined as of "the 
date of the summons/' Id. 
Grathol's argument is also contradicted by long-established Idaho case law. See Spokane 
& Palouse Ry. v. Lieuallen, 3 Hasb. 381, 29 P. 854 (Idaho 1892) ("In proceedings for the 
condemnation of land for railroad purposes under the statutes of Idaho, the value of the land at 
the time it is taken is the measure of damages, and it is error to admit evidence of value at the 
time of trial."); City of Lewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 851,857,853 P.2d S96, 602 (Ct. App. 
1983) (Idaho Code § 7-712 11cbronologically limits the right to compensation from the date of the 
summons in an eminent domain proceeding"); Zollinger v. Big Lost River Irr. Dist., 83 Idaho 
411,419,364 P.2d 176, 180 (1961) ("I.C. § 7-712 required determination of damages for the 
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area taken in the eminent domain proceeding as of June 27, 1958, the date summons issued in 
that proceeding."). 
The 1892 case of Spokane & Palouse Ry. v. Lieuallen is particularly instructive. In 
· Lteuallen, a railroad sought to condemrrcertain real propercyrin Latah County owned by A.A. 
Lieuallen. Id. At trial, one of the witnesses for Lieuallen testified, on cross-examination, that he 
"based his estimate of damages upon the present value of the property, while the statute fixes the 
value of the property at the time it was taken as the rule." Id The Idaho Supreme Court held 
that the district court erred in permitting testimony which gave an estimate of damages that was 
not the value at the time of the taking. Id 
It is urged by appellant, as a ground for reversal, that one of the 
witnesses for defendant, upon his cross-examination, testified that 
he based his estimate of damages upon the present value of the 
property, while the statute fixes the value of the property at the 
time it was taken a.s the rule. We thilli) the court e1Ted in allowing 
this testimony to stand against the plaintiffs motion to strike it out, 
but we think such error was rendered harmless by the reiterated 
charge of the court to the jury that they were to find from the 
evidence the value of the property on September 27, 1890, the time 
of the taking. 
id (emphasis added). in its decision, the Court relied on Section 5221 of the Idaho Revised 
Statutes, which contained the identical language as the current Idaho Code§ 7-721, requiring 
compensation and damages to be determined as of the date of summons. Id 
Idaho's jury instructions are based on § 7-712 and established case law, and set the date 
· of valuation as the date of summons. See IDJI2d 7.05, 7.05.1, 7.05.S, 7.07, 7.16, 7.18, 7.20. "It 
is incorrect to think of 'severance damage' as a separate and distinct item of just compensation 
apart from the difference between the market value of the entire tract immediately before the 
taking and the market value of the remainder immediately after the taking." U>zited States v. 
91.90 Acres of Land, 586 F.2d 79, 86 (8th Cir. 1978). The issue of the correct valuation date is 
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so important that the wrong date of value "may give rise to a motion to strike the appraisal, or the 
reversal of the entire verdict." See 5-18 NICHOLS ONEM!NBNTDoMAIN § 18.16 (2011). 
2. Grathol's reliance on Dunclick is misplaced, 
OTathol's argument suggests that.there are different.dates for valuing the compensation .. , .. 
owed for the property taken and the severance damages that are caused to the remainder property 
as a result of the taking. Orathol does not provide any authority that supports the view that there 
are multiple valuation dates in a condemnation case. Instead, Grathol relies on a misreading of a 
single quote from Dunclick. 
When such reasonable market value of the part taken has been 
determined and fixed, appellant is then entitled to further recover 
the damages to the remainder. This latter sum is determined by the 
market value of such remainder before and after the taking. The 
difference in value is the severance damage. 
State ex ,-el. Rich v. Dunclick, Inc., 77 Idaho 45, 55-56 286 P.2d 1112, 1118 (195S) (citing J.C. 
§7~711; 29 C.J.S. EMINENT DOMAIN§ 139); see also Grathol Resp. Brf. at 5. According to 
Grathol, this quote from Dunclick provides that severance damages are to be calculated as of a 
different date than compensation for the property taken. However, Grathol' s inte.tpretation of the 
quote is incorrect. 
The Dunc/ick quote cites and relies on Idaho Code § 7-711 which does not address the 
date damages are calculated. As cited above, Idaho Code § 7-712 govems the date that damages 
are to be calculated. Thus, if this quote were addressing the date damages are calculated, then it 
would cite to§ 7-712 and not§ 7-71 I. · 
When this Dunclick quote is read in context, it is clear that the Idaho Supreme Court is 
referencing how just compensation is calculated-not when. Dunclick, lnc, 1 77 Idaho at 55-56 
286 P .2d at 1118 ("This ianer sum is determined by the market value of such remainder before 
and after the taking. The difference in value is the severance damage.'~. 
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3. The language ofl.C. § 7•711(2) does not alter the plain language ofl.C. § 7-
712. 
Gtathol also argues that Idaho Code§ 7-711(2) mandates that severance damages be 
determined on different dates. Grathol Resp. Brf. at 5-6. To support its argument, Grathol 
isolates the word "will," as contained in Idaho Code § 7-711(2), from.the statutory clause and 
contends that it should be ascribed a meaning of"at some future time." Id at 6. Further, Grathol 
argues that damages, such as damages caused by delays in the project, "must be quantifiable" 
before they can be known. Id at 5. Thus, according to Grathol, the actual construction of the 
project must be fully completed before the extent of Orathol' s damages caused by the delay can 
be known. Yet Grathol does not provide any legal authority to support its position or to show 
when severance dam.ages are to be assessed. Arguably, under Grathol's theory, damages for a 
taking could be claimed for alleged damages decades into the future and would require delaying 
every condemnation trial until construction is fully completed. In reality, the reverse is true. It is 
extremely rare for a condemnation trial to be held after construction is completed. It is even 
more rare for a court to delay a condemnation trial until after a project is completed. 
Grath:oi' s argument is further rebutted when the whole sentence with the word "will" is 
read in context. Idaho Code § 7-711 (2) states in relevant part: 
2. If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part 
of a larger parcel: (a) the damages which will accrue to the portion 
not sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance from the 
portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the 
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff; 
Idaho Code§ 7-711(2). Where the language of a statute is unambiguous, the expressed intent of 
the legislature must be given effect. Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 135,138,804 P.2d 308,311 
(1990). The language "the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be 
condemned" is a simple reference to the fa.ct that severance damages must be caused by the 
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physical severance of the condemned property from the remainder. It is not a license to look 
years into the future and set valuation dates different from and contrary to express provisions of 
the Idaho Code. 
In addition, the language ••and the construction of the improvement in the manner 
proposed by the plaintiff' indicates that it is prospective and looking forward. Not backwards. 
If Grathol's interpretation is accepted, then the.project would have to be completed before 
damages could be assessed, and the language regarding "construction of the improvement in the 
manner proposed by the plaintiff'' would be rendered meaningless, because the construction 
would no longer be proposed, it would be completed. Idaho Code§ 7-711(2) (emphasis added). 
Both special benefits and severance damages can be, and are required to be, valued as of the date 
of summons as set by Idaho Code § 7-712, and not at some unspecified future date. Thus, 
Grathol' s proposed interpretation of the statute would render meaningless the requirements of 
§7-712 and violate the established rules of statutory interpretation. State v. Hagerman Water 
Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 736, 743-44, 947 P.2d 409, 416-17 (1997) ("in construing 
legislative acts, it is not the business of the court to deal in subtle refinements, but to ascertain 
from reading the whole act the purpose and intent of the legislature and to give force and effect 
thereto" and .. a statutory provision will not be deprived of its potency if a reasonable alternative 
construction is possible.") (internal citations omitted). 
The Idaho Court of Appeal has construed the provisions of § 7-712 and has held that the 
statute places a piOspective time limit on the compensatory reiief when the government directiy 
condemns property. City of Lewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 8S1, 857,853 P.2d 596,602 (Ct. 
App. 1993). As stated by the Court, 
This section [I.C. § 7-712] clearly places a prospective time limit, 
from the date of the summons, on the compensatory relief 
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available in ordinary condemnation proceedings where the 
government acts to condemn property in the exercise of its power 
of eminent domain. · 
Id Grathol' s interpretation of § 7-712 is not supported by a plain reading of the statute, it is 
contrary to Idaho law, and it violates the basic tenets of statutory construction. 
4. Contrary to Grathol's unsupported assertion, a landowner is not entitled to 
compensation for delays caused by the take. 
GTathol makes several unsupported statements that Orathol is entitled to compensation 
for delays in the project. Gtathol Resp. Brf. at 5. Grathol cites no law, statute or case that shows 
it is entitled to compensation for delays in the project. Id 
It is well established that a landowner is not entitled to compensation for delays to the 
project See I.C.§7-711(3); ITD's Brief in Support of Summary Judgment at 16-23; see also 
ITD's Summary Judgment Reply Brief, Section V. Grathol's unsupported suggestion as to what 
it believes the law provides has no merit and does not support its argument that a different date 
than that set by Idaho Code § 7-712 may be used to assess damages. 
C. Sherwood's Opinion Violates Idaho Law By Failing To Appraise The Whole Parcel. 
ITD has moved to exclude Sherwood's valuation regarding the larger parcel for two 
reasons. First, Sherwood's opinion violates Idaho law as set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
State ex rel. Symms v. City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528,531,493 P.2d 387,390 (1972). 
Second, the methodology Sherwood uses in considering only 30 acres of the 56 acre parcel is not 
scientifically sound, would not assist a trier of fact, and is therefore not admissible. 
1, Gratbol did not respond to controlling Idaho Supreme Court case law, 
Sherwood's opinion violates the requirements of Idaho law regarding the "larger parcel." 
As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Symms, it is en-or to artificially divide a parcel as 
Sheiwood attempts to do: 
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If, as a matter of fact, the parcel taken is part of a larger tract held 
by the same owner, it is error to consider such parcel as if it 
constituted an entire tract separate and apart from other property in 
the possession of the same owner; the amount awarded for the land 
taken must reflect any enhanced value arising from its availability 
for use in conjunction with the land not taken. 
Symms, 94 Idaho at 531, 493 P.2d at 390. Grathol does not respond to this legal argument, nor 
does it attempt to refute the case authority cited by ITD. There is no dispute that Grathol owns 
the entire 56-acre parcel and Sherwood's attempt to consider only 30 acres as a separate tract 
violates Idaho law and is inadmissible. 
2. Sherwood's methodology artificially divides the 56 acres and is 
fundamentally unsound and not helpful to the trier of fact. 
It is undisputed that Grathol's property is approximately 56 acres. Sherwood's valuation 
only analyzed the front 30 acres which are bordered by US-95 and Highway 54. He ignored the 
remaining 26.8 acres. Sherwood Report, at 6, 9 (York Aff., Ex. 18); Sherwood Dep. 119: 12-22, 
120:12-15 (York Aff., Ex. S). Grathol suggests that ITD merely disagrees with Sherwood's 
methodology and that differences in opinion as to methodology do not make his opinion 
inadmissible. Orathol Resp. Brf. at 3. Grathol goes on to state that Sherwood bases his 
valuation on the section of the property from which ITD is taking the 16.314 acres. Orathol 
Resp. Brf. at 3. Sherwood claims that these 30 acres are worth $2,940,300. Sherwood Report at 
I 
9 (York Aff., Ex. 18). However, in order to suppprt that value conclusion, he ignores the 
remaining 26 acres. Id Sherwood admits that smaller parcels typically sell for more on a per-
acre basis than larger parcels. Sherwood Dep. at 222: 19-223 :3 (York Aff,, Ex, S), 
Sheiwood's opinions also violate the requirements of Idaho law that, to be admissible, an 
expert's principles and rnethodoloay must be sound. Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 140-41, 
219 P .3d 45.3, 464-65 (2009), The court's function is to distinguish scientifically-sound 
reasoning from that of the self-validating expert, who uses scientific terminology to present 
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wisubstantiatedpersonal beliefs. State v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410,417, 3 P.3d 535,542 (Ct. 
App. 2000). ITD is not moving to exclude Sherwood's opinion because his methodology differs 
from the methodology used by ITD's experts. ITD is moving to exclude Sherwood's opinion 
because his methodology is not scientifically or logically sound. Sherwood's methodology fails· 
to value the entire 56-acre property. Grathol offers no explanation or defense for Sherwood's 
failure to consider the entire larger 56-acre parcel in his valuation, as required by Idaho law. 
Instead, Sherwood improperly assigns a value of $2,940,300 for 30 acres-disregarding 
the fact that the entire 56 acres was purchased for only $1,4SO,OOO in 2008. Sherwood's 
methodology is not reliable and should be excluded. 
D. Sherwood's Comparable Sales Are Inadmissible Because He Has Failed To Disclose 
Specific Adjustments For Each Comparable Sale. 
Sherwood's comparable sales should be excluded because he fails to disclose the specific 
adjustments he made to each of his comparable sales. Without the specific adjustments to the 
comparable sales, it is impossible for the trier of fact to detennine whether those sales are 
actually comparable or even relevant to the analysis. Grathol argues that a mere disagreement 
regarding Sheiwood's methodology does not go to the ;'admissibiiity;; of his comparable sales 
but rather only goes to the weight. Grathol Resp. Brf. 3-4. Grathol argues that real estate 
valuation is not a matter of applying a mathematical formula and that it is not subject to the 
''formulaic, rigid strictures of Daubert and it [sic] progeny.', Id 
Grathol appears to misunderstand ITD' s challenge to Sherwood's lack of adjustments. 
IID's challenge on this issue is not based on Daubert principles, as suggested by Grathol. 
Rather, Im simply asks that Idaho law be applied, which requires that the methodology and 
principles used by experts be sound. By refusing to provide any calculations to support his 
comparable sales adjustments and relying only upon his "experience" to justify his methodolOiY5 
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condemnation" but Sherwood still considered it because of its proximity and zoning. Grathol 
Resp. Brf. at 7. In his Report, Sherwood acknowledges the deficiencies apparent in Comparable 
No. 5, stating that "this sale was negotiated under threat of condemnation and courts have ruled 
that these sales may not represent true market value for this reason," Sherwood Report at 8 
(York Aff., Ex. 18). Sherwood's use of Sale No. S is inadmissible for this very reason-it does 
not represent a ''true market value" and thus is not a valid comparable sale. 
As the proponent of the comparable sales data, Grathol has the burden of satisfying the 
"s1rict foundation requirements [that] apply when evidence of comparable sales is offered as 
substantive proof of the value of the property taken/' Symms1 93 Idaho at 23, 454 P.2d at 60. 
Thus, Sherwood's own opinion begs the question: if this sale does not represent true market 
value, why was it used to determine true market value? 
Grathol'sjustification for its expert's use of the sale is that c'Sherwood also adjusted the 
stated sale price downward based on these differences to assist/help in arriving at his opinions of 
value." Grathol Resp. Brf. at 7. However, because Sherwood did not provide a calculation of 
his adjustments, no one can say how much he adjusted Sale No. S because of the condenmation. 
Even if adjustments were made, the starting point price is not a value that was achieved on the 
open market, making its use improper under any circumstances. Thus, despite any alleged 
adjustment made, the underlying starting data has no bearing in determining true market value. 
Perhaps sensing that Sale No. S is inadmissible, Grathol attempts to downplay its 
significance. Orathol Resp. Brf. at 7. Grathol says that Sale No. S, as only one of 10 sales, "isn't 
very important in the whole scheme ofthings.11 Id. However, Orathol's characterization of the 
sale is directly contradicted by Sheiwood's own report where he states he placed 0 primary 
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Sherwood's unsubstantiated personal beliefs are precisely the type of opinion that Idaho courts 
seek to exclude. See State v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410, 417, 3 P.3d 53S, S42 (Ct. App. 2000). 
[T]he key to admission of [an expert's] opinion is the validity of 
the expert's reasoning and methodology .... The court's function is 
to distinguish scientifteally sound reasoning from that of the self-
validating expert, who uses scientific terminology to present 
unsubstantiated personal beliefs. 
Id, 134 Idaho at 417, 3 P.3d at 542 (citing Ryan v. Beisner, 121 Idaho 42, 46, 844 P.2d 24, 28 
(Ct, App, 1992) (quoting Landrigan v. Celotex Corp. 1 127 N.J. 404,605 A.2d 1079, 1084 
(1992)). 
Idaho also acknowledges a higher standard when it comes to the admissibility of 
comparable sales. Grathol has the burden of satisfying the "strict foundation requirements [that] 
apply when evidence of comparable sales is offered as substantive proof of the value of the 
property taken." See State ex rel, Symms v. Collier, 93 Idaho 19, 23,454 P.2d S6, 60 (1969). By 
failing to provide, or even make, any calculations explaining how he used the comparable sales 
in his methodology, Sherwood is preventing anyone, including the trier of fact, from 
substantiating the validity of his comparable sales. Sherwood is simply using appraisal 
terminology to present his unsubstantiated personal beliefs. Therefore, his use of comparable 
sales and his conclusions based on comparable sales should be excluded. 
E. Johnson's Damages Calculation Is Improperly Based on Incorrect Acreages For the 
Property Actually Being Taken, 
Johnson, who is one of the owners of Grathol, bases his opinion and corresponding 
damages on an 18-acre taking by ITO, when it is undisputed that ITO is only taking 16.314 
acres. Johnson Dep. at 92:6-16, 93:16-94:2, 94:8-10, 102:14-103:3 (York AfJ,, Ex. 3), Grathol 
Third Suppl. Discovery Resp. at 6 (York Aff., Ex. 6). Johnson's opinion states that ITD is 
acquiring the "prime 18 acres" of Orathol's property. Johnson Dep. at 92:6-16, Orathol Third 
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Suppl. Discovery Resp. at 6 (York Aff., Ex. 6). Johnson then calculates his damages by 
multiplying his estimated price per acre and 18 acres. Id The result of this multiplication is the 
basis for his estimation of damages for the property acquired. Id He then uses this 18-acre 
calculation to determine the rest of bi-s-claimed damages. ~zd at 6-7. 
When confronted about this discrepancy Johnson testified that he had added 
approximately an acre and a half to ITO' s acquisition because that is how much he believes ITD 
is acquiring for Sylvan Road. Johnson Dep. at 92:6-16. As discussed in detail in ITD's motion 
for summary judgment, ITD is not acquiring any of Grathol's Property for Sylvan Road and the 
Court has concluded that the taking in this case does not include any taking for Sylvan Road. 
IID's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 6-12. Grathol has now conceded that ITO is not 
taking or condemning any land for Sylvan Road. See Grathol Resp. to Mot. Sum. Jmt. at 5. 
Therefore, by Grathol 's own admission, this testimony by Johnson is incorrect. 
ITD is moving to exclude Johnson's testimony not because of a disagreement about 
methodology, but because his opinion violates a basic premise of condemnation law-where no 
t.aking has occurred, no compensation is owed. See Me"ittv. State, 113 Idaho 142; 145, 742 
P.2d 397,400 (1987). Johnson's opinion asks this Court to compensate him as though 18 acres 
were taken-even though it is undisputed that only 16.314 acres are actually being taken. Thus, 
the facts on which his opinion is based are flawed, and his opinion would not assist the trier of 
fact in making a determination. 
F. Evidence Of Sherwood's Sale No, 5 Is Not A Valid Comparable Sale Because It Was 
Sold Under Threat Of Condemnation, 
ITD has moved to exclude testimony and evidence regarding Sherwood's use of Sale No. 
5-a sale under threat of condemnation-as a comparable sale. Grathol argues that 
"Comparable Sale No. 5 may not represent a true 'market value' by reason of the threat of 
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emphasis" and "more weight" on Comparable Sale No. 5 in rendering his opinion. Compare, 
Grathol Response at 7 with Sherwood Report at 9 (York Aff., Ex. 18). 
In considering an estimate of the west 30 acres of the subject site 
with commercial zoning and without the planned interchange I 
considered the values of the comparable sales with primary 
emphasis on comparables 5 and 7 as they are on the same highway 
and located north and south of the subject Comparable 4 is also 
another good comparable which was given more weight like 
comparables 5 and 7. 
Sherwood Report at 9 (York Ail Ex. 18) ( emphasis added). To avoid an unfavorable ruling, 
Grathol cannot downplay the importance of data that its own expert placed "primary emphasis" 
on, particularly where such use calls into question the very reliability of the methodologies and 
facts used by the Grathol expert. 
m. CONCLUSION 
Grathol has failed to respond to legal arguments and authority presented by ITD. Instead, 
Grathol argues that mere disagreements about methodology do not render expert opinions 
inadmissible. Yet, Grathol does not defend or explain its experts' methodology. Grathol ignores 
controlling Idaho law which sets forth the parameters of eminent domain law. Moreover, 
Grathol disregards its own burden to provide this Court with expert opinions based upon sound 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
) CASE NO. CV-10-10095 
) 
) 
) ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 







The trial in this matter is scheduled to begin on March 5, 2012. On January 6, 
2012, Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") filed its motion in 
limine, along with a Brief in Support and the Affidavit of Mary York. On January 20, 
2012, Defendant HJ Grathol ("Grathol") filed its Responsive Brief and the Affidavit of 
Christopher Gabbert. On January 27, 2012, ITD filed its Reply Brief. The matter came 
on for hearing on February 2, 2012. Mary York and Ted Tollefson appeared on behalf of 
ITD, and Douglas Marfice and Christopher Gabbert appeared on behalf of Grathol. 
At the conclusion of the February 2, 2012, hearing, this Court orally pronounced 
its reasoning and decision. Specifically, this Court found that the record before it was 
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devoid of expert witness testimony as to the fair market value of the remaining property 
before the take, making any testimony as to a claimed loss of fair market value of the 
remainder as a severance damage inadmissible. The Court also found, based upon the 
record before it, that the nature and amount of special damages, claimed as severance 
damages, are not sufficiently identified in any way that the Court could determine what, 
if any, evidence would be admissible at trial on the severance damage claims. 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Grathol serve upon ITD 
and file with this Court an expert witness disclosure that provides: (1) evidence for the 
evaluation of a fair market value for the remainder parcel of Grathol's property before 
and after the take, and (2) evidence as to the nature and amount of any items of special 
damages claimed as severance damages. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Grathol shall serve upon ITD and file with this 
Court the disclosure within seven (7) calendar days from the date of this Order. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the remainder of the subjects in ITD's Motion 
in limine are denied, or reserved for trial, at this time . 
.r-, 
DATED this ;; day of February, 2012. 
,. ' ---
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
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HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
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On January 6, 2012, Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") 
filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, along with a Brief in Support and the Affidavit 
of Mary York. On January 20, 2012, Defendant HJ Grathol ("Grathol") filed its 
Responsive Brief and the Affidavit of Christopher Gabbert. On January 27, 2012, ITD 
filed its Reply Brief. The matter came on for hearing on February 2, 2012. Mary York 
and Ted Tollefson appeared on behalf of ITD, and Douglas Marfice and Christopher 
Gabbert appeared on behalf of Grathol. 
At the February 2, 2012, hearing, ITD sought to dismiss Grathol's seven alleged 
severance damage claims. During the hearing, Grathol's counsel conceded that three of 
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Grathol's claims could be dismissed, to wit: (1) construction delay; (2) lost profits; and 
(3) gravel damages. At the conclusion of the hearing, this Court orally pronounced its 
reasoning and decision. 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that ITD's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied in part, as follows: 
1. ITD's Motion for Summary Judgment re: (1) construction delay; (2) lost 
profits; and (3) gravel damages is granted based upon Grathol's concession, 
and these claims are hereby stricken; 
2. ITD's Motion for Summary Judgment re: a taking claim for Sylvan Road and 
damages for such alleged taking is granted, and this claim is hereby stricken; 
3. ITD's Motion for Summary Judgment on the remaining damage claims of: (1) 
visibility; (2) access; and (3) impact on development plan is denied. 
DATED this ) day of February, 2012. 
CHARLES W. HOSACK, Senior District Judge 
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HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
POBOX2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
Douglas Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher Gabbert, Esq. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 N.W. Blvd. 
PO BOX 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
J. Tim Thomas, Esq. 
Deputy Attorney General, ITD 
PO BOX 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
Clifford T. Hayes 
Clerk of the District Court 
~-~ By _A'h L 
Deputy Clerk 1 
D us Mail 
o Hand Delivered 
o Overnight Mail 
~ Via Fax: 208-343-8869 
D us Mail 
o Hand Delivered 
o Overnight Mail 
J\ Via Fax: 208-664-5884 
o US Mail 
o Hand Delivered 
o Overnight Mail 
~Via Fax: 208-334-4498 
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 3 of3 
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FIRS 'UDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATI r IDAHO 
_ i AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOT_t,_,r'jAI 
324 W. GARDEN AVENUE 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83814 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD 
vs. 







Case No: CV-2010-10095 
) ORDER ASSIGNING DISTRICT JlJDGE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Honorable Charles W. Hosack, District Judge of the First Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, is hereby administratively assigned to take jurisdiction of the above entitled action. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the District Court of Kootenai County shall cause a copy of this 
Order Assigning District Judge to be mailed to counsel for each of the parties, or if either of the parties are represented pro 
se, directly to the pro se litigant. 
DATED: Wednesday, February 08, 2012 
John T. 
I certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows: 
e<finteroffice to the Honorable Charles W. Hosack 
~nteroffice to the Honorable Judge Haynes 
DENNIS M. DA VIS 
FAX: (208) 667-8470 ./ 
fl\3(\ 
DOUGLAS S. MARFICE 
FAX: (208) 664-5884 / 
J. TIM THOMAS, DEPUTY ATTY GENERAL 
FAX: (208) 334-4498/ 
MARYV. YORK 
FAX: (208) 343-8869 / 
Order Assigning District Judge 
Dated: Wednesday, February 08, 2012 
Clifford T. Hayes ;1 
er Of The Districf trt 
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.:Jo.9LnnS ..... ..a[fe8A\t Ci JD~~J},--::,. ~,}SS 
Official Court ~porte9 '.l'D GS~ii'Qb}"160 
324 'West (jartfen9Lvenue • P.CHrBd;c.9000 
Coeur cf'JlL!e.ne, 'l.cfafi.o 83816-9000 r ,, 1 • ') 1. 
Phone: (208} 446-113~r'.\ ':) rr~ \ f} (n L:, • .._, <i 
... ~-~ .... 
NOTICE OF FILING ORIGINAL 
TO: Clerk of the District Court - KOOTENAI COUNTY 
DATE: February 10, 2012 
CASE: State of Idaho Idaho TYransportation Board vs. 
HJ GRATHOL, ET AL. 
CASE NO.: CV-10-10095 
Notice is hereby given that a transcript of the 
Motion for Summary Judgment Hearing (Continued) of 
2/2/12, totalling 45 pages, has been prepared. The 
original transcripts are being filed with: 
Clerk of the District Court 
Kootenai County Courthouse 
324 W. Garden Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Copies have been provided to: 
Holland & Hart, LLP 
Attention Mary V. York/Ted S. TOllefson 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
If additional copies of transcripts are requested, 
please call the court rep rter at 208 446-1136. 
cc: Douglas 
Mary V. 
NOTICE OF FILING ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
STATE OF IOAHO ' 
Co t 1u ~v 0' l(f'nTC-NA' > SS (_; rt , I \. ( ; 1 ·~· ~ I t_ I, 
'-T ,-:·. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VIN GS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 
through 5, 
Defendants. 




COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol, pursuant to the Court's Order of February 3, 
2012 (Order Re: Plaintiffs Motion in Limine), and hereby submits the following Supplemental 
Expert Witness Disclosure. 
Model # 1 (Exhibit 1): Skip Sherwood will testify that the entire tract before the 
taking would be valued, in his opinion, at approximately $2,940,3001 based on a per square 
foot fair market value of $2.25 for the western 30 acres2• The value of the 16.314 acres being 
taken is $1,598,5433 ( or $2.25/sq. ft.) and the value of the residual 40± acres after the taking 
1 Sherwood valuation report, p.10. 
2 Sherwood valuation report, p. 9; Deposition, p.l I 9. 
3 Sherwood valuation report, p.10. 
DEFENDANT HJ GRA THOL'S SUPPLfflfflf N Arss DISCLOSURE - I 
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is $1,344,4574 with downward time value adjustment m the range of $1,060,000 to 
$1,165,0005. 
Therefore, his opinion is that just compensation should be in the range of $1,775,000 
.,.,.,. q, 1 88(\ nno6 1-~u~,.:(e,.:(\ 
LV .VJ., v,VV \lV HU U)• 
Model # 2 (Exhibit 2): Alan Johnson will testify that the value of the entire tract 
before the taking, in his opinion, is between $5,379,660 and $6,359,7607• The value of the 
16.314 acres being taken is $2,295,3608 and the value of the remainder 40± acres after the 
taking and construction is $3,642,000±9 with a downward time value and impact adjustment 
to approximately $2,722,00010 as ofNovember 2010. 
Therefore, his opinion is that just compensation should be in the range of $2,658,000 
to $3,638,000 (rounded)11 • 
Model # 3 (Exhibit 3): Additionally, Alan Johnson is of the opinion that the value of 
the part taken is $2,295,360 12• The value of the total residual part not taken before the taking 
is approximately $3,060,000 to $3,520,000 (rounded)13 and the value of the residual 
4 Sherwood valuation report, p.10. 
5 Sherwood valuation report, p.12. 
6 Sherwood valuation report, p.12 ($2,940,300 less $1,060,000 to $1,165,000 = $1,775,300 to 
$1,880,300. 
7 Defendant's Third Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories, dated October 6, 2011, p.6 (± 
$3.23/sffor west 30± acres, ±$1.00/sf for east 26± acres). 
8 16.314 acres x $3.23/sf = $2,295,360. Defendant's Third Supplemental Answers to 
Interrogatories, dated October 6, 2011, p.6. 
9 Defendant's Third Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories, dated October 6, 2011, p.7. 
10 Defendant's Third Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories, dated October 6, 2011, p.7. 
11 Defendant's Third Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories, dated October 6, 2011, p.7 
($5,379,660 to $6,359,760 less $2,722,000 = $2,657,660 to $3,637,760). 
12 16.314 acres x $3.23/sf = $2,295,360. Defendant's Third Supplemental Answers to 
Interrogatories, dated October 6, 2011, p.6. 
13 ±26 acres @ $1.00/sf = $1,132,560 plus 13.7 ± acres @ $3.23 to $4.00/sf ($1,927,573 to 
$2,387,088) equals $3,060,133 to $3,519,648. 
DEFENDANT HJ GRA THOL'S SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE - 2 
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( 
remainder after the taking and construction is ± $3,670,00014 with a downward time value 
and impact adjustment to $2,722,000±15. 
Therefore, his opinion is that just compensation should, under this analysis, is 
approximately $2,630,000 to $3,090,000 (rounded)16• 
DATED this 10th day of February, 2012. 
· topher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm 
orneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of February, 2012, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
X' US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
X Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
X USMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
~ Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
14 Defendant's Third Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories, dated October 6, 2011, p.7, items 
(1)-(4). 
15 Defendant's Third Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories, dated October 6, 2011, p.7. 
16 Difference between $3,060,000 to $3,520,000 and $2,722,000 equals range of $338,000 to 
$798,000. Plus the take ($2,295,360) equals $2,633,360 to $3,093,360. 
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE- 3 
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SHERWOOD BEFORE TAKE 
Model #1, 
p.1. 
I ·-=====· -=--=--=-=-=, ·===~·======- ----=--- -------










STA'I! HlllffWAY N0.154- A"IIIOL T-0 l!_A~------------------------
1 
I D -$2,940,300 (Sherwood valuation report pp. IO- I I, Depo. at p. I 9) 
EXHIBIT I 
•• 0 ................................. •R--... ,,,, .. ,, .. _____ ,_,,,_, .. •••••rn•••••••·--.,.,,., __ ,_,. ""'''"""""•---•---
... ------· ------------. 
... ···-- ---------- ·--------------
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Model #1, p.2 
SHERWOOD AFTER TAKE 
Ii I I 
4=- - -------- . --- --- --- --=====r--------------~----- --~==~==~==~==~==~==~ -i 
I 
j 








PARCU.S 1 & 3 
'IIIEST OF R/W 
ARCEL # :53N03°W10500 
168, 700 S.F. 
3.87 ACRES 
II I I I Mnmm 
PltCl'GSIII in MfA 1111 
710.618 S.F. 
16.31 ACRES 
RDIAINNG PARCELS 1 & 3 
EAST OF R/W TO S'd.VAH RO. 
PARca # 53N03W105000 
385,362 S.F'. 
8.B:I ACRES 
REMAINING PARCELS 1 & 3 
EAST OF R/W TO 8'1.VAH RD, 































I i . l~SF. 
Lr-------------·------- -------------~_!! HIGH!AY N0.154 A'IH_OL TI> '!_A'l'IIIEW ___________________________________ .,,._ 
D -$1,598,543 (16.314 acres @$2.25/sq.ft) (Sherwood valuati' report p. I 0) 
D ~ 
- Residual 40 plus/minus after take is $1,344,457, time adjusted to range of $1,060,000 to $1,165,000 (Sherwood report pp. 10-11) 




Model #2, p. l 
JOHNSON BEFORE TAKE · 
I ===·===-==-=-=-' ·------===~'====== ... ----=-.::::::::::.-==------=---:=·-~----"'--- -- -r -~---_________ _ ~-=-==-=·,::=a:=-_-=_---_---_-_-_-=_-_--_--_- ------111-:--











'UL----,--------+------~--------/~ I ___ _ ...._ ______________ _ ITAtt Hi~WAY ND.le+ A'!tl0l. TO l!_A't\11:W _______________________ _ 
I 
I 
- From $5,379,660 to $6,359,760 (Def. 3rd Sup. Answers, 10/6/11, p. 6), 
(Plus/minus $3.23 sq.ft for west-30 acres, and plus/minus $1.00 sq.ft for east -26 
acres) 
EXHIBIT~ 





Model #2, p.2 
1
1 1 ROIANNG PARCELS 1 II: II I EAST CF R/W 10 S'ILVAH RO, REIIAINNG PARca # 53N03W105000 
1 PARCILS t a, 3 385,362 S.F. I '1ESJ OF R/W 8.8:1 ACRES II ~n,~~~ II 168,700 S.F. 
1
1 3.87 ACRES REMAINING PARCELS 1 II: II 
111
/ 
EAST OF R/W 10 S'ILVAH RD, 
PARCEL (I 53N03WI 05000 
I I l'llOfG!ID l!h ARfA FIJI 1,209,314 S.F. I 
I I US 15 27, 76 ACRES I 710.618 S.F. I 16.31 ACRES 1 
111/ /! 
II >,Iii, / ~~/ 
I 
1
1 ~1 I ,~/ 
I /I / I I I // ! . -~ __ _,_ ______________ _ 
Lt,.~ ______ _____________ STA1E HIClH~AY N0.15+ A'IH__~A'l\'IEW -------------------------------------
[] - $2,295,360 (Def. 3rd Sup. Answers, 10/6/11, p. 6), (16.314lacres@$3.23/sq.fi.) 
• i! 
- Residual 40 plus/minus acres after take is $3,642,000, time adjusted to approximately $2,722,00. (Def. 3rd Sup. Answers, 10/6/11, p.7.) 










JOHNSON RESIDUAL BEFORE/AFTER TAKE Model #3 
Ii I I 
rt=: ------~===~===~==~==---==~==---=====r~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~==~ -
I I 
I- - -- ·--------, 
RDIAINNG 
PARCll.51 ,113 
'llEST Of' R/W 
RCEL I :13N03°W1050 
168,700 S.F". 
3.B7 AC~ES REMAININ$ PARC!LS 1 41: 3 













PARCEL (/ 53N03W105000 
1,209,314 S.F. 




















I I ~ 
I I .... _____... I 
I .. --------·------1--------·-•, / --...L..---------------
LJ:__________________ _____________ STAlE HIGHWAY N0.154 A'hi01. 10 81\YIIIEW ___________________________________ ~_ c:J -$2,295,360 (Def. 3rd Sup. Answers, 10/6/11, p. 6), (16.314 Lcres@$3.23/sq.fi.) 
I 
- Residual Before take: $3,060,000 to $3,520,000 (rounded), (plus/minus 26 acls@$1.00/sq.fi = $1,132,560 plus 13.7 acres@$3.23 to $4.00/sq.ft ($1,927,573 to $2,387,088) 
C·.J - Residual After take: $3,670,000, time adjusted to- $2,722,000 (Def.3rd Sup. Answers, 10/6/1 L p.7, items (I) -(4).) 
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.:J o.91.nn Scha[ler 
Official Court 2?gporte0 1'D ~~Jfl.~ l 
324 West (janfen.9Lvenue • P.O.f'.$0?(__9000 ,,,OT[NAJ{ SS 
Coeur a'.9Lfene, 'l.aaho 83816-9000 
Plume: {208} 446-113701? E 
EB l 3 PH 1 1,g 
TO: Clerk of the District Court 
Kootenai County Courthouse 
324 W. Garden Avenue 
(P-ERKPJS1/t6f COURT ----J} . 
~·~w 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
KOOTENAI CV-2010-10095 
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington corporation; 
and DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
Notice is hereby given that on February 13, 2012, 
I lodged the original Summary Judgment Motion 
transcript of February 2, 2012, in the 
above-referenced case, totalling 45 pages, and 
three copies, with the District Court Clerk of 
the County of Kootenai in the First Judicial 
I 
District. 
February 13, 2012 
u 
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1 800 879-1700 
Spokane, Washington 
SOUTHERN OFFICES 
1 800 234-9611 
421 W. Franklin Street 
P.O. Box 2636 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2636 
208 345-9611 
208 345-8800 (fax) 
email m-and-m@gwest.net 






STATE OF IOAHO iss 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI I 
February 8, 2012~1t:-J: 
MaryV. York 
Holland & Hart, LLP 
101 South Capitol Blvd., Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise ID 83701-2527 
RE: State of Idaho (1TB) v. HJ Grathol 
Case No. CVl0-10095 (Kootenai County, Idaho) 
Deponent: Alan Johnson 
Taken on 11/18/2011 
M & M Job No. 5761C2 
2012 FEB 15 AM IQ: 48 
CL;r OIST~T COURT k 
OEP'ttfJ~ 
We are in receipt of the signed original Certificate of Witness of the 
deponent for the above-referenced deposition. We are forwarding the same 
to you for attachment to the original transcript, which we delivered to you 
on or about 11/30/2011. If an Errata Sheet was completed, a copy is also 
attached. 
Very truly yours, 
M & M Court Reporting Service, Inc. 
cc: Mr. Douglas S. Marfice 




CERTIFICATE OF ALAN JOHNSON 
I, ALAN JOHNSON, being first duly sworn, depose and say: 
That I am the witness named in the foregoing deposition; 
that I have read said deposition and know the contents thereof; 
that the questions contained therein were propounded to me; and 
that the answers therein contained are true and correct, except 
for any changes that I may have listed on the Change Sheet 
attached hereto. 
DATED this 2:1._ day of Det:..- ' i<6// . 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 27thday of 
December , 2011 > by Alan Johnson, proved to me on the 
basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person who appeared 
before me. 
NAME OF NOTARY PUBLIC Arlene L. Biron 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR State of California 
RES,IDING AT Irvine, California 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES December 23, 2013 
576JC2 
1-800-879-1700 M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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ORJGINAL 
ERRATA SHEET FOR ALAN JOHNSON 
PAGE~ LINE--6.Q_ REASON FOR CHANGE __ .--~f~'1~P~t2~------------
SHOULD READ -------'l'-"t,,...""'"'~a\...__ _________________ _ 
PAGE--1..JS_ LINE~ REASON FOR CHANGE __ t::-'---l'f<-:p~e>'-------------
READS ___ __...:fc.-..O.c..s-,;!!,,~-1b~l.w.b<.~~)t:~,$'------------------
SHOULD READ --~;:;...;=~=W:::;_~=...,,lC-.Jlb..u:::e>c.F,](,.__ _________________ _ 
PAGE LINE REASON FOR CHANGE ________________ _ 
READS _________________________ __.;. ____ _ 
SHOULD READ ____ -.:_ ______________________ _ 
PAGE LINE REASON FOR CHANGE ________________ _ 
READS-------------------------------
SHOULD READ 
PAGE LINE REASON FOR CHANGE -- --
READS 
SHOULD READ 
PAGE LINE REASON FOR CHANGE --
READS 
SHOULD READ 
PAGE LINE REASON FOR CHANGE -- --
READS 
SHOULD READ 
PAGE LINE REASON FOR CHANGE -- -
READS 
SHOULD READ 
WITNESS SIGNATURE: _________________ -c,~ 
576JC2 
1-800-879-1700 M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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STATE OF ID AHO ~ SS 
COUNTV nr:- '.--'.fJOTENAl1 
r.n_ ;:- : 
2012 FE8 16 PM I: 31 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ GRA THOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
) CASE NO. CV-10-10095 
) 
) 
) ORDER RE: DEFENDANT 







On February 3, 2012, this Court entered its Order re: Plaintiffs Motion in Limine, 
wherein it ordered Defendant HJ Grathol ("Grathol") to serve upon Plaintiff State of 
Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD"), and file with the Court, an expert witness 
disclosure that provided evidence for the evaluation of a fair market value for Grathol's 
property before and after in order to provide support for Grathol's just compensation 
values and severance damage claims. On February 10, 2012, Grathol filed its 
Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, which essentially complied with this Court's 
February 3, 2012, Order. 
Order Re: Defendant HJ Grathol' s Severance Damages Page 1 of 4 
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On February 13, 2012, this Court held an additional hearing to discuss ITD's 
Motion in Limine and Grathol's Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure. Mary York 
appeared on behalf ofITD, and Doug Marfice appeared on behalf of Grathol. 
At the hea.ring, Grathol's counsel conceded that Grathol's cli:iims for severance 
damages1 are incorporated or merged into its expert witness disclosures that provide 
opinion testimony as to the amount of severance damages claimed for the remainder 
parcel based upon the difference between the fair market values for the remainder parcel 
before and after the take. Further, Grathol's counsel affirmatively stated that Grathol's 
damage claims for the remainder, i.e., visibility, access, and impact on development 
plan2, are not claims for discreet compensable special damage amounts, and that any loss 
based upon those claims is incorporated within the damages based upon the difference in 
fair market value of the remainder before and after the take, as set forth in Grathol's 
supplementary expert witness disclosures. 
Based upon Grathol's concessions, arguments of counsel and this Court's 
reasoning provided in open court on February 12, 2012, NOW THEREFORE, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that this Court grants, in its discretion, ITD's Motion in Limine in 
regards to all of Grathol's separate special severance damage claims. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Grathol is hereby barred from seeking any 
separate discreet special severance damages, to include loss of visibility, access and 
development plan damages, because these claims are incorporated in Grathol' s expert 
witness disclosures as to the before and after fair market values for the remainder parcel. 
1 This Court and the parties have referred to severance damages, or damages to the Grathol's remaining 
ffoperty after ITD's take, as special damages. 
Summary Judgment as to these three severance damage claims was denied via this Court's Order Re: 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, entered on February 3, 2012. 
Order Re: Defendant HJ Grathol's Severance Damages Page 2 of 4 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the previously scheduled eight-day court trial 
shall commence on March 5, 2012, at 9:00 a.m., in Kootenai County. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(e), the parties shall 
provide this Court with pre-trial briefs that shall provide, at a minimum, a concise 
statement of the case, a statement of factual and legal issues that remain to be litigated, 
and a list of witnesses and exhibits. Additionally, the parties are encouraged to confer 
and attempt to stipulate to the admission of exhibits, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(e)(6)(H), and 
shall file the pre-trial briefs with the Court no later than 5:00 p.m. on February 27, 2011.3 
DATED this ~day of February, 2012. 
' . -
3 Please e-mail copies of the pre-trial briefs to the Court at: bpennington@kcgov.us. 
Order Re: Defendant HJ Grathol's Severance Damages Page 3 of 4 
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02-16-'12 13:45 FROM-Kootenai Dist Court 208-446-1188 T-688 P0004/0004 F-894 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the It f<Y\day of February, 2012 a true and correct copy 
of this Order Re: Defendant HJ Grathol's Severance Damages was served, by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Mary Yorl<, Esq. 
Ted Tollefson, Esq. 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
POBOX2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
Aitorneys for l'lain'/iff JTD 
Douglas Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher Gabbert, Esq. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700N.W. Blvd. 
PO BOX 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
J. Tim Thomas, Esq. 
Deputy Attorney General, ITD 
l?OBOX7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
Courtesy Copy 
a USMail 
a Hand Delivered ,_oJ/4""' 
[J Overnight Mail r,:J""' 
J'{J)a Fax: 208<343-8869 
o US Mail ~t) 
o Hand Delivered ()-' 
r, ~emight Mail . 
Uia Fax: 208-664~5884 
o USMail 
a Hand Delivered fjo~O/ 
[J 0v 'ghtMail u , 
~: 208-334-4498 
Order Re: Defendant HJ Gtathol's Sev~rance Damages Page 4 of 4 
I 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Dougias S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
~Mit\8fr\_D~~gENAI} SS 
"" 
2012 FFB 21 AH 11: 40 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST TIJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ ORA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VIN GS BANK, 
a Washington corporation; and DOES 1 
through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
DISCOVERY RESPONSES 
TO: CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 17th day of February, 2012, that Defendant 
HJ Grathol, by and through their attorney, Christopher D. Gabbert of the firm Ramsden & 
Lyons, LLP did serve a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol's Fourth Supplemental 
Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents, together with a copy of this Notice, upon counsel for Plaintiff via facsimile. 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES - 1 ORIGINAL 
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DATED this 17th day of February, 2012. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
is her D. Gabbert, Of the Firm 
Atto eys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of February, 2012, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES - 2 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
,,Hand Delivered 
-~- "R Fa'csimile (208) 334-4498 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
~and Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
___,---
{[L Vl t1tt!\__ , t:'1/L-v~ 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
STATE OF IOAHO } 
Co f l~TV r,r l,(~f1"£U • • SS J-,., ,_,r ,·.·-~ I !~Al 
r" 
2012FEB 28 AMII: 07 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRATHOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VIN GS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
DEFENDANTHJGRATHOVS 
WITNESS LIST 
COMES NOW the Defendants HJ Grathol, by and through its counsel of record, and 
pursuant to the Court's Uniform Pretrial Order hereby submits a witness list of persons who 
may be called to testify at trial. Defendant reserves the right to supplement or withdraw any 
of the witnesses listed. 
1. Alan Johnson; 
2. Geoffrey Reeslund; 
3. Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood; 
DEFENDANT HJ GRA THOL'S WITNESS LIST - 1 
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4. Tom Vandervert; 
5. Brett Terrell; and 
6. James Coleman 
DATED this 27th day of February, 2012. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
By: -~~r...=...~~---+------
Douglas . Marfice, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2?1h day of February, 2012, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas ./ US Mail 
Deputy Attorney General __ Overnight Mail 
Idaho Transportation Department ~and Delivered 
P.O. Box 7129 __ Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S WITNESS LIST- 2 
~SMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
~and Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOUS 
EXHIBIT LIST 
COMES NOW the Defendant HJ Grathol, by and through its counsel of record, and 
pursuant to the Court's Uniform Pretrial Order hereby files the Defendant's Exhibit List in 
the form attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
DATED this 27th day of February, 2012. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
By: if!},~~ 
DouglaS. Marfice, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
DEFENDANT HJ GRA THOL'S EXHIBIT LIST - I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 27th day of February, 2012, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
/ 
J. Tim Thomas US Mail 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S EXHIBIT LIST- 2 
__ Overnight Mail 
~and Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
~SMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
~and Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
on James 
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LIST OF EXHIBITS 
(Exhibit "A") 
Case Number: CV-10-10095 
Title of Case: Idaho Transportation Board v. HJ Grathol 
Plaintiffs Exhibits (list numerically) 
X Defendant's Exhibits (list alphabetically) 
Third Party Exhibits State Party: 
No. Description 
A Appraisal of Stanley Moe ( dated 4/29/10) 
B Appraisal of Stanley Moe (dated 4/30/10) 
C Shanley letter to Wilson ( dated 6/3/10) 
D Record of Decision (dated 6/30/10) 
E Sylvan Drive Access Study ( dated 6/30/10) 
F Site Line Survey (dated 2/18/12) 
G ITD Plan/Maps 
H CLC Site Plans 
I Hughes Site Plans 
EXHIBIT "A" - I 
Admitted 
by Stip. 
Trial Date: March 5, 2012 






STATE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy Attomey General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8803 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V. York (ISB #5020) 
Ted S. Tollefson (!SB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P .0. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
N0.4313 P. 2/5 
JJ~LE OF IDAHO ; 
rllf:af '.00F KODTE.NAJ 1'>SS 
9D l±-LoD~ 
Zll/2 FEB 27 PH , .. 
Lf • t, 3 
CL , ; 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST .mDICIAL DISTRICT OF TRE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ ORA THOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SA VINOS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES 1 through S, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S TRIAL WITNESS LIST-1 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S TRIAL 
WITNESS LIST 
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Plaintiff, Idaho Transportation Department ("ITD"), by and through its attorneys of 
record, Holland & Hart LLP, hereby provides the following list of witnesses ITD expects to call at 
the trial of this matter: 
1. Jason Minzghor 
District 1 Project Development Engineer 
Idaho Transportation Department 
600 West Prairie 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815"'.8764 
2. Stanley D. Moe, MAI, RM 
Real Estate Appraiser and Consultant 
Columbia Valuation Group, Inc. 
1410 Lincoln Way, Suite 200 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
3. Carole Richardson, P.E. . . . . 
Senior Project Manager/Transportation Planner 
David Evans and Associates,; Irie. 
908 North Howard Street, Suite 300 
Spokane, Washington 99201 
4. Kenneth Geibel, P.E ... 
Senior Civil Engineer · · · · 
David Evans and Associates, Inc. 
908 North Howard Street; ~uite 300 
Spokane, Washington 9920 I 
5. Mel Palmer 
Planner 1 
Kootenai County Building & Planning Department 
451 GovemmentWay 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-9000 
6. Lawrence R. Pynes, JD,~ASA 
Real Estate Appraiser .. 
Herron Companies 
2929 Edinger Avenue 
Tustin, California 927~0 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S TRIAL WITNESS LIST-2 . . 
747 of 1617
7. George Hedley, CEO 
Commercial Developer 
Hedley Construction & Development, Inc. 
3300 Irvine Avenue, #135 
Newport Beach, California 92660 
8. Dennis R. Reinstein, CPA/ABV, ASA, CVA 
Hooper Cornell, PLLC 
250 Bobwhite Court, Suite 300 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
9. Shawn Montee 
Shawn Montee Timber Co. 
2251 W. Ironwood Center Dr. 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
ITD may also call the following witnesses at trial: 
10. Any witness included on Defendant's witness list. 
11. Any individual whose identity is not presently known but who may become 
known prior to the trial of this matter. 
12. Any individual whose testimony is required to establish a foundation for the 
admission of any evidence offered by Plaintiff at trial. 
13. Any individual named by Defendant. 
14. Any individual whose testimony is necessary for rebuttal or impeachment. 
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of February, 2012. 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S TRIAL WITNESS LIST - 3 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Idaho Transportation Department 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 27th day of February, 2012, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Fax: 208-664-5884 
Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol 
5427273 _I.DOCX 












02-28- 1 12 10: 17 FROM-Koot r···'li Dist Court 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy Attorney Generai 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attorney General . 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise. Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8803 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V. York (ISB #5020) 
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HARTLLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boule'Vard 
P.O. Bo>t 2S27 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 . 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
208-446-1188 T-296 P0001/0001 F-743 
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANllFOR l'HE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF lDAf!O, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION 130.AlU), ·· 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
·~ ·.. \ 
. Case No. CV ~I 0-1009S 
. : PL.AIN'm'FITD'S TRIAL .·.·. '._ EXHIBIT UST . ·.•. . . 
HJ ORA THOL. ~ CaJifo~a gmu,rafpami~p;: . : 
STER.LINO SA VINOS BANJ{~ a W•gto.Q · · · 
corporation;.and DOBS 1 through·s, ·.• · · · · · · · 
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Defendants. 
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Plaintiff, Idaho Transportation Department ("ITD"), by and through its attorneys of 




























Exhibit Description Adm/Stlp 
U.S 95- Garwood to Sagle Corridor 
Aerial Photograph of Garvee Construction 
Project 
Right-of-Way Plans for Project·. 
Aerial Access Photo of Subject Pl'QP,erty·. 
North View Photo of Subject Pr9perty· . 
South View Photo of Subject Property .· .. · 
East View Photo of Subject Property · ·· · ·· 
West View Photo of Subject Property . . 
. . - . . 
January 1967 Warranty Deed··.· •· · 
AL TA Land Title Survey . -~- .. 
CV - Stanley D .. Moe 
Stan Moe Appraisal of HJ Grathof .· 
Property · · 
Stan Moe's Summary _of Value 
Conclusions 
Photo: Grathol Property lmpro\/ement$ 
Kootenai County Zoning· District Map· -·• 
·-. -:--;: ·,·. 
Grathol Property Listing --
•'. -. -· 
Moe Size Adjustment Chart .•. _ .'. · , ... 
Moe Comp Sale AdjustmentSqnim.ary: -. 
. ·, ' ' 
.... ··-, 
'·. 
Grathol After Site Plan from' Mqe Apprai,s~t ·,,•,' < 
Moe Demographics Comparisori' 
Stan Moe Rebuttal Report, 12l16:-:11 -C. - · ·.· 
Analysis of Land Sale Used by Alan > 
Johnson ' .. 
Analysis of "Comparable" Sates U$ed by 
M. Dewitt Sherwood · ... · 
Alan Johnson Dep9sition Transc'rip( 11- . 
18-11 . . . . . .. 
Flow Chart for HJ Grattiol, ·4~14 .. '1 i · · · • · .. 
5-28-08 Buyer's Settlement Stateme·n:t · ·, •. 
[Dep. Ex. 44] · · .,- · ,· .. , . 
6-11-08 Memo to Alan Johnso·n from 
Geoff Reeslund re: Koot~.nai_C:ouhty . ·. · .. 
Rezone Application [Dep; Ex-:20L· :• •." 1--•:: : 
•'• ' 
. .. ,._ .. 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S TRIAL E_~I'f iJst,:.:.:J'/ 
·. ',• 
Offered 
·-- . ' : ·.··,. 
..... ; 
_., -.. 
























Exhibit Description Adm/Stip 
11-14-08 Email String between Reeslund 
and Johnson re: Grathol property [Dep. 
Ex. 21] 
8-13-09 V'v'inger and Johnson Email String 
re: Athol Study 
1-29-10 Reeslund-Johnson Email String 
re: Athol Appraiser [Dep. Ex. 25] 
6-30-10 Reeslund-Johnson Email String 
re: Athol Project and ITD Meeting{Dep, _ 
Ex. 29] 
1-26-11 Winger-Johnson Email String re: 
Athol Research Studies · · ·- · · · --
Athol Commercial Site Plans {Doc:: #s .---
1413-1414] .-, __ - . 
Land Sales Analysis with Handwritten 
Notes [Dep. Ex. 8] · 
Geoffrey Reeslund Deposition Transcript,' 
11-17-11 - - -
··:·:··· 
5-22-08 Warranty Deed b~tween North -_ 
Alpine Development and Graca1 • -- . · 
. --
.·.' 
Corporation [Dep. Ex.17] · 
7-28-08 Letter from Lakes Highway · 
District to Mark Mussman, -Kootenai·_ 
County Planning Department, re: Hughes : 
Zone Change Request[Dep. E>C. j9J. . ____ -_- i --
Reserved 
Reserved - · 
6-29-09 Reeslund-CLC Associates Email -
String re: Athol, ID Final SiteP1ans [Pep. 
~-2~ --
8-17-09 Email from Reeslund to Johnson 
re: 1-95 ROW Study and. preparation of. 
... 
--
overlay [Dep. Ex. 23] r __ . • - -
1-27-10 Email from-ReeslunEito Johnson -. 
re: Latest 1-95 Alignmentplari [Dep. Ex.. ~--- --
24] ·- :,·_· ·:- _ . . 






~- . , 
-- . 
,·,_· 
.. · .. ·· 
-·-Reserved . : . ·\':· ' ', . _,·.· '' •·· ... 
4-14-10 Cost Estimate from Andy Eli$son, 
Allwest Test & Engineering, to Reeslund -
re: Estimate for Geotechnfcal-Evah.1ati0.n 




.. , . •. 
'·· ... · .. : . .t·· , .• ,·· .. 
.. •': •, 






Exhibit Exhibit Description Adm/Stip Offered Refused Reserve Ruling 
45 10-25-10 Email string re: US 95 Highway 
54 Boring Logs [Dep. Ex. 27] 
5-27-10 Email between Reeslund and 
46 Andy Eliason re: US 95 and SH 54 Test 
Pit Logs [Dep. Ex. 28] 
47 Reserved 
8-30-10 Email between Vandervert and 
48 Johnson re: Meeting with ITD to Discuss Options of Extending Sylvan Road [Dep. 
Ex. 30] 
8-31-10 Reeslund-Torgeson-Vandervert 
49 Email String re: Bayview Gateway Plans · .. · 
[Dep. Ex. 31] ...... 
50 Reserved ;.': . ·;, 
2-17-11 HJ Grathol Preliminary SoftCosf .. 
,, 
51 ,. . 
Budget [Dep. Ex. 33] .. --




52 , . 
. 
Project Budget [Dep. Ex: 34] · · · ·· .. . . 
53 2-21-08 Handwritten notes re: Highway 95 . & 54 [Dep. Ex. 35] 
54 2-21-08 Meeting Minutes re: f.:.Q5 •· Improvement Project [Dep. Ex. 36]. . 
55 8-13-09 Handwritten Meeting Notes {Dep, _·. 
. .... 
Ex. 37] 
56 Undated Handwritten Notes [Dep.·.ex.·38} · 
57 2-10-10 Handwritten Notes from Athol Meeting [Dep. Ex. 39] "·*·•·. .. 
58 10-05 Handwritten notes from. meeting 
.. 
with Jim Coleman [Dep. Ex. 40] · .. 
4-01-08 LFR Proposal to Hughes .. 
•, 
Investments to Perform Phase I . ,, .. 59 
Environmental Site Assessment [#s 14 H> ,, : ·-·. 
1707] ::. ,. 
60 Brett Terrell Deposition Transcript, 2.,14- , 
.... 
·I.:·.· .. 
12 ,. .· 
61 6-9-1 0 Terrell Email to Johnson re: URM Athol Study .. . . 
. . 
L 
62 2-04-11 Letter from Winger to Johnson re: , 
Athol Commercial Property 
63 7-27-10 Terrell Email to Johnson re: URM Study for Athol 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST'.'."" 4 . 
753 of 1617
Exhibit Exhibit Description Adm/Stip Offered Refused 
Reserve 
Ruling 
64 5-28-09 Email from Reeslund to 
Vandervert re: Athol Site Plans 
65 Reserved 
66 Reserved 
8-31-10 Email Chain from Reeslund to 
67 Torgeson and Vandervert re: Bayview 
Gateway 
68 6-08-09 CLC Proposal for Services 
ITD Access Management: Standards and · , .. 
69 Procedures for Highway Right-of-Way· ;.·· --· . ' ... ' . ,. 
Encroachments - Selective pages 
ITD Administrative Policy A-12-01, State '· 70 
Highway Access Control 
71 Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance 394 · -. 
72 Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance 401 . ··• ·. 
73 Tom Vandervert Deposition Transcrtpf, 2-:-: 
13-12 . . . . . 
Coleman Engineering, Inc. Agreement for 
74 Professional Services with Hughes 
Investments [#s 000536-000555] 
8-16-10 Reeslund-Coleman.Email string · 
.. 
75 re: Athol project system aprovalwith · 
attachments [#s 000558 - 000566] 
Coleman Engineering Invoices to Hughes 
76 Investments for HJ Grathol Project [#s 
001489 - 001517] 
... 
.. 
77 Reserved ·. -
6-04-08 Email from Johnson to Coleman 
78 re: design of treatment system for Athol 
project [#s 001548 - 001579] 
Coleman Work File: Engineers Opinion of .. 
79 Probable Cost, December 09 [COLEMAN '. 
000001] 
Coleman Work File: Engineers Opinion of.. -- .. , 
80 Probable Cost, January 20t2 [COLEMAN.· ·., ·. 
000002] .. ... .. 
81 Coleman Work File: WW Flows .;. Fre>n:i, ·.· • ' 
.. ' , 
Site Plan 8-12-09 [COLEMAN 000003] ... . . 
Coleman Work File: WW Flows ~ From 
,,: . .. 
82 
Site Plan 6-25-09 [COLEMAN ooqoo41 . . ' .. :· , . .. . . · . . ., . . 
Coleman Work File: Township Map of ' ' . . •', .· .. 83 Subject Property [COLEMAN 000007] 
. •', 
.,. ,'•' 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST-,5 
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Exhibit Exhibit Description Adm/Stip Offered Refused Reserve Ruling 
Coleman Work File: Township Map with 
84 Coleman Plans for HJ Grathol Property 
[COLEMAN 000008] 
Coleman Work File: Athol Travel Plaza 
Summary Chart of Wastewater, Treatment 
85 Options, Disposed Options and Total Land 
Application Required, etc. [COLEMAN 
000009 - 00001 0] 
86 Coleman Work File: Athol Commercial Site Plan [COLEMAN 000011] 
Coleman Work File: Handwritten notes re:,· .. 
87 Riverside PUD/Advantex [COLEMAN 
000030- 000034] 
Coleman Work File: Figure 3: Treatment 
88 Process Flow Diagram with miscellaneous ·' ··.-attached pages [COLEMAN 000041· -
000044] .··. -
89 Coleman Work File: Commercial Plan for · · HJ Grathol property [COLEMAN 000048] 
Coleman Work File: Athol Commercial ·• .·· 
.. ·. 
90 
Site Plans [COLEMAN 000049 - 000051l -.: . ·, ,· 
91 Coleman Work File: HJ Grathol Plans [COLEMAN 000052] 
Coleman Work File: HJ Grathol Plans 
92 forwarded from Geoff Reeslund .. •. 
[COLEMAN 000053] 
93 Coleman Work File: HJ Grathol Plans 
[COLEMAN 000054] 
94 Deposition Transcript of Dewitt M. "Skip" Sherwood 
95 Grathol Listing Pages from Sherwood's . · 
Transaction File 




97 CV - Carole Richardson 
... 
98 David Evans and Associates Rebuttal Report, 12-16-11 
99 Appendix A to DEA Report . - . 
100 Appendix B to DEA Report 
101 Figure 1 DEA Report 
102 Figure 2 DEA Report 
·,·: ... ·--
103 Figure 3 DEA Report 
PLAINTIFF ITO'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST - 6 ·. 
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Exhibit Exhibit Description Adm/Stip Offered Refused Reserve 
Ruling 
104 Figure 4 DEA Report 
105 Figure 5 DEA Report 
106 Figure 6 DEA Report 
107 Figure 7 DEA Report 
108 Figure 8 DEA Report 
109 Figure 9 DEA Report 
110 Figure 10 DEA Report 
111 Figure 11 DEA Report 
112 Kootenai County Zoning Ordinances 
.-
113 
General Development Parameters -
Summary of Key Findings, DEA 
114 
Excerpt from Pages 6 and 7 of DEA ... 
Report 




Excerpt from Pages 12 and 13 of DEA '··· 
116 
Report 
117 CV - Kenneth Geibel , ' 
118 Appendix C to DEA Report 
2-13-12 Public Records Request Letter 
119 from Ted Tollefson to DEQ Coeur d'Alene 
Regional Office re: HJ Grathol Property '. 
2-23-12 Letter from DEQ Coeur d'Alene 
120 Regional Office to Barbara Feraci re: 
Public Records Request 
121 
Selective Pages from DEQ Public. Records. 
Request 
122 
DEA/Hedley Site Plan: Summary of Key 
Findings (Pages 19-20 of DEA Report) 
Developable Land Area - HJ Grathol Plans 
123 (Excerpt from Pages 11-12 of DEA .. ,, 
Report) ·. 
124 Figure 12 DEA Report 
Infrastructure Costs For HJ Grathol Site 
.· 
125 Plans (Excerpt from Pages 13-14 of DEA · ..
Report) 
Infrastructure Costs for Hedley/DEA Site· 
126 Plans (Excerpt from Pages 18-19 of DEA 
Report) 
127 Infrastructure Requirements .· 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST- 7 
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Exhibit Exhibit Description Adm/Stip Offered Refused Reserve 
Ruling 
128 Reserved 
129 Summary of HJ Grathol Wastewater 
System 
130 6-11-08 Zone Change Application and 
Related Materials 
131 8-12:..08 Kootenai County Letter with Staff 
Report 
132 8-21-08 Public Hearing Minutes 
133 HJ Grathol Application and Findings of 
Fact .. 
134 9-02-08 Findings of Fact .:. 
' 135 11-20-08 Order of Decision 
,. 
136 11-20-08 Ordinance No. 424 
137 CV - Larry Pynes '' ·'· 
138 Demographics Report 
139 Herron Appraisal Report, 12-01-.11 
140 Herron Rebuttal Report, 12:-1 s:..11 
141 Larry Pynes Summary of Value 
Conclusions 
142 Photos of Grathol Property 
143 Pynes Analysis of Johnson Sale 
144 Pynes Analysis of Sherwood Sales 
.· 
145 Pynes Comparable Sales Adjustment ·' 
Chart . 
. 
146 CV - George Hedley 
147 George Hedley Report, 12-19-2011 
148 Reserved 
149 CV - Dennis Reinstein 
150 Dennis Reinstein Expert Report, 12-19- ' 2011 
2011-04-15 Defendant HJGrathol's 
151 Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's First 
Set of Interrogatories and Requests for ·.··:·· 
Production of Documents ' 
.. ·,· ·, . 
.,. ' 
2011-05-16 Defendant HJ Grathol's-
152 Supplemental Responses. to .Plaintiff's· ' ' 
First Set of Interrogatories and Requests_ .. 
for Production 
. .- '• ··,_. .'. ·:·-
'•' 
2011-08-19 Defendant HJ Grathol's Exp~rt ''' 
.. ·,··: 
'. 
153 Witness Disclosure 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S TRIAL EXHIBIT i1ST- ~. · 
757 of 1617
Exhibit Exhibit Description Adm/Stip Offered Refused Reserve 
Ruling 
2011-09-19 Defendant HJ Grathol's 
Second Supplemental Answers and 
154 Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production of Documents 
2011-09-28 Defendant HJ Grathol's 
155 Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's 
Second Set of Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production 
2011-10-06 Defendant HJ Grathol's Third 
156 Supplemental Answers and Responses to 
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production of Documents. 
2011-12-05 Defendant HJ Grathol 's 
157 Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's 
Third Set of Interrogatories and Requests 
for Production .... 
158 2012-02-10 Defendant HJ Grathol's 
Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure · 
2012-02-17 Defendant HJ Grathol's Fourth 
. 
159 Supplemental Responses to 
Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production of Documents 
160 11-12-10 Reeslund-Johnson et. al. Email string re: ITD Conditions 
06-01-10 Fabiano-Johnson Email string 
161 re: Level of participation to pursue 
regarding the buying or leasing of parceis 
162 Alan Johnson Valuation (Model #2 and #3) 
163 M. Dewitt Sherwood Valuation (Model #1) 
164 Excerpt from Pages 15 - 16 of DEA Report· 
. 
. - . 
165 Excerpt from Pages 16 - 17 of DEA Report -·· 
.. 
166 Interactive Map - Prepared by Plaintiff 
167 Other Illustrative and demonstrative exhibits prepared by Plaintiff 
168 Any pleading filed in the case 
169 Any discovery response submitted in the I·• 
case 
170 Any document produced in discovery in . ·• 
the case 
171 Any deposition taken in the case 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST- 9 
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172 Any exhibit attached to any deposition taken in the case 
173 Any exhibit identified by HJ Grathol 
174 Any exhibit necessary for impeachment or 
rebuttal 
175 Any exhibit identified after the date of this initial exhibit list 
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of February 2012. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ GRA THOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES 1 through S, 
Defendants. 
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Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD"), files its Trial Brief in 
advance of the 8-day bench trial set to begin on March S, 2012. 
I. CASE SUMMARY 
ITD is engaged-in a project to widen and improve l:T-S"-95 from Gatwood to Sagle, Idaho. 
The Project will improve US-95 from a two-lane unrestricted access highway to a four-lane 
divided freeway. In order to construct the us.95 Project. ITD must condemn a portion of 
property owned by Defendant HJ Grathol, a California general partnership ("Grathol"). The 
Grathol property is located near the City of Athol. The Grathol property consists of 56.8 acres of 
undeveloped land. No utilities or infrastructure have been added to the site. The City of Athol 
has refused annexation of the property and has refused to allow Grathol to connect to the city's 
water and sewer systems. 
The Grathol property is cwrently zoned commercial. The property was originally zoned 
residential when Grathol purchased the property in 2008. Grathol applied to Kootenai County to 
have the property rezone to commercial, and the County approved Grathol' s request. In light of 
the current zoning of the property, the parties agree that the "highest and best use" of the 
property is for future commercial development. No development has occurred on the property 
and no business is located on the property. 
The Grathol property is bordered by US-95 on the west and State Highway 54 on the 
south. In the before condition-that is, the condition of the property before the taking and before 
the construction of the US-9S Project-Grathol had no legal access to US-9S, and had no 
physical access to SH 54. Grathol had three deeded access rights to SH S4 in the before 
condition, but no physical access was ever constructed under those deeds. The right of access 
under the deeds was limited to access for residential and fann use. However, after the rezone of 
the property to a commercial zone, the old deeded access riahts for farm or residential access 
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have no value or use to Grathol. Rather, Gtathol must obtain permits for commercial access. To 
date, Grathol has not applied for any commercial access to the site from either ITD or Lakes 
Highway District. 
As part ofthe-US-95 Project, ITD is condemning i6.3 acres of the Oiathol property. 
Attached to this brief as Exhibit 1 is an aerial photograph showing the general location of the 
Gtathol property and the vicinity of the property. Attached as Exhibit 2 is an aerial photograph 
showing the Grathol property lines and the portion being acquired. Attached as Exhibit 3 is an 
aerial photograph showing the Orathol property with a computer-genetated depiction of the new 
freeway, including the portion of the freeway to be constructed on the Grathol property. 
On May 28, 2008, Grathol paid $1.45 million for its 56.8-acre property. Yet in this case, 
Grathol is attempting to recover as much as $3,638,000 for ITD's acquisition of 16.3 acres, 
which is less than one-third of the total 56.8 acres. To reach this number that is far in excess of 
the amoUllt it paid for the property, Grathol uses improper and misleading valuation 
methodologies and value opinions that are not supported by the market data. 
Grathol has two valuation witnesses. The first is its vice president, Mr. Alan Johnson, 
who asks the Court to award between $2,658,090 and $3,638,000 for the taking of 16.3 acres. 
None of the valuations provided by experts on either side of the case is in that range. On 
February 10, 2012, Grathol's other valuation witness, real estate appraiser Dewitt Shetwood, 
caine forward with a "before and after" opinion of value as directed by the Court. His opinion is 
in the form of a range of between $1,775,000 and $1,880,000. Mr. Sherwood's appraisal is filled 
with errors and violations of USP AP, the professional standards governing the appraisal of real 
estate. 
ITD retained Mr. Stan Moe, MAI, to appraise the taldna. Mr. Moe prepared a formal 
appraisal report. His appraisal is a complete "before and after'' appraisal and report. Unlike 
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Grathol's valuation witnesses, Mr. Moe used the correct "date of valuation," which is the date of 
summons as mandated by Idaho Code § 7-721. The date of summons and date of valuation is 
November 17, 2010. Mr. Moe's appraisal determined that the difference between the fair market 
v:tlue of the entire-property before the taking and the fair market value of toe remaining property 
after the taking is $571,000. Mr. Moe did not find any severance damages based, in part, on the 
fact that Grathol touted the benefits of the new US-95 Project as the basis for having Kootenai 
Cowity rezone the property to commercial. In addition, Mr. Moe found no basis for concluding 
that Grathol' s ability to develop the property with commercial uses after the US-95 Project was 
impaired or damaged in any way. 
Grathol refused to disclose experts and expert opinions in this case, which led to ITD's 
Motion To Exclude Expert Testimony Or, Alternatively, To Compel Expert Disclosures filed on 
September 23, 2011. When faced with the motion and a court hearing, Grathol relented and 
designated three e,q,erts - Alan Johnson, Dewitt Sherwood, and Geoff Reeslund, and disclosed 
their opinions. 
When Grathol disclosed two valuation experts (Mr. Johnson and Mr. Sherwood), ITD 
retained a second appraiser, Mr. Larry Pynes, to review the opinions of Mr. Johnson and 
Mr. Sherwood. Ultimately, Mr. Pynes detennined that he needed to conduct his own appraisal 
and prepare a full appraisal report in order to respond to the opinions of Mr. Johnson and 
Mr. Sherwood. Like Stan Moe, Mr. Pynes conducted a full "before and after" appraisal and 
submitted a complete appraisal report. Mr. Pynes deter.mined the value of the property taken to 
be $675,000. Mr. Pynes also determined that the remaining property will suffer no severance 
damages. ITO timely disclosed Mr. Pynes as a rebuttal expert and produced his appraisal and 
rebuttal reports to Grathol in accordance with the Court's scheduling order. 
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The following is a summary of ITO' s two appraisal experts: 
STANMOE 
Licensed Real Estate Appraiser 
Professional Accreditations: MAI 
Date of Valuation: November 17, 2010 
c~nciusions of ·V-alue;- · 
Before: $1,973,000 
After: $1.402.600 
Just Compensation: $ 571,600 
LARRYPYNES 
Licensed Real Estate Appraiser 
Professional Accreditations: J.D., ASA 
Date of Valuation: November 17, 2010 
Conclusions of Value·:·" ... , 
Before: $2,350,000 
After: $1,67S,OOO 
Just Compensation: $ 675,000 
II. THE SOLE ISSUE FOR TRIAL IS THE AMOUNT OF JUST COMPENSATION 
TO BE PAID TO GRATHOL 
In condemnation cases, the sole issue for trial is the amount of just compensation to be 
paid to the property owner for the taking. See IDJI2d 7.01.1 ("[t]he sole issue for your 
determination is the just compensation to be paid to the defendant by the plaintiff[.]"), 
As properly directed by the Court, the focus of the trial will be on the ''before and after" 
valuation of the property to determine just compensation to be paid to Grathol for the taking of 
16.3 acres. See also IDJI2d 7.16. ("Just compensation is the difference between the market 
value of the entire property before the talcing and the market value of the remainder after the 
acquisition, together with any special damages caused by the taking measured as of [the date of 
summons].") (brackets added). 
III. ALL ISSUES OTHER THAN JUST COMPENSATION ARE TO BE RESOLVED 
BY THE COURT BEFORE TRIAL. 
Since the only issue in a condemnation trial is the amount of just compensation, all other 
issues are to be resolved brJfore trial. All of these issues are for the Court to decide. "[A]ll 
issues, whether legal or factual, other than just compensation, are for resolution by the trial 
court." City of Lewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 851, 8S7, 8S3 P.2d 596,602 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(citing Reuth v. State, 100 Idaho 203, 222-23, 596 P.2d 75, 94-95 (1978); Tibbs v. City of 
Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 670, 603 P.2d 1001, 1004 (1979)). 
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A. The Threshold Legal Issues Were Resolved Early In The Case. 
The threshold legal issues in a condemnation case are: (1) the scope and extent of the 
taldng; (2) whether the taking is needed for the public project; (3) whether the public use is a use 
~.1thorized by law;-and (4) whether the condemning auth-mity has the power-o-feminent domain. 
After an evidentiary hearing, the Court entered a written order resolving these issues. In that 
order, the Court held that the scope of the taking was defined in the Complaint. Order Granting 
Possession of Real Property, at 2, 12 and Exhibit A (legal description of the condemned 
property, which does not include land for Sylvan Road) (filed Jan. 27, 2011). The Court further 
held that the t.aking in this case is for a public use, the taking is necessary for that use, and ITD 
has the power of eminent domain. Id. at 3, ~12-3. 
B. Grathol's Challenge To The "Scope Of The Taking" Based On Sylvan Road 
Has Been Dismissed On Summary Judgment And Stricken From ne Case. 
At the hearing on rm' s motion for possession, the Court ruled that neither the 
administrative order of condemnation nor the Complaint condemned any land for Sylvan Road. 
See Transcript of January 21, 2011 hearing ("Tr."), at 61 :2-16, and 61 :18-25 (Ex. 1 to York Aff. 
filed Jan. 6, 2012). In its January 27, 2011 written order, the Court ruled that the scope of the 
taking was defined by and limited to the land identified and described in the Complaint Order 
Granting Possession of Real Property, at 2, 12, and citing Exhibit A to the order. Exhibit A to 
the order is a legal description of the land condemned in ITD' s complaint and does not include 
any land for Sylvan Road. 
Despite these early rulings, Grathol continued. to pursue a claim for compensation and 
damages based on Sylvan Road. Therefore, ITO filed a motion for summary judiJ:D,ent on the 
entire Sylvan Road issue, On February 3, 2012, the Court entered its Order Re: PlaintijfJs 
Motion For Summary Judgment, granting IID's motion for summary judament on Grathol' s 
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Sylvan Road claims. The Court held: "ITD's Motion for Summary Judgment re: a taking claim 
for Sylvan Road and damages for such alleged taking is granted and this claim is hereby 
stricken." Id. at 3 (emphasis in original). Therefore, all taking and damage claims relating to 
·&y1van Road have bee:a dismissed on summary judgmenfand stricken from tlie case. 
IV. RULINGS BY THE COURT HA VE SET THE PARAMETERS FOR THE TRIAL 
ON JUST COMPENSATION 
A. Claims For Severance Damages BaJTed By Law Have Been Dismissed On 
Summary Judgment And Stricken From The Case. 
Grathol sought to recover just compensation in the form of severance damages based on 
improper claims for construction delay, lost profits, and the value of gravel that may be located 
on the condemned property. ITD moved for summary judgment on these claims on the grounds 
that they are barred as a matter of law. The Court granted ITD's motion and dismissed these 
claims from the suit. 
In its order, the Court noted that at the February 2, 2012 hearing on ITD's motion, 
"Grathol's counsel conceded that three of Grathol's claims could be dismissed, to wit: 
(1) construction delay; (2) lost profits; and (3) gravel damages." Order Re: Plaintiff's Motion 
For Summary Judgment, at 2-3. Accordingly, the Court ruled that ''ITD's Motion for Summary 
Judgment re: (1) construction delay; (2) lost profits; and (3) gravel damages is granted based 
upon Grathol' s concession, and these claims are hereby stricken[.]" Id. at 2 ( emphasis added). 
Therefore, Grathol's claims for construction delay, lost profits, and recovery for the value of 
gravel have been dismissed on summary judgment and stricken from the case. 
B. The Court Bas Also Ruled That Grathol May Not Seek Separate Severanee 
Damqe Awards Based On Allegations Of Restriction Of Aceess, Loss Of 
Visibility, Or Development Plan Damages. 
Grathol previously sought separate severance damage awards based on allegations of 
restriction of access and loss of visibility, Grathol also attempted to recover severance damages 
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by using site development plans to show Project impacts on a development that does not exist. 
ITD moved for summary judgment on these claims. 
Idaho law bars recovery for an alleged loss or restriction of access in a condem.nation 
··zP..se uniess ail· access to the property is "destroyed" and the property is 'leffwithout access to the 
public road system. See, e.g., Merritt v. State, 113 Idaho 142, 145, 742 P.2d 397,400 (1987) 
(finding that "there having been no destruction of vehicular access to the [landowner's) property, 
and the remaining vehicular access being reasonable, there was no taking of the [landowner's] 
property which would entitle him to compensation."). 
Idaho law and the majority of states also bar recovery for an alleged "loss of visibility" of 
property from passing traffic. See ITD's Brief in Support of Motion/or Summary Judgment, at 
23-32 (filed Jan. 6, 2012). 
Grathol' s claims for loss of access and loss of visibility also fail as a matter of law 
because no facts exist to support them. ITD is not taking or restricting any access, and the US-95 
Project will not block visibility of the property. In responding to ITD's motion for summary 
judgment, Grathol failed to come forward with any evidence to support its claims. The only 
support it offered were conclusory statements by its two vice presidents. It gave no specifies 
regarding resttictions on access and no support for loss of visibility. Nor did Grathol explain or 
quantify how the alleged restrictions affect value. 
Lastly, Idaho law bars Grathol from using site plans with various visions of potential 
development on the property as a basis for recovering severance damages, Specifically, IDJI2d 
7 .14 states that the fact finder "may consider the owner's particular plan for development and use 
of the property only for the purposes of determining uses for which the property is adaptable." 
Id. In other words, Grathol cannot seek or recover damages by pointing to an un-built site plan 
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and claiming ''we cannot build this here now," or ''this building will have to be smaller," and ask 
that specific dollar amounts be assigned to such alleged "losses" or "severance~, damages. 
On February 16, 2012, the Court entered its Order Re: Defendant HJGrathol's 
··&verance Damages: ·In that order, the Court ruled as follows: 
Grathol is hereby barred from seeking any separate discreet 
severance damages, to include loss of visibility, access and 
development plan damages, because these claims are incorporated 
in Grathol' s expert witness disclosures as to the before and after 
fair market values for the remainder parcel. 
Id. at 2. Therefore, Grathol may not seek or recover separate awards of damages for alleged 
restrictions on access or loss of visibility. Nor can Orathol use un-built development plans to 
recover a separate award for severance damages. Rather, as held by the Court, "these claims are 
incorporated in Orathol' s expert witness disclosures as to the before and after fair market values 
for the remainder parcel." Id. 
Based on the Court's ruling, no testimony should be needed from either side on the issues 
of access, visibility, or site plans. Since these issues are incorporated in Grathol's opinions of 
value, then only the valuation testimony is necessary. 
V. THE DISAGREEMENT OVER JUST COMPENSATION IS CAUSED BY 
FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN THE METHODS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF GRATHOL'S VALUATION WITNESSES. 
The Court's decision on just compensation will turn on its evaluation of the markedly 
higher opinions of value advanced by Grathol' s valuation witnesses and the methodologies and 
assumptions they used to reach those high numbers. The following factors are the primary 
source of the disagreement between the parties on the amount of just compensation. 
First, the Grathol opinions assume immediate and successful commercial development on 
the property. However, the facts show that the area has little or no demand for commercial 
development, particularly as of the date of valuation (after the real estate crash in 2008 and after 
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the bottom had fallen out of the U.S. economy). The facts also show that the surrounding area 
has no consumer base to support end users like grocery stores, retail chains, and restaurants that 
Grathol has suggested will purchase lots within the commercial development. Therefore, as 
· ··--fcund by the appraisers and deveiopment experts retained by ITD, the property will have to be 
held for a lengthy period of time before commercial development will be viable. 
Second, Grathol's experts, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Sherwood, employ the "comparable 
sales" approach to real estate valuation. However, they have not used sales of property that are 
comparable to the subject property. On the contl'ary, to value property located in the sparsely-
populated, rural area near the town of Athol, they have gone to Spokane, Coeur d'Alene, Post 
Falls, and other developed areas and selected sales of prime commercial real estate to support 
their claims for the value of the Grathol property. This is not surprising for Mr. Johnson, who 
has a financial interest in the outcome of the case. However, it is surprising for Mr. Sherwood, 
who would not be expected to deviate from the standards and principles that govern his 
profession. 
Lastly, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Sherwood misuse the "comparable" sales they selected. 
They either make no adjustments where adjustments should be made for location, si2e, date of 
sale~ availability of utilities and infrastructure, and other attributes, or they make adjustments 
which significantly increase the value of the Grathol property - without any explanation or 
analysis that would justify the adjustment or that can be evaluated or verified. 
A. Flaws In Appraisal By Mr, Sherwood, 
1, Failure to value tbe "larcer parcel," 
Mr. Sherwood's appraisal improperly values the "larger parcelu as the 30 western acres 
and not the entire 56.8-ac:re parcel owned by Grathol. Mr. Sherwood attempted to fix this defect 
in his valuation as directed by the Court in early February. His "fix" consists of simply stating 
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that he actually valued the entire S6.8-acre parcel. H9wever, his value conclusion remained the 
same. 
Thus, either Mr. Sherwood did not actually value the "larger parcel" consisting of S6.8 
-aires, and he continues to contend that the eastern 26+ acres are worth $0,00 per sq, ft., or his 
actual value for the entire 56.8 acre Grathol property is $1.17 per sq. ft. rather than the $2.25 per 
sq. ft. stated in his report. 
2. Failure to use the correct "date of valuation." 
In Idaho, the date of valuation for purposes of determining just compensation is mandated 
by statute. See I.C, § 7w712. Idaho Code§ 7~712 requires that the value of the property taken in 
a condemnation case and the severance damages, if any, to the remaining property are to be 
determined as of "the date of the summons." Id In this case, the date of summons and, 
therefore, the date of valuation is November 17, 201 O. 
Instead of using the date of valuation mandated by statute, Mr. Sheiwood used multiple 
dates in his valuation- none of which was the date of valuation of November 17, 2010. He 
valued the Grathol property in the "before" condition as of September 2010, and he used 
valuation dates of March 2012 and March 2013 for his "after" value. Thus, Mr. Sheiwood's 
appraisal violates the law on valuing just compensation in condemnation cases, Moreover, 
Mr. Sherwood used and manipulated the dates of value to justify an inflated opinion of value. 
For these reasons, stated more fully in ITD's Brief In Support Of Motion In Limine filed 
January 6; 2012; ~..r. Sherwood's appraisal should be stricken, 
3. Use of "construction delay" to manipulate fair market value, and 
failure to remove "construction delay" as required by the Court's 
order. 
Mr. Sherwood's appraisal improperly includes damages for "Downward Time Value and 
Impact Adjustment." These are separate "damages" and are not attributable to a decrease in/air 
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market value. "Just compensation means the fair market value of the property taken measured as 
of [the date of summons)." 1Dn2d § 7.05. 
' The Court granted ITD's motion for summary judgment on Grathol's claim for damages 
-based on construction delay and ordered that the ciaim oe"stricken frottftne·case; Order Re: 
Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment, at 2. However, despite the Court's order 
Mr. Sherwood continues to include dollar amounts based on construction delays of 1.5 to 2.5 
years. His calculations ate set forth below: 
• Value of the property taken (16.314 acres at $2.25 per sq.ft.) = $1,598,543, 
He then calculates a "Downward time value adjustment," which is 
based on construction delays of 1.5 years and 2.5 years. 
$1,598,543 (value of take)+ $176,457 (1.5 years delay)-= $1,770,000 
$1,598,543 (value of take)+ $281,457 (2.S years delay) c $1,880,000 
The $176,457 and $281,457 represent construction delay damages that have been stricken 
from the case but continue to be included in Mr. Sherwood's appraisal. 
Moreover, these figures are separate "damages" and are not attributable to a dec.rease in 
fair market vaiue. 
4. Failure to use "comparable" sales. 
The "comparable" sales used by Mr. Sherwood are far superior to the Grathol property 
and do not reflect the value of property near Athol, Idaho. Mr. Sherwood used sales in highly-
developed areas along Interstate 90, with much stronger market demand and significantly higher 
real estate values. Mr. Sherwood also used sales in superior locations within the city limits of 
Spokane, Coem d'Alene, and Post Falls with access to city services. 
Using sales from developed urban areas significantly distorts the value of the Gratho! 
property located outside of Athol. The sales used by Mr. Sherwood have significantly higher 
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surrounding population densities to support commercial development than Athol. Mr. Sherwood 
appears to have purposefully gone out of his way to find properties in Spokane, Coeur d'Alene, 
Post Falls, and along I-90 to inflate the value of the Otathol property, 
-· -s~ ·---- Incorrect information on sales used. 
The information provided by Mr. Sherwood on the sales he relied on has been found to 
be incorrect or misrepresented in many instances. In addition, many of the sales had utilities 
such as water and sewer in place or available, whereas the Grathol property does not. 
6. Misuse of a condemnation settlement as a "comparable sale." 
The comparable sale that Mr. Sherwood placed the greatest emphasis on was not a "sale." 
Rather, his sale #5 was in fact a settlement of a condemnation, which included incentives and 
payments above fair market value to achieve settlement and avoid litigation. As such, the 
transaction was not a comparable sale, and is not evidence of fair market value. ITD set forth 
the law and appraisal principles barring use of settlements as indicators of market value in 
previous briefing filed with the Court. See Plaintiff ITD 's Brief In Support Of Motton In Limine, 
at 16-19 (filed Jan. 6, 2012). Again, use of a settlement instead of an open market transaction is 
contrary to the proper use of the sales comparison approach to real estate valuation. 
7, Failure to make uecessary adjustments. 
Mr. Sherwood used sales that occurred at the height of the real estate market, and made 
no adjustments for time to reflect market conditions as of the date of taking on November 17, 
2010. He failed to make adjustments for size, location, and improvements where adjustments 
should have been made. 
8. Failure to disclose and explain adjustments to "comparable'' sales. 
Mr. Sherwood failed to disclose the specific adjustments he made to the comparable sales 
he relied on to reach his conclusion of value. Adjustments are the key to proper use of the sales 
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comparison approach to real estate valuation. He made adjustments in a "black box," without 
explanation, quantification, or reasoning for the adjustments. Thus, it is not possible to evaluate 
or verify the validity of his adjustments. The one thing that is clear is that he used black box 
. adjustments to·increase the value of the Grathoi propedy. · 
B. Flaws In Value Opinion Of Alan Johnson. 
Mr. Alan Johnson is vice president of Grathol. He is not a real estate appraiser. The few 
examples set forth below show that his valuation is fundamentally flawed and driven by 
Grathol's own financial interest in the outcome of this case. 
1. Inexplicable "before" and "after" values. 
Mr. Johnson's ''before" value ($3.23 per sq. ft.) is inexplicably lower than the "after" 
value ($4.00 to $4.S0 per sq. ft.). This indicates that the Project increased the value of the 
property in the after condition. Yet somehow, inexplicably, he manages to reach the highest 
figure for just compensation in the case. 
2. Improper valuation of the property in pieces. 
Mr. Johnson values the land in portions, rather giving an opinion of value of the whole or 
"larger parcel.'~ As a result, the math shows that his value of the entire 56.8 acres is less than the 
$3.23 per sq. ft. price used by Mr. Johnson. This inconsistency results from his placing different 
values on different portions of the property, In the before condition, Mr. Johnson values the 
16.314·acre take area at $3.23 per sq. ft., the west remainder at $3.23 and $4.00 per sq. ft., and 
the east remainder at $1.00 per sq. ft. In the after condition, Mr. Johnson again values the take 
area at $3.23, but values four different areas within the remainder at values ranting from $4.50 to 
$1.00 per sq. ft. This type of valuation is improper, and is contrary to law and established real 
estate valuation principles in condemnation cases. 
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3. Valuation of the "after'' condition as if already developed. 
Mr. Johnson values of the remainder as though it were developed. The property is not 
developed and it is improper to value it as if it were. 
- 4.- - Failure to use correct "date of'"iaiuation." 
Mr. Johnson fails to establish the before and after value of the property as of the date of 
summons, November 17, 2010, in violation of Idaho Code § 7-712. He manipulates the 
valuation dates to reach a higher compensation figure, 
S. Use of "construction delay" to manipulate fair market value, and 
failure to remove "construction delay" as required by the Court's 
order. 
Like Mr. Sherwood, Mr. Johnson's opinion also improperly includes damages for 
"Down.ward Time Value and bnpact Adjustment." These are separate "damages" for 
construction delay and are not attributable to a decrease in the fair market value of the property. 
The Court has dismissed claims for construction delay, but the claim is still reflected in 
Mr. Johnson's opinion of value. 
6. Use of only one comparable sale, 
Mr. Johnson used only one "comparable sale" to support his opinion of value, This is not 
a proper use of the "comparable sales" approach to real estate valuation. 
7. Misuse of the one comparable sale, 
Mr. Johnson misuses the one sale on which his opinion is based. The folloWing are some 
examples: 
• The sale Mr. Johnson relied on is considerably smaller than the Otathol property. 
However, he did not adjust the sale price to account for the size difference, 
resulting in a substantially inflated opinion of value when applied to the Gra.thol 
property. 
• The sale property had water and sewer/septic available, The Grathol property has 
no sewer or water, and those systems will have to be constructed at considerable 
expense to Orathol. A developer always pays more for property with utilities and 
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infrastructure in place or available to the site. Mr. Johnson made no adjustment to 
reflect these differences. 
• The sale relied on by Mr. Johnson occurred at the height of the real estate market, 
yet he made no adjustment to the date of taking in this case. By using a sale at the 
top of the market, without adjustment, he gives an inflated opinion of value of the 
--G1athol property as of the date of taking:-··· 
• The sale relied on by Mr. Johnson is located in Sagle, and has considerably better 
potential for commercial development than the Grathol property. He made no 
adjustment for location or market support. 
• Mr. Johnson's adjustments are made in a "black box," where neither the 
adjustments nor the methodology or reasoning he employed can be seen, 
understood, or verified. 
• The comparable sale relied on by Mr. Johnson sold for $2.69 per sq. ft. 
Mr. Johnson adjusted the price upward by an arbitrary 20% based on the Grathol 
property being located at a signalized intersection. However, he ignored the fact 
that the comparable sale is in Sagle and is a superior property in tenns of size, 
utilities, and development potential. 
• With his upward adjustment of20%, Mr. Johnson claims that the Grathol property 
is worth S3.23 per sq. ft. About 3 months after the sale of the Sagle property, that 
property was listed for sale again, this time at $3.48 per sq. ft. The property has 
been on the market at that price for over 3 years now. This clearly shows that 
there is no market for commercial property at that price, particularly in the remote 
area around Athol. 
• The sale relied on by Mr. Johnson shows that there is no market support for his 
contention that the Grathol property is worth $3.23 per sq. ft., particularly where 
the Sagle property is in a better location, has better development potential, and 
has water and sewer available. 
Mr. Johnson's opinion of value is fundamentally flawed and unreliable. In light of the 
substantial disparity between his opinion and those of the three licensed real estate appraisers 
involved in the case, Mr. Johnson's valuation should be given little, if any, weight. 
VI. ORDER OF PROOF AND ANTICIPATED WITNESSES 
As the Plaintiff, ITD will lead off and present Mr. Jason Minzghor, P.E., the ITD project 
manager for the US-95 Project Mr. Minzghor will explain the Project and identify and explain 
the taking on the Grathol property. ITD will then call Mr. Stan Moe, MAI, who will go through 
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his appraisal report and give his opinion of the value of the uiking. ITD will then rest its case-in-
chief. 
After ITD presents the Project, explains the taking, and presents the appraisal and value 
···-· conclusion of its independent appraiser' the burden shifts to Grathol to prove that it is entitled to 
more compensation. "In this case, the defendants have the burden of proving that the just 
compensation for the taking of their property exceeds the sum of$ ____ , which is the 
amount for just compensation presented in this trial by the state[.]" IDJl2d § 7.03. See also 
Rocky Mountain Power v. Jensen,_ Idaho~ _P.3d _ 2012 WL 231254, *S (Idaho Jan. 
26, 2012) ("The burden of proving just compensation is borne by the landowner."). 
ITO does not know what witnesses Grathol will call at trial. Since the Court has 
correctly directed that the trial shall focus on the "before and after'' value of the property, 
Orathol should call only Mr. Johnson and Mr. Sherwood. However, Grathol has indicated that it 
may call witnesses to testify on unrelated issues, such as the costs of construction of sewer and 
waste water treatment systems on the property, and the development of various site development 
plans with various visions of commercial uses and sizes and locations of commercial uses. 
These witnesses are not relevant to the issue to be tried-the fair market value of the property 
before and after the taking. Thus, if Grathol is permitted to call these witnesses, their testimony 
should be limited. 
ITD believes that Grathol may call "fact,, witnesses who are engineers and other experts 
whose testimony is composed primarily of opinions. Grathol appears to be returning to the 
"actor/viewer" ploy it attempted to use early in the case to hide all expert opinions. ITD will 
address this issue by motion. If witnesses are permitted to testify to expert opinions that were 
not timely disclos~ ITD will suffer substantial prejudice and will be forced to appeal and seek a 
new trial if an adverse verdict 1esults. 
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After Gtathol presents its case, ITO will call Stan Moe and Larry Pynes to rebut the 
valuation opinions, methodologies, and conclusions of Mr. Johnson and Mr. Sherwood. If 
Grathol is permitted to call witnesses to testify about side issues unrelated to the fair market 
vaiue of the property, such as water and sewer faciliti1,;;s and various visions or plans for 
commercial development on the property, then ITD will call two engineers from the local firm 
David Evans and Associates: Ms. Carole Richardson, P.E., and Mr. Ken Geibel, P.E. ITD is 
also prepared to c~ll Mr. George Hedley, a commercial real estate developer and national 
authority on real estate development, to testify in response to Grathol' s claims regarding the 
development potential, costs, and time :frame for development of the subject property. In 
particular, Mr. Hedley will focus on the lack of demand and market support for commercial 
development in that area, and the significant questions regarding financial feasibility of 
commercial development on the site. 
All of these witnesses prepared written rebuttal reports, and these reports were produced 
to Grathol in accordance with the Court's scheduling order. 
If Grathol attempts to bring in issues that have already been resolved and stricken from 
the case, such as Sylvan Road, ITD would have to call additional witnesses on rebuttal. For 
example, ITD has contacted Kootenai County regarding the issue of Sylvan Road. Kootenai 
County has designated Ms. Mel Palmer, a planner in the Planning and Zoning Department, to 
testify on issues relating to Sylvan Road, Grathol's rezone of the property, and commercial 
access requirements. Specifically, Ms. Palmer will testify that Grathol will be required to build 
Sylvan Road, regardless of the US-95 Project, as a condition for county approval of a 
commercial development on the Grathol property. 
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In summary, the anticipated witnesses in the case are as follows: 
ITD CASE IN CHIEF 
Jason Minzghor, P.E. 
Stan Moe; r,..w-
GRATHOL CASE IN CIDEF 
Dewitt Sherwood, MAI 
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ITD REBU'ITAL 
Stan Moe, MAI 
. Larry Pynes, JD, ASA 
Carole Richardson, P .E . 
(if necessary) 
Ken Geibel, P .E. 
(if necessary) 
George Hedley, Developer 
(if necessary) 
Mel Palmer, Kootenai County 
(if necessary) 
The sole issue for trial is the amount of just compensation to be paid for the taldng of 
16.3 acres from the S6.8"acre parcel owned by Grathol. Therefore, the only witnesses who 
should testify at trial are the valuation witnesses. Testimony by non-valuation witnesses would 
necessarily be tangential at best to the issue of the amount of just compensation. If other 
witnesses are permitted to testify, their testimony should be limited. 
All claims based on Sylvan Road, construction delay, lost profits, and gravel damages 
have been dismissed on summary judgment and have been stricken from the case. Therefore, no 
testimony on these claims should be pennitted and no claims for monetary recovery should be 
allowed to be pursued at trial. 
The Court has correctly ruled that Grathol may not seek separate monetary awards for 
severance damages based on allegations of restriction of access, loss of visibility, or damages 
based on un"built development plans. No testimony on these issues is necessary because, as 
correctly noted by the Court, ''these claims are incorporated in Grathol' s expert witness 
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disclosures as to the before and after fair m.arket values for the remainder parcel." Order Re: 
Defendant HJ Grathol 's Severance Damages, at 2. 
The focus of the trial will be on the disparities between appraisers Stan Moe and Larry 
- · · ··Pynes for ITD and Dewitt Sherwood for Gtathol. The ·verdict on jusfcoriipensatiori will 
necessarily tum on who the Court finds to have conectly and fairly applied accepted appraisal 
principles and methodologies and reached a fair and objective determination of fair market value. 
From a broader perspective, the State ofldaho will not be able to improve its highways if 
held hostage by extreme demands for payment for land. In this case, Grathol wants a minimum 
of $1,775,000 for 16.3 acres ofland, or $108,895 per acre. The State will not be able to build 
roads if it has to pay $108,000 per acre for undeveloped land in rural areas. 
DATED this 27th day of February, 2012. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Idaho Transportation Department 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 27th day of February, 2012, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
..•. Christoph~D.-Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Dougias S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 
through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S 
TRIAL BENCH BRIEF 
CO1\1ES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol and submits its Trial Bench Brief in accordance 
with the Court's Uniform Pretrial Order. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a proceeding brought by Plaintiff, the State of Idaho and the Idaho Board of 
Transportation (the "Board") for condemnation of a 16.314 acre portion of real property 
owned by Defendant, HJ Grathol ("Grathol"), at the intersection of U.S. 95 and State 
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Highway 54 in Kootenai County, Idaho. 
After filing its Complaint for condemnation in November, 2010, the Board moved for 
and received an Order for Possession. The remaining issues to be litigated at trial in this 
matter are a determination of the amount of just compensation for the real property taken and 
the severance damages accruing to the remainder of the Grathol property. The determination 
of just compensation owed to Grathol includes issues of the larger parcel and an examination 
of different methodologies used to calculate condemnation damages. 
This Court is well acquainted with the fundamental differences between the parties' 
positions. This Trial Bench Brief will, accordingly, address only those primary issues 
articulated by the Court at the last status conference as being areas of ongoing concern to the 
Court, specifically the larger parcel analysis and the measure(s) of damages. 
1. The Larger Parcel. 
The term "larger parcel" is not a regular part of the appraisal lexicon. See, The 
Appraisal of Real Estate, 10th ed., Appraisal Institute (1992). It is an analytical premise unique 
to eminent domain valuation and thus often misapplied. The "larger parcel'' theory is 
sometimes referred to as the ''parent tract" or the "rule ofjoinder." In a typical valuation, "the 
appraiser estimates the value of a parcel of land which has specific boundaries and the 
parameters of the property are known before the analysis is made. This is not, or should not be, 
the case in condemnation appraisals." Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, 2nd ed., Eden (1995). 
In condemnation valuations, the appraisal should first address what, precisely, is the larger 
parcel. In condemnation valuation, when a tract or tracts of land are under the beneficial 
control of a single individual or entity and have the same, or at least integrated, highest and best 
use; those tracts can be considered as one "larger" parcel. See e.g., State ex rel. Rich v. 
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Halverson, 86 Idaho 242, 384 P.2d 480 (1963), citing with approval Sasso v. Housing Authority 
of Providence, 82 RI 451, 111 A.2d 226 (" ... it is generally held that two tracts can be treated 
as one ... [it] ... the taking of one necessarily ... injures the other.") 
The "larger parcel" may be all of a parcel, part of a parcel, or even several separate 
parcels depending to a varying degree on unity of ownership, unity of use and contiguity. 
When a condemnation does not effectuate a taking of a complete parcel but only a part of a 
larger parcel; the owner is entitled to damages from the severance as well as the value of the 
parcel taken. Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th Ed; Idaho Code§ 7-711. 
The tests to determine the larger parcel (i.e. - unity of ownership, unity of use, and 
contiguity) cannot be applied universally and blindly. See, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, 
2nd ed. supra. Most courts, both State and Federal, have ruled that all three indicia need not be 
present in every instance. The factors for consideration in determining the larger parcel are all 
evidentiary in nature, and like most valuation issues, the court has broad discretion in weight 
given to these factors. 
The physical contiguity of land is an engineering question; the unity of ownership is 
usually a legal question; and the unity of use is typically a factual question. Many examples can 
be given where two or even only one of the elements of the "larger parcel" test is evident, but 
where the larger parcel is still determinable. One simple example is where a tract has a 
commercial highest and best use. However, only a small comer portion of the parcel is 
presently in a commercial use, say, for example; a convenience store. In that instance, the 
entire parcel may meet the test of unity of ownership and physical contiguity, but there is not a 
unity of use if the remainder of the parcel is vacant. Therefore, if condemnation affects the 
opposite comer from where the convenience store is located, the convenience store area is not 
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part of the larger parcel and therefore does not suffer compensable damage or receive special 
benefits. 
By properly defining the larger parcel, the appraiser, valuation witness, or court can 
confine judgments of value to the parcel(s), or parts of a parcel that are most directly affected 
by the condemnation. It is universally held that the determination of what constitutes the 
"larger parcel" is a question of fact, not of law. Therefore, the question is typically to be 
answered by the jury ( or trier of fact), which should consider evidence of the use, appearance of 
the land, its legal division or divisibility, and the intent of its owner ( emphasis added). State ex 
rel. Symms v. City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528,493 P.2d 387 (1972), citing 4A Nichols§ 
14.31. 
Often the larger parcel analysis comes into play when part of a unified parcel is taken 
and the condemnor argues that the remainder parcel is specifically benefited by the purpose for 
which the take occurred and that special benefit should be an offset against any severance 
damages. This was the issue in the City of Mountain Home case, supra. In that case, 14 acres 
of a 255 acre parcel was condemned for a highway which would bisect the larger (255 acre) 
parcel owned by the City of Mountain Home. Both the State ( condemnor) and the City 
( condemnee) agreed that the remainder would derive some special benefits. The City argued 
the benefits were far outweighed by the damages to the remainder. The jury agreed and 
awarded less than the lowest estimate of special benefits and the State appealed. That issue of 
damages was found to be in error so an additer was awarded but, germane to this case, the 
Court affirmed the notion that the larger parcel concept must be applied with flexibility, taking 
into account the unique facts of each case (and property). 
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"Under a statute such as our [LC. § 7-711 ], it is not the identity of 
uses of the condemned and remaining land which is 
determinative; what is significant is the dependency of the value 
on the remaining land upon its use in conjunction with the 
condemned land." 
94 Idaho at 532. 
In this case, the larger parcel analysis should focus on valuation of a part of Grathol's 
total property, specifically the western most 30± acres, even though Grathol will still own 26.4 
acres after the take. The logic for this is that the western most 30 acres are the most usable, 
desirable and marketable part of the property. Like the City of Mountain Home case, all of 
Grathol' s remaining property will, as a direct consequence of the take, be impacted, but not 
nearly to the magnitude of the western portion. Accordingly, the effects (damages) upon the 
part of the property that would be developed are (at least incrementally) greater than the effects 
upon the whole property. 
The remainder parcel in City of Mountain Home case (over 230 acres) was intended to 
be used in part to add nine holes to the City's golf course. However, the remainder parcel was 
crossed by a drainage ditch, "a physical barrier of considerable size." Id. Because this physical 
barrier, together with the loss of property by the bisecting highway, impacted the ability to add 
holes to the existing golf course, severance damages were properly awarded even though the 
golf course was, in the view of the condemnor, not properly part of the larger parcel. In this 
case, Grathol's larger parcel (the west 30 acres) will be damaged by the loss of the part taken, 
by the effects of segregation created when the new highway cuts through the property (leaving 
remnant parcels on both sides) and certainly by the further division caused by the need to 
construct Sylvan as a frontage road. In this respect, the intent of the condemnee (Grathol) 
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relative to development of the property bears heavily on the question of damages to the 
remainder property. 
The larger parcel evaluation can be complicated by application of the "back land 
theory" or the "front land - rear land" concept. These issues arise where, as is the situation 
here, a parcel with desirable frontage on a roadway is intuitively worth more closer to the 
frontage and worth less toward the back or rear of the property. One of the best descriptions of 
this circumstance is as follows: 
A land owner is always entitled to the fair market value of the 
land actually taken. The fair market value of the front land in 
certain situations is higher than the average unit price of the tract 
as a whole. The fact that adjacent areas of the property ... are all 
under the same ownership, and together compose a large 
ownership tract, does not presuppose that they would be 
developed or marketed as a single tract. In fact, market realities 
dictate otherwise. An owner ordinarily will sell a portion of his 
property for the highest price the market will deliver so long as 
that ... does not damage the value of the remainder. 
State Dept of H'ways v. Stegemann, 269 So.2d 480 (La. 1973) 
Accordingly, most jurisdictions recognize that different portions of a single larger tract 
may have both different highest and best uses and certainly different per unit values. Applying 
the back land theory is difficult in the best of circumstances. Where, as here, the property is 
bordered not just on one side by a single highway but rather on two sides by two intersecting 
highways (in the before condition) and will be bisected by one of those highways and have 
direct access to only one of them (in the after condition), applying these general valuation 
principals in some cookie-cutter fashion is extraordinarily difficult. 
Simply put, any effort to apply a precise, gradiated value to portions of the larger parcel 
in proportion to the distance of each portions of the parcel from the offsite features that affect 
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desirability (the road), is futile. Some commentators argue that property can be divided into 
"zones of value" by moving backward through a property away from the point of a take. 
However, as stated in Nichols, "this kind of scientific analysis of market conditions is not 
representative of what occurs in the market and begins to drift so far away from reaiity to be an 
exercise in abstract philosophy rather than an attainment of damage value." 
Here, the evidence will focus on what Grathol could do in terms of development of the 
property had the highway improvements never been proposed or built versus what Grathol must 
address in order to develop and market the property after the project is built. That, together 
with the value of the 16.4 acres being taken, constitutes Grathol' s just compensation. 
2. Measure of Damages. 
In partial takings cases, as here, the government must compensate a landowner not 
only for the value of the land taken but also for any damage to the remainder. Hetland v. 
Capaldi, 103 RI 614, 240 A.2d 155 (1968). Where only a portion of a property is 
condemned, the measure of damages includes both the value of the portion of land actually 
taken and the value by which the remaining land has been diminished as a consequence of the 
partial taking. Calculating the value by which the remainder has been diminished is more 
difficult when the remainder is subject to a variety of uses or is presently under-utilized. 
There are two main, although not exclusive, methods of calculating damages in eminent 
domain. One method enunciated by courts is the so-called "before and after rule," which 
computes severance damages as the difference between the value of the entire tract before the 
taking and the value of the remainder area after the taking. State by Commissioner of 
Transportation v. Silver, 92 NJ 507, 457 A.2d 463 (1983). The difference is just 
compensation. This approach is illustrated by the following equation: 
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Value of entire parcel before taking - value of remainder 
area after taking= just compensation. 
However, strict application of the before and after rule can have a tendency to either 
disregard, or conversely, to double-count severance damages. Therefore, a hybrid before and 
after rule approach is sometimes applied. This involves a formulaic effort to determine the 
value of the part taken ( as a part of the whole), adding to that the damages to the remainder, and 
then subtracting any special benefits. This is supposed to yield a difference that should 
accurately constitute the just compensation owed. This variation to the before and after rule, is 
absolutely necessary in jurisdictions (like Idaho) which statutorily provide for both severance 
damages and special benefits. This approach is illustrated by the following equation: 
Value of entire parcel before taking - value of remainder 
area after taking = value of part taken. Then, value of part 
taken + damages to remainder (if any) - benefits to 
remainder (if any) = just compensation. 
A simple example is as follows: The landowner owns five acres of vacant, residential 
land and the government takes one acre. The one acre taken is valued at $100,000.00 at the 
time of taking and the remaining four acres are valued at $400,000.00 before the taking 
( entire parcel is valued thus at $500,000.00 before the taking). Under local zoning 
regulations, a 1.5 acre minimum lot size is required to build. Before the taking the landowner 
could subdivide the land into three buildable lots, but after the taking the landowner can only 
subdivide his property into two lots. Because the landowner's use of the remainder has been 
limited by the taking of the one acre parcel, the remaining four acres have been valued at 
$330,000.00 after the taking. Using the above equation, the landowner's just compensation 
for the partial taking would be computed as follows: $500,000.00 - $330,000.00 = 
$170,000.00. 
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If only it were so simple in this case . . .. Grathol's property, being commercial 
development property located on, and bordered by, two intersecting high traffic corridors, 
cannot be systematically pigeonholed into a simple "unit" value equation, because the 
damages to the remainder are not limited as in this example where the only severance damage 
is the ability to create two lots instead of three. 
The second, and generally favored, approach to measuring damages in the eminent 
domain context is the "value of the take plus damages rule." Idaho courts have most often 
utilized this measure. Given the uniqueness of the Grathol property, the value plus damages 
approach must be given greater weight. This involves a longer and necessarily more subjective 
analysis geared toward determining the market value of the property before the taking and then 
measuring the hypothetical difference in value of the remainder portion before and after the 
taking. The severance damages are calculated as the market value of the land taken plus the 
difference before and after the taking in market value of the remainder area. Department of 
Transportation v. Into, 219 Ga.App. 311, 464 S.E.2d 886 (1995). At this point, any special 
benefits to the remainder are factored in to arrive at a sort of "net" damage to the remainder 
figure which is added to the value of the part taken, yielding total just compensation. There are, 
of course, a number of variations on this formula dictated by the challenges of applying a dollar 
value to the myriad of damages a remainder may incur. This concept of the measure of 
damages may be illustrated by the following equation: 
Value of land taken + (value of remainder area before taking 
- value of remainder area after taking)= just compensation. 
Using the same simple example as above, the landowner's just compensation for the 
partial taking would be the same, computed as: $100,000.00 + ($400,000.00 - $330,000.00) = 
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$170,000.00. See, 60 Am. Jur. Trials 447 (Originally published in 1996). 
It is in the valuation of other damages that this equation gets difficult. Some damages, 
like the cost to cure a physical harm ( e.g. - "salt on the ground") to the remainder, are pretty 
easily calculable. Other damages ( e.g. - loss of visibility, traffic noise, etc) are much less 
susceptible to being "line-itemed." In this context, the Grathol parcel has to be viewed 
through the owner's intended uses(s), taking into account the numerous impacts that the 
condemnation will have on those uses. Effectively "monetizing" those impacts/damages is 
not as easy as simply estimating a per land unit value reduction. Yet, under the constraints 
imposed by recognized valuation methodologies that is what must be attempted where the 
damages to the remainder can't be set out as discreet amounts in a ledger page format. 
Take, for example, Grathol 's contention that the inevitable requirement of running 
Sylvan Road through the property has an adverse affect on the value of the remainder. In 
determining severance damages, courts give consideration to all circumstances, present or 
future that may affect the residue's value at the time of the taking. In this connection, a 
condemnee ordinarily should not be permitted to benefit from an advantageous highest and 
best use while at the same time ignoring the fact that some of its property would need to be 
given up to put the property to that use. Where a condemnee alleges severance damages 
based on the development potential of the property, therefore, the government's intent to 
require dedication of a portion not taken as a condition of development may preclude the 
landowner from seeking severance damages. The government must, however, offer proof 
that such conditional dedication is reasonably probable by showing that it would have 
imposed the dedication condition if the landowner had sought to develop the property and 
that the proposed dedication requirement would have been constitutionally permissible. 
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Here, the Board acknowledges that Sylvan Road will be required to be dedicated 
when Grathol develops. The board says, in effect; "So what? If that development exaction 
occurs, it is not because of the Project." But the question stands: Would that dedication have 
been required of Grathol if ITD' s project were never built? If the answer to that question is 
"No," then the impact of this future dedication requirement must be considered as a 
"circumstance that may affect the residue's value at the time of the taking." Simply put, it 
lessens the value of the remainder. Perhaps not by dollars per square foot, but by virtue of 
the fact that Grathol ( or any prospective purchaser) of the remainder will consider it in 
determining what that remainder is worth to them. 
Likewise, there must be a value placed on the damage resulting from the fact that two 
small remnant parcels of Grathol's property will be situate on the opposite side of the 
highway once construction is complete. Those parcels may still be independently 
marketable, but if Grathol can't provide utility (water, sewer) connectivity to them, they are 
far, far less valuable, usable or desirable to tenants or purchasers. Same consideration applies 
if those parceis are essentially at the base of a steep bank leading up to the elevated highway 
surface. These issues affect the value. These factors are not calculable like a cost-to-cure 
damage, but they are compensable none the less. 
Here, the evidence will show how the Grathol property owner could, and likely 
would, have used its property had the condemnation never been considered, funded, or 
completed. The owner will then show how the remainder property will necessarily have to 
be used as a direct result of the condemnation having occurred. The difference between those 
two development approaches has a direct monetary impact on the owner. It is that impact, 
together with the value of the 16.4 acres being taken which constitutes the "just 
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compensation" to which Grathol, and all similarly situated property owners, are 
constitutionally entitled. 
DATED this 27th day of February, 2012. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
By: ~~~~~L_--2';~::::::::::-:___ 
Douglas . Marfice, 0 e Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
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Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITO"), by and through its attorneys 
of record Holland & Hart, LLP, hereby moves the Court to exclude two new expert witnesses 
identified by Defendant HJ Grathol ("Grathol'') two weeks before the March 5, 2012 trial: 
Mr. Brett Terrell and Mr. Tom Vandervert. Tne Pretrial Order in this case required Grathol to 
disclose experts and their opinions by August 19, 2011. 
In addition to failing to timely disclose these experts, Grathol has failed and refused to 
disclose their opinions and the basis of their opinions. It is now less than one week before trial. 
ITD's motion is supported by a brief and by the Affidavit of Mary V. York also filed on 
this date. 
DATED this 29th day of February, 2012. 
By_,_..__.,__~-d---~~;.......;.....;.._ ___ _ 
MaryV. Y 
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Special Deputy Attorney General 
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Deputy Attomey General 
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Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD''), submits this brief in support 
of its Motion to Exclude Experts Not Timely Disclosed. ITO has also filed the Affidavit of Mary 
V. York ("York Aff. ") in support of its motion. 
INTRODUCTION··· 
ITD respectfully moves the Court to exclude two expert witnesses disclosed by 
Defendant HJ Grathol two weeks before trial. These experts are Mr. Brett Terrell and Mr. Tom 
V andervert. In addition to failing to timely disclose these experts, Grathol has failed and refused 
to disclose the opinions of these experts and the basis for their opinions. Grathol has repeatedly 
failed to comply with the requirements of the Court's scheduling orders and has failed to respond 
properly or timely to discovery requests by ITD. ITP will suffer substantial prejudice if these 
expert witnesses are permitted to testify at trial. 
BACKGROUND AND FACTS 
The Court's Pretrial Order dated April 5, 2011 established the pretrial deadlines for the 
parties' expert disclosures. Pretrial Order, at 2. Under the Pretrial Order, ITO was required to 
disclose its expert witnesses by July 21, 2011; Grathol was required to disclose responsive 
experts by August 19, 2011; and ITD was required to disclose rebuttal experts by October 19, 
2011. Id. The Pretrial Order also required that expert disclosures "consist of at least the 
information required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i)." Id 
The Pretrial Order did not excuse Grathol from disclosing the opinions from witnesses it 
deemed to be "actor/viewer'' experts. The Pretrial Order did not exempt any experts or opinions 
of experts from being disclosed. 
In addition to the requirements of the Pretrial Order, ITD requested the disclosure of 
Grathol's expert wi1nesses and all opinions and the basis for the opinions in discovery requests 
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served more than a year ago on February 2, 2011. Ex. A to the York Aff. (ITD discovery 
requests, at 8). 
Grathol responded to ITD's discovery requests on April 1S, 2011. York Aff., Ex. B. 
In its responses, Grathol identified 16 potential expert witr,esses, but did not disciose any 
opinions or the basis for any opinions. Id Grathol' s responses were inadequate and failed to 
comply with ITD's discovery requests. Brett Terrell was among the list of potential experts, but 
as with the other individuals identified as potential experts, Grathol did not provide any opinions 
of Mr. Terrell or the basis for any opinions. Grathol cited to an alleged "actor/viewer" exception 
as the basis for refusing to provide opinions by any of the 16 experts, including Mr. Terrell. 
Tom V andervert was not disclosed as either a lay or expert witness in any of Grathol' s 
disclosures. 
On July 22, 2011, counsel for ITD sent a deficiency letter to counsel for Grathol, 
specifically raising the issue of Grath.ol's failure to disclose the opinions of experts. York Aff., 
Ex.. C. Grathol did not respond to ITD's letter until more than a month latter. 
On August 19, 2011, Grathol served its expert witness disclosures and narrowed its 
expert witnesses to three: Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, Geoffrey Reeslund, and Alan Johnson. 
York Aff., Ex. D. However, Grathol did not disclose any of the opinions of these experts or any 
of the information required by the Court's Pretrial Order. The Pretrial Order required that expert 
disclosures "consist of at least the :information required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
26(b)(4)(i).'' In refusing to provide opinions or the bases of the opinions of any of these experts, 
Grathol again cited the "actor/viewer" exception noted in the comments to Rule 26 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. York Aff., Ex. D at 19, 
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On August 24, 2011, counsel for ITD sent another deficiency letter to counsel for 
Grathol regarding its failure to disclose the opinions of its three experts and the basis of the 
opinions, as required by the Court's Pretrial Order and ITD's long-standing discovery requests. 
"'YorkAff., Ex; E. -Grathol's counsel responded on August-29, 201i, stating-only that its 
appraiser, Mr. Sherwood, was preparing a report and that it would be disclosed upon completion. 
York Aff., Ex. F. Counsel did not address the failure to disclose the opinions of the other two 
experts, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Reeslund. Nor did counsel address the fact that the deadline for 
disclosure of expert opinions, such as the report of Mr. Sherwood, had already passed. Id 
On September 9, 2011, counsel for the parties had a conference call to discuss the 
discovery dispute and Grathol's refusal to disclose the opinions of its experts. Counsel for 
Grathol confinned the conversation in correspondence dated September 19, 2011, in which he 
attempted to explain his position on why he was refusing to disclose his experts' opinions, citing 
an out-dated comment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See York Aff., Ex. G. Attached 
to the September 19 letter was Grathol's second supplemental discovery responses, in which it 
provided the untimely appraisal report of Mr. Sherwood. York Aff., Ex. H. Gtathol still refused 
to provide the opinions or the basis of the opinions of Mr. Johnson and Mr. Reeslund. 
On September 20, 2011, counsel for ITD wrote to counsel for Gtathol again, in another 
attempt to obtain the opinions of Grathol' s experts without having to ask the Court to intervene. 
York Aff., Ex. I. ITD noted that the Court's Pretrial Order did not place any limits on the 
disciosure requirements for experts or make an exception for "actor/viewer" experts, and that 
Idaho's expert disclosure rules do not contain any exception for "actor/viewer" witnesses. Id. 
ITD also noted that the opinions were required to be disclosed based on the specific discovery 
requests that ITD had served on Grathol. Id. 
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When ITO failed to receive either the required expert disclosures or a commitment from 
counsel for Grathol to provide the required disclosures, ITD filed a motion on September 23, 
2011, to exclude Grathol's expert wi.1nesses or, alternatively, to compel proper expert 
··uisclosures. YorkAff., Ex. J. Just before the hearing on lID's motion to·-exclude, Grathoi 
conceded and agreed to disclose the opinions of Mr. Johnson and Mr. Reeslund. On October 16, 
2011, Grathol served its third supplemental discovery responses in which it finally provided 
expert opinions of Mr. Johnson and Mr. Reeslund. York Aff., Ex. K. 
On October 18, 2011, the parties entered into a stipulation wherein Gtathol stipulated and 
agreed that "all opinions of its experts Dewitt 'Skip' Sherwood, Alan Johnson and Geoff 
Reeslund have been disclosed." York Aff., Ex. L. 
On January 17, 2012, counsel for ITD asked Orathol to identify the fact witnesses who it 
intended to call at trial and requested deposition dates for the individuals. York Aff., Ex. M. On 
January 20, 2012, during a conference call, counsel for Grathol identified four individuals that he 
intended to call as fact wimesses at trial: Bill Hughes, John Shaw, Brett Terrell, and Jim 
Coleman. This information was confll'll'led in a letter dated January 23, 2012. York Aff., Ex. N. 
About a week later, on February 8, 2012, Grathol revised its list of fact witness to: Jim 
Coleman, Brett Terrell, Tom Vandervert, and Mike Winger. York Af£, Ex. 0. Mr. Winger was 
later withdrawn by Grathol as a fact witness. York Aff., Ex. P. 
ITO took the depositions of Mr. Terrell and Mr, Vandervert on February 13 and 14, 2012. 
Because Grathol had not disclosed these individuais as expert witnesses and had not produced 
any opinions or the basis for the opinions of these individuals, ITD could not prepare for and did 
not depose these fact witnesses as experts. 
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Despite having disclosed these individuals as fact witnesses and after the depositions of 
these witnesses, Grathol served supplemental discovery responses identifying Mr. Terrell and 
Mr. Vandervert as expert witnesses late on Friday, February 17, 2012. York Aff., Ex. Q. 
---counsel for ITD dictnot see these disclosures until Monday, February 20, 20t2, two weeks 
before trial. 
The disclosures are untimely. Grathol was required to disclose all experts and the 
opinions of all experts by August 19, 2011. Permitting these new experts to testify would be 
unfairly prejudicial to ITD. Moreover, identifying new ex.perts two weeks before trial is 
particularly prejudicial where the disclosures do not set forth the opinions to be offered at trial or 
the basis for the opinions. 
Grathol's disclosure of Mr. Te1Tell and Mr. Vandervert as experts did not provide any of 
the opinions that would be offered at trial or the basis of any opinions. York Aff., Ex. Q. 
Grathol has once again invoked the ''actor/viewer" exception to hide the opinions of Mr. Terrell 
and Mr. V andervert and refused to comply with the requirements of Rule 26 and ITD' s discovery 
requesting the opinions ofGrathol's experts and the basis of the opinions. Id. 
ARGUMENT 
1. H Mr, Terrell and Mr. Vandervert Are Allowed To Testify, The Court's 
Pretrial Orders, The Stipulation Between The Parties, And The Rules of 
Discovery Are All Meaningless. 
As set forth in detail above, Grathol did not disclose Mr. Terrell or Mr. Vandervert as 
experts until two weeks before trial. In addition, Grathol did not disclose either their opinions to 
be offered at trial or the basis for their opinions. 
The Court's Pretrial Order required Grathol to disclose experts and expert opinions by 
August 19, 2011. If Orathol is pennitted to call these individuals as experts at this late date and 
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without disclosing any opinions before trial, then the Court's Pretrial Orders governing expert 
disclosures are meaningless. 
Likewise, the Stipulation between the parties filed October 18, 2011, in which Otathol 
·--· stipulated th.at itwc;uld be calling three experts (Sherwood,-Johnson, and-Reeslund) and that it 
had disclosed all of their opinions is meaningless. The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure governing 
Grathol's obligation to respond to discovery served by ITD more than a year ago, as well as 
seasonably supplementing its responses, are also meaningless. 
2. The Witnesses Are Properly Excluded, 
The exclusion of evidence is the recognized sanction for a party's failure to comply 
with Rule 26, including the duty to seasonably supplement responses to discovery requests. 
"Typically, failure to meet the requirements of Rule 26 results in exclusion of the proffered 
evidence." Radmer v. Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86, 90, 813 P.2d 897,900 (1991). 
Courts have broad authority to compel obedience with its orders and may impose 
sanctions upon a party wno fails to comply with its orders, including a party who fails to serve 
timely responses to discovery. Idaho Code§ 1-1603(4); Noble v. Ada County Elections Bd., 
. 
135 Idaho 495,499, 20 P.3d 679, 683 (2000); Ashby"· Western Council, Lumber Production 
and Indus. Workers, 117 Idaho 684, 686, 791 P.2d 435,436 (1990). See also Idaho R. Civ. P. 
37(b)(2)(B) (providmg that where a party fails to obey an order of the Court to provide 
discovery, the Court may enter an order "refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or 
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting that party from introducing designated 
matters in evidence.>'). 
If permitted, Grathol's use of previously undisclosed experts will be highly prejudicial. 
Identifying new experts two weeks before trial is particularly prejudicial where the disclosures 
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do not set forth the opinions to be offered at trial or the basis of the opinions. Allowing new 
experts to testify at trial under these circumstances would be reversible error. 
"[W]hile trial courts are given broad discretion in ruling on pretrial discovery matters, 
- ... reversible enorbasbeen found in allowing testimony where Rule 26 has not been compiied 
with." Radmer1 120 Idaho at 90, 813 P.2d at 900 (citing Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784 
(10th Cir. 1980)), 
In cases [involving e,cpert testimony], a prohibition against 
discovery of information held by expert witnesses produces in 
acute form the very evils that discovery has been created to 
prevent. Effective cross-examination of an expert witness requires 
advance preparation ... Similarly, effective rebuttal requires 
advance knowledge of the line of testimony from the other side. 
If the latter is foreclosed by a rule against discovery, the narrowing 
of issues and elimination of surprise which discovery nonnally 
produces are frustrated. 
Radmer, 120 Idaho at 89,813 P.2d at 900 (brackets in original). 
Other cases are in accord. See Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 181, 219 P.3d 1192, 
1197 (2009) (district court properly excluded expert not timely disclosed from testifying at trial); 
Adams v. Reed, 138 Idaho 36, 39, 57 P.3d 505, 508 (2002) (affirming dismissal of action for 
Plaintiff's failure to timely disclose experts, failure to timely respond to discovery, and failure to 
comply with deadlines set in pretrial orders). 
In the condemnation case, City of McCall v. SeubertJ 142 Idaho 580, 130 P.3d 1118 
(2006), the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court properly excluded a rebuttal expert 
who the City failed to disclose until a week before trial. Id. at 586, 130 P.3d at 1125. The 
Supreme Court noted that the disclosure came "well beyond the time the parties agreed upon for 
disclosure of witnesses and the trial court's deadline." Id. The Court further noted that "the City 
never gave any reason for the late disclosure[.]" Id. In this case, Gtathol has not given any 
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reason for the late disclosure, nor did it seek leave of Court or an agreement from ITD to call 
new expert witnesses. 
Idaho case law clearly shows that Mr. Terrell and Mr. Vandervert should be precluded 
from testifying due to Orathol' s repeated violations of th~ Court's scheduling- orders, the 
Stipulation between the parties regarding expert disclosures, and the rules of discovery. 
3. Gratbol Bas No Basis To Withhold Expert Opinions Under The 
"ActorNiewer" Exception Under the Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure, 
In addition to failing to timely disclose Mr. Terrell and Mr. Vandervert, Grathol has not 
disclosed the opinions they will offer at trial or the bases of their opinions. Grathol specifically 
refused to do so in its disclosure of these experts two weeks before trial, again relying on the 
"actor/viewer" exception found in the comments to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The "actor/viewer" exception is not recognized in Idaho. More importantly, even under 
the Federal Rules, it does not permit a party to withhold expert opinions. Rather, the only effect 
of the exception is to excuse an actor/view expert from preparing a fonnal expert report, as 
required by other experts under the Federal Rule. The opinions of actor/viewer experts still have 
to be disclosed, along with the basis of the opinions. No legal authority exists in either state or 
federal court for the purposeful refusal to disclose expert opinions before trial. 
Idaho case law specifically rejects Grathol's attempt to use the actor/viewer exception. 
In Clark v. Raty, 137 Idaho 343, 48 P.3d 672 (Ct. App. 2002), the distriet court excluded the 
testimony of a treating physician who was not timely disclosed, Id at 344, 48 P.3d at 673. 
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that he was not required to produce the expert's opinions because 
the expert's opinions and knowledge were not acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation 
and therefore were not subject to the requirements of Rule 26(b)(4). Id. at 345, 48 P.3d at 674. 
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The Idaho Court of Appeals soundly rejected plaintiff's argument, stating that 
"[a]lthough Clark is conect that a treating physician's knowledge that was not developed for 
pw:poses of litigation is not subject to Rule 26(b)( 4), the conclusion that he then draws-that 
, · · such testimony fa,entirely sheltered from discovery--drt·ws no support fr-om~the ianguage of that 
rule or the remaining discovery rules." Id. The Court of Appeals quoted the federal decision of 
Lee v. Knutson, 112 F.R.D. 105 (N.D. Miss. 1986) and its statement that "(t]here is simply no 
reason to hold that non-26(b)(4) trial experts may not be discovered by way of the same 
interrogatories as 26(b)(4) trial experts." Id. at 346, 48 P.3d at 67S (quoting Lee v. Knutson, 112 
F.R.D. 105, 108 (N.D. Miss. 1986)). According to the Lee decision, "[t]his result flows from 
precedent as well as logic and common sense." Id, 
The Court of Appeals in Clark concluded that Rule 26(b)(4) ''provides no justification 
for [plaintiff's] failure to respond to [defendant's] inteITogatories seeking disclosure of all of 
[plaintiff's treating physician's] opinions that [plaintiff] wished to present at trial." Id. The 
Court of Appeals upheld the exclusion of the treating physician's testimony because it was not 
timely produced and because plaintiff failed to seasonably supplement its responses to discovery 
requests as required by Rule 26(e)(4). Id at 347, 48 P.3d at 676. 
In summary, ITO will suffer substantial and unwarranted prejudice if Mr. Terrell and 
Mr. Vandervert are pennitted to testify. These witnesses were not disclosed until two weeks 
before trial, and their opinions and the base~ for their opinions have still not been disclosed. It is 
now less than one week before trial. 
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DATED this 29th day of February, 2012. 
_,....,. -:-.,· - .---·-~--: 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Idaho Transportation Department 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
Mary V. York, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am a partner in the Boise office of the law firm of Holland & Hart LLP and am 
duly licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho. 
2. I am counsel of record for Plaintiff, Idaho Transportation Department ("ITD") in 
the above-captioned matter, and I make this affidavit in support ofITD's Motion to Exclude 
Expert Testimony. 
3. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff ITD's First Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production. 
4. Attached as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol's 
Answers and Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents. 
5. Attached as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of counsel for ITD's deficiency 
letter to counsel for Grathol dated July 22, 2011. 
6. Attached as Exhibit Dis a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol's 
Expert Witness Disclosures. 
7. Attached as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of counsel for ITD' s deficiency 
letter and attempt to "meet and confer" with counsel for Grathol dated August 24, 2011. 
8. Attached as Exhibit Fis a true and correct copy of counsel for Grathol's response 
to counsel for ITD's deficiency letter, which is dated August 29, 2011. 
9. Attached as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of correspondence between 
counsel for Grathol and counsel for ITD dated September 19, 2011. 
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10. Attached as Exhibit His a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol's 
Second Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production of Documents. 
11. Attached as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of counsel for ITD's 
correspondence to counsel for Grathol dated September 20, 2011. 
12. Attached as Exhibit J is a true and correct copy ofITD's Motion to Exclude 
Expert Testimony or Alternatively, to Compel Expert Disclosures and supporting brief. 
13. Attached as Exhibit K is a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol' s Third 
Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production of Documents. 
14. Attached as Exhibit Lis a true and correct copy of the parties' Stipulation for 
Extension of Time for Plaintiff's Rebuttal Expert Witness Disclosures and for "Acarrequi 
Offer." 
15. Attached as Exhibit Mis a true and correct copy of counsel for ITD's 
correspondence to counsel for Grathol dated January 17, 2012. 
16. Attached as Exhibit N is a true and correct copy of counsel for ITD' s 
correspondence to counsel for Grathol dated January 23, 2012. 
17. Attached as Exhibit O is a true and correct copy of counsel for ITD' s 
correspondence to counsel for Grathol dated February 8, 2012. 
18. Attached as Exhibit Pis a true and correct copy of counsel for ITD's 
correspondence to counsel for Grathol dated February 9, 2012. 
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19. Attached as Exhibit Q is a true and correct copy of Defendant HJ Grathol's 
Fourth Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set oflnterrogatories and 
Requests for Production of Documents. 
DATED this 29th day of February, 2012. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 29th day of February, 2012. 
Nota½, Public for Idaho 
My Commission Expires 6·Ztf/-Zoltj 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 29th day of February, 2012, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeurd'Alene,ID 83816-1336 






Telecopy (Fax) (208) 664-5884 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V. York (ISB #5020) 
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Plaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board by and through their attorneys of 
record and pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby serves its First Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents on Defendant HJ Grathol and requests 
Defendant to answer all interrogatories and produce all documents for inspection and/or copying, 
in accordance with the Instructions and Definitions set forth below within thirty (30) days from 
the date of service of this discovery, unless otherwise provided by Court order or the parties' 
mutual agreement. 
INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING INTERROGATORIES 
Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the interrogatories set forth 
below are to be answered within thirty (30) days of service, fully and separately in writing, under 
oath, and in accordance with the above-cited rules. When responding in written form to any 
interrogatory, please give the number of the interrogatory before providing the specific response. 
Answers to these interrogatories must include not only information in your personal 
knowledge and possession, but also any and all information available to you, including 
information in the possession of any of your agents, attorneys, or employees. If you cannot 
answer any of the following Interrogatories in full, after exercising due diligence to secure the 
information to do so, so state, and answer to the extent possible, specifying your inability to 
answer the remainder and stating whatever information or knowledge you have concerning the 
unanswered portions. If a claim of privilege is made as to any such information, you must 
specify the basis for the claim of privilege and describe the information claimed to be privileged. 
If any document identified in an answer to an interrogatory was, but is no longer in your 
possession, custody or control, or was known to you but is no longer in existence, describe what 
disposition was made of it or what became of it. No document requested to be identified or 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION TO DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL - 2 
820 of 1617
produced herein can be destroyed or disposed of by virtue of a record retention program or for 
any other reason. 
The interrogatories are intended to be continuing in nature and to require the addition of 
supplemental information and documents in the future to the fullest extent provided by Rule 
26( e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. If, after responding to the interrogatories, you 
acquire any information respective thereto, you are requested to file and serve supplemental 
responses containing such information, as required by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This 
request for supplementation is also specifically a request pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26( e ). 
INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Rule 34 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, you are requested, within 
thirty (30) days of the date this document was served upon you, to present for inspection and 
copying the documents and things requested below at the offices of Holland & Hart LLP, Suite 
1400, U.S. Bank Plaza, 101 S. Capitol Blvd., Boise, Idaho. As an alternative to producing 
documents for inspection and copying, accurate, legible and complete copies of requested 
documents may be attached to your answers and responses to these discovery requests and 
served within the same time period. Please clearly identify the request for production to which 
each document or group of documents you provide is responsive. 
Your response must include and be based not only on documents and things in your 
personal possession, but also on any and all documents and things available to you, including 
those in the possession of any of your agents, representatives, attorneys, or employees. If any 
document requested to be identified in the following interrogatories, or asked to be produced in 
the requests for production, was but no longer is in your possession or subject to your control, or 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION TO DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL - 3 
821 of 1617
in existence, state whether it is (1) missing or lost, (2) has been destroyed, (3) has been 
transferred, voluntarily or involuntarily, to others, or (4) otherwise disposed of; and in each 
instance, please explain the circumstances surrounding the authorization of such disposition 
thereof, and state the date or approximate date thereof. 
With respect to each document as herein denied which is required to be identified by 
these interrogatories or produced in the requests for production and which you presently contend 
you are not required to disclose because of any alleged "privilege" ( which you are not presently 
prepared to waive), in lieu of the document identification called for above, please identify each 
such "privileged" document as follows: (1) give the date of each such document; (2) identify 
each individual who was present when it was prepared; (3) identify each individual to whom a 
copy was sent; (4) identify each individual who has seen it; (5) identify each individual who has 
custody of it; (6) identify each and every document which refers to, discusses, analyzes or 
comments upon it, in whole or in part, or which contain any or all of its contents; and (7) state 
the nature of the privilege asserted, (i.e., attorney-client, work-product, etc.). 
The document requests set forth below are intended to be continuing in nature and to 
require the addition of supplemental information and documents in the future to the fullest extent 
provided by Rule 26(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. If, after responding to the 
requests for documents, you acquire any information respective thereto, file and serve 
supplemental responses containing such information, as required by the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. This request for supplementation is also specifically a request pursuant to Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 26(e). 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION TO DEFENDANT HJ GRA THOL - 4 
822 of 1617
DEFINITIONS 
The following definitions shall apply to these discovery requests: 
1. "Plaintiff' means the above-named Plaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board 
("Board"). 
2. "Defendant" means the above-named Defendant, HJ Grathol, a California general 
partnership, its representatives, employees, agents, or other person(s) acting for or on behalf of 
HJ Grathol. 
3. "You," "your," or "yours," means the above-named Defendant, HJ Grathol, its 
representatives, employees, agents, or other person( s) acting for or on behalf of HJ Grathol. 
4. "Subject Property" means the property owned by Defendant which is the subject of the 
present condemnation action. The "Subject Property" is more completely described in Plaintiff's 
Complaint. 
5. "Identify" when used with respect to a natural person requires that you provide the 
following information with respect to the person: 
a. Full name; 
b. Last known business address; 
c. Last known residence address; 
d. Last known business telephone number; 
e. Last known home telephone number and 
f. Name of employer or business with whom the person was associated and 
the person's title and position at the time relevant to the identification. 
6. "Identify" when used with respect to a person that is not a natural person means, to the 
extent applicable, to provide the same information required as though the entity were a natural 
person [see Definition 5(a) through 5(f) above], and also provide the additional information 
regarding a description of the nature of the entity (e.g., partnership, corporation, limited liability 
company, etc.). 
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7. "Identify" when used with respect to a document, item or thing means to provide the 
following information relating to such document, item or thing: 
a. A general description thereof; 
b. Date it was written or created; 
c. Nrune and present or last known address of the person or persons who 
wrote or created it; 
d. Nrune and present or last known address of the person to whom it was 
sent; 
e. Nrune and present address of the custodian thereof; and 
f. Whether you have a copy, duplicate, reproduction, photostat, photograph, 
srunple or exemplar thereof. 
8. "Identify" when used with respect to Appraisals and/or Appraisal Reports means to 
provide the following information relating to such document, item or thing: 
a. The nrune, address, and company of each appraiser; 
b. The date the appraiser was engaged and the date of each appraisal; 
c. The reason for the appraisal and who retained the appraiser to perform the 
appraisal; 
d. The fair market value of the entire property; 
e. The fair market value of the property being taken for the public project; 
f. The runount of drunages to the remainder property caused by the taking; 
g. The methodology for computing the fair market value of the entire 
property, the property taken, and the drunages to the remainder property; 
h. If a written appraisal report was made, the nrune and address of the 
custodian of the report; 
9. "Describe" shall mean to set forth all facts that exhaust your information, knowledge, and 
belief with respect to the subject matter of the discovery request. 
10. "Document" or "documents" shall mean the original, all copies and drafts of papers and 
writings of every kind, description and form, and all mechanical, magnetic media, and electronic 
recordings, records, writings and data of every kind, description and form, and all photographs of 
every kind, and including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following: 
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correspondence, notes, e-mails, memoranda, reports, notebooks, binders, drawings, studies, 
analyses, drafts, diaries, intra- or inter-office communications, memoranda, reports, canceled 
checks, minutes, bulletins, circulars, pamphlets, telegrams, typewritten and handwritten notes, 
letters, telegrams, instructions, work assignments, messages (including reports, notes and 
memoranda of telephone conversations and conferences), telephone statements, calendar and 
diary entries, desk calendars, appointment books, job or transaction files, books of account, 
ledgers, bank statements, promissory notes, invoices, charge slips, working papers, lab books, 
lab notes, lab journals or notebooks, evaluation or appraisal reports, pleadings, transcripts of 
testimony or other documents filed or prepared in connection with any court or agency or other 
proceeding, deeds, mortgages, deeds of trust, contracts, agreements, assignments, instruments, 
charges, opinions, official statements, prospectuses, appraisals, feasibility studies, trusts, releases 
of claims, charters, certificates, licenses, leases, invoices, computer printouts or programs, 
summaries, audio, video or sound recordings, cassette tapes, video recorded, electronic or laser 
recorded, or photographed information. Documents are to be taken as including all attachments, 
enclosures and other documents that are attached to, relate to or refer to such documents. 
The above definition of "Document" or "Documents" shall also include any 
"Electronically Stored Information." 
11. "Electronically Stored Information" means information made, maintained, retained, 
stored, or archived by computer or electronic means in any medium, including but not limited to 
word processing documents, email, email attachments, databases, spreadsheets, writings, 
drawings, graphs, photographs, sound recordings, images, data, and data compilations. 
Electronically Stored Information shall include prior versions or drafts of information, as defined 
above, as well as all attachments, and shall include information stored on personal digital 
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assistants, cell phones, smart phones, Blackberries, personal laptop computers, hard drives, 
portable hard drives, and other similar devices. 
12. The words "relate to" or "relating to" shall be deemed to mean and include the following 
terms: regards, describes, involves, compares, correlates, mentions, connected to, refers to, 
pertains to, contradicts, or compromises. 
13. The words "and" and "and/or" and "or" shall each be deemed to refer to both their 
conjunctive and disjunctive meanings, being construed as necessary to bring within the scope of 
the discovery request all information and documents which would otherwise be construed as 
being outside the request. 
14. The word "any" shall mean "each and every'' and "all" as well as "any one," and "all" 
shall mean "any and all." 
15. The term "date of take" shall mean November 19, 2010, the date the initial Complaint 
and Summons in this matter was filed. 
INTERROGATORIES 
Interrogatory No. 1: Please identify each person whom you expect to call as a lay or 
expert witness at the trial of this matter and the subject matter upon which each witness is 
expected to testify. 
Interrogatory No. 2: For each expert witness identified in response to Interrogatory 
No. 1, please provide the subject matter upon which the expert witness is expected to testify, a 
complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the reasons therefore, the 
substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions, the underlying 
facts and data upon which those opinions are based, and all information referenced in and 
required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Interrogatory No. 3: (Just Compensation) Please identify the amount of just 
compensation which you will advocate at trial that Defendant is entitled to as a result of the 
taking of a portion the Subject Property and the basis for the amount of just compensation to 
which you believe Defendant is entitled. Do not simply reference an appraisal report, which may 
or may not be relied upon and which may be subject to change. 
Interrogatory No. 4: (Just Compensation) Please state and identify each and every 
fact, and describe each and every document, which supports your opinion of the amount of just 
compensation that Defendant is entitled to as a result of the taking of a portion the Subject 
Property. Include in your answer each and every fact and document that describes, shows, or 
evidences each aspect of just compensation which you believe Defendant is entitled. 
Interrogatory No. 5: (Opinion of fair market value - Before Take) Please state and 
identify your opinion of the fair market value of the Subject Property before the taking of a 
portion of the Subject Property as of the "date of take" as that term is defined herein. 
Interrogatory No. 6: (Opinion of fair market value-After Take) Please state and 
identify your opinion of the fair market value of the Subject Property after the taking of a portion 
of the Subject Property as of the "date of take" as that term is defined herein. 
Interrogatory No. 7: (Severance Damages) Please identify and state any witnesses' 
opinion, including your own opinion, as to whether any severance damage will result from the 
taking of a portion of the Subject Property by Plaintiff. If the response is "yes", describe the 
amount of severance damages, the method used to calculate the amount of damages, and all facts 
and documents used or relied upon, including the comparable sales used or relied upon, as a 
basis for that opinion. 
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Interrogatory No. 8: (Purchase of Subject Property) Please identify the date you 
purchased the Subject Property, including any businesses located on the Subject Property and 
state the total amount paid for the Subject Property and identify the specific amounts paid for the 
real property, the buildings, the assets and all businesses located on the Subject Property. 
Include in your answer any all special terms or conditions related to your purchase of the Subject 
Property. 
Interrogatory No. 9: (Appraisals) Please state whether the Subject Property or any 
portion thereof, including any business located on the Subject Property has been appraised by 
you or on your behalf within the last five ( 5) years, and if so, please identify ( as defined above) 
each appraisal. 
Interrogatory No.10: (Income) Have you received any income from your interest in 
the Subject Property or any part thereof during the five (5) years preceding the taking? If so, 
please state the following: 
a. The amount of annual income received; 
b. Every source of income for each year; 
c. The amount received each year from each source of income. 
Interrogatory No. 11: (Project Enhancement/Project Influence) Please state whether in 
your opinion or the opinion of your expert(s), the Subject Property has experienced project 
enhancement or project influence (also referred to as project blight), and if so, please provide a 
full explanation of the opinion and a full statement of how you and/or the expert(s) reached his 
or her conclusion and all facts, information and data used or relied upon to support that 
conclusion. 
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Interrogatory No. 12: (Leases) As of the "date of take," were any third persons or 
entities asserting an interest in and to the Subject Property pursuant to a lease, claim, lien, 
adverse possession, prescriptive use, or other interest? If so, please list and identify ( as defined 
above) each and every lease, claim, lien, adverse possession, prescriptive use, or other interest. 
Interrogatory No. 13: (Applications for Development or Improvements) As of the 
"date of take" or during the five (5) year period immediately prior thereto, had you or any third 
party applied to the applicable planning and zoning department for the development or 
improvement of all or a portion of the Subject Property, zoning change, or a construction permit 
on the Subject Property? If so, please list and identify (as defined above) each and every 
application. Include in your answer the identity of any entity or person retained or employed by 
your for the purpose of assisting in the development or improvement of the Subject Property. 
Interrogatory No. 14: (Offers to Purchase or Sell) As of the "date of take," and for the 
five (5) years immediately prior thereto, did you receive any offers to purchase or make any 
offers to sell all or a portion of the Subject Property? Ifso, please list and identify (as defined 
above) each and every offer to purchase or sell. 
Interrogatory No. 15: (Environmental Contamination) As of the "date of take," were 
you aware of any previous environmental or hazardous wastes, including but not limited to 
asbestos, lead paint, underground storage tanks, or water contamination or damage that was 
present or had occurred under, on, or over the Subject Property? If so, please state and identify 
the nature and extent of such contamination or damage, when the contamination or damage 
occurred, whether any remediation or curative efforts have been made, and whether the 
contamination or damage has been eradicated. 
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Interrogatory No. 16: (Hughes Investment) Please describe your relationship, if any, to 
Hughes Investments. Include in your response the identify of any and all officers, managers or 
other directors who are common to both you and Hughes Investments. Please also include any 
involvement you have or may have had in Hughes Investments applications for zoning changes, 
annexation into the city of Athol, development or other proposed improvements to the Subject 
Property. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Request for Production No. 1: Please produce all documents identified, used, 
referenced or relied upon in responding to the interrogatories above. 
Request for Production No. 2: Please produce the curriculum vitae or resume for each 
and every expert consulted by you in reference to this action, including Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b )( 4 )(A) experts. 
Request for Production No. 3: Please produce. copies of all documents relied upon by 
any witness expected to be called at trial as an expert which concerns or reflects any opinion 
relating to the Subject Property. 
Request for Production No. 4: Please produce any and all appraisal reports, written 
estimates, or market studies relating in any way to the issues in this case, or any other document 
that reflects an opinion relating to the Subject Property, including but not limited to, the appraisal 
reports, written estimates, market studies or market analyses of each appraiser or valuation 
witness that you intend to call to testify as an expert witness at the trial of this matter. 
Request for Production No. 5: For each appraiser and valuation witness you intend to 
call to testify as an expert witness at the trial of this matter, please produce copies of all appraisal 
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reports prepared by and/or signed by the appraiser of properties located within a ten-mile radius 
of the Subject Property which have a date of valuation within the last five (5) years. 
Request for Production No. 6: Please produce copies of all documents, objects or 
things intended to be introduced, offered or utilized by you as an exhibit at the trial of this 
matter, including but not limited to all maps, drawings, photographs, video tapes, deeds or other 
documents. If final exhibits have not been completed, please attach drafts, if available. 
Request for Production No. 7: Please produce copies of all witness statements which 
relate in any way to the issues in this case, including but not limited to, the reports, analysis, 
documentation, assessments or valuations of each appraiser or valuation witness that Defendant 
intends to call to testify as an expert witness at the trial of this matter. 
Request for Production No. 8: Please produce copies of all documents, 
correspondence, and Electronically Stored Information created, produced, received or sent by 
you within the last five (5) years which relate in any way to the value of the Subject Property 
and/or any business operated on the Subject Property. 
Request for Production No. 9: Please produce a copy of any and all compensation or 
employment agreements between you and any expert retained by you, including but not limited 
to any expert retained by you to appraise or analyze the Subject Property ( or any aspect or 
portion thereof). 
Request for Production No. 10: Please produce copies of any and all documents, 
correspondence, communications, notes, and Electronically Stored Information between you and 
any expert retained by you in relation to the present lawsuit and/or the taking of a portion of the 
Subject Property by Plaintiff. 
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Request for Production No. 11: Please produce copies of any and all documents, 
correspondence, communications, notes, and Electronically Stored Information between you and 
Plaintiff in relation to the present lawsuit and/or the taking of a portion of the Subject Property 
by Plaintiff. 
Request for Production No. 12: Please produce copies of any and all documents, 
correspondence, communications, notes, and Electronically Stored Information between you and 
any governmental entity, other than Plaintiff, (such as the City of Athol, Kootenai County, and 
the Lakes Highway District or any other applicable entity) in relation to Subject Property, the 
present lawsuit and/or the taking of a portion of the Subject Property by Plaintiff. This document 
request shall relate to all such documents for a period of five (5) years prior to the "date of take" 
and up to the present." 
Request for Production No. 13: (Loan and Other Documents) Please produce a copy 
of each and every financial statement, loan application, or other document on which a value of 
the Subject Property has been set forth during the last five (5) years. 
Request for Production No. 14: (Purchase Documents) Please produce a copy of all 
documents relating to your purchase of the Subject Property. 
Request for Production No. 15: (Leases) Please produce a copy of all leases, rental 
agreements, and other documents relating to rents, lease payments, or other consideration paid 
for occupancy or access to all or any portion of the Subject Property. This document request 
shall relate to all such documents for a period of five (5) years prior to the "date of take" and up 
to the present. 
Request for Production No. 16: (Applications for Development or Improvement) 
Please produce each and every application for development, improvement, rezoning, annexation, 
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or construction on the Subject Property filed, submitted or pending during the period of five (5) 
years prior to "date of take" and continuing up to the present date. 
Request for Production No. 17: (Litigation or Claims) Please produce a copy of all 
pleadings, claims, or demands relating to recorded or unrecorded interests, easements, 
descriptive uses, adverse possession, liens, or other rights in and to the Subject Property as of the 
"date of take," and for the period five (5) years immediately prior thereto up to the present date. 
Request for Production No. 18: (Unrecorded Liens or Interests and Restrictive 
Covenants) Please produce a copy of all unrecorded liens, interests, claims, easements, 
restrictive covenants, or other burdens upon the Subject Property as of the "date of take" and for 
the period five (5) years immediately prior thereto up to the present date. 
Request for Production No. 19: (Environmental Documents) Please produce a copy of 
each and every document relating in any way to environmental contamination, hazardous waste 
contamination, water contamination, asbestos, lead paint, underground storage tanks, or 
petroleum contamination upon the Subject Property during the period five (5) years immediately 
prior to the "date of take" up to the present date. 
Request for Production No. 20: (Surveys) Please produce a copy of all recorded and 
unrecorded surveys that have been performed upon the Subject Property, and, if more than one 
survey has been performed, please produce the most recently performed recorded survey. 
Request for Production No. 21: (Water, Sewer and Utilities) Please produce a copy of 
any and all documents related to any application to provide the Subject Property with water, 
sewer or any other utilities. Please include in your response any documents related to the current 
availability of water, sewer or other utilities on the Subject Property. 
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Request for Production No. 22: Please produce any and all documents and 
correspondence related to any and all entities or persons employed or retained to assist in the 
development or development planning of the Subject Property. 
DATED this 2nd day of February, 2011. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of February, 2011, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Ma.rfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol 
4958313 _ I.DOC 
[gj U.S.Mail 
D Hand Delivered 
D Fax 
D E-mail 
D Overnight UPS 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664:5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attomeys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
No. 2502 P. 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
. . 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR TIIB COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRATIIOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VJNGS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants. 
TO: THBABOVE-ENTITLED PLAINTIFF 
Case No.-CV-10_-10095 
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S 
ANSWERS.AND RESPONSES TO 




COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol and hereby responds to Plaintiff1s First Set of 
futerrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents as foJlows: 
INTERROGATORIES 
Interrogatozy No. 1: Please identify each person whom you expect to call as a lay or 
expert witness at the trial of this matter and the subject matter upon which each witness is 
expected to testify. 
EXHIBIT 
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ANSWER: Defendant has not yet detennined with certainty who they may call as 
either expert or lay witness in this matter. Discovery is ongoing and any or all of the 
individuals identified through discovery who possess relevant information may be called. 
The substance of all expected trial testimony will be developed during the course of 
discovery in this case. However, it is anticipated that Defendant may call any of the 
following individuals as trial witnesses and those witnesses may testify as to facts known and 
opinions held, as generally summarized below: 
(1) Bill Hughes 
(2) AlanJohnson 
(3) GeoffReeslund 
These persons may give testimony as to the acquisition, ownership and development 
plans for the Subject Property; opinion testimony as to its use(s), its value (before and after 
the condemnation), the value of the Defendant's property remaining after condemnation and 
before and after construction, and entitlement/construction planning activities; efforts and 
expenses associated with the purchase, holding and development of the property; planning 
and design work associated with the property; marketing efforts of the property prior to and 
after condemnation; and the effects of the condemnation on the remaining property. 
(4) Dewitt "Skip" Sheiwood 
(5) EdMorse 
(6) Dee Jamison 
(7) Scott Taylor 
(8) Brent Heleker 
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These persons may give testimony, including opinion testimony as to the value of the 
Subject Property, pre-condemnation and post-condemnation, including impacts to the value 
occasioned by tliis condemnation, and other matters within their knowledge or expertise. 
(9) Ron Harvey, Idaho Transportation Department 
(10) Yvonne Dingman, Idaho Transportation Department 
(11) Karl Vogt. counsel, Idaho Transportation Department 
These individuals may be called to testify as to their .knowledge, information, and 
actions relative to seeking acquisitipn of a portion of Defendant's property. 
(12) Darrell Manning, Chairman, Idaho Transportation Board 
(13) James Coleman, Member, Idaho Transportation Board 
(14) Janice Vassar, Member, Idaho Transportation Board 
(15) Jerry Whitehead, Member, Idaho Transportation Board 
(16) Gary Blick, Member, Idaho Transportation Board 
(17) Neil Miller, Member, Idaho Transportation Board 
(18) Lee Gagner. Member, Idaho Transportation Board 
(19) Sue Higgins, Secretary Idaho Transportation Board 
(20) Brian W. Ness, Director, Idaho Transportation Department 
(21) Pam Lowe, former Director, Idaho Transportation Department 
(22) Jesse W. Smith, Jr., Right of Way Manager, Idaho Transportation Department 
These individuals. or some of them, may be called to testify as to their knowledge, 
information and actions relative to approval of the project which precipitated the need to 
condemn Defendant's property; future plans for construction of the US 95 improvements 
through and adjacent to Defendant's property and other matters within their knowledge. 
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James Coleman, named above, may also testify on behalf of Coleman Engineering regarding 
the planning, design, and function of a proposed on-site sewage system and related 
infrastructure servh1g Defendant's property. 
(23) Tom B, Cole, Chief Engineer, Idaho Transportation Department 
(24) Tamara R. Jauregui, Management Assistant. Idaho Transportation Department 
(25) Duane L. Zimmennan, P .L.S 
(26) Jason Minzghor, Idaho Transportation Department 
(27) Justin Wuest, !daho Transportation Department 
(28) Jerry Wilson, P.E., Idaho Transportation Department 
These individuals, or some of them, may be called to testify as to their knowledge, 
information and actions relative to the design and construction of the highway improvements 
across and adjacent to Defendant's property. 
(29) Ross Blanchard, Federal Highway Administration, Idaho Division 
(30) Rod Twete, Commissioner, Lakes Highway District 
(31) Monty Montgomery, Commissioner, Lakes Highway District 
(32) Marv Lekstrum, Commissioner, Lakes Highway District 
(33) Joe Wuest, Road Supervisor, Lakes Highway District 
(34) Eric W. Shanley, P.E., Lakes Highway District 
These individuals may be called to testify as to communications and interactions with 
the Idaho Transportation Department relative to acquisition and/or improvements of frontage 
road(s) and access on State Highway 54 in the vicinity of Defendant's property and the 
necessity, plan or expectations of bisecting Defendant's property with a frontage road. 
(35) David Evans and Associates, Inc., including Greg Holder, P.E., Michael Kosa1 
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and/or Bill Stark. 
Defendant reserves the right to supplement this response in accordance with the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court's Pretrial Order. 
Interrogatory No. 2: For each expert witness identified in response to Interrogatory 
No. 1, please provide the subject matter upon which the expert witness is expected to testify, 
a complete statement of all opinions to he expressed by the expert and the reasons therefore, · 
the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions, the 
underlying facts and . data upon which those opinions are based, and all information 
referenced in and required by Rule 26(b )( 4 )(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ANSWER: Defendant anticipates offering expert opinion testimony in this matter, 
including testimony concerning the plan, design and engineering of portions of the Plaintiffs 
project across or adjacent to Defendant's property, as well as testimony concerning valuation 
of the property. Th~ witnesses offering opinion testimony as actor-viewers may include the 
following: 
(I) Bill Hughes 
(2) Alan Johnson 
(3) GeoffReeslund 
(4) Scott Taylor 
(5) Brent Heleker 
(6) John Beutler 
(7) Mark Johnson 
(8) Jeff Bond 
(9) Donald Smock 
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As an actor/viewer "expert," Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover the testimony of such 
persons. See, U.S.C.A., Fed. R Civ. P. 26 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1970 
Amendment at 114 (West 1995). 
(1) Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, CGA 
(2) E<l_Morse, MAI 
With respect to these valuation experts, as of the date of the Answers to these 
Interrogatories, no fonnal appraisal reports have been completed. Therefore. the remainder 
of the infonnation requested in this Interrogatory cannot be provided. If and when formal 
appraisal reports are prepared, the infonnation in the above Interrogatory will be contained 
within those appraisal reports. 
Interrogatory No. 3: (Just Compensation) Please identify the amount of just 
compensation which you will advocate at trial that Defendant is entitled to as a result of the 
taking of a portion the Subject 'Property and the basis for the amount of just compensation to 
which you believe Defendant is entitle~. Do not simply reference an appraisal report, which 
may or may not be relied upon and which may be subject to change. 
ANSWER: Defendant does not know at this time the precise amount of just 
compensation which will be advocated at trial, Defendant may offer a value assessment at 
the trial in this matter including, but not necessarily limited to, the Defendant's past and 
intended future use and development of the properly as well as the opinions derived from 
comparative market analysis undertaken by the Defendant for purposes of valuing the Subject 
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Property, The basis of computation of the Defendant's opinion of the value of the Subject 
, 
Property is s.et forth generally in the letter of June 28, 20 l 0 directed to Ron Harvey at ITD 
and the letter of October 27, 2010 directed to Mary York, Holland and Hart. 
Interrogatory No. 4: (Just Compensation) Please state and identify each and every 
fact, and describe each and every document, which supports your opinion of the amount of 
just compensation that Defendant is entitled to as a result of the taldng of a portion the 
Subject Property. Include in your answer each and every fact and docwnent that describes, 
shows, or _evidences each aspect of just compensation which you believe Defendant is 
entitled. 
ANSWER: This Interrogatory, as phrased, is overbroad, ambiguous and unreasonably 
burdensome. Further, as phrased it seeks matters that are subject to attorney-client privilege, 
attorney work product doctrine, and otherwise not discoverable under Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b ). Notwithstanding this, Defendant does not know at this time the precise 
amount of just compensation which will be advocated at trial as discovery and evaluation is 
still underway. However, it is anticipated that Defendant will offer value opinions based 
upon more appropriate comparable property sales which will establish a value of the portion 
'• 
condemned in a range of $3.00 to $5.00 per square foot for the part taken and severance 
damages for the remainder. Among the facts supporting this valuation are the comparable 
property sales described in the letter of October 27, 2010 directed to Mary York. 
Interrogatozy No. 5: (Opinion of fair market value - Before Talce) Please state and 
identify your opinion of the fair market value of the Subject Property before the talc:ing of a 
portion of the Subject Property as of the "date of take'1 as that tennis defined herein. 
ANSWER: It is Defendant's opinion that the fair market value of the Subject 
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Property being taken before the take, was not less than $1.420,000.00 - up to approximately 
$3,500,000.00 in its highest and best use. The basis of computation of the Defendant's 
opinion of the value of the Subject Property is set forth generally in the letter of June 28, 
2010 directed to Ron Harvey at ITD and the letter of October 27, 2010 directed to Mary 
York. 
Interrogato.cy No 6: (Opinion of fair market value~ After Talce) Please state and 
identify your opinion of the fair market value of the Subject Property after the taking of a 
porti~n of the Subject Property as of the· "date of take" as that tennis defined herein. 
ANSWER: This Interrogatory, as phrased, is vague and ambiguous. Further, the 
question as phrased seeks matters that are potentially subject to attorney-client privilege, 
attorney work product, and the privileges afforded under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b ). Notwithstanding this, Defendant does not know at this time the value of the property 
after the take because of the ongoing uncertainty as to time of construction, completion of 
construction and ancillary severance damages occasioned by the construction and by project 
influence/stigma. 
Interrogatory No. 7: (Severance Damages) Please identify and state any witnesses' 
opinion, including your own opinion, as to whether any severance damage will result from 
the taldng of a portion of the Subject Property by Plaintiff. If the response is "yes'', describe 
the amount of severance damages! the method used to calculate the amount of damages, and 
all facts and documents used or relied upon, including the comparable sales used or relied 
upon, as a basis for that opinion. 
ANSWER: Yes, Defendant believes severance damages will result. Defenda.t1t does 
not know at this time the precise amount of severance damage it will suffer by reason of 
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Plaintiffs actions in this matter nor is it possible to articulate "all facts and documents" used 
to calculate Defendant's view of severance damages. Discovery and evaluation in this matter 
is ongoing and all facts supporting severance damages may not be fully known until after the 
project is completed or at least construction is initiated. 
Interrogatoxy No. 8: (Purchase of Subject Property) Please identify the date you 
purchased the Subject Property, including any businesses located on the Subject Property and 
state the total amount paid for the Subject Property and identify the specific amounts paid for 
the real property, the buildings, ·the assets and all businesses located on the Subject Property. 
Include in your answer any all special tenns or conditions related to your purchase of the 
Subject Property, 
ANSWER: Plaintiff already has the infonnation requested in this Interrogatory as it 
was included in Plaintiff's own appraisal data and acquisition packet. Defendant's acquired 
the Subject Property in a distress sale circumstance in 2008 for the total purchase price of 
$1,450,000.00. Defendant does not know what is referred to as "any all special terms or 
conditions . , . ,, and as such cannot meaningfully answer this portion of the Interrogatocy, 
Interrogatozy No, 9: (Appraisals) Please state whether the Subject Property or any 
portion thereof) including any business located on the Subject Property has been appraised by 
yoti or on your behalf within the last five (5) years, and if so, please identify (as defined 
above) each appraisal. 
ANSWER: Yes, Defendant has evaluated the property value on its own behalf and 
with the assistance of consultants, including licensed real estate broker(s), certified, general 
appraiser(s), and land use planner(s)/consultant(s). 
Interrogatory No. l 0: (Income) Have you received any income from your interest in 
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the Subject Property or any part thereof during the five (5) years preceding the taking? If so, 
please state the following: 
a, Tne amount of annual income received; 
b. Every source of income for each year; 
c. The amoW1t received each year from each source of income. 
ANSWER: A portion of the property has been leased on an annual basis to Shane 
Smith d/b/a Blacksmith Fanns since its .acquisition. The rent derived from that use of the 
. ' 
property is $400.00 per month or $4,800.00 per year. 
Interrogatory No. 11: (Project Enhancement/Project Influence) Please state whether 
in your opinion or the opinion of your expert(s), the Subject Property has experienced project 
enhancement or project influence (also referred to as project blight). and if so, please provide 
a full explanation of the opinion and a full statement of how you and/or the expert(s) reached 
his or her conclusion and all facts, infonnation and data used or relied upon to support that 
conclusion. 
ANSWER! It is Defendant's opinion that the Subject Property has not experienced 
and will not experience project enhancement. It is Defendant's opinion that the Subject 
Property has suffered "project influence" or "blight" as those tenns are commonly used. 
Defendant does not fully know at this time the amount of damage it has suffered by reason of 
project influence or project blight and it is not possible to fully assess that element of damage 
until the project has been completed or to even make an educated estimate until construction 
is at least commenced and a completion date can be calculated. 
Interrogatory No. 12: (Leases) As of the "date of take," were any third persons or 
entities asserting an interest in and to the Subject Property pursuant to a lease, claim, lien) 
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adverse possession, prescriptive use, or other interest? If so, please list and identify (as 
defined above) each and every lease, claim, lien, adverse possession, prescriptive use~ or 
other interest. 
ANSWER: Yes. Black Smith Fanns leased a portion of the property on a month-to-
month basis since its acquisition . . See, Response to Interrogatory No. 10, above, 
Interrogatory No. 13: (Applications for Development or Improvements) As of the 
"date of taken or during the five (5) year period immediately prior thereto, had you or any 
third party applied to the applicable planning and zoning department for the development or 
improvement of all or a portion of the Subject Property, zoning change, or a construction 
permit on the Subject Property? If so, please list and identify (as defined above) each and 
every application. Include in your answer the identity of any entity or person retained or 
employed by your for the purpose of assisting in the development or improvement of the 
Subject Property. 
ANSWER: Subsequent to acquiring the Subject Property in 2008, Defendant, through 
. 
its development agent1 applied to Kootenai County to rezone the property from "Ruralu to the 
"Commercial)) zone classification. The rezone was approved on or about November 20, 
2008. Geoff Reeslund has been employed and retained to assist in the development and 
improvement of the Subject Property, including application and submittals for zone change 
and proposed subdivision of the property. 
Defendant has also retained Coleman Engineering for professional services in the 
design and development of sewer and wastewater treatment system to serve the Subject 
Property and its anticipated development buyers/tenants. Defendant has also contracted with 
and retained CLC Associates, Inc. as land use planners and architects to assist in the 
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development of plans, schematics, and uses of the Subject Property, Defendant has also 
contracted with and retained Intermountain Transportation Solutions to assist in analysis of 
development plans and to conduct a Traffic Impact Study in order to facilitate development 
proposals for the subject Property. Defendant has also contracted with and retained Allwest 
Testing & Engineering, LLC as project geotechnical engineers to analyze the soils and gravel 
of the Subject Property for development feasibility study purposes. 
Interrogatory No. 14: (Offers to Purchase or Sell) As of the "date of take," and for the 
five (5) years immediately prior thereto, did you receive any offers to purchase or make any 
offers to sell all or a portion of the Subject Property? If soJ please list and identify ( as defined 
above) each and every offer to purchase or sell. 
. ANSWER; Yes. Defendant has actively marketed the property to prospective "end 
users," both purchasers and tenants, to ascertain highest and best use options for development 
of the property both with and without the anticipated project influences. No fonnal 
purchase/sale offers have been memorialized. 
Interrogatory No. 15: (Environmental Contamination) As of the "date of takei 11 were 
you aware of any previous environmental or hazardous wastes, including but not limited to 
asbestos, lead paint, underground storage tanks, or water contamination or damage that was 
present or had occurred under, on, or over the Subject Property? If so, please state and 
identify the nature and extent of such contamination or damage, when the contamination or 
damage occurred, whether any remediation or curative efforts have been made, and whether 
the contamination or damage has been eradicated. 
ANSWER: Please see, Defendant's Phase I Environmental Site Assessment (April 
14i 2008) and the Phase II Assessment Correction Completion Certificate (May 6, 2008). 
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copies of which are available for inspection and/or copying to Plaintiff and/or its agents 
during regular business hours, upon reasonable request. 
Interrogatory No. 16: (Hughes Investment) Please describe your relationship, if any, 
to Hughes Investments. Include in your response the identity of any and all officers, 
managers or other directors who are common to both you and Hughes Investments. Please 
also include any involvement you have or may have had in Hughes Investments applications 
for zoning changes> annexation into the city of Athol, development or other proposed 
improvements to the Subject Property. 
ANSWER: D~fendant HJ Grathol is a Califomia general partnership which holds title 
to the Subject Property, Hughes Investments, also a California general partnership is the 
development agent for HJ Grathol on this property. Alan Johnson is employed by Hughes 
Investments as Senior Vice President of Development and is a partner for development 
purposes with Hughes Investments. Additional infonnation responsive to this Interrogatory 
has been requested and will be supplemented. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Request for Production No. 1: Please produce all documents identified, used, 
referenced or relied upon in responding to the interrogatories above. 
RESPONSE: Defendant has compiled the voluminous documents responsive to these 
Requests for Production and will make them available for inspection and/or copying to 
Plaintiff and/or its agents during regular business hours, upon reasonable request. 
ReQUest for Production No. 2: Please produce the curriculum vitae or resume for each 
and every expert consulted by you in reference to this action1 including Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b)(4)(A) experts. 
DEPENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SE.TOP' INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FO:R. PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS. 13 
848 of 1617
Apr. 15. 2011 12:34PM No. 2502 P. 15 
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production is overbroad and beyond the 
scope of I.RC.P. 26(b)(4)(B). See also, Answer to Interrogatory No. 2. At this time, 
Defendant has not determined which experts it anticipates utilizing at trial, and discovery is 
not permitted as to specially retained experts. 
Reguest for Production No. 3: Please produce copies of all documents relied upon by 
any witness expected to be called at trial as an expert which concerns or reflects any opinion 
relating to the Subject Property. 
RESPONSE: See) Answer to Interrogatory No. 2. 
Reguest for Production No. 4: Please produce any and all appraisal reports, written 
estimates, or market studies relating in any way to the issues in this case, or any other 
document that reflects an opinion relating to the Subject Property, including but not limited 
to, the appraisal reportsJ written estimates, market studies or market analyses of each 
appraiser or valuation witness that you intend to call to testify as an expert witness at the trial 
of this matter. 
RESPONSE: Defendant has no appraisal reports responsive to this request) but 
infonnation relative to Defendant's opinion of the value of the Subject Property can be found 
in the documents produced or available for inspection and in the letters to Ron Harvey and 
Mary York referenced herein. 
Reguest for Production No. 5: For each appraiser and valuation witness you intend to 
call to testify as an expert witness at the trial of this matter, please produce copies of all 
appraisal reports prepared by and/or signed by the appraiser of properties located within a 
ten-mile radius of the Subject Property which have a date of valuation within the last five (5) 
years. 
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RESPONSE: Defendant does not have any discoverable documents responsive to this 
request. 
Reguest for Production No. 6: Please produce copies of all documents! objects or 
things intended to be introduced, offered or utilized by you as an exhibit at the trial of this 
matter, including but not limited to all maps, drawings, photographs, video tapes, deeds or 
other documents. If final exhibits have not been completed! please attach drafts, if available. 
RESPONSE: Defendant has not yet determined what exhibits it will offer at trial but 
will produce such exhibits consistent with the Court,s Pretrial Order. 
Request for Production No. 7: Please produce copies of all witness statements which 
relate in any way to the issues in this case, including but not limited to, the reports, analysis, 
documentation, assessments or valuations of each appraiser or valuation witness that 
Defendant intends to call to testify as an expert witness at the trial of this matter. 
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be 
protected by the attomey-cllent privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding 
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied. 
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.) 
Request for Production No. 8: Please produce copies of all documents, 
correspondence, and Electronically Stored Infonnation created, produced, received or sent by 
you within the last five (5) years which relate in any way to the value of the Subject Property 
and/or any business operated on the Subject Property. 
RESPONSE: Objection, This Request for Production seeks materials which may be 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding 
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied, 
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(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.) 
Request for Production No. 9: Please produce a copy of any and all compensation or 
employment agreements between you and any expert retained by you, including but not 
limited to any expert retained by you to appraise or analyze the Subject Property ( or any 
aspect or portion thereof). 
RESPONSE: Defendant has no discoverable documents responsive to this Request 
for Production. 
Request for Production No. 10: Please produce copies of any ·and all documents, 
correspondence, communications, notesi and Electronically Stored Information between you 
and any expert retained by you in relation to the present lawsuit and/or the taking of a portion 
of the Subject Property by Plaintiff. 
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production see.ks materials which may be 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding 
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied. 
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.) 
Request for Production No. 11: Please produce copies of any and all documents, 
correspondence, communications. notes, and Electronically Stored Information between you 
and Plaintiff in relation to the present lawsuit and/or the taldng of a portion of the Subject 
Property by Plaintiff. 
RESPONSE: Objection, This Request for Production seeks materials which may be 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding 
this. discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied. 
(Seel Response to Request for Production No. 1. above.) 
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Request for Production No. 12: Please produce copies of any and all documents, 
correspondence, communications, notes, and Electronically Stored Infonnation between you 
and any governmental entity, other than Plaintiff, (such as the City of Athol, Kootenai 
County, and the Lakes Highway District or any other applicable entity) in relation to Subject 
PropertyJ the present lawsuit and/or the taking of a portion of the Subject Property by 
Plaintiff. This document request shall. relate to all such documents for a period of five (5) 
years prior to the ''date of take" ~d up to the present. 
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding 
this, discoverable documents responsive to thls Request for Production have been complied. 
(pee, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.) 
Request for Production No. 13: (Loan and Other Documents) Please produce a copy 
of each and every fmancial statement, loan application, or other document on which a value 
of the Subject Property has been set forth during the last five (5) years. 
RESPONSE: Defendant has no discoverable documents responsive to this Request 
for Production. 
Request for Production No. 14: (Purchase Documents) Please produce a copy of all 
documents relating to your purchase of the Subject Property. 
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding 
thisJ discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied. 
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above,) 
Reguest for Production No. 15: (Leases) Please produce a copy of all leases, rental 
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agreements, and other documents relating to rents, lease payments, or other consideration 
paid for occupancy or access to all or any portion of the Subject Property. This document 
request shall relate to all such documents for a period of five (5) years prior to the "date of 
take" and up to the present. 
RESPONSE: Defendant has one document responsive to this Request for Production 
which is available for inspection and/or copying to Plaintiff and/or its agents during regular 
business hours, upon reasonable request. 
Request for Production No. 16: (Applications for ·nevelopment or hnprovement) 
Please produce each and evezy application for development, improvement, rezoning, 
annexation, or construction on the Subject Property filed, submitted or pending during the 
period of five (5) years prior to "date of take" and continuing up to the present date. 
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding 
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied. 
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.) 
Request for Production No. 17: (Litigation or Claims) Please produce a copy of all 
pleadings, claims; or demands relating to recorded or unrecorded interests, easements, 
descriptive uses, adverse possession, liens. or other rights in and to the Subject Property as of 
the "date of take/' and for the period five (5) years immediately prior thereto up to the 
present date. 
RESPONSE: Defendant has no discoverable documents responsive to this Request 
for Production other than the title insurance policy acquired at the time Defendant purchased 
the property, A copy of the same is available for inspection and/or copying to Plaintiff 
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and/or its agents during regular business hours, upon r~asonable request. 
Request for Production No. 18: (Unrecorded Liens or Interests and Restrictive 
Covenants) Please produce a copy of all unrecorded liens) interests, claims, easements, 
restrictive covenants, or other burdens upon the Subject Property as of the "date of take" and 
for the period five (5) years immediately prior thereto up to the present date. 
RESPONSE: Defendant has no discoverable documents responsive to this Request 
for Production. 
Request for Production No. 19: ·(Environmental Documents) Please produce a copy 
of each and every document relating in any way to environmental contamination. hazardous 
waste contamination> water contamination, asbestos, lead paint, underground storage tanks, 
or petroleum contamination upon the Subject Property during the period five (5) years 
immediately prior to the ''date of take'' up to the present date. 
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding 
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied. 
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.) 
Reguest for Production No. 20: (Surveys) Please produce a copy of all recorded and 
unrecorded surveys that have been perfonned upon the Subject Property, and, if more than 
one survey has been performed, please produce the most recently perfonned recorded survey. 
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding 
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied. 
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.) 
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Request for Production No. 21: (Water) Sewer and Utilities) Please produce a copy of 
any and all documents related to any ap.1;>lication to provide the Subject Property with water, 
sewer or any other utilities. Please include in your response any documents related to the 
current availability of water, sewer or other utilities on the Subject Property, 
RESPONSE~ Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding 
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied. 
(See> Response to Request for Production No. 1, above,) 
Request for Production No. 22: Please produce any and all documents and 
correspondence related to any and all entities or persons employed or retained to assist in the 
development or development planning of the Subject Property, 
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production seeks materials which may be 
protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Notwithstanding 
this, discoverable documents responsive to this Request for Production have been complied. 
(See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, above.) 
DATED this 15th day of April, 2011. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
By: ~4.if 7K~-
Dougls, Marflce, -Ofthe Finn 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
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County of Orange ) 
Alan Johnson , being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
I am the managing member of }il [ff,0,J'\t)b \ , Defendant, in the above-
entitled action; I have read Defendant HJ Grahtol's Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's First 
Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents; I know the contents thereof, 
and I state the same to be true to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. 
SUBSCRJBED AND SWORN to before me this 9th day of May, 2O11by Alan Johnsri>n, 
proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person who 
appeared before me. 
Notary Public for the State of California 
Residing at Irvine, California 
Commission Expires Dec. 23, 2013 
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VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Re: ITD v. HJ GrathoL et aL 
July 22, 2011 
First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County 
Case No. CVI0-10095 
Dear Doug: 
MaryV. York 
Phone (208) 342-5000 
Fax (208) 343--8869 
myork@hollandhart.com 
This purpose of this letter is to meet and confer on deficiencies we see in 
Defendant HJ Grathol's responses to ITD's First Set oflnterrogatories and Request for 
Production of Documents (the "April 15th discovery responses") and to address issues 
that have arisen regarding the responses. We hope to resolve these issues with you 
informally, without having to resort to a motion to compel. 
First, the April 15th discovery responses are in direct conflict with the 
representations that Mr. Gabbert made to Judge Haynes at the March 31, 2011 status 
and scheduling conference. Specifically, Mr. Gabbert represented at the scheduling 
conference that HJ Grathol would call, at most, two or three expert witnesses. This 
conformed with our earlier conversations with you. Judge Haynes entered a scheduling 
order and set a 10-day trial based on the representations that HJ Grathol would only call 
two or three expert witnesses. 
However. the April 15th discovery response list fourteen ( 14) potential expert 
witnesses. See Response to Interrogatory No. 2. Regardless whether these witnesses 
are designated "actor/view experts" or "valuation experts" these witnesses will be 
providing expert testimony - which requires substantial additional time both at trial and 
in discovery. 
After we received the April 15th discovery response, I spoke with Chris Gabbert 
about this and he indicated that he would speak to you about the number of witnesses 
HJ Grathol intended to call at trial. If the number of experts is going to be greater than 
the two or three represented to the Court, then the scheduling order will have to be 
revised, the period of time for discovery extended, the trial will have to be moved to a 
later date, and additional trial days will have to be reserved. 
Holland & Hart LLP EXHIBIT 
Phone [208] 342-5000 Fax [2081 343-8869 www.hollandhart.com ) 
101 South Capitol Boulevard Suite 1400 Boise, ID 83702 Mailing Address P.O. Box 2527 Boise, ID 83701-2527 j 
Aspen Boulder Carson City Colorado Springs Denver Denver Tech Center BIiiings Boise Cheyenne Jackson Hole Las Vegas Reno Salt Lake City Sant 
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If you only intend to call two or three witnesses to provide expert testimony, 
regardless of whether they are "actor/viewer experts" or "valuation experts" please 
identify which experts you actually intend to call so that, if possible, we can keep the 
current trial date and schedule. 
Second, your response to Interrogatory No. 8 indicated that you could not 
describe any special terms or conditions of HJ Grathol 's purchase of the Subject 
Property in 2008. You responded that the Subject Property was purchased in 2008 in a 
distress sale, but did not describe any of the terms of the purchase. Additionally, ITD 
does not have the information regarding the specific terms of your client's purchase of 
the Subject Property. The documents provided (00648-00768) detail a purchase of the 
Subject Property by Hughes Investment and Gracal Corporation. It does not provide 
documents regarding HJ Grathol's acquisition of the Subject Property. Please provide 
documentation or an explanation how HJ Grathol acquired the Subject Property from 
Hughes Investment and Gracal Corporation. We are also entitled to know all terms of 
the sale to and acquisition by HJ Grathol. Therefore, we request that you please 
provide all terms and conditions of HJ Grathol's 2008 purchase of the Subject Property. 
Third, your response to Interrogatory No. 9 represented that there were 
appraisals done on the Subject Property. However, your response to Interrogatory 
No. 9 failed to identify (as defined in the definition section) each of those appraisals. 
Please indentify each of those appraisals and provide them pursuant to Request for 
Production No. 1. 
Fourth, your response to Interrogatory No. 14 stated that HJ Grathol received 
offers to purchase the Subject Property in the five (5) years prior to the date of take. 
However, your response to Interrogatory No. 14 failed to identify any of those offers. 
Please fully respond to Interrogatory No. 14 by identifying, as that term is defined, each 
and every offer to purchase or sell the Subject Property within the five (5) years prior to 
the date of take. Please also provide any relevant documents pursuant to Request for 
Production No. 1. 
Fifth, your response to Interrogatory No. 16 references that "additional 
information" regarding HJ Grathol's relationship to Hughes Investment has "been 
requested and will be supplemented." Please provide us with that supplemental 
information. 
Sixth, your response to Request for Production No. 5 stated that you had no 
"discoverable" appraisal reports prepared by your expert witnesses regarding properties 
in the vicinity of the Subject Property. Please clarify whether or not appraisals 
responsive to Request for Production No. 5 exist. If appraisals exist, they are 
discoverable. 
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Seventh, response to Request for Production No. 9 also states there are no 
"discoverable" expert compensation agreements. We ask that you please produce all of 
these agreements or explain how they are not "discoverable." 
Eighth, your response to Request for Production No. 13 indicated that you had no 
"discoverable" documents regarding the value of the Subject Property. Thus, it is our 
understanding that no documents responsive to Request for Production No. 13 exist -
because if they did exist these documents would be discoverable. Please confirm that 
your response to Request for Production No. 13 is that there are no "financial 
statement, loan application, or other document on which a value of the Subject Property 
has been set forth during the last five (5) years." 
Ninth, please provide an explanation regarding your responses to Request for 
Production Nos. 14 and 16. Specifically, please explain how documents relating to the 
purchase of the Subject Property or applications for development are protected by the 
attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. For example, is it your response 
that the Subject Property was acquired for the purposes of this litigation? 
Tenth, please provide us with any new or supplemental documents or information 
responsive to our First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production. 
We look forward to resolving the above- referenced issues with you. It is our 
hope that we can resolve these discovery deficiencies without having to resort to a 
motion to compel. Therefore, we request that you please provide us with full and 
complete responses as outlined above by August 5, 2011 or we will be forced to turn to 
the Court for assistance. Thank you for your consideration. 




Aug, 19. 2011 4:11PM 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d,Alene, Idaho 83816~1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grnthol 
No. 4332 P. 2/25 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; ~nd DOES 1 
through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S 
EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE 
COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol and pursuant to the Court's Uniform Pretrial 
Order and discloses the following experts intended to be called at the trial of the above-
referenced matter: 
1) Dewitt M. "Skip" Sherwood 
Cornerstone Property Advisors 
1311 N. Washington, Ste, C 
Spokane, WA 99201 
(509) 321-2000 
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A. Statement of Testimony: 
Mr. Sherwood is a real estate appraiser licensed in the states of Idaho and Washington. 
He will testify in accordance with his appraisal report, which will be provided to Plaintiff upon 
completion. Mr. Sherwood will testify generally as follows: 
The subject property is was transferred to Gracal Corporation on May 22, 2008 from 
North Alpine Development LLC, an Idaho limited liability corporation on May 22, 2008 and 
subsequently from Gtacal Corporation to HJ Grathol, a California general paitnership on 
October 15, 2009. According to the brokei- who sold the sit~ in May 2008, the sale price was 
$1,450,000; however, he relayed that there was a lien on the property from a local lender for 
a fat higher amount and the seller was highly motivated due to financial problems. At the 
time of the sale the property was zoned residential. Cunent ovvners have paid for a rezone of 
the site, engineering for site development plans, approval of city water to the site, and work 
for an onsite sewage system. 
County records indicate the property is identified under three parcel numbers: A-
0000-010-6350, 53N03Wl06100, and 53N03Wl05000. Assessed values for each of the 








The property is located on the NE Comer of Highway 95 and Highway 54 in Athol, 
Idaho and contains approximately 56.8 acres. In the county assessor's records, parcel 
53N03Wl05000 is indicated as a 63,24 acre parcel, which appears to be an e1Tor based on all 
the other data reviewed on this site, Parcel A00000106350 has .419 acres and includes a 
small commercial building, but it is also the SW comer of the site at the intersection of the 
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highways and therefore considered an important part of the entire property. The subject 
property is cun-ently zoned Commercial by the Kootenai County Plfilllling Department and 
this zoning was obtained by the current owners since their purchase of the property in 2008. 
The site is approximately 16 miles n011h of Interstate 90 in Coeur d'Alene, 8 miles 
east of Spirit Lake, 5 miles west of Bayview, and 30 miles south of Sandpoint. The 
intersection currently consists of a convenience store on the SW corner, a restaurant/bar on 
the NW comer, vacant land on the SE corner, and the subject along with some other 
commercial uses on the NE comer along Highway ?S, Although site is contiguous at this 
time, the new interchange planned at this location show Sylvan Road being extended north 
through the subject site when the interchange is built, splitting the subject site, 
Major attractions in the immediate area include Farragut State Park to the east of this 
location and Silve1wood Amusement Park two miles south of this location. Lake Pend 
Oreille is accessible via public and commercial launch facilities at Bayview, Farragut, or 
Sandpoint. Sandpoint is also the location of Sweitzer Mountain, the largest ski area in the 
Inland Northwest. 
The site has approximately 750 feet of frontage along Highway 95 and 2,090 feet 
along Highway 54 with 4 deeded access points, Access is also available along Highway 95 
as all three parcels include frontage along the highway, There is another property containing 
1. 5 8 acres that is located north of the corner parcel that has 417 feet of frontage along 
Highway 95 as well. Water to the site is available from the City of Athol and according to 
the owner's representative, Alan Johnson, Coleman Engineering is working on development 
of a modular waste treatment plant to meet needs for onsite sewage, Other site utilities 
include natural gas from Avista, electric from Kootenai Electric, and fiber optic from 
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Verizon. The site is generally level and at grade with both highways. The site is bounded by 
Howard Road to the east. The site is treed with small sized pine trees at this time, but these 
trees have no marketable timber value. 
Market conditions for Kootenai County were similar to other areas in the Inland 
Northwest and set records for the number of properties sold as well as appreciation rates from 
2002 through 2006, The number of residential units sold in 2002 through the Coeur d'Alene 
MLS was 2,958 and that number peaked at 5,035 units in 2005 declining to 2,821 units in 
2006. The average sale price through tiles~ same years was $138,908 in 2002 and it 
increased to $271,192 in 2006, an increase of 95% in a fom year period. In 2007 and 2008 
the number of units sold continued to drop to 2,007 units in 2008 with the average sale price 
dropping to $269,120. In 2009 the total number of units sold increased to 2,216 with the 
average price dropping to $209,415, One of the reasons for the large drop in 2009 was a tax 
credit for first time homebuyers. and purchasers of first homes generally buy lower pl'ice 
properties, 2010 has continued to see fewer residential sales with prices continuing to 
decline; however, there has been continued commercial development in Kootenai County in 
the past two years, Two Wal-Mart Supercenters have been built in addition to a nev,r Super 1 
Foods store and a Love's Travel Plaza being built. In addition the Highway 95 cmTidor has 
seen the construction of a U.S. District Court Facility and a 55i000 square foot Western 
States Cat facility in Hayden. 
The highest and best use of the subject property is the ideal use of vacant land or an 
improved property that results in the highest value. The use needs to be legally permitted, 
physically possible, financially feasible, and maximally productive. The subject is a large 
tract of vacant commercially zoned land (with the exception of a small commercial building) 
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on a <'lighted~) intersection of two highways. The large size of 56.8 acres is much larger than 
typically utilized for a "big box" retail user which can range from approximately 10 to 30 
acres in size. Silverwood Amusement Park south of the subject occupies a large site 
including parking. This is a unique use that has grown over the past 20+ years and recently 
an application has been made by Silverwood to rezone an additional 90+ acres to the south of 
its existing facilities, Nevertheless, as population growth in this area continues, convenience 
issues will no doubt spur residents to patronize locally situated commercial establishments. 
The corner location and zoning o( the subject suggest commercial uses that can take 
advantage of the traffic flow at this location that presently exists on Highway 95. I 
understand from the owner's representative that they were in negotiation with URM for a sale 
of a portion of the site for a Super One Grocery store. Mike Winger of URM confinned that 
he had been involved in discussions with Hugh's Investments for a store at this location that 
was delayed by the condemnation. He also relayed that with the opening of a new WINCO 
in Coeur d'Alene and a Wal-Mart Super Center in the City of Hayden the likelihood of a new 
grocery store at the subject site is less probable due to new competition that was not there 
when negotiations were going on with Hughes, but that changing economic conditions have 
not eliminated this possibility. Other potential uses include a travel plaza/truck stop, "big 
box" retail, specialized retail use such as "Big R" ot "D & B" (local farm/ranch supply 
stores), motel, and a convenience store; however, in my opinion only about ½ of the subject 
site would be utilized for these uses. The balance of the site might include some self storage, 
residential usesi or perhaps some type of light industrial use. 
Clm-ent plans for the subject site included a new freeway interchange. The taking in 
this condemnation will bisect the property taking 16.31 acres leaving remnants on both sides 
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of the new interchange. Remnants on the west side of the new interchange include the .419 
comer parcel and a 3.87 acre parcel fronting the old Highway 95. On the east side of the new 
interchange will be the balance of the site containing 36.61 acres. The property enjoyed 
access from both highways in the before situation and I understand that in the after will only 
have limited access from Highway 54, Sylvan Road when built, and Howard Road which 
bounds it to the east. As discussed earlier in this report, the planned Sylvan Road extension 
will bisect the site effectively changing the original highest and best use analysis of the site. 
With the site bisected, only the 8.~5 acres to the east of the new interchange and west of 
Sylvan Road in addition to the 3.87 acres on the NW corner of the site~ and the .419 acre site 
on the SW comer will be available for development out of the original west half of the site. 
There will also likely be a condemnation of land needed for the new Sylvan Road as it does 
not cu1Tently exist. The cost of constructing Sylvan Road is also unknown at this time which 
may also be an additionalitem of reimbursement to the owners of the property ifldaho DOT 
makes them pay for the road improvements. 
I researched various large commerciai tract saies in the Spokane, Tri Cities, Coeur 
d'Alene, and Moses Lake areas and am familiar with prices for sales in these areas for users 
such as Home Depot, Safeway, Target, Lowes, Kohl's, Yokes) Albertson's, Costco, Sam's 
Club, and Wal-Ma1t. Retail users prefer a lighted intersection in most cases for locations as 
is a benefit for customers to access stores easier. Freeway interchanges are often locations of 
retail development, but generally these developments usually occur in higher density 
residential areas. 
As a lighted intersection with commercial zomng, I viewed the site as being 
developed in two phases. With the site containing approximately 57 acres prior to the taking, 
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I considered that approximately 30 acres closest to the intersection would be valued at a 
different rate than the remaining 27 acres. A 30 acre site would likely fit several anchors 
such as grocery stores or other "big box" retail users. The 30 acres would also likely 
accommodate other pad users such as banks, fast food uses, or convenience store uses in 
addition to some additional ''inlinell retail uses associated with the big box users, Big box 
users often pay $4 to as high as $9 per square foot for sites as in the recent WIN CO purchase 
in Coeur d'Alene. The subject location is inferior to most of the comparables discussed in 
this repo1t in that it is located in a more remote area and it doesn't presently enjoy the same 
demographics; however, the lighted intersection of two state highways offers excellent 
exposure for commercial uses and as traffic increases this location will become the "go to" 
location between Haden and Sandpoint. 
In the after scenario, the 16.31 acl'e take will leave three parcels; an 8.85 acre parcel 
on the east side of the new interchange, a 3.87 acre parcel on the west side, and the .419 acre 
parcel in the SW corner of the site. The balance of the site will be east of the newly planned 
Sylvan Road. Access to these sites will be limited to the old Highway 95 fur the 3.87 acre 
parcel and Highway 54 and Sylvan Road for the 8.85 acre parcel. Estimating values in the 
after situation will be contingent upon when the project is completed. Upon completion the 
property will likely develop differently that in the before situation and although the property 
on the east side of the freeway is still large enough to accommodate some big box retail uses, 
but not stores as large as Wal-Ma11, Costco, or Home Depot. Examples given above indicate 
that development may take many years. Without an accurate estimate of the completion of 
this project projecting values into the future is extremely difficult. 
I have considered the following comparable sales: 
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Idaho Comparables 
1. 1601 W Appleway Coeur d'Alene~ Sale Price $3,528,360-Sale Date 8/09 
Size 9 AC (392,040 sq ft)- Price Per Foot $9.00 
Comments: This was a former gravel pit site that was sold for a new WINCO 
Grocery Store. The sellers paid to level the site for the purchasers and granted 
easements to Ramsey Road to the west for additional access. The site included all 
utilities. This property would be considered superior to the subject for location and 
size. 
2, Seltice Way and I 90 Post Falls - Sale Price $20,456,747 - Sale Date 11/06 
Size 235 AC - Price Per Foot $2.00 
Comments: Foursquare Properties, developers, bought this site which consisted of 
numerous parcels from two other developers and Cabela's committed to purchase 40 
acres for a new _store at the same time frame. Although the site had utilities, the 
developers paid to build all the interior streets and provide access to the Cabela's 
parcel. Since the purchase another parcel has been sold for a new Wal-Mart which 
recently opened. This parcel is far larger than the subject and would be considered at 
a lower rate for size~ but a superior rate for location. The purchasers paid for bringing 
utilities to the site as well as significant costs for grading on the property to 
accommodate the new building sites and roads. 
3. Highway 41 & Prairie Post Falls - Sale Price $2,936,161- Sale Date 11/06 
Size 13.5 AC (588,060 sq ft)-Price Per Foot $5.00 
Comments: This sale is in the City of Post Falls and utilities were available. It was 
purchased with the intention of retail development. This is the SB corner of the 
intersection. This sale is a smaller parcel than the subject which would indicate a 
lesser price for the subject, but somewhat similar for location at a lighted intersection, 
but also a superior location demographically, although the subject has higher traffic 
counts. 
4. Highway41 &PrairiePostFalls-SalePrice$6,591,591-SaleDate 10/07 
Size 50.44 AC (2,197,197 sq ft)-Price Per Foot $3.00 
Comments: This involved the same purchaser as comparable 3 (Post Falls Station 
LLC) and it is the NE comer of the same intersection and outside the City of Post 
Falls. The site was not zoned for commercial development} but the purchaser was 
confident that they could develop the site. This is an excellent comparable for the 
subject in terms of overall size and a similar location at a lighted intersection, but a 
superior location demographically. The property has no sewer which likely may need 
to be purchased from the City of Post Falls. 
5, Highway 95 & Garwood Road-Sale Price $1,017,200- Sale Date 7/08 
Size 4.41 AC (192,100 sq ft)-Price Per Foot $5.30 
Comments: This was the sale of the Gaiwood Saloon property to Idaho DOT. The 
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sale price was confirmed with the attorney for the property owner and he relayed that 
it represented land value only. The site was zoned commercial like the subject and it 
is the next "lighted" intersection south of the subject on Highway 95. This 
intersection is with a county road versus another state highway like the subject. The 
site is smaller than the subject which would indicate a higher value and it is also a 
superior location being closer to Coeur dl Alene. I understand this sale was negotiated 
under the threat of condemnation and courts have ruled that these sales may not 
represent true market value for this reason. 
6. Ramsey & Appleway- Sale Price $7)800,000 - Sale Date 11/07 
Size 17 AC apx (740,520 sq ft) - Price Per Foot $10.53 
This sale was confim1ed with the owner who sold the property to the Coeur d, Alene 
Tribe. The site is near comparable 1 and considered superior to the subject in that it is 
a smaller parcel and located in a better location. 
7. Highway 95 & Sagle Road- Sale Price $3,400,000-Sale Date 3/08 
Size 29 AC (1,263,249 sq ft)- Price Per Foot $2.69 
This sale was confirmed with the broker who sold the property. The site was zoned 
for commercial use and it included utilities. The agent who handled the sale relayed 
that the property is currently for sale as 5 lots. This parcel does not have access to 
Highway 95 like the subject and it is not a lighted intersection like the subject. This is 
an excellent comparable sale to the subject in terms of size and it would be considered 
slightly superior for location being closer to Sandpoint, but inferior as it does not have 
a lighted intersection and it does not have access to Highway 95. 
Washington Cornparables 
8. 9527 N Nevada-Sale Price $4)813,685 -Sale Date 7/07 
Size 18.71 AC (815,100 sq ft) - Price Per Foot $5.91 
This was the site of a new WINCO in Spokane that has been built and it included 
additional pads. This site is smaller than the subject indicating a higher value and also 
a superior location. 
9. 21801 E Country Vista - Sale Price $3,045,405 - Sale Date 6/05 
Size 18.98 AC (608,969 sq ft)-Price Per Foot $5.00 
This is a dated sale for a new Home Depot store at Liberty Lake off Interstate 90 that 
has been built onsite, This site is smaller indicating a higher value and also a superior 
location. 
10. 4315 E Sprague- Sale Price $7,559,686- Sale Date 9/06 
Size 22.98 AC (1,000,000 sq ft)- Price Per Foot $7.55 
This is a Wal-Mart site purchased for a new Sam's Club that has not yet been built. 
The purchasers paid for rezoning and access to Sprague as the site didn1t have 
sufficient access as purchased. The site was purchased from Union Pacific Railroad 
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and required extensive work for development. The site is somewhat similar ·in size, 
but considered a superior location and also located adjacent to COSTCO. 
Sales of commercial/retail sites in Washington differ from Idaho with regard to 
economic issues regarding tax implications, but they were included as they reflect prices for 
big box retail uses. 
VALUE PRIOR TO POTENTIAL CONDEMNATION 
In considering an estimate of the west 30 acres of the subject site with commercial 
zoning and without the planned interchange I considered the values of the comparable sales 
with pl'imary emphasis on comparnbles 5 and 7 as they are on the san1e highway and located 
north and south of the subject. Comparable 4 is also another good comparable which was 
given more weight like comparables 5 and 7. I also considered the sizes and locations of the 
other comparables in completing my estimate of the subject. I also considered the purchase 
price of the subject as well as the motivation of the seller when the property was sold for 
$1,450,000, but as mentioned earlier, the seller was distressed and the site was not 
commercially zoned at the time of the sale. Even considering the sale price of $.59 per foot 
the majority of the value would have been to the 30 acres on the west side of the site. Based 
on these considerations, it is my opinion that the west 30 acres would have had a value in the 
range of$2.25 per foot or $2,940,300. 
VALUE AFTER THE POTENTIAL CONDEMNATION 
In the after situation, the west 30 acres will be bisected by the taking, This taking will 
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There will still be sufficient land in the original 30 acres to develop some commercial 
developments, but there will be three parcels of 8.85, 3.87, and .419 acres. These remaining 
parcels can accommodate various uses, but the chances of any big box retail use on the west 
30 acre site a1·e gone. With the planned Sylvan Road forming a boundary for the remaining 
property the remaining property is also bisected, 
Until a definitive completion date of the planned interchange at the subject 
intersection can be established, it will be very difficult to estimate a value for the remaining 
parcels due the unknowns of the anticipated project. 
Utilizing the anticipated construction date for the freeway improvements as published 
by IDrs website, an assumption can be made that the best case scenario for project 
construction would be the summer of 2011. Assuming this construction date is accurate, the 
project might be completed in the spring of 2012. If the planned construction date is laterj 
the completion date will be moved fa1ther into the future. In my opinion, no potential user of 
the remaining property would have any interest in using any of the remaining parcels until 
they know for certain when the project will be completed. Assuming the completion can be 
completed as forecast above in the spring of 2012, the value of the land would need to be 
discounted from the present date. The discount is applicable as no one would pay for 
something today that they can't receive until a future date, This same principal applies to 
valuing a subdivision that is slated to be developed in the future or the purchase of an income 
stream like a real estate contract. 
In attempting to value the remaining parcels, I have made the assumption that they 
will have a similar value to the before scenario at $2.25 per square foot. I have also assumed 
that they will be available for use upon completion of the new freeway at the earliest in the 
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spring of 2012 and the latest in the spring of 2013. This results in a discount time frame of 
1.5 to 2.5 years from the date of valuation, Using this scenario, the future value of the 
remaining parcels of $1,344,457 would be discounted to a present value. 
The discount rate is basically a rate of return that someone is looking for on a given 
investment. It is based on risk and that risk is affected by the rates of safe investments, 
market conditions, and other factors. In this case, we are dealing with undeveloped land in 
uncertain economic times. For this reason, I selected a rate higher than typical capitalization 
rates in the current market and utilized a rate of 10%. The higher rate used to discount the 
future value in this case is due to all the unknowns concerning this project including the 
unknown timing of the project being finished, issues with regard to access, Sylvan Road 
being built, the cost of who will be responsible for the cost of Sylvan Road, and the need for 
condemnation of the right of way for Sylvan Road. Applying this discount rate to the 





Utilizing these estimates and the original before estimate the final concluded value 
estimates were completed as follows: 
Before Value 
After Present Value 1.5 years 





== $1,775,000 - $1,880,000 
This difference in value does not address the value of the Sylvan Road, cost of 
constructfon of Sylvan Road, or loss of access to Highway 54 which are all potential 
additional items of compensation. 
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B. Data and Other Information Considered in F om1ing Testimony: 
The data, documents, and information relied on by Mr. Sherwood in fonnulating his 
opinions are: 
C. 
Planning documents related to the Property; 
Property and project design, right-of-way, and construction plans; 
Personal inspection of the site of the property; 
Applicable federal, state and local regulations and specifications; 
Planning and zoning documents; 
Kootenai County Assessor's records; 
Property records and documents for the property and comparable properties; and 
MLS sales data and comparable sales information from personal interviews with 
transaction participants/agents 
Exhibits that May Be Used as a Summary of or Supp01t for Testimony: 
Mr. Sherwood may use the documents and infmmation identified in his appraisal report 
to summarize, illustrate, or suppo1t his testimony. He may also use some or all of the following: 
hereto. 
D. 
Planning documents related to the Property; 
Property and project design, rlght-of-way, and construction plans; 
Personal inspection of the site of the property; 
Applicable federal, state and local regulations and specifications; 
Planning and zoning documents; 
Kootenai County Assessor's recol'ds; 
Property records and documents for the property and comparabie properties; and 
MLS sales data and comparable sales info1mation 
Qualifications of Mr. Sherwood: 
The qualifications of Mr. Sherwood are set forth in his curriculum vitae, attached 
E. Compensation Paid to Mr. Sherwood: 
:W.Ir. Sherwood was paid a flat fee for his appraisal research/evaluation. He will be paid 
his standard hourly rate of $175.00 per hour for research and testimony. 
F. Pubiications Authored by Mr, Sherwood in the Past Ten Years: None. 
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Vice President, Director of Design and Construction 
Hughes Investments, LLC 
Clo Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
Statement of Nature of Testimony: 
Mr. Reeslund will give opinion testimony as to the development plans for the Property, 
testimony as to its potential uses, its value (before and after the condemnation), the limitations 
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on uses of the Property remaining after condemnation, and land use planning/entitlement, 
construction planning activities; efforts and expenses associated with the purchase, holding and 
development of the Property; planning and design work associated with the property; and the 
effects of the condemnation on the development of the remaining Property. 
B. Data and Other Information Considered in Forming Testimony: 
Mr. Reeslund has relied on the following data and documents in this matter: 
Planning documents related to the Property; 
Environmental documents related to the Property; 
Property and project design, right-of-way, and construction plans; 
Personal inspection of the site of the property; 
Applicable federal, state and local regulations and specifications; 
Planning and zoning documents; 
Engineering standards and guidelines; and 
Property records and documents 
C. Exhibits that May Be Used as a Summazy of or Support for Testimony: 
Mr. Reeslund may use the following exhibits to summarize, illustrate, or support his 
testimony: 
D. 
Planning documents related to the Property; 
Environmental documents related to the Property; 
Property and project design, right-of-way, and construction plans; 
Personal inspection of the site of the property; 
Applicable federal, state and local regulations and specifications; 
Planning and zoning documents; 
Engineering standards and guidelines; and 
Property records and documents 
Qualifications of Mr. Reeslund: 
Mr. Reeslund is a graduate of the University of Southern California, where he earned 
Bachelors and Masters Degrees in Architecture. A registered Architect since 1977, for over 
21 years Geoff worked for SGPA Architecture and Planning, one of the foremost 
retail/commercial architectural firms in the country. A Principal with SGPA si11ce 1986, he 
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provided leadership in the planning, design and entitlement prncessing of over 200 
community, specialty, regional and ente1tainment centers throughout California and other 
\Vestem states, including nine projects for Hughes. In addition, he served as SGPA's 
Southern California Marketing Director from 1993 to 1997, helping to expand their pl'esence 
and Client bf)se in the region. 
As Director of Design and Construction at Hughes Investments, Mr. Reeslund 
oversees all aspects of project planning, design~ governmental approvalsi and construction. 
He assembles and manages the project consultant teams, works closely with tenants and their 
consultants, and coordinates the construction process to a successful completion, 
Mr. Reeslund is a member of the American Institute of Architects, and is actively 
involved in the Intemational Council of Shopping Centers. 
E. Compensation Paid to Mr. Reeslund: 
Mr. Reeslund is employed by Hughes Investments, LLC, His only compensation is his 
regular salary paid by Hughes Investments, LLC. No additional or separate compensation is 
being paid for his testimony. 
F. Publications Authored by Mr. Reeslund in the Past Ten Years; None. 
G. List of Other Cases in Which Mr. Reeslund has Testified as an Expert: None. 
3) Alan Johnson 
A. 
Senior Vice President, Development 
Hug._hes Investments, LLC 
Clo Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
Statement of Testimony: 
Mr. Johnson will give testimony as to the acquisition, ownership and development plans 
for the Property1 testimony as to its uses, its value (before and after the condemnation), the 
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values of the Property remaining after condemnation and before and after construction and 
entitlement/construction planning activities; efforts and expenses associated with the purchase, 
holding and development of the Property~ planning and design work associated with the 
property; marketing efforts of the property prior to and after condemnation; and the effects of 
the condemnation on the remaining Pl'operty. 
B. Data and Other Infom1ation Considered in Forming Testimony: 
Mr. Johnson has relied on the following data and documents in this matter: 
Planning documents related to the Property~ 
Environmental documents related to the Property; 
Property and project design, right-of-way, and construction plans; 
Personal inspection of the site of the property; 
Applicable federal, state and local regulations and specifications; 
Planning and zoning documents; 
Engineering standards and guidelines; and 
Property records and documents 
C. Exhibits that May Be Used as a Summruy of or Support for Testimon__x: 
Mr. Johnson may use the following exhibits to summarize, illustrate, or support his 
testimony: 
Planning documents related to the Property; 
Environmental documents related to the Property; 
Property and project design, right-of-way, and construction plans; 
Personal inspection of the site of the property; 
Applicable federal, state and local regulations and specifications; 
Planning and zoning documents; 
Engineering standards and guidelines; and 
Property records and documents 
D. Qualifications ofMr. Johnson: 
Mr. Johnson attended Mount Royal College in his native Calgary, Canada and 
graduated from the University of Oklahoma in Nmman, Oklahoma. After graduation in 
1983, he joined Coldwell Banker now CB Richard Ellis, as a retail specialist, transferring to 
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the Anaheim, California office in 1985. In 1989 Mr. Johnson was hired by Hughes 
Investments as Vice President - Leasing. After nine years with Hughes Investments, Mr. 
Johnson joined The Irvine Company as Director of Leasing and concentrated on the 
development and leasing of several ground-up projects including The Market Place - Irvine, 
Northpark Plaza, Quail Hill, Trabuco Grove, Oakcreek Village, Irvine Spectrum Pavilion, 
Newport Coast, The Bluffs and several other projects throughout Irvine and Newport Beach. 
Mr. Johnson completed transactions and fom1ed relationships with Albertsons, Sav-on Drugs, 
Lowe's, Target, Kohl's, Office Depot, Ralph's, Ethan Allen, Vons, Sears and many other 
national tenants, 
In September of 2003 Mr. Johnson left The Irvine Company to serve as Senior Vice 
President, Development with Hughes Investments. Mr. Johnson is responsible for all phases 
of acquisition and development of shopping centers throughout California. Utah. Washington 
and Idaho. Mr. Johnson is a member of ICSC and has attained his Senior Certified Leasing 
Specialist "SCLS" credential. 
E. Com12ensation Paid to Mr. Johnson: 
Mr. Johnson is employed by Hughes Investments, LLC. His only compensation is his 
regular salary paid by Hughes Investments, LLC. No additional or separate compensation is 
· being paid for his testimony. 
F. Publications Authored by Mr, Johnson in the Past Ten Years: None. 
G. List of Other Cases in Which l\tfr. Johnson has Testified as an Expert: None. 
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4) As an actor/viewer ''expert," Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover the testimony of 
persons, such as Reeslund and Johnson. See, U.S.C.A., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Notes of Advisory 
Committee on Rules, 1970 Amendment at 114 (West 1995). 
5) Reservation. 
Defendant reserves the right to call additional expe1t witnesses, including fact and 
expert witnesses, identified through discovery by Defendant. Defendant also reserves the 
right to call any expert disclosed by Plaintiff through those certain expe1t disclosures filed by 
Plaintiff pursuant to the Comt's Uniform Pretrial Otder and the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Defendant further resei-ves the right to supplement this response in a timely 
manner and upon proper motion to identify rebuttal expert witnesses should the same be 
necessary in light of Plaintiff's disclosures both through discove1y and Plaintiffs expert 
disclosures. 
DATED this 19111 day of August, 2011. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
DEFENDANT HJ GRA THOL'S EXPERT Wl1NESS DISCLOSURE - 19 
878 of 1617
Aug, 19. 2011 4:13PM No. 4332 P. 21/25 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the l 911i day of August, 2011, I served a true and correct. copy of 
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transp01tation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box2527 





__ Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
~land Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
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EDUCATION 
DEWITT M. "SKIP" SHER WOOD 
APPRAISER QUALIFICATIONS 
No. 4332 P. 22/25 
Bachelor of Science Degree - Educatjon - University of Mont. - 1970 
Navigator Flight Training - USAF 1971 
30 Semester Hours - Masters Degree - Guidance & Counseling 
1973 - I 975 Central Michigan University & Chapman College 
Residential Appraisal - 1978 - Amerjcan Institut.e of RE Appraisers 
Real Estate Law - 1978-Rockwell lnstitute 
Fundamentals of Real Estate Investment and Taxation-1980-CCIM 
Course l O 1 - National Association of Realtors 
Fundamentals of Real Estate Appraisal - 1997 -Mykut RE School 
USPAP 1991,1997, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2007 . 
IRS 1 OJI ·Exchanges & Charitable Trusts - 1993 - NW Closing 
Commercial Real· Estate Tax Update - 1994 - WA Assn. RE 
Marshall Swift Cost Analysis - I 99$ - Appraisal Inst. 
Multifamily Appraisals - 1999.,.. McKissock Data 
Regression Analysis - 1999 - McKissock Data 
Income Capitalization - 2002 - McK.issock Data 
Disclosures and Disclaimers -2005 - McKissock Data 
Red Flags Property Inspection Guide - 2005 - Mykut RE School 
Environmental Issues in Real Estate Practice - 2005 - Mykut RE 
Valuation ofDetrimental·Conditions in RE- 2007 -Appraisal Inst. 
BUSINESS HISTORY 
1971 -1977 Navigator & Instructor USAF 
1977 - 1979 Real Estate Sales, Crane & Ward Realtors, Spokane, WA 
1980-1984 Real Estate Sales, Wolff & Walker Realtors, Spokane 
1984 - 2005·- Real Estate Appraising & Sales, Byrd RE Grp. LLC 
2005 - Present - Cornerstone Property Advjsors, Spokane, WA 
1977 - 1981 ·Mortgage & ·Finance Committee, Spokane Brd. of RE 
1986 - Member of Commercial Multiple Listing Committee 
1986 - Instructor for Metropolitan Mortgage - Financial Analysis 
1977 - Present- Member Spokane Ass~. of Realtors 
1976 - I 994 - Officer Wash. Air National Guard, Retired Lt. Colonel 
2005 - Instructor- Lannan Education Services - Eau Claire, WI 
1997 - Licensed General Appraiser, WA # 1100412 
2004-Licensed General Appraiser, ID #CGA 1125 
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DEWITIM, <'SKIP,, SHERWOOD 
(Appraiser Qualifications Continued) 
SAMPLES OF APPRAISAL ASSIGNMENTS 
REO (real estate owned) properties for various lenders 
Non-conforming properties for various lenders 
Estate Appraisals - Commercial, Land, & Residential 
Internal Revenue Appraisals -All Types 
Feasibility Analysis for Real Estate Investors 
Insurance Company Va]uations -AU Types 
Condemnation Appraisals .:.. All Types 
No. 4332 P. 23/25 
Qualified as an Expert Witness -Superior Court of WA-Counties of 
Spokane; Adams, Grant, & Pend OreiUe -. Su_perior Court of ID -
Bonner County 
PARTIAL LIST OF APPRAISAL CLIENTS 
Al1ied Insurance Company, Spokane Washington 
American States Insurance, Indianapolis, Indiana 
American West Bank, Spokane, Washington 
Burlington Northern Santa Fee Railroad 
Central Pre-Mix, Spokane, Washington 
City of Cheney, Washington 
City of Fairfield, Washington 
Farmers Insurance Group 
Fanners and Merchants Bank, Spokane, Washington 
General·Electric Corporation, Kent, Washington 
Global Credit UnionJ Spokane, Washington 
Kaiser.Aluminum; Spokane, Washington 
Marsh Insurance, Spokane, ·Washington 
Prudential Insurance Company> San Francisco, California 
SAFECO: Insurance,. Seattle, Washington 
Spokane County Washington 
Tomlinson Black Realtors, Spokane, Washington 
Unigard Insurance, Spokane, Washington 
US Bank, Spoka.ne,.Washington 
United States ·Marshals Service 
Wheatland Bank, Spokane1 Washington 
Numerous Attorneys & Accountants 
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August 24, 20Il 
Via Fax: 208-664-5884 and 
E-mail: fim@,ramsdenlyons.com 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Re: ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al. 
Dear Doug: 
First Judicial District Court1 Kootenai County 
Case No. CVl0-10095 
This letter constitutes our efforts to "meet and confer" regarding the deficiencies in 
your Expert Witness Disclosure received August 19, 2011, prior to seeking intervention by the 
Court. 
First, your expert disclosures do not comply with the Court's Pretrial Order, nor do they 
comply with discQvery requirements. Under Idaho case law and the Court's order, expert 
opinions and the bases of the. opinions must be disclosed, whether formed for litigation or not. 
The Pretrial Order states: 
2. EXPERT WITNESSES: 
Not later than one hundred eighty (180) days before. trial, 
Plantiff(s) shall disclose all experts to be called at triaJ. Not 
later than one hundre!J fifty (15()) days before, Defendant(s) 
shall disclose all experts to be called at trial. Rebuttal 
witnesses shall be disclosed by all parties not later than ninety 
(90) days before trial. Such disclosure shall consist of at .least 
the information required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
26(b)(4)(i). Notice of compliance shall be contemporaneously 
filed with the Court. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(i) requires, among other things, the expert to 
disclose a "complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons 
therefore." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(i) states the following: 
( 4) Trial preparation--Experts. Discovery of facts known and 
opinions held by experts, expected to testify, otherwise 
Holland&Hart LJ.P EXHIBIT 
Phone [208] 342-5000 Fax [208] 343-8869 www.hollandhart.com 
101 South Capitol Boulevard Suite 1400 Boise.ID 83702 Mailing Add res• P.O.Box 2527 Boise.ID 83701-2527 
Aspen Boulder Carson Gty Colotado Springs D•nver Denver Tech C•nter Billings Bois• Chey<>nne Jawon Hole Las Vegas Reno Salt Lake City Santa Fe E 
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discoverable under the provisions of subdivision (b)(l) of this 
rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for 
trial, may be obtained by interrogatory and/or deposition, 
including: 
(A) (i) A complete statement of .all opm1ons to be 
expressed and the basis and reasons therefore; the data or other 
information considered by the witness in forming the opinions; 
any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the 
opinions; any qualifications of the witness, including a list of all 
publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten 
years; the compensation to be paid for the testimony; and a listing 
of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert 
at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years. 
Please provide full and complete disclosures as requ~red by the Courf s order within 
seven (7) days of the date of this letter, which we are faxing and emailing to you today. 
Otherwise, we will file our motion to compel. 
Second, the disclosure regarding Mr. Sherwood states that "He will testify in 
accordance with his appraisal report, which will he provided to Plaintiff upon completion." 
Under the scheduling order, Mr. Sherwood's report was req11ired to be completed and delivered 
to us by the expert disclosure deadline. Moreover, references to Mr. Sherwood and his report 
have been made for nearly a year. No possible reason or excuse exists for failure to complete 
the report after these many months and after the Court-imposed deadline for expert disclosures. 
Please produce Mr. Sherwood's report within seven (7) days of the date of this letter. 
If we do not receive his report by that date, we will file a. mi;ition to exclude any testimony by 
Mr. Sherwood that he. appraised the property, that he prepared a report, and any testimony not 
contained in the expert disclosures of August 19, 2011. 
Third, please respond within seven (7) days to our letter of July 22, 2011 regarding 
deficiencies in the Defendant's discovery responses. 
U/-
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Re: The Stat~ of Idaho v. HJ Grathol, et al. 
Kootenai Co. Case No. CV-10~10095 
Dear Mary, 
Via facsimile (208) 343-8869 
We have reviewed your correspondence dated July 22, 2011 taking exception to 
Defendant Grathol's discovery responses and the letter of August 24, 2011 over your 
signature concerning the expert witness disclosure we filed and served August 19, 2011. I 
will address the points in the order pl'esented in your letters: 
1) Expert witnesses. Grathol's recent expert witness disclosures should have addressed 
your concerns as to the identity of our anticipated testifying opinion witnesses. The 
disclosure filed on August 19, 201 I compiles wlth the :Pretrial Order and contains all 
of the information required by Rule 26(\>)(4)(i), Referring specifically to the August 
241h letter (signed by Mr. Tollefson on your behalf), nothing in the Pretrial Order or 
the State Court Rules requires a testifying expert to prepare a formal) written report, 
''Full and complete disclosures as required by the Couit's Order . , , '' wereJ in fact, 
made in the expert witness disclosul'e. Nevertheless, Skip Sherwood is preparing a 
report, the contents of which will comport to the disclosure and will be pL'ovided to 
you once it is completed. 
2) Inten·ogatory No. 8. - We have produced tho documents describing the pul'Chase of 
the subject property and all te1•ms 1·elated thereto. It appeai·s that you are more 
precisely seeking information regarding the ownership oftht, property by HJ Grathol, 
instead of the acquisition of the property by Hughes Investments. As such, your 
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described in our answer to Interrogatory No. 16, and a supplemental answer dated 
May 16> 2011. If this response does not adequately address the information you are 
seeking please let us lmow. 
3) Interrogatory No, 9. - The property has been fully evaluated by Skip Sherwood and 
his opinions and the basis for his opinions were included in Defendant's Expert 
Witness Disclosure, Because Mr. She1wood is the only retained valuation expert we 
anticipate calling to testify, his opinions and the basis for them are the only facts 
discoverable. Appraisals, if any, prepare by non•testifying expert witnesses and 
consultants are not discoverable. 
4) Interrogatory No. l4. - .Your interrogatory was compound. It asked whether 
defendant made any offers to sell m: received any offers to buy the property. Grathol 
reSponded to th~ 1·equest indicating that it has not received any formal, written offers 
for the purchase of the StJbject Property (other than ITD's "offer"). It has, however, 
marketed the property for sale or lease as the answer described. Please make fill effort 
to read the subject discovery before complaining about the adequacy of the response. 
5) Inten-ogatory No. 16. - Additional information responsive to this request was 
provided to your office on May 16, 2011, via Defendant HJ Grathol's Supplemental 
Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Intell"ogatories and Request for 
Production of Documents, Please make an effort to read the discovery before, 
including the supplemental responses, befote complaining about the adequacy of the 
response. 
6) Reguest for Production No, 5. - Discoverable information responsive to this Request 
for Production was set forth in Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure. To the extent 
that Defendants specifically retained or consulted with other experts who are not 
expected to testify, such information is precluded from discovery by application of 
IRCP 26(b)(4)(B). To the extent the Defendant's anticipated testifying expert has 
appraised other properties; those documents are not discoverable in this case. 
7) Reguest for Production No. 9, - lnformatlon responsive to this request was included 
in Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure, including compensation to be paid for 
testimony by the expert. Any other compensation agreements with experts not 
expected to testify are precluded from discovery by application ofIRCP 26(b)(4)(B). 
8) Request for Prnduction No, 13. -There are no discove1·able documents responsive to 
this Request. 
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9) Reguest for Productions Nos, 14 and 16. -As stated, the materials responsive to this 
request may contain attorney-client privileged materials, if they contained internal 
privileged discussions of the legal implications involved with acquisition, 
development and or/zoning changes, Notwithstanding the stated objection, all 
responsive matel'ials were provided. 
Please review these responses and let me know ifthere is anything else. 
CDO/sj 
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Viafacsimile (208) 343-8869 
Letter Only 
MaryV. York 
Holland & Hart, LLP 
P.O. Box:2527 
Boise, ID ·83701 
Re: The State of Idaho v. HJ Graihol, et al. 
Kootenai Co. Case No, CV-10-10095 
Dear Mary, 
This correspondence is in follow up to our telephone conversation on Friday. 
September 9, 2011, regarding various ongoing discovery issues, I will attempt to address our 
discussion in the order presented to the best of my recollection. 
. 1. Ongoing Discovery: 
First, enclosed herewith please find Defendant's Second Supplemental Discovery 
Responses. Included with these responses is a copy of the recently completed appraisal 
report of Dewitt Sherwood. The contents of the report are entirely consistent with the Expert 
Witness Disclosure previously filed. This report should alleviate your client's concerns with 
respect to Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure, dated August 19, 2011. We stand on our 
position that lRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(i) does not require such a report to be created. Further, 
contrary to Mr. Tollefson's letter of August 24, 2011, the Court's Uniform Pretrial Order did 
not require that such a report be created or disclosed by the expert witness deadline. Instead, 
the Pretrial Order simply requires disclosure of the information listed in Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) 
which we have done. Nonetheless, Mr, Sherwood had completed a report, which you now 
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Second, I included in Defendant's Second Supplemental Discovery Responses some 
additional information in light of our discussions. I included a supplemental response to 
Inte1Togato:ry No. 8 pertaining to the cash purchase of the property and a reference to the 
Phase I Environmental Site Assessment and Phase II Completion Certificate which were 
previously produced, There are no other terms or conditions related to the purchase of the 
property. I also supplemented our Response to Interrogatory No. 9 that there were no 
appraisals performed on the Subject Property when our client acquired it. The supplemental 
response to Interrogatory No. 14 describes marketing discussions and inquiries about the 
property. Again, I reiterated that no offers were made/received. 
With respect to Request for Production No. 5, (appraisals performed by Mr. 
Sherwood during the previous five years), Defendant stands.on its prior response that it does 
not have any documents responsive to this request. To the extent such documents exist, they 
would likely either be in the possession of Mr. Sherwood or the persons who commissioned 
them and subject to the ownership interests of whatever client or entity employed Mr. 
Sherwood to conduct them. However, Defendant does not own or have in its possession 
such materials, therefore, canlt produce them. 
With respect to Request for Production No. 13, we will supplement this request with 
additional materials, as necessary. As to Request for Production Nos. 14 and 16, there are no 
additional materials responsive to this request. 
2. Johnson and Reeslund as Opinion Witnesses: 
Defendant disclosed Mr. Jolmson and Mr. R.eeslund as "expert witnesses" in order to 
comply with the Court's Uniform Pretrial Order. However, these individuals are not "expert 
witnesses" in the traditional sense of a Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) disclosure. They fall within the 
"actor/viewer exception', possessing information not acquired in preparation for litigation, 
but instead are actors/viewers with respect to the occurrences that are part of the subject 
matter of this litigation - specifically the history, development, construction and value of the 
subject property. See, Notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, Subdivision (b )( 4). 
These "experts" are to be treated as ordinary witnesses, and as such, Mr. Tollefson's 
assertions that our Disclosure with respect to these individuals fails to comply with Rule 
26(b)(4)(A)(i) is without merit, Out of an abundance of caution, these individuals were 
identified because they will testify as to $eir opinions concerning the Subject Property, 
including their opinions of its potential· developability and its value before and after 
condemnation. These opinions might constitute what is traditionally thought of as "expert" 
testimony because their opinions are based upon specialized knowledge, experience and 
expertise, but that fact alone does not subject them to Rule 26(b)(4(A)(i) considerations. 
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You indicated that you desire to depose Mr. Johnson and Mr. Reeslund and we 
provided their availability to do so on October 51\ 61\ 251h and 26th• With respect to your 
request that all of their opinions be disclosed to you, that information may be discovered 
through their depositions which you are entitled to talce, Their opinions will be based on 
their observations and familiarity with the property, their experience and history in 
commercial developments and on the documentary materials previously produced and 
disclosed to you. 
We do not agree that your request for infonnation concerning other (unrelated) 
projects with which our clients have been involved are either relevant or discovei:able, but in 
the interest of avoiding any further arguments, we will produce that information to you and 
are compiling the supplemental infonnation. 
Pl.ease let us know when you would like to take these deposition 
your consideration. 
hristopher D, Gabbert 
CDG/sj 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
ORIGINAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VIN GS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants. 
TO: THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PLAINTIFF 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL 
ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
OF DOCUMENTS 
COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol and hereby responds to Plaintiff's First Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents as follows: 
INTERROGATORIES 
Interrogatory No. 2: For each expert witness identified in response to Interrogatory 
No. 1, please provide the subject matter upon which the expert witness is expected to testify, 
a compiete statement of aii opinions to be expressed by the expert and the reasons therefore, 
EXHIBIT 
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the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions, the 
underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based, and all information 
referenced in and required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ANSWER: Defendant anticipates offering expert opinion testimony in this matter, 
including testimony concerning the plan, design and engineering of portions of the Plaintiffs 
project across or adjacent to Defendant's property, as well as testimony concerning valuation 
of the property. The witnesses offering opinion testimony as actor-viewers may include the 
following: 
(1) Bill Hughes 
(2) Alan Johnson 
(3) Geoff Reeslund 
(4) Scott Taylor 
(5) Brent Heleker 
(6) John Beutler 
{'7\ Mark Jo!u1son \' J 
(8) Jeff Bond 
(9) Donald Smock 
( 10) Paul Daugharty 
(11) Brett Terrell 
(12) Mike Winger 
As an actor/viewer "expert," Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover the testimony of such 
persons. See, U.S.C.A., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1970 
Amendment at 114 (West 1995). 
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( 1) Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, CGA 
(2) Ed Morse, MAI 
With respect to these valuation experts, as of the date of the Answers to these 
Interrogatories, no formal appraisal reports have been completed. Therefore, the remainder 
of the info1mation requested in this Interrogatory cannot be provided. If and when formal 
appraisal reports are prepared, the information in the above Interrogatory will be contained 
within those appraisal reports. 
Supplemental Answer: See, Appraisal Report of Dewitt "Skip: Sherwood, CGA, 
produced herewith and Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure dated August 25, 2011. 
Interrogatory No. 3: (Just Compensation) Please identify the amount of just 
compensation which you will advocate at trial that Defendant is entitled to as a result of the 
taking of a portion the Subject Property and the basis for the amount of just compensation to 
which you believe Defendant is entitled. Do not simply reference an appraisal report, which 
may or may not be relied upon and which may be subject to change. 
Af~SWER: Defendant does not know at this time the precise amount of just 
compensation which will be advocated at trial. Defendant may off er a value assessment at 
the trial in this matter including, but not necessarily limited to, the Defendant's past and 
intended future use and development of the properly as well as the opinions derived from 
comparative market analysis undertaken by the Defendant for purposes of valuing the Subject 
Property. The basis of computation of the Defendant's opinion of the value of the Subject 
Property is set forth generally in the letter of June 28, 2010 directed to Ron Harvey at ITD 
and the letter of October 27, 2010 directed to Mary York, Holland and Hart. 
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Supplemental Answer: Based upon the appraisal calculations prepared to date, 
Defendant anticipates that it will advocate just compensation for the land taken of not 
less than $1,775,000.00 per the opinion of Dewitt Sherwood. Additionally, Defendant 
anticipates advocating additional severance damages not less than $1,000,000.00 for 
diminishment to the use and developability of the property for commercial purposes, 
project influence, project delay and damages related to the anticipated loss of property 
and utility of the property with the extension of Sylvan Road and loss of access, 
visibility and development opportunity, and tax liabilities. 
Interrogatory No. 4: (Just Compensation) Please state and identify each and every 
fact, and describe each and every document, which supports your opinion of the amount of 
just compensation that Defendant is entitled to as a result of the taking of a portion the 
Subject Property. Include in your answer each and every fact and document that describes, 
shows, or evidences each aspect of just compensation which you believe Defendant is 
entitled. 
ANSWER: This Interrogatory, as phrased, is overbroad, ambiguous and unreasonably 
burdensome. Further, as phrased it seeks matters that are subject to attorney-client privilege, 
attorney work product doctrine, and otherwise not discoverable under Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b). Notwithstanding this, Defendant does not know at this time the precise 
amount of just compensation which will be advocated at trial as discovery and evaluation is 
still underway. However, it is anticipated that Defendant wiii offer value opinions based 
upon more appropriate comparable property sales which will establish a value of the portion 
condemned in a range of $3.00 to $5.00 per square foot for the part taken and severance 
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damages for the remainder. Among the facts supporting this valuation are the comparable 
property sales described in the letter of October 27, 2010 directed to Mary York. 
Supplemental Answer: See, Supplemental Answer to Interrogatory No. 3. 
Interrogatory No. 5: (Opinion of fair market value - Before Take) Please state and 
identify your opinion of the fair market value of the Subject Property before the taking of a 
portion of the Subject Property as of the "date of take" as that term is defined herein. 
ANSWER: It is Defendant's opinion that the fair market value of the Subject 
Property being taken before the take was not less than $1,420,000.00 - up to approximately 
$3,500,000.00 in its highest and best use. The basis of computation of the Defendant's 
opinion of the value of the Subject Property is set forth generally in the letter of June 28, 
2010 directed to Ron Harvey at ITD and the letter of October 27, 2010 directed to Mary 
York. 
Supplemental Answer: It is the opinion of Defendant's designated expert witness 
(appraiser) Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood that the fair market value of the Subject Property 
before the take was $2,940,300.00. It is the opinion of Defendant's general and limited 
partners, who as owners of the Subject Property are deemed competent to opine as to 
its value, that the fair market value before the take was approximately $3.00 per square 
foot "as is" and significantly more in its highest and best form. 
Interrogatory No 6: (Opinion of fair market value - After Take) Please state and 
identify your opinion of the fair market value of the Subject Property after the taking of a 
portion of the Subject Property as of the "date of take" as that term is defined herein. 
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ANSWER: This Interrogatory, as phrased, is vague and ambiguous. Further, the 
question as phrased seeks matters that are potentially subject to attorney-client privilege, 
attorney work product, and the privileges afforded under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b). Notwithstanding this, Defendant does not know at this time the value of the property 
after the take because of the ongoing uncertainty as to time of construction, completion of 
construction and ancillary severance damages occasioned by the construction and by project 
influence/stigma. 
Supplemental Answer: It is the opinion of Defendant's designated expert witness 
(appraiser) Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood that the value of the Subject Property after the 
taking will be between $1,060,000.00 and $1,165,000.00. It is the opinion of Defendant's 
general and limited partners, who as owners of the Subject Property are deemed 
competent to opine as to its value, that the fair market value of the Subject Property 
after the taking will be approximately $1,000,000.00 "as is," and without regard to the 
significant severance damages and negative project influence(s) that will result to the 
remaining property. 
Interrogatory No. 8: (Purchase of Subject Property) Please identify the date you 
purchased the Subject Property, including any businesses located on the Subject Property and 
state the total amount paid for the Subject Property and identify the specific amounts paid for 
the real property, the buildings, the assets and all businesses located on the Subject Property. 
Include in your answer any all special terms or conditions related to your purchase of the 
Subject Property. 
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ANSWER: Plaintiff already has the information requested in this Interrogatory as it 
was included in Plaintiffs own appraisal data and acquisition packet. Defendant's acquired 
the Subject Property in a distress sale circumstance in 2008 for the total purchase price of 
$1,450,000.00. Defendant does not know what is referred to as "any all special terms or 
conditions ... " and as such cannot meaningfully answer this portion of the Interrogatory. 
Supplemental Answer: The Subject Property was purchased for cash. 
Defendant's Phase I Environmental Site Assessment (April 14, 2008) and the Phase II 
Assessment Correction Completion Certificate (May 6, 2008), were previously 
produced as Bates Nos. 000785-000963. No other terms or conditions are related to the 
purchase of the Subject Property. 
Interrogatory No. 9: {Appraisals) Please state whether the Subject Property or any 
portion thereof, including any business located on the Subject Property has been appraised by 
you or on your behalf within the last five (5) years, and if so, please identify (as defined 
above) each appraisal. 
ANSWER: Yes. Defendant has evaluated the property value on its own behalf and 
with the assistance of consultants, including licensed real estate broker(s), certified, general 
appraiser(s), and land use planner(s)/consultant(s). 
Supplemental Answer: No other appraisals have been performed on the Subject 
Property. 
Interrogatory No. 14: (Offers to Purchase or Sell) As of the "date of take," and for the 
five (5) years immediately prior thereto, did you receive any offers to purchase or make any 
offers to sell all or a portion of the Subject Property? If so, please list and identify (as defined 
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above) each and every offer to purchase or sell. 
ANSWER: Yes. Defendant has actively marketed the property to prospective "end 
users," both purchasers and tenants, to ascertain highest and best use options for development 
of the property both with and without the anticipated project influences. No formal 
purchase/sale offers have been memorialized. 
Supplemental Answer: Defendant received inquiries from McDonalds for the 
purchase of approximately one acre of land, from a Taco Bell franchisee for a purchase 
or co-branded location, from URM for a Super 1 store or other branded store, from a 
travel center operator who also had hotels, Ace Hardware, the local video and pizza 
store in Athol Idaho. The terms discussed ranged depending on the amount of lands 
discussed ranging from $2.63/square foot for the entire 56 acres of the property as a 
bulk sale, to $12/$15/square foot for smaller parcels. 
None of these inquiries were formalized into offers. Additionally, see Bates Nos. 
00013-00015, 00025-00026, previously produced. 
Request for Production No. 4: Please produce any and all appraisal reports, written 
estimates, or market studies relating in any way to the issues in this case, or any other 
document that reflects an opinion relating to the Subject Property, including but not limited 
to, the appraisal reports, written estimates, market studies or market analyses of each 
appraiser or valuation witness that you intend to call to testify as an expert witness at the trial 
of this matter. 
RESPONSE: Defendant has no appraisal reports responsive to this request, but 
information relative to Defendant's opinion of the value of the Subject Property can be found 
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in the documents produced or available for inspection and in the letters to Ron Harvey and 
Mary York referenced herein. 
Supplemental Answer: See, Appraisal Report of Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, CGA, 
produced herewith. 
Request for Production No. 13: (Loan and Other Documents) Please produce a copy 
of each and every financial statement, loan application, or other document on which a value 
of the Subject Property has been set forth during the last five (5) years. 
RESPONSE: Defendant has no discoverable documents responsive to this Request 
for Production. 
Supplemental Answer: See, Appraisal Report of Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, CGA, 
produced herewith. 
DA TED this il day of September, 2011. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
By: ~'il-~/4 
Dou~.Marfice, Of th Ffrm 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
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August 25, 2011 
Doug Marfice 
Ramsden & Lyons 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
RE: HJ Grathol Condemnation 
Highways 95 & 54 NEC 
Athol, Idaho 
Dear Mr. Marfice: 
As requested, I have made. an inspection and completed an appraisal of the 
above mentioned property. The purpose of the appraisal is to estimate a 
before and after valuation of the property for a proposed condemnation by 
Idaho DOT. The date of valuation in this case will be as of the latest date of 
inspection of the property on September 15, 2010. This appraisal has been 
prepared under the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice 
(USP AP), is limited in scope as agreed, and presented in a restricted 
appraisal format according to USP AP reporting requirements. It should be 
noted that the restricted report is the most abbreviated of the report formats 
and as such may be difficult to clearly understand by a third party without 
additional data contained in my working files. 
Idaho is a non-disclosure state and comparable sales are only verified by 
parties to the transaction and not official records as in other states. The 
comparable data I am presenting to you in this matter is believed to be 
correct and obtained from sources considered reliable, but cannot be verified 
by records. 
The subject property is legally described in "Exhibit A" in the addenda 
section of this appraisal. The property was transferred to Gracal Corporation 
on May 22, 2008 from North Alpine Development LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability corporation on May 22, 2008 and subsequently from Gracal 
Corporation to HJ Grathol, a California general partnership on October 15, 
2009. According to the broker who sold the site in May 2008, the sale price 
was $1,450,000; however, he relayed that there was a lien on the property 
from a local lender for a far higher amount and the seller was highly 
motivated due to financial problems. At the time of the sale the property 
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was zoned residential. I understand the owners have paid for a rezone of the 
site, engineering costs for site development plans, approval of city water to 
the site, and work for an onsite sewage system. 
County records indicate the property is identified under three parcel 
numbers: A-0000-010-6350, 53N03W106100, and 53N03W105000. 
Assessed values for each of the parcels for 2010 are as follows: 
A00000106350 Land $58,500 Improvement $59,944 
53N03W106100 Land $79,395 
53N03W105000 Land $150,469 
The property is located on the NE Comer of Highway 95 and Highway 54 in 
Kootenai County, Idaho and contains approximately 56.8 acres. In viewing 
the county assessor's records I noted that parcel 53N03W105000 is 
indicated as a 63 .24 acre parcel, which appears to be an error based on all 
the other data I have reviewed on this site. Parcel A00000106350 has .419 
acres and includes a small commercial building, but it is also the SW corner 
of the site at the intersection of the highways and therefore considered an 
important part of the entire property. The subject property is currently zoned 
Commercial by the Kootenai County Planning Department and this zoning 
was obtained by the current owners since their purchase of the property in 
2008. 
The site is approximately 16 miles north of Interstate 90 in Coeur d'Alene, 8 
miles east of Spirit Lake, 5 miles west of Bayview, and 30 miles south of 
Sandpoint. The intersection currently consists of a convenience store on the 
SW comer, a restaurant/bar on the NW comer, vacant land on the SE comer, 
and the subject along with some other commercial uses on the NE comer 
along Highway 95. Although site is contiguous at this time, plans I have 
seen regarding the new interchange planned at this location show Sylvan 
Road being extended north through the subject site when the interchange is 
built, splitting the subject site. A map showing this extension is included 
with this report. 
Major attractions in the immediate area include Farragut State Park to the 
east of this location and Silverwood Amusement Park two miles south of 
this location. Lake Pend Oreille is accessible via public and commercial 
launch facilities at Bayview, Farragut, or Sandpoint. Sandpoint is also the 
location of Sweitzer Mountain, the largest ski area in the Inland Northwest. 
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The site has approximately 750 feet of frontage along Highway 95 and 2,090 
feet along Highway 54 with 4 deeded access points. Access is also available 
along Highway 95 as all three parcels include frontage along the highway. 
There is another property containing 1.58 acres that is located north of the 
comer parcel that has 417 feet of frontage along Highway 95 as well. Water 
to the site is available from the City of Athol and according to the owner's 
representative, Alan Johnson, Coleman Engineering is working on 
development of a modular waste treatment plant to meet needs for onsite 
sewage. Other site utilities include natural gas from Avista, electric from 
Kootenai Electric, and fiber optic from Verizon. The site is generally level 
and at grade with both highways. The site is bounded by Howard Road to 
the east. The site is treed with small sized pine trees at this time, but these 
trees have no marketable timber value. 
Market conditions for Kootenai County were similar to other areas in the 
Inland Northwest and set records for the number of properties sold as well as 
appreciation rates from 2002 through 2006. The number of residential units 
sold in 2002 through the Coeur d'Alene MLS was 2,958 and that number 
peaked at 5,035 units in 2005 declining to 2,821 units in 2006. The average 
sale price through these same years was $138,908 in 2002 and it increased to 
$271,192 in 2006, an increase of 95% in a four year period. In 2007 and 
2008 the number of units sold continued to drop to 2,007 units in 2008 with 
the average sale price dropping to $269,120. In 2009 the total number of 
units sold increased to 2,216 with the average price dropping to $209,415. 
One of the reasons for the large drop in 2009 was a tax credit for first time 
homebuyers, and purchasers of first homes generally buy lower price 
properties. 2010 has continued to see fewer residential sales with prices 
continuing to decline; however, there has been continued commercial 
development in Kootenai County in the past two years. Two Wal-Mart 
Supercenters have been built in addition to a new Super 1 Foods store and a 
Love's Travel Plaza is being built. In addition the Highway 95 corridor has 
seen the construction of a U.S. District Court Facility and a 55,000 square 
foot Western States Cat facility in Hayden. 
Census data indicates that the population of Athol doubled between 1990 
and 2000 and similar population patterns are evident in Spirit Lake and 
Bayview area as well. 
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Other sectors of the real estate market follow the residential trends and have 
slowed as well. With the slowing market, capitalization rates have risen, 
vacancy for many types of real estate increasing and demand declining. 
In completing this appraisal I considered the highest and best use of the 
subject property and this use simply stated is the ideal use of vacant land or 
an improved property that results in the highest value. The use needs to be 
legally permitted, physically possible, financially feasible, and maximally 
productive. The subject is a large tract of vacant commercially zoned land 
(with the exception of a small commercial building) on a "lighted" at grade 
intersection of two highways. The large size of 56.8 acres is much larger 
than typically utilized for a "big box" retail user which can range from 
approximately 10 to 30 acres in size. The relatively remote location of this 
property would also dictate that immediate development of the site would be 
limited unless some major attraction would increase demand for commercial 
use in this area. Silverwood Amusement Park south of the subject occupies 
a large site including parking, but this is a unique use that has grown over 
the past 20+ years and recently an application has been made by Silverwood 
to rezone an additional 90+ acres to the south of its existing facilities. 
Nevertheless, as population growth in this area continues, convenience 
issues will no doubt spur residents to patronize locally situated commercial 
establishments. 
The comer location and zoning of the subject suggest commercial uses that 
can take advantage of the traffic flow at this location that presently exists on 
Highway 95. I understand from the owner's representative that they were in 
negotiation with URM for a sale of a portion of the site for a Super One 
Grocery store. Mike Winger of URM confirmed that he had been involved 
in discussions with Hugh's Investments for a store at this location that was 
delayed by the condemnation. He also relayed that with the opening of a 
new WINCO in Coeur d'Alene and a Wal-Mart Super Center in the City of 
Hayden the likelihood of a new grocery store at the subject site is less 
probable due to new competition that was not there when negotiations were 
going on with Hughes, but that changing economic conditions have not 
eiiminated this possibiiity. Other potential uses include a travel plaza/trnck 
stop, "big box" retail, specialized retail use such as "Big R" or "D & B" 
(local farm/ranch supply stores), motel, and a convenience store; however, in 
my opinion only about ½ of the subject site would be utilized for these uses. 
The balance of the site might include some self storage, residential uses, or 
perhaps some type of iight industriai use. 
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Current plans for the subject site included a new freeway interchange. The 
taking in this condemnation will bisect the property taking 16.31 acres 
leaving remnants on both sides of the new interchange. Remnants on the 
west side of the new interchange include the .419 comer parcel and a 3 .87 
acre parcel fronting the old Highway 95. On the east side of the new 
interchange will be the balance of the site containing 36.61 acres. The 
property enjoyed access from both highways in the before situation and I 
understand that in the after will only have limited access from Highway 54, 
Sylvan Road when built, and Howard Road which bounds it to the east. As 
discussed earlier in this report, the planned Sylvan Road extension will 
bisect the site effectively changing the original highest and best use analysis 
of the site. With the site bisected, only the 8.85 acres to the east of the new 
interchange and west of Sylvan Road in addition to the 3 .87 acres on the 
NW corner of the site, and the .419 acre site on the SW comer will be 
available for development out of the original west half of the site. There will 
also likely be a condemnation of land needed for the new Sylvan Road as it 
does not currently exist. The cost of constructing Sylvan Road is also 
unknown at this time which may also be an additional item of 
reimbursement to the owners of the property if Idaho DOT makes them pay 
for the road improvements. 
I have completed research on various appraisal cases with regard to large 
commercial tract sales in the Spokane, Tri Cities, Coeur d'Alene, and Moses 
Lake areas and am familiar with prices for sales in these areas for users such 
as Home Depot, Safeway, Target, Lowes, Kohl's, Yokes, Albertson's, 
Costco, Sam's Club, and Wal-Mart. Retail users prefer a lighted intersection 
in most cases for locations as is a benefit for customers to access stores 
easier. Freeway interchanges are often locations of retail development, but 
generally these developments usually occur in higher density residential 
areas. 
I also have recently completed some research in Moses Lake, Washington 
and reviewed development at the intersection of Interstate 90 and Highway 
i 7. Much of the development at this location has only been completed in the 
past 10 years even though Interstate 90 has been completed for over 50 
years. 
An example of how commercial property can be influenced by a freeway 
interchange is in Pasco, Washington. Severai years ago a new interchange 
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was built at Kartchner Avenue intersection with Highway 395. Prior to the 
interchange there had been a lighted intersection with Hillsboro Street a few 
blocks south and there had been much commercial development at this 
lighted intersection. The development included a motel, restaurant, two fast 
food restaurants, a truck stop, and some other retail uses. Prior to the 
announcement of the new interchange there were offers on several parcels 
on the SW comer of the Hillsboro intersection including McDonalds and a 
national motel. The construction of the new interchange led to offers from 
McDonalds and the motel being terminated in addition to all of the 
businesses that were currently operating suffering substantial losses in 
revenue due to the new interchange being built. In short, although 
interchanges assist the flow of traffic, they are often of little or no benefit to 
development or retail uses following their construction. 
In attempting to estimate the impact on the property in the after value 
situation, I considered multiple examples from the local area in concluding 
that it may take many years for any commercial development to occur at this 
location, particularly if the freeway construction is delayed. 
In viewing the subject as a lighted intersection with commercial zoning as it 
exists, I viewed the site as being developed in two phases. With the site 
containing approximately 57 acres prior to the taking, I considered that 
approximately 30 acres closest to the intersection would be valued at a 
different rate than the remaining 27 acres. A 3 0 acre site would likely fit 
several anchors such as grocery stores or other "big box" retail users. The 
3 0 acres would also likely accommodate other pad users such as banks, fast 
food uses, or convenience store uses in addition to some additional "inline" 
retail uses associated with the big box users. Big box users often pay $4 to 
as high as $9 per square foot for sites as in the recent WINCO purchase in 
Coeur d'Alene. The subject location is inferior to most of the comparables 
discussed in this report in that it is located in a more remote area and it 
doesn't presently enjoy the same demographics; however, the lighted 
intersection of two state highways offers excellent exposure for commercial 
uses and as traffic increases this location will become the "go to" location 
between Hayden and Sandpoint. 
In the after scenario, the 16.31 acre take will leave three parcels; an 8.85 
acre parcel on the east side of the new interchange, a 3.87 acre parcel on the 
west side, and the .419 acre parcel in the SW comer of the site. The balance 
of the site will be east of the newiy pianned Syivan Road. Access to ihese 
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sites will be limited to the old Highway 95 for the 3.87 acre parcel and 
Highway 54 and Sylvan Road for the 8.85 acre parcel. Estimating values in 
the after situation will be contingent upon when the project is completed. 
Upon completion the property will likely develop differently that in the 
before situation and although the property on the east side of the freeway is 
still large enough to accommodate some big box retail uses, but not stores as 
large as Wal-Mart, Costco, or Home Depot. Examples given above indicate 
that development may take many years. Without an accurate estimate of the 
completion of this project projecting values into the future is extremely 
difficult. 
In assisting you with this case I have considered the following comparable 
sales: 
Idaho Comparables 
1. 1601 W Appleway Coeur d'Alene - Sale Price $3,528,360 - Sale Date 8/09 
.Size 9 AC (392,040 sq ft) - Price Per Foot $9.00 
Comments: This was a former gravel pit site that was sold for a new WINCO 
Grocery Store. The sellers paid to level the site for the purchasers and granted 
easements to Ramsey Road to the west for additional access. The site included all 
utilities. This property would be considered superior to the subject for location 
and size. 
2. Seltice Way and I 90 Post Falls - Sale Price $20,456,747 - Sale Date 11/06 
Size 235 AC -Price Per Foot $2.00 
Comments: Foursquare Properties, developers, bought this site which consisted 
of numerous parcels from two other developers and Cabela's committed to 
purchase 40 acres for a new store at the same time frame. Although the site had 
utilities, the developers paid to build all the interior streets and provide access to 
the Cahela' s parcel. Since the purchase another parcel has been sold for a new 
Wal-Mart which recently opened. This parcel is far larger than the subject and 
would be considered at a lower rate for size, but a superior rate for location. The 
purchasers paid for bringing utilities to the site as well as significant costs for 
grading on the property to accommodate the new building sites and roads. 
3. Highway 41 & Prairie Post Falls- Sale Price $2,936,161- Sale Date 11/06 
Size 13.5 AC (588,060 sq ft) - Price Per Foot $5.00 
Comments: This sale is in the City of Post Falls and utilities were available. It 
was purchased with the intention of retail development. This is the SE corner of 
the intersection. This sale is a smaller parcel than the subject which would 
indicate a lesser price for the subject, but somewhat similar for location at a 
lighted intersection, but also a superior location demographically, although the 
subject has higher traffic counts. 
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4. Highway 41 & Prairie Post Falls - Sale Price $6,591,591 - Sale Dale 10/07 
Size 50.44 AC (2,197, 197sq ft) - Price Per Foot $3.00 
Comments: This involved the same purchaser as comparable 3 (Post Falls Station 
LLC) and it is the NE comer of the same intersection and outside the City of Post 
Falls. The site was not zoned for commercial development, but the purchaser was 
confident that they could develop the site. This is an excellent comparable for the 
subject in terms of overall size and a similar location at a lighted intersection, but 
a superior location demographically. The property has no sewer which likely may 
need to be purchased from the City of Post Falls. 
5. Highway 95 & Garwood Road - Sale Price $1,017,200 - Sale Date 7 /08 
Size 4.41 AC (192,100 sq ft)-Price Per Foot $5.30 
Comments: This was the sale of the Garwood Saloon property to Idaho DOT. 
The sale price was confirmed with the attorney for the property owner and he 
relayed that it represented land value only. The site was zoned commercial like 
the subject and it is the next "lighted" intersection south of the subject on 
Highway 95. This intersection is with a county road versus another state highway 
like the subject. The site is smaller than the subject which would indicate a higher 
value and it is also a superior location being closer to Coeur d'Alene. I 
understand this sale was negotiated under the threat of condemnation and courts 
have ruled that these sales may not represent true market value for this reason. 
6. Ramsey & Appleway- Sale Price $7,800,000 - Sale Date 11/07 
Size 17 AC apx (740,520 sq ft) - Price Per Foot $10.53 
This sale was confirmed with the owner who sold the property to the Coeur d' 
Alene Tribe. The site is near comparable 1 and considered superior to the subject 
in that it is a smaller parcel and located in a better location. 
7. Highway 95 & Sagle Road- Sale Price $3,400,000- Sale Date 3/08 
Size 29 AC (1,263,249 sq ft)- Price Per Foot $2.69 but no sewer 
This sale was confirmed with the broker who sold the property. The site was 
zoned for commercial use and it included utilities. The agent who handled the 
sale relayed that the property is currently for sale as 5 lots. This parcel does not 
have access to Highway 95 like the subject and it is not a lighted intersection like 
the subject. This is an excellent comparable sale to the subject in terms of size 
and it would be considered slightly superior for location being closer to 
Sandpoint, but inferior as it does not have a lighted intersection and it does not 




8. 9527 N Nevada - Sale Price $4,813,685 - Sale Date 7 /07 
Size 18.71 AC (815,100 sq ft)-Price Per Foot $5.91 
This was the site of a new WIN CO in Spokane that has been built and it included 
additional pads. This site is smaller than the subject indicating a higher value and 
also a superior location. 
9. 21801 E Country Vista - Sale Price $3,045,405 - Sale Date 6/05 
Size 18.98 AC (608,969 sq ft) - Price Per Foot $5.00 
This is a dated sale for a new Home Depot store at Liberty Lake off Interstate 90 
that has been built onsite. This site is smaller indicating a higher value and also a 
superior location. 
10. 4315 E Sprague- Sale Price $7,559,686 - Sale Date 9/06 
Size 22.98 AC (1,000,000 sq ft)- Price Per Foot $7.55 
This is a Wal-Mart site purchased for a new Sam's Club that has not yet been 
built. The purchasers paid for rezoning and access to Sprague as the site didn't 
have sufficient access as purchased. The site was purchased from Union Pacific 
Railroad and required extensive work for development. The site is somewhat 
similar in size, but considered a superior location and also located adjacent to 
COSTCO. 
Sales of commercial/retail sites in Washington differ from Idaho with regard 
to economic issues regarding tax implications, but they were included as 
they reflect prices for big box retail uses. 
VALUE PRIOR TO POTENTIAL CONDEMNATION 
In considering an estimate of the west 30 acres of the subject site with 
commercial zoning and without the planned interchange I considered the 
values of the comparable sales with primary emphasis on comparables 5 and 
7 as they are on the same highway and located north and south of the 
subject. Comparable 4 is also another good comparable which was given 
more weight like comparables 5 and 7. I also considered the sizes and 
locations of the other comparables in completing my estimate of the subject. 
I also considered the purchase price of the subject as well as the motivation 
of the seller when the property was sold for $1,450,000, but as mentioned 
earlier, the seller was distressed and the site was not zoned at the time of the 
sale. Even considering the sale price of $.59 per foot the majority of the 
value would have been to the 30 acres on the west side of the site. Based 
on these considerations, it is my opinion that the west 30 acres would have 
had a value in the range of $2.25 per foot or $2,940,300. 
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VALUE AFTER THE POTENTIAL CONDEMNATION 
In the after situation, the west 3 0 acres will be bisected by the taking as 
described earlier in this report. This taking will result in the loss of 16.41 







There will still be sufficient land in the original 30 acres to develop some 
commercial developments, but there will be three parcels of 8.85, 3.87, and 
.419 acres. These remaining parcels can accommodate various uses, but the 
chances of any big box retail use on the west 30 acre site are gone. With the 
planned Sy Ivan Road forming a boundary for the remaining property the 
remaining property is also bisected as described earlier. I know of no cases 
where a developer or user will buy a property for development not knowing 
when a planned highway that will provide access to the property will be 
built. This same scenario occurred in a case I was involved in that happened 
when WSDOT condemned a site north of Spokane on Hatch Road and 
Highway 395. All of the experts who testified in this case agreed that 
without knowledge of when the planned interchange would be built there 
was no way to estimate a value due to the uncertainty of its completion. 
This property also contained approximately 30 acres and has been available 
since the state finished the interchange approximately 12 years ago. The 
owner has been attempting to sell or develop the site since then with no 
success; again this is an example of why interchanges do not add value when 
they are completed. An aerial photo of this interchange with Hatch Road 
and Highway 395 has been included with this report to show all the 
residential development that has occurred around this interchange since it 
was constructed and yet the 30 acre commercial tract is still vacant despite 
the owner's attempts to develop the site. 
Until a definitive completion date of the planned interchange at the subject 
intersection can be established, it will be very difficult to estimate a value 
for the remaining parcels due the unknowns of the anticipated project. 
Utilizing the anticipated construction date for the freeway improvements as 
pubiished by IDT' s website, an assumption can be made that the best case 
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scenario for project construction would be the summer of 2011. Assuming 
this construction date is accurate, the project might be completed in the 
spring of 2012. If the planned construction date is later, the completion date 
will be moved farther into the future. In my opinion, no potential user of the 
remaining property would have any interest in using any of the remaining 
parcels until they know for certain when the project will be completed. 
Assuming the completion can be completed as forecast above in the spring 
of 2012, the value of the land would need to be discounted from the present 
date. The discount is applicable as no one would pay for something today 
that they can't receive until a future date. This same principal applies to 
valuing a subdivision that is slated to be developed in the future or the 
purchase of an income stream like a real estate contract. 
In attempting to value. the remaining parcels, I have made the assumption 
that they will have a similar value to the before scenario at $2.25 per square 
foot. I have also assumed that they will be available for use upon 
completion of the new freeway at the earliest in the spring of 2012 and the 
latest in the spring of 2013. This results in a discount time frame of 1.5 to 
2.5 years from the date of this valuation. Using this scenario, the future 
value of the remaining parcels of $1,344,457 would be discounted to a 
present value. 
The discount rate is basically a rate of return that someone is looking for on 
a given investment. It is based on risk and that risk is affected by the rates 
of safe investments, market conditions, and other factors. In this case, we 
are dealing with undeveloped land in uncertain economic times. For this 
reason, I selected a rate higher than typical capitalization rates in the current 
market and utilized a rate of 10%. The higher rate used to discount the 
future value in this case is due to all the unknowns concerning this 
condemnation including the unknown timing of the project being finished, 
issues with regard to access, Sylvan Road being built, the cost of who will 
be responsible for the cost of Sylvan Road, and the pending condemnation of 
the right of way for Sylvan Road. Applying this discount rate to the 
anticipated after value of $1,344,457 yielded the following present values 







Utilizing these estimates and the original before estimate the final concluded 
value estimates were completed as follows: 
Before Value 
After Present Value 1.5 years 





=== $1,775,000 - $1,880,000 
This difference in value does not address the value of the Sylvan Road, cost 
of construction of Sylvan Road, or loss of access to Highway 54 which are 
all potential additional items of compensation. 
Respectfu11y submitted, 
Ly,y_ ~_,(') 
Dewitt M. Sherwood, 
Certified General Appraiser 
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Tranaf&r Date 
· Owner Information 
HJGRATHOL 
23 CORPORATE Pl.2 STE 245 
NEWPORT BEACH CA 92G60 
11/02/2009 
· · Location 1 Description 
Tax Authority 
Group 
007000 Cuminl Cagiii De•c. ·· · · · tX #14531 (IN SW-SW) 10 53N 03W 
Situs Address 
Acre399 
6401 E HIGHWAY 54, ATHOL 
,4190 
Pr()Pf)rty ClilN COCM 
Nelghborhood Co<!& 
Parcel Type 
442- Com Imp lotllracl In city·· 
25 ATHOL, CITY 




Tot,11 Market Value 
01-01- 'CurrentYsar:.:2010 2010 '}. . . ' .• 
$58,500 Hoinepwnens !;llglb,1'.Amt· 
'U!nd · ·· · 
$59,944 · H'orn;i~el'§ .Eliglb'4.Amt Imp'' . ·.···· ' , ... 
$118,444 i~,!iome~n~ !ligibte 
Homeowners Exemption 
Allowed· ·· · ·· 










Hom~nGrtl Eligible Amt 
U!mt , 
Homaowneni Eilglble Amt fitip'''' .. ' . . .. 
S'-!11'!. Homeown.,ra Eligible Altil ·. . ···.· ..... 
$0 l:lonjf.lowners EJC11mptlon 
Allowed · · 
$118,444 Total Market Value 
$0 Homeowners Exemption 
$0 Agmmbar Exemption 
$118,444 Net Taxable Value 











, Ownor Information , · 
HJGRATHOL 
23 CORPORATE PLZ STE 245 
NEWPORT BEACH CA 926{)0 
11/02/2009 
, ' :" , Location I 0escriptiOll 
Tax Authority 156000 
Group 
Current Leg11I TAX #18907 [IN S2~ 10 53N 03W 
Desc. 
Situs Addreu , 
Acnlage 10.0000 
· , Paree! Type 
Property ci.½. t:oda 
Neighborhood Code 
512- Rural residential tract 
1202 RURAL N OF HWY 64 




Total Market Value 
01-01-.c1111'$ntYear~201or 2010 . , ''" . ,·,,, .. , ,,, . 
$79,395 Hp,rieowne~Etlgl~ie A,mt 
~od 
$0 Homeow~'l!llglbleAmt 
hpp , , , ·• ... , •. ", ,• 
$79,395 sum Homeowners l;llalble Amt , , ...... ' ···· 
Homeqwner$.ExoippUon 
Allowed ··· 










' ':' ., .. 
Homeowners Ellglbkl Amt ~n«l ·· · · · · 
Hom,own.,-s Eliglble Amt Imp ... , . . ··•. 
Sum HO!l'leowne~ f:llglble 
Amt ... 
$0 Homeowners Exemption 
Allowed 
$79,395 1'otal Market Value 
$0 Homeowners Exemption 
$0 Ag/Timber Ex&mpllon 
$79,395 ,Net Taxable Value 











r Owner Information , ' · 
Transftr Date. 
HJGRATHOL 
23 CORPORATE PlZ STE 245 
NEWPORT BEACH CA 92660 
11/02/2009 
: Location I Description , · 
Talt Authority 156000 Current Legal S2-SW NW OF CO RD LYINGS OF 
Group Desc. AE!A NO RR R[W EX N 165' 10 53N 03W 
Situs Addre.ss 
Acreage 63.2400 
) Parcel Type 
Property Clau Code . 
Nelgoborhood Code 
512· Rural residentlaltracl 
1~02 RURAL N 017 ti.WY 54 






$150,469 Homaownars'Ellglbla Amt 
.L?~_cF · ' · ·· 
$0 ::t~~·~JiJg.~la,/~mt 
$150,469 Sl,lll'.I Home()1rVners.Ellglble 
AmF'···c· 
Homeowner$ Exemp~on 
Allowed · ·.··' 




Net Taxable Value 
o PriorYeat-200i 
$0 H0"180Wn11rs Eligltlle Amt 
Land 
$0 Home9Wners J:llglble Amt Jmp . . ..... 
$0 Sum Home.owners El!g!ble 
Amt . 
$0 Homeowners Exe111ptlon 
Allowed 
$150,469 Total Market Value 
$0 Homeowners Exemption 
$0 Agffimber Exemption 
$150,469 Net Taxable Value 
Pnnl i Bads i(! kiU i << Fil"ili < Previous Nexi :> Lasi :,.:,. 
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That portion of the South Half of the Southwest Quarter of Section 10, Township 53 North, 
Range 3 W~ Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, state of Idaho, tying Westerly of the county 
road fonnerly known as the Athol-Bayview Highway, now known as Howard Road, which 
runs ln a Northeasterly and Southwesterly direction across the Southeast Quarter of the 
Southweu Quarter of said Section 10, and lying Southerly of the South line of that certain 
strip appropriated by the United states of America in Oeaee of Condemnation recorded April 
29, 1944 in Book 20 of Misc., Page 436. 
EXCEPT all that portion of the Southwest Quarter commencing at a point on the Southwest 
comer of the said Southwest Quarter of Section 10 where the North line of the state 
Highway known as the Athol-Bayview Hfghway Intersects the East line of U.S. Highway No. 
95;thence 
North along the East IJne of said U.S. Highway No. 95, a distance of 32 rodsi thence 
East parallel to the South line of said Southwest Quarter, a distance of 10 rods; thence 
South parallel to the West line of said Southwest Quarter, a distance of 32 rods to the North 
line of' said Athol-Bay.new Highway; thence 
West along the North line of said Athol-Bayview Highway, 10 rods to the PLACE OF 
BEGINNING. 
AND EXCEPT that portion of the South Half of the Southwest Quarter of Section 10, 
Township 53 North, Range 3 West, Bofse Meridian, Kootenai County, Idaho, desoibed as 
follows: 
A sbip of land 165 feet wide, said 165 feet being measured along the East right-of-way of 
Highway 95, lylng South of and contiguous to that tract of land taken by the United States of 
America by Deaee or Condernnatfon, recorded in Book 20 of Miscellaneous Records, Page 
436, records of Kootenai county, Idaho and Northwest or the county road known as Howard 
Road. · 
AND ALSO EXCEPT that certain strip conveyed to the State of Idaho In Deed recorded June 4, 
1942 In Book 119 of Deeds, Pages 442 and 444, and in deed recorded January 31, 1967 as 
Instrument No. 504394. 
PARCEL 2: 
A tract of land situated In section 10, Township 53 North, Range 3 West, Boise Meridian, 
Kootenai County, Idaho, more particularly desaibed as follows: 




BEGINNING at a paint which is identical to the Intersection of the North right-of-way line of 
the Athol-Bayview Highway No, 54 and the East right-of-way line of U.S. Highway No. 95i 
thence · 
North 00°55' East, along the East rlght•of-way llne of U.S. Highway 95, 110.68 feet distant; 
thence 
North 89° Eas~ parallel to the North right-of-way line of Highway No, 54, 165.00 feet 
distant; thence 
South 00°55' Wesft 110,68 feet distant to a point on the North right-of-way llne of Highway 
No. 54; thence 
South 89° West, 165.00 feet on and along the North right-of-way of Highway No. 54 to the 
POINT OF BEGINNING. 
PARCEL 3: 
That portion of the South Half of the Southwest Quarter of Section 10, Township 53 North, 
Range 3 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, Idaho, desoibed as follows: 
A strip of land 165 feet wide, said 165 feet being measured along the East right-of·way of 
Highway 95, lyJng South of and contiguous to that b'act of land taken by the United States of 
America by Deaee of Condemnation, recorded in Book 20 of Mlscellaneous Records, Page 
436, records of Kootenai County, Idaho and Northwest of the county road known as Howard 
Road. 




The most probable price which a property should bring in a 
competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair 
sale, the buyer and seller each acting prudently and 
knowledgeably, and assuming the price is not affected by undue 
stimulus. Implicit in this definition is the consummation of a sa]e 
as of a specified date and the passing of title from sel1er to buyer 
under conditions whereby: 
1. Buyer and seller are typica!Zv motivated; 
2. Both parties are well informed or well advised, and both acting 
in what they consider their best interest; 
3. A reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market; 
4. Payment is made in terms of cash in United States dollars or in 
terms offinancial arrangements comparable thereto; and 
5. The price represents normal consideration for the property 
sold, unaffected by special or creative .financing or sales 
concessions granted by anyone associated with the sale. * 1 
*1 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRS), 12 
CFR Part 225 
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CERTIFICATION 
I certify, that to the best of our knowledge and belief: 
1. The statements of fact contained in this report are true and con-ect. 
1 The appraiser has no present or future contemplated interest in the 
subject property and have no personal interest or bias with respect to 
the pa1iies invoJved unless it is mentioned in the report. 
3. The compensation for this report is contingent only upon delivery of 
the report and neither the employment to make the appraisal or the 
value determined in the appraisal are contingent upon a predetennined 
appraised value or the attainment of a stipulated result, or a 
subsequent event directly related to the intended use of this report. 
4. The appraiser has made a personal inspection of the property 
appraised. 
5. The reported analysis, conclusions, and op1mons contained in this 
appraisal are limited only by the reported assumptions and limiting 
conditions and are my personal, impartial, and unbiased professional 
analysis, opinions, and conclusions. 
6. I have no bias with respect to the property that is the subject of this 
appraisal. 
7. No one provided significant professional assistance to the appraiser 
unless mentioned in the appraisal. 
8. This appraisal along with the analysis, conclusions, and opinion were 
prepared under the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal 
Practice. 
Dewitt M. Sherwood, General Appraiser 
Idaho GCA l l 25 
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LIMITING CONDITIONS 
1. No responsibility for matters of a legal nature with regard to the 
property and its title is assumed by the appraiser. 
2. This report is considered confidential between the client and the 
appraiser for the specified use in the report. Any other use of the 
report constitutes an unauthorized use of the report. 
3. The appraiser is not required to appear in court or give testimony as a 
result of this report unless previous arrangements have been made. 
4. Maps, photos, and sketches are intended to assist the reader of the 
report; however, no warranty for the accuracy of these maps is made 
and the appraiser is not trained nor has made a survey of the property. 
No encroachments are assumed unless stated in the report. 
5. The appraiser obtained information, estimates, and opinions from 
sources he considers reliable and believes them to be correct; 
however, he does not assume responsibility for the accuracy of this 
information provided by other parties. 
6. The appraiser assumes there are no hidden or unapparent conditions of 
the property, subsoil, of structures, which would render it more or less 
valuable and he assumes no liability if such conditions are present. 
The appraiser has no expertise with respect to toxic waste, hazardous 
materials, or undesirable substances. A Leve1 One Environmental 
Audit of the property by qualified experts is recommended to 
determine whether or not there are any potential problems with the 
property such as toxic waste, hazardous materials, or undesirable 
substances as they can be EXTREMELY COSTLY to remove. He 
has no knowledge of the presence of Radon or if Radon has been 
detected, it has been assumed that the present level is considered safe 
according to the standards of the Environmental Protection Agency. 
No warranty sha11 be implied that the property has been tested for 
Radon or if tested that the tests were conducted pursuant to EPA 
procedures. 
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7. The appraiser is also not qualified to test for asbestos, mold, or lead 
based paint and recommends that any parties who may be concerned 
about the presence of any of these substances obtain an inspection by 
an expert to determine their presence and any potential risks 
associated with them. 
8. The estimated value contained in this report is considered accurate for 
the date it was appraised. Real estate markets tend to fluctuate due to 
many conditions and the property may be worth more or less at a 
future date depending on market conditions. 
9. The liability of the appraiser is limited to the client only and only up 
to the amount of the fee charged for the assignment. There is no 
accountability, obligation, or liability to any third party. 
10. This report was prepared for the client specified in the report and the 
information contained is for their use only. Neither the report nor any 
part of it including the identity of the appraiser shall be conveyed to 
the public without written permission of the appraiser. The 
certification and limiting conditions are an integral part of the report 
and the report should not be used without them. 
11. No opinion is rendered as to the value of any subsurface oil, gas, or 
mineral rights on the property in this report. 
12. No responsibility for hidden defects or conformity to specific 
governmental requirements such as fire, safety, earthquake, or 
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RECREATIONAL VEHICLE PARK PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 
SPECIAL NOTICE PERMITS 
9-9-1: GENERAL COMMERCIAL ZONE DEFINED: The "General Commercial zone" is a land use 
classification for a district suitable for wholesale and retail sales and services. 
9-9-2: PERFORMANCE STANDARDS: In the Commercial zone, no building or premises shall be used, nor any 
building or structure be hereafter erected or altered, unless otherwise provided in this title, except for one (1) or 
more of the following uses in accordance with the following standards. A Commercial lot shall have direct access 
from a public road. 
All uses shall meet the following standards: 
A. Requirements of Chapter 17 of this title, Design Standards 
B. Requirements of Chapter 19 of this title, Supplementary Regulations 
C. Anticipated traffic impacts will be determined for all commercial uses using the most current edition of the 
"Trip Generation Manual." A Special Notice Permit shall be required for commercial uses or buildings that 
are anticipated to generate traffic impacts in excess of the following thresholds: 
1, For sites which access directly onto a State or Federal Highway- 25 cars per hour, or 250 vehicles per 
day. 
2. For sites which access onto other public roads - 50 cars per day. 
D. Uses on all Jots or parcels in the Commercial zone which front on a state or federal highway shall require a 
Special Notice Permit. 
E. Requirements of the applicable Highway District and Idaho Transportation Department or if the site is within 
an area of city impact, the city's standards for access, approaches, and street design, whichever is the higher 
standard. 
F. lfan existing community water system within 1,000 feet ofthc site is willing and able to provide water service 
to the use, connection to that system shall be required. 
G. Requirements of the Panhandle Health District for sanitary sewage disposal. 
H. Requirements of the Panhandle Health District's Critical Materials Regulation. 
May 24, 2007 Ortlinance No. 40 I/ Cas1: No. OA-133-06 (Znning Ortlinance Amendme111s) Pogc 37 ol' 128 
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I. All uses shall be in a structural Fire Protection District and meet all applicable District regulations; or absent a 
structural Fire Protection District, shall incorporate fire protection measures recommended by the State Fire 
Marshall. 
J. No uses shall generate sound pressure levels greater than 80 dBA as measured at the property line. 
9-9-3: SITE AREAS: Filly percent (50%) of the area of all sites must be left in open spaces free from structures. 
9-9--4: USES PERMITTED: 
A. Parks, playgrounds, and golf courses. 
B. Community facilities, including fire stations, public utility installations. etc. 
C. Public or non-profit recreational buildings. 
D. Any wholesale, retail or service business. 
E. Public or private office buildings. 
F. Any eating or drinking establishment. or other entertainment facility. 
G. Hospitality businesses, such as hotels and motels, and meeting and convention facilities. 
H. Transfer, storage. and warc110use facilities. except outside storage must be within a sight-obscuring fence. 
I. Single family, two-family or multi-family dwellings are allowed provided they are on the second and/or third 
floors of a commercial building, or in a separate structure provided it is accessory to the commercial use of the 
site. Residential uses are subject to the density requirements of the High Density Residential (HDR) zone. 
J. Recreational vehicle park. 
K. General farming, except the minimum lot area for the keeping of livestock shall be 3/4 acre. 
L. Vocational, trade, or private instructional schools, providing a specialized or single-item curriculum. 
M. Churches. 
9-9-5: FRONT, SIDE, AND REAR YARDS: The following front, side, and rear yard setback requirements shall 
apply in the Commercial zone. 
All Buildings: 
A. Front yard ................................. 35 feet 
B. Side yard ...................................... none 
C. Flanking streel. ......................... 20 feet 
D. Rear yard .................................. l 5 feet 
9-9-6: USES PER.i\1.JTTED -STORAGE: No premises in the Commercial 7.one shall be used as a storage area for 
any purpose other than storage of materials required in connection with the enumerated pem1itted uses in the 
Commercial zone. 
May 24. 2007 Ordinance No. 401/ Case No. OA-133·06 (Zoning Ordinance Arncndmcnls) Page 38 of I 28 
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Storage areas must conform to the minimum setback regulations of the zone. Automobiles and other mllchinery 
nonnally displayed for sales purposes on an open lot may be so displayed. 
9-9-7: USES PROllIBITED: 
A. Automobile wrecking yards and junk yards. 
B. Processing and manufacturing are prohibited, unless they are part of the operation of a business or service 
specifically permitted in the Commercial zone. Such processing and manufacturing uses must be clearly 
incidental to the permitted use on the site. 
9-9-8: CONDITIONAL USES: 
A. Outdoor Theaters. 
B. Public Utility Complex Facility. 
C. Zoos .. 
D. Radio and Television Towers. 
E. Special Events Location (Note: See the definitions of Special Events and Special Events Location in Section 
9-2-2 of this Title). 
F. Wireless Communication Facility (WCF). 
9-9-9: RECREATIONAL VEHICLE PARK PERFORMANCE STANDARDS: 
A. Intent - The intent of these standards is for temporary living quarters and not permanent or year-round 
housing. 
B. Accessory Uses - Management headquarters, recreational facilities, toilets, dumping stations, coin-operated 
laundry facilities, and other convenience establishments are permitted as accessory uses incidental to the 
operation of the recreational vehicle park. 
C. Recreational vehicles shall be separated from each other and from other structures by at least ten (I 0) feet. 
Any accessory structures, such as attached awnings or carports, shall, for the purpose of this separation 
requirement, be considered to be part of the recreational vehicle. 
D. Each recreational vehicle lot/space shall contain a stabilized vehicular parking pad composed of paving, 
compacted crushed gravel, or other all-weather material. 
E. Interior drives in recreational vehicle parks which enter and exit onto a public road must be approved by the 
applicable Highway District or the Idaho Transportation Department. 
F. Yurds. fences, walls, or vegetative screening shall be provided at the property lines of a recreational vehicle 
park where the park adjoins adjacent lands that are zoned or used for residential purposes. In particular. 
extensive off-street parking areas and service areas for loading and unloading purposes other than for 
passenger uses and areas for storage and collection of refuse shall be screened. 
G. J fit is detcnnincd by the applicable 1-lighway District or Idaho Transportation Department that traffic control 
devices or other traffic regulation improvements are required as a result of development of a recreational 
vehicle park, the Sponsor shall be responsible for the cost of installation or construction of said improvements. 
May 24. 2007 Ordinance No. 40 I/ Case No. OA-133-06 (Zoning Ordinance Amendments) Page 39 of 128 
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H. Internal roads and parking service areas shall provide safe and convenient access for service and emergency 
vehicles and to amenities within the recreational vehicle park. Internal roads shall not be designed to 
encourage use by outside traffic to traverse the recreational vehicle park to adjoining developed areas. 
I. Each recreational vehicle lot shall have one (I) off-street vehicle parking space. 
J. Any action toward removal of wheels of a recreational vehicle, except fortemporary purposes of repair or to 
attach the recreational vehicle to the grounds for stabilizing purposes is prohibited. 
K. Occupancy ofa recreational vehicle park space by a particular recreational vehicle shall be limited each year 
to only those days between Memorial Day and October 1, and/or a maximum of thirty (30) consecutive days 
during the remaining months of the calendar year. 
L. A site plan shall be submitted upon application for a building permit with a North arrow and date of drawing, 
showing uses and structures which are proposed. Said plan shall include adequate infonnation to clearly depict 
existing and proposed structures and their uses, existing and proposed roads, easements, points of access, 
_recreational vehicle lot dimensions, number of acres in site, dimensions of property lines, property line 
setbacks, reserved or dedicated open space, major landscape features (both natural and man-made), locations 
of existing and proposed utility lines, accessory off-street parking and loading facilities, parking space areas, 
wastewater drain field area, traffic circulation patterns, refuse and service areas, signs, outdoor storage, and 
fences, yards, or wall or vegetative screening. 
9-9-10: SPECIAL NOTICE PERMITS: 
A. Outdoor Lighting of Pennitted Recreational Uses. 
B. Railroad car or truck cargo container/trailer used for storage or any other purpose not associated with the 
active operation of a railroad or trucking business. 
C. As required by section 9-9-2 of this chapter. 




DEWITT M. "SKIPn SHER WOOD 
APPRAISER QUALIFJCATIONS 
Bachelor of Science Degree - Education - University of Mont. - 1970 
Navigator Flight Training - USAF 1971 
30 Semester Hours - Masters Degree - Guidance & Counseling 
1973 - 1975 Central Michigan University & Chapman College 
Residentia] Appraisal - 1978 -American Institute of RE Appraisers 
Real Estate Law - 1978 - Rockwell Institute 
Fundamentals of Real Estate Investment and Taxation - 1980 - CCIM 
Course l O l - National Association of Realtors 
Fundamentals of Real Estate Appraisal - 1997 - Mykut RE School 
USP AP 1991, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2007 
IRS l 031 Exchanges & Charitable Trusts - 1993 - NW Closing 
Commercial Real Estate Tax Update - 1994 - WA Assn. RE 
Marshall Swift Cost Analysis - 1995 - Appraisal Inst. 
Multifamily Appraisals - 1999 - McK.issock Data 
Regression Analysis - l 999 - McK.issock Data 
Income Capitalization - 2002 - McKissock Data 
Disc1osures and Disclaimers -2005 - McK.issock Data 
Red Flags Property Inspection Guide - 2005 - Mykut RE School 
Environmental Issues in Real Estate Practice - 2005 - Mykut RE 
Valuation of Detrimental Conditions in RE- 2007 -Appraisal Inst. 
BUSINESS HISTORY 
1971 - 1977 Navigator & Instructor USAF 
1977 - 1979 Real Estate Sales, Crane & Ward Realtors, Spokane, WA 
1980- 1984 Real Estate Sales, Wolff & Walker Realtors, Spokane 
1984 - 2005 - Real Estate Appraising & Sales, Byrd RE Grp. LLC 
2005 - Present - Cornerstone Property Advisors, Spokane, WA 
1977 - 1981 Mortgage & Finance Committee, Spokane Brd. of RE 
1986 - Member of Commercial Multiple Listing Committee 
1986 - Instructor for Metropolitan Mortgage - Financial Analysis 
1977 - Present - Member Spokane Assn. of Realtors 
1976- 1994 - Officer Wash. Air National Guard, Retired Lt. Colonel 
2005 - Instructor - Lorman Education Services - Eau Claire, WJ 
1997 - Licensed General Appraiser, WA# I J 00412 
2004 - Licensed Genera] Appraiser, ID #CGA 1125 
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DEWITT M. "SKIP" SHERWOOD 
(Appraiser Qualifications Continued) 
SAMPLES OF APPRAISAL ASSIGNMENTS 
REO (real estate owned) properties for various lenders 
Non-confonning properties for various lenders 
Estate Appraisals - Commercial, Land, & Residential 
lnternal Revenue Appraisals - All Types 
Feasibility Analysis for Real Estate Investors 
Insurance Company Valuations -All Types 
Condemnation Appraisals-All Types 
Qualified as an Expert Witness - Superior Court of WA- Counties of 
Spokane, Adams, Grant, & Pend Oreille - Superior Court of JD -
Bonner County 
PARTIAL LIST OF APPRAISAL CLIENTS 
AUied Insurance Company, Spokane Washington 
American States Insurance, Indianapolis, Indiana 
American West Bank, Spokane, Washington 
Burlington Northern Santa Fee Railroad 
Central Pre-Mix, Spokane, Washington 
City of Cheney, Washington 
City of Fairfield, Washington 
Farmers Insurance Group 
Fanners and Merchants Bank, Spokane, Washington 
General Electric Corporation, Kent, Washington 
Global Credit Union, Spokane, Washington 
Kaiser Aluminum, Spokane, Washington 
Marsh Insurance, Spokane, Washington 
Prudential Insurance Company, San Francisco, California 
SAFECO Insurance, Seattle, Washington 
Spokane County Washington 
Tomlinson Black Realtors, Spokane, Washington 
Unigard Insurance, Spokane, Washington 
US Bank, Spokane, Washington 
United States Marshals Service 
Wheatland Bank, Spokane, Washington 
Numerous Attorneys & Accountants 
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HOLLAND&HART-"J 
September 20, 2011 
VIA FACSIMILE 
(208) 664-5884 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 814 
Re: ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al. 
Dear Chris: 
First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County 
Case No. CVl0-10095 
Idaho Court of Appeals Docket No. 38511-2011 
MaryV. York 
Phone (208) 342-5000 
Fax (208) 343-8869 
myork@hollandhart.com 
We received your letter from yesterday afternoon regarding the parties' continuing dispute 
over HJ Grathol's expert disclosures and other discovery issues. Since your faxed letter did not 
include the appraisal report of Mr. Sherwood or Grathol's supplemental discovery responses, we 
are unable to respond to the sufficiency of the information provided. We will review and respond 
to those documents once they are received. 
With respect to the expert opinions of Mr. Johnson and Mr. Reeslund, it appears from 
your letter that the discovery responses being produced do not contain the opinions of these 
experts. Your explanation for the reason why the opinions are not being produced does not excuse 
the withhoiding of these individuai's expert opinions. 
The Court's Pretrial Order establishes the minimum requirements for expert disclosures, 
stating that "such disclosure shall consist of at least the information required to be disclosed 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b )( 4 )(i)." It does not excuse any particular type of expert from the 
requirements of the Order. Instead, it specifically requires that the expert disclosures shall include 
at least the information required under Rule 26(b)(4). In order for any witness to offer opinion 
testimony, the opinions must be disclosed in advance - as required by the Court's scheduling order 
and the Idaho Rules. 
Additionally, despite your contention that these individuals are "actor/viewer" experts 
and are therefore not subject to the requirements of Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i}-a contention with which 
ITD disagrees-ITD has specifically requested in discovery a complete statement of these 
individuals' opinions, the substance of their opinions, the basis and reasons for their opinions, and 
the underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based. ITD's First Set of Discovery, at 
Interrogatory 2. Regardless of how these individuals are characterized, Grathol is still required to 
Holland & Hart u, 
Phone [208] 342-5000 Fax [208] 343·8869 www.hollandhart.com EXHIBIT 
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HOLLAND&HARL"J 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
September 20, 2011 
Page2 
comply with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and to provide supplemental responses to 
discovery. IRCP 26(e)(l)(B). Moreover, to the extent that any of these individual's opinions were 
developed in anticipation oflitigation, those opinions are subject to disclosure under Rule 26(b)(4). 
We renew our request that Grathol comply with the Court's Pretrial Order and also 
supplement its discovery responses to provide a complete statement of Mr. Reeslund's and 
Mr. Johnson's opinions, the substance of their opinions, the basis and reasons for their opinions, 
and the underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based. We intend to proceed with 
a motion to exclude these experts from testifying or, in the alternative, to compel the disclosure of 
their opinions. 
If you would like to discuss this matter further, please feel free to contact me. 
vf e truly yours, . 
Mary . ork / 
I 






STATE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V. York (ISB #5020) 
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HARTLLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P;O. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
HJ GRA THOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVl0-10095 
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Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") by and through its counsel 
of record, Holland & Hart LLP, hereby submits this Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony or, 
Alternatively, to Compel Expert Disclosures. ITD requests an order from the Court excluding 
the expert testimony of two expert witnesses identified by Defendant, HJ Grathol ("Grathol"), 
Geoffrey Reeslund and Alan Johnson. Grathol has failed to comply with the expert disclosure 
requirements of the Court's Pretrial Order entered on April 5, 2011 and the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Grathol has also failed to respond to ITD discovery requests that specifically ask for 
the opinions and supporting information of all ofGrathol's experts. Accordingly, testimony by 
these experts should be excluded. 
As a result of Grathol's failure to disclose its expert opinions, ITD has been prejudiced 
because it cannot determine what rebuttal experts it will need, and it cannot prepare rebuttal 
expert reports, prepare for the depositions of Grathol' s experts, prepare for trial, or engage in 
settlement negotiations. Additionally, ITD is unable under these circumstances to make a proper 
pretrial offer in accordance with the requirements of Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 
105 Idaho 873,673 P.2d 1067 (1987) and subsequent, related cases. 
In the aitemative, ITD moves this Court to compei Grathoi to comply with the Pretrial 
Order requiring disclosure of expert opinions and the basis of those opinions, which are also the 
subjects ofITD's discovery requests served on February 2, 2011. If the Motion to Compel is 
granted, ITD will necessarily need an extension of time to disclose rebuttal experts and reports, 
and therefore requests that the Court amend the Pretrial Order accordingly and continue the trial 
in this matter. 
Counsel has made repeated efforts to reach an agreement with opposing counsel on the 
issue of Grathol 's expert disclosures and despite those efforts, no agreement could be reached. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OR ALTERNATIVELY, TO 
COMPEL EXPERT DISCLOSURES - 2 
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Therefore, if successful, ITD also requests that it be awarded its attorney fees and costs incurred 
in bringing this motion. 
ITD's motion is supported by a brief and by the Affidavit of Mary V. York also filed on 
this date. 
DA TED this 22nd day of September, 2011. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
B~ ary V. rk, of e 
ral 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Idaho Transportation Department 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OR ALTERNATIVELY, TO 
COMPEL EXPERT DISCLOSURES - 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of September 2011, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol 








Fax (208) 664-5884 
E-mail 
Overnight UPS 
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P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V. York (ISB #5020) 
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
STATE Of IDAHO }ss 
CDUS f ( OF KOOTENAI 
FILED: 
20! I SEP 23 AH IQ: 44 
CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
O[DIIT'>' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ GRA THOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVl0-10095 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
EXPERT TESTIMONY OR, 
ALTERNATIVELY, TO COMPEL 
EXPERT DISCLOSURES 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OR, 




Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") by and through its counsel 
of record, Holland & Hart LLP, hereby submits this brief in support of its Motion to exclude the 
expert testimony of certain experts identified by Defendant, HJ Grathol ("Grathol"). Grathol has 
failed to comply with the requirements of the Court's Pretrial Order and has failed to respond 
properly to discovery requests propounded by ITD. ITD has suffered and will continue to suffer 
prejudice without the required expert disclosures in that it ITD is unable to identify rebuttal 
experts needed for trial, and cannot prepare rebuttal expert reports, prepare for the depositions of 
Grathol's experts, prepare for trial, or engage in settlement negotiations. Additionally, ITD is 
unable under these circumstances to make a proper pretrial offer in accordance with the 
requirements of Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873,673 P.2d 1067 
(1987) and subsequent, related cases. 
Grathol claims that it is not required to disclose the opinions or basis of opinions of these 
experts under the "actor-viewer" exception noted in the Committee Notes of Rule 26 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Grathol's attempted justification for its refusal to disclose 
expert opinions and supporting information is not supported by the facts or applicable law. The 
stated subject matters upon which these experts will offer opinion testimony fall squarely within 
the requirements of Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, even if it is 
determined that the testimony of these experts' testimony is exempted from the Idaho Rule, the 
experts' opinions and the basis and facts supporting those opinions were specifically requested in 
ITD's discovery and Grathol has refused to produce the requested information. Additionally, 
Grathol has ignored the Court's Pretrial Order and has sought to place limitations on the Court's 
requirement for the disclosure of Grathol's experts that are not contained in the Order. Finally, 
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even in one were to accept Grathol' s argument regarding application of the "actor-viewer" 
exception under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and federal case law, Grathol still could not 
hide its experts' opinions. On the contrary, the federal rules require "actor-viewer" experts to 
disclose "a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify." Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C). Grathol's refusal to disclose its experts' opinions is purely an attempt to 
hide the ball and deny ITD the ability to properly prepare for trial. The exclusion of expert 
testimony is the typical sanction for a party's failure to comply with Rule 26 of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure and should be applied here. 
Alternatively, ITD requests the Court enter an Order compelling Grathol to submit 
adequate and sufficient expert disclosures as required by the Court's Order and as requested by 
ITD in its discovery requests. Additionally, because ITD is unable to identify rebuttal experts, 
prepare rebuttal expert reports, prepare for expert depositions, or make an appropriate pretrial 
Acarrequi offer, ITD also requests that the Court amend the Pretrial Order to extend the time for 
ITD to disclose rebuttal experts and expert reports, and vacate and continue the trial date in this 
matter. If the testimony of Grathol's experts is not excluded, then the extension of time and 
continuance of the trial date is the only remedy that will prevent unfair prejudice to ITD by 
requiring Grathol to disclose the opinions of its experts, and thereafter providing sufficient time 
for ITD to prepare for the depositions of Grathol's experts and to indentify rebuttal experts and 
submit rebuttal expert reports. This remedy is also necessary to give ITD an adequate 
opportunity to evaluate the opinions of Grathol' s experts and present a fair and reasonable 
Acarrequi offer to Grathol. The continuance is also necessary to provide a fair opportunity for 
ITD to prepare its case for trial. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND FACTS 
The Court's Pretrial Order dated April 5, 2011 established the pretrial deadlines for the 
parties' expert disclosures. Pretrial Order, at ,i 2. Under the terms of the Order, ITD was 
required to disclose its expert witnesses by July 21, 2011. Id. Grathol was then required to file 
its responsive experts on August 19, 2011. Id. And then the parties would file any rebuttal 
experts on October 19, 2011. Id. The Order did not place any limitations on which experts or 
types of experts were required to be disclosed and, with respect to the substance of the 
information to be provided for each parties' respective experts, the expert disclosures were to 
"consist of at least the information required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i)." Id. 
On August 19, 2011, Grathol filed its Expert Witness Disclosure in which it identified 
three expert witnesses who were expected to be called to testify at the trial of this matter, Dewitt 
"Skip" Sherwood, Geoffrey Reeslund and Alan Johnson. Affidavit of Mary V. York, Ex. H 
(Grathol's Expert Witness Disclosures). With respect to Mr. Sherwood's expert testimony, 
Grathol stated that "[h ]e will testify in accordance with his appraisal report, which will be 
provided to Plaintiff upon completion." York Aff., Ex.Hat 2. Despite the specific reference to 
Mr. Sherwood's appraisal report, Grathol did not produced Mr. Sherwood's appraisal report. 1 
With respect to Grathol's expert disclosures for Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson, Grathol 
merely outlined in broad terms the general subject matter of the anticipated testimony. Grathol's 
disclosures did not provide any of the "opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons 
therefore," as required by Rule 26(b )( 4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, nor did it "consist 
1 On September 19, 2011, counsel for Grathol faxed a letter to ITD' s counsel in which it stated 
that it was belatedly producing Mr. Sherwood's appraisal report. The fax did not contain a copy 
of the appraisal report or the supplement discovery responses being provided by Grathol. ITD 
just received Grathol's discovery responses, which included a copy of Mr. Sherwood's appraisal 
report on September 21, 2011. 
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of at least the information required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b )( 4)(i)," as required 
by the Court's Pretrial Order. Grathol's expert disclosure as it relates to Mr. Reeslund stated 
that: 
Mr. Reeslund will give opinion testimony as to the 
development plans for the Property, testimony as to its potential 
uses, its value (before and after the condemnation), the limitations 
on uses of the Property remaining after condemnation, and land 
use planning/entitlement, construction planning activities; efforts 
and expenses associated with the purchase, holding and 
development of the Property; planning and design work associated 
with the property; and the effects of the condemnation on the 
development of the remaining property. 
York Aff. ,r,r 11-18, Ex. H. Grathol' s expert disclosure as it relates to Mr. Johnson is similar, 
stating that: 
Mr. Johnson will give opm1on testimony as to the 
acquisition, ownership and development plans for the Property, 
testimony as to its potential uses, its value (before and after the 
condemnation), the values of the Property remaining after 
condemnation and before and after construction and 
entitlement/construction planning activities; efforts and expenses 
associated with the purchase, holding and development of the 
Property; planning and design work associated with the property; 
marketing efforts of the property prior to and after condemnation; 
and the effects of the condemnation on the remaining Property. 
York Aff., Ex. H. Grathol failed to provide any actual opinions to be offered by either expert; 
there is no detail as to the experts' value opinions, condemnation impact opinions, or 
condemnation damages opinions. Furthermore, there is no information about the basis, reasons 
or support for the experts' opinions. 
Upon receiving Grathol's expert disclosures, on August 24, 2011, counsel for ITD 
notified Grathol's counsel that its expert disclosures were deficient in that they did not comply 
with the Court's Pretrial Order, the disclosure requirements of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, or with ITD's discovery requests and the corresponding supplementation 
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requirements of the Rules. York Aff., Ex. I (August 24, 2011 Letter from counsel for ITD to 
counsel for Grathol). ITD' s August 24th letter requested that Grathol provide full and complete 
disclosures. Id 
Counsel for Grathol responded to ITD's August 24th letter by stating that it believed that 
the disclosures did in fact comply with the Court's Pretrial Order and contained all of the 
information required by Rule 26(b)(4). York Aff., Ex. J (August 29, 2011 Letter from counsel 
for Grathol to counsel for ITD). While not expressly stating the underlying reasoning behind its 
refusal to provide the requested opinions and supporting information in its August 29th letter, 
Grathol's assertion that its disclosure complied with the Court's Pretrial Order and Rule 26(b)(4) 
is based upon its contention that Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson are "actor-viewer" experts and 
are therefore not subject to the requirements of Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In support of its as~ertion, Grathol cited to the Committee Notes of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, but provided no argument or analysis to support its cited reference. Grathol 
had made a similar statement in its original responses to ITD's First Set oflnterrogatories and 
Requests for Production of Documents. York Aff., Ex. D (Grathol's Ans. and Resp. to Plfs First 
Set oflnterrogs. and Req. for Prod. of Doc.) at 5-6. TTD's Interrogatory and Grathol's Answer 
stated the following: 
Interrogatory No. 2: For each expert witness identified in 
response to Interrogatory No. 1, please provide the subject matter 
upon which the expert witness is expected to testify, a complete 
statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the 
reasons therefore, the substance of the expert witness' opinions, 
the basis and reasons for the opinions, the underlying facts and 
data upon which those opinions are based, and all information 
referenced in and required by Rule 26(b )( 4)(A)(i) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ANSWER: Defendant anticipates offering expert opm10n 
testimony in this matter, including testimony concerning the plan, 
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Id. 
design and engineering of portions of the Plaintiffs project across 
or adjacent to Defendant's property, as well as testimony 
concerning valuation of the property. The witnesses offering 
opinion testimony as actor-viewers may include the following: 
(1) Bill Hughes 
(2) Alan Johnson 
(3) Geoff Reeslund 
(4) Scott Taylor 
(5) Brent Heleker 
(6) John Beutler 
(7) Mark Johnson 
(8) Jeff Bond 
(9) Donald Smock 
(10) Paul Daugharty 
(11) Brett Terrell 
(12) Mike Winger 
As an actor/viewer "expert," Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover 
the testimony of such persons. See, U.S.C.A., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1970 Amendment at 114 
(West 1995). 
(1) Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, CGA 
(2) Ed Morse, MAI 
With respect to these valuation experts, as of the date of the 
Answers to these Interrogatories, no formal appraisal reports have 
been completed. Therefore, the remainder of the information 
requested in this Interrogatory cannot be provided. If and when 
formal appraisal reports are prepared, the information in the above 
Interrogatory will be contained within those appraisal reports. 
On September 9, 2011, counsel for ITD held a conference call with counsel for Grathol 
as a formal "meet and confer" conference on the issue of Grathol' s deficient expert disclosure, as 
well as other discovery matters. York Aff., at ,r,r 18-19. During the conference, counsel for ITD 
made reasonable efforts to reach an agreement with counsel for Grathol on the issue of Grathol' s 
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deficient expert disclosures for Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson. Id. At the close of conference, 
counsel for Grathol stated that he would follow up on the expert issues the following week. Id. 
Grathol's counsel did not respond within the stated time frame, but a week later, on 
September 19, 2011, Grathol 's counsel sent a letter again refusing to disclose the expert opinions 
of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson. York Aff., at~ 19 and Ex. M. In its September 19th letter, 
Grathol once again reiterated its contention that Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson were "actor-
viewer" experts and therefore not subject to the requirements of the Court's Pretrial Order or 
Rule 26(b)(4). Id. Notably, Grathol's letter did not explain why it was unable to provide the 
experts' opinions and supporting information in response to ITD's Interrogatory No. 2, which 
asked for "a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the reasons 
therefore, the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions, 
the underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based." See, id. 
ITD's counsel responded on September 20, 2011 and stated its express disagreement with 
Grathol's arguments and conclusions. York Aff., Ex. N. The September 20th letter from ITD's 
counsel also notified Grathol that it would be filing a motion to exclude the testimony of Mr. 
Reeslund and Mr. Johnson testimony or, alternatively, to compel the disclosure of their opinions 
and supporting information. Id. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. The Testimony of Grathol's Experts Should be Excluded Because Grathol 
Has Failed to Comply with the Court's Pretrial Order, the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and ITD's Discovery Requests. 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allow ITD to obtain "discovery regarding any matter, 
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it 
relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any 
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other party[.]" Idaho R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l). With respect to expert witnesses, Rule 26(b)(4) 
provides that a party may discover, by interrogatory and/or deposition, a complete statement of 
the opposing party's expert's opinions and the reasons for those opinions. Id at 26(b)(4). 
The exclusion of evidence is the recognized sanction for a party's failure to comply with 
Rule 26, including the duty to seasonably supplement responses to discovery requests. 
"Typically, failure to meet the requirements of Rule 26 results in exclusion of the proffered 
evidence." Radmer v. Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86, 90,813 P.2d 897,900 (1991). 
Additionally, courts have broad authority to compel obedience with its orders and may impose 
sanctions upon a party who fails to comply with its orders, including a party who fails to serve 
timely responses to discovery. Idaho Code§ 1-1603(4); Noble v. Ada County Elections Bd., 135 
Idaho 495, 499, 20 P.3d 679, 683 (2000); Ashby v. Western Council, Lumber Production and 
Indus. Workers, 117 Idaho 684,686, 791 P.2d 435,436 (1990). See also Idaho R. Civ. P. 
37(b)(2)(B) (providing that where a party fails to obey an order of the Court to provide 
discovery, the Court may enter an order "refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or 
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting that party from introducing designated 
matters in evidence."). "Moreover, while trial courts are given broad discretion in ruling on 
pretrial discovery matters, reversible error has been found in allowing testimony where Rule 26 
has not been complied with." Radmer, 120 Idaho at 90, 813 P.2d at 900 (citing Smith v. Ford 
Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784 (10th Cir.1980)). 
In the present case, in addition to the requirements imposed by Rule 26(b)(4), the Court's 
Pretrial Order required that expert disclosures "shall consist of at least the information required 
to be disclosed pursuant to J.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i)." Pretrial Order, at 2. The Order made no 
exception for alleged "actor-viewer" experts. Further, ITD propounded discovery requests on 
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Grathol in which it sought "a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert 
and the reasons therefore, the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for 
the opinions, the underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based," as well as all 
information referenced in and required by Rule 26(b )( 4 )(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. York Aff., Ex. A, Interrogatory No. 2. 
Grathol failed to comply with or satisfy the requirements of the Court's Pretrial Order 
and Rule 26(b)(4) because it did not include a complete statement of Mr. Reeslund's and Mr. 
Johnson's expert opinions or the reasons for those opinions in its expert disclosures. Moreover, 
Grathol failed to respond to ITD's discovery requests and provide a complete statement of these 
experts' opinions and the underlying substance, reasons and basis for those opinions. See York 
Aff., Exs. H through M, and 1117-19. Accordingly, the recognized sanction for Grathol's 
disregard of the Court's Order and the discovery requirements of Rule 26 is to exclude the 
testimony of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson. 
B. The Expert Testimony of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson Fall Directly 
Within the Scope of Rule 26(b)(4) and Should Have Been Disclosed In 
Accordance with the Court's Pretrial Order and the Requirements of 
Idaho's Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Grathol's explanation of why it refuses to produce the expert opinions of Mr. Reeslund 
and Mr. Johnson is that these experts "are not 'expert witnesses' in the traditional sense of a Rule 
26(b)(A)(i) disclosure." York Aff., Ex. M. According to Grathol, these individuals "fall within 
the 'actor/viewer exception'" of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because their 
testimony is based upon knowledge and information not acquired in preparation for litigation and 
they are "actors/viewers with respect to the occurrences that are part of the subject matter of this 
litigation." Id. In support of its argument, Grathol cites to the Committee Notes of the Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26, Subdivision (b )( 4). 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OR, 
ALTERNATIVELY, TO COMPEL EXPERT DISCLOSURES - 10 
950 of 1617
Grathol's argument has no merit because Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson are identified as 
experts who will be offering expert testimony that was obtained or created in anticipation of 
litigation. Specifically, Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson have both been identified as offering 
expert testimony on the very issues relating to the present condemnation action. Grathol 
identified Mr. Reeslund as providing expert testimony on issue of the value of the subject 
property before and after the condemnation, the limitations on uses of the remaining property 
after the condemnation, and the effects of the condemnation on the development of the 
remaining property. York Aff., Ex. H. Similarly, Mr. Johnson is identified as providing expert 
testimony as to ITD's acquisition of a portion of the subject property, the value of the property 
before and after the condemnation, the values of the Property remaining after condemnation and 
before and after construction, and entitlement/construction planning activities, marketing efforts 
of the property prior to and after condemnation, and the effects of the condemnation on the 
remaining Property. Id. 
Each of these identified areas of expert testimony are directly related to and, in fact, arise 
out of or in direct response to the current lawsuit. An opinion about this condemnation action 
could not have been formed in the absence of this condemnation action. Such opinions 
necessarily arise from and are directly related to this suit. Therefore, Grathol cannot sustain its 
claim that Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson created their opinions prior to or independent of this 
action. The identified subject areas of expert testimony for Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson fall 
directly within the bounds of Rule 26(b)(4) and should have been disclosed by Grathol on 
August 19, 2011. Grathol's failure to do so violated the Court's Pretrial Order and the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and the testimony should be excluded. 
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C. Grathol's Suggested Justification for Its Refusal to Produce the Expert 
Opinions of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson Is Contrary to Idaho Law. 
Grathol's contention that it is not required to disclose the expert opinions of Mr. 
Reeslund and Mr. Johnson expert fails under Idaho law, which requires Mr. Reeslund's and Mr. 
Johnson's expert opinions to be disclosed under Idaho's discovery rules. In fact, the assertions 
made by Grathol are nearly identical to those that were rejected by the Idaho Court of Appeals in 
Clark v. Raty, 137 Idaho 343, 48 P.3d 672 (Ct. App. 2002). 
In Clark, the district court excluded the testimony of a treating physician who was not 
timely disclosed. Id. at 344, 48 P.3d at 673. On appeal, plaintiff argued that he was not required 
to produce the expert's opinions because the expert's opinions and knowledge were not acquired 
or developed in anticipation of litigation and therefore were not subject to the requirements of 
Rule 26(b)(4). Id at 345, 48 P.3d at 674. The Court of Appeals soundly rejected plaintiffs 
argument, stating that "although Clark is correct that a treating physician's knowledge that was 
not developed for purposes of litigation is not subject to Rule 26(b )( 4), the conclusion that he 
then draws-that such testimony is entirely sheltered from discovery---draws no support from 
the language of the rule or the remaining discovery rules." Id. The Court of Appeals quoted the 
federal decision of Lee v. Knutson, 112 F.R.D. 104 (N.D. Miss. 1986) and its statement that 
"[t]here is simply no reason to hold that non-26(b)(4) trial experts may not be discovered by way 
of the same interrogatories as 26(b)(4) trial experts." Id. at 346, 48 P.3d at 675 (quoting Lee v. 
Knutson, 112 F.R.D. 104, 108 (N.D. Miss. 1986)). According to the Lee decision, "[t]his result 
flows from precedent as well as logic and common sense." Id. 
The Court of Appeals in Clark concluded that Rule 26(b )( 4) "provides no justification for 
[plaintiffs] failure to respond to [defendant's] interrogatories seeking disclosure of all of 
[plaintiff's treating physician's] opinions that [plaintiff] wished to present at trial." Id. And it 
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upheld the exclusion of the treating physician's testimony as not being timely produced and for 
plaintiffs failure to seasonably supplement its responses to discovery requests as required by 
Rule 26(e)(4). Id. at 347, 48 P.3d at 676. 
Applying Clark to the present case, the same result should follow. While ITD does not 
concede that Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson are not subject to Rule 26(b)(4) and the Court's 
Pretrial Order, the ruling in Clark makes clear that Grathol is still subject to ITD's discovery 
requests, which specifically asked for "a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by 
the expert and the reasons therefore, the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and 
reasons for the opinions, the underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based," as 
well as all information referenced in and required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. York Aff., Ex. A., Interrogatory No. 2. 
Grathol has offered no explanation as to why it continues to refuse to answer ITD's 
discovery requests or why it has failed to comply with Rule 26(e)(4) and supplement its initial 
responses that failed to provide the requested information. Indeed, given that Grathol states that 
Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson are prepared to testify at deposition, at which time ITD can ask 
these experts about their opinions, Grathol obviously knows these opinions and is required under 
Rule 26(e)(4) to supplement its responses and provide that information. Grathol has refused to 
answer ITD's discovery and has refused to comply with Idaho's discovery rules, including the 
rule requiring Grathol to supplement its discovery responses. 
Grathol' s continued and strenuous efforts to hide the opinions of its experts violates the 
very purpose of the discovery rules and their efforts should not be rewarded. Like the court in 
Clark, the Court should exclude the testimony of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson for Grathol' s 
failure to comply with the Court's Pretrial Order and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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D. Even if Grathol's Actor-Viewer Argument is Accepted and the Federal Rules 
are Applied, Grathol Would Still be Required to Disclose the Opinions of 
Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson. 
In support of its argument that it is not required to provide the expert opinions of 
Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson, Grathol cites to the Notes of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26, Subdivision (b)(4). The Committee Notes referenced by Grathol state that "[i]t should be 
noted that the subdivision [Rule 26(b)(4)] does not address itself to the expert whose information 
was not acquired in preparation for trial but rather because he was an actor or viewer with 
respect to transactions or occurrences that are part of the subject matter of the lawsuit." See 
Comments to 1970 Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b )( 4). 
The federal rule that formed the context for the Committee Notes differs from Idaho Rule 
26 in that the federal rule distinguishes between those experts who are required to produce a 
report and those who are not. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(b) with Idaho R. Civ. P. 
26(b )( 4). Under the federal version of the rule, an expert is required to produce a report that 
contains a complete statement of all opinions and the basis and reasons for the opinions "if the 
witness is one retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or one 
whose duties as the party's employee regularly involve giving expert testimony." Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(a)(2)(b). However, even if an expert, such as an actor-viewer expert, is not required to 
produce a report, he is still required to disclose the subject matter on which the witness is 
expected to present evidence and "a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is 
expected to testify." Id.; Nagle v. Mink, 2011 WL 3861435, *2-3 (D. Colo. Aug. 29, 2011) 
(experts not required to disclose reports under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) are required to disclose 
"(i) the subject matter on which the witness is expected to present evidence under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 702, 703 or 705 and (ii) a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is 
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expected to testify."). Additionally, if that expert's opinion testimony goes beyond the facts 
known to him as an actor-viewer, the expert is then required to comply with the disclosure 
requirements of Federal Rule 26(a)(2)(B). See e.g., Zarecki v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 
914 F.Supp. 1566, 1573 (N.D. Ill. 1966) (concluding that the substance of expert's testimony 
went beyond personal observations and experience and therefore should have been disclosed 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) and the expert disclosure requirements of the rule); Wreath 
v. United States, 161 F.R.D. 448, 449-50 (D. Kan. 1995) (holding that to once an testifying 
physician develops additional specific opinion testimony beyond the facts made known to him 
during the course of care and treatment of the patient, he becomes subject to the provisions of 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) and the expert disclosure requirements of the rule). 
The actor-viewer expert may be excused under Federal Rule 26 from preparing a formal 
report. However, no rule excuses them from being required to disclose opinions under Rule 26, 
court scheduling orders, or interrogatories and requests for production. Thus, if one accepts 
Grathol's argument, Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson may not be required to prepare a report 
under the Federal Rules, they are certainly required to disclose a "summary of the facts and 
opinions" to which they would testify at trial. And to the extent their testimony went beyond the 
facts known to them as an actor-viewer, then Grathol would be required to comply with the 
additional requirements of Federal Rule 26(b)(2)(B). 
E. The Court's Pretrial Order does not Excuse Any Particular Type of Expert 
from Disclosure. 
The Court's Pretrial Order establishes the minimum requirements for expert disclosures, 
and it does not excuse any particular type of expert from the requirements of the Order. Pretrial 
Order, at~ 2. The Court's Order specifically requires that Defendants "shall disclose all experts 
to be called at trial" no later than 150 days before trial. Id. (emphasis added). The Order makes 
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no qualification, limitation or exception to the type of experts that are required to be disclosed. 
Id. With respect to the information that must be disclosed, the Order states that "such disclosure 
shall consist of at least the information required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i)." 
Id. ( emphasis added). Grathol should be required to comply with the provisions of the Order. 
Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson were identified as experts and they have been disclosed 
by Grathol as individuals who will be offering expert opinion testimony at trial. York Aff., 
Ex. H. As the Court well knows, witnesses are limited to testifying as to facts within their 
personal knowledge. Under certain circumstances, a witness may go beyond that and testify as 
to opinions they have formed on matters relevant to the case. To offer these opinions, the 
witness must qualify as an expert based on their specialized training, education, or experience. 
Here, as in most cases, and in accordance with Rule 26, the Court's Pretrial Order requires all 
experts to disclose all opinions and the basis of those opinions by certain specified dates. The 
Court's Order does not exempt any experts of any kind from this requirement. 
Moreover, to the extent that Grathol contends that these individuals are experts whose 
opinions were not developed in anticipation of litigation, their opinions and the basis therefore 
must have already been formed prior to the commencement of this case. In that case, Grathol 
should have immediately disclosed Mr. Reeslund's and Mr. Johnson's opinions in response to 
ITD's discovery in April. At a minimum, Grathol was under a duty to supplement its discovery 
under Rule 26(e)(4) long before now. Grathol's failure to do so is not supportable or justified 
and should result in the exclusion of their testimony. 
F. ITD Will Be Prejudiced by Grathol's Failure to Disclose Its Experts' 
Opinions and Supporting Information. 
Grathol refusal to provide expert opinions and supporting information results in 
substantial unfair prejudice to ITD. Without sufficient disclosures, ITD cannot determine what 
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rebuttal experts it will need at trial. ITD cannot prepare and serve its rebuttal opinions in 
response to the opinions of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson because Grathol has not produced any 
substantive information about these experts' opinions or the basis for them. ITD has no 
information about their opinion as to either the before or after value of the property, what 
opinions they are going to offer as to the limitations on the use of the subject property after the 
condemnation, or their conclusions as to the effects of the condemnation on the development of 
the property. In short, ITD has nothing to rebut because Grathol has refused to provide any 
opinions from these experts. 
Additionally, ITD is not able to adequately prepare for the depositions of these experts 
without an undue and unnecessary expenditure of time and expense. ITD should not have to, nor 
is it required to, go into an expert deposition without an adequate disclosure of the experts' 
opinions and the reasons and basis for them. The Rules have been structured to require complete 
disclosures of an expert's opinions to prevent such inequities. As stated by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Clark v. Klein, 
In cases of this character [involving expert testimony], a 
prohibition against discovery of information held by expert 
witnesses produces in acute form the very eviis that discovery has 
been created to prevent. Effective cross-examination of an expert 
witness requires advance preparation.... Similarly, effective 
rebuttal requires advance knowledge of the line of testimony of the 
other side. If the latter is foreclosed by a rule against discovery, the 
narrowing of issues and elimination of surprise which discovery 
normally produces are frustrated. 
Id., 137 Idaho 154, 157-58, 45 P.3d 810, 813-14 (2002) (quoting Advisory Committee Notes, 
Rule 26, Fed. R. Civ. P.). "The purpose of our discovery rules is to facilitate fair and expedient 
pretrial fact gathering." Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867,873, 136 P.3d 338,344 (2006). "It 
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follows, therefore, that discovery rules are not intended to encourage or reward those whose 
conduct is inconsistent with that purpose." Id 
Additionally, ITD is prejudiced by Grathol's refusal to disclose its experts' opinions 
because ITD will be unable to evaluate the opinions and properly prepare a fair and appropriate 
pretrial offer as required by Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P .2d 
1067 (1987) and succeeding cases. Under Acarrequi, ITD as the condemnor is required to make 
a timely pretrial offer of settlement of at least 90% of the ultimate jury verdict and no later than 
90 days before trial. Id at 876-78, 673 P.2d at 1070-72. This offer serves as the basis for 
determining awards of costs and attorney fees ih condemnation actions. Iri cases involving large 
sums, such as the present case, the amount of costs and fees can be considerable. ITD is simply 
unable to assess these witnesses' opinions as to the fair market value of the property, before or 
after the condemnation, or their opinions on damages suffered by the remaining property after 
the condemnation. Consequently, ITD is unable to assess or determine an appropriate offer of 
settlement under Acarrequi, due solely to Grathol's unjustified refusal to disclose the opinions of 
individuals who will offer expert testimony at trial. 
The prejudice faced by ITD has been addressed by Idaho appeiiate courts. In the case of 
Clark v. Raty, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he potential for prejudice to the 
opposing party from the admission of evidence that was not disclosed in discovery is particularly 
acute with respect to expert testimony." Clark, 137 Idaho at 347, 48 P.3d at 676. The Idaho 
Supreme Court echoed this concern when it noted that in cases involving expert witnesses, 
advance preparation is necessary and pretrial discovery is fundamental. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 
157-58, 45 P.3d 810, 813-14 (2002). Because of Grathol's failure to disclose its experts' 
opinions or the underlying basis for the opinions, in compliance with the Court's Pretrial Order, 
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Rule 26(b)(4), and ITD's discovery requests, ITD is unable to adequately prepare its case for 
trial. Accordingly, the expert testimony of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson should be excluded. 
This sanction is particularly appropriate given Grathol's repeated willful failure and refusal to 
provide any of the opinions from these experts, as required by the Court's Pretrial Order and the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
G. In the Alternative, ITO Requests that the Court Compel Full Disclosure of 
Mr. Reeslund's and Mr. Johnson's Expert Opinions and the Supporting 
Information and Modify the Pretrial Order. 
Alternatively, if the expert testimony of these individuals is not excluded, ITD requests 
that the opinions and basis for those opinions be compelled to be disclosed, and that the Court's 
scheduling order be modified to extend ITD's deadline to serve rebuttal reports and to continue 
the trial of this matter in order to avoid prejudice to ITD. The extension of time and continuance 
of the trial date is necessary to allow time for ITD to receive the expert opinions and supporting 
information of Grathol' s experts, to prepare for the expert depositions, and to complete its own 
expert rebuttal reports. The additional time is also needed to afford ITD a fair opportunity to 
present a reasonable Acarrequi offer to Grathol. This remedy is also needed to provide ITD with 
a fair opportunity to for trial. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Grathol has identified expert witnesses who will testify and offer opinions at trial, but it 
has refused to provide the opinions or the basis for the opinions-despite the Court's Pretrial 
Order, the requirements of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and ITD's outstanding discovery 
requests. Without the disclosure of these experts' opinions, ITD will be substantially and 
unfairly prejudiced. Accordingly, the testimony by these experts should be excluded at trial. In 
the alternative, Grathol should be compelled to disclose the opinions of their experts and the 
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basis for them, and the trial should be vacated and the Pretrial Order should be amended to give 
ITD adequate time to identify and disclose rebuttal experts. 
ITD further requests that it be awarded its attorney fees and costs incurred as a result of 
Grathol's failure to comply with the Court's Pretrial Order and to answer its discovery requests. 
DA TED this 21st day of September, 2011. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Idaho Transportation Department 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of September, 2011, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants. 
TO: THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PLAINTIFF 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S 
THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL 
ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
OF DOCUMENTS 
COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol and hereby responds to Plaintiff's First Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents as follows: 
INTERROGATORIES 
Interrogatory No. 2: For each expert witness identified in response to Interrogatory 
No. 1, please provide the subject matter upon which the expert witness is expected to testify, 
a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the reasons therefore, 
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the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions, the 
underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based, and all information 
referenced in and required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ANSWER: Defendant anticipates offering expert opinion testimony in this matter, 
including testimony concerning the plan, design and engineering of portions of the Plaintiffs 
project across or adjacent to Defendant's property, as well as testimony concerning valuation 
of the property. The witnesses offering opinion testimony as actor-viewers may include the 
following: 
(1) Bill Hughes 
(2) Alan Johnson 
(3) Geoff Reeslund 
(4) Scott Taylor 
(5) Brent Heleker 
(6) John Beutler 
(7) Mark Johnson \'/ 
(8) Jeff Bond 
(9) Donald Smock 
(10) Paul Daugharty 
(I 1) Brett Terrell 
(12) Mike Winger 
As an actor/viewer "expert," Rule 26(b )( 4) does not cover the testimony of such 
persons. See, U.S.C.A., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1970 
Amendment at 114 (West 1995). 
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( 1) Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, CGA 
(2) Ed Morse, MAI 
With respect to these valuation experts, as of the date of the Answers to these 
Interrogatories, no formal appraisal reports have been completed. Therefore, the remainder 
of the information requested in this Interrogatory cannot be provided. If and when formal 
appraisal reports are prepared, the information in the above Interrogatory will be contained 
within those appraisal reports. 
Supplemental Answer: See, Appraisal Report of Dewitt "Skip: Sherwood, CGA, 
produced herewith and Defendant's Expert Witness Disclosure dated August 25, 2011. 
Supplemental Answer: Defendant's actor/viewer witnesses are still in the process of 
formulating their opinions and testimony for trial. As discovery and investigation continues 
in this matter, Defendant's witnesses are expected to revise their opinions in their respective 
areas of expertise. Defendant reserves the right to update and supplement these discovery 
requests accordingly. However, the following summary sets forth the (presently) anticipated 
testimony of these witnesses. 
Alan Johnson anticipates testifying, generally as follows: 
Hughes Investments and its various partnerships is a commercial real estate developer 
not a land speculator. Since the company was formed in 1977, Hughes Investments entities 
have acquired, entitied, deveioped, constructed, leased and managed over 5,000,000 square 
feet of GLA. Hughes Investments has never purchased a piece of property, either raw land or 
an income producing asset for the purpose of quickly flipping it for a profit. Hughes 
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Investments and its entities have and always will make our income from developing property. 
Hughes Investments mission statement provides: 
"Hughes Investments is a reputable, retail commercial development company 
whose purpose is to generate equity and cash flow by developing high-quality 
shopping centers. We firmly believe that this approach translates into the 
highest return for long term ownership for ourselves and our partners while 
providing the highest quality shopping environment for our merchants and the 
communities they serve." As highly experienced commercial developers, we 
convert a piece or raw land using our capabilities in design, entitlements, 
leasing, construction, financing and management, to create significant value 
and a financeable asset that provides cash flow over long periods ohime. 
With respect to the property at the northeast comer of Highways 95 and 54, in Athol 
Idaho, Hughes Investments purchased this property in 2008 with the sole intent to develop it 
into a commercial retail center/hospitality project. Hughes Investments acquired and 
immediately rezoned the property to a commercial designation, invested in engineering a 
sewage treatment system that would be approved by the Idaho DEQ, commenced discussions 
with merchants and tenants for prospective sales or leases, met with and filed site plans with 
Kootenai County and commissioned the prerequisite traffic study for further development 
evaluation. Hughes Investments has spent significant amounts of money on consultants, 
engineers, and carrying costs in order to develop this property. As of the date of this writing, 
the costs for development of this property have exceeded $428,000. 
Hughes Investments has a long history of successfully developing retail shopping 
centers. Hughes Investments has been designing, building and leasing shopping centers for 
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nearly forty years. With any sophisticated shopping center, developer, a signalized "hard 
comer" with high traffic counts, high visibility, easy ingress and egress at the comer of two 
major streets is always the most sought after location. A "Hard Comer" is recognized by the 
International Council of Shopping Centers as a signalized intersection at the comer of two 
main streets. While freeway on and off ramps are often the location of services and 
shopping, a hard comer is always preferred by developers, merchants and tenants. In the case 
of HWY 95/54, the current configuration offers excellent visibility and slows traffic at the 
lighted intersection. Easy access is provided by 4 deeded access points at or near the 
intersection. 
In contrast, from the materials I have been provided by ITD, the proposed overpass 
will be at an elevation well above the current grade of the property at an assumed speed of 55 
to 65 MPH. It is important to note that the new interchange is not expected to increase traffic 
counts by the site. While access has not been finalized at this time, it won't be remotely as 
good as what is presently available. As difficult as it is to work around the issues caused by 
the overpass, Hughes Investments has still not been provided the date for the start of 
construction, let alone an estimated date for completion of this project. Without either 
completion, or realignment dates and timelines, Hughes Investments is unable to start 
development. All of the merchants that we have been in discussions with will not move 
forward with any kind of commitment until the interchange is complete or it is determined 
that the highways will keep their current alignment. 
Please refer to previous correspondence submitted from Mike Winger of URM. (See 
Bates Nos. 000016-000024, 000030-000031, 000040-000045, and 000053-000055.) 
Additionally attached are several newspaper articles "A bump in the road" 11/23/08 and "US 
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95 widening in N. Idaho hits another snag" 11/22/08 both referring to the ITD slashing its 
request for funding for widening HWY 95 between Coeur d'Alene and Sandpoint. To further 
the uncertainty of this project in a meeting with Ron Harvey and Jason Mingzhor with ITD, 
Jason indicated that ITD would take our property through a condemnation action and if they 
didn't receive funding for construction, "they could sit on the property for 15 years" and 
effectively halt any development of our remaining property. This was perceived as threat. 
ITD' s delays and indecision to date may have cost Hughes Investments potential tenants and 
has put the entire development in jeopardy. A delay in construction or re-alignment of even 
two more years will cause significant financial damages through increased holding costs, lost 
opportunity and the inability to develop and market the remaining property resulting in an 
almost complete loss of value as a development parcel. 
The estimated value of the property being taken by ITD is based on the values of 
similarly available property with the potential for commercial development. The most similar 
comparable in ITD's appraisal, being that it is the only commercially zoned property on 
HWY 95, is at Sagle Road and HWY 95. This 29 acre site sold on 3/08 for $2.69/sf. Mr. 
Johnson believes this Sagle property is far inferior to the property at issue in this case. 
Contrary to notes in ITD's appraisal, this property did not have sewer service. Also, Sagle 
Road is not a "hard comer." In fact, it is actually a T intersection leading only to a school to 
the east of Highway 95 and into a small housing tract to the west. It is not at a signalized 
intersection like the comer at HWY 95/54. Experienced deveiopers will pay at least a 20% 
premium for property located at a signalized intersection of two highways. This factor 
effectively places the value of ITD's take of Hughes Investments' property at± $3.23/sf or, 
$2,532,578 for the prime 18 acres being acquired. 
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It is estimated that the value in the subsurface gravel for road construction materials 
located underneath Hughes Investments property is approximately $300,000. However, the 
most important component to the determination of the value of the take is the time period still 
needed to complete construction. 
It is Mr. Johnson's opinion that the remainder property, after the take, would be worth 
$3,669,300 (at the time of completion and the opening of the interchange) calculated as 
follows: 
(1) 3.87 acres west of the take is given a value of $674,300 (value is reduced due 
to the inability to provide sewer to the parcel across ITD's ROW; 
(2) 3.19 acres east of the ROW and west of Sylvan road at a value of $625,300; 
(3) Travel Plaza east of Sylvan, 7 acres at $1,219,000; and 
(4) Remaining 26.42 acres with limited commercial viability priced at $1,150,000. 
Hughes Investments factors in the value for the remaining property on the assumption 
of at least an additional three year delay in the ability to sell by reason of construction. Also, 
it should be noted that spreading the cost of the $1,000,000 sewer system to significantly 
fewer users will greatly decrease the value of the remainder land. At a discount rate of I 0% 
per annum, the NPV of the remainder property is $2,722,000, a reduced value of $947,000. 
To summarize $2,532,578 in the land value of the take+ $300,000 for construction materials 
+ a reduction in value for the remaining property waiting for completion of construction of 
$947,000 = $3,779,578. This is the absolute minimum value that should be used as just 
compensation for the take. 
In the alternative, looking at the development potential before the take for the 
property's "highest and best use" the value is significantly higher. The potential profit, as is 
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shown in the pre-take budget, is estimated at just over $8,670,000. This approach provides 
Hughes Investments with the investment strategy required in our projects, developing and 
holding of at least a portion of the asset. The expected value after the take is: ITD 
condemnation $571,000 + NPV of the remainder property $2,722,000 = $3,293,000. 
Subtract the land and expenses to date of approximately $1,800,000 and the potential profit is 
only about 15% of that of the "highest and best use". 
Geoff Reeslund anticipates testifying in the following areas: 
• Retail/commercial site planning and design, including building orientation, 
sight line and visibility criteria: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that the proposed elevated 
freeway, as it traverses the site, will greatly limit visibility and sight lines to the tenant 
buildings and signage in the development. Without at-grade pass-by visibility and identity, 
many potential customers may simply speed by the site without stopping. Conversely, the 
current at-grade highway with its signalized intersection provides superior visibility to the 
traveling public and also provides better access and an opportunity for encouraging 
customers to pull off the highway and patronize the project. 
• Division of property/parcel configurations: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that 
the land taken for the freeway construction bifurcates the most usable portion of the property 
into two pieces, one of which is very small with limited use applications, poor access and 
visibility; the other with poor visibility and very poor access opportunities. A third parcel will 
be created when right-of:-say is acquired for the Syivan frontage road use, further isolating a 
large portion of the property from the remainder and limiting the amount of property that 
could be developed for (highest and best-use) retail/commercial tenants. 
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• Access & circulation - on and off-site: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that the 
configuration and location of the land taken for the highway reconfiguration use severely 
impacts the viability for developing the resultant sites by eliminating or drastically limiting 
the ability to provide effective access points critical to successful commercial development. 
• Infrastructure and utility needs/provisions: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that 
the taking of this property for highway reconfiguration creates a severe hardship by 
impacting the ability to provide an effective and economical utility infrastructure for the 
resulting properties, and will require significant additional expenses due to the potential 
installation ofredundant systems, such as sewer, water and electrical facilities. 
• Development process and sequencing, from initial planning to construction 
completion: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that the lack of a recorded map defining the 
properties with which Hughes Investments are left after the taking has significantly delayed 
the development of the remaining property and has likely cost Hughes Investments tenants 
who were willing to proceed if the development were permitted to occur with legally defined 
parcels. 
• Land use potential: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify as to the various potential 
plans for development of the subject property and its suitability given its reconfiguration, 
location and infrastructure needs. He will also testify about Tenant leasing issues relative to 
division of construction between Tenant and Landlord, including implementation of 
requirements to affect Tenant openings. 
• Further that the land use development potential is now limited due to the 
splitting of the prime commercial site by the taking. 
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• Predevelopment planning and research including A&E consultant 
management: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify as to his familiarity with the property and his 
work with various consultants for the three years Hughes Investments have owned the 
property, including architects, civil engineers, environmental consultants, traffic engineers, 
waste water engineers, general contractors and others. Hughes Investments has spent 
significant dollars and prepared numerous commercial site plans, environmental studies and 
reports, ALTA site surveys, traffic studies and waste water treatment system designs, all to 
prepare for and support the development of this property. 
• Land use entitlements processing: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that he 
worked closely with consultants and Kootenai County to process the Commercial rezone and 
allow for the development of the property by Hughes Investments. During this process, 
Reeslund also worked and/or coordinated with the City of Athol, Lakes Highway District, 
Kootenai Metropolitan Planning Organization, and numerous local residents as well as ITD 
on several occasions. 
• On mid off-site development and construction, including agency coordination. 
consultant management, permit processing and construction management. Mr. Reeslund 
intends to testify as to his qualifications to manage the project A &E team in preparing the 
required improvement plans for the construction of the planned commercial project, 
including processing the required ministerial construction permits, managing the bidding and 
construction for the on and off-site improvements and buildings for construction and leasing; 
Mr. Reeslund will also be coordinating with various tenants who will construct their own 
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facilities and ensuring that tenants' design and construction teams produced an effective and 
timely completion of construction to meet timelines for the project opening. 
Additional detail in support of Mr. Reeslund' experience and qualifications in these 
areas, are attached as a copy of his Statement of Qualifications. 
Interrogatory No. 7: (Severance Damages) Please identify and state any witnesses' 
opinion, including your own opinion, as to whether any severance damage will result from 
the taking of a portion of the Subject Property by Plaintiff. If the response is "yes", describe 
the amount of severance damages, the method used to calculate the amount of damages, and 
all facts and documents used or relied upon, including the comparable sales used or relied 
upon, as a basis for that opinion. 
ANSWER: Yes, Defendant believes severance damages will result. Defendant does 
not know at this time the precise amount of severance damage it will suffer by reason of 
Plaintiffs actions in this matter nor is it possible to articulate "all facts and documents" used 
to calculate Defendant's view of severance damages. Discovery and evaluation in this matter 
is ongoing and all facts supporting severance damages may not be fully known until after the 
project is completed or at least construction is initiated. 
Supplemental Answer: See, Supplemental Answer to Interrogatory No. 2, above. 
Request for Production No. 1: Please produce all documents identified, used, 
referenced or relied upon in responding to the inten-ogatories above. 
RESPONSE: Defendant has compiled the voluminous documents responsive to these 
Requests for Production and will make them available for inspection and/or copying to 
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Plaintiff and/or its agents during regular business hours, upon reasonable request. 
Supplemental Answer: See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, Bates Nos. 
001401 -001416 produced herewith. 
Request for Production No. 2: Please produce the curriculum vitae or resume for each 
and every expert consulted by you in reference to this action, including Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b)(4)(A) experts. 
RESPONSE: Objection. This Request for Production is overbroad and beyond the 
scope of I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B). See also, Answer to Interrogatory No. 2. At this time, 
Defendant has not determined which experts it anticipates utilizing at trial, and discovery is 
not permitted as to specially retained experts. 
Supplemental Answer: See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, Bates Nos. 
001402 -001404 produced herewith. 
Request for Production No. 3: Please produce copies of all documents relied upon by 
any witness expected to be called at trial as an expert which concerns or reflects any opinion 
relating to the Subject Property. 
RESPONSE: See, Answer to Interrogatory No. 2. 
Supplemental Answer: See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, Bates Nos. 
001401 -001416 produced herewith. 
Request for Production No. 4: Please produce any and all appraisal reports, written 
estimates, or market studies relating in any way to the issues in this case, or any other 
document that reflects an opinion relating to the Subject Property, including but not limited 
to, the appraisal reports, written estimates, market studies or market analyses of each 
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
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appraiser or valuation witness that you intend to call to testify as an expert witness at the trial 
of this matter. 
RESPONSE: Defendant has no appraisal reports responsive to this request, but 
information relative to Defendant's opinion of the value of the Subject Property can be found 
in the documents produced or available for inspection and in the letters to Ron Harvey and 
Mary York referenced herein. 
Supplemental Answer: See, Appraisal Report of Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood, CGA, 
produced herewith. 
Supplemental Answer: See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, Bates Nos. 
001401 -001416, produced herewith and Bates Nos. 0000964-0001400 already produced. 
Request for Production No. 13: (Loan and Other Documents) Please produce a copy 
of each and every financial statement, loan application, or other document on which a value 
of the Subject Property has been set forth during the last five (5) years. 
RESPONSE: Defendant has no discoverable documents responsive to this Request 
for Production. 
Supplemental Answer: See, Response to Request for Production No. 1, Bates No. 
001416, produced herewith. 
DA TED this 6th day of October, 2011. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP -~ 
1stopher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
Alan Johnson, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
I am the managing member of HJ Grathol, Defendant, in the above-entitled action; I 
have read Defendant HJ Grahtol 's Third Supplemental Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's 
First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents; I know the contents 
thereof, and I state the same to be true to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. 
for HJrathol = 
Its: Senior VP Development 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this h_ day of October, 2011. 
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Project List Idaho 
Bayview Gateway (Athol, ID): Owned. 56 acres (subject to partial condemnation) Zoned commercial. 
Grocery, gas, fast food, pads, retail 
RiverviE:?w (Spokane County, WA): Owned. 10 acres. Approved for 2 hotels, restaurant, fast food, gas 
Spokane Street: Spokane Street and 1-90, Post Falls, ID. Escrow terminated due to lack of tenant 
demand. 
Plaza Coeur d Alene (CDA, ID. 95/Aqua): Proposed project. Was to be a relocation for JC Penney's, 
Target. Circuit City and other interest. Deal postponed as Penney's elected not to relocate and Target is 
on hold. Not owned by Hughes 
The Crossings (CDA, ID. Appleway/NW BLVD): Project was under negotiation until Kohl's elected to build 
on HWY 95. Negotiations terminated. 
Riverstone (CDA, ID.) Hughes was under contract to buy a 1 acre pad site in the Riverstone Center. Pad 
and entire project was sold to another party prior to dosing. 




. S:ENIO.R VICE PRES]DENT; DEVl;LQPMSNT 
At.AN JOHNSON - Alan attended Mounl Royar College ln ·his· naiive Calgary, Canada and graduated from the 
University of Oklahoma in Norman, Oklaho·ma. After graduation in 1983, he joined Coldwell Banker now CB Richard 
E:il!S, as a retal[ speciallst, transferring to the Anaheim, California office in 1985. In 1989 Alan was hired by Hughes 
lnve:stineiits as Vice Pr.esldenf- Leasing. After-nine years with Hughes Investments, Mr. Johnson joined The Irvine 
Cotilpariy .asDir$clor Of· Leasing and concentrated· on· 1he d~ve!cipment and:teasing of several ground-up projects 
.ini;i.uding th(i Markel Place - Irvine (500,000 sf GLA), Northpark Plaza ( 124,00sf GLA), Quail Hill ( 150,000sf GLA}, 
Trabuco Grove (!80,000 sf GLA), Oal<creek Village (139,000sf GLA}, Irvine Spectrum Pavilion (471,000 sf GLA). 
Newpor.t'C:oast(103;000 sf GLA), The ~luffs (61,000 sf GLA}, Vineyards Marketplace (10,000 sf GLA), Corona Valley 
(84,000 sf GLA) and several other projects throughout Irvine, Newport Beach Utah, Idaho and Washington. 
During the· past 26·years Alan completed transactions and formed relationships with Albertsons, Sav-on Drugs. 
Lowe's, Target, Kohl's, Office Depot, Ralph's, Ethan Allen, Vons, Sears and many other national tenants. He has 
been res11onsible for all aspects of acquisitlon and development including site and proper1y identification, purchase 
negotiations, desJgn, site planning, entitlements. development, leasing, management, broker coordination and all 
other aspects of commercial development. 
ln·Si:ipWm'i>er of:2003 Alan .left The li:1./ine Company to serve as Senior Vi<ie President, Development with Hughes 
lnvastments .. Mr. Johnson Is responsible for all pbas.es of acquisition <111d development of shopping centers 
·ihroughout:Califorriia, Utah, Washfngton and idaho; .Alan 1s·a member oflCSC. and has att~lned his Senior Certified 
.Leasing Specialist "S.CLS" credential.. . 




A· Rl:AL- l:STATlo St::RVICl:S COMPANY 
GEOFFREY B. REESLUND, AJA 
STATEMENT OF QUALIFICA TlONS 
Mr. Reeslund is a graduate of the University of Southern California, where he earned 
Bachelors and Masters degrees in Architecture. A registered Architect since 1977, for over 
21 years Geoff worked for SGPA Architecture and Planning, one of the top retail/commercial 
architectural firms in the country. A Principal with SGPA since 1986, he provided leadership 
ii) the planning, design and entitlement processing of over 200 community, specialty, 
regional and entertainment centers ttiroughout California and other Western states, 
Including nine projects for Hughes Investments. In addition, he served as SGPA'~ Southern 
California Marketing Director from 1993 to 1997, helping to expand their presence and Client 
base in the region. 
In 1998, Geoff joined Hughes Investments, one of his longstanding Clients, as Vice 
President and Director of Design and Construction. Hughes Investments, established in 
1977, is one .of the most successful developers of shopping centers in Southern California. 
In addition to building and managing their own centers, the firm also co-develops with,· 
and/or provides development services to many of the country's most successful major 
tenants, such as Home Depot, Albertsons, Target and Wal*Mart 
As Director of Design and Construction, Mr. Reeslund oversees all aspects of project 
planning, design, governmental approvals, and construction. He assembles and manages 
the project consultant teams, works closely · with tenants and their consultants, and 
coordinates the construction process to a successful completion. He also works closely with 
Hughes Investments' Senior Management and Property Management staffs on a regular 
basls·to facilitate clear Internal communications, project services and ongoing maintenance 
programs for existing centers. · 
Mr. Reeslund is a member of the American Institute of Architects, serves on the Advisory 
Board of the California Business Properties Association, and is actively involved in the 
International Council of Shopping Centers, where he· was a member of the Southern 
California Program Committee from 1991 to 1995. 
Representative projects managed and constructed whiie at Hughes investments: 
• The Marketplace at Hollywood Park- a 43 acre "Power Center'' in Inglewood, 
Califomla with 453,000 SF of retail uses including Home Depot, Target, El Super 
grocery store, Bally Fitness, Walgreens, and Staples. 
13 CORPORATE PLAZA• SUITE 150 • NEWPORT BEACH, CA 92660 
P.O. BOX 8700 • NEWPORT BEACH, CA 92658-8700 
PHONE (949) 759-9531 FACSIMILE (949) 759-8531 
001403 
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• Mountain Gate Marketplace- an 11 acre neighborhood retail center with Albertson's 
and 45,000 SF of other retail shops and freestanding pad tenants. 
• Heritage Marketplace:... a 10 acre neighborhood center with Albertson's, Wells Fargo, 
Carl's Jr., Del Taco, 7 Eleven and 23,000 SF of retail shop space. 
• Corona Valley Marketplace ~ a 1 0 acre neighborhood center with Albertson's, Chase 
Bank, Carl's Jr., 7 Eleven and 20,000 SF of retail shop space. 
• Garden Promenade - a 31 acre community center with Regal Cinemas, Ross Dress 
for Less, Marshall's, Party City, PetSmart, 24 Hour Fitness Bank of America, Carl's 
Jr., Pizza Hut and 50,000 SF of other retail tenant spaces. 
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HUGHES INVESTMENTS - DEVELOPMENT 
SILVER CREEK JUNCTION 
PROJECT BUDGET 
Share of Open Space 
Cap 
$/BldgSF N.O.L Land SF 
60,000 
Rate Potential Value 
Drug - Ground Lease 
{Assumed :lo/. Mgml Fee only) 
Pad 1 Bank •ZL 
9,800 Bldg, SF 




$180,000 $18.37 $174,600 44,245 7.50% $2,328,000 
(Assumed 3% Mgml fee only) 
Pad 2 Ba11k/Thrift GL 
(Msumed 3% Mgml Fee only) 
Pad 3 Multi ·renan! 
(Assumed :I¾ Mgml Fee & 5% Vacancy) 
Parcel 4 Medica!/dentaUre office GL 

















25,810 8.00% $809,375 
25.810 8.00% ::.: $909,375 
14,74$ 8.00% $1,382,250 
18.'135 8.00% $806,313 
TOTAL VALUED OPMENT PROPERTY S6,335,313 
TOTAL BUILDING SQ.FT. _ _,;29=.a .. o.,o 
POTENTIAL COSTS: 
$520,000 $495185 129,048 7 .82% OveraU cap 
TOTAL SQ. FT.==-==""" TOTAL VALUE $6,335,313 
_.....,,_,nd Purcrn,s& 304,048 NET SF $4.28 PER SF 
)urchasing 6,98 acres, however, only 175k sf useable) 
-.:IITE COSTS: . 
Off S;te Conslruction Costs: 
Off S~e Permit & lmpiu;t Fees/A & E 
On site Construction Costs 
Onslte Costs for.Open Space• Wetlands 






$1.SO PER SF 
$0.15 PER SF 
$3.50 PER SF 
$0.77 
A& E/Testin!l 175.000 
SubTotal Site Costs prior to Reimb.; 
$0.25 PER SF 
$0.25 PER SF 
1,088,750 Hanf Cost 975.000 
Reimbursem,enl On-Sile & DffsRe Salas/GL 1,088.750 88.57% 
BUii.DiNG CONSTRUCTION: 
Shops • Retail 
Tl Contributions to Shop Tenarns 
A & E Build;ngs 
Testing/Fore Mgmt 
PERMITS & FEES 
Hard Cost C.,nGngency 
Leasing Commissions - Shops 
Lease Comm. On Ground Leases 
AEGAL. ACCOUNTING. RE TAXES 
i )AN COSTS/Appraisal/Fees/Legal 
· .,,TEREST CONSTRUCTION LOAN 














SUBTOTAL BLDG. CONSTRUCTION COSTS 
$10.00 






(S100k min) 4.00% $1,856,250 
SUBTOTAL OTHER COSTS 

























TOTAL POTI:NTIAL NET COSTS 
TOTAL REIMBURSMEN'TS INCLUDED ABOVE 
Potential loan Amount @ 85% of Gross Costs: 
Loan Amount Used: 
Loan Amounr @ 85¾ of Net Costs 
Pay back required to bring loan down to 85% of Costs 
Loan Equity Required /JpFront 
Less Rcimb. From Tenants 
Plus Additional Pay Down of Loan to get to 85% of Net Costs 
Net Reimbursements availabte lo Pay Oown HI Eql.lity 
G:\$.'5\little summit.xis GO Ls Drug 1 l/2912005 


















Loan Value Using DSCR: 
NOi@ 1.25 OSC@S.25% k 
25YtAmOr1.. 
Loan Value Using 75"/4 LTV 
Permanent Loan Amount:75%LTV 
Pay Sack of Equity Loan lo HI 
Pay Sack of !interest on Equity Loan 
Consb'ucl0!1 Loan Pay Off 
Loan Fee/Legal/T'ot!e@1 •• 5% 
Net Cash from Perm Loan: 
cash Flow after Permanent Loan: 
Assumed Perm Loan Amount 
Ne! Operaffng Income 
Debt Service @ 8k 
(Int @ 7% ror 30 yrs) 
lmpaoods/Rollover @$1/sf/yrf 
Net Cash Flow Annually 
HI Equity Required; 
(Interest on Equity Not Included in Budget) 
112Yr.@ll% 
Excess Reimbursement to r(I 
!Net HI Equity 
1yr.@9% 
Total Interest 18 mos. 
Total Equity Due HI al Perm Loan 
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POTENTIAL INCOME: 
Pad - Ground Lease FF 
(Assumes 4% Mgmt. Fee) 
Pad - Ground Lease Fast Food 
(Assumes 4% Mgmt Fee) 
Pad - Ground Lease Restaurant 
(Assumes 4% Mgmt. Fee) 
Retail Shops 
(Assumes 4% Mg~t. Fee) 
Retail Pad 
(Assumes 4% Mgmt Fee) 
3,500 Bldg. SF 
4,000 Bldg. SF 
5,000 Bldg. SF 





Scheduled Net Operating 
Rent $/Bldg SF Income Land SF Cap Rate Potential Value 
$50,000 $14.29 $48,000 65,340 7.50% $640,000 
$50,000 $12.50 $48,000 65,340 7.50% $640,000 
$55,000 $11.00 $52,800 65,340 8.00% $660,000 
$220,000 $22.00 $211,200 87,120 8.00% $2,640,000 
$100,000 $20.00. $96,000 65,340 8.00% $1,200,000 
27,500 TOTAL BUILDING SQ.FT.====== $475,000 $456,000 348,480 7.89% $5,780,000 
Land sales: 
Gas Station 
Groceiy Store (Major Tenant) 
Future Development 
Travel Center · 
Motels 
TOTAL LAND SALES: 
POTENTIAL COSTS: 
Land Purchase 
Development Land total Square Footage: 
SITE COSTS: 
Off Site Construction Costs: (Dev Land) 
On Site Construction Costs: Site A 
Permit & Fees 
A & E/Testing 
Sewer (aU Dev Land) 
Hard Cost Contingency - Site 
Site Reimbursements 
Offsites (Sales & Gril Leases) 
Onsites (GL and Grocery) 
Sewer Costs 
Total Site: 
Net Site Reimbursements: 
BUILDING CONSTRUCTION: 
Shops (Includes TA's) 
A & E Buildings 
Permits & Fees 
Hard Cost Contingency- Bldg. 
Soft Cost Contingency - Bldg. 
Total Bulding Construction 
G & A & Marketing 
Leasing Commisslons - Shops 
Pad Ground Lease Commissions 
Overhead Construction Fee 
Subtotal G & A & Overhead Costs 














$10.00 58,370 $583,700.00 $17,511 
$4.50 216,493 $974,218.50 $29,227 
$8.00 138,956 $1,111,648.00 $33,349 
$7.50 304,920 $2,286,900.00 $68,607 
$7.75__:2:,;5.;.,7,""87c::5 _ _:$t:.:.1i.;,9~982:,53:::.:.:1·:::25:._ _ _,.::$;:.;:5.::,9,.;:95:;.6 
976,614 $6,954,997.75 $208,650 $6,746,348 
Total Potential Revenue $12,526,348 
$0.49 PER SF 
$0.49 PER SF 
Not included in costs below & 
$1,200,000 excludes value to Athol comer 
$651,857 
$0.23 PER SF 
$3.00 PER SF 
$0.06 PER SF 
$0.13 PER SF 













$0.15 PER SF 







50% of first year's income 
4% of Hard Costs 





















$173, 134 _ __,,..,..,-=-=,....,.. 
$445,634 
Total Potent/al Costs: __ $_3.,_,8;..;5_4.:..;.,3_54_ 
Total Profit Potential:j $8,671,9941 
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LA WRENCB G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GBNERAL 
STA TE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3S86) 
Deputy Attorney Oeneral 
Chie( CJvil Litigation Division 
1. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Trmsportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boisep Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-881S 
Faodmile: (208) 334114498 
Mary V, York OSB #5020) 
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400) U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701 .. 2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plamtiff 
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IN nm DISTRICT COURT or Tim FIRS? Jtrl>ICJAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDA.HO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTA!lON BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BJ GRATHOL1 a Calif0r12ia ge11eral 
' 
' a Washington corporation; and DOES 1 
through 5, 
Case No. CV10~10095 
STl:PtJLATION FOR 
:EXTENSION OF TIME FOR 
PLAJNTJFJ•s REBUTTAL 
EXPERTS WITNESS 
DlSCLOSVllES AND .FOR 
ER" 
Defendants. EXHIBIT 
STIPULATION FOR EXTENSION or TlME FOR PLAINTIFF'S RJBUTTAL I __ L __ _ 
EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURES AND FOR "ACA.RREQUl OFFER" • 1 
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Oct. 18. 2011 9:31AM No. 5307 P. 3 
Plaintiff, the State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") and Defendant 
HJ Grathol (''Grathol") (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "parties',), by and 
through their counsel of record. hereby stipulate and agree as follows: 
1. The parties agree to extend the deadline for ITD to identify rebuttal expert 
witnesses and serve their disclosures of opinions to be offered at trial from October 19, 
2011 to November 21, 2011, and request the Court to enter an Order accordingly. The 
Court's Notice of Trial and Uniform Pretrial Order will otherwise remain unchanged. 
a. The Court's Notice of Trial and Uniform Pretrial Order provides 
that all parties are to disclose rebuttal expert witnesses no later 
than ninety days (90) before trial. The trial in this matter is 
scheduled to begin on January 17, 2012, which would require that 
rebuttal expert witness be disclosed no later than October 19, 2011. 
b. The parties agree to a one-month extension for ITD to disclose 
rebuttal expert witnesses and opinions, which would extend ITD's 
deadline to November 21, 2011. 
2. The parties also agree to extend by one month the date by which ITD may 
submit an offer of settlement in accordance with Ada County Highway District v. 
Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983) and succeeding cases and other 
relevant provisions ofidaho law. Under this extension, ITD's i'Acarrequi" Offer will 
be due no later than November 21, 2011 and Grathol may not assert any argument that 
an "Acarrequf" offer made on or before November 21, 2011 is untimely. 
3. Grathol agrees that all opinions of its experts Dewitt "Skjp" Sherwood, 
Alan Johnson. and Geoff Reeslund have been disclosed. 
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4. ITD agrees to withdraw Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony 
or, Alternatively, to Compel Expert Disclosures, currently pending before the Court and 
scheduled for hearing on October 19, 2011. 
5. The parties respectfully submit that good cause exists for this Stipulation 
and that this Stipulation is not intended to impact other existing deadlines in this case. 
DATED this .JJj_day of October, 2011. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
By ..._ <;,., ~ ~ Do~Marfi~rm 
Attorneys for Defendant 
HJ Grathol 
Attorneys for lain.tiff 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this .11_1ay of October, 2011, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing. by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, 1D 83816-1336 
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January 17, 2012 
Via Fax: 208-664-5884 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Re: ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al. 
Dear Chris: 
First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County 
Case No. CVl0-10095 
MaryV. York 
Phone (208) 342-5000 
Fax (208) 343-8869 
myork@hollandhart.com 
We are enclosing with this letter ITD's supplemental responses to Grathol's second set of 
discovery requests. We have completed our review ofITD's prior productions of documents in this 
case and confirmed that the documents requested have already been produced. When we requested 
the extensions of time to obtain additional documents responsive to Grathol's discovery, we were 
searching for new documents located at District 1 and ITD's Headquarters. We did not expect that 
the responsive documents had already been produced and so had not initially reviewed our prior 
productions in preparing ITD's supplemental response. 
As stated in my letter of Friday, January 13, 2012, the information requested in this 
discovery has no relevance either to the trial on just compensation or the issues raised in ITD's 
motion for summary judgment and motion in limine. Additionally, since the requested information 
had already been produced, there is no reason why you should not be able to meet the Court's 
deadline for responding to ITD's motion for summary judgment and motion in limine. 




Holland & Hart up 
;•hons [208] 342-5000 F•• [208] 343-8869 www.hollandhart.com 





Via Fax: 208-664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 814 
Re: ITO v. HJ Grathol, et al. 
January 23, 2012 
First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County 
Case No. CVI0-10095 
Dear Doug: 
MaryV. York 
Phone (208) 342-5000 
Fax (208) 343-8869 
myork@hollandhart.com 
This letter is to confirm our telephone conversation from Friday, January 20, 2012 regarding 
the Grathol matter. Among other things, we discussed the fact witnesses you intend to call at trial. 
You indicated that you are planning on calling four fact witnesses at trial - Bill Hughes, John Shaw, 
Brett Terrell, and Jim Coleman. 
We requested available deposition dates for these individuals for the week of January 30th 
or at the latest, the first part of the week of February 13th. With the rapidly approaching trial date, 
our preference is for the week of January 30th. If not all of the depositions can be scheduled for 
that week, we would at least like to take Jim Coleman's and Brett Terrell's depositions during that 
week. You stated that you would check on available dates. Please let us know as soon as possible 
the available dates for these individuals. 
Also during our conversation, we requested that the deponents provide their complete files 
relating to the Grathol matter prior to the depositions. In response, you stated that you would not 
object to the request and that you would follow up with the individuals regarding the files. 
Please let us know if you have any questions and we look forward to hearing from you. 
MVY:st 
5376985_1 
Holland & Hart LLP 
/ 
V truly yours, , 
Mary Y:· , ork 
of Holl d & 
'· 
Phone [208] 342-5000 fax (208] 343-8869 www.hollandharLcom } 
101 South Capitol Boulevard Suite 1400 Boise, ID 83702 'V!a,;;,,.J And•,·,, P.O.Box 2527 Boise, ID 83701-2527 j 





Via Fax: 208-664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Re: ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al. 
February 8, 2012 
First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County 
Case No. CVl0-10095 
Dear Doug: 
MaryV. York 
Phone (208) 342-5000 
Fax (208) 343-8869 
myork@hollandhart.com 
In light of the upcoming fact witness depositions, I want to confirm that Grathol only 
intends to call four fact witnesses at trial-Jim Coleman, Brett Terrell, Tom Vandervert, and Mike 
Winger. These four individuals were identified in response to my question as to whom you 
intended to call as fact witnesses at trial. Please confirm that you will not be calling any other fact 
witnesses. Also, it will expedite the depositions if you can provide a brief summary of the facts that 
these individuals will be testifying to at trial. 
We have not yet received confirmation of Mike Winger's availability for deposition on 
Tuesday, February 14, 2012. We would like to take all of the fact witness depositions (other than 
Mr. Coleman's) next week, so that we do not have to make another trip to Coeur d'Alene. Can you 
please let me know as soon as possible whether we will be going forward with Mr. Winger's 
deposition on Tuesday? 
Also, can you provide the complete files of Messrs. Terrell, Vandervert, and Winger relating 
to the Grathol matter prior to the depositions. It will help speed up the depositions if we can receive 
those documents this week. 
Please let us know if you have any questi ns and we look forward to hearing from you. 
MVY:st 
5402809 _l .DOCX 
Holland & Hart LLP 
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Via Fax: 208-664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons~ LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Re: ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al. 
February 9, 2012 
First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County 
Case No. CVl0-10095 
Dear Doug: 
MaryV. York 
Phone (208) 342-5000 
Fax {208) 343-8869 
myor1<@hollandhart.com 
This letter is to confirm our conversation today regarding the fact witnesses Grathol intends 
to call at the trial of this matter. The first issue involves Mike Winger who you had originally 
identified as a fact witness in this case. During our conversation today, you confirmed that you are 
withdrawing Mike Winger as a fact witness and will not be calling him as a witness in this case. 
As a result of your decision not to call Mr. Winger, we will not depose him. 
The second issue involves Jim Coleman, who you also identified as a fact witness in this 
matter. After reviewing Mr. Coleman's file and discussing in general terms the scope of his 
testimony, Mr. Coleman made clear that all of his testimony is opinion testimony. Specifically, 
he stated that his design of the sewer treatment facility for the Grathol property is all based on his 
engineering opinions. He also made clear that the feasibility of his proposed system, his cost 
estimates for the proposed system, and. whether or not his proposed system would be approved by 
the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality are all engineering opinions. He further stated that 
he cannot testify without offering his opinions. 
Because all of Mr. Coleman's testimony constitutes opinions developed through his 
expertise as an engineer, we will not be taking Mr. Coleman's deposition tomorrow as originally 
planned. Our scheduling of Mr. Coleman's deposition was based upon your designation of him as 
a fact witness, and not as an expert or any claimed category of expert witness. Any offer of opinion 
testimony by Mr. Coleman is barred by your failure to identify him as an expert witness and 
disclose his opinions as required by the Court's pretrial orders, the civil rules governing expert 
witness disclosures, and ITD's long-standing requests for identification of experts and disclosure 
of expert opinions. As it stands, we believe we have the facts within Mr. Coleman's knowledge, 
which are limited to the dimensions of the Grathol property and the lack of available water or sewer 
connections to the site, and therefore, have no need to depose him as a fact witness. 
Holland & Hart LLP EXHIBIT 
Phun~ [208] 342-5000 Fax [208] 343-8869 www.hollandhart.~om 
101 South Capltol Boulevard Suite 1400 8oise,ID 83702 Malli n,I ~c1,1, ,_.,, P.O.Box 2527 Boise.ID 83701-2527 I 
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Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
February 9, 2012 
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Lastly, I am writing to confirm your statement today that you will not solicit any testimony 
from Mr. Coleman regarding the expert opinions by David Evans and Associates. 
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ORIGINAL 
RAMSDEN &LYONS,LLP 
700 No1thwest Blvd, 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Ma:dice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D, Gabb01t, !SB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST nJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




ID GRATHOL, a Califomia general 
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants, 
TO: THE ABOVE-ENTITLED PLAINTIFF 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
DEFENDANT BJ GRATHOL'S 
FOURTH SUPPLEMENTAL 
ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO 




COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol and hereby supplements its l'esponses to 
Plaintiffls First Set ofinteri-ogatodes and Requests for Pl'oduction of Documents as follows: 
INTERROGATORIES 
Interrogatory No. 1: Please identify each person whom you expect to call as a lay or 
expert witness at the trial of this matter and the subject matter upon which each witness is 
expected to testify. 
DEFENDANT HJ 0RATHOL'SFOURrlf SUPPLBM£NTAL ANsmRs AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST 




Feb. 17. 2012 4:38PM No. 7150 P. 3/11 
ANSWER: Defendant has not yet dete1mined with certainty who they may call as 
either expert 01· lay witness in this rnatte1·. Discovery is ongoing and any Ol' all of the 
individuals identified through discovery who possess relevant information may be called. 
The substance of all expected trial testimony will be developed during the course of 
discovery in this case. However, it is anticipated that Defendant may call any of the 
following individuals as trial witnesses and those witnesses may testify as to facts known and 
opinions held, as generally summadzed below: 
(l) Bill Hughes 
(2) Alan Johnson 
{3) GeoffReeslund 
These persons may give testimony as to the acquisition, ownership and development 
plans for the Subject Prope1ty; opinion testimony as to its use(s), its value (before and after 
the condemnation), the value of the Defendant's prope1ty remaining after condemnation and 
before and after constmction, and entitlement/construction planning activities; effo1ts and 
expenses associated with the purchase, holding and development of the property; planning 
and design wol'k associated with the property; marketing efforts of the property prior to and 
after condemnation; and the effects of the condemnation on the l'emaining property. 
(4) Dewitt "Skip'1 Sherwood 
(5) EdMorse 
(6) Dee Jamison 
(7) Scott Taylor 
(8) Brent Heleker 
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S FOURTH SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS AND RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
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These persons may give testimony, including opinion testimony as to the value of the 
Subject Property1 pre-condemnation and post-condemnation, including impacts to the value 
occasioned by this condemnation, and other matters within their knowledge or expertise. 
(9) Ron Harvey, Idaho Transportation Department 
(10) Yvonne Dingman, Idaho Transportation Department 
(11) Karl Vogt, counsel, Idaho Transportation Department 
These individuals may be called to testify as to their knowledge, information, and 
actions relative to seeking acquisition of a portion of Defendant's property. 
(12) Darrell Manning, Chairman, Idaho Transportation Board 
(13) James Coleman, Member, Idaho Transportation Board 
(14) Janice Vassar, Member, Idaho Transportation Board 
{15) Jerry Whitehead, Member, Idaho Transportation Board 
(16) Gary Blick, Member, Idaho Transportation Board 
(17) Neil Miller, Member, Idaho Transportation Board 
(18) Lee Gagner, Member, Idaho Transportation Board 
(19) Sue Higgins, Secretazy Idaho Transpmtation Board 
(20) Brian W. Ness, Director, Idaho Transportation Department 
(21) Pam Lowe, former Director, Idaho Transportation Department 
(22) Jesse W. Smith, Jr., Right of Way Manager, Idaho Transportation Dep8.11ment 
These individuals, or some of them, may be called to testify as to their knowledge, 
infonnation and actions relative to approval of the project which precipitated the need to 
condemn Defendant's property; future plans for construction of the US 95 improvements 
through and adjacent to Defendant's property and other matters within their knowledge, 
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James Coleman, named above, may also testify on behalf of Coleman Engineel"ing regarding 
the planning, design) and function of a proposed on-site sewage system and related 
infrastructure serving Defendant's property. 
(23) Tom E. Cole, Chief Engineer, Idaho Transportation Department 
(24) Tamara R. Jauregui, Management Assistant, Idaho Transportation Department 
(25) Duane L. Zimmerman, P .L.S 
(26) Jason Minzghor, Idaho Ti-ansportation Department 
(27) Justin Wuest, Idaho Transportation Department 
(28) Jeny Wilson, P.E., Idaho Transportation Department 
These individuals, or some of them, may be called to testify as to their knowledge, 
information and actions relative to the design and construction of the highway improvements 
across and adjacent to Defendant's property. 
(29) Ross Blanchard, Federal Highway Administration, Idaho Division 
(30) Rod Twete, Commissioner, Lakes Highway District 
(31) Monty Montgomery, Commissioner, Lakes Highway District 
(32) Marv Lekstmrn, Commissioner, Lakes Highway District 
(33) Joe Wuest, Road Supervisor, Lakes Highway District 
(34) Eric W. Shanley, P.E., Lakes Highway District 
These individuals may be called to testify as to communications and interactions with 
the Idaho Transportation Department relative to acquisition and/or improvements of frontage 
road(s) and access on State Highway 54 in the vicinity of Defendant's property and the 
necessity, plan or expectations of bisecting Defendant's property with a frontage road. 
(35) David Evans and Associates, Inc., including Greg Ho1der, P.E., Michael Kosa, 
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and/or Bill Stark. 
Defendant reserves the right to supplement this l'esponse in accordance with the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court's Pretrial Order. 
Supplemental Answer: 
(36) Torn Vandervert, CLC Associates 
Mr. Vandervert may be called to testify as to his services provided to Defendant as a 
land planner, including but not limited to the scope of his work on the Subject Property, 
designing and site planning, subdivision configuration for commercial development, planning 
and accessibility issues both before and after the condemnation of 16.314 acres of the Subject 
Property. He may also testify as to subdivision and zoning regulations, design standards and 
services he performed to determine the suitability of uses and feasibility for development of 
the Subject Property . .Mi·. Vandervert was deposed in this matter on Febrnary 13, 2011 by 
the Plaintiff and may testify as to all matters upon which he was interrogated by Plaintiff. 
(37) Brett Terrell, Motion Realty1 LLC 
Mr. Ten-ell may be called to testify as to his service provided to Defendants as a 
commercial real estate broker, including but not limited to the scope of his work for Defendants 
marketing the Subject Property as a commercial development, discussions with potential 
tenants, lessees and purchasers for the Subject Property, analysis of demand and market price 
for commercial real estate development at the Subject Property, and discussions with interested 
parties and negotiations for the use of the p1·operty, M1·. Terrell was deposed in this matter on 
February 14, 2012 by the Plaintiff and may testify as to all matters upon which he was 
inten·ogated by Plaintiff. 
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As an actor/viewer "expert," Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover the testimony of such 
persons. See, U.S.C.A.J Fed, R. Civ. P. 26 Notes of Advisol)' Committee on Rules, 1970 
Amendment at 114 (West 1995). 
Intel'rogato1y No. 2: For each expert witness identified in response to hltell'ogatory 
No. I, please provide the subject matter upon which the expert witness is expected to testify, 
a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the reasons therefol'e, 
the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions, the 
underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based, and all information 
referenced in and required by Rule 26(b )( 4)(A)( i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ANSWER: Defendant anticipates offering expe1t opinion testimony in this matter, 
including testimony concerning the plan, design and engineering ofpmtions of the Plaintiffs 
project across or adjacent to Defendant's property, as well as testimony concerning valuation 
of the property, The witnesses offering opinion testimony as actor-viewers may include the 
following: 
(1) Bill Hughes 
(2) Alan Johnson 
(3) Geoff Reeslund 
(4) Scott Taylor 
(5) Brent Heleker 
(6) John Beutler 
(7) Mark Johnson 
(8) Jeff Bond 
(9) Donald Smock 
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(10) Paul Daugharty 
(II) Brett Terrell 
(12) Mike Winger 
No. 7150 P. 8/11 
As an actor/viewer "expert,i» Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover the testimony of such 
persons. See, U.S.C.A,) Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1970 
Amendment at 114 (West 1995). 
(I) Dewitt 1'Skip0 Sheiwood, CGA 
(2) Ed Morse, MAI 
With respect to these valuation expe1ts, as of the date of the Answers to these 
Inten·ogatories) no fo!"mal appraisal reports have been completed. Therefore, the remainder 
of the information requested in this Intenogato1-y cannot be provided. If and when formal 
appraisal 1·eports are prepared) the information in the above Interrogatm-y will be contained 
within those appraisal reports. 
Suppleme11tal A11swer: 
Tom Vanderve1t, CLC Associates. Mr. Vanderve1t may be called to testify as to his 
services provided to Defendant as a land planner, including but not limited to the scope of his 
work on the Subject Property, designing and site planning, subdivision configuration for 
commercial development, planning and accessibility issues both before and after the 
condemnation of 16.314 acres of the Subject Property, He may also testify as to subdivision 
and zoning regulations. design standards and services he performed to determine the 
suitability of uses and feasibility for development of the Subject Property. Mr. Vanderve1t 
was deposed in this matter on February 13, 2012 by the Plaintiff and may testify as to all 
matters upon which he was inte1rngated by Plaintiff 
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Brett Terrell, Motion Realty, LLC. Mr, Tei.Tell may be called to testify as to bis service 
provided to Defendants as a commercial real estate broker, including but not limited to the 
scope of his work for Defendants marketing the Subject Property as a commercial development. · 
discussions with potential tenants, lessees and purchasers for the Subject Property, analysis of 
demand and market price for commercial real estate development at the Subject Property, and 
discussions with interested parties and negotiations for the use of the property. Ml·. Ten-ell was 
dep~sed in this matter on Febnuuy 14, 2012 by the Plaintiff and may testify as to all matte1·s 
upon which he was intel'l'ogated by Plaintiff. 
As an actor/viewer- "expert," Rule 26(b)(4) does not cover the testimony of such 
persons. See, U.S.CA., Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1970 
Amendment at 114 (West 1995). 
DATED this 17th day of Pebruary, 2012. 
i pher D. Gabbe11, Of the Finn 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
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STATE OF IDAHO } 
· COUNTY OF ~OOl£N__A~ :'/ , SS 
FILED:........,\ _2,._/-~----"(_'V-'-----
AT~ O'~~~ M 
(!j~JT111.Mf 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
) CASE NO. CV-10-10095 
) 
) 
) ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF ITD's 
vs. 
) MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT 
) WITNESSES NOT TIMELY 
HJ GRA THOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 







On February 29, 2012, Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board 
("ITD") filed its Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses not Timely Disclosed, along with a 
supporting brief and the Affidavit of Mary York. On March 3, 2012, the motion came on 
for hearing. 
In its Motion, ITD requested that this Court exclude two of Defendant HJ 
Grathol's ("Grathol") untimely disclosed expert witnesses1 from testifying, to wit: Brett 
Terrell and Tom Vandervert. ITD argued that these two witnesses were originally 
1 Grathol was required to disclose all of its experts and their opinions no later than August 19, 2011, 
pursuant to this Court's Uniform Pre-Trial Order. The eight-day court trial began on March 5, 2012. 
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denominated and deposed as fact witnesses, but in Grathol's supplemental expert witness 
disclosure, served on February 17, 2012, they were denominated as expert witnesses. 
At the March 5, 2012, hearing, Grathol conceded that Mr. Terrell and Mr. 
Vandervert are only fact witnesses, but due to ITD's line of questioning during their 
depositions, Grathol thought it best to supplement its disclosure and denominate them as 
expert witnesses out of an abundance of caution. Further, Grathol's counsel affirmatively 
stated that Grathol will only inquire into opinions that were covered in the witnesses' 
depositions. 
The impositions of sanctions, to include the exclusion of witness testimony, is in 
the sound discretion of the court. Viehweg v. Thompson, l 03 Idaho 265, 64 7 P .2d 311 
(Ct. App. 1982). 
Based upon Grathol's concession and lack of opposition to ITD's Motion, and 
this Court's reasoning provided in open court on March 5, 2012, NOW THEREFORE, IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED that this Court grants, in its discretion, ITD's Motion to 
Exclude Expert Witnesses not Timely Disclosed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Terrell and Mr. Vandervert are barred from 
providing expert witness testimony as to valuation. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Terrell and Mr. Vandervert are allowed to 
testify as fact witnesses only. 
DATED this 4 day of March, 2012. 
ew::~Q.Q-·-CHARLES W. HOS~ Senior District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the __ day of February, 2012 a true and correct copy 
of this Order Re: ITD's Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses was served, by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Mary York, Esq. 
Ted Tollefson, Esq. 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
POBOX2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
Douglas Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher Gabbert, Esq. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 N.W. Blvd. 
PO BOX 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
J. Tim Thomas, Esq. 
Deputy Attorney General, ITD 
PO BOX 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
Clifford T. Hayes 
Clerk of the District Court 
By _____________ _ 
Deputy Clerk 
o US Mail 
o Hand Delivered 
o Overnight Mail 
o Via Fax: 208-343-8869 
o US Mail 
o Hand Delivered 
o Overnight Mail 
o Via Fax: 208-664-5884 
o US Mail 
o Hand Delivered 
o Overnight Mail 
o Via Fax: 208-334-4498 
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LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civii Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8803 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V. York (ISB #S020) 
Steven C. Bowman (ISB #4404) 
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
NO. 4442 P. 2 
STArE OF !!JAHO 
COUNTY OF KOOTEN1\l7ss 
FILED: 
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Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD''), hereby files its Post-Trial 
Brief as directed by the Court at the conclusion of the trial in this matter on March 9, 2012. 
I. SUMMARY OF ITD'S POST-TRIAL BRIEF 
Defendant HJ C1athol ("Grathol") called t'.vo valuation witnesses at trial, Mr. Sherwood 
and Mr. Johnson. The opinions of these witnesses violate Idaho law and therefore cannot be 
used in determining just compensation in this case. 
1. Sherwood failed to value the larger parcel as required by Idaho law. Because of 
his violation of this fundamental legal requirement, Sherwood's opinion cannot, as a matter of 
law, serve as a basis for determining just compensation in this case. 
2. Sherwood and Johnson failed to use the correct date of valuation mandated by 
Idaho Code§ 7-712. They used dates years after the statutory date. The Idaho Supreme Court 
has held that it is error for a district court to admit testimony of a valuation based on a date other 
than the date mandated by statute. Since allowing the testimony at all is error, it would certainly 
be reversible error for the Court to rely on these opinions in determining just compensation. 
3. Sherwood and Johnson included claims for severance damages based on alleged 
delay in construction of the US-95 Project. These claims are barred by Idaho law and were 
dismissed by the Court in its February 3, 2012 Order Re: Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Therefore, these claims should be dismissed again. 
4. Johnson based his valuation after the taking as though a hypothetical development 
were completed. This approach is barred by law and bars consideration of his opinion of value. 
Il. THE GRATHOL PROPERTY AND THE TAKING 
Grathol owns 56.8 acres of contiguous real property located at the comer ofUS-95 and 
State Highway 51 near Athol, Idaho. ITD is condemning 16.3 acres of the property, leaving a 
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remainder of 40.5 acres. The Orathol property and the land taken by ITO are illustrated in Trial 
Exhibit 166. 
A small but contiguous parcel of 0.4 acres is located at the southwest comer of the 
.. -pr~perty. Some appraisers inciuded the 0.4 acres in the larger-parcel, others did not. All agreed, ... 
however, that whether the 0.4 acres was included or not had no bearing on the issue of just 
compensation. Accordingly, for ease of discussion, this brief will refer to the entire Grathol 
property, the "larger parcel," as 56.8 acres. 
m. SHERWOOD FAILED TO VALUE THE LARGER PARCEL. THEREFORE, 
CONSIDERATION OF ms OPINION IS BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
As the Court knows, Sherwood did not value the larger parcel owned by Gratbol. Rather, 
he used an imaginary 30.acre parcel bounded by US-95 on the west and an imaginary line on the 
east. Grathol bought the 56.8 acres in one transaction. All of the property is contiguous. The 
property has not been subdivided. No legal division or physical barrier separates the 30-acre 
parcel from the rest of the 56. 8-acre larger parcel. Grathol sought and obtained a rezone for the 
entire property in 2008. All of the property is now zoned commercial. The property is all owned 
by Grathol. It is undeveloped land. All witnesses agree that the highest and best use of the 
property is for commercial development. Thus, the larger parcel is unquestionably 56.8 acres. 
Idaho law bars the use of an artificial division of property as the basis for determining 
just compensation in a condemnation case. 
A, Idaho Statutory Provisions, 
Idaho Code§ 7~707 states that "[t]he complaint must contain: ... (S) A description of 
each piece of land sought to be taken, and whether the same includes the whole, or only a part, 
of an entire parcel or tract." I.C. § 7-707 (emphasis added), In this case, no 30-acre parcel or 
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tract ofland exists. Rather, the "whole" or ''entire parcel or tract" is the 56.8 acres owned by 
Grathol. 
Idaho Code§ 7-711 governs the assessment of just compensation. 
The court, jury or referee- must hear such legal -testimony as may 
be offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon 
must ascertain and assess: . , . If the property sought to be 
condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel: (a) the 
damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be 
condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to 
be condemned, and the construction of the improvement in the 
manner proposed by the plaintiff[.] 
I.C. § 7-711(2) (emphasis added). In Idaho, the "larger parcel" is the property owned by the 
defendant, so long at it is contiguous and has the same highest and best use. Grathol cannot 
create an artificial larger parcel, particularly a smaller one that simply inflates its compensation 
claim. No case law or appraisal principle supports the designation of part of a piece of property 
that is contiguous, under the same ownership, with the same zoning, and having the same highest 
and best use as the larger parcel. That would defy logic and Idaho law. A smaller part of the 
same piece of property cannot be the larger parcel. 
B. Idaho Jury Instructions. 
Idaho jury instructions make clear that Grathol's attempt to create an artificial larger 
parcel is contrary to Idaho law. IDJI 7 .16 states: 
lust compensation is the difference between the market value of 
the entire property before the taking and the market value of the 
remainder after the acquisition, together with any special damages 
caused by the taking, measured as of [date]. 
IDJI2d 7.16 (emphasis added). The entire Grathol property is 56.8 acres, not 30 acres. Not even 
Gtathol's witnesses disputed the fact that the remainder of the Grathol property after the taking 
is 40.5 acres (56.8 -16.3 ~ 40.5 acres). The agreement as to the remainder necessarily reflects 
the reality that the "larger parcel" is S6.8 acres. 
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The Comment to IDfl 7 .16 states: "This instruction applies where there is a partial take 
with severance damage to the remainder and no offsetting benefit." Comment, IDJI2d 7.16. It is 
undisputed that this is a partial taking case and that Grathol has sought to recover severance 
damages. Therefore, IDn 7.i 6 governs fue determination of.just compensation in this case, and ... 
that determination begins with the market value of the entire property. not an artificial or 
imaginary portion of the entire property. 
Similarly, IDJI 7.16.l sets forth factors that may be considered in deter.mining what 
compensation should be paid for severance damages, if any, "to the remainder of the property." 
IDJI2d 7.16.1 ( emphasis added). The instruction makes clear that these factors may only be 
considered to the extent that they are found to "affect the market value of the property." Id. The 
Comment to IDn 7.16.1 is particularly germane to the "larger parcel" issue. 
Where there is no benefit claimed to the remainder, the approach 
of State v. Dunclic.k, Inc., 77 Idaho 45 (1955), of determining just 
compensation by subtracting the fair market value of the remainder 
from the fair market value of the whole before the take would 
eliminate the necessity for this instruction. Where, however, the 
parcel taken and the parcel remaining are separately valued, this 
instruction might be useful. 
Comment, IDJI2d 7.16.1 (emphasis added). The entire statutory scheme in Idaho, as reflected in 
the jury instructions, is premised on the market value of the whole property and the market value 
of the remainder. 
These principles are further demonstrated in IDfl 7.16.5, which states that ''Severance 
damages may arise where the property being taken is only part of a larger parcel belonging to the 
defendant.'' IDJI2d 7 .16.5 ( emphasis added), The larger parcel is the whole property belonging 
to the defendant. Again, Idaho's statutes and jury instructions are based on the determination of 
the fair market value of the whole property owned by the defendant and the remaining property 
after the talcing. 
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C. Idaho Case Law Bars Grath~l's Use Of An Artificial And Smaller "Larger 
ParceL', 
The Idaho Supreme Court has long enforced the fundamental principles noted above. In 
Idaho-Western Ry. Co. v. Columbia Conference of Evangelical Lutheran Synod, 20 Idaho 568, 
·- .. •-·-·.·\ 
119 P. 60 (1911), the Court cited the provisions ofldaho Code now codified as§ 7-711 and held: 
It will be observed by the foregoing statute that under the laws of 
this state three facts are to be determined in a condemnation suit 
where it is not sought to take the entire tract of land but only a 
portion thereof. First, the value of the property sought to be 
condemned together with all the improvements thereon pertaining 
to the realty; second, if the property sought to be condemned 
constitutes only a part of the larger parcel, the damages which will 
accrue to the remaining portion by reason of the severance must be 
assessed; and, third, if the property sought to be condemned 
constitutes a part of a larger parcel, the benefits which will accrue 
to the remaining portion after the severance of the part condemned 
must be ascertained and assessed and be deducted from the 
damages that will be sustained by the severance. 
Id. at 119 P. 64 (emphasis added). It is undisputed that ITD is not condemning "the entire tract 
of land" owned by Grathol, "but only a portion thereof." It is also undisputed that the 
condemned property is "part of a larger parcel." And, lastly, it is undisputed that ''the entire tract 
of land" owned by Orathol is 56.8 acres. No factual or legal basis exists for determining just 
compensation in this case based on an artificial 30-acre segment of "the entire tract of land." 
In Big Lost River Irrigation Co. v. Davidson, 21 Idaho 160, 121 P. 88 (1912), the Idaho 
Supreme Court, again citing the statutory provisions now codified as Idaho Code § 7-711, 
explained: 
Under the provisions of the statute it was not necessary that the 
jury should find the value of each legal subdivision of the tract 
sought to be condemned. It however, there is more than one 
parcel of land, or several separate parcels or tracts, each 
separated from the other, then it is necessary for the jury to 
determine the value of each separate tract or parcel. But where the 
tract is a single or consolidated tract, the value then may be fixed 
as a single parcel or tract. "Parcel" or "tract" of land, as used in 
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Id. at 121 P. at 92 (emphasis added). In this case, the Grathol property has not been subdivided. 
No-separate parcels ofland exist, and ncseparate par~els are '~each separated from the other." 
Rather, the undisputed facts are that Grathol owns 56.8 acres of contiguous real property. By 
any definition, the Grathol property is a "consolidated body of land." 
In State ex rel. Rich v. Dunclick, 77 Idaho 45, 286 P.2d 1112 (1955), the Idaho Supreme 
Court began by noting: 
Under our Constitution and statutes, Art. I, § 14, Idaho 
Constitution and sections 7w711 and 7-714 I.C., a defendant in a 
condemnation suit is entitled to be paid in money the value of the 
property to be taken and the damages which will accrue to the part 
not taken because of its severance. 
Id. at 51, 286P.2d at 1116. The Court then described thefonnulafor detenniningjust 
compensation in Idaho: 
When such reasonable market value of the part taken has 
been determined and fixed, appellant is then entitled to further 
recover the damages to the remainder. This latter swn is 
determined by market value of such remainder before and after the 
taking. The difference is the severance damage. 
Id. at S5·56, 286 P.2d at 1118. It would be impossible for Idaho courts to follow this formula if 
property owners were allowed to create artificial "larger parcels" (particularly smaller larger 
parcels) and artificial "remainders." The only workable approach, and the only approach 
authorized by Idaho law, is to base the larger parcel and remainder on contiguous real property 
having the same ownership, the same zoning, and the same highest and best use. In this case, the 
larger parcel is plainly 56.8 acres. 
State ex rel. Rich v Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269,328 P.2d 60 (19S8), demonstrates when 
separate parcels of land, but under common ownership, should not be considered together as a 
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ularger parcel" for purposes of determining ju.st compensation for property taken and damages to 
the remainder. In Fonburg, the state sought to condemn 12. 76 acres of Fonburg' s farm to build a 
new highway. Id. at 274, 328 P.2d at 61. A railroad line divided Fonburg's property in the 
before condition. Id. at 274,328 P.2d-at62. Fonburg alw-Gwned "land non-contiguous to the ______ _ 
land through which the new road crosses, namely, a residence and farm land, located in or near 
Culdesac, and north from the railroad track, his dwelling being approximately 600 to 1,000 feet 
distant from the land taken." Id. Fonburg sought severance damages for impacts on the land 
where his home was located. In other words, F onburg wanted his home and sUITounding 
property to be included with his farm as part of a "larger parcel" of land, a portion of which was 
being condemned by the state. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected this claim. 
The contention of appellant in assignments of error and 
arguments here made, that his residence in Culdesac, and 
ownership of land non-contiguous to and disconnected with the 
land sought to be condemned should be considered as an element 
of severance damage is not sustainable. 
The different parcels of defendant's land, separated and 
located at a distance, one from the other, one south of the track and 
the other north, are not severed by the proposed road. The land 
separating the two parcels of defendant's land is owned by third 
persons. The trial judge did not err in refusing to instruct the jury 
to allow severance damages in this regard. 
Id. at 277, 328 P.2d at 64. In this case, Orathol's property is all contiguous. It is not divided by 
a railroad line, and no third party owns land between the artificial 30-acre parcel used by 
Sherwood and the rest of the Grathol property, On the contrary, the Grathol property is all 
contiguous. It is a "consolidated body of land." Big Lost River, 21 Idaho 160, 121 P. at 92, 
In State ex rel. Symms v_ Collier, 93 Idaho 19, 454 P.2d 56 (1969), the district court and 
the Idaho Supreme Court had no difficulty identifying the larger parcel of land to be "a 40 acre 
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tract belonging to defendants," id. at 20,454 P.2d at 57, despite the fact that the 40 acres was 
actually divided into separate tracts. In Collier, the state filed a condemnation action 
to acquire 25.47 acres of land located in Ada County for the 
purpose of constructing theteon an interchange between Broadway 
Avenue, Boise, and Interstate Highway SON;-· The property to be 
acquired was part of a 40 acre tract belonging to defendants. The 
land remaining in possession of defendants after the taking is 
approximately 14.S acres divided into five separate tracts. The 
entire area was characterized as undeveloped, dry graze land. The 
best use for the land apparently was industrial. 
Id. (emphasis added). In this case, Grathol owns a 56.8-acre tract of land. The valuation 
witnesses on both sides all testified that the land has the same highest and best use. As in 
Collier, the Grathol property is undeveloped land. In Collier, the larger parcel was found to be 
the entire 40-acre tract, even though it was actually divided into separate tracts, five of which 
remained after the taldng. In Gtathol, the property has not been divided into tracts. If the Idaho 
Supreme Court deemed the larger parcel to be the whole property owned by the Colliers, even 
though it had actually been divided, it would certainly do so in this case, where the Grathol 
property bas not been divided. 
In State ex. rei. S)Rnms v. City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528,493 P.2d 387 (1972), tiie 
state sought to condemn 14 acres of land owned by the City of Mountain Home for Interstate 80. 
As described by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
The property taken ( about 14 acres) was part of a larger 
tract of land (255.44 acres) which was purchased by the city in 
1963 for $36,000 and which was to be developed and used for 
recreational purposes, including an eighteen-hole golf course, a 
trap shoot, a fishing and skating pond, a park, trailer parking, an 
archery range, and hildng areas. · 
Id, at 530,493 P.2d at 389, After a jury trial, the state appealed the verdict arauing, in part, that 
the city could not recover severance damages to the land where the golf course was located 
because it was distant from the area of the taking. Id., at 531,493 P.2d at 390. The Idaho 
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Supreme Court denied this part of the appeal, finding that the jury properly concluded that the 
"larger parcel" was the entire 255.44 acres ofland owned by the city. Id. at 532, 493 P.2d at 
387. 
As part of its ruling, the Supreme Court held that-"[i]:f, as a matter of fact, the parcel --~-. 
taken is part of a larger tract held by the same owner, it is e"or to consider such parcel as if it 
constituted an entire tract separate and apart from other property in the possession of the same 
owner." Id. at 531, 493 P.2d at 390 (emphasis added). This principle is controlling in the case at 
hand. Moreover, in the present case, no 30-acre tract exists. It is not the product of any legal 
division or any physical separation from the other Grathol property. 
The Court in Mountain Home further held: 
The question raised by the state is, in essence, whether the 
255 acres owned by the city (and including the golf course land) 
may properly be considered a 'larger parcel,' only a part of which 
is sought to be condemned, within the meaning of I.e. § 7-711. 
'Parcel,' as used in this section, means a consolidated body of land. 
Big Lost River I"igation Co. v. Davidson, 21 Idaho 160, 171-172, 
121 P. 88 (1912). Ordinarily, the question whether two pieces of 
land constitute a single parcel is a practical one for the juzy, which 
should consider evidence on the use and appearance of the land, its 
legal divisions, and the intent of its owner. 
Id. at 532, 493 P.2d at 391. In the case at hand, no 30~acre parcel exists. Therefore, no grounds 
exist for even considering whether the artificial 30-acre parcel is part of a larger parcel or not. 
Since the 56.8 acres of the Orathol property is not divided or separated in any way, no legal or 
factual basis exists to take a smaller part of the whole and call the smaller piece the larger 
parcel. 
The criteria set by the Supreme Court in Mountain Home also make clear that the larger 
parcel is the entire Gtathol property. It is all zoned for the same use. Its appearance is the same 
-undeveloped land. No legal division exists creating the 30wacre parcel. Grathol's site plans 
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(both in the before and after) show commercial development on the land east of the artificial 30-
acre parcel. Therefore, the intended use of the property is the same. 
In City o/Coew d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idah~ 839, 136 P.3d 310 (2006), the Idaho 
· ·· · supreme Court noted that "Courts t'ypieally reject the so-called 'conceptual severance' theory--., 
the notion that whole units of property may be divided for the purpose of a takings claim." Id. at 
848, 136 P.3d at 319. This is precisely the situation here. Grathol is attempting to divide the 
whole for the purpose of enhancing its recovery in a takings case. 
D. Because Sherwood Did Not Follow Idaho Law, His Opinion Of Value Cannot 
Be Used In Determining Just Compensation. 
Sherwood created an artificial "larger parcel" in violation of Idaho law. Since 
Sherwood's opinion violates Idaho law, it cannot, as a matter of law, serve as a basis for 
determining just compensation in this case. Based on the many holdings of the Idaho Supreme 
Court on this issue, an award based on Sherwood's opinion would constitute reversible error. 
IV. SHERWOOD AND JOHNSON VIOLATED IDAHO LAW BY FAILING TO USE 
THE DATE OF VALUATION MANDATED BY STATUTE. THEREFORE, 
THESE OPINIONS CANNOT BE USED IN DETERMINING JUST 
COMPENSATION 
In Idaho, the date of valuation for determining just compensation is mandated by statute. 
Idaho Code § 7-712 requires that the value of the property taken in a condemnation case and the 
severance damages, if any, to the remaining property are to be determined as of "the date of the 
summons." Id In this case, the date of summons and, therefore, the date of valuation is 
November 17, 2010. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly enforced the statutory mandate of Idaho Code 
§ 7-712. See Spokane & Palouse Ry. v. Lieuallen, 2 Idaho 1101, 29 P. 854 (Idaho 1892) ("In 
proceedings for the condemnation of land for railroad purposes under the statutes of Idaho, the 
value of the land at the time it is taken is the measure of damages, and it is error to admit 
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evidence of value at the time of trial."); Zollinger v. Big Lost River Irr. Dist., 83 Idaho 411, 419, 
364 P.2d 176, 180 (1961) ("I.C. § 7-712 required determination of damages for the area taken in 
the eminent domain proceeding as of June 27, 19S8, the date summons issued in that 
· · · i,ro-ceeding."); City of Lewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 851;-857, 853 P.2d 596, 602 (Ct. App. 
1983) (Idaho Code § 7-712 "chronologically limits the right to compensation from the date of the 
summons in an eminent domain proceeding"), 
Instead of using the date of valuation mandated by statute, Sherwood used multiple dates 
in his valuation - none of which was the date of valuation of November 17, 2010. He valued the 
Grathol property in the ''before" condition as of September 2010, and he used valuation dates of 
March 2012 and March 2013 for his "after" value. Thus, Sherwood's appraisal violates Idaho 
law and cannot be used in determining just compensation in this case. 
Johnson also failed to value the property as of November 17, 2010. He valued the 
remainder three and/our years after the date of taking. This is a clear violation of the law. 
In Spokane & Palouse Ry Co., the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court erred 
by even allowing a witness to testify as to a date of valuation other than the date mandated by the 
statute. 
[O]ne of the witnesses for defendant, upon his cross-examination, 
testified that he based his estimate of damages upon the present 
value of the property, while the statute fixes the value of the 
property at the time it was taken as the role. We think the court 
erred in allowing this testimony to stand against the plaintifr s 
motion to strike it out, but we think such error was rendered 
harmless by the reiterated charge of the court to thejtLty that they 
were to find from the evidence the value of the property on 
September 27, 1890, the time of the taking. 
2 ldaho 1101, 29 P. at 8S4 (emphasis added). In its decision, the Court relied on Section 5221 of 
the Idaho Revised Statutes, which contained the identical language as the current Idaho Code 
§ 7-712, requiring compensation and damages to be detennined as of the date of summons. Id. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held that it is error to allow testimony of an opinion of 
value based on a date other than the date of the taking. Therefore, it would undoubtedly be 
reversible error to base a determination of just compensation on the opinions of either Sherwood 
· · ·or Johnson, who use dates of value years after the date of.taking in formulating their opinions.n..f _ 
just compensation. 
If the proper date of valuation is not applied, the validity of the expert's valuation 
analysis is irreparably compromised. As stated in Nichols on Eminent Domain, "[i]t is critical 
that the appraisal performed by both parties reflect the legal date of valuation." 5-18 NICHOLS 
ON EMINENT DOMAIN§ 18.16 (2011). A partf s "[f]ailure to appraise according to the correct 
date of value may give rise to a motion to strike the appraisal, or the reversal of the entire 
verdict." Id. Jmisclictions across the nations are uniformly in accord. See ITD Brief In Support 
Of Motion In Limine, at 5-7 (filed Jan. 61 2012). 
Because they did not value the property as of the date of taking, and instead used dates 
years after that date in order to inflate their opinions, these opinions cannot, as a matter of law, 
be considered in determining just compensation in this matter. 
V. IN ACCORDANCE WITH IDAHO LAW, THE COURT DISMISSED 
SEVERANCE DAMAGES BASED ON CONSTRUCTION DELAY IN ITS 
ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
On January 6, 2012, ITD filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss Grathol's 
claim for construction delay damages on the grounds that the claim is barred by Idaho law, that 
there is no compensable taking of property rights belonging to Gtathol as a result of a delayed 
consttuction schedule, and there has been no delay of the US-95 Project. On February 3, 2012, 
the Court granted IID's motion and dismissed Orathol's claim for construction delay damages. 
Despite the Court's order, both Sherwood and Johnson improperly included damages for 
construction delay in their testimony at trial. They attempted to disguise the construction delay 
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claims by labeling them ''downward time value and impact adjustments" or generic "severance 
damages." Although the delay claims were labeled differently, the amounts and the calculations 
are exactly the same. 
· - --- · --~-. - Idaho's jury instructions leave-no doubt as tc the manne-r in which severance damages...axe 
calculated, "Severance damages are calculated by ascertaining the fair market value of the 
remainder immediately before the taking, and deducting from this value the fair market value 
which results after the severance of the part taken and after the construction of the project in the 
manner proposed by the plaintiff." IDJI2d 7.16.5. Stated as a formula, the method for 
determining severance damage in Idaho is: 
Value of Remainder Before Taking 
-Vaine of Remainder After Takin& 
= Severance Damages 
A. Sherwood's Construction Delay Claim. 
Sherwood perfonned the basic calculation for determining severance damages, but then 
added an extra amowit for alleged delay in the construction of the US-9S Project. His 
calculations are as follows: 
First, Sherwood determined the value of the artificial 30-acre "larger" parcel that he used 
in his analysis before the taking. According to Sheiwood, he valued the 30-acre parcel at 
$2.25/s.f. for a total of $2,940,300. 
Value of30 Acres Before Taking (30 Acres@$2,2S/s.f.) = $2,940,300 
Using Sherwood's $2.25/s.f. ''before" value, his conclusion of value for the 13,69wacre remainder 
of the 30-acre larger parcel before the taking is $1,341,757. 
Value of 13,69 Acre Remainder Before Taking (13,69 Acres @$2.2S/s,f,) = 51,341,757 
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Next, Sherwood calculated the "after" value of the remainder of the 30-acre larger parcel 
that he used in his analysis. As with his "before" value, Sherwood concluded that the value of 
the remainder of the Grathol Property after the taking was $2.25/s.f. and totaled $1,341,757. 
· Value of 13~69 Acre Remaind~ After Takhig (13.69 Acres @$2.25/s,f,) = Sl,341,757 .. _ . 
Applying Idaho's method for determining severance damages, there are no severance 
damages to the Grathol property under Sherwood's analysis because the "before" value and the 
"after" value for the Grathol property are the same. 
Value of 13.69 Acre Remainder Before Taking (13.69 Acres@ $2.25/s,f,) =eo Sl,341,757 
- Value of 13.69 Acre Remainder After Taking (13.69 Acres @S2.2S/s.f.) = $1,341,757 
=- $0 Severance Damages 
Next, Sherwood's value of the property taken for the US-95 Project is $2.25/s.f., for a 
total of $1,598,543. 
Value of 16.31 Acres Taken (16.31 Acres@$2.25/s.f.) = $1,598,543 
Sherwood explained his "before and after analysis" in Grathol' s initial eXpert disclosures 
and in his subsequently disclosed appraisal report. Grathol' s Expert Witness Disclosure, at 1 0; 
Second Supp. Ans. and Resp. to ITD's Disc. (Report, at 10); Trial Ex. 154 
VALUE AFTER THE POTENTIAL CONDEMNATION 
In the after situation, the west 30 acres will be bisected by the 
ta.king. This taking will result in the loss of 16.41 acres leaving an 
after value estimate as follows: 






Id. The figures contained in Sherwood's report are consistent with the values to which he 
testified at trial, with the exception of the "after" value, which Sherwood noted at trial contained 
a math error. Sherwood corrected this figure at trial and testified that the conected "after'' value 
was $1,341,757. 
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In accordance with Idaho law, this should have been the end of Sherwood's analysis, 
which would have resulted in a conclusion of value of $1,598,543 (although based on use of a 
smaller 30-acre "larger'' parcel that violates Idaho law). Yet, rather then ending his analysis, 
·· - --Sherwood went on·to add additional--stm1s to his value -conclusion based upon alleged delay m-- ... 
completion of the US-95 Project. 
Sherwood's construction delay damages were described in both Grathol's expert 
disclosures and Mr. Sherwood's report. Grathol's Expert Witness Disclosure, at 11-12; Second 
Supp. Ans. and Resp. to ITD's Disc. (Report, at 11-12); Trial Ex. 154. According to Sherwood's 
analysis "[u]ntil a definitive completion date of the planned interchange at the subject 
intersection can be established, it will be vezy difficult to estimate a value for the remaining 
parcels due to the unknowns of the anticipated project." Id at 11; Second Supp. Ans. and Resp. 
to ITD's Disc. (Report, at 11); Trial Ex. 154. Therefore, Sherwood looked out into the future, 
considered the anticipated completion date of the US-95 Project as part of his analysis, and 
added dollars to his market value determination using these later dates. Id. 
As stated by Sherwood, "[a]ssuming the completion can be completed as forecast above 
in the spring of 2012, the value of the land would need to be discounted form the present date." 
Id Mr. Sherwood also projected a later project completion date of the spring of 2013. Id. at 11-
12; Second Supp. Ans. and Resp. to ITD's Disc. (Report, at 11-12); Trial Ex. 154. Sherwood 
then applied a 10% capitalization rate to his "after" value of $1,344,4571 "due to all the 
unknowns concerning this project including the unknown timing of the project being finished[.)" 
Id at 12; Second Supp. Ans. and Resp. to ITD's Disc. (Report, at 12); Trial Ex. 154. Thus, 
based upon a LS year and a 2,5 year estimated completion date of the Project and bis present 
1 Sherwood's original report contained a math error, which he corrected at trial. As co1Tected, 
Sherwood's after value (as noted above) is $1,341,364. 
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valuation discounting using a 10% capitalization rate, Sherwood reduced the after value of the 
remainder from $1,344,457 to either $1,161,732 or $1,065,1202-not because of any decrease in 
the fair market value of the Grathol property, but based solely on his belief that the US-95 
- --Project-would not be completed fortu1other i.S to 25 years. Id. By reducing the after val~_. 
the remainder property, Sherwood's conclusion of just compensation in this case is artificially 
inflated because the reduction is not due to a decrease in the fair market value of the Grathol 
property. The magnitude of the increased damages added by Sherwood is $180,025 based on 1.5 
yeaxs of construction delay or $285,637 based on 2.5 years of construction delay. 
Also, as noted above, Sherwood's use of two separate dates for his after value, which are 
l .S and 2.5 years after the date of summons in this case, is a clear violation of Idaho law. See 
Idaho Code § 7-712. Under § 7-712, the date of summons is to be used for both the before and 
after valuation and the accrual of any damages. 
Sherwood's improper methodology is further demonstrated in his description of his 
analysis where he clearly shows that he is using two different "after values" in his analysis and 
that the reason for the two different "after values" is based upon either a 1.5 year or a 2.5 year 
delay in completion of the Project, denoted as the "After Present Value 1.5 years" or the "After 
Present Value 2.S years." Id As stated in Sherwood's report, 
Id. 
Utilizing these estimates and the original before estimate the final 
concluded value estimates were completed as follows: 
Before Value 
After Present Value 1.5 years 






2 Sherwood also had math errors contained in his report in his calculation of the construction 
delay damages, Those errors were corrected during Sherwood's trial testimony. 
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Sherwood's addition of construction delay damages to his value conclusions was also 
referenced in Grathol's Second Supplemental Answers and Responses to ITD's Discovery. 
There, Grathol described the construction delay damages as follows: 
~--· ·-· ~· ~ ~- .. Based upon the appraizal calculation prepared to date, Defendant 
anticipates that it will advocate just compensation for the land 
taken of not less than $1,775,000.00 per the opinion of Dewitt 
Sherwood. Additionally, Defendant anticipates advocating 
additional severance damages of not less than $1,000,000.00 for 
diminishment to the use and developability of the property for 
commercial purposes, project influence, proiect del©:, and 
damages related to the anticipated loss of property and utility of 
the property with the extension of Sylvan Road and loss of access, 
visibility and development opportunity, and tax liabilities. 
Second Supp. Ans. and Resp. to ITD's Disc., at Supp. Ans, to Interrog. No, 3 (emphasis added); 
Trial Ex. 1S4. 
Throughout this case, Gtathol consistently characterized its additional damages based on 
construction delay as just that---damages based on delay in completion of the US-9S Project. 
Suddenly, in February 2012, after the Court's order on summary judgment, Grathol began 
referring to its construction delay damages by different names. The timing of Orathol's change 
in terminology coincided with the Court's Order on Summary Judgment granting ITD's motion 
for summary judgment and dismissing Grathol' s claim for construction delay damages. Order 
Re: ITD's Mtn. for Summ. Judg., at 2. ITD had filed its summary judgment motion on several 
grounds including Grathol's claim for "money damages based on what it characterizes as 'delay' 
on the part oflTD in constructing the US-95 Project." ITD's Br. in Supp, of Mtn. for Summ. 
Judg., at 3. ITD described Grathol's damage claim as "construction delay damages'' based upon 
Alan Johnson's own characterization of the damages as compensation for the '~eduction in value 
for the remaining property while waiting for the completion of construction." Id. at 16 
(referencing Grathol's Third Supp. Resp. to Disc., at 11). 
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In its first filing after the Court's Order on summary judgment) Grathol referred to its 
construction delay damages as a "downward time value and impact adjustment.'1 Supp. Expert 
Discl., at 2 (Feb. 10. 2012). Notably, the analysis and conclusions for the "downward time value 
· ·and impact adjustment" were identic-al to the constructica de!ay damages. Grathol' s discloS11!~., 
for Sherwood contained the same value conclusions of $1,775,000 and $1,880,000 as contained 
in his original report; it contained the same "after" values of $1,060,000 and $1,165,000 as used 
by Sherwood when he discounted his original "after" values based upon 1. 5 year and 2.5 year 
construction completion dates; and, significantly, the disclosures specifically cited to the portions 
of Sherwood's appraisal report where he explained his methodology for applying the discounted 
present valuation analysis to add an additional damage amount for construction delay damages. 
Id Since Grathol uses the exact same figures and specifically cites to the portions of 
Sherwood's report where he explains that he is adding damages based upon future completion 
dates of the US-95 Project, there can be no question that Grathol simply relabeled its 
construction delay damages so that it could avoid having to reduce its compensation claim as 
ordered by the Court on summary judgment. 
Orathol's attempt to disguise its construction delay damages continued through trial when 
Sherwood testified to the "downward time value and impact adjustment."3 Significantly, when 
ITD raised objections during Sherwood's testimony about his inclusion of construction delay 
damages in his valuation, counsel for Grathol did not ask Sherwood to testify to any conclusion 
as to either just compensation or damages. Then, on re-direct of Sherwood, counsel for Grathol 
sought to gloss over the construction delay damaaes by merely having Sheiwood testify to his 
3 Grathol's attempts to keep its construction delay damages alive in contravention of the Court's 
order is more apparent in its labeling of the damages as "severance damages" for the first time 
during Johnson's testimony at trial. See Trial Ex. J. Prior to trial, neither Johnson nor Sherwood 
had referred to damages caused by the time delay in completion of the Project as severance 
damages. 
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ultimate conclusion of just compensation. However1 when Sherwood finally testified to the 
"downward time value and impact adjustment," he explained that it was an "adjustment" based 
on the fact that the project would not be completed for several years-which was an express 
·· ····~admission that he,was adding damages based on delay i.n'COnstruction of the US-95 Project.....U .. 
shown on a chart, Sher.vood's testimony is as follows: 
Sherwood's Valuation of Grathol Property 
With Added Damages for Construction Delay 
Value of 30 Acres Before Take 
(30 Acres @ $2.2S/sf) 
Value of 13,686 Acre Remainder After Take 
(13.69 Acres@$2.2S/st) 
Value of16.31 Acre Take 
(16.31 Acres @ $2.25/sf) 
Added Damage tor Construction Delay 
















Grathol' s attempt to hide its construction delay damages is intentionally misleading and a 
flagrant violation of the Court's order dismissing the claim. The adding on of construction delay 
damages to the fair market value determination also violates the method established by Idaho law 
for determining severance damages in condemnation cases. It also serves to improperly increase 
Grathol;s claim for compensation in this case. The construction delay damages aiso violate 
Idaho law because they are calculated using dates 1. S and 2.5 years after the date of summons, 
which is the mandatory date for determining the value of the take and damages to the remainder. 
See Idaho Code § 7-712. As a matter of law and due to violation of the Court's order, 
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Sherwood's opinion of just compensation should not be considered in determining just 
compensation in this case. 
B. Johnson's Construction Delay Claim. 
Alan johnson's valuation, lilre Sherwood's, also-includes damages for construction d.el»,y 
damages, with the only difference being that Jolmson used a three and four-year estimated 
completion date for the Project. Like Sherwood, Johnson's inclusion of construction delay 
damages violates Idaho law requiring the value of the property taken and severance damages to 
be determined as of the date of summons. Johnson's inclusion of delay damages also violates 
the Order of the Court dismissing the claim from the case. 
Grathol first disclosed that Johnson would be claiming damages for alleged delay in the 
construction of the US-95 Project in its Second Supplemental Answers and Responses to 
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents. There, Gtathol 
stated that 
Additionally, Defendant anticipates advocating additional 
severance damages not less than $1,000,000.00 for diminishment 
to the use and developability of the property for commercial 
purposes, project int1uence, project delay and damages related to 
the anticipated loss of property and utility of the property with the 
extension of Sylvan Road and loss of access, visibility and 
development opportunity, and tax liabilities, 
Second Supp. Ans. and Resp. to Disc.., at Second Supp. Resp. to Jnterrog. No. 3 (emphasis 
added). On October 6, 2011, Grathol further explained Johnson's opinions and anticipated 
testimony .regarding his elaims for damages, including his claims for construction delay 
damages. Third Supp. Ans. and Resp. to Disc., at 3-8. Construction delay was the focus of the 
damage claim by Johnson. Mr. Johnson's proposed testimony included the following statement: 
ITD's delays and indecision to date may have cost Hughes 
Investments potential tenants and has put the entire development in 
jeopardy. A delay in construction or re-alignment of even two 




more years will cause significant financial damages through 
increased holding costs, lost opportunity and the inability to 
develop and market the remaining property resulting in an almost 
complete loss of value as a development parcel. 
NO. 4442 P. 23 
Id at 6. Johnson characterized construction delay as the "most important component" of value. 
However, the most important component to the determination of 
the value of the take is the time period still needed complete 
construction. 
Id. at 7. Johnson then went on to state that his valuation of the remainder property included an 
assumption of delayed construction of the US-9S Project. According to Johnson, 
Hughes Investments factors in the value for the remaining property 
on the assumption of at least an additional three year delay in the 
ability to sell by reason of construction. 
Id Like Sherwood, Johnson used an anticipated completion date and a 10% capitalization rate to 
reach a net present value of the remainder property. Id. Then based upon the net present 
valuation, Johnson reduced his "after" value of remainder property to account for "a reduction in 
value for the remaining property waiting for completion of construction." Id This reduction in 
value, when reduced from the before value, resulted in an increase in the just compensation 
claim based solely on cowuuction delay, noi fair market value in L1ie before a.i-id after. 
After the Court dismissed Grathol' s claim for construction delay damages, Orathol 
submitted its Supplemental Expert Disclosures in which it provided the "new'' value opinion that 
Johnson would testify to at trial. Supp. Expert Witness Disc., at 2-3. In its supplemental 
disclosures, Grathol noted for the first time that Johnson, like Sherwood, would be testifying to a 
''downward time value and impact adjustment." Id Significantly, however, the "downward time 
value and impact adjustment" by Johnson applied the .same net present value calculation and the 
same 10% capitalization rate as he applied in calculating his construction delay damages. 
Additionally, as support for Johnson's "downward time value and impact adjustment,'' Grathol 
cited to the portions of its discovery responses where Johnson explained his calculations for "a 
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reduction in value for the remaining property waiting for completion of construction." Id at 2, 
fn. 10 and 3, fn. 15-16. According to Johnson, the reduction in the "after" value of the property 
caused by the alleged construction delays total $338,000 or $798,000. Id. at 3, fn.16. Johnson's 
attempt to change the name ofhis-e·o:nstruction delay·claim does not change what it really ig-c-a -
claim for an additional amount of money based on delay in completion of the US-95 Project. 
During trial, Johnson changed the label of his construction delay damages again. This 
ti.me, be referred to the construction delay damages as "severance damages.,, See Trial Ex. J. 
Johnson's attempt to put a new label on the dam.ages and cast them as "severance damages" is 
even more transparent than the characterization of an adjustment for time. In his testimony at 
trial, Johnson applied the same calculation as he did in the Supplemental Expert Disclosures and 
concluded that the newly labeled "severance damages" (that were previously "downward ti.me 
value and impact adjustments" and before that construction delay damages) totaled either 
$338,000 or $789,000. These are the exact same figures for construction delay damages that 
Johnson disclosed earlier in the case. 
The fallacy of Johnson's attempt to cast these damages as "severance damages" is further 
demonstrated through application of Idaho's formula for detennining severance damages, set 
forth in the Idaho Jury Instructions. Idaho law provides that severance damages in condemnation 
cases are calculated as follows: 
Value of Remainder Before Takina 
- Value of Remainder After Taking 
= Severance Damaaes 
IDJI2d 7.16.S. As described in Trial Exhibit J, Johnson values the remainder property under two 
scenarios - one where the ''western remainder" is valued at $3 .23/s.f. and one where it is valued 
at $4.00/s.f, Based on these assumptions, Johnson concludes that the value of the remainder 
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property "before" the talcing is either $3,060,133 (at $3.23/s.ffor the western remainder) or 
$3,519,648 (at $4.00/s.f. for the western remainder). 
Johnson's conclusion of the value of the remainder property "after" the taking is 
··· 13,670,140. Based upon his testimony at trial, Johnson's-after value is based upon values aft..er 
the "completion of [the] Grathol Development."4 See Trial Ex. J. Thus, by his own acc0Wlt, 
there are no severance damages to the Gtathol property because Johnson's "after" values are 
higher than his ''before" values. 
Using Johnson's $3.23/s.f. values, the value of the remainder "after" the taking is 
$610,007 higher than the before value. 
Value of 40.48 Acre Remainder Before Taking ($3.23/s.f. for Western Remainder)="' $3,060,133 
- Value of 40.48 Acre Remainder After Taking {Using Developed Values)= $3,670,140 
Severance Damages= SO (After Value is $610,007 Higher Than Before Value) 
Similarly, if Mr. Johnson's $4.00/s.f. value is used, the value of the remainder ''after'' the taking 
is $150,492 higher than the before value. 
Value of 40.48 Acre Remainder Before Taking ($4,00/s.f. for Western Remainder)= $3,519,648 
- Value of 40.48 Acre Rernainder After Taking (Usine Developed Values)= $3,670,140 
Severance Damages= SO (After Value is $150,492 Higher Than Before Value) 
C, Conclusion. 
Both Sherwood and Johnson calculated construction delay damages early in the case. 
These calculations were produced to ITO in discovery responses and expert disclosures. Precise 
figures were given for the construction delay damages, as well as the method for calculating the 
damages. 
4 The valuation of undeveloped land as if it were developed is improper and another basis for 
excluding Johnson's valuation testimony. See Section VI. below. At trial, ITD objected to 
Johnson's testimony on several bases, including his use of values of the property as if it were 
already developed. 
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After the Court dismissed Gtathol,s claims for construction delay damages, Sherwood 
recharacterized his construction delay claim as a "doWI1ward time value and impact adjustment." 
However, the figure for this "adjustment" was identical to the construction delay damages he had . 
· disclosed previously. In addition,·th.e method for calc~ating the damages was identical~ and the 
reason for the calculation was the same - delay in construction of the US-95 Project, 
Johnson first recharacterized his construction delay claim as a "downward time value and 
impact adjustment,, At trial, we saw for the first time a heading for "severance damages." 
However, the figure Johnson gave for his "downward time value and impact adjustment'' and 
then his "severance damages," as well as his calculations and the reasons given for the add on 
were all identical to his construction delay claim. 
At no time did either Sherwood or Johnson calculate severance damages using the 
formula set by Idaho law. In fact, using their market value conclusions) Sherwood determined 
that severance damages amounted to $0.00, and Johnson concluded that the after value was 
higher than the before value. For all of these reasons, the construction delay claim, whether 
labeled as "severance damages" or downward time value and impact adjustments'' should be 
dismissed again. 
VI. JOHNSON'S OPINION BASED ON "DEVELOPED" LAND VALUE VIOLATES 
IDAHO LAW AND SHOULD BE DISREGARDED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
In Idaho, just compensation is defined as "the difference between the market value of the 
entire property before the taking and the market value of the remainder after the acquisition, 
together with any special damages caused by the taking, measured as of [the date of summons].1' 
IDJI2d 7 .16. In the present case, Johnson ignored the established method for valuing property in 
condemnation cases and instead valued the Grathol property based upon a hypothetical 
development plan and the sale prices he hopes to obtain for subdivided commercial lots after the 
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property is fully developed. The Idaho Supreme Court long ago rejected this cype of testimony 
and valuation methodology because it is purely speculative, and it substantially and artificially 
inflates the value of undeveloped and non-subdivided land. 
In his valuation, J ohnso?ttlsed values that as.Swnc the completion ·of a hypothetical--~.· -
commercial development on the property. Trial Exs. H, J. According to Johnson's testimony, 
his "after" values included the future sales prices be hopes to obtain once the conceptual 
subdivision development is completed. Trial Ex. 33, 33-1. Mr. Johnson used the following 
subdivided parcels and values: 
It is Mr. Johnson's opinion that the remainder property, 
after the take, would be worth $3,669,300 (at the time of 
completion and the opening of the interchange) calculated as 
follows: 
(1) 3.87 acres west of the take is given a value of $674,300 
(value is reduced due to the inability to provide sewer to 
the parcel across ITD's ROW; 
(2) 3.19 acres east of the ROW and west of Sylvan road at a 
value of $625,000; 
(3) Travel Plaza east of Sylvan, 7 acres at $1,219,000; and 
(4) Remaining 26.4 acres with limited commercial viability 
priced at $1,150,000. 
Trial Ex. 1S4, at 7 (Grathol's Second Supp. Ans. and Resp. to ITD's Discovery). Reduced to a 
per-square-foot basis, Johnson's values for the four separate subdivided parcels are as follows: 
(1) 3.87 acres west of the take= $4.00/s.f. 
(2) 3 .19 acres east of the ROW and west of Sylvan Road "" $4.50/s.f. 
(3) 7 acres for the Travel Plaza east of Sylvan Road== $4.S0/s.f. 
(4) Remaining 26.42 acres at $1.00 s.f. 
Trial Ex. 3 3, 
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Johnson's use of values as if developed was expressly rejected by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in City o/Caldwellv. Roark, 92 Idaho 99,101,437 P.2d 615,617 (1968). Roark involved 
a condemnation action by the City of Caldwell to acquire a portion of the Roark property for the 
-·~··- -expansion and improvement ofthe"Caldwell airport. ·Jd at 100, 437 P.2d at 616. The Roarks 
had previously platted their property for residential development and the plat had been accepted 
and approved by the city. Additionally, the Roarks had marked the proposed streets and alleys 
for their development and utility services had been made available to the property. Id. 
At trial, the Roarlcs sought just compensation based upon the aggregate value of the 
individual lots in their development plan. On appeal, the Roarks challenged the trial court's 
instructions requiring the jury to determine the fair market value of the property as one parcel 
and instructing the jury that the values given to hypothetical parcels in the Roarks development 
plans were not to be considered. Id The Idaho Supreme Court rejected the Roarlcs' argument 
and upheld the trial court's instructions. 
The Supreme Court concluded that the jury was allowed to consider the property's 
potential for residential development to determine the highest and best use of the property. Id at 
101,437 P.2d at 617. However, the Court prohibited the use of "developed" land values to 
determine the fair market value of bare land. The Court held that 
where the entire parcel of land, as a unit, is taken at one time by 
condemnation, the jury is required to fix the value of the entire 
parcel as a unit as of the time the summons is issued. I.C. § 7-712. 
This value cannot properly be determined by aggregating the 
individual sales value which separate lots may brina when sold to 
individual prospective home builders over a period of time in the 
future, for the reason that such a basis of valuation would permit 
the jury to speculate upon future developments. 
Id at 101-102, 437 P.2d at 617-18. The Court further explained that "[t]he test is not what the 
lots will brina when and if 62 willing buyers come along, but what the tract, as a unit, and as is, 
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platted or not, and in whatever state of completion, will bring from a willing buyer of the whole 
tract." Id (citing numerous state cases from Utah, Oregon, Colorado, North Carolina and a 
federal case from the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals as additional support). Rather, "[t]he 
· -- - -, -· ·· valuation must be on the basis of-what a willing pureh:aser would pay now and not what a:--- , 
number of purchasers might be induced to pay in the future for the land in smaller parcels." Id 
(emphasis added) (quoting Utah Road Commission v. Hansen, 383 P.2d 917,920 (Utah 1963)). 
Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the trial court's instruction that the property should be 
valued as one parcel of bare land and not on potential subdivided and developed values. Id 
The majority of other jurisdictions reach the same conclusionsi aptly summarized in the 
case of Department of Highways v. Schulhoff, 445 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1968) and its citation of 
Nichols on Eminent Domain, the primacy treatise on eminent domain law: 
Id. at 405. 
The applicable rule is ably stated in 4 Nichols, The Law of 
Eminent Domains 12.3142(1) (3d ed. rev. 1962): 
'* * * It is well settled that if land is so situated that it is actually 
available for building pµrposes, its value for such purposes may be 
considered, even if it is used as a fann or is covered with brush and 
boulders. The measure of compensation is not, however, the 
aggregate of the prices of the lots into which the tract could be best 
divided, since the expense of cleaning off and improving the land, 
laying out streets, dividing it into lots, advertising and selling the 
same, and holding it and paying taxes and interest until all the lots 
are disposed of cannot be ignored and is too uncertain and 
conjectural to be computed. * * * The measure of compensation is 
the market value of the land as a whole, taking into consideration 
its value for building purposes if that is its most available use.' 
It is proper to show that a particular tract of land is suitable and 
available for subdivision into lots and is valuable for that purpose. 
It is not proper, however, to show the number and value of lots as 
separated parcels in an imaginary subdivision thereof. Stated 
differentlyi it is improper for the jury to consider an undeveloped 
tract of land as though a subdivision thereon is an accomplished 
fact. Such undeveloped property may not be valued on a per lot 
basis, the cost factor clearly being too speculative. 
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Idaho law bars the valuation approach by Johnson in this case. That law has been 
endorsed across the country. Johnson's valuation testimony based upon estimated values of his 
hypothetical subdivision of the property when developed should be disregarded as a matter of 
- law. Idaho law requires that just·compensation be valued based on the state or character of the 
property on the date of summons in all eminent domain proceedings. Plans for future 
development may not be considered for purposes of determining the fair market value of the 
property. See Idaho Code§ 7-712; IDil2d 7.05.5, 7.14, 7.16, 7.16.S, 7.20. The appropriate 
measure of compensation damages for a partial taking is the "fair market value of the entire 
property before the taking and the market value of the remainder after the acquisition." IDil2d 
7.16. See also Idaho Code§ 7-712. 
In tum, severance damages are calculated as the difference between the value of the 
remainder before and after the taking. State v. Dunclick, 77 Idaho 45, 55-56, 286 P.2d 1112, 
1118 (1955); IDffid 7.16, 7.16.5. Both compensation and severance damages are to be 
computed as of the date of summons in the eminent domain action. l.C. § 7-71t State ex rel. 
Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444,449,546 P.2d 399,404 (1976); IDil2d 7.05, 7.0S.S; 7.16.5. 
The law does not allow just compensation or damage calculations based upon the 
aggregate values oflots or zones created only on paper and existing only in a hypothetical 
development. Therefore, Johnson's opinion using "developed" values should be stricken and 
disregarded as a matter oflaw. 
'\'11. CONCLUSION 
As a matter of law, the opinions of Sherwood and Johnson cannot serve as a basis for 
determining just compensation in this case. They did not value the larger parcel as required by 
Idaho law. They used dates of value long after the date of valuation mandated by Idaho law. 
They included construction delay claims barred by Idaho law and dismissed by the Court. And 
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Johnson used future "developed" values to value bare, vacant land, in violation of well-
established Idaho law. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
DEFENDANTHJGRATHOUS 
POST TRIAL BRIEF 
COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol ("Grathol") and submits its Post Trial Brief in 
accordance with the Court's Order. 
INTRODUCTION 
At the close of evidence, the Court requested briefing to address two narrow legal 
questions. The first concerns the determination of the larger parcel. The Court heard evidence 
at trial to support the theory that the larger parcel could be a portion of Grathol's 56.8 acres. 
The second issue is whether Grathol' s valuation methodology for calculating severance 
damages, as a component of its claim for just compensation, is appropriate. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Larger Parcel. 
The concept of larger parcel is an analytical tool unique to eminent domain. The term 
larger parcel is not found in comprehensive appraisal textbooks such as The Appraisal of Real 
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Estate or USP AP guidelines. All of the licensed appraisers who testified in this case agreed that 
the determination of the larger parcel is a subjective decision that the appraiser must make as a 
part of the analytical valuation process. 
The concept of the larger parcel is important in a condemnation appraisal, because the 
appraiser cannot determine the highest and best use of a property and properly value that 
property in relation to that use until a conclusion as to the larger parcel is reached. "The larger 
parcel may be all of one parcel, part of a parcel, or several parcels, depending to varying 
degrees on unity of ownership, unity of use, and contiguity." Real Estate Valuation in 
Litigation, J.D. Eaton, Appraisal Institute at 76, (2nd ed. 1995) (emphasis added). 1 
Id. 
In a typical appraisal assignment, an appraiser is retained to 
estimate the value of a parcel of land which has specific 
boundaries and the parameters of the property are known before 
any in-depth appraisal analysis is made. This is not, or should not 
be, the case in condemnation appraisals. 
[P]arcel, or right-of-way, maps are developed by the condemnor. When a roadway is to 
be constructed, the condemnor's engineers prepare a survey of the proposed right-of-way 
limits, which is then given to the title department to identify all ownerships within the proposed 
right-of-way and to determine the property boundaries of each parcel affected. These 
boundaries include all of the land that is contiguous to and under the same ownership as the 
land within the proposed right-of-way. 
The physical contiguity of land is an engineering question, while unity of ownership is 
usually a legal question. The right-of-way map is prepared and the boundaries of the properties 
to be appraised are thus determined prior to any consideration of the unity of use. Therefore, 
most appraisal assignments specify that the appraiser is to estimate the value of a parcel which 
may or may not be the larger parcel. "The ultimate determination of the larger parcel must be 
made by the appraiser." Id. at 76 (emphasis added). The Uniform Appraisal Standards for 
Federal Land Acquisitions speak directly to this point. 
Often essential in the appraiser's consideration of the highest and 
1 Real Estate Valuation in Litigation is a recognized treatise for condemnation appraisal authority. It is sometimes 
referred to as "the Bible," and is widely recognized as providing hombook law on condemnation valuation. 
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best use is the conclusion concerning the larger parcel. Because 
the ultimate determination of highest and best use is the 
appraiser's to make, and that determination cannot be made until 
after considerable investigation and analysis has been completed, 
the appraiser's conclusion as to the larger parcel is sometimes 
different from the specific parcel he or she was requested to 
appraise by the agency. 
Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1992), § B-1-14, p. 73 (emphasis added). 
Unity of use is an appraisal question, and the ultimate determination of the larger parcel 
is typically in the strict purview of the appraiser. This is strongly supported by two court 
rulings: 
The method of valuation of the parcels taken, whether as a 
separate entity or in a relationship to the whole tract, then 
becomes a matter of opinion of appraisers to be weighed by the 
jury ... We conclude that in this case the use of either method of 
valuation by the expert witnesses was proper and their testimony 
admissible, subject only to the inherent risk of nonpersuasion. 
Territory of Hawaii v. Adelmeyer, 363 P.2d 979,986 (Haw.1961). 
Where the property taken is less than the entire tract, other 
considerations arise. The highest and best use of the part taken 
may be as a separate and distinct piece of property unrelated to the 
entire property endowing such part with a fair cash market value. 
On the other hand the highest and best use of the part taken may 
be so related to the entire property that the value of the part taken 
for its highest and best use is dependent upon the value of the 
entire tract. Such a relation or dependence may present an issue of 
fact and either party is entitled to present his theory of 
independent or dependent valuation. 
Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Oberlander, 235 N.E.2d 3, 9, 92 111.App.2d 174, 
185 (Ill. 1968), ajf'd247 N.E.2d 888 (1969). 
Thus the determination of the larger parcel may be limited to the take area, the entire 
parent tract or a portion of the parent tract that is less than the whole. Real Estate Valuation in 
Litigation at 76, ( emphasis added). This determination will depend on a critique of the requisite 
factors; unity of title, contiguity, and unity of use. Of the factors to be considered, unity of use 
is often the key factor. However, where, as here, the use (hig11est an.d best) to which the 
property is properly put has yet to be created the analysis becomes even more subjective. 
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Idaho has not yet addressed the issue of larger parcel theory. Indeed there are only a 
handful of Idaho cases on eminent domain in general. While Idaho courts have not decided 
whether the larger parcel may contitute a portion of the entire parent tract, the courts have not 
restricted the larger parcel to only the entirety of a landowner's property. Because Idaho courts 
have not addressed the issue, the Court must look to other jurisdictions' treatment to resolve the 
case at bar. However, Idaho cases and statutes support Grathol's contention that the larger 
parcel can encompass less than the total property owned. 
In City of Phoenix v. Wilson, 200 Ariz. 2, 21 P.3d 388 (2001), the City condemned a 
portion of landowners' 23.24-acre vacant property for a fire station. The City took 1.4 acres. 
The take area was at the very comer of the parcel and situated on the intersection of two 
adjacent streets, much like the take of Grathol's property. The trial judge permitted the 
landowners' expert witness to estimate damages based on an opinion that a portion of the 
property had a different highest and best use from the rest, just as Grathol's valuation witnesses 
did. The appraiser in Wilson testified that the 23.24-acre property should be treated as two 
separate "units" before the taking, with different valuations given to the 5-acre comer, on which 
the take was to occur. Wilson at 4, 21 P.3d 390. The jury verdict was based on that theory. The 
Court of Appeals reversed holding that the trial court erred in permitting this portion of the 
property as larger parcel theory, but the Arizona Supreme Court granted review and 
determined that the Court of Appeals deprived the landowner of just compensation. Id. 
At the time of the condemnation, the entire 23 .24-acre parcei was uniformiy zoned for 
low density residential development. The City's General Plan, however, classified the area as 
one that should be developed with high-density uses and the evidence showed that rezoning 
was "very likely". The landowners' appraiser testified that the property had different highest 
and best uses in different locations and as two parcels: the 5-acre comer lot including the take 
valued at $1.25 per square foot, and the remaining 18.24-acres, valued at $.60 per square foot. 
Id. Tnese vaiue opinions were supported by market data. The iandowner aiso cakuiated 
severance damages based on testimony that the value of the 3.6-acre remainder of the 5-acre 
comer parcel was reduced to $.60 per square foot because after the take it was only suitable for 
the same type of low density development as the landowners' remaining 18.24-acres. This is 
precisely the type of evidence Grathol presented in this case. 
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In Wilson, the City's appraiser opined that the highest and best use of the entire 23.24-
acre property was for low density residential development. Based on that highest and best use 
opinion; no separate economic use existed for any portion of the property. Relying on sales 
data, the City appraised the value of the entire 23.24-acre parcel at $.55 per square foot. The 
City's appraiser concluded that the value of the 1.4-acre parcel taken was $35,088.00 and there 
were no severance damages. Id. at 5, 21 P.3d 391. This is exactly how ITD's valuation witness 
testified. 
The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict for the landowners, holding that 
the property taken should have been valued either as a discrete, separate unit or as part of the 
entire parcel, but not as part of a hypothetical unit less than the entire parcel. The Court of 
Appeals held that to allow the jury to follow the landowners' methodology would be to apply 
an unrecognized method of valuation. Id. 
However, on review, the Arizona Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals erred 
in concluding that there are only two methods of evaluation - the part taken as a separate unit 
or as part of the whole. Id. at 6, 21 P.3d 392. The Supreme Court properly recognized that these 
two approaches are usually utilized when the area of the take is a "strip-take," wherein the 
value of the part taken, based on the comparable market analysis, would not be of any value 
because of irregularity in size, shape or utility.2 In those partial (strip) takings cases, the Wilson 
Court observed land should be valued as a part of the whole in order to attribute some value for 
the take and protect the condemnee by assuring a just reward. Id. at 7, 21 P.3d 393. Where the 
part taken is not some unusable, un-economic "strip," the rules are different. The Wilson Court 
succinctly stated: 
However, the converse is also true: when the units of property are 
actually worth more when valued independently, the landowner 
should have the benefit of that greater, more realistic market-
based value. Emphasizing the role of the market in Buchanan that 
when the part taken has a "Separate and independent economic 
use and could therefore command a higher value as a separate 
entity, this value must be considered without resort to the value of 
any tract from which it was severed." (Internal citations omitted.) 
This statement referred only to the monetary value of the part 
2 An example of a "strip take" would be when the area of a take was the simple expansion of an existing right-of-
way along the same route for purposes of highway expansion. 
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taken and not to any tract larger than the taking but smaller than 
the whole parcel. Nowhere in Buchanan, however, did we 
restrict an expert from ascribing different values before the 
taking to different units of the parcel, as White did in the 
present case. To do so, when the market supports different uses 
and resulting differing valuations, would undermine the very 
rationale on which Buchanan rests: the protection of the 
landowner's interest in receiving just compensation based on the 
highest and best use of the property. (Internal citations omitted.) 
Thus, we have never limited such a method of valuation to just 
the part taken and the remainder. 
Id. at 7, 21 P.3d 393 (emphasis added). 
The Wilson Court continued: 
As we have seen, the cases do not support a rigid rule that "the 
property taken should have been valued either as a separate unit 
or as part of the whole parcel" but not "as part of a hypothetical 
parcel within the whole parcel." (Internal citations omitted.) 
The independent value rule exists to protect the landowner 
from being compensated for the most valuable part of his 
property by averaging the market price for the most 
valuable with that of the least valuable land. The obverse of 
that rule is that when the part taken has no independent value 
before the taking, it must be valued based on the average of the 
whole parcel because the part taken, having no independent use, 
would be valueless. People v. Silveira, 236 Cal.App.2d 604, 46 
Cal.Rptr. 260, 272 (1965) (citing 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain 
§ 14.231). 
Id. at 8, 21 P.3d 394 (emphasis added). The Wilson court went on to say that "when the 
evidence provides an adequate foundation by common sense and market data showing 
different highest and best uses, we see no reason why it is improper to consider a large tract 
of property, as if, in the before condition, it were divisible into separate hypothetical entities. 
See 4A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN§ 14.02 at 14-34 (3d ed.rev.1999)." Id. 
The Wilson court found that the landowners' could have developed their 5-acre comer 
lot without a concurrent development of the remaining 23.24 acres. "There is no logical 
reason to prejudice them for owning more than the most valuable portion taken." Id. 
The Wilson court's analysis is spot on! It's reasoning, rationale, and logic applies 
perfectly to the very situation presently before this Court. The Wilson court found that the 
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methodology of calculating the value of the take plus severance damages could be 
demonstrated by the market value of the independent economic unit, greater than the take, but 
less than the whole of the parent tract. Similarly, Skip Sherwood's valuation of the area of the 
take is based on the western 30-acre property as a single economic unit, independent from the 
remaining property to the east. Identical to the City's contentions in Wilson, ITD argues for this 
Court to ignore the independent use and development of Grathol's property simply to justify the 
application of a pro-rata valuation of the entire acreage to the take area and arrive at a minimal 
per unit value. These arguments were soundly rejected by the Wilson Court, since such 
argument basically prejudices landowners for owning more than the most valuable portion of 
land taken. But this is not one, single aberrant opinion. Other courts have found the obvious 
merit in this approach as well. 
In People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Corp. etc. of Latter-Day Saints, 13 Cal. App. 3d 
371, 91 Cal. Rptr. 532 (Ct. App. 1970), the State of California condemned a strip of land 
across landowners' entire property for the expansion of a roadway. Prior to the taking, 
landowner owned a 264-acre parcel adjacent to the roadway and the property enjoyed 
unrestricted access to the roadway. After the take, the property's access was limited to only 
the southeast comer. Latter-Day Saints at 374, 91 Cal.Rptr. 534. The landowners' expert 
witness valued the property taken based on a highest and best use as commercial and 
multiple-family residential development along the road and as single-family residential 
development away from the road. The landowner sought compensation for the take at the 
rate of $65,000 per acre for the commercial area, $40,000 per acre for the multiple residential 
area and $22,500 per acre for the single family area. Id. 
Conversely, the State's experts valued the property taken based on a "holding use," 
i.e. - an investment holding for a period of time until market demand justified development. 
The State's experts assigned a uniform value of $17,000 per acre to all of landowners' land 
and assigned that pro-rata vaiue to the take. Over objection by the iandowner, the State's 
experts also testified that after construction the remainder would have the same potential 
commercial and residential use, albeit at different locations from those testified to by the 
landowner. Id. at 375, 91 Cal.Rptr. 534. The trial court refused the owner's proposed 
instruction that the take should be valued as a distinct piece of property, if that valuation was 
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higher than the proportionate value of the take as part of the whole. The jury returned an 
award based upon a valuation of$18,000 per acre. Id. at 376, 91 Cal.Rptr. 535. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the trial court erred in refusing 
the landowners' instruction as to valuation of the take as a part of a separate and distinct 
parcel less than the whole. The Latter-Day Saints court recognized that when a parcel taken is 
of such a size and shape that it is not susceptible to being valued as a separate and distinct 
parcel, the larger parcel must be the entire parcel. However, where, the property condemned 
approaches a size that renders it independently usable, it is appropriate to determine what a 
willing buyer would pay for the property taken as part of an independent parcel less than the 
whole. Id. at 379, 91 Cal.Rptr. 537. 
The Latter-Day Saints court also found that it was error to admit evidence by the State 
of the potential commercial and residential uses of the remainder created by the project 
(special benefits) to be off-set against the value of the take. Id. at 379-80, 91 Cal.Rptr. 537. 
The Latter-Day Saints court recognized that the California Code required the trier of 
fact to separately determine the value of the take from severance damages and benefits, if 
any. Id. at 376, 91 Cal.Rptr. 535. Similar to Idaho, special benefits could only be off-set 
against severance damages and "shall in no event be deducted from the value of the portion 
taken." Id. 
Id. 
The evidence of potential higher ( and hence more valuable) uses 
of land on the property remaining is thus irrelevant if it tends to 
only establish a special benefit because no severance damages 
are claimed in the case at bench. It is relevant if it goes to the 
valuation of the property taken. 
Similar to the State of California's arguments in Latter-Day Saints, ITD argues that 
the larger parcel must encompass the entirety of Grathol's property to arrive at a lower pro-
rata value for the 16.314-acre take. While ITD has not been so bold as to overtly assert that 
special benefits accruing to the remainder are to be off-set against the value of the take (as 
did the State of California), ITD is, in effect, doing just that by including the additional 
acreage in their square foot value estimate (through adjustments). ITD is offsetting the lower 
value of the unaffected acreage against the value of the take. Indeed, ITD's witnesses 
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testified that the Project will provide "benefits" to the remainder and off-set any severance 
damages even though ITD failed to identify or quantify such benefits in their appraisal. Such 
an off-set, however termed, is impermissible as against the value of the take and ITD's larger 
parcel analysis is flawed. 
To determine the larger parcel, unity of use becomes the key component. In State v. 
Lacey, 8 Wash.App. 542, 507 P.2d 1206 (1973), the State sought to acquire 31 acres from a 
parent tract of 237 acres known as Lacey Farm. The State appealed from a jury verdict for the 
landowners based on the trial court's determination that the land was comprised of five 
separate tracts instead of a single larger parcel as contended by the State. Lacey at 543, 507 
P.2d 543. 
The Lacey court held that in order to find that a tract of land constitutes a single larger 
parcel rather than separate parcels for purposes of determining just compensation, a finding 
of unity of ownership, unity of use, and contiguity was required. The Lacey court found that 
in many cases the court can, as a matter oflaw, determine that a portion of the land taken is a 
separate or independent parcel, but ordinarily this is a question of fact for a jury, unless 
reasonable minds could not differ. Id. at 543-544, 507 P.2d 1208; citing 4A J. Sackman, 
Nichols on Eminent Domains 14.31 (rev.3d ed. 1971). 
In Lacey, the State argued that the entire 237 acres was one unit, for the purpose of 
offsetting special benefits against the award for the taking and damaging of other portions of 
the owners' property. The Lacey court rejected the State's argument of combining properties 
(assemblage), even though the property was all under one ownership. There was no dispute 
that the parcels were physically separated by intersecting streets. The Lacey court recognized 
that the contiguity requirement in condemnation cases is not necessarily a conclusive test. "If 
the land is occupied or in use, unity of use, becomes an important factor in determining 
whether contiguity has been established." Id. at 544, 507 P.2d 1208-09. The Lacey court 
found that it must, therefore, look to the integrated uses of the property in question to 
determine contiguity existed. 
The Lacey court found that the parcels were used for separate purposes (pasture, a 
small gasoline station and store, growing raspberries, airport hanger, a fruit stand and sign 
advertising). These uses were not dependent on one another. 
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S POST TRJAL BRIEF - 9 
1050 of 1617
In determining unity of use, it must be kept in mind that the 
parcels must be used in connection with each other, and a 
mere devotion to the same use by other tenants will not serve to 
fuse two separate parcels into one unity of use. Condemnation 
Appraisal Practice (1972 reprint). Not one of the tracts m 
question was used in connection with any other tract. 
Id. at 545-46, 507 P.2d 1209 (emphasis added). Thus the Lacey court found there was not a 
unity of use for the parcels and instead a complete diversity of uses, independent of one 
another existed. "Failing to establish each of the elements of the larger parcel prevents 
offsetting special benefits against the larger parcel and requires a separate determination of 
the just compensation for damages to each of the independent parcels." Id. at 546, 507 P.2d 
1209. Because reasonable minds could not differ in rejecting the State's theory of 
assemblage, the trial court correctly determined that the tracts were to be treated separately 
and independently for purposes of determining just compensation. Id. Thus, in order to find 
unity of use for purposes of assemblage, the uses of the parcels need to be dependent on one 
another, not merely incidental or convenient. 
The larger parcel analysis may also be used to combine parcels to determine a value 
for the take. In M&R Investment Company, Inc. v. State ex rel. Dept. of Transp., 103 Nev. 
445, 744 P.2d 531 (1987), the State of Nevada condemned a portion of property located on 
the west side of a freeway. The State sought to obtain approximately 17 acres of M&R's 27-
acre parcel for the expansion of the freeway. The 27 acres were located on the west side of 
the freeway, but the Dunes Hotel, also owned by M&R was located on the east side of the 
freeway directly across from the property at issue. M&R at 446, 744 P.2d 533. M&R 
contended that the larger parcel should consist of the combined properties on both the west 
and east sides of the freeway because of their integration. The State of Nevada insisted that 
only the 27-acre parcel on the west side should be the larger parcel. The trial court agreed 
with the State and ruled that the larger parcel consisted only of the western property from 
which the property was taken. Id. at 448, 744 P.2d 533. 
The question on appeal was from which larger parcel the condemned property was 
taken. M&R contended that the trial court erred in ruling that the 27-acre parcel to the west 
of the freeway was the larger parcel for purposes of determining the value of the take and 
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severance damages to the remainder. Id. at 448, 744 P.2d 534. The Nevada Supreme Court 
found that the evidence showed several development plans to integrate the uses of the 
western and eastern portions of M&R's property. During the time in which those 
improvements were contemplated, the Dunes Hotel used the west parcel for overflow 
parking. 
In deciding the contiguity of the properties, the M&R court found that ordinary 
contiguity must be shown, but it is not always necessary. The court held that parcels damaged 
need not be physically contiguous to those taken so long as the evidence discloses an actual 
and existing unity of use and purposes. Id. at 449-50, 744 P.2d 534.3 The M&R court found 
that the use of the west parcel as a parking facility in conjunction with the Dunes Hotel 
justified the jury's finding of a unity of use favoring M&R's position and the trial court erred 
in not allowing the jury to determine whether the condemned parcel was part of the east 
parcel for the award of severance damages. Id. at 450, 744 P.2d 535. Thus, for purposes of 
deciding severance and/or benefits, existing integration of uses was required. 
The M&R court also reviewed the trial court's exclusion ofM&R's assemblage of the 
two tracts for purposes of valuing the take. Id. at 451, 744 P.2d 535. 
Id. 
If the highest and best use of separate parcels would involve a 
prospective, integrated, unitary use, then such prospective use 
may be considered in fixing the value of the property 
condemned providing joinder of the parcels is reasonably 
practical. (Internal citations omitted.) Hence, when valuing the 
condemned parcel as part of a large parcel or assemblage, the 
requisite unity of use may be merely prospective; whereas, when 
assessing severance damages to the remaining part of a large 
parcel, the requisite unity of use must be actual and present. 
The M&R court recognized that for purposes of determining the value of the property 
condemned, in order to support assemblage to create a larger parcel, there must be the 
likelihood of an integrated use of the properties in connection with one another. Other 
jurisdictions have similarly held that in considering unity of use in determining the larger 
3 Citing e.g., Sauvageau v. Hjelle, 213 N.W.2d 381 (N.D.1973) (unity of use evidenced by integrated use of non-
contiguous parcels); State Road Commission v. Williams, 22 Utah 2d 301, 452 P.2d 548 (1969) (unity of use 
evidenced by non-contiguous parcels functioning as a single economic unit); 4A Nichols, The Law of Eminent 
Domain§ 14.26[1] at 14-678 (J. Saclanan ed. 1985). 
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parcel, the uses of the parcels must be dependent on one another.4 
In the Grathol case, the property is vacant but will be developed separately into 
commercial uses. There has been no evidence introduced by ITD to support the contention 
that the development of the western 30 acres is dependent in any manner on the eastern 26 
acres for purposes of valuing the take. Skip Sherwood based his theory of the larger parcel 
on the western 30 acres as a separate economic unit, which will be developed independently 
from the eastern 26 acres. Sherwood limited his opinion of severance damages to the western 
30 acres, caused by the take. Sherwood did not opine on any value for the eastern 26 acres 
and did not attribute any severance damages to that portion of the property. 
Conversely, ITD has impermissibly included in its valuation of the take the average 
square foot value for the entire 56.8-acre tract, despite admitting no severance damages exist 
for that portion of the Grathol property. ITD has based its opinion of the larger parcel on the 
unsupported assumption that the properties are dependent on one another for development. 
However, ITD offered no evidence to support its position that the eastern and western 
properties are dependent on one another. 
ITD's appraiser, Stan Moe, is well acquainted with the risks associated in failing to 
consider the integrated use of properties for the larger parcel analysis in condemnation 
proceedings. In State v. Wandermere Co., 89 Wash.App. 369, 949 P.2d 392 (1997), the 
Washington DOT appealed from a jury verdict for the condemnee in the amount of 
$3,500,000. The Wandermere case is particularly apropos here as it involved the same two 
competing valuation witnesses: Skip Sherwood and Stan Moe. The Washington DOT 
condemned 5.56 acres as part of a highway construction project. Wandermere leased 24.45 
acres as a sand and gravel pit which included the 5.56-acres taken. Id. at 371, 949 P.2d 394. 
The State's valuation was premised on the theory that the 5.56 acres was simply a part of the 
24.45 acre parcel, containing little remaining sand and gravel and that its highest and best use 
4 See, e.g. Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Oberlaender, 92 Ill.App.2d 174, 235 N.E.2d 3 (I 968), (the 
highest and best use of the part taken may be so related to the entire property that the value of the part taken for its 
highest and best use is dependent upon the value of the entire tract. It is the nature of the relationship of the part to 
the whole which determines that value of the part since all parts are not necessarily equally related); Territory by 
Sharpless v. Adelmeyer, 45 Haw. 144, 363 P.2d 979 (1961), (where, as here the parcels taken approach such size 
and character as to assume proportions of independent economic use, in the light of the highest and best use of the 
land, the rationale of the rule valuing 'the whole first, then on that basis, assign a value to the part condemned' 
dissolves into meaninglessness. 
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was no longer as a mine, but for residential development. Wandermere, however, maintained 
that the taking was from a portion of a larger 62-acre parcel containing 4.5 million cubic 
yards of sand and gravel yet to be mined. Id. at 372, 949 P.2d 395. 
The State argued that only the 24.45-acre leasehold was currently zoned for mining 
operations and the additional 3 7 acres was zoned for single family residential, therefore, the 
highest and best use of the take area would be for residential purposes. Id. at 3 72, 949 P .2d 
395. Wandermere presented evidence that the gravel pit had been in use since the 1920's, the 
family regarded the entire 62 acres as a single economic unit and expected to mine all of it 
once it was rezoned. Testimony also showed that the Department of Natural Resources would 
likely have granted a request for the expansion of the mining operations, if applied for. 
W andermere argued the highest and best use of the 3 7 acres was therefore mining. Id. at 
372-73, 949 P.2d 395-96. 
Skip Sherwood testified for Wandermere that the highest and best use of the larger 
parcel was mining and the take had eliminated the highest and best use for the 62-acre parcel 
because there would be insufficient area left for a batch plant. Using the income approach to 
measure the loss, Sherwood discounted the future royalties and rent amounts to a present 
value and subtracted the reversionary value of the property after the mine was depleted in 
order to arrive at a value for the property in the amount of $4,580,000. Id. at 374, 949 P.2d 
396. Appraiser Stan Moe for the State disputed Sherwood's valuation believing that the 
future royalty payments were too uncertain to be inciuded in the vaiuation process. 5 Id. The 
State offered $38,900 for the taking. Id. at 371, 89 Wash.App. 394. 
The State objected to proposed jury instructions on the larger parcel theory which 
instructed the jury that "the property is defined as all parcels which are unified by ownership 
and use." Id. at 375, 949 P.2d 396. The State argued that the instruction was erroneous 
because under its theory, the parcels must be presently used in connection with each other for 
the same use. 
On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals determined that the property owners 
presented sufficient evidence of intent to use the full 62 acres as a sand and gravel pit to 
5 This battle of appraisal methodology is reminiscent of the Grathol case where Moe again attacks Sherwood's 
valuation approach. See, Section II, herein. 
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submit the case to the jury. Id. at 379, 949 P.2d 380. Because the evidence of Wandermere's 
theory was sufficient to submit its larger parcel analysis to the jury, the trial court did not 
commit error and the jury's award based on the integrated use of the property as a mine was 
upheld. That award included damages based on Sherwood's discounted valuation 
methodology. Ironic, that 14 years later, Moe is still dismissive of Sherwood's valuation 
methodology and larger parcel analysis, even though both were upheld in the Wandermere 
case. 
Other jurisdictions are in accord. In State Through Dept. of Highways v. Landry, 171 
So.2d 779 (La.Ct.App. 1965), the State appealed from a condemnation award based on the 
value the condemned portion ( a "strip-take") had as commercial highway frontage, as if it were 
sold in lots with a depth of 150 feet. The sole issue on appeal was whether the method of 
determining the market value of the highway frontage taken was proper. 
The State argued that following the taking, the remainder of the landowners' 25-acre 
"parent tract" was provided with new frontage on the highway with a commercial value 
equivalent to the frontage taken on the old highway. Landry at 780. The State argued that the 
landowners therefore did not sustain the loss of valuable commercial frontage. Since the entire 
parent tract had a value of $2,750.00 per acre prior to the taking, the State argued that value of 
the take was only the pro-rata loss in value of the entire tract caused by its take of 1.3 acres. Id. 
The State's contention was that it was improper to award landowners the commercial value of 
the frontage taken, or to vaiue the take as if it were soid on the market for commerciai purposes 
as lots separate from the entire parent tract. 
The Louisiana Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that although a willing buyer might 
not pay $0.83 per square foot for an irregularly shaped strip, the evidence showed that such 
price would be paid for the land squared off to a depth of 150 feet. Id. 
Since it was a portion of [the] valuable front land that was taken, 
we think the trial court correctly determined the market value of 
the portion taken as proportionate to that which a willing buyer 
would pay for the land squared off to a depth of 150 feet. 
Id. The Landry court found that this method of computing compensation was consistently 
utilized aitd appro,red, aitd tl1at prior cases pro,rided authoriry for basiI1g the av"1ard on the 
higher market value of the frontage taken, rather than on its lesser pro rata average-acre value 
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as a proportionate piece of the entire parent tract. In Landry, the State basically argued that the 
true market value of the commercial frontage actually taken should be reduced to allow credit 
for the benefits received by the remainder (i.e. the "slide-back" theory). The Landry court 
disagreed, because in Louisiana (like Idaho), the market value of the take cannot be offset by 
the benefit that the remainder may receive. Such benefits can only be off-set against severance 
damages, if claimed. Id. at 781. 
A similar result was reached in State Through Dept. of Highways v. LeDoux, 184 
So.2d 604 (LA, Ct.App.1966), holding that a landowner is entitled to recover the highest per 
acre market value of frontage property "squared off'' to a depth which would be most suitable 
for commercial purposes, even though property actually taken by the State did not have 
sufficient depth to accommodate such commercial development. See also, Territory by 
Sharpless v. Adelmeyer, 45 Haw. 144, 363 P.2d 979 (1961), rejecting the State's argument 
that the sole method of valuation for a partial take was a pro-rata application of the value of 
the entire parcel. 
The import of these diverse cases is that there is not a single, required "method" for 
determining the larger parcel. The courts have recognized that the larger parcel may be the 
entirety of the parent tract, the parent tract plus other non-contiguous tracts, the take (only), or a 
part of the parent tract, if such hypothetical divisions are logical, rationale and supported by 
market data demonstrating that such parts are independent economic units. The determination 
of the larger parcel is vital. Determining the highest and best use of the subject property, is part 
of the larger parcel analysis, but only part, and difficulties arising in valuation based on 
theories of assemblage, or the "slide back value theory" would be avoided if the larger parcel 
included only those integrated lands actually affected by the condemnation. The issues become 
more complicated where, as is the situation here, a parcel with desirable frontage on a roadway 
is intuitively worth more closer to the frontage and worth less toward the back or rear of the 
property. One of the best descriptions of this circumstance is as follows: 
A land owner is always entitled to the fair market value of the 
land actually taken. The fair market value of the front land in 
certain situations is higher than the average unit price of the tract 
as a whole. The fact that adjacent areas of the property ... are all 
under the same ownership, and together compose a large 
ownership tract, does not presuppose that they would be 
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developed or marketed as a single tract. In fact, market realities 
dictate otherwise. An owner ordinarily will sell a portion of his 
property for the highest price the market will deliver so long as 
that ... does not damage the value of the remainder. 
State Dept ofH'ways v. Stegemann, 269 So.2d 480 (La. 1973). 
Courts have consistently recognized that such pro-rata methods of valuation are really 
only useful in cases where the area of the take would have no independent market value or a 
value could not be determined from the market because of irregularities in size, shape or utility 
of that part taken. In those cases, the valuation must be based on a pro-rata valuation of the 
entire value of the parent tract to avoid finding that the take was valueless. However, when the 
take by itself or as part of a larger tract does have an independent economic value based on the 
market, then the "larger parcel" must be identified accordingly. Further, when severance 
damages are not claimed, assemblage of independent, unrelated parcels in order to arrive at a 
lower pro-rata value of the take is disallowed. This is exactly what ITD has proposed. 
Here, ITD valued the take as part of Grathol's entire 56.8-acre parent tract, instead of 
the western 30 acres. In order to arrive at an estimate of value for the entire parent tract, Stan 
Moe used a comparable market analysis to identify comparable properties and then made 
adjustments to the size of those comparables to reach a value conclusion for the entirety of 
Grathol's parent tract. Moe arrived at a range of "adjusted values" for his comparables then 
"reconciled" those values to reach liis value opi11ion value for Grathol's entire tract at 
$35,000.00 per acre. Finally, Moe simply applied the lower average value of the whole property 
to the 16.314 acres taken. 
In failing to recognize the larger parcel as the western 30 acres, ITD advocates an 
approach that ignores reality. The value of the Grathol property is significantly higher on the 
front than the rear and ITD is condemning the front; i.e. - the most valuable part. ITD's 
application of a pro-rata valuation based on the 56.8-acre larger parcel impermissibly compares 
apples to oranges; including the lower average values for the eastern 26.8 acres for which no 
severance damages were given by Sherwood. ITD has opined that there are no severance 
damages and that the eastern acreage remains unaffected by the Project. However, by including 
the eastern 26.8 acres in its calculation, ITD is basically arguing that special benefits accruing 
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to the eastern parcel (which are unaffected) should be set-off against the value of the take. This 
analysis is flawed and unsupportable. 
ITD offers no cogent explanation for determining that the larger parcel encompasses all 
56.8 acres. ITD concluded that the highest and best use of the property is to be held as 
development land. However, holding land is not an integrated use of property. While both 
parcels remained vacant at the time of these proceedings (therefore requiring a broader 
analysis), the future use and values of those parcels are not so intertwined or dependent on one 
another to lead to the inescapable conclusion that, as a matter of law, the "larger parcel" can 
only be the entire 56.8 acres. Stan Moe based his determination of the larger parcel on his 
assumption that the eastern acreage would be needed as land application for treated water in 
connection with the commercial development to the west. However, there is no evidence in the 
record to support such an assumption. 
Instead, the un-contradicted testimony at trial by Grathol's project engineer and modular 
waste water system designer, Jim Coleman, is that he designed a sewer system that takes up 
very little space and could be put virtually anywhere on the property. Coleman also testified 
that the treated water could be applied on-site to landscaping, circulated throughout the western 
commercial development, applied to right-of-way or even transported off-site at very little cost. 
Coleman did not testify that the system needed or required any of the eastern 26-acre parcel in 
order to function. 
Conversely, ITD failed to put on any evidence that Coleman's system could not be 
designed or located entirely on the western 30 acres, nor did ITD put on any evidence 
whatsoever that the eastern 26 acres was necessary or required for the development of the 
western acreage. Indeed, ITD chose not to cross-examine Jim Coleman on any of these issues 
and chose not to call any rebuttal experts to testify that such a system was infeasible or 
insufficient. ITD had identified several engineers from David Evans & Associates as rebuttal 
experts to Coleman, and even had such persons physically present in the courtroom during the 
trial, but chose not to call those persons to rebut Coleman's testimony. See, Plaintiff !TD 's 
Trial Witness List, at p. 2. Coleman's testimony remains un-contradicted. Because ITD failed 
to put on any evidence of the integrated and necessary use of the eastern 26 acres in connection 
with the development of the western 30 acres, Stan Moe's basis for including the entire 
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property in his larger parcel analysis is without any factual support whatsoever. 
Further, the property will be physically divided by the inevitable extension of Sylvan 
Road across Grathol's property, into the eastern and western parcels. ITD acknowledged the 
extension of Sylvan in the Board's resolution attached to the Complaint. Complaint at Exhibit 
C. ITD's witness, Jason Minzghor, testified in his deposition that Sylvan "is expected to be 
there." Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Motion in Limine, at Exhibit D; Depa. Minzghor, p. 59, 11. 5-22. ITD's right-of-
way plans show that they are constructing an approach to the Grathol property at the 
intersection of Sylvan and Highway 54. Id. at Exhibit C. ITD's right-of-way plans also show 
that it acquired right-of-way to the north along Roberts Road, dead-ending at the Grathol 
property and such plans indicate a "Permanent Easement for Future Roberts Road 
Development." Id. Finally, Lakes Highway District also requested that Sylvan be developed as 
part of the rezone hearing in April 2009, and has indicated that such development and 
dedication of Sylvan will be a requirement of any commercial development. Id. at Exhibit H. 
While ITD may not be physically condemning Sylvan Road across the Grathol property and 
compensation for its extension is not part of these proceedings, ITD cannot, in good faith, 
ignore that the Grathol property will be bisected by Sylvan Road for purposes of the larger 
parcel analysis. 
Based on the inevitable extension of Sylvan Road, the remaining parcels will be 
physically separated, destroying any contiguity between the western and eastern remainders. As 
contiguity will not be present, the Court must look to the integrated uses of the properties to 
determine the larger parcel. However, the uses of the remnant eastern and western parcels are 
independent and there is no evidence to show otherwise. 
Further, market data supports Grathol's theory that the western 30 acres is the larger 
parcel. Sherwood testified that he valued only the western 30 acres because that was the size 
that most commercial developments utilize and Sherwood reviewed and compared commercial 
sales of that size in his analysis. ITD offered no testimony to refute this market data, but 
instead simply utilized the entire 56.8-acres. ITD's valuation methodology essentially penalizes 
Grathol for owning "too much land," a theory that has been repeatedly rejected by the courts. 
ITD's inclusion of unaffected property is directly contrary to the cases cited, holding that 
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special benefits (i.e. - more land) cannot be off-set against the value of the take. Idaho law is in 
accord with this approach, providing that special benefits can only be deducted from severance 
damages, if any. Idaho Code § 7-711 requires a separate determination of the value of the take 
from severance and special benefits, if any. I. C. § 7-711 (1-3).6 
ITD's argument that the property is benefitted by the Project by reason of increased 
values to the remainder (i.e. "slide-back") has no applicability in the larger parcel analysis for 
arriving at the value of the take. This approach is only relevant to claims for severance damage 
and cannot be used as an off-set against the take. ITD's "slide-back" theory also fails factually 
because, in the instant situation, there is not simple expansion of an existing right-of-way (i.e. 
"strip-take), but instead the construction of an entirely new freeway with off-ramps directly 
across the Grathol property.7 Access has changed, visibility has changed, speed of traffic has 
increased, the western 30 acres has been bisected by the new alignment, and the values of the 
western remainder after the take are not the same as before the take. 
Because the western 30-acres is a separate economic unit, and is not dependent upon the 
eastern 26-acres for its highest and best use, the evidence supports Skip Sherwood's 
determination of the larger parcel. Based on the foregoing authority and arguments, there is 
sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to determine that the 30-acre property west of Sylvan 
constitutes the larger parcel for a determination of market value for the take. 
II. Severance Damages. 
Just as the appraisers who testified in this case disagreed about the larger parcel 
approach, so too do they part ways philosophically on how to approach severance damages 
or, more properly, the value of the remainder in the "after" condition. ITD repeatedly moved 
to strike the testimony of Sherwood, arguing that he was using two different dates of 
valuation. In point of fact, Sherwood was not using two dates of valuation. Instead, he was 
addressing the value of the remainder in the after condition (its value after the take, taking 
into account the affects of the take and ITD's use of the portion taken) by appiying a 
recognized appraisal methodology of reaching the present value (i.e. - the value of the 
6 See also, I.DJ.I. 7.18, separating the assessment of the fair market value of the take from severance damages and 
benefits, if any. 
7 The "slide back theory" is not applicable as the remainder's exposure is not the same in the before and after. See e.g., 
City of Los Angeles v. Allen, 36 P.2d 611 (Cal.1934); State, Dep 't of H'ways v. LeDoux. La., 184 So.2d 604 (La. 1966). 
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S POST TRIAL BRIEF- 19 
1060 of 1617
remainder after the take) by examining the property's future value and discounting it back to 
the date of the take. 
Discounting is a general term used to describe the process of converting a future value 
to a present value. In the discounting process, future values are converted into present value 
through discounting, a concept that benefits received in the future are worth less than the same 
benefits received today. The Appraisal of Real Estate, Appraisal Institute (12th Ed. 2001) at p. 
550. Discounting is simply the application of the time value of money and the application of 
interest, wherein the present value of a future amount will be less than that expected future 
amount. In other words, discounting of a future benefit uses the reciprocal of the growth of 
compound interest. Id. at 551. The Appraisal of Real Estate is hornbook law on appraisal 
methodology and recognizes that the discount approach is an accepted method of appraisal to 
arrive at a present value for a future income. 
The use of a discount rate in condemnation proceedings is not an isolated anomaly or 
unrecognized method of valuation by appraisers. Discounting is most frequently utilized 
through the "income approach" of appraisals in order to arrive at a present value for income 
streams produced by commercial property at some point in the future. This approach is 
accepted and utilized by most courts. See e.g., Boring v. Metro. Edison Co., 435 Pa. 513, 522, 
257 A.2d 565, 570 (1969); Matter of Acquisition Prop. by Eminent Domain, 263 Kan. 470, 
479, 949 P.2d 1115, 1121, (1997); City of St. Louis v. Union Quarry & Const. Co., 394 
S.W.2d 300, 306 (Mo. 1965). See also, Weese v. Pinellas County, 688 So.2d 221, 1996 WL 
34001 (Fl. App.3 Dist.1996), holding that trial court improperly struck landowner's expert's 
testimony on ground that he used wrong date for calculation of damages then discounted 
back to date of take. 
Other jurisdictions have recognized that the use of the income approach is permitted 
even when other methods of appraisal are available. 
The approach which we have elected to follow takes into 
account the practice followed by appraisers in preparing an 
opinion as to value. Appraisers do not adopt an isolated 
approach to reach an opinion as to value, but attempt to utilize 
all three approaches to test the validity of their conclusion as to 
the fair and actual cash market value of the property to be 
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condemned. Opinion evidence as to value requires that the 
unique and different characteristics of every individual piece 
of property be analyzed for its comparability to other 
property that bears comparable characteristics. Factual 
circumstances may cause one approach to valuation to be 
more appropriate than another. Rarely are two pieces of real 
estate identical, and usually each parcel of real property has 
advantages and disadvantages which are not possessed by 
another. No purpose is served by limiting testimony to one 
approach or to the most appropriate method of attaining an 
opinion as to value. Recognition should be given to all 
relevant factors which tend to provide a means for arriving 
at a fair evaluation. 
Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Berglund-Cherne Co., 193 Colo. 562, 566-67, 568 P.2d 478, 
481 (1977) (emphasis added). 
In fact, the two expert witnesses involved in this case are well-acquainted with the 
discount income approach, as demonstrated in State v. Wandermere Co., 89 Wash.App. 369, 
949 P.2d 392 (1997), supra. In Wandermere, Stan Moe, on behalf of the State of 
Washington, was especially critical of Skip Sherwood's use of the same appraisal 
methodology used here for arriving at the present value of the gravel pit and mine property. 
Id. at 372, 949 P.2d 396. However, the Washington Court of Appeals found that use of 
Sherwood's methodology was supported by market evidence and the State was able to argue 
that Sherwood's methodology was not related to present fair market value during trial. The 
State in Wandermere did not attack the discounted approach as being an unrecognized 
method of appraisal valuation, but instead disagreed with Sherwood's inclusion of future 
income streams in arriving at his present value conclusions as being speculative. The jury, 
however, accepted Sherwood's methodology and awarded $3,500,000.00 for the taking and 
severance damages. Id. at 376, 949 P.2d 397. 
Here, Sherwood has used the same recognized appraisal methodology by arriving at 
an opinion of the value of the remainder after the take by using the future value of the 
remainder after development, then discounting that same amount back to the date of the take. 
The methodology is identical. While the use of the discounted cash flow analysis is regularly 
empioyed by appraisers to a..--rive at the present value for commercial properties, the same 
methodology is appropriate here because the land is currently unused but will be developed 
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S POST TRIAL BRIEF -21 
1062 of 1617
into commercial property as its highest and best use. 
All of the appraisers who testified in this case (Moe, Pynes and Sherwood) spoke of 
recognized appraisal methodologies being the comparative market approach, replacement 
cost approach, and income approach. All three testified that ordinarily appraisers strive to use 
all three approaches and then reconcile their conclusions. However, because the Grathol 
property was, for the most part, unimproved, bare ground held for development purposes, the 
replacement cost approach was largely inapplicable. Of the two remaining approaches 
(income approach and comparative market approach), all the appraisers emphasized a 
comparative market approach to arrive at a baseline unit value of the property. For ITD's 
appraisers, the analysis simply stopped there because both concluded that the property's 
highest and best use was to hold the property as vacant, unimproved property for some 
distant future development. However, holding land for speculative purposes is not a "use" of 
property. Neither Pynes nor Moe gave so much as a second thought to the application of any 
appraisal methodology to arrive at an opinion of the value in the after, other than to 
dismissively conclude there were no severance damages and therefore no change in value of 
the remaining property in the after from the before. 
Conversely, Sherwood's testimony clearly recognizes that the value of the property in 
the after condition is impaired and has suffered damage. Sherwood also recognized that 
calculating the impairment is difficult because the effect of the condemnation on such 
property will continue in the future. If the property were a fully improved income-producing 
property, a net present value analysis comparing the post-take income stream from the 
property would be applied. But, because the property is in the process of being developed and 
not yet producing income, Sherwood utilizes the same recognized methodology by estimating 
what the value of the property would be to an end-user after completion of the project and 
then applying a discount rate to determine the net present value as of the date of the take. 
Sherwood used a flat discount rate of 10%, identical to the rate that ITD's appraisers used in 
making their adjustments to comparable sales occurring prior to the date of the take. 
Sherwood also used a period of 1.5 to 2.5 years to apply that discount rate back to the date of 
the Summons. Sherwood's use of this time period cannot be criticized as excessive (and 
indeed appears conservative), since the property remains unusable at the time of trial more 
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than 16 months after the official date of the take. 
Indeed, ITD's main criticism of Skip Sherwood's discount method is that Sherwood 
failed to use the same date of valuation for the "before and after" analysis. However, such 
argument completely ignores that Sherwood's appraisal methodology is widely recognized 
and his discounting adjusts those future values (of the property) back down to the date of the 
take, November 2010. Sherwood's analysis uses the same date of the taking in the "before 
and after" utilizing a recognized and approved methodology to account for the uses of the 
western 30-acres in a commercial highest and best use, and the affects ofITD's partial taking 
on that property. 
DATED this 23rd day of March, 2012. 
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Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S POST TRIAL BRJEF - 23 
1064 of 1617
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 23rd day of March, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
'KUS Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
>( US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S POST TRIAL BRIEF - 24 
1065 of 1617
Mar. 29. 2012 11: 59AM 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Notthwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attomeys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
No. 7595 P. 2/8 
STATE Of IOAHO l . 
COUNTY OF KOOTEHAlfss 
rtLEO: -if 3i)3 ol,J 
2012 HAR 29 PM 12: t. I 
CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
llir~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRATHOL, a Califomia general 
partnership; STERLING SA VINOS BANK, a 
Washington col'poration; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
MOTION TO ENLARGE TIME 
COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol, pursuant to Rule 6(b ), Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and respectfully moves this Court for its order enlarging Defendant's time within 
which to file a Reply to Plaintiff's Post Trial Brief and file its proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. Counsel represents to the Cou1t that the grounds above stated in support 
of this request for an enlargement are consistent with the actual existing needs of the defense 
and are made in good faith and not as a dilatory matter; as fmther explah1ed in Affidavit of 
Christopher D. Gabbert attached hereto. 
MOTfON TO ENLARGE TIME· 1 ORIGINAL 
1066 of 1617
Mar. 29. 2012 11: 59AM No. 7595 P. 3/8 
Defendant requests an enlargement of time of approximately seven (7) days from the 
date hereof to pe1n1it said Reply and proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
DATED this 2.'1 day ofMarch, 2012. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
stopher D. Gabbert, Of the Film 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the '2.tf day of March, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transpo1tation Depru.tment 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
Ma1yV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
MOTION TO ENLARGE TIME -2 
us Mail 
_ Overnight Mail 
~ rlD r d _ --an- e.1vere 
~ Facsimile (208) 334~4498 
US Mail 
__ Ovemight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
X Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
1067 of 1617
M:iJ. 29 .. 2012 11: 59AM 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
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HJ GRATHOL, a Califomia general 
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTOPHER 
D. GABBERT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO ENLARGE TIME 
CHRISTOPHER D. GABBERT, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. I am an attoiney of reco1·d fo1· the Defendant HJ Grathol in this action and 
therefore am aware of the facts surrounding this matter, 
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2. The Court has requested post-trial briefing of the parties due on Friday, March 
23, 2012, with Reply Briefs due on Friday March 30, 2012. 
3. The Court has requested the pru.ties to provide proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, also due on Fl'iday Mru.·ch 30, 2012. 
4. On the afternoon of March 23, 2012, I received copies of the trial transcripts 
for the 5-day jury tt·ial dated March 5 through March 9, 2012. 
5. The trial transcript contains over 950 pages of testimony. 
6. Douglas Marfice has been away from the office from March 12, 2012 through 
March 30, 2012 for a previously scheduled vacation and has been unable to assist in the 
preparation of the briefing or the pl'oposed findings. 
7. Due to the time constraints and the volume of the trial transcript, I am unable 
to finalize and submit the Defendant's Reply Brief and the proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law by Friday, March 30, 2012. 
8. I have spoken with ITD's attorneys who are unwilling to agree to any 
extension of time. 
9. Grathol has not previously requested an extension of time. 
10. I believe that a one week enlargement of time to Friday, April 6, 2012 for the 
filing of the Reply Bdef and the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law will 
provide a reasonable time to finalize Defendant's submissions. 
11. O1'athol is not requesting the enlargement for improper purposes and does not 
believe that the one-week extension will unreasonably delay the orderly administration of this 
proceeding. 
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SUBSCRIBED & SWORN to before me this 2~ day of March, 2012, 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
No. 7595 P. 6/8 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day ofMai·ch, 2012J I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Th'll Thomas 
Deputy Attomey General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. Yol'k 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART1 LLP 
,.,.,.,, B ""'"'""' l:',U, OX L.JL. I 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
_k. Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
US Mail 
__ Oveinight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
,x Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S, Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christophel' D. Gabbe1t, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VINOS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
ORDER TO ENLARGE TIME 
This matter having come before the Court on Defendant HJ Grathol 's Motion to 
Enlarge Time; . 
Based on the pleadings and documents on file, the argument of counsel and evidence 
presented; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Enlarge Time for filing its Post 
Trial Reply Brief and proposed Findings of Pact and Conclusions of Law is hereby granted, and 
the deadline for the parties to submit theiL' Reply Bl'iefs and proposed Findings of Fact and 
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Conclusions ofLaw is enlarged by seven (7) days to April 6, 2012, 
DATED this-3° day of March, 2012. 
THE HONORABLE CHARLES HOSACK 
District Court Judge 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thej_Q_ day of March, 2012, I served a true and coffect copy of 
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaiyV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
Chrfatopher D. Gabbe1t 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d~Alene, ID 83816-1336 
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_ Overnight Mail 
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US Mail 
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_Jj_ Facsirnile (208) 343-8869 ;#- 11~~ 
US Mail 
_ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
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LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STA TE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8803 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V. York (ISB #5020) 
Steven C. Bowman (ISB #4404) 
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
VS, 
HJ ORATHOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVl0-10095 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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As directed by the Court, Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD"), 
submits the following proposed Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law. 
I. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
i-. -----This is a condemnation case brought by ITD to condenin a·portion of real 
property owned by Defendant HJ Grathol, a California general partnership ("Grathol"). The 
Court conducted a bench trial on March S through March 9, 2012. The Court has carefully 
reviewed and considered all of the testimony and evidence admitted at trial. The Court has also 
reviewed and considered the post-trial briefs filed by the parties, as well as prior briefing on 
ITD's motion for summary jud~ent and motions in limine. The Court has also reviewed its 
prior orders on the aforementioned motions. 
2. Based on a full and complete review of the record in this matter, the Court makes 
the following findings of fact. To the extent that any fmding of fact may also be a conclusion of 
law, that finding of fact is hereby incorporated within the Court's conclusions of law. 
3. Unless otherwise noted, references to e,chibits in these findings are to trial 
exhibits. References to the trial transcript shall be abbreviated as "Tr." 
A. The ITD Project. 
4. The Idaho Transportation Department is engaged in a project to widen and 
improve a section of US-95 between the communities of Garwood and Sagle in north Idaho ("the 
Project''). 
5. Mr. Jason Minzghor, P.E., is an engineer with ITD and has had primary 
responsibility for the Project. He testified at trial regarding the specifics of the Project. He also 
submitted a detailed affidavit regarding the Project on January 18, 2011. 
6. US-95 is the key north-south link for northern Idaho transportation, commerce, 
and tourism. In the area of the Project, US-95 is eUtTently a two-lane highway. Rapid growth in 
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Bonner and Kootenai Counties has caused traffic volumes to increase substantially, in turn 
causing traffic congestion and reduced public safety, The purpose of the Project is to improve 
safety and increase the capacity ofUS-95. 
1.--~--·--In-2002, ITO initiated a comprehensive study ofUS~9Sbetween Garwood and 
Sagle. The study detennined that US-95 should be redesigned and expanded to improve public 
safety and enable the highway to accommodate increasing traffic volumes. Id. This process 
involved extensive work with the public, local governmental entities, and state and federal 
agencies. 
8. The study cu1roinated in a decision by the Idaho Transportation Board to upgrade 
31.S miles of US-95 to a four-lane divided freeway with interchange access only. 
9. Due to the size of the US-95 Garwood to Sagle Project, it has been divided into 
seven segments. The Grathol property is located in the "Athol Segment" of the Project, ITD 
Project No. A009(791), Key No. 9791. The Athol Segment will convert approximately 1.8 miles 
of US-95 from a two-lane, unrestricted access highway to a four-lane divided and access-
controlled high.way. The Athol Segment will also construct an interchange with State Highway 
54 just outside the town of Athol. 
10. In order to construct the Project, ITD must take and condemn a portion of the 
Gtathol property. This is a partial taking case. 
11. ITD filed this action and had summons issued on November 17, 201 O. Therefore, 
under Idaho Code§ 7-712, the date oftalcing and the date of valuation in this case are 
November 17, 2010. 
B. The Grathol Property And The Taking. 
12, The Grathol property consists of 56.8 acres located in Kootenai County, Idaho, 
outside the town of Athol. 
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13. The Grathol property is baxe, undeveloped land, except for an old building located 
at the southwest comer of the property. 
14. The property is located at the northeast comer of present US-95 and Highway 54. 
It is bounded-by--US-9S on the west, State Highway 54 on the south;·Howard-Road on the east, 
and the Farragut Trail on the north. 
15. Upon completion of the US-9S Project, a small portion of the Grathol property 
will continue to have front.age on the former US-95. The remaining property will be adjacent to 
the new interchange with State Highway 54, at the northeast quadrant of the interchange. 
16. ITD is condemning 16.314 acres, leaving Grathol with 40.486 acres after the 
taking. A metes and bounds legal description of the 16.314 acres condemned in the Complaint is 
attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint. 
17. The Grathol property, the area of the take, and a computer-generated depiction of 
the new US-9S across the Orathol property are shown in detail in Trial Exhibit 166. 
18. Grathol first learned about the property in January 2008. At that time, the 
property was for sale, and the listing for the property by the Multiple Listing Service provided 
notice to any prospective purchaser that a highway interchange was planned to be constructed on 
the property. Specifically, the listing for the property stated that "preliminary drawings show 
future off-ramps and frontage road for [highway] 95 through this property." Trial Exhibit 16. 
The MLS listing also advised that the purchaser should "check with [the] Department of 
Transportation to verify" the details regarding the Project. 
19. Grathol purchased the 56.8 aere parcel on May 28J 2008 for the sum of 
$1,450,000. 
20. At trial, Mr. Skip Sherwood, testifying for Grathol, stated that he believed the 
seller was in financial distress when he sold the property to Gtathol. However, he did not 
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confirm this with the seller. Mr. Stan Moe, testifying for Im, stated that he spoke personally 
with the seller, who informed Mr. Moe that he was not in fmancial distress at the time of the sale. 
Mr. Moe also testified that he reviewed and relied on an affidavit from the seller attesting to the 
fact that the sale was not made under financiai disttess. Tne Cotu-t findscthis-evidence 
persuasive, The Court further finds that the May 28, 2008 sale of the subject property for 
$1,4S0,000.0O is indicative of the fair market value of the property at that time. 
21. According to the witnesses called by Grathol, Grathol purchased the property in 
order to pursue a mixed-use commercial development on the property. 
22. Before purchasing the property, Orathol started work on an application to 
Kootenai County to change the zoning of the property from Rural to Commercial. 
23. Grathol purchased the property on May 28, 2008 and submitted its rezone 
application to Kootenai County on May 30, 2008. Trial Exhibit 130, 
24. Grathol's rezone application referred to the US-95 Project and cited the Project as 
one of the reasons why a zoning change to Commercial was warranted for the property. Id The 
application stated that ''1-95 is soon to begin improvement to full freeway status, and will be 
realigned to cross this property, providing on and off-ramps at the Hwy 54 intersection." Id at 
A-3. 
25. On November 20, 2008, the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners issued an 
Order of Decision granting Grathol's requested zoning change, and ordered that the Grathol 
property be rezoned from Rural to Commercial, Trial Exhibit 135. 
26. No utilities or infrastructure have been added to the site. The City of Athol has 
refused annexation of the property and has refused to allow Grathol to connect to the city's sewer 
system, 
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27, In order to develop its property, Grathol will have to build its own waste water 
treatment system. Grathol will also have to use land application to dispose of its treated waste 
water or make arrangements for other property owners to accept its treated waste water. 
-- , C. Findingt Relating To Assessment Of Just Compensation;"- - .- .-. - · 
28. Idaho Code§ 7-711 governs the assessment of just compensation in Idaho 
condemnation cases. It requires the finder of fact to "ascertain and assess" the "value of the 
property sought to be condemned, and all improvements thereon pertaining to the realty[.]" I.C. 
§ 7-711(1). 
29. ITD has condemned 16.314 acres of the 56.8 acres owned by Grathol. No 
improvements are located on the condemned property. Therefore, Grathol is entitled to just 
compensation for the fair market value of the condemned property as of the date of talcing, 
November 17, 2010. 
30. Under Idaho Code§ 7-711, "[i]fthe property sought to be condenmed constitutes 
only a part of a larger parcel," then the :finder of fact must also "ascertain and assess" "(a) the 
damages which Will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance 
from the portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the improvement in the 
manner proposed by the plaintiff; and (b) the damages to any business qualifying under this 
subsection[.]" I.C. § 7-711(2)(a), (b). 
31. The Grathol property consists of 56. 8 acres of contiguous land. Therefore, the 
condemned property is part of a larger paxcel owned by Grathol. Accordingly, Grathol is entitled 
to recover damages, if any, to the remaining 40 .486 acres by reason of the severance of the 
16.314 acres from the remaining property. I.C. § 7-711(2)(a). 
32. The Grathol property is undeveloped and no business is operated on the property. 
Therefore, Idaho Code§ 7-71 l(b), governing claims for business damages, does not apply. 
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1. Fair market value of the condemned property. 
33. Based on the testimony at trial and the evidence presented, the Court finds that the 
highest and best use of the property is for commercial development. The Court further finds that 
. the highest-and-best use of the property is the same both before and-after the.taking. 
34. No testimony or evidence was presented at trial that Grathol is contemplating or 
has contemplated the idea of rezoning any portion of the property to a different use other than 
commercial. 
3 5. No testimony or evidence was presented at trial that portions of the Grathol 
property would be put to uses other than commercial uses or uses necessary to support 
commercial development. 
36. Based on the testimony at trial and the evidence presented, the Court finds that its 
determination of the highest and best use of the property for commercial development, both 
before and after the talcing, applies to all 56.8 acres. This finding is in accord with Grathol's 
application for rezoning and the decision of the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners 
approving the rezoning of the entire property to commercial use. This finding is also in accord 
with the development plans presented by Grathol. This finding is also in accord with the 
testimony and evidence showing that most of the 56.8-acre property would be used in the 
mixed-use commercial development planned by Grathol. 
37. Based on the testimony and evidence presented, the Court finds that Grathol 
failed to present persuasive evidence of economic feasibility or market demand for its planned 
commercial development in the near term. However, because the parties are in agreement that 
the highest and best use of the property, before and after the takina, is for commercial 
development, the Court finds sufficient basis for that conclusion. 
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38. The real estate appraiser called by Gtathol, Mr. Skip Sherwood, prepared a 
restricted appraisal report. He testified that in his opinion the fair market value of the 16 .314 
acres condemned by ITD is $1,598,543.00. 
39.- - -Fox.the followlng reasons, the Court does not find Mr; Shel'W'Ood's opinion to be 
credible or persuasive. 
a. The testimony at trial showed that Mr. Sherwood failed to follow the 
Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice ("USP AP") in conducting his appraisal. 
b. Mr. Sherwood used the ''sales comparison" approach to real estate 
valuation. However, he admitted at trial that most of the sales he relied on were in far superior 
locations in the cities of Spokane, Coeur d'Alene, and Post Falls. 
c. Many of the sales Mr. Sherwood relied on were of properties that had 
utilities and other improvements already in place or readily available to the property. 
d. By contrast, the Grathol property is in a comparatively remote location 
outside of Athol, has no improvements, and cannot tie into a municipal or other sewer system. 
e. A number of the sales were substantially smaller than the subject property, 
and Mr. Sherwood acknowledged in his testimony that small properties generally have a higher 
per acre or per square foot price than larger parcels like the Grathol property. 
f. Many of the sales used by Mr. Sherwood occurred at the top of the real 
estate market before the substantial drop in property values that occurred between the time of 
those sales and the date of taking in this case of November 17, 2010. 
g. Mr. Sherwood did not meaningfully or persuasively identify, explain, or 
quantify the adjustments he made to the sales he used in order to reflect the fair market value of 
the subject property. He made adjustments without explanation, quantification, or reasoning for 
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the adjustments. Thus, it is not possible to detennine what adjustments he made or evaluate the 
appropriateness of his adjustments. 
h. Mr. Sherwood's restricted appraisal report stated that he gave ''primary 
· - -- · emphasisP1o·two sales, one of which (Sale No. S) was a transactioiftlial occuired under threat of 
condemnation, which he himself stated in his report and testified at trial does not reflect ''market 
value." 
1. Mr. Sherwood did not value the whole Orathol property in the before 
condition. As discussed in more detail below, Mr. Sherwood used an artificial "larger parcel" as 
a device to increase the per square foot price of the Grathol property. 
J. Mr. Sherwood admitted that he valued the Grathol property in the "before" 
condition as of September 2010, rather than November 17, 2010. He also testified that he valued 
the Otathol property in the "after" condition l.S and 2.S years after the date of taking. Idaho law 
requires property in condemnation eases to be valued using the same date, for both the before 
and after value, and the law requires the date of taking to be the date of summons, which in this 
ease is November 17, 2010. See I.C. § 7-712. 
k. Mr. Sherwood added an amount to his opinion of fair market value to 
compensate Grathol for delay of 1.5 and 2.5 years in the completion of the US-9S Project. This 
construction delay claim is contrary to Idaho law and was dismissed by the Court prior to trial, 
However, Mr. Sherwood continued to include this claim in his testimony at trial. 
1. in post-trial briefing, Orathoi has suggested that the additionai amount 
added by Mr. Sherwood for construction delay was a variant or component of an "income 
approach" to the appraisal of real estate. However, Mr. Sherwood testified at trial that he did not 
use the income approach and only used the sales comparison approach, Tr. at 44 7 :2-11. He also 
testified that the income approach only applies to improved property that is producing income, 
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Id. It is undisputed that the Grathol property is bare land and is not producing income. In 
addition, Sherwood's appraisal report makes no mention of the income approach or discounting 
future income. Trial Exhibit 154. 
· -40;-- .· As the proponent of the comparablt·sales used by tv.lr; Sherwood, Grathol had the 
burden of satisfying the "strict foundation requirements [that] apply when evidence of 
comparable sales is offered as substantive proof of the value of the property taken." State ex rel. 
Symms v. Collier, 93 Idaho 19, 23,454 P.2d 56, 60 (1969). In all cases, the sales must have 
"sufficient criteria of similarity to be admitted as independent substantive evidence of the value 
of property taken." Id. The Court finds that the sales used by Mr. Sherwood did not have 
"sufficient criteria of similarity," Moreover, Mr, Sherwood could not identify, explain, or 
quantify the adjustments he made to the sales. Having selected sales that were substantially 
dissimilar to the subject property, and being unable to identify and explain the adjus1ments he 
made to the sales, Mr. Sherwood was not able to show that the sales could be relied upon as 
''proof of the value of the property taken." 
41. Mr. Alan Johnson is vice president and part owner of Grathol. He also gave an 
opinion of value of the Grathol property. However, he used an "as developed" valuation 
approach, as though the Grathol development project were completed. He also divided the 
property into different areas of value based on the anticipated composition of Grathol' s planned 
commercial development. These methods of valuing property are not pennitted in condemnation 
cases in Idaho. 
42. Mr. Johnson testified that the value of the 16.314 acres condemned by ITD is 
$2,295,360.00. His opinion of the compensation owed in this matter has gone through a number 
of iterations, taken different approaches, and has changed in amounts from his initial disclosures 
in October of 2011 through his testimony at trial on March 8, 2012. 
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43. Mr. Johnson is not areal estate appraiser. However, his opinion of value 
resembled a "sales comparison" approach to valuation used. by real estate appraisers. His 
analysis considered only one sale, which is not typical in the use of the sales comparison 
approach.· In addition, the evidence showed that Mr. Johnson;s·use of the sale to be unreliable 
for the following reasons. 
a. The sale Mr. Johnson relied on is considerably smaller than the Grathol 
property. However, he did not adjust the sale price to account for the size difference, resulting in 
an inflated opinion of value when applied to the Grathol property, 
b. The sale property had water and sewer/septic available. The Grathol 
property has no sewer or water, and those systems will have to be constructed at considerable 
expense to Grathol. Mr. Johnson made no adjustmen~ to reflect these differences. 
c. The sale relied on by Mr. Johnson occurred at the height of the real est.ate 
market, yet he made no adjus1ment to the date of taking in this case. By using a sale at the top of 
the market, without adjustment, his opinion of the value of the Grathol property as of the date of 
taking is inflated. 
d. The sale relied on by Mr. Johnson is located in the town of Sagle, and has 
measurably better potential for commercial development than the Grathol property. He made no 
adjustment for location or market support. 
e. Mr. Johnson did not identify or explain adjustments he made to the sale 
and neither the adjustments nor the methodology or reasoning he employed could be discerned or 
verified. 
f. The one adjustment Mr. Johnson apparently made appeared to be an 
arbitrary 20% upward adjustment based on the Orathol property being located at a signalized 
intersection. However, he did not account for the fact that the comparable sale in Saale was 
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shown by the testimony at trial to be a superior property in tenns of size, utilities, and 
development potential. 
g. With his upward adjustment of20%, Mr. Johnson opined that the Grathol 
property~is worth_$3.23 per sq. ft. About 3 months- after the sale of the Sagle property, that 
property was listed for sale again at $3 .48 per sq. ft. The property has been unable to sell at that 
price for over 3 years. This evidence indicates that there is no market for commercial property at 
that price. 
44. Based upon review and consideration of Mr. Johnson's testimony and the entire 
record in this matter, the Court does not find Mr. Johnson's opinion to be persuasive or a 
credible indication of the fair market value of the condemned property as of November 17, 2010. 
45. The opinions of value asserted by Mr. Sherwood and Mr. Johnson assume 
immediate and successful commercial development on the Grathol property. However, Grathol 
did not present any economic feasibility or market analysis to support this assumption. The 
evidence shows that the area has little or no demand for commercial development, particularly as 
of the date of valuation. The evidence also shows that the surrounding area has no consumer 
base to support end·users like grocery stores, retail chains, and restaurants that Gtathol has 
suggested will purchase lots within the commercial development Therefore, the evidence 
indicates that the property will most likely have to be held for a lengthy period of time before 
commercial development will be viable. 
46. ITD presented two appraisers at trial, Mr. Stan Moe, MAI, and Mr. Larry Pynes, 
ASA. Both appraisers testified that they prepared complete "before and after" appraisal reports. 
In addition to their testimony, Mr. Moe's appraisal repon was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 
12 by stipulation of the parties. 
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4 7. Mr. Moe testified that his opinion of the fair market value of the Grathol property 
before the taking is $1,973,650.00 and the fair market value of the remaining property after the 
talcing is $1,402,660.00. He therefore further testified that his opinion of just compensation 
,- .r· , owedto·6rathol is $571,000.00, being the difference between'thefait-market value of the 
property before and after the taking, determined as of November 17, 2010. 
48. Mr. Pynes testified that his opinion of the fair market value of the Grathol 
property before the taking is $2,350,000.00 and the fair market value of the remaining property 
after the taking is $1,675,000.00. He therefore further testified that his opinion of just 
compensation owed to Grathol is $675,000.00, being the difference between the fair market 
value of the property before and after the taking, determined as of November 17, 201 0. 
49. Both Mr. Moe and Mr. Pynes used the "sales comparison'' approach to real estate 
appraisal. They used sales that had similar characteristics to the Grathol property. They also 
explained and quantified the adjustments they made to the comparable sales in order to provide 
accurate and reliable indications of the market value of the Grathol property on the date of the 
taldng. 
50. Having carefully considered the testimony of Mr. Moe and Mr. Pynes and the 
record before the Court, the Court finds the opinions of Mr. Moe and Mr. Pynes to be credible 
and persuasive, and their opinions are reliable indications of the fair market value of the 
condemned property as of the date of taking. 
2, Severance Damages. 
S1. Orathol's appraiser, Mr. Skip Sherwood, testified that he did not find any 
severance damaaes to the remaining property. Tr. at S23:8-18. 
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52. Mr. Sherwood added amounts to his determination of the fair market value of the 
condemned property based on periods of 1.5 and 2.5 years of delay in completing the US~95 
Project. 
53. · - ·· Mr. -Sherwood testified that he added amounts to his opinion of the fair market 
value of the condemned property based on anticipated time needed for completion of the US-9S 
Project. Tr. at603:1 to 606:9. 
54. Mr. Sherwood also testified that the amounts he added to his opinion of just 
compensation had nothing to do with the fair market value of $2.25 per square foot that he 
assigned to the condemned property. Tr. at 606: 19-22. 
55. Mr. Sherwood also testified that he used two dates of valuation for his opinion of 
just compensation. He used dates of valuation of 1.5 and 2.S years after the date of taking, 
despite the fact that the date of value in this case is November 17, 2010. Tr. at 606:23 to 607: 15. 
56. Based on the record before the Court, including the restricted appraisal report of 
Mr. Sherwood (Trial Exhibit 154); expert witness disclosures pertaining to Mr. Sherwood; 
briefing by the parties; the trial testimony of Mr. Sherwood; and the rebuttal testimony of 
Mr. Moe and Mr. Pynes, the Court finds that the amounts added by Mr. Sherwood to his 
determination of the fair market value of the condemned property are a restatement of the 
construction delay claim previously dismissed by the Court. The amounts are not severance 
damages as defined by Idaho law and are not attributable to a decrease in fair market value of the 
property. 
57, In the opinion of Grathol' s other valuation witness, Mr. Alan Johnson, the 
remaining property has a higher value after the taking than before the taking. Specifically, his 
''before" value is $3.23 per sq. ft., which is lower than his "after" value of $4.00 to $4.50 per 
sq. ft. Since his "after" value is higher than his "before" value, no claim for severance damages 
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can be made based on the testimony and opinions of Mr. Johnson. Based on the definition of 
severance damages and the formula for determining severance damages under Idaho law, the 
Court cannot by law find severance damages based on the testimony of Mr. Johnson. 
58. Upon review of Mr. Johnson's oth~rtestimony, the'Court finds no credible or 
reliable basis to support a finding of severance damages based on his testimony. 
59. Mr. Johnson prepared an exhibit which contained heading labeled "Severance 
Damage." Trial Exhibit J. Based on the record before the Court and the testimony at trial, the 
Court finds that the severance damages claimed by Mr. Johnson are solely a product of 
calculations by him based on the time needed for ITD to complete the US-95 Project. Thus, 
Mr. Johnson's claim for severance damage is in fact a claim for construction delay, which is 
barred by Idaho law and was previously dismissed by the Court. 
60. Based on the entire record in this matter, the Court finds no persuasive evidence 
upon which to conclude that the remaining Grathol property suffered severance damages. 
61. The real estate appraisets called by ITD, Mr. Stan Moe, MAI and Mr. Larry 
Pynes, ASA also testified that the remaining property did not suffer any severance damages. 
They each testified that they had found no basis for concluding that Grathol's ability to proceed 
with their plans for commercial development of the property after the US-95 Project was 
impaired or damaged in any way. 
3. The "Larcer Parcel" Issue. 
62. In his restricted appraisal report and testimony at trial, Mr, Sherwood offered an 
opinion that the "larger parcel" to be valued in this case is a hypothetical 30-acre parcel within 
the 56.8 acres of the Grathol property. 
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63. All witnesses who testified on the subject at trial agreed that in the profession of 
real estate appraisal, the elements for identifying the "larger parcel" are unity of title, contiguity, 
and unity of use. 




All witnesses agreed that the 56.8 acres is contiguous. 
The Grathol property has not been subdivided. In addition, no physical barrier 
exists separating one portion of the property from any other portion. 
67. Mr. Sherwood testified that, in his opinion, the westernmost 30 acres of the 
property does not have "unity of use" with the other 26.8 acres. However, he did not testify that 
the 26.8 acres has a different highest and best use. He also did not testify that the 26.8 acres 
would not be put to commercial use. In addition, neither Mr. Sherwood nor anyone from Grathol 
testified that Grathol intends to rezone the 26.8 acres again, to perm.it uses such as industrial or 
residential uses on that property. 
68. Mr, Sherwood testified that the waste water treatment facilities needed for the 
Gtathol development would be placed on the eastern 26.8 acres, thereby conceding that at least 
some of the 26.8 acres would be part of the commercial development planned by Grathol. 
69. Grathol's witness, James Colem~ testified that Grathol would need between 13 
and 16 acres for the waste water treatment system and land application for the treated water. 
Coleman speculated that Grathol might be allowed to pipe its waste water onto someone else's 
property, but he did not testify that any such mangement had been made, 
70. ITD witness George Hedley testified that Grathol would need 19 to 25 acres of 
land application for its treated waste water based on det.ailed analyses by engineers with David 
Evans and Associates. Thus, both Grathol witness Coleman and ITD witness Hedley testified 
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that a substantial part of the eastern portion of the Grathol property would be needed for the 
commercial development planned by Grathol. 
71. The development plans presented by Grathol for both the before condition 
(without>&iy change to US-95) and the after condition (with eompletion-0fUS-9S Project) show 
commercial development on the 26.8 acres east of Mr. Sherwood's hypothetical 30-acre parcel. 
Below is a "before" site plan prepared by Grathol (without any change to US-95), which shows 
commercial development (a Travel Plaza) east of Mr. Sherwood's hypothetical 30-acre parcel. 
Specifically, the eastern edge of the hypothetical Sherwood parcel is the edge of where Grathol 
may construct Sylvan Road running from State Highway 54 on the southern edge of the property 
due north (shown by a yellow line). 
Trial Exhibit H, at p. 5. 
1, ,, ,---·---, 
ia:.=.· I 
', El I 
~, l M::J I ,, I 
: \ 1!11:11,'"""""'S.:"' I ii --'-·---
72. At trial, Geoffrey Reeslund, Orathol's vice president for project development, 
testified that Gtathol is proceeding with the development as planned. Tr. at 432:12-18. 
Mr. Reeslund did not testify that Grathol will not develop the eastern portion with commercial 
uses. Therefore, Mr. Sherwood's larger parcel detennination is contrary to the stated intention of 
his client. 
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73. · Mr. Sherwood testified that he believes commercial real estate developers and 
end~users do not typically buy parcels larger than 30 acres for commercial development. This 
testimony is refuted by the fact that Grathol bought the entire 56.8-acre parcel for commercial 
developme..'lt 3.1).d had the entire properttrezoned for commercial development. His opinion is 
also refuted by his own comparable sales, which reflect sales of commercial properties ranging 
in size from 9 acres to 235 acres. 
74. The second sale used by Mr. Sherwood in his sales comparison approach was a 
sale of commercial property consisting of235 acres. In his discussion of that sale, 
Mr. Sherwood noted that Cabela's committed to 40 acres alone, which refutes his claim that no 
end-users want anything larger than 30 acres. He also notes that a Wal-Mart is going in at that 
site, which further demonstrates that a nuxed use development like the one proposed by Grathol 
needs more than 30 acres. Similarly, Grathol has proposed one to two motels, an undefined 
"major" tenant, a travel plaza, and multiple pad sites for restaurants and other smaller users. In 
addition, testimony at trial established that the development will need land for setbacks, 
landscaping, roads, parking lots, waste water treatment facilities, and land application of treated 
waste water. 
75. Mr. Sherwood did not perform a market study or provide any documentation to 
support his claim that commercial real estate developments generally do not exceed 30 acres. 
He also did not offer any explanation for why Grathol bought a 56.8 acre parcel and rezoned the 
entire property for commercial use. 
76. Based upon review of his testimony and appraisal report, the Court finds that 
Mr. Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel is based on his belief that the hypothetical 30-acre 
parcel may have a higher value than the other 26.8 acres. As testified by all witnesses who 
addressed the subject, including Mr. Sherwood, "higher value'' is not a factor in detennining the 
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larger parcel in the field of real estate appraisal. The three elements are unity of title, unity of 
use, and contiguity. If higher value were the test, then every property owner could use the comer 
or frontage of its property to set the unit value for the condemned property and the before and 
after·Yfdue,ofthe·remainder. · This is not allowed under Idah<rlaw. -· ~ _. 
77, The Court finds that Mr. Sherwood created an artificial "larger parcel'' as a device 
to increase the per square foot price of the condemned property, 
78. Three of the valuation witnesses called at trial, Mr. Stan Moe, MAI, Mr. Larry 
Pynes, MAI, and Mr. Alan Johnson of Grathol, did a before and after valuation of the entire 56.8 
acres. Only Mr. Sherwood failed to value the entire property before and after the taking. 
79. Based on the testimony at trial and the evidence presented, the Court finds that the 
condemned property is part of a larger parcel of property owned by Grathol. The Court further 
finds that the larger parcel is the 56.8 acres owned by Grathol. The 56.8 acres has unity of title 
because it is all owned by Gtathol, and it is all contiguous. The 56. 8 acres also have unity of use 
in that the entire property is zoned commercial, its highest and best use is for commercial 
development, Grathol's plans show commercial development east of Sherwood's hypothetical 
30-acre parcel, and the weight of the testimony at trial established that much of the eastern 26.8 
acres will be needed for Grathol' s planned commercial development. 
80. The Court finds that Mr. Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel being a 
hypothetical 30-acre segment of the Grathol property is not credible or persuasive, and is not 
supported by the facts presented in the case. 
II, PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the record before it, the Court makes the following conclusions oflaw, To the 
extent that any conclusion of law may also be a finding of fact, that conclusion of law is hereby 
incorporated within the Court's findings of fact. 
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1. The Court incorporates the following prior orders in this case by reference as if 
set forth in full: Order Granting Possession of Real Property (filed Jan. 27,2011); Order Re: 
Motion in Limine (filed Feb. 3, 2012); Order Re: Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
·-
0 (filed-Feb. 3-, 2012); and Order Re: Defendant HJ Grathoi's Severance Damages (filed Feb. 16, 
2012), 
A. Foundational Legal Principles. 
2. Article I, section 14 of the Idaho Constitution provides that private property may 
be taken for public use. Idaho Const., art. I,§ 14. When the government seeks to acquire private 
property, it is required to pay just compensation for the taking. Id.; Covington -v. Jefferson 
County, 137 Idaho 777, 780, 53 P.3d 828~ 831 (2002). See also U.S. Const. amend V (providing 
that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation''). 
3. The threshold legal issues in a condemnation case are: (1) the scope and extent of 
the taldng; (2) whether the taking is needed for the public project; (3) whether the public use is a 
use authorized by law; ( 4) whether the condemning authority has the power of eminent domain; 
and (S) whether the or not the plaintiff has sought, in good faith, to purchase the lands sought to 
be taken. I.C. § 7-707(2). After an evidentiary hearing, the Court entered a written order 
resolving these issues. In that order, the Court held that the scope of the taking was defined in 
the Complaint. Order Granting Possession of Real Propetty, at 2, 1 2 and Exhibit A (legal 
description of the condemned property) (filed Jan. 27; 2011); The Cott.rt :further held that the 
taking in this case is for a public use, the taking is necessary for that use, ITD has the power of 
eminent domain, and it negotiated in good faith to purchase the portion of the Gtathol property 
needed for the US-95 Project. Id. at 3, 112-3. 
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4. In condemnation cases, the sole issue for trial is the amount of just compensation 
to be paid to the property owner for the talcing. See IDmd 7.01.1 ("[t]he sole issue for your 
determination is the just compensation to be paid to the defendant by the plaintiffI.]''). 
· · -· -·· ·5·, · - .. -The Idaho Legislature has enact~ legislation implementing the takings clause of 
the Idaho Constitution. See I.C. § 7-711. Under § 7-711, a landowner is entitled to 
compensation for (1) the value of the property taken, and (2) damages to the remam.ina property 
in partial taking cases (commonly referred to as "severance damages"). See Idaho Code§ 7-
711(1) and (2); State ex rel. Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444,446,546 P.2d 399,401 (1976). 
6. Gtathol has the burden of proving just compensation. See IDJI2d § 7.03; and 
Rocky Mountain Power v. Jensen,_ Idaho_,_ P.3d _ 2012 WL 2312S4, *5 (Jan. 26, 
2012) C'The burden of proving just compensation is bome by the landowner.,'). 
7. This is a partial taking case. Just compensation in partial takings eases is defined 
as follows. "Just compensation is the difference between the market value of the entire property 
before the taking and the market value of the remainder after the acquisition, together with any 
special damages caused by the taking, measured as of [the date of summons]." IDJI2d 7.16. 
8. ~'Fair market value" is defined as follows: 
The term "fair market value" means the cash price at which a 
willing seller would sell and a willing buyer would buy the subject 
property, in an open marketplace free of restraints, taking into 
aecount the highest and most profitable use of the property. 
It presumes that the seller is desirous of selling, but is under no 
compulsion to do so, and that the buyer is desirous of buying, but 
is under no compulsion to do so. 
It presumes that both parties are fully informed, knowledgeable 
and aware of all relevant market conditions and of the highest and 
best use potential of the property, and are basing their decisions 
accordingly. 
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IDJI2d 7.09. 
It presumes that the market is open and competitive, and that the 
subject property has been exposed to the market for a reasonable 
time. 
·. ,,9_ ·. "Severance damages" are defined as follows: .... - ··· . 
IDil2d 7.16.S. 
Severance damages may arise where the property being taken is 
only part of a larger parcel belonging to the defendant. Severance 
damage consists of either or both of the following: 
a. A diminution in the value of the remainder caused 
by the taking or severance of the parcel taken from the remainder; 
or 
b. A diminution in the value of the remainder caused 
by the construction upon and use put to the property taken. 
Severance damages are calculated by ascertaining the fair market 
value of the remainder immediately before the taking, and 
deducting from this value the fair market value which results after 
the severance of the part taken and after the construction of the 
project in the manner proposed by the plaintiff. 
10, As noted in the Findings of Fact, the three real estate appraisers in the case all 
testified that the remaining Grathol property did not suffer any severance damages. A fourth 
witness, Mr. Alan Johnson, included a line in an exhibit titled "Severance Damage." However, 
the amounts claimed under that heading were a product of Mr. Johnson's calculations for 
construction delay, Grathol's claim for construction delay was previously dismissed. 
11. Idaho jury instructions provide that the fmder of fact C{may consider the owner's 
particular plan for development and use of the property only for the purposes of determining uses 
for which the property is adaptable." IDJI2d 7.14. Therefore, Orathol's attempts to value the 
property "as developed" and its assignment of particular land values to particular portions of the 
property based on its anticipation of the eventual composition of its commercial development is 
not permitted under Idaho law. 
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B. Date Of Valuation. 
12. Idaho Code§ 7-712 provides: 
For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right 
thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the 
summons., and its actual value, at that date1 shall be the measure of 
compensation for all property to be actually taken, and the basis of 
damages to property not actually taken, but injuriously affected, in 
all cases where such damages are allowed, as provided in the last 
section. 
I.C. § 7-712 (emphasis added). 
13. That the valuation of the taking and severance damages must be made as of the 
date of t.aking has been repeatedly recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court. See, e.g., State ex 
rel. Moore v. Bastian, 91 Idaho 444,449,546 P.2d 399,404 (1976); State ex rel. Symms v. 
Collier, 93 Idaho 19, 21-22, 454 P.2d 56, 58-59 (1969) (the date of swnmons "shall be the 
measure of compensation."). See also IDJI2d 7 .OS, 7.0S. 1. 
14. Thus, Idaho law requires that just compensation be assessed as of the date of 
taking, including "damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned, by 
reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the 
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff[.]" I.C. § 7-711(2). This requires the 
property to be valued in the after condition as if the public project has been built as of the date of 
taking. 
15. Mr. Sheiwood did not do this. He used future dates of 1.5 and 2.5 years after the 
date of taking in forming his opinion of the value of the property after the taking. Mr. Johnson 
was less specific, but stated in his expert disclosures that his opinion of the value of the property 
after the talcing used a period of at least three years after the date of taking of November 17, 
2010. Trial Exhibit 156 (Grathors Third Supp. Resp. to Disc., atp. 7). 
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16. In Spokane & Palouse Ry Co., the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district 
court erred by even allowing a witness to testify as to a date of valuation other than the date 
mandated by the statute. 
[O]ne of the witnesses for defondant, upon his cross-examination, 
testified that he based his estimate of damages upon the present 
value of the property, while the statute fixes the value of the 
property at the time it was taken as the rule. We think the court 
erred in allowing this restimony to stand against the plaintiff's 
motion to strike it out, but we think such error was rendered 
hannless by the reiterated charge of the court to the jury that they 
were to find from the evidence the value of the property on 
September 27, 1890, the time of the taking. 
2 Idaho 1101, 29 P. at 854 (emphasis added). In its decision, the Court relied on Section 5221 of 
the Idaho Revised Statutes, which contained the identical language as the current Idaho Code 
§ 7-712, requiring compensation and damages to be determined as of the date of summons. Id 
17, Since the Idaho Supreme Court has held that it is error to allow testimony of an 
opinion of value based on a date other than the date of the taking, the Court finds that it may not 
rely on the opinions of Mr. Sherwood or Mr. Johnson, who used dates of value years after the 
date of taking, in forming their opinion of the amount of compensation to be awarded in this 
case. 
C. Mr. Sherwood's Use Of A Transaction Made Under Threat Of Condemnation Is 
Barred By Law. 
18. Mr. Sherwood's comparable sale No. S was a transaction under threat of 
condemnation. In his report, Mr. Sherwood states: "I understand this sale was negotiated under 
threat of condemnation and courts have ruled that these sales may not represent true market 
value for this reason." Trial Exhibit 154 (Sherwood restricted appraisal report, at 8). 
19. At trial, Mr. Sherwood testified that "I've been in a condemnation case before 
where the purchase by a govenunent entity was disallowed for that reason [ does not represent 
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market value]." Tr. at 556:22-24 (brackets added). Mr. Sherwood is correct in his understanding 
of the law. The clear weight of authority shows that courts exclude such sales 
20. The definition of"fair market value" "presumes that the seller is desirous of 
selling, but is under no compulsion to do so; a."id that the buyer-is desirous of buying, but is under · .. "' · 
no compulsion to do so." IDJI2d 7.09. Thus, where the property is acquired as part of a 
compromise between a condemnor and a landowner, the sale is not voluntary because both 
parties are under compulsion to buy and sell the property. As such, courts uniformly exclude 
evidence of the sale as inadmissible. See, e.g., State v. DeTienne, 707 P.2d 5341 537~38 (Mont. 
1985) ("it is generally held by the weight of authority that evidence of the sale of a parcel of land 
subject to condemnation to the proposed condemner or to another potential condemnor may not 
be admitted as evidence of the value of the land condemned. 11) (quoting S NICHOLS ON EMINENT 
DOMAIN § 21.33). 
21. Despite his own acknowledgement that courts will not accept such transactions as 
indications of fair market value, Mr. SheIWood states in his report that "I considered the values 
of the comparable sales with primary emphasis on comparables 5 and 7 .... " Trial Exhibit 154 
at 9 (emphasis added). By bis own admission, Sherwood's appraisal places primary emphasis on 
Sale No. 5, a transaction that does not represent fair market value. For this reason and the othe1 
reasons stated herein, much of Mr. Sherwood's appraisal is inadmissible and cannot be relied 
upon as an indication of fair market value or a proper basis for determining just compensation in 
this case. 
D. Severance Damages. 
22. In Idaho, "[i]t is a well-established principle that where the public's use of the 
condemned land diminishes the value of other adjoining, untaken property, the owner is entitled 
to recover this loss (typically referred to as 'severance damage') in addition to the value of the 
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invaded land.'' C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Hwy. Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 148, 75 P.3d 194,202 
(2003) (parentheses in original). 
23. Idaho's civil jury instructions define "severance damages" as: 
a, A diminution in the valae of the remainder· caused by the 
taking or severance of the parcel taken from the remainder; or 
b. A diminution in the value of the remainder caused by the 
construction upon and use put to the property taken. 
IDJI2d 7.16. S. 
24. Thus, "severance damages" encompass only those damages that arise from the 
"public's use of the condemned land." In Idaho, a landowner is only entitled to compensation 
for damages to the remaining property "by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be 
condemned." Idaho Code§ 7-711(2). 
2S. To be compensable, the alleged severance damages must have accrued "because 
o/' the take. Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Walker, 80 Idaho 10S, 109,326 P.2d 388,391 
(1958), 
26. Thus, severance damages are only recoverable if they are actually "caused by the 
public use." See C&G, Inc., 139 Idaho at 148, 75 P.3d at 202 (Hohnhorst, specially concurring). 
See also SA Nichols, Eminent Domain§ 16.02[1] (3d ed.2002) (stating "severance damages may 
be defined as damages or diminution in the value of the remainder resulting from the taking of a 
portion of a tract of land") ( emphasis added). 
27. Orathol's appraiser, M_r, Sherwoo~ testified at trial that the property did not 
suffer any severance damages. Both his trial testimony and his appraisal teport states that the 
remainder property has a value of $2.25 per square foot before the taking and $2.25 per square 
foot after the taking. 
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8 Q. All right. Where you used the same per unit 
9 value in all of your calculations, you used it - in 
10 the before value, you used $2.25 a square foot, you 
11 used the after value of $2.25 a square foot -- excuse 
12 me -- that was the part taken at $2.2S a square foot, 
NO. 4516 P. 28/46 
13 and the after value at $2.25 a square foot. Would it 
14 be fair to say that you conclude t.11ere's zero severance 
15 damages? 
16 A. There's zero severance, correct. 
17 Q. So I'm going to put a circle around zero. 
18 A. Okay. 
28. Idaho's jury instructions establish the method for calculating severance damages. 
"Severance damages are calculated by ascertaining the fair market value of the remainder 
im.mediately before the talcing, and deducting from this value the fair market value which results 
after the severance of the part taken and after the construction of the project in the manner 
proposed by the plaintiff." IDJI2d 7.16.5. 
29. Stated as a formula, the method for determining severance damage in Idaho is: 
Value of Remainder Before Taking 
-Value of Remainder After Taking 
= Severance Damages 
30. Using the Idaho formula, Mr. Sherwood's opinion that the remainder is worth 
$2.25 before the taking, minus his opinion that the remainder is worth $2.25 after the tal<lng, 
equals $0.00 severance damages. 
31. Mr. Sherwood further testified that he did not assess any damages for loss of 
access. Tr. at 524: 17-19. He also testified that he did not assess any severance damages for loss 
of visibility. Tr. at 527:16-18. And he testified that he did not assess any damages based on 
utilities. Tr. at 524:S-8. He offered no testimony of damages to the remainder property due to 
the severance of the condemned property from the remainder. 
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32. In its Findings of Fact above, the Court found that the additional amount added by 
Mr. Sherwood to his determination of the fair market value of the condemned property is in fact 
a claim for construction delay. 
·· ·· 33. In its post trial briefi Gtathol s-.1ggested that ~.r~·Sherwood's calculation of 
construction delay is some variant or component of an "income approach" to real estate 
valuation. However, Mr. Sherwood's appraisal report (Trial Exhibit 154) makes no mention of 
the income approach to real estate appraisal. In addition, he testified at trial that he did not use 
the income approach and that the income approach only applies to improved property generating 
income and does not apply to undeveloped land that is not generating income. Tr. at 447:2-11. 
34. Grathol has also not provided any authority for the proposition that Mr. Sherwood 
should be permitted to determine the fair market value of the property through the "sales 
comparison approach" and then add an additional amount to that figure using some variant or 
component of the "income approach. 11 To do so would result in an impermissible double 
recovery in the form of taking two real estate valuation methods and adding the results together 
to make a large, combined claim for compensation. 
35. In its post trial brief, Gtathol also suggests that Mr. Sherwood's future value 
discounted back to the date of taking is the same thing as adjustments for "date of sale" that 
appraisers make to comparable sales used in the sales comparison approach. However, 
Mr. Sherwood did not testify that his discounting for delay bad anything to do with adjustments 
made to comparable sales in the comparable sales approach. Moreover, Grathol has failed to cite 
any authority to support its post-trial contention. Thus, the Court concludes that Mr. Sherwood's 
claim for additional compensation in the amounts of $176,757 and $280,757 based on 
construction delay cannot be equated with adjustments to comparable sales made as part of the 
sales comparison approach to real estate valuation. 
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36. Grathol's other valuation witness, Mr. Johnson, prepared an exhibit which 
contained a section labeled "Severance Damage." Trial Exhibit J. Based on the record before 
the Court and the testimony at trial, the Court finds that the severance damages claimed by 
M1-..--Johnson are solely a product of calculations by him based·on the bis estimate of the delay by 
ITD in completing the US-95 Project. Thus, Mr. Johnson's claim for severance is in fact a claim 
for construction delay, which is barred by Idaho law and was previously dismissed by the Cowt. 
3 7. In its post trial brief, Gtathol m~e no attempt to explain or justify the 
"severance" damage claim by Mr. Alan Johnson. 
38. The record also shows the calculations by both Mr. Sherwood and Mr. Johnson 
mirror their construction delay calculations before that claim was dismissed by the Court. 
39. Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the amounts added by 
Mr. Sherwood and Mr. Johnson to their determination of the fair market value of the property are 
not severance damages. 
40. The Court further concludes that Grathol has provided no persuasive evidence 
that would support an award of severance damages in this case. 
E. Construction Delay, 
41. Grathol has freely admitted that the discounting calculations by Mr. Sherwood 
and Mr. Johnson are based on the future value of the property 1.5 to 2.5 years (Sherwood) or at 
least three years (Johnson) after the date of taking, to account for the time needed to complete 
the US-95 Project. Neither Mr. Shetwood nor Mr. Johnson testified to any reason for the these 
calculations and add-ons other than the time needed to complete the US-95 Project. 
42. Idaho law requires that just compensation be assessed as of the date of taking, 
including ''damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned, by reason of 
its severance from the portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the improvement 
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in the manner proposed by the plaintiff[.]" I.C. § 7-711(2). This requires the property to be 
valued in the after condition as if the public project has been built as of the date of taking. Mr. 
Sherwood and Mr. Johnson did not do this. For example, Mr. Sherwood used future dates of 
valuation of l.5 and 2.5 years after the date cftaking, and then added $280,757 and $176,757, 
respectively, to his opinion of the value of the condemned property. 
43. As noted above, Mr. Sherwood's and Mr. Johnson's additional sums for delay are 
not "severance" damages. These amounts are claims for compensation based on their estimate of 
the time it will take ITO to complete the US-95 Project, and those claims have been dismissed by 
the Court, 
44. Under Idaho law, '"before an owner is entitled to compensation for a violation of 
Article I, § 14 of the Idaho Constitution, his property must be 'taken' and not merely 
'damaged."' Moon v. N. ldaho Farmers Ass'n, 140 Idaho 536,541, 96 P.3d 637,642 (2004). 
45. The landowner has the burden of proving that he has a valid property right and 
that the property right has been taken. Reuth v. State, 100 Idaho 203,218,596 P.2d 75, 90 
(1978). 
46. The Court finds no Idaho statute or case law supporting the proposition that 
Orathol has a protected property right to have the us.95 Project constructed on a schedule or by 
a date desired by Grathol. 
4 7. A landowner cannot recover damages where there is "no indication that the 
condition is permanent." Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 7771 781-82~ 53 PJd 828, 
832-33 (2002) (emphasis added) (citing Marty v. State, 122 Idaho 766, 769, 838 P.2d 1384, 1387 
(1992)). Likewise, the Idaho Supreme Court held in Moon that ''the mere interruption of the use 
of one's property, as it is less than a permanent (complete) deprivation, does not mandate 
compensation." Moon, 140 Idaho at 542, 96 P.3d at 643. See also 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT 
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DOMAIN § 13.19 ("Under the prevailing rule, the profits a business owner has been deprived of 
by reason of the interruption of operations by the condemnation are not compensable."), 
48. By its nature, an alleged "delay" in construction of the US-95 Project is not 
· pennanent, .. Anything less than a permanentdeprivation ofpmp-erty does not amount to a 
compensable taking. Covington, 137 Idaho at 781, S3 P.3d at 832; Moon, 140 Idaho at 542, 96 
P.3d at 643. See also 3 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN§ 10.02(3), n.61 (Matthew Bender, 3rd 
ed.) (citing cases}. 
49, In Jusfs, Inc. 11. Arrtngton Const. Co. 1 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978), the 
Idaho Supreme Court denied a claim based on construction delay in the course of a public 
project, and highlighted the policy reasons behind the rule that a landowner cannot recover 
damages for construction delay. The Supreme Court reasoned that "[t]his plaintiff is surely not 
the only person who may have suffered some pecuniary losses as a result of the downtown 
renovation project" but "could conceivably include not only all the other business in the area, but 
also their suppliers, creditors, and so forth, ad i,,tinitium." Id at 470, 583 P.2d at 1005. Thus, 
the court reversed the award of damages because such a holding "would unduly burden any 
construction in a business area." Id. 
SO. In summary, claims in condemnation cases for compensation based on 
construction delay are barred by the Idaho Constitution and decisions by the Idaho Supreme 
Court, 
St. In its 0tder addressing ITD's motion for S\llw-nary judgment, the Cow-t noted that 
at the February 2, 2012 hearing on ITD's motion, "Grathol's counsel conceded that three of 
Grathol's claims could be dismissed, to wit: (1) construction delay; (2) lost profits; and (3) 
gravel damages," Order Re: Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment, at 2-3. Accordingly, 
the Court ruled that "ITD's Motion for Summary Judgment re: (1) construction delay; (2) lost 
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profits; and (3) gravel damages is granted based upon Grathol's concession, and these claims are 
hereby stricken[.]" Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
52. Therefore, Grathol's claims for construction delay and lost profits were dismissed 
orrsummary judgment, and are hereby dismissed again. 
F. Tbe Larger Parcel Issue. 
S3. As noted in the Findings of Fact, Mr. Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel 
being a hypothetical 30-acre segment of the 56.8-acre Grathol property is contrary to the facts 
and not supported by the criteria used by real estate appraisers to determine the larger parcel for 
a real estate appraisal (contiguity, unity of use, unity of title). 
S4. Mr. Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel is based on his belief that a 
hypothetical 30-acre piece of the property has a higher value than the other 26.8 acres. "Higher 
valueu is not a factor in determining the larger parcel under either Idaho law or the field of real 
estate appraisal. The three elements are unity of title, unity of use, and contiguity. If higher 
value were the test, then every property owner could use the comer or frontage of its property to 
set the unit value for the condemned property and the before and after value of the remainder. 
This is not allowed under Idaho law. 
5S. At the close oftrial, the Court directed Grathol to cite Idaho law that would 
support the larger parcel opinion of Mr. Sherwood. In its post trial brief filed March 23, 2012, 
Grathol did not cite any Idaho statutes, case law, or jury instructions that support Sherwood1s 
opinion of the larger parcel. 
56. Idaho law bars the use of an artificial division of property as the basis for 
determining just compensation in a condemnation case. 
57. Idaho Code § 7-707 states that "[t]he complaint must contain: ... (5) A 
description of each piece of land sought to be taken, and whether the same includes the whole, or 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 32 
1104 of 1617
.APR. 6.2012 4:34PM NO. 4516 P. 34/46 
only a part, of an entire parcel or tract." I.C. § 7-707 (emphasis added). In this case, no 30-acre 
parcel or tract of land exists. Rather, the ''whole" or "entire parcel or tract" is the 56.8 acres 
owned by Gtathol. 
58.- Idaho Code § i-i 11 governs the assessment of just compensation. 
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal testimony as may 
be offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon 
must ascertain and assess: ... If the property sought to be 
condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel: (a) the 
damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be 
condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to 
be condemned, and the construction of the improvement in the 
manner proposed by the plaintiff[.] 
I.C. § 7-711(2) (emphasis added). 
59. In Idaho~ the "larger parcer' is the property owned by the defendant, so long at it 
is contiguous and has the same highest and best use. Grathol cannot create an artificial larger 
parcel, particularly in the absence of any facts to support a division of the property. 
60. No case law or appraisal principle cited by Grathol supports the designation of 
part of a piece of property that is contiguous, under the same ownership, with the same zoning, 
and having the same highest and best use as the larger parcel. 
61. Idaho jury instructions make clear that Orathol' s attempt to create an artificial 
larger parcel is contrary to Idaho law. IDJI 7.16 states: 
Just compensation is the difference between the market value of 
the entire property before the taking and the market value of the 
remainder after the acquisition, together with any special damages 
caused by the taking, measured as of [date). 
IDil2d 7.16 (emphasis added). The entire Grathol property is 56.8 acres, not 30 acres. Grathol's 
wimesses disputed the fact that the remainder of the Grathol property after the taking is 40. 5 
acres (56.8 - 16.314 = 40.486 acres). The agreement as to the remainder necessarily reflects the 
reality that the "larger parcel" is 56.8 acres. 
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62. The Comment to IDJI 7.16 states: "This instruction applies where there is a 
partial ta.lee with severance damage to the remainder and no offsetting benefit." Comment, 
IDJI2d 7. 16. It is undisputed that this is a partial taking case and that Grathol has sought to 
:recoverseverance damages. Therefore, IDJI 7.16 govemsthe detennination of just 
compensation in this case, and that determination begins with the market value of the entire 
property, not an artificial portion of the entire property. 
63. Similarly, IDJI 7.16.1 sets forth factors that may be considered in determining 
what compensation should be paid for severance damages, if any, "to the remainder of the 
property." IDJUd 7, 16.1 ( emphasis added). The instruction makes clear that these factors may 
only be considered to the extent that they are found to "affect the market value of the property.'' 
Id. The Comment to IDn 7 .16.1 is particularly germane to the ''larger parcel" issue. 
Where there is no benefit claimed to the remainder, the approach 
of St.ate v. Dunclick, Inc., 77 Idaho 45 (1955), of detennining just 
compensation by subtracting the fair market value of the remainder 
from the fair market value of the whole before the take would 
eliminate the necessity for tbis instruction. Where, however, the 
parcel taken and the parcel remaining are separately valued, this 
instruction might be useful. 
Comment, IDil2d 7.16.1 (emphasis added). The entire statutory scheme in Idaho, as reflected in 
the jury instructions, is premised on the market value of the whole property and the market value 
of the remainder. 
64. These principles are further demonstrated in IDJI 7.16.S, which states that 
"Severance damages may arise where the property being taken is only part of a larger parcel 
belonging to the defendant.'' IDJI2d 7.16.S (emphasis added). The larger parcel is the whole 
property belonging to the defendant. Again, Idaho's statutes and jury instructions are based on 
the determination of the fair market value of the whole property owned by the defendant and the 
remaining property after the taking. 
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65, The Idaho Supreme Court has long enforced these legal principles. In Idaho. 
Western Ry. Co. v. Columbia Conference of Evangelical Lutheran Synod, 20 Idaho 568, 119 P. 
60 (1911 ), the Court cited the provisions of Idaho Code now codified as § 7-711 and held: 
·It will be observed by the·fowgoing statute that under the laws of 
this state three facts are to be determined in a condemnation suit 
where it is not sought to take the entire tract of land but only a 
portion thereof. First, the value of the property sought to be 
condemned together with all the improvements thereon pertaining 
to the realty; second, if the property sought to -be condemned 
constitutes only apart of the larger parcel, the damages which 'Will 
accrue to the remaining portion by reason of the severance must be 
assessed; and, third, if the property sought to be condemned 
constitutes a part of a larger parcel, the benefits which will accrue 
to the remaining portion after the severance of the part condemned 
must be ascertained and assessed and be deducted from the 
damages that will be sustained by the severance. 
Id. at 119 P. 64 ( emphasis added). It is undisputed that ITO is not condemning "the entire tract 
of land" owned by Grathol, "but only a portion thereof." It is also undisputed that the 
condetnned property is "part of a larger parcel." And, lastly, it is undisputed that "the entire tract 
of land" owned by Grathol is 56.8 acres. No factual or legal basis exists for determining just 
compensation in this case based on an artificial 30-acre segment of "the entire tract of land." 
66. In Big Lost River Irrigation Co. v. Davidson, 21 ldaho 160, 121 P. 88 (1912), the 
Idaho Supreme Court, again citing the statutory provisions now codified as Idaho Code § 7-711, 
explained: 
Under the provisions of the statute it was not necessary that the 
jury should find the value of each legal subdivision of the tract 
sought to be condemned. ~~ however, there is more than one 
parcel of land, or several separate parcels or 'tracts, each 
separated from the other, then it is necessary for the jury to 
determine the value of each separate tract or parcel. But where the 
tract is a single or consolidated tract, the value then may be fixed 
as a single parcel or tract. "Parcel" or "tract" of land, as used in 
this section1 does not mean legal subdivision1 bur a consolidated 
body of land, and the finding of the jury may be upon each single 
parcel or tract ofland. 
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Id. at 121 P. at 92 {emphasis added). In this case, the Grathol property has not been subdivided. 
No separate parcels ofland exist, and no separate parcels are "each separated from the other.,, 
Rather, the undisputed facts are that Grathol owns 56.8 acres of contiguous real property. By 
·· · any definition; the Orathol property is a ~'cunsolidated body ofland;" · 
67. In State ex rel. Rich v. Dunclick, 77 Idaho 45,286 P.2d 1112 (1955), the Idaho 
Supreme Court began by noting: 
Under our Constitution and statutes, Art. I, § 14, Idaho 
Constitution and sections 7-711 and 7-7141.C., a defendant in a 
condemnation suit is entitled to be paid in money the value of the 
property to be taken and the damages which will accrue to the part 
not taken because of its severance. 
Id. at 51, 286 P .2d at 1116. The Court then described the formula for determining just 
compensation in Idaho: 
When such reasonable market value of the part taken has 
been determined and fixed, appellant is then entitled to further 
recover the damages to the remainder. This latter sum is 
determined by market value of such remainder before and after the 
talcing. The difference is the severance damage. 
Id. at 55-56, 286 P.2d at 1118. Idaho courts could not follow this formula if property owners 
were allowed to create artificial "larger parcels'' and artificial "remainders." The only workable 
approach, and the only approach authorized by Idaho law, is to base the larger parcel and 
remainder on contiguous real property having the same ownership, the same zoning, and the 
same highest and best use. In this case, the larger parcel is plainly 56.8 acres. 
68. The Supreme Court case State~ rel. Rich v Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269,328 P.2d 60 
(1958), demonstrates when separate parcels of land, but under common ownership, should not be 
considered together as a "larger parcel" for purposes of determining just compensation for 
property taken and damages to the remainder. In Fonburg, the state sought to condemn 12.76 
acres of Ponblll'g's farm to build a new_ highway. Id. at 274, 328 P.2d at 61. A railroad line 
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divided Fonburg's property in the before condition. Id. at 274, 328 P.2d at 62. Fonburg also 
owned 11land non.contiguous to the land through which the new road crosses, namely, a 
residence and fann land, located in or near Culdesac, and north from the railroad track1 his 
dwelling being approximately 600 to 1,000 feet distant fromthe-landtaken." Id. Fonburg • · 
sought severance dam.ages for impacts on the land where his home was located. In other words, 
Fonburg wanted his home and surrounding property to be included with his farm as part of a 
"larger parcel" of land, a portion of which was being condemned by the state. The Idaho 
Supreme Court rejected this claim. 
The contention of appellant in assignments of error and 
arguments here made, that bis residence in Culdesac, and 
ownership of land non-contiguous to and disconnected with the 
land sought to be condemned should be considered as an element 
of severance damage is not sustainable. The different parcels of 
defendant's land, separated and located at a distance, one from the 
other, one south of the track and the other north, are not severed by 
the proposed road. The land separating the two parcels of 
defendant's land is owned by third persons. The trial judge did not 
err in refusing to instruct the jury to allow severance damages in 
this regard. 
Id. at 277, 328 P.2d at 64. 
69. In this case, Grathol's property is all contiguous. It is not divided by a railroad 
line, and no third party owns land between the artificial 30-acre parcel used by Sherwood and the 
rest of the Grathol property. On the contrary, the Orathol property is all contiguous. It is a 
"consolidated body ofland." Big Lost River, 21 Idaho 160, 121 P. at 92. 
70. In State ex rel. Symms v. Collier, 93 Idaho 19, 454 P .2d 56 (1969), the district 
court and the Idaho Supreme Court had no difficulty identifying the larger parcel of land to be "a 
40 acre tract belonging to defendants,'' id at 20, 4S4 P .2d at 57, despite the fact that the 40 acres 
was aetually divided into separate tracts. In Collier, the state filed a condemnation action 
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to acquire 25.47 acres of land located in Ada County for the 
pwpose of constructing thereon an interchange between Broadway 
Avenue, Boise, and Interstate Highway 80N. The property to be 
acquired was part of a 40 acre tract belonging to defendants. The 
land remaining in possession of defendants after the taking is 
approximately 14.5 acres divided into five separate tracts. The 
entire area was characterized as undevelop·ect~· dry graze land. The 
best use for the land apparently was industrial. 
Id. (emphasis added), 
71. In this case, Grathol owns a 56.8-acre tract of land. The valuation witnesses on 
both sides all testified that the land has the same highest and best use. As in Collier, the Grathol 
property is undeveloped land. In Collier, the larger parcel was found to be the entire 40-acre 
tract, even though it was actually divided into separate tracts, five of which remained after the 
taking, In Grathol, the property has not been divided into tracts. If the Idaho Supreme Court 
deemed the larger parcel to be the whole property owned by the Colliers, even though it had 
actually been divided, it would certainly do so in this case, where the Grathol property has not 
been divided. 
72. In State ex. rel. Symms v. City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528,493 P.2d 387 
(1972), the S"'i.ate sought to condemn 14 acres ofland owned by the Ciiy of Mountain Home for 
Interstate 80. As described by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
The property taken (about 14 acres) was part of a larger 
tract of land (255.44 acres) which was purchased by the city in 
1963 for $36,000 and which was to be developed and used for 
recreational purposes, including an eighteen-hole golf course, a 
trap shoot, a fishing and skating pond, a park, trailer parking, an 
archery range. and hiking areas; 
Id. at 530, 493 P.2d at 389. After a jury trial, the state appealed the verdict arguing, in part, that 
the city could not recover severance damages to the land where the golf course was located 
because it was distant from the area of the taking. Id., at 531,493 P.2d at 390. The Idaho 
Supreme Court denied this part of the appeal, finding that the jury properly concluded that the 
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"larger parcel" was the entire 255.44 acres ofland owned by the city. Id. at 532,493 P.2d at 
387. 
As part of its ruling, the Supreme Court held that "[i]f, as a matter of fact, the parcel 
,tfiken,is part of a larger tract held by-the same owner, it is error to ,consider such parcel as if it 
constituted an entire tract separate and apart from other property in the possession of the same 
owner." Id. at 531, 493 P .2d at 390 ( emphasis added). This principle is controlling in the case at 
hand. Moreover, in the present case, no 30-acre tract exists. It is not the product of any legal 
division or any physical separation from the other Grathol property. 
The Court in Mountain Home further held: 
The question raised by the state is, in essence, whether the 255 
acres owned by the city (and including the golf course land) may 
properly be considered a 'larger parcel,' only a part of which is 
sought to be condemned, within the meaning of I.C. § 7-711. 
'Parcel,' as used in this section, means a consolidated body of land. 
Big Lost River Irrigation Co. v. Davidson, 21 Idaho 160, 171-172, 
121 P. 88 (1912). Ordinarily, the question whether two pieces of 
land constitute a single parcel is a practical one for the jury, which 
should consider evidence on the use and appearance of the land, its 
legal divisions, and the intent of its owner. 
Id. at 532,493 P.2d at 391. In the case at hand, no 30-acre parcel exists. Therefore, no 1;i10,mds 
exist for even considering whether the artificial 3 0-acre parcel is part of a larger parcel or not. 
Since the 56.8 acres of the Gtathol property is not divided or separated in any way, no legal or 
factual basis exists to take a smaller part of the whole and call the smaller piece the larger 
parcel. 
73. The criteria set by the Supreme Court in Mountain Home also make clear that the 
larger parcel is the entire Grathol property. It is all zoned for the same use. Its appearance is the 
same- undeveloped land. No legal division exists creating the 30-acre parcel. Gtathol's site 
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plans (both in the before and after) show commercial development on the land east of the 
artificial 30~acre parcel. Therefore, the intended use of the property is the same. 
74. In City of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 136 P.3d 310 (2006), the 
-Idaho Supreme Court noted that "Cour.s ~ypically reject the so .. called 'conceptual severance' 
theory - the notion that whole units of property may be divided for the purpose of a takings 
claim." Id. at 848, 136 P .3d at 319. This is precisely the situation here. Otathol is attempting to 
divide the whole for the purpose of enhancing its recovery in a takings case. · 
75. Grathol has cited cases from outside Idaho to attempt to support Sherwood's 
theory of the larger parcel in this case. However, the cases cited by Grathol either reinforce the 
conclusion that Sherwood's larger parcel is contrary to law or are so different factually that they 
have no application to this case. In some inst.ances, Grathol has mischaracterized or omitted the 
key facts or holding of the cases. 
76. Mr. Sherwood created an artificial "larger parcel" in violation ofldaho law. 
Since Mr. Sherwood's opinion fails to adhere to Idaho law, it cannot, as a matter oflaw, serve as 
a basis for determining just compensation in this case. 
G. Mr. Johnson's Use Of Developed Land Value. 
77. In Idaho, just compensation is defined as "the difference between the market 
value of the entire property before the taking and the market value of the remainder after the 
acquisition, together with any special damages caused by the taking, measured as of [the date of 
summons]." IDJI2d 7.16. 
78. Mr. Johnson disregarded the established method for valuing property in 
condemnation cases and instead valued the Grathol property based upon a hypothetical 
development plan and the sale prices he hopes to obtain for subdivided commercial lots after the 
property is fully developed. 
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79, Mr. Johnson's use of values as if developed was expressly rejected by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in City of Caldwell v. Roark, 92 Idaho 99, 101, 437 P.2d 615, 617 (1968). Roark 
involved a condemnation action by the City of Caldwell to acquire a portion of the Roark 
. property for the expansion and improvement of the Calawelfairport. Id. at TOO, 437 P.2d at 
616. The Roarks had previously platted their property for residential development and the plat 
had been accepted and approved by the city. Additionally, the Roarks had marked the proposed 
streets and alleys for their development and utility services had been made available to the 
property. Id 
At trial, the Roarks sought just compensation based upon the aggregate value of the 
individual lots in their development plan. On appeal, the Roarks challenged the trial court's 
instructions requiring the jury to determine the fair market value of the property as one parcel 
and instructing the jury that the values given to hypothetical parcels in the Roarlcs development 
plans were not to be considered. Id The Idaho Supreme Court rejected the Roarks' argument 
and upheld the trial court's instructions. 
The Supreme Court concluded that the jury was allowed to consider the property's 
potential for residential development to determine the highest and best use of the property. Id at 
101, 437 P .2d at 617. However, the Court prohibited the use of "developed" land values to 
detennine the fair market value of bare land. The Court held that 
where the entire parcel of land, as a unit, is taken at one time by 
condemnation, the jury is required to fix the value of the entire 
parcel as a unit as of the time the summons is issued, I.C. § 7-712. 
This value cannot properly be determined by aggregating the 
individual sales value which separate lots may bring when sold to 
individual prospective home builders over a period of time in the 
future, for the reason that such a basis of valuation would permit 
the jury to speculate upon future developments. 
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Id. at 101Al02, 437 P.2d at 617-18. The Cottrt further explained that "[t]he test is not what the 
lots will bring when and if 62 willing buyers come along, but what the tract, as a unit, and as is, 
platted or not, and in whatever state of completion, will bring from a willing buyer of the whole 
. . ,,,tract.~.' !d · ( citing numerous state eases frnm Utah, Or~gon, Colorado, North Carolina and a 
federal case from the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals as additional support). Rather, "[t]he 
valuation must be on the basis of what a willing purchaser would pay now and not what a 
number of purchasers might be induced to pay in the future for the land in smaller parcels." Id 
(emphasis added) (quoting Utah Road Commission v. Hansen, 383 P.2d 917,920 (Utah 1963)). 
Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the trial court's instruction that the property should be 
valued as one parcel of bare land and not on potential subdivided and developed values. Id 
80. The majority of other jurisdictions reach the same conclusions, aptly summarized 
in the case of Department of Highways v. Schulhoff, 445 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1968) and its citation of 
Nichols on Eminent Domain, the primary treatise on eminent domain law: 
The applicable rule is ably stated in 4 Nichols, The Law of 
Eminent Domains 12.3142(1) (3d ed. rev. 1962): 
'* **It is well settled that ifland is so situated that it is actually 
available for building purposes, its value for such purposes m.ay be 
considered, even if it is used as a f ann or is covered with brush and 
boulders. The measure of compensation is not, however, the 
aggregate of the prices of the lots into which the tract could be best 
divided, since the expense of cleaning off and improving the land, 
laying out streets, dividing it into lots, advertising and selling the 
same, and holding it and paying taxes and interest until all the lots 
are disposed of cannot be ignored and is too uncertain and 
conjectural to be computed. * * * The measure of compensation is 
the market value of the land as a whole, taking into consideration 
its value for building purposes if that is its most available use.' 
It is proper to show that a particular tract of land is suitable and 
available for subdivision into lots and is valuable for that purpose. 
It is not proper, however, to show the number and value of lots as 
separated parcels in an imaginary subdivision thereof. Stated 
differently, it is improper for the jury to consider an undeveloped 
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tract of land as though a subdivision thereon is an accomplished 
fact. Such undeveloped property may not be valued on a per lot 
basis, the cost factor clearly being too speculative. 
N0.4516 P. 44/46 
81.. Idaho law bars the valuatiun approach by rvtr. Johnson in this case. That law has 
been endorsed across the country. Mr. Johnson's valuation testimony based upon estimated 
values of his hYPothetical subdivision of the property as if fully developed &hall be disregarded 
as a matter of law. The law does not allow just compensation or damage calculations based upon 
the aggregate values oflots or zones created only on paper and existing only in a hypothetical 
development. 
82. Idaho law requires that just compensation be valued based on the state or 
character of the property on the date of summons in all eminent domain proceedings. Plans for 
future development may not be considered for purposes of determining the fair market value of 
the property. See Idaho Code§ 7-712; IDJI2d 7.05.5, 7.14, 7.16, 7.16.S, 7.20. 
H. Determination And Award Of Just Compensation. 
83. The Court concludes that the valuation opinions of Mr. Sherwood and Mr. 
Johnson are not supported by the evidence admitted at trial and are not a credible or reliable 
indication of the fair market value of the property before and after taking. 
84. The Court further concludes that the opinions of Mr. Sherwood and Mr. Johnson 
cannot serve as a basis for determining just compensation in this case. Mr. Sherwood did not 
value the larger parcel as reqwred by Idaho law. They bot.11 used dates of value long after the 
date of valuation mandated by Idaho law. They included constniction delay claims barred by 
Idaho law and previously dismissed by the Court. And Mr. Johnson used future "developed" 
values to value bare, vacant land, in violation of established Idaho law. 
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85. The Court further concludes that the appraisal opinions of Mr. Stan Moe and Mr. 
Larry Pynes are thorough, competent, and comport with Idaho law and recognized standards and 
practices governing real estate appraisal. 
-,.,.. 
86. The Court further coneiudes that the opinions of Mr. Moe and Mr. Pynes provide 
a credible and reliable basis for determining just compensation in this matter. 
87. Having carefully and thoroughly considered the evidence in this matter and 
applicable law, the Court finds that the amount of just compensation to be paid to Grathol in this 
matter is $ _____ .oo. 
88. The Court's determination of just compensation reflects the fair market value of 
the 16.314 acres condemned by ITD as ofNovember 17, 2010. 
89. No improvements were condemned and no severance damages to the remainder 
were properly asserted or supported by facts. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of April, 2012. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRA THOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
DEFENDANT'S (PROPOSED) 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol, by and through their attorneys of record, and 
hereby submit (Proposed) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
The matter having come before the Court for trial on March 5, 2012 and the Court 
having heard the testimony of the witnesses and reviewed the admitted exhibits and 
considering the arguments of counsel, makes the following findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. 
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I. FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff Idaho Transportation Board through the Idaho Transportation 
Department ("ITD") is engaged in construction of a 31 and a half mile project known as the 
"Garwood to Sagle Project" ("Project"). The "Athol" stage is part of the Project. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 
40, 42-43.) 
2. The Athol stage begins at Remington Road on existing US 95 then diverts past 
the City of Athol. The construction of this stage will create a new highway interchange with 
on- and off-ramps to connect to Highway 54 in either direction. The Athol stage then connects 
back to existing US 95 at Trinity road to the north. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 42-43.) Currently US 95 
runs through the City of Athol with a 45 mph max speed limit. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 43-44.) The 
existing intersection of US 95 and Highway 54 is signalized (lighted) and at-grade. (Tr. Vol. 1, 
p. 43.) Construction plans by ITD propose an interchange that will be elevated above the 
existing grade of Highway 54 to a maximum height of approximately 25 feet. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 
44-45.) After construction, the new highway will allow traffic to go around Athol at a 
maximum speed limit of 65 mph. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 44.) The anticipated Project completion date 
is fall of 2013. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 48.) 
3. Defendant HJ Grathol ("Grathol") is a California general partnership owned by 
Hughes Investments ("Hughes"). (Tr. Vol. 4, p. 716.) Hughes is a commercial property 
developer specializing in the acquisition, ownership and development of retail shopping centers. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 332, Vol. 4, p. 725.) Grathol owns the property on the northeast comer of the 
current existing US 95/Hwy 54 intersection. (Complaint at p. 4.) The entire Grathol property 
("Subject Property") consists of three parcels totaling 56.8-acres in the aggregate. (Complaint 
at p. 4, Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 10.) The Subject Property was rezoned from Rural to 
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Commercial by Kootenai County in 2008 at Grathol's request. (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 
135.) ITD has taken steps to acquire 16.314-acres of Grathol's property for the construction of 
the new US 95 highway realignment project. The Subject Property is located outside of the city 
limits of Athol. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit No. 3.) 
4. Prior to ITD's project, the Subject Property is situated adjacent to the signalized 
intersection of US 95 and Highway 54 and is generally level with no significant improvements. 
ITD's realignment and construction will relocate US 95 to the east and the new alignment will 
split the Subject Property into several parcels. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit No. 3.) 
5. ITD's right-of-way plans show an approach at the intersection of Highway 54 
and Sylvan Road on the south side of the Subject Property. ITD's right-of-way plans show that 
ITD has acquired right-of-way on Roberts Road to the north boundary of the Subject Property. 
Id. The Board's Order of Condemnation attached to the Complaint contains an 
acknowledgement that Sylvan Road will be extended across the Subject Property in connection 
with ITD's project. (Complaint at Exhibit C.) The extension of Sylvan Road to the north to tie 
into Roberts Road and provide local frontage access roads is likely to occur in the future. 
6. After the extension of Sylvan Road, the Subject Property will be effectively 
segregated. (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 468, Vol. 4, p.747.) The eastern portion will contain approximately 
26.8-acres situated furthest to the east of the proposed US 95 realignment. The western portion 
will contain approximately 30-acres, including the 16.314-acres physically taken by ITD in this 
condemnadon. 
7. After the take, the furthest western portion of the Subject Property remaining will 
contain approximately 3.87 acres on the west side of the new US 95 alignment and east of"old" 
(or currently existing) US 95. (Tr. Vol. 4, p. 758-59.) The western portion will also consist of 
DEFENDANT'S (PROPOSED) FINDINGS OFF ACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 3 
1120 of 1617
approximately 8.85 acres laying to the east of the new US 95 alignment and to the west of the 
Sylvan Road extension, once it is created. 
8. Both IID and Grathol retained licensed appraisers to value the subject property. 
Both ITD and Grathol offered other (non-appraiser) valuation witness testimony as well. ITD 
called appraiser Stanley Moe ("Moe"), who testified that the value of the Subject Property was 
$35,000.00 per acre or $0.80 per foot. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 87.) 
9. Moe utilized a "before and after appraisal" methodology to arrive at his opinion 
of value as of April 7, 2010. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 86.) Moe testified at trial that his opinion of value 
would be the same as of the statutory date of the take (November 17, 2010). (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 84-
85.) 
10. Moe opined that the highest and best use of the Subject Property was for 
eventual commercial development and opined that the value of the Subject Property would be 
unaffected by the interchange (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 88.). Moe also opined that the market demand for 
retail uses that Grathol proposes for the Subject Property does not currently exist. (Tr. Vol. 1, 
pp. 123-24.) 
11. In valuing the Subject Property, Moe identified the "larger parceI'' as 56.39 
acres, excluding the small .419 acre improved parcel on the NE comer of US 95 and Hwy 54, 
which parcel lies in the city limits of Athol. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 136-37.) 
12. Moe acknowledged that appraisers have discretion in determining the "larger 
parcel'' for valuation purposes. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 287.) 
13. In determining the larger parcel Moe considered the highest and best use of the 
property and testified that the eastern portion of the property would be needed in order to 
support any development of the western portion, for waste water disposal. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 139.) 
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14. Moe identified four land sales occurring in Kootenai, Bonner and Shoshone 
Counties prior to the date of the take to arrive at a comparative market value opinion of the 
Subject Property. (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 12, p. 30.) 
15. One of the comparable lai.7.d sales relied on by Moe was a sale of property located 
at the northeast comer of Highway 41 and Prairie Avenue in Post Falls, Idaho (Land Sale# 1). 
(Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 12, p. 36.) IID also called appraiser, Lawrence Pynes to testify. 
Pynes identified Moe's Land Sale# 1 as being the best comparable to the Subject Property. (Tr. 
Vol. 5, pp. 830-831.) 
16. Moe made "adjustments" to Land Sale # 1 for location, access to utilities and 
size difference of 58% ( downward) and arrived at an indicated value of Land Sale # 1 of 
$50,930.00 per acre, or $1.17 per sq. ft. before reconciling. Moe then testified that after 
factoring in time adjustments, the indicated value of Land Sale # 1 on that date of the take 
(November 17, 2010) would be $35,500.00 per acre or $0.81 per sq. ft. in comparison to the 
Subject Property. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 205, 237-40, 245-46, Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 18.) 
1 7. Both Pynes and Moe testified that it would be highly unusual for the same 
appraiser to assign two different values to the same property on the same date. (Tr. Vol. 5, pp. 
894-95, 940). 
18. On cross-examination, Moe admitted he had conducted an appraisal for Zions 
Bank on the same property identified as Land Sale # 1, wherein Moe concluded that same 
property (Land Sale# 1) was worth $3.50 per sq. ft. as of October 2010. (Tr. Vol 5, pp. 943-47). 
In the appraisal of the Hwy 41/Prairie property for Zions Bank, Moe utilized a future value 
discounting approach based on development potential of that property. (Defendant's Trial 
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Exhibit K.) This future value discounting approach is the same methodology used by Grathol's 
appraiser Skip Sherwood. 
19. Moe's appraisal opining of the Hwy 41/Prairie property indicated an increase in 
value from the October 2007 purchase date to the valuation date in October 2010. (Defendant's 
Trial Exhibit K.) 
20. Moe made adjustments to each of the comparable land sales in order to reach a 
range of comparable values. Moe adjusted each of the land sales based on size to compare to 
the entirety of the Subject Property's 56.39 acres. Moe also made adjustments for location, 
orientation/access and utilities/zoning. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 237-40, 245-46, Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 
No. 18.) 
21. Moe's adjusted values for the comparable land sales ranged from $24,408.00 to 
$69,172.00 per acre. All of the comparable land sales identified by Moe were further adjusted 
downward in his "reconciliation" stage to reach a "final" opinion of value for the Subject 
Property of $35,000.00 per acre or $0.80 per sq. ft. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 245-46, Plaintiffs Trial 
Exhibit No. 18.) Pynes did not do a similar final reconciliation, but gave a final opinion of 
value of $41,382.00 per acre or $0.95 per sq. ft. (Tr. Vol. 5, p. 838, Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 
145.) 
22. Moe applied the uniform ($35,000.00 per acre) value opinion to the 16.314 acre 
"take" to arrive at his opinion of the total just compensation owed to Grathol of $571,000.00. 
(Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 246,251, Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 13.) 
23. Moe did not utilize any other methods of appraisal, including the Replacement 
Cost Approach, Income Capitalization Approach or Development Cost Approach to reach his 
opinion of value. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 76, 82.) Moe did not provide an opinion on either severance 
DEFENDANT'S (PROPOSED) FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 6 
1123 of 1617
damages or special benefits and concluded that the value of the remainder after the take was the 
same as before the take. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 88.) 
24. Grathol presented evidence of potential development plans for the Subject 
Property that would include a hotel, grocery store, travel plaza, restaurants and other highway-
related commercial services. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 349-51, Defendant's Trial Exhibit I.) 
25. Geoff Reeslund is an architect and project manager and coordinator employed by 
Hughes and minority owner in Grathol. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 332-33.) Reeslund prepared conceptual 
site plans for commercial retail development of the Subject Property based on an ALTA survey 
and ITD's preliminary project plans that were available at the time the Subject Property was 
acquired. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 349-51, Defendant's Trial Exhibit I.) 
26. Reeslund was told by ITD in February 2008 (prior to Grathol's acquisition of the 
Subject Property) that the highway realignment would likely be an at-grade, signalized, 
intersection and would require the taking of about 10 acres. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 342-44.) Reeslund 
utilized IID's then available materials to create several conceptual site plans to evaluate what 
type of yield, uses and coverage the Subject Property would have. These conceptual site plans 
were used by Hughes to illustrate to potential users, including tenants and purchasers, possible 
retail and commercial sites. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 349-51, Defendant's Trial Exhibit I.) 
27. In August 2009, Grathol learned from 11D for the first time that the Project 
would entail an elevated interchange which increased the amount of the Subject Property taken. 
(Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 364-65, Vol. 4, pp. 731-32.) 
28. Grathol also learned that the proposed Sylvan Road extension would no longer 
curve to the west but instead would run straight northward connecting to Roberts Road to 
provide access to those properties to the north. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 374-80, Vol. 4, p. 743.) 
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29. In the "before" condition, the signalized highway intersection at-grade allows 
patrons and customers to see the property and make a decision to visit the retail businesses 
located there. In the "after" condition, patrons and customers have to be aware of the 
commercial development before approaching the off-ramps to Hwy 54 to access to the Subject 
Property. The elevated design of the highway interchange adversely affects the visibility of the 
Subject Property for potential retail customers traveling both north and south. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 
383-84, Vol. 3, pp. 403-04, Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 752-53.) 
30. Grathol's ability to attract customers to the Subject Property is impacted because 
they will be unable to see much of the development until they are parallel to the property, at 
which time it will be too late to exit the highway to access the development. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 
383-88.) 
31. Reeslund testified that the Subject Property is also adversely affected by the 
higher speed limits on the new highway which will reduce the time in which patrons will have 
to make a decision to exit the highway. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 388-89.) 
32. Jim Coleman, a licensed professional engineer and owner of Coleman 
Engineering testified that he was employed by Grathol to design a waste water treatment system 
to accommodate the commercial development of the Subject Property. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 620-21, 
623, 625.) Coleman has designed similar systems, including one serving the Silverwood Theme 
Park and one for another retail project Hughes is constructing near Stateline. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 
623-25.) 
33. Coleman testified that the system he designed takes very little physical space, 
requires two expandable "modules" eighty feet wide by forty feet long which can be located 
underground, and utilizes a micro-filtration system that would be housed in a building about 
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twelve by twenty feet long. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 652-55.) Coleman stated that the system he 
designed will exceed Idaho Department of Environmental Quality standards for wastewater, and 
that the wastewater land application would require between 13 to 16 acres of area which could 
be on-site or off-site for landscaping features ( such as ponds/fountains), irrigating common 
areas, irrigating off-site right-of-way, or could even be recycled inside buildings (such as a 
hotel) for flushing toilets. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 653-55, 657-59.) 
34. Reeslund testified that the realignment of Highway 95 also creates an 
impediment to the use of the 3.87 acre portion that will be located on the west side of the new 
interchange once it is built. Before the take, the 3.87 acre portion could share any utilities 
infrastructure built on the Subject Property, including the wastewater system Coleman designed. 
After the take, the 3.87 acre (west) parcel can only be tied in to the wastewater treatment system 
and to any wells, gas and electrical infrastructure by running lines under, around or over the 
new elevated interchange. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 405-15.) 
35. Reeslund testified that providing utility sleeves directly under the new freeway 
during construction of the Project would be the most cost-effective method (comparatively) for 
getting utility services to the 3.87 acre parcel on the west from the property remaining on the 
east. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 405-15.) Without connecting the westerly 3.87 acre remainder parcel to the 
utility systems servicing the rest of the property that 3.87 acre remainder would be almost 
unusable because the cost of stand-alone utility services for it would be prohibitive. (Tr. Vol. 4, 
pp. 758-60.) 
36. Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood was employed by Grathol to appraise the Subject 
Property. (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 445.) Sherwood, like both Moe and Pynes, employed the "comparable 
market data approach" to formulate his opinion of value. Sherwood used comparable market 
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data for existing sales of comparable property to arrive at a value conclusion, and Sherwood, 
like Moe, testified that there was limited data available for larger commercial development 
property sales. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 447-51, 455.) 
37. All of the appraisers who testified, including Sherwood, stated that it is not 
unusual for differing valuation opinions to be reached by different appraisers. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 
453-54.) 
38. Sherwood initially reviewed twenty to twenty-five property sales before selecting 
ten which were the most comparable to the Subject Property. Sherwood also reviewed sales of 
properties where grocery stores were located to determine if that proposed use would be 
indicative of the size of parcel that he was evaluating. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 455-59.) 
39. Sherwood testified that the identification of the "larger parcel" is relevant to 
appraise the value of the part being condemned and the conclusion of the larger parcel rests in 
the discretion of the appraiser. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 464-67.) Sherwood viewed the Subject Property 
as a large commercially zoned tract with multiple potential uses. He identified the "larger 
parcel" as the western 30 acres of the property based on the typical market size for retail 
(grocery) and/or developments of the type proposed for the property by Grathol. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 
468-70.) Sherwood concluded that while the entire property's "generic" highest and best use is 
for commercial; the western 30 acres of the property has different highest and best use( s) than 
the eastern 26 acres. (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 468.) Sherwood testified that the larger parcel can be a part 
of the "parent tract" for purposes of valuation, even when the parent tract is under common 
ownership and is contiguous to the rest of the property. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 467-68.) Sherwood 
testified that the eventual extension of Sylvan Road across the Subject Property would 
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physically separate the western 30 acres from the eastern 26 acres and that was also a factor in 
his larger parcel conclusion. (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 469-70.) 
40. Of the ten properties, Sale No. 7 (Sagle) was identified by Sherwood as being the 
most comparable to the Subject Property because Sale No. 7 was proximate in time to the date 
of the summons, similar in size to the western 30 acres and physically closest to the Subject 
Property. Sherwood testified that he gave the greatest weight to Sale No. 7 for these reasons 
and arrived at an opinion of value for the Grathol property of $2.25 per sq. ft. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 
477-78, 481-82, 484.) 
41. Sherwood concluded the value of the 16.314 acres taken at $2.25 per sq. ft. is 
$1,598,543.00. (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 484.) 
42. Sherwood testified that the value of the western 30 acres (which he considered 
the larger parcel) before the take was $2,940,300.00 and that the value of the western 30 acres 
after the take was between $1,165,000.00 and $1,060,000.00. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 596-598.) For 
purposes of his evaluation, Sherwood gave no consideration to the eastern 26 acres one way or 
another because it would likely be used differently and developed further out in the future. (Tr. 
Vol. 3, pp. 464-65, 467-68.) 
43. Sherwood testified that in his opinion the value of the remainder (of the western 
30 acres) after the take would be less than its value before the take based on the market factors 
that a reasonable buyer would consider, including its utility (uses), its availability and its 
configuration/shape. (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 486.) According to Sherwood, the value of the remainder 
would be affected by IID's take but it was difficult to quantify the amount since the land was 
not presently developed; so he quantified the impacts of the take and Project on the remainder 
of the western 30 acres by using a discounted present-value approach, to arrive at the value of 
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the remainder as of the date of the take. (Tr. Vol. 3, p. 485.) Although Moe criticized the 
discount development approach used by Sherwood, Moe use the same approach to value 
comparable properties for Zion's Bank. 
44. Sherwood used a discount rate of 10% per annum and applied that rate to the 
time period of 1.5 to 2.5 years in order to arrive at the present value of the remainder at the time 
of the take. Sherwood subtracted the present value of the remainder after the take from the 
value of the western 30 acres before the take to arrive at his opinion of a range of just 
compensation in the amount of$1,775,000.00 to $1,880,000.00. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 596-598.) 
45. Alan Johnson is one of the owners of the property and testified to its value, and 
Grathol's plans for the Subject Property and the various impacts the Project will have on the 
value of the portion(s) of the Subject Property remaining after the take. 
46. Johnson testified that he is familiar with the local commercial real estate market, 
is knowledgeable of the local conditions and had gone through the same processes employed by 
the appraiser witnesses in arriving at his opinion of value. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 726-35.) 
4 7. Johnson and Hughes are involved in other commercial development in the area 
including the development of two hotel sites, a fast-food restaurant and gas station located at 
Stateline adjacent to Cabelas. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 717-20.) Johnson initially identified the Subject 
Property as a prime retail development opportunity because of its location at the intersection of 
two highways. Johnson testified that the Subject Property was desirable because of the 
signalized intersection of US 95 and SH 54, which causes traffic to stop adjacent to the Subject 
Property increasing exposure time to potential purchasers of goods and services from retail 
businesses that could be located there. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 720-21, 722-725.) Johnson referred to 
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this as a "hard comer" and stated that in retail development circles, this type of location is 
highly desirable and commands a premium from end users. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 720-21, 748-50.) 
48. Johnson also opined that the Athol area is underserved by commercial/retail 
business and the absence of competition nearby increases its potential for near-term 
commercial/retail development, based on his research and study of regional demographics and 
traffic counts. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 722-725, 738-43.) 
49. At the time of acquisition of the Subject Property, Johnson was aware of a 
proposed highway project but not the final plans for the take area or the configuration of the 
new interchange as it would ultimately be designed. (Tr. Vol. 4, p. 731-32.) Only after Grathol's 
purchase of the Subject Property, Johnson learned that ITD's Project would consist of an 
elevated highway interchange with on and off ramps as opposed to a widened, at-grade 
signalized interchange. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp 731-33.) 
50. Johnson evaluated the feasibility of a grocery store at the Subject Property and 
concluded that the market would support commercial development at that location based on 
tenant interest and demographics. Grathol also evaluated the feasibility of a hotel at the Subject 
Property and concluded that the market area is underserved based on the surrounding amenities 
including Silverwood, Farragut Park and Bayview/Lake Pend Oreille. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 722-725, 
738-43.) 
51. Based on preliminary right-of-way plans provided by ITD, Grathol's conceptual 
site plans depicting various potential configurations of the Subject Property for development 
were produced and Johnson used these plans to begin marketing the property to potential 
tenants, buyers and users. 
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52. The preliminary site plans depicted the alignment of Sylvan Road curving to the 
west based on materials initially provided by IID. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 364-65, Vol. 4, pp. 731-32, 
743.) 
53. Based on his research and analysis of the market for commercial/retail property, 
Johnson testified that the value of the Subject Property before condemnation was $3.23 per sq. 
ft. for the western 30 acres and approximately $1.00 per sq. ft. for the 26 acres located to the 
east. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 745-46.) 
54. Johnson based his opinion on a review of the comparable properties identified by 
the various appraisers, including Moe, Sherwood and Pynes, and opined the Sagle (US 
95/ Algoma) sale as being the most comparable property to the Subject Property. Johnson 
testified that the Sagle comparable is inferior to the Subject Property due to the fact that it is has 
no traffic signal and is not at the intersection of two highways. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 747-49.) 
Additionally, even though the population demographics near the Sagle property indicates higher 
density, there are existing retail and commercial businesses already serving that population 
within a 5-mile radius whereas the Grathol property has little commercial/retail competition 
within a greater (10 mile) radius. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 751-52.) 
55. Johnson testified that retailers seek to locate at signalized intersections in order to 
drive sales. He added a "premium" to the Grathol property by reason of the intersection 
location. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 720-21, 749-51.) 
56. Johnson testified that after the take, the remainder will suffer great detriment 
caused by the new highway alignment, configuration and elevation. After the take, the property 
will no longer have the signalized at-grade intersection; the highway travel lanes will be 
elevated to 25 feet above the grade, affecting visibility and the traveling speeds of the traffic 
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will be increased to 65 mph causing customers to "fly by" the property possibly before even 
seeing the retailers and services located there. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 753-55.) Because of the elevation, 
speed and limited access to the new highway alignment, even if potential customers were able 
to see the Subject Property they would have difficulty getting off the highway and back to the 
property. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 753-55.) 
57. Also, the remainder 3.87 acre piece of property located west of the new highway 
alignment will be unable to be served by sewer and water by reason of the construction of the 
elevated highway, unless utility lines can be extended beneath the new highway. Before the 
take, that 3.87 acre "west" parcel could be served by any waste water system located on 
Grathol's property, but without access to a waste water system, the potential uses of that 3.87 
acre west parcel would be limited to low intensity uses, such as a tire store or auto shop. (Tr. 
Vol. 4, pp. 756-60.) 
58. Johnson testified that his opinion of$3.23 per sq. ft. yields a value for the 16.314 
acre take of$2,295,360.00. (Tr. Vol. 4, p. 764.) 
59. Johnson also testified that the value of the western most 30 acres before the take 
was between $1,927,573.00 at $3.23 per sq. ft. and $2,387,088.00 at $4.00 per sq. ft. (Tr. Vol. 
4, pp. 764-67.) Johnson opined that the eastern 26 acre portion of the Subject Property before 
the take was worth $1.00 per sq. ft. and was not materially changed after the take, therefore still 
worth $1.00 per sq. ft. Johnson explained that the difference between the western and eastern 
portions was because the west side is where the "development value" is and Grathol does not 
value the full 56 acres as a single, integrated unit and would not undertake to develop the 
eastern 26 acre portion of the property in the same way, or at the same time, as the western 
portion. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 765-66.) 
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60. Johnson testified that the values for the remainder of the western 30 acres after 
the take would be $2,722,000.00 assuming that the highway project was complete as of 
November 17, 2010, the statutory date of the take. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 768-69, 773) 
61. Johnson testified that the severance damages to the remainder were in the range 
of $338,000.00 to $798,000.00 based on all of the impacts of the condemnation to the Subject 
Property. (Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 773-75.) Those impacts included the loss of the signalized 
intersection, increased speed of traffic, the elevated interchange and the loss of visibility. 
62. Johnson added the severance damages to the value of the area taken to arrive at a 
total opinion of just compensation in the amount of$2,633,360.00 to $3,093,360.00. (Tr. Vol. 4, 
pp. 775-76.) 
63. ITD called George Hedley of Hedley Construction Company to testify as to the 
feasibility of development of the Subject Property. Hedley also offered opinion testimony as to 
the value of the Subject Property and the cost of all necessary infrastructures to place a retail 
development of the type Grathol planned on the Subject Property. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 663-67, 681-
82.) 
64. Hedley testified that in his opinion the Subject Property has a net value of less 
than zero and that Grathol should not have purchased the property for development. (Tr. Vol. 3, 
pp. 673-75, 681-82, 702.) 
65. Hedley testified that he and a team of other consultants, including David Evans 
& Associates, calculated the infrastructure costs of Grathol's conceptual plans for the Subject 
Property at $4.92 per sq. ft. before the taking. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 667-668, 691-92, 695, 705-06.) 
Hedley testified that the same infrastructure costs of developing the Subject Property after the 
taking would amount to $6.92 per sq. ft. (Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 695-98, 706-07.) 
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66. ITD did not call any witnesses from David Evans & Associates. 
II. STANDARDS OF LAW 
In condemnation proceedings, the broadest latitude is allowed in the admission of 
evidence to show value of a property. State ex rel McKelvey v. Styner, 58 Idaho 233, 72 P.2d 
699 (1937). Here, evidence of the value of the property taken was presented by the Plaintiff 
through two appraiser witnesses, Moe and Pynes. Evidence of the value of the property was 
presented by the Defendant as well through Sherwood and Johnson. The valuation evidence 
presented was widely divergent. 
The Court, as the finder of fact, must ascertain and assess the value of the realty 
condemned and if the property taken constitutes part of a larger parcel, the finder of fact 
must ascertain and assess the damages which will accrue to the remaining portion of property 
by reason of its severance from the portion condemned. See, Idaho Code § 7-701, State ex 
rel Burns v. Blaire, 91 Idaho 137, 417 P.2d 217 (1966). Idaho Code § 7-711 imposes a 
mandatory duty on the court to fairly assess the value of the property condemned and the 
value of damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason of 
severance and construction of the improvement by the condemnor. See, Big Lost River 
Irrigation District v. Zollinger, 83 Idaho 401, 363 P. 2d 706 (1961). 
In an eminent domain proceeding, the fact finder's award will only be set aside if it is 
not supported by any evidence. See, State ex rel Ohman v. Ivan H Talbot Family Trust, 120 
Idaho 825, 820 P.2d 695 (1991). An appellate court will not set aside an eminent domain 
award that is within in a range of estimates of just compensation given by various witnesses. 
Id. In this case, the range of estimates given by the various witnesses was $571,000.00 
(Moe) to $3,093,360.00 (Johnson). 
DEFENDANT'S (PROPOSED) FINDINGS OFF ACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 17 
1134 of 1617
III. FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The low end of the range of damage estimates was offered by Stan Moe. The Court 
finds that while Moe utilized a recognized appraisal methodology ( comparative market 
approach), evidence adduced at trial established that Moe made significant adjustments to the 
comparable land sales and then further adjusted those values downward through a 
"reconciliation" to arrive at a value conclusion for the Grathol property of $35,000.00 per 
acre. Further evidence adduced at trial impeached Moe's value conclusion by establishing 
that one of the identified comparable land sales (Land Sale # 1 - NEC of US Hwy 41 and 
Prairie) to which he ascribed an adjusted value of $35,000.00 (or $.80/sq. ft.) in this case, 
was appraised by Moe for other purposes at $3.50 per sq. ft. on or near the date of the take. 
Moe's valuation of the property is further impeached by the fact that a second, independent 
appraiser (Pynes) hired by the State, utilizing virtually the same comparable market approach 
as Moe and most of the same comparable land sales, offered opinion of just compensation 
nearly 20% higher than Moe at $675,000.00. based on the evidence, the Court concludes 
that Plaintiffs valuation evidence and conclusions are not supported or credible. 
For purposes of their valuations, both Moe and Pynes considered the Defendant's 
"larger parcel" to be the entire parent tract of 56.8 acres. The determination of the larger 
parcel in a condemnation valuation problem is significant because it can materially alter the 
applicability of size adjustments to comparable land sales and the calculation of severance 
damages to the remainder of the larger parcel. 
Defendant presented evidence, and the Court concludes that in this context, the larger 
parcel can and should be a portion of the parent tract if it is a separate economic unit. Here, 
the appropriate larger parcel is the western 30 acres of the Grathol property which comprises 
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a separate economic unit from the remaining 26.8 acres of the Grahtol property. 
Grathol' s valuation evidence established a fair market value as of the date of the take 
of the western 30 acres of the property in a range of $2.25 to $3.25 per sq. ft. (Sherwood and 
Johnson). These witnesses based their valuation opinions upon recognized appraisal 
methodologies of comparative market analysis and development approach reduced to a net 
present value. Johnson, as one of the owners of the property, places a greater premium on 
the property for its location in comparison to the various comparable sales considered. 
Additionally, Grathol's witnesses testified that the remainder of Grathol's 30 acre larger 
parcel not taken will be negatively impacted by various consequences associated with both 
the loss of 16.34 acres taken and the project that will be built by Plaintiff on the 16.34 acres. 
Based on the evidence at trial, the Court can conclude as a matter of law that the remainder 
property will be impacted, albeit in a manner and to a degree that is difficult to calculate. 
Both Johnson and Sherwood calculate the impact to the remainder property by 
application of a net present value discounting method. This entails estimating the value of 
the remainder property upon completion of ITD's project and discounting the value of the 
property to a current value as of the date of the take. The Court finds as a matter of law that 
this methodology represents a legitimate valuation approach, particularly for purposes of 
valuing commercial development property, taking into account its highest and best use. This 
approach was utilized by the State's own appraiser in a non-condemnation appraisal of one 
of the properties identified as a comparable to the Grathol property (Land Sale # 1 ). 
Utilizing this valuation approach, Grathol' s valuation witnesses estimated impact to the 
remainder property in the ranges of $282,000.00 (Sherwood) to $338,000.00 - $798,000.00 
(Johnson). The Court finds as a matter of law that this valuation approach utilized by 
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Grathol is appropriate. The Court notes that another recognized valuation analysis technique, 
the "development cost approach," was utilized by one of the State's rebuttal witnesses to 
illustrate that Grathol's proposed development plan for the subject property was not 
financially feasible. Utilizing this methodology, the State's witness (Hedley) testified that 
for no reason other than the condemnation, Grathol's post-take development costs would be 
$2.00 per sq. ft. higher than if the take had not occurred. The Court can conclude as a matter 
of law that while likely mathematically accurate, this conclusion strains credulity. 
Idaho law is well settled that a condmnee may show whether a property has market 
value for a certain purpose and the extent of such value. See, Idaho Farm Development 
Company v. Brackett, 36 Idaho 748, 213 P. 696 (1923). Here, the condemnee, Grathol, 
presented adequate and admissible evidence of the market value of its property for a 
"certain" purpose, to wit: commercial/retail development. While the State offered evidence 
calling into question the wisdom, timing and financial viability of Grathol' s intended 
purpose, the fact remains that as the owner of the property, Grathol has the prerogative of 
developing the property as it sees fit. The key question then is what is the fair market value 
of the property taken in light of the purpose to which the property will be put by Grathol, and 
what is the harm to the property not taken as a consequence of the Project. 
Weighing the evidence presented at trial, the Court determines as a matter of law that the 
fair market value of the 16.34 acres "taken" as of the date of condemnation was $3 .23 per sq. ft. 
or $2,295,360.00. The Court further concludes that the remainder of the 30 acre larger parcel 
(not taken) is impacted as a direct consequence of the take in the amount of$798,000.00. 
In Idaho the measure of just compensation to be awarded is the value of the taking plus 
severance damages accruing to the remainder. Therefore, the Court concludes that Grathol is 
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entitled to just compensation in the amount of $3,093,360.00. 
DATED this 6th day of April, 2012. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
/ ---~ ---· --------_/ ..,,.,.....~ 
By: ~"""A-v,_---~-----_--_______ _ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST mDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRATHOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS BANK, 
a Washington corporation; and DOES 1 
through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S 
REPLY TO PLAJNTIFF'S POST 
TRIALBRIEF 
COMES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol ("Grathol") and submits its Reply to Plaintiffs 
Post Trial Brief in accordance with the Court's Order. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Larger Parcel. 
ITD argues in its Post-Trial Brief that Idaho statutes and cases "bar" the identification of 
the larger parcel as anything less than the entire parent tract owned by a landowner. Not true. 
ITD essentially argues that the larger parcel must be confined to either the take, or the entire 
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parent tract of a landowners' property; propositions which have been soundly rejected by 
numerous courts in numerous jurisdictions. ITD cites exclusively to Idaho cases, despite the 
fact that none of the cases cited hold that the larger parcel can only be determined by resorting 
to one of these two options. In fact, even the Idaho cases cited demonstrate that the larger parcel 
analysis must be tailored to the specific facts of the case and those cases support the idea that 
the larger parcel can be an independent economic unit from which the take is severed. 
ITD first cites to Idaho Code §§ 7-707 and 7-711 and the Idaho jury instructions 
(IDTI's). However a careful reading of those authorities does not in any way limit the 
identification of the larger parcel to the entire parent tract. Idaho Code § 7-707 sets forth the 
necessary elements of a condemnation complaint. Under ITD's interpretation, a condemning 
authorities' identification of the parcel contained in the complaint is infallible, even if that 
parcel described does not have any relation to the actual intended uses of the lands. Had the 
Idaho Legislature intended the larger parcel always encompass all lands owed by the 
condemnee, it could have done so, but it did not. LC. § 7-711(2) specifically allows for 
severance damages caused by the ti:ike and constmction of the improvement by the conderrmor; 
when the take is a part of a larger parcel, but it does not limit the larger parcel determination to 
the entirety of a landowners' property. 
Similarly the IDTI's do not support ITD's position. ITD asserts that references in the 
IDTI's to the value of the remainder "from the whole" refers to the entire parent tract. This 
conclusion is without support. The IDTI' s do not contain any definition of the larger parcel. If 
such a definition were included in the IDTI's, it would no doubt state that the larger parcel can 
be less than the parent tract under appropriate circumstances. See generally, Eaton, Real Estate 
Valuation in Litigation, Chapter 5. 
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ITD claims that Grathol cannot create an "artificial" larger parcel, particularly a smaller 
one, to inflate its compensation claim. What ITD fails to address is that limitations on the larger 
parcel analysis cut both ways and as a condemnor, ITD cannot include more land than 
necessary in its iarger parcei in order to artificiaiiy lower the value of the take. This is not a 
one-size-fits-all proposition. The trier of fact is tasked with identifying the larger parcel based 
on the evidence presented and upon the particular circumstances of the case. 
ITD cites several Idaho cases, with little analysis of the facts of the cases. I1D cites to 
Idaho-Western Ry. Co. v. Columbia Conference of Evangelical Lutheran Synod, 20 Idaho 568, 
119 P.2d 60 (1911) which simply recited the Revised Codes in existence at the time. ITD's 
analysis stopped there, neglecting to note that in that case one of the respondent's witnesses had 
testified as to the value of land as if it were divided up: 
One witness that was called on the part of the respondent in this 
case testified as to what he considered to be the value of the land 
sought to be taken, and later on in explaining his evidence and 
giving his reasons for placing such a value on the property stated 
that it would be worth so much if divided up and placed on the 
market as town lots. We fail to see any serious error in this 
evidence. The ju..ry were able to judge of the value oft.lie evidence 
thus given and the speculative character of the evidence. On the 
other hand, we cannot say that it was improper to allow 
witnesses to testify as to such a use to which the property 
could be devoted. 
Id. at 66 (emphasis added). Indeed Idaho-Western does not limit the larger parcel analysis and, 
more importantly, it recognized that value could be based on hypothetical divisions. 
I'ID next cites to Big Lost River Irr. Co. v. Davidson, 21 Idaho 160, 121 P. 88 (1912) to 
support its argument that the larger parcel must be considered a consolidated body of land. In 
fact, the landowner in Biz Lost River included in its affirmative defenses an assertion that an 
additional 80-acres of land, separately subdivided, should be added to the take area. The 
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condernnor (irrigation company) did not contest this addition, but on appeal challenged the 
jury's verdict as to the value of the land as a consolidated piece of instead of separated out. The 
Idaho Supreme Court held that where tracts are consolidated, the value may be fixed as a single 
parcel, without regard to legal subdivisions. The only significance of the Big Lost River case is 
that legal subdivisions are irrelevant for determining the larger parcel. { A similar result was 
reached in State v. Collier, 93 Idaho 19, 454 P.2d 56 (1969).} Despite the recognition in these 
cases that subdivision lines do not control the larger parcel analysis, ITO continues to argue 
that the Grathol property has not been subdivided. So what? The holding of these cases has 
little to do with the issues before the Court and fail to support ITO's arguments in any event. 
Moreover, neither case presents any discussion whatsoever of the independent economic unit 
value for the proposed uses of the remainder. See, Grathol's Post-Trial Brief. 
Next, ITO cites State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d 60 (1958) which 
1s factually distinguishable. In Fonburg, the landowner condernnee attempted to include 
additional lands he owned as the larger parcel to support severance damages to those additional 
lands, even though they were physically remote from the area of the take and were separated by 
land owned by a third party. Thus there was no contiguity to support the landowner's theory of 
assemblage. Again, ITO cites a case that stands for nothing relevant to this case. 
ITO's analysis of State v. City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528,493 P.2d 387 (1972) is 
also unreasonably simplistic and deficient. ITO would have this Court believe that under City of 
Mountain Home the determination of the larger parcel is only to be based on a consolidated 
body of land. Instead, the actual analysis of the Idaho Supreme Court in City of Mountain Home 
(for purposes of determining severance damages) took into account the combined use (or, more 
accurately, potential use) of the properties in connection with one another as the key factor in 
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determining the larger parcel. This part of the opinion is critical: 
Although the city's tract was crossed by a drainage ditch (a 
physical barrier of substantial size), substantial evidence was 
introduced to show the feasibility of joint use of the land on both 
sides of the ditch ... Under a statute such as ours, it is not the 
identity of uses of the condemned and remaining lands which 
is determinative; what is significant is the dependency of the 
value of the remaining land upon its use in conjunction with 
the condemned land .... 
In the case at bar there was considerable testimony at the trial to 
demonstrate that the value of the golf course land (part of the 
remaining land) was dependent upon the availability of land 
upon which could be constructed an additional nine holes, part of 
which land was taken for the proposed highway. Hence, we 
conclude that the jury could have properly awarded severance 
damages for the diminution in value of the land upon which the 
existing golf course was situate, which land was part of a larger 
parcel, a part of which was condemned, and which damages 
would result from its severance and the construction of the 
proposed highway. 
Id. at 391, 93 P.2d 532 (emphasis added). Thus, even though the Mountain Home golf course 
was non-contiguous and under different ownership structure, it was "added to" the larger parcel 
since it (the golf course) would be harmed by the taking of property on the other side of the 
drainage ditch because that property could have been used to add additional holes ( and thus 
value) to the golf course. Indeed, City of Mountain Home court clearly recognizes that proposed 
future uses of properties in connection with one another are relevant to the larger parcel 
analysis. That being the case, there is no logical argument against the idea that part of a 
property ca..TJ. be the larger parcel where it is viewed l'I'- a separate economic unit. ITD fails to 
bring this to the Court's attention and ignores the Idaho Supreme Court's analysis. 
Finally, ITD cites to City of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 136 P.3d (2006) 
for the proposition that courts typically reject 'conceptual severance' theory. City of Coeur 
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d'Alene was a regulatory taking analysis and the lands in question were owned by two separate 
parties. In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in summarily 
disregarding the separate ownership of the parcels for a regulatory takings analysis. Id. at 849, 
i36 P.3d 320. If anything, this case supports Grathoi's position. 
ITD seeks to convince this Court that Idaho cases have constrained the larger parcel 
analysis, despite the abject absence of any such actual holdings. One can only conclude that 
ITD has limited its authority to Idaho because it is well aware of ample authority which 
undercuts its position from numerous sister states with statutory and constitutional structure 
similar to Idaho's. Simply stated; No Idaho court has ever ruled that the larger parcel is limited 
to the take or the entirety of the landowners' parent tract. 
The determination of the larger parcel is to be resolved by the fact finder. The fact 
finder can rely on the appraiser. Here, Sherwood concluded the larger parcel is the west 30 
acres because it has a different economic value than the rest of the property. Idaho case law 
supports Sherwood's treatment of the larger parcel as a separate economic unit based on its 
potential fotnre use. In City of Orofi,no v. Swayne; 95 Idaho 125, 504 P.2d 398 (1972), the City 
condemned a 1.59 acres of a larger 93-acre tract. The landowner had previously waived any 
claim of severance damages to the remainder, but the City's experts presented evidence of 
increased value of the entire property after the taking, arguing that the new roadway would 
provide better :frontage. The trial court found that the land taken was an "independent economic 
unit" and entered judgment in favor of the landowners. Id. at 126, 504 P.2d 399: On appeal, the 
city argued that the court erred in refusing to consider general benefits to the remainder of land 
as an off-set against the damages for the take. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed stating that 
the rule prohibiting such offsetting increases in valuation against the take is particularly 
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applicable in a case where the land taken was determined to be an independent, economic unit. 
Id. at 128, 504 P.2d 401. The City of Orofino Court recognized that when the evidence 
supported such an "artificial" division, then the finder of fact could make that determination: 
The appellant here would have this Court apply the rule of 
damages considered by its appraisers, that is: the 'before' and 
'after' basis for valuation. It is the conclusion of the Court that 
under the particular facts here where the land taken constituted an 
'independent, economic unit' strict application of such a rule 
would in effect force the respondents to part with their land 
without compensation. 
Id. at 129,504 P.2d 402. 
In the instant case, there was considerable evidence to show that the proposed (Grathol) 
development of the eastern and western parts of the property is unrelated and those portions are, 
in fact, independent economic units. Sherwood's identification of the western 30-acres as an 
independent economic unit was supported by market data based on the size and configuration 
of commercial (grocery store anchored) developments such as Grathol plans for the property. 
Sherwood testified that these types of retail developments are almost always around 30 acres in 
size. ~hP.rwooil ~ko iilP.ntifieil thP. [arger parrel h~c:.eil on thP. phyc:.ir.~l c:.ep~r~tion th~t will or.cnr 
by the inevitable extension of Sylvan Road through the property. Sherwood's identification of 
the western 30-acres as the larger parcel focused on its highest and best use as commercial 
development that was independent from the eastern 26-acres. 
There was no evidence introduced at trial to conclude that the highest and best use of the 
west portion of the property was in any manner dependent on the east portion of the property. 
The un-contradicted testimony of Jim Coleman demonstrated that the waste water treatment 
system could be placed virtually anywhere on ( or even off of) the property and the wastewater 
could be re-circulated within the commercial development or land applied virtually anywhere. 
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Sherwood did not attribute any value or severance damages to the eastern 26-acres because it 
remained, in his opinion, largely unaffected by the condemnation. Instead, Sherwood limited 
his analysis of the value of the take and severance damages to the western 30-acres. So too, 
Aian Johnson placed the value of the eastern 26± acres at $1.00 per sq. ft. both before and after 
the take. 
Conversely, Moe's treatment of the entire 56+ acre parent tract as the larger parcel was 
clearly intended to allow rm to argue for a lower per unit value. Moe ignores the actual uses of 
the Subject Property as independent economic parcels, ignores the inevitable extension of 
Sylvan Road and blindly assumes that the development of the entire 56 acre property will be 
integrated based on his erroneous belief that the eastern 26-acres must be used for wastewater 
treatment, despite the fact that rm offered no evidence whatsoever in support of this theory or 
in rebuttal to Jim Coleman. Moe simply took IID's right-of-way plans identifying the Subject 
Property and used that description for his larger parcel. Moe did this even though his own 
former employer, mentor and author of authoritative text on condemnation appraisal, Eaton, 
ur<>rn~ ag!'.linc::t dnino sn 
Ti'C-Li.i..u., ..............a.LL.JO.,_ '-'.&..1..&.b '-'• 
Nevertheless, the larger parcel determination, as part of highest 
and best use analysis, is the appraiser's decision, and it must be 
made objectively regardless of the desires, or opinions, of the 
client. 
* * * 
[The appraiser] . . . has an obligation to make a proper 
analysis of the larger parcel, rather than merely appraise an 
entire ownership or the parcel as shown on the condemnor's 
map. 
Eaton, MAI, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation (1995) (excerpt attached) (emphasis added) 
By including the eastern 26-acres, unaffected by the condemnation, Moe is artificially 
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decreasing the value of the take based on his unsupported assumption that both properties will 
be needed for wastewater treatment. By including the extra land, size regression theory means 
that the unit value decreases. Moe's approach to the larger parcel question simply seeks to 
spread the pro-rata cost of owning more land than necessary across the entire parcel to arrive at 
the lowest possible value for the part taken. Moe simply ignores the fact that ITD is 
condemning the best situated and most valuable portion of the Subject Property and that 
different portions of the land have different values. 
ITD failed to identify a single case directly supporting its argument that the larger 
parcel can only be the entirety of Grathol' s property. None of the cases cited by ITD stand for 
this one-size-fits-all application. Instead, the cases recognize that the determination of the 
larger parcel is to be based on the evidence presented, including the intended uses of the 
property in the future .... Grathol has presented nufnerous authorities to support Sherwood's 
identification of the larger parcel as an independent economic 30 acre unit and Idaho cases 
support Sherwood's approach, if not explicitly, at least implicitly. Further, Idaho law is in 
accord with most other jmisdictions that prohibit the off-setting of special benefits to the 
remainder unaffected by the take, against the value of the take, which is really what ITD 
advocates here by including additional acreage that is unaffected by the condemnation in order 
to decrease the value of the part taken. 
II. Date of Valuation. 
In its Post Trial Brief ITD again argues that both Sherwood and Johnson "violated" 
Idaho law in failing to use the date of the summons as the basis for valuation and damages. 
ITD's arguments are misplaced as Grathol's valuation witnesses clearly testified that their 
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opinions of just compensation were based on the date of the summons, November 17, 2010.1 
IID cites to Spokane & Palouse Ry Co. v. Lieuallen, 2 Idaho 1101, 29 P. 854 (1892) as support 
for its argument that to allow such testimony is error. However the testimony criticized by the 
Spokane & Palouse Court was value as of the date of trial. The witness in that case apparently 
did not give any opinion of value as of the date of the take, as other witnesses had, but 
(regardless) the Idaho Supreme Court held that the allowance of such testimony was harmless. 
In the instant case, ITD stubbornly ignores Grathol's valuation witness's testimony. 
Grathol's witnesses all stated the date on which values and damages were calculated and 
specifically connected their opinions to the date of condemnation. 
Q. Okay. And what is your opinion as to the value of that 
property as ofNovember 17, 2010? 
A. $2.25 a square foot. i 
Tr. Vol. 3, p. 484, 11. 5-8 (Sherwood). 
Q. Now, through this process, based on everything you've 
described as what you do in your day-to-day business, do you 
feel that you've developed an opinion as to the value of the 
Grathol property in general? 
A. Yes, I have. I have 
Q. Okay. You feel like you've adequately developed an 
opinion base upon everything I've asked you so far as to what 
that property is worth after the date of take, November 17, 
2010? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Tr. Vol. 4, p. 734, 11. 14-24 (Johnson). 
Q. Based on everything you've testified to, to this point, 
1 It is worth noting that ITD's appraiser, Stan Moe, appraised the Subject Property as of April 7, 2010. In this trial 
testimony, Moe said there was no difference between the value on April 7 and the value on November 17. Yet ITD 
continues to argue that Defendant "violates Idaho law" if it doesn't utilize the correct date of November 17, 2010. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 84, 11. 12-21.) Defendant's value witnesses used the same procedure as Moe to reconcile their value 
opinions to the date of the summons, and so testified at trial. See above. 
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research and the analysis of the market and so forth, did you 
come to an opinion as to what this property is worth as its 
depicted here without regard to the portion being taken by the 
State of Idaho for the 95 alignment? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What's your opinion? 
A. For the front 30 acres, $3.23 a square foot; for the back 26 
acres, $1 a square foot. 
Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 745-46, 11. 19-25, 1-3 (Johnson). 
Q. Okay. Now, then, what about after the take but before your 
project is done, have you calculated an opinion of that that 
property is worth on November7th - the remainder property is 
worth on November 1 ih, 2010? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Okay. And that's assuming that the highway has been built 
and it's in place but your retail shopping center is not complete? 
A.Yes. 
Q. And what is that opinion? 
A. I put a value on it of$2,722,000. 
Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 769, 11. 2-13 (Johnson). 
Q. So, in that respect, is it your testimony that $2,722,000 is the 
actual value of the remaining property not taken by I1D as of 
November 17th, 2010? 
A.Yes. 
Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 773, 11. 14-17 (Johnson). 
Because IID's take impacts the value of the remainder based on loss of visibility, 
configuration of the remainder property, speed of passing traffic and impaired accessibility to 
the remainder, Grathol's witnesses valued the property as if the construction ofIID's Project 
were complete and the effects of the project were being considered by purchasers, tenants and 
others whom Grathol would be marketing the remainder property to. This is not related to 
"construction delay," as argued ad nauseum by IID, but instead this is evidence of numerous 
market factors which negatively affect the value of the property as if ITD's Project were 
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completed, as is required under Idaho Code § 7-712. Grathol's witnesses specifically 
testified as to those factors and their valuations as of the date of the talce, and ITD's 
arguments to the contrary are disingenuous. 
III. Severance Damages. 
ITD continually attempts to re-characterize Grathol's evidence of severance damages 
as "construction delay damages," ignoring that the facts and opinions testified to by 
Sherwood and Johnson were related to the impacts of ITD's Project on the value of the 
remaining property. ITD claims that Grathol utilized a previously "unrecognized 
methodology" in determining the value of the remainder by utilizing a discounted or net 
present value approach. ITD's argument is simply, flat wrong. The discounted approach to 
arriving at the net present value of property is an accepted appraisal method. The method is 
particularly appropriate in the instant case, where the existing land is not currently being put 
to any "unified" use but will be developed into diverse commercial uses in the foreseeable 
future. ITD desires to have its simplistic "before and after" appraisal method applied in a 
vacuum, ignoring the actual highest and best use of the property as commercial development, 
instead characterizing the highest and best use of the land as "speculative land" to be held for 
future development. 
On that point, ITD plays fast and loose with the definition of "highest and best use" by 
first agreeing that the highest and best use is "commercial," but then arguing through its 
expert witnesses that the best use of the property is to simply hold it as speculation land for 
some future time. Holding land vacant for better economic times in the future is not a 
"highest and best use" of commercial property. Commercial development of the property is. 
Because the Subject Property will be developed for commercial purposes, its highest 
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and best use it is just that - commercial development. As such, it is mandated by Idaho law that 
the impacts of the condemnation on that use be evaluated to establish whether there are 
severance damages. 
In this regard, the uncontroverted evidence at trial presents an interesting scenario. One 
of ITD's own expert witnesses, George Hedley testified in response to questions by ITD's 
counsel that the Subject Property was significantly impacted by the take because the remainder 
after the taking was far more costly to develop than it was before the take. Hedley was retained 
by ITD to evaluate the feasibility of Grathol's development plans for the Subject Property. He 
did this by conducting a detailed analysis of the development costs for Grathol's shopping 
center. Hedley was asked to give an honest opinion about the development potential and 
feasibility of the Grathol property for that development. Tr. Vol. 4, p. 667, 11. 22-25. 
Hedley testified that he looked at Grahtol' s proposed "before" and "after" conceptual 
site plans and came up with what it would cost to prepare the entire 56 acres (less the 16 acres 
taken) to make it ready to develop. Tr. Vol. 4, p. 691-692, 11. 16-25, 1-5. 
Q. Okay. And what was your total figure for development costs 
for this Grathol before plan? 
A. The before plan turned out to be - well, including the 
$1,450,000 to buy the land, it was $7,102,000. So ifl deduct - it 
was about five and a half million of improvement cost, plus the 
price of the property, So you take the $1,450,000 and add the 
price of improvements, the off-site improvements, infrastructure, 
it came to $7,103,000. 
Q. And---
A. Which worked out to $4.92 a square foot. 
Tr. Vol. 4, p. 691-692, 11. 16-25, 1-5. 
Then, ITD's counsel elicited testimony from Hedley as to what the development costs 
are for the remaining property after the take: 
DEFENDANT HJ GRATHOL'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S POST TRIAL BRIEF- 13 
1151 of 1617
Q. Okay. And so after you've done that, would you look at the 
development costs, the infrastructure costs for this after plan? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what was your total figure for the infrastructure costs for 
this after plan proposed by Grathol? 
A. It's about a million dollars less because the right-of-way is not 
included. You know, that land went away. So it worked out to, 
including the price of land of a $1,450,000, it came in at 
$6,592,000. But if I subtract out what Stanley Moe's $571,000 
take money, it worked out to $6,021,000 will be the net cost to 
Grathol to improve the sit on the 20 acres, which works out to 
$6.90 a square foot of developable land. 
So you start at $0.58, and really when you get done, its $6.92 is 
what it really costs you to own the land. 
Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 696-97, 11. 25, 1-17. 
On cross-examination, Hedley made it abundantly clear that in his analysis, the cost to 
Grathol to develop the remainder property after fID's take increases by $2.00 per square foot: 
Q. So in your before development cost analysis, you came up with 
the cost that Grathol is going to have to spend is $4.92 to do this 
right? 
A. The $4.92 -
Q. - per square foot? 
A. - includes the price of the land. 
Q. Okay. $4.92 to do this. 
*** 
Q. Gotcha. Then you did a cost analysis of the property in the 
after condition, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And your conclusion is that it will cost $6.92 for Grathol to 
develop their property in the after condition; isn't that what you 
said? 
A. Well, let me back up? 
Q. Yes or no, is that what you said? 
A. I said yes. 
Q. Okay. 
Tr. Vol. 4, p. 706, 11. 1-7, 12-21. 
Q. So in the before condition, the cost of development is $4.92 
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per foot, that's your opinion? 
A. Per net usable acreage, yes net usable acreage. 
Q. And in the after condition, the cost to develop is $6.92, a $2 
increase in cost per foot to develop after the take; that's your 
testimony, isn't it? 
A. Based on the net available acreage left. 
Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 706-07, 11. 25, 1-7. (emphasis added) 
While Hedley presumably offered this testimony to show the economic "infeasibility" of 
Grathol's development plans; ITD's questioning of him, in fact, elicited testimony that the 
effect of ITD's take is to increase the cost to develop the property to the tune of $2.00 per 
square foot! The import of his evidence cannot be overstated, as Hedley was not flying solo in 
arriving at this opinion. By his own description, Hedley led a team with David Evans & 
Associates (civil engineers) and Stanley Moe (appraiser) in order to conduct this detailed 
analysis. Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 667, 11. 10-21, p.668, 11. 18-20. Through its own expert witness 
testimony, ITD proved that the Grathol property suffered severance damages in the amount of 
$2.00 per square foot by virtue of the increased costs to develop the net acreage left after ITD's 
condemnation. While ITD continues to argue that Grathol suffered no severance damage, its 
own witnesses apparently collaborated to agree that severance damages not only do exist, the 
damages are greater than even Grathol thought.2 
ITD's criticism of both Sherwood and Johnson's analysis is that they both allegedly said 
that no severance damages existed at the time of the condemnation but instead added additional 
amounts based on construction delay. This grossly mischaracterizes the approach that both 
2 In this regard, Grathol faces the obvious temptation to concede the larger parcel issue addressed irifra so as to take 
advantage of Mr. Hedley's generous severance damage analysis as to the whole parent tract. However, Grathol 
admits that Hedley's $2.00/sq. ft. increase cost of development should in no event be applied beyond the remainder 
of the west 30 acres which is all Grathol intends to develop. 
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witnesses took. Neither Sherwood nor Johnson found that there were no severance damages to 
the remaining property. Instead, they each applied a recognized discount approach to arrive at 
their opinions of the actual present value of the property on the date of the condemnation. The 
difference between that actual present value of the remainder after the take and the value of the 
remainder before the take is severance damage: by definition. In fact, the difference between 
the actual value of the remainder before and after the taking can be measured by the 
"development cost approach"3 which is exactly what was utilized by Hedley and the "team." 
While they used a development cost approach to try to demonstrate the folly of Grathol's plans, 
that approach is still a legitimate way to value development property. In short, that is "how 
developers do it." It may note the same approach used by our appraiser, but it is legitimate 
nonetheless. 
Condemnation cases require an analysis of the property before and after the take as if 
the contemplated construction magically dropped out of the sky. This artificial construct is 
created in order to allow the fact-finder to determine the amount of damages caused solely by 
the completed project and to avoid other (unrelated) influences on property value. The 
severance damages testified to by both Sherwood and Johnson were not construction delay 
damages (i.e. damages attributable to non-use of property caused by construction), but instead 
were based on the market factors that a buyer would consider in valuing the property, if such 
construction was complete. Those damages included consideration of the value of the 
commercial development as impacted by ITD's project. The analysis necessary to get to this 
value is scarcely different from that method employed by Hedley's team. Because the property 
3 Eaton, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, Chapter 12, p. 245 (attached). 
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is not currently in "use" (but will be a commercial/retail development as per its "highest and 
best use"), it is possible (and appropriate) to value the property as if both the retail development 
and highway construction have occurred and then to discount the value to a present value that 
reflects the impacts of the (highway) Project as well as the present non-existence of the 
commercial/retail improvements. That analysis necessarily requires an opinion of property 
value at a future date, and then discounts that value back to the date of the condemnation to 
arrive at the actual (net) present value of the remainder as of the time of the summons (date of 
the take). 
Sherwood specifically testified that his opinions were based on the market impacts of 
ITD's Project on the remainder value after the construction of the Project. That is exactly what 
is required by Idaho law. 
Q. And is it the object of the exercise in producing a valuation 
opinion for you to try to predict, based upon all of the data and 
information that you consider, to try and predict what a buyer in a 
buyer's shoes, would pay for a property at a given point in time? 
A. That's what I was attempting to do, sir. 
Tr. Vol 3; pp. 391-92; ll. 20-25; I Sherwood didn't line-item out each of the m::irket factors 
influencing the remainder value after the taking, but instead included those considerations in 
arriving at the value for the remainder on November 17, 2010, including the diminishment to 
the use and developability of the property for commercial purposes as well as damages related 
to the loss of access, visibility and development opportunity. Second Supp. Ans. and Responses 
to ITD 's Discovery at No. 3. This is not construction delay damages, no matter how many times 
ITD says it is. 
Alan Johnson also testified to the various factors influencing the value of the remainder 
after the taking. Johnson's valuation was based on the fact that the property will no longer be at 
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a signalized, at-grade intersection; the property will adjoin an elevated fly-by interchange; the 
property will be segmented with several acres on the west side of the "new" highway; the west 
parcel will not have utility connectivity; the increase speed of the traffic past the property, and 
the other market factors affecting value and desirability to tenants and users, all of which he 
testified to in detail. Tr. Vol. 4, p. 774-75, ll. 21-25, 1-18. These market factors are what any 
rational buyer would consider in valuing the property after the talcing, as if ITD's project were 
complete. The lower values after the talcing are directly caused by ITD's condemnation and are 
properly subject of just compensation. At trial, ITD elected not to cross-examine Johnson on 
any of these issues, and instead it simply tries to re-label all of Johnson's testimony as 
"construction delay related." Johnson did not testify as to any severance damages for 
"construction delay" and ITD cannot now change Johnson's testimony via argument. 
IV. Johnson's Opinions on Damages. 
Last, ITD criticizes Johnson's valuation based on the market value of the property as 
commercial development. ITD argues that Johnson's testimony is contrary to Idaho law, 
prohibiting valuation testimony on speculative future sales of lots. However, in making this 
argument, ITD ignores the fact that neither Johnson's valuation of the take or the severance 
damages is based on what individual retail lot sales would bring. Instead, Johnson testified as to 
the value of the property both before and after the condemnation and construction of the 
highway. Johnson did not testify as to the potential sales profits of individual lots to arrive at an 
opinion of value for the take. Instead, he compared the market value of the whole property 
before the take with the market value of the remainder after the take in order to arrive at his 
opinion of severance damage. He did this, in part, by looking at the end-user value of the 
property once all of the development work was completed and then discounted that value back 
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to the net present value (as of the date of the take). The decreased value of the property after the 
take as compared to the higher value before the take is, by definition, the severance damages to 
the remainder. 
ITD relies on City of Caldwell v. Roark, 92 Idaho 99,437 P.2d 615 (1968) to argue that 
such valuation methodology is verboten. However, the landowner in City of Caldwell didn't 
even seek severance damages. Instead, he attempted to utilize future hypothetical lot sales as 
the basis for finding the value of the land actually taken ( condemned). That is not what Johnson 
has done here. 
The Supreme Court in Roark recognized that although the property was subdivided, 
there were no separate ownerships involved and the tract taken by the City "constituted a single 
quadrangular, consolidated body of land." Id. at 101, P.2d 617. The trial court had instructed 
the jury to find the value of the land taken as a single tract ofland by the condemnor. The court 
also recognized that the take's value was to be based on the "highest and best use" to which the 
land could be devoted. "Its value for the highest and best use to which the land was adaptable 
was the basis upon which the defenda.nts were entitled to recover." Id. 
In arriving at a value for the take, the Roark court ruled that the take was to be valued as 
a single tract of land, instead of the aggregate individual values which separate lots (that could 
be created from the part taken) might bring over a period of time in the future. However, the 
Roark court also recognized that the jury was properly permitted to consider the prospective 
value of the property in the future for determining its value as of the date of the summons. Id. at 
102, 437 P.2d 618. The Roark case did not hold that the decrease in market value of the 
proposed development caused by a condemnor's actions was barred in any manner. Indeed, 
that case did not address severance damages in any respect, as none were requested by the 
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landowner. 
Johnson's opinion testimony as to the value of the take, on November 17, 2010 was 
based on his opinions of the market value of the property, in its highest and best use as 
commercial development, on that date. Unlike the landowners' in Roark, Johnson did not base 
the value of the take on an aggregate of individual future hypothetical lot sales, but instead 
attributed a flat value of $3 .23 per sq. ft. to the area of the take as a single parcel of commercial 
land. This was Johnson's opinion of the amount that an informed, arms-length buyer would pay 
on the date of condemnation. Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 745-46, ll. 19-25, 1-3. 1hls was the same 
valuation method expressly recognized and approved by the City of Caldwell v. Roark court. 
ITD mixes apples and oranges, and fails to recognize that Roark does not even address the 
propriety of calculating severance damages. 
Indeed, the very same valuation approach criticized by ITD (value based on the 
property's potential future use) was expressly recognized in Ada County Highway Dist. By and 
Through Silva v. Magwire, 104 Idaho 656, 662 P.2d 237 (1983). There the Idaho Supreme 
Court considered an appeal by the County from an award of just compensation for a highway 
widening project. At the time of the taking the property was zoned residential and carried 
restrictive covenants preventing its use for anything other than for residential purposes. The 
property was located on the comer of an intersection of two major streets. Id. at 658, 662 P.2d 
239. The Idaho Supreme Court found that the uses to which the property taken or is adaptable 
are those that are reasonably probable. It held that the full extent of such probable use (as it 
affects the value of the take) must be considered. The Court said that the probability of a 
potential zone change would be taken into consideration by a hypothetical buyer in determining 
value. "It is the effect, if any, upon the fair market value on the date of taking, which makes 
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relevant evidence of a possible rezoning of the property." The Silva Court found that because 
the rezoning was reasonably probable and would affect the value of the property at the time of 
the take, it was a proper basis for the jury to utilize in determining value. 
Similarly, the Grathol property has to be valued as commercial development at the time 
of the condemnation. That is its highest and best use. Johnson testified as to the value that a 
hypothetical buyer would arrive at on the date of taking, based on the property being a 
commercial/retail development parcel. Those factors influencing the market value include all of 
the impact ofITD's project on that use. 
IID's criticism of Johnson's methodology is without merit. ITD spends much of its 
post-trial brief claiming that Johnson "violated the law" or applied an "unrecognized" 
methodology in arriving at his opinions of value. It is a well settled rule in Idaho that the owner 
of property is a competent witness to its value, as he is presumed to be familiar with its value by 
reason of inquiries, comparisons, purchases and sales. Weaver v. Vil!. of Bancroft, 92 Idaho 
189, 193, 439 P.2d 697, 701 (1968); Riley v. Larson, 91 Idaho 831, 432 P.2d 775 (1967); 
Rankin v. Caldwell, 15 Idaho 625, 99 P. 108 (1908). Further, Johnson is not merely an owner 
of property, but is also a commercial/retail real estate developer whose business is to arrive at 
an opinion of land values for commercial development. At trial, Johnson testified at length 
(and was unchallenged, even on cross-examination) as to his depth of knowledge, experience 
and acumen in valuing property. Johnson employed the same methodology as other 
developers for determining the value of the Grathol property based on its features for a 
commercial/retail development. Johnson's analysis included a prospective analysis of the 
development project and how such development is impacted by ITD's taking. A developer 
with a bare piece of ground must conduct a broader analysis in order to evaluate the 
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economic prospects of a proposed project to determine the market value of the land itself. 
This is not some fabricated analysis derived solely to increase the claims for just 
compensation as alleged by ITD. Indeed, ITD's own expert witnesses utilized a very similar 
development approach to analyze the costs of development and concluded that such costs 
increased by reason ofITD's take and Project. ITD's own experts proved severance damages 
using the same development cost approach! Johnson's methodology to identify the actual 
existing impacts of the take on the Grathol property was sound and logical. While ITD's 
witnesses testified that the severance damages equated to $2.00 per square foot, Johnson's 
estimate of those damages was considerably more conservative.4 
Simply put, the severance damages are not easily calculable for this type of land and 
this type of take. The traditional "cost to cure" method doesn't work. There is no way to 
systematically "measure" to any degree of mathematical certainty how the Project and the take 
will lessen (or increase) the value of the remainder. There is no "formula." Instead, it is both 
appropriate and accepted to look at how the Project will impact the intended use(s) of the 
property in its "highest and best" state. The only way to quantify those impacts to the property 
is through either a discount analysis to reach the present value of the remainder after the take, or 
through Hedley's development approach. Either one gets you to a result, but as evidenced here, 
one approach (ITD's, as it were) gets to a considerably higher number. 
ITD fails to recognize that Johnson testified with sufficient foundation as to the value of 
the property at the time of the taking and provided an opinion of the remainder value after the 
4 Johnson's testimony as to severance damages to the remaining property was from $338,000 to $798,000 based on 
pre-take values of $3.23 and $4.00 per square foot. Broken down, that equates to a per foot value of severance 
damage to the total remainder of $0.19 to $0.45, compared to Hedley's $2.00 per sq. ft. 
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taking as if ITD's project were completed. Johnson then compared the value of the whole 
"before" with the remainder "after" to arrive at a range of value ( severance damages) from 
$338,000.00 to $798,000.00 based on the multiple market factors and impacts he identified. Tr. 
Vol. 4, p. 775, ll. 2-15. Johnson then added that opinion of severance damages to his valuation 
of the take to arrive at a total amount of just compensation in the range of $2,633,360 to 
$3,093,360. Tr. Vol. 4, p. 775-76, ll. 19-25, 1-2. This testimony was literally unchallenged. 
ITD had the opportunity to cross-examine Johnson on his methods and calculations but chose 
not to do so, and it cannot now attempt to re-characterize his testimony as something other than 
it was. 
Hombook law on condemnation appraisal practice supports Grathol's valuation in this 
case. Eaton's, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation reads as follows: 
Historically, the value of a remainder property in a partial taking 
case was estimated assuming the public improvement was 
complete and operational on the date of valuation. Because the 
size of public projects and the cost of money have increased, as 
has the amount of time between land acquisition and the 
completion of many public projects, it is now more corn.mon to 
estimate the value of a remainder property in its physical 
condition as it exists on the date of valuation, giving consideration 
to the proposed public construction and its anticipated effect. 
The 'after value' is based on the value of the remainder property 
assuming that the actual construction of the proposed project will 
not be completed until an estimated future date. 
Eaton at p. 271. 5 
5 Copies of selected chapters and text from Real Estate Valuation in Litigation are attached at Appendix "A" for the 
Court's use. All three appraisers who testified in this acknowledged this as an authoritative treatise on property 
valuation in condemnation. 
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Id. at p. 272. 
Id. at 306. 
Although the appraiser is to view the remainder property as it 
physically existed on the date of value, he or she must consider 
the impact of the pending construction on the remainder property. 
Therefore, the appraiser must be able to visualize the remainder 
property after the proposed public project is complete to estimate 
its value and reflect the damages and/or special benefits that will 
accrue to it. 
The appraiser measures damages, not as an end in itself, but to 
assist in estimating the value of the remainder tract. Id. at 295. In 
other words, the estimate of damages is the basis for arriving at an 
adjustment that will be applied to various market data in valuing 
the property in the after situation. One . . . method of estimating 
damage is by analyzing comparable sales using the matched pairs, 
or paired data analysis, technique. Damages can also be estimated 
by capitalizing the net rent loss resulting from the damage. Id. A 
third method applied to estimate a proper adjustment for damage 
is known as the cost to cure. This method can be used when the 
property being appraised has suffered damage that can be 
physically and economically corrected. 
In estimating the value of the remainder tract, it is important 
that the appraiser consider all observations made in 
determining the highest and best use of the tract in the after 
situation and the effect, if any, of the proposed public 
improvement. 
While ITD spends an inordinate amount of time critizing Johnson' opinion, it doesn't' 
reflect on its own expert witnesses' testimony at trial, establishing a higher range of severance 
damages than even the Defendant could come up with. ITD's consultants, at its directive, 
evaluated the impacts of ITD's take and project on the value of the Grathol property in its 
highest and best form. While IID attempted to present this (Hedley) testimony to demonstrate 
the perceived financial folly of Grathol's proposed development, it unilaterally elicited 
testirn.ony from its own expert as to the actual severance damages caused. Hedley did not 
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unwillingly present this testimony, nor was it elicited by some savvy cross-examination 
trickery. Hedley volunteered this testimony in response to IID's own line of inquiry. His 
testimony was based on a collaborative effort and analysis between Hedley, Moe and experts at 
David Evans & Associates (who were never called to testify.) This "team" conducted its 
analysis because the inherent difficulty in valuing raw ground as commercial property 
necessitates a broader analysis than IID's simple "before and after" appraisal approach. 
Johnson and Sherwood undertook similar analyses to arrive at their opinions of value for the 
take and severance damages. How ironic that IID castigates the condmnee for using the very 
same analytical approach that its own witness resorted to, particularly where, as here, IID' s 
witnesses concluded severance damages will be in excess of what Grathol seeks. 
DA 1ED this 6th day of April, 2012. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
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The Larger Parcel 
I I he apprniser seldom encounters a 
valuation or analytical premise in condemnation appraising that cannot also be 
found in general appraisal assignments. The concept of the larger parcel, however, 
is an exception. It is an analytical premise unique to eminent domain valuation 
and is often misunderstood and/ or misapplied by appraisers, condemnors, law-
yers, and the courts. 
The term larger parcel cannot be found in comprehensive appraisal textbooks 
such as The Appraisal of Real Estate, 1 but two definitions are provided in The Dictionary 
of Real Estate Appraisal. One definition of the larger parcel is 
In condemnation, the portion of a property that has unity of ownership, contigu-
ity, and unity of use, the three conditions that establish the larger parcel for the 
consideration of severance damages in most states. In federal and some state 
cases, however, contiguity is sometimes subordinated to unitary use.2 
Black's Law Dictionary defines the larger parcel as: 
A term used in eminent domain proceedings, signifying that the parcel taken is 
not a complete parcel but part of a "larger parcel"; the owner, therefore is entitled 
to damages from the severance as well as the value of the parcel taken. Unity of 
ownership, use, and contiguity must be present, although federal courts and some 
states do not require contiguity where there is a strong unity of use.3 
The larger parcel is sometimes referred to as the parent tract4 or the rule of joinder.5 
l. The Appraisal of Real Estate, 10th ed. (Chicago: Ap-
praisal Institute, 1992). 
2. The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal, 3d ed. (Chi-
cago: Appraisal Institute, 1993), 202. 
3. Black's Law Dictionary, abr. 6th ed., s.v. "larger parcel:' 
75 
4. United States v. 8.41 Acres of Land, 783 F.2d 1256 (5th 
Cir. 1986). 
5. People v. Ocean Shore RR, 196 P.2d 570 (Cal. 1948); 




REAL ESTATE VALUATION IN LITIGATION 
A second definition of the larger parcel included in the Dictionary of Real Estate 
Appraisal is more meaningful and useful to appraisers. It reads: 
In condemnation, that tract or tracts of land which are under the beneficial con-
trol of a single individi'.ial or entity and have the same, or an integrated, highest 
\., e--· and best use. Elements for consideration by the appraiser in making a determina-
< .• 1i'\~ (! tion in this regard are c~ntiguity, or p~oximity, a~ it bea~s on the highest and best 
'/.., ~i.:'.ir use of the property, urnty of ownership, and urnty of highest and best use.6 
.:!}.!":;- Understanding the concept of the larger parcel is vital in condemnation appraisal 
r\~-.~- because the appraiser cannot determine the highest and best use of a property 
until a conclusion as to the larger parcel is reached. The larger parcel may be all Jr/ of one parcel, part of a parcel, or several parcels, depending to varying degrees on I , unity of ownership, unity of use, and contiguity. 
In a typical appraisal assignment, an appraiser is retained to estimate the 
value of a parcel of land which has specific boundaries and the parameters of the 
property are known before any in-depth appraisal analysis is made. This is not, 
or should not be, the case in condemnation appraisals. 
It is useful to understand how parcel, or right-of-way, maps are developed by 
a condemnor. If, for example, a roadway is to be constructed or widened, the 
condemno:r's engineers prepare a survey of the proposed right-of-way limits. 
This survey is then given to the title department within the condemning agency, 
or to a title company, with instructions to identify all ownerships within the 
proposed right-of-way and to determine the property boundaries of each parcel. 
These boundaries include all land that is contiguous and under the same owner-
ship as the land within the proposed right-of-way. A right-of-way map like the 
one shown in Figure 5.1 is then prepared. Figure 5.2 shows the typical ownership 
information included on such a map. The right-of-way map is then usually passed 
on to the appraiser with instructions to appraise a specific parcel identified on the 
map. 
The physical contiguity of land is an engineering question, while unity of 
ownership is usually a legal question. The right-of-way map is prepared and the 
boundaries of the properties to be appraised are determined prior to any consid-
eration of unity of use. Therefore, most appraisal contracts between an appraiser 
and a condemning agency, and most instructions assigning an appraisal to a staff 
appraiser, specify that the appraiser is to estimate the value of a parcel which may 
or may not be the "larger parcel'.' The ultimate determination of the larger parcel 
must be made by the appraiser. If it is found that the parcel defined by the right-
of-way map and the appraisal contract or assignment does not constitute the 
larger parcel, the appraiser must insist on a revised contract or assignment. As 
stated in the Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions: 
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FIGURE 5.2 TYPICAL OWNERSHIP INFORMATION 
OWNERSHIPS 
1¥1RCELNO. NAME TOTAL AREA TAKE LT. REMAINDER RT. EASEMENTS 
f-l'l/7 J.ALDRICH SEE SHEET ,?O 
4•/'l/8 8.£. TRE!SCH£l 3.24 AC, 0.3.2 AC. 2.92 AC. 
4·1919 £.A.SOWERS 2.44 AC. 0 . .38 AC. 2.06 AC 
4-192() K. D£C.KFRT 0.20 AC. 0.07 AC. 0, 1.3 AC 
4·1'121 R. P. SCHUMACHER 0.86 AC. 0.20 AC. 0.66 AC. 
•-1,.n R.L.SMAZA O. 92 AC. 0.28 AC. 0.64 AC. 
4-l'llJ $.LOCKWOOD 1.39 AC. 0.32 AC. 1.07 AC. 
4•1924 E.C.MORRIS 0.65 AC. 0./5 AC. 0.50 AC. 
•f-1925 A. R.JANISCH 1.96 AC. 0 • .36 AC. 1.60 AC. 
/921, D. 0. WALSTON 1./4 AC. 0. 13 AC. I.Of AC. 
4-1'129 A JANISCH 3.88 AC. 0.60 AC. 3.28 AC. 
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Often essential in the appraiser's consideration of highest and best use is the 
conclusion concerning the larger parcel. Because the ultimate determination of 
highest and best use is the appraiser's to make, and that determination cannot be 
made until after considerable investigation and analysis has been completed, the 
appraiser's conclusion as to the larger parcel is sometimes different from the spe-
cific parcel he or she was requested to appraise by the agency. In such an instance, 
the appraiser shall inform the agency of his or her determination of the larger 
parcel and the agency shall amend the appraisal assignment accordingly.7 
The determination of the larger parcel is particularly important in partial 
taking cases, in which compensable damages and/or special benefits accrue to 
the remainder parcel after the taking. Like many other elements in condemna-
tion appraisal, the tests to determine the larger parcel (i.e., unity of ownership, 
unity of use, and contiguity) cannot be applied universally and blindly. The 
federal courts and some state courts have ruled that all three tests need not be 
met in ey.ecy-instanee. -=------
- A situation in which a right-of-way map may not correctly depict the larger 
parcel is illustrated in Figure 5.3. In this case, the entire parcel meets the tests of 
unity of ownership and contiguity, but it fails the test of unity of use. Therefore, 
the service station is not a part of the larger parcel8 and cannot suffer compensable 
damage or receive a special benefit. 
FIGURE 5.3 NO UNITY OF USE 




















Another situation is depicted in Figure 5.4. In this instance, the two sites have 
unity of ownership, but they are certainly not contiguous or put to the same use. 
However, unity of use has often been defined to include an integrated use.9 The mill 
may have been constructed for the sole purpose of processing logs harvested from 
7. Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisi-
tions (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1992), §B-1 - 14, p. 73. 
8. O'Brien v. City of New York, 32 A.D.2d 1059 (N.Y. 1969). 



























































THE LARGER PARC1 
FIGURE 5.4 NONCONTIGUOUS LARGER PARCEL 
Improved 




Timber Stand A N 
the 500-acre timber stand. Thus, while the two tracts do not have identical uses, 
they certainly have an integrated use. In some jurisdictions, the larger parcel 
would be defined as the mill site plus the timber stand. In such a case, damages 
accruing to the mill site due to the taking of the timber stand would be 
compensable. 
In an often-cited landmark case, a federal court ruled that two parcels lo-
cated 17 miles apart, on two different islands, constituted a single larger parcel. In 
this ruling the court said: 
The first question before us here, therefore, and the basic one in all severance 
damage cases, is what constitutes a "single" tract as distinguished from "separate" 
ones. The answer does not depend upon artificial things like boundaries between 
tracts as established in deeds in the owner's chain of title, nor does it depend 
necessarily upon whether the owner acquired his land in one transaction or even 
at one time. Neither does it wholly depend upon whether holdings are physically 
contiguous. Contiguous tracts may be "separate" ones if used separately, and tracts 
physically separated from one another may constitute a "single" tract if put to an 
integrated unitary use or even if the possibility of their being so combined in use 
"in the reasonably near future" "is reasonably sufficient to affect market value'.' 
.. .Integrated use, not physical contiguity, therefore, is the test. Physical contigu-
ity is important, however, in that it frequently has great bearing on unity of use ... 
[S]eparation still remains as evidentiary; not an operative, fact. 10 [Citations omitted] 
Note that in the above case the court recognized that separate parcels do not 
have to be put to the same use on the date of valuation; rather, if the highest and 
best use of the properties requires a unity of use, they constitute a single larger 
parcel. However, the mere fact that two parcels constitute a single larger parcel 
does not necessarily mean that the remainder property is damaged. On remand 
of the above case, the court found that .the remaining lands had not suffered any 
compensable damages.11 
By defining the larger parcel, the appraiser can confine his or her judgments 
to those parcels, or parts of a single parcel, that are affected by condemnation. 
10. Baetjerv. United States, 143 F.2d 391, 394-395 (1st Cir. 
1944) cert. denied 323 U.S. 772 (1944). 
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Figure 5.5 shows a 100-acre farm that is subject to two zoning classifications. The 
proposed widening of Road A necessitates the acquisition of the easterly 25 feet 
of the tract. The highest and best use of the property coincides with its current 
zoning. The property is owned by a single individual and is contiguous, but there 
is no unity of highest and best use. Thus, the larger parcel in this case is the 
easterly 500 feet of the ownership and only this part of the tract is subject to 
compensable damages and/ or special benefits. 
FIGURE 5.5 No UNITY OF USE 
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This determination of the larger parcel eliminates the application of the backland 
theory described in Chapter 3. The backland theory would be used, and :mifused, 
furless frequently if appraisers and others involved in condemnation proceed-
ings had a better understanding of the larger parcel prernise. Once the appraiser 
has identified the larger parcel, the scope of the analysis required is narrowed 
substantially. In the above case, only the easterly 500 feet need to be appraised, so 
only comparable commercial land sales have to be investigated and analyzed. 
Residential land sales need not be studied. 
As the preceding examples illustrate, the appraiser must consider more than 
single ownership and parcel size to define the scope of the assignment. Because 
the tests of the larger parcel can be applied in a variety of ways, it is necessary to 
study each element of this trinity-unity of ownership, unity of use, and contigu-
ity-in some depth. Although most of the rulings pertaining to the larger parcel 
involve the question of compensable damages, the rulings are equally applicable 
to special benefits. 
It generally has been held that determination of the larger parcel is a matter 
of foct, not a matter of law. Therefore, when a question of the larger parcel arises 
in a condemnation trial, it is a question to be answered by the jury (or trier of 
fact), not by the court.12 However, some confusion exists in this regard in the 
federal court system because all federal condemnation cases are conducted under 
12. Arkansas State H'way Comm. v. Arkansas Real Estate Co., 
471 S.W.2d 340 (Ark. 1971); Sharp v. United States, 











































































THE LARGER PARCF 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide that just compensation will be 
determined by the trier of fact, but that "[t]rial of all issues shall otherwise be by 
the court'.'13 The U.S. Supreme Court has said that "[tlhe Rule [71(h)] thus provides 
that, except for the single issue of just compensation, the trial judge is to decide 
all issues, legal and factual, that may be presented'.'14 
Because determination of the larger parcel is intertwined with the question 
of highest and best use, strict adherence to the above rule would result in the 
court, rather than the trier of fact, making the finding of highest and best use. 
The Reynolds' decision quoted above dealt with the issue of the scope of the project 
rather thari the question of highest and best use or the larger parcel. (See Chap-
ter 6 for further discussion of the scope of the project rule.) Several federal 
circuit cases decided after Reynolds have interpreted that decision narrowly and 
have ruled that the question of highest and best use, and thus the larger parcel, 
rests with the jury.15 
It is suggested that "it is safe for the practitioner to prepare and present the 
case upon the assumption that the theory of unity of use [the larger parcel] is a 
factual question for the trier as it relates to the ultimate issue of value, damage 
and just compensation. If there is a question, the Motion in Limine is available to 
preliminarily resolve questions, particularly in the federal courts where judges 
and magistrates have broad powers available to them at the pretrial stage of 
litigation'.'16 
As the examples presented demonstrate, determination of the larger parcel is 
critical. The appraiser should discuss this issue with legal counsel in the early 
stages of the appraisal assignment if the larger parcel determination is in ques-
tion. 
UNITY OF TITLE 
It is generally held that for one or more parcels to be considered a single larger 
parcel, it is essential that they be owned by the same individual or group of 
individuals.17 In a few cases, however, the courts have held otherwise. In a Kansas 
case, for instance, the court held that three contiguous parcels of land, owned by 
three different individuals and being used as one farm operation by mutual agree-
ment, were a single larger parcel and, therefore," ... injury to each [parcel]result-
ing from the whole taking may be considered:'rn Most cases that have aHowed 
consideration of lands owned by others have done so under the theory of the 
highest and best use of an assemblage. (The highest and best use of an assem-
blage is further discussed in Chapter 6.) 
On the other side of the coin, there is case law that supports the proposition 
that the quality of the title to all parcels must be identical for the tract to be 
13. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 71A(h). 
14. United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 17 (1970). 
15. United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, More or Less in Cty., 
605 F2d 762 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. 100 Acres 
of Land, Etc, Marin Ct1i, CaL, 468 E2d 1261 (9th Cir, 
1972), cert. den., 414 U.S. 822 (1973); United States v. 
341.45 Acres of Land, 633 E2d 108 (8th Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied 451 U.S. 938 (1981). 
16. Nichols'TheLawofEminentDomain, rev. 3d ed. (New 
York: Mathew Bender Co., Inc., 1992), vol. 4A, 
§ 14B.04[2]. 
17. Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Dennis, 409 S.W.2d 
292 (Ky. 1966); United States v. 429.59 Acres ~f Land, 
612 F2d 459 9th Cir. (1980). 
18. County of Smith v. Labore, 15 P. 577 (Kan. 1887). 
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considered a single larger parcel. For example, if Parcel A in Figure 5.6 is owned 
by Mrs. Jones, as her sole and separate property, and Parcel B is owned by Mr. and 
Mrs. Jones jointly, some courts would rule that the larger parcel is Parcel A only 
and that no compensabl~ damages can accrue to Parcel B, even though the two 
tracts have contiguity and unity ofuse.19 The federal government has historically 
supported the proposition that the form of title must be identical. 
To satisfy the requirement as to unity of ownership, title to all parts of the whole 
must be vested to the same extent in the same person(s). Unity of ownership is 
lacking when the owner has different interests in the two or more tracts, as, for 
example, where he owns one tract in fee simple, has a leasehold interest in an-
other, and owns in entirety the stock of a corporation which owns another tract. 
Likewise, unity of ownership is lacking between two tracts when one is owned by 
the husband and the other by the wife, or where one is owned by the father and 
the other is owned by the son.20 















The federal government most often cites United States v. Honolulu Plantation Co.21 
in support of identical ownership. The court in that case said (at page 178, 179) 
"[t]he rule requiring compensation for loss in market value of the remainder of 
the tract is applied strictly only where there is but a single parcel owned by one 
party in fee simple .... If, therefore, the fee owner of one tract holds a lesser tenure 
in the tract taken, there can be no additional compensation for this reason. The 
explanation is that the fee is the integer." However, it is clear that the foregoing is 
dicta. In introducing this issue the court said (at page 178) "[a]lthough disposition 
has thus been made of the erroneous claims and theories of the experts, it be-
hooves us to consider whether Plantation is entitled to compensation, without 
regard to the clauses of the respective leases:' 
Nevertheless, the same court later ruled in two different cases that identical 
title was not required to find a single larger parcel. In one case the larger parcel 
19. Glendenning v. Stahlty, 91 N.E. 234 (Ind. 1910). 
20. Unifonn Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisi-
tions, §A-11, p. 29. 
21. United States v. Honolulu Plantation Co., 182 F.2d 172 
(9th Cir. 1950) cert. den., 340 U.S. 820 (1950) at 178, 
179. 
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was found to be ownership of an easement in one parcel and a leasehold interest 
in a second parcel. The court said "Honolulu Plantation is inapposite, however, 
because the party seeking severance damages in that case had no interest what-
soever in the land which had been condemned'.'22 In the second case, the court 
found that three tracts of land constituted a single larger parcel, even though the 
tracts were owned by three different corporations, because ownership of all three 
corporations was held by the same individuals. In making this ruling the court 
said that "[t]he fact that land thus treated [as a single entity] is owned by different 
entities does not destroy the unity concept:'23 In a footnote the court distinguished 
this case from Honolulu Plantation "because the plaintiff sugar refinery in that case 
had no compensable interest in sugar cane fields taken from a third party.' 
These rulings suggest that the policy stated in the Uniform Appraisal Standards 
for Federal Land Acquisitions with regard to unity of ownership is not without its 
weaknesses. Any appraiser involved in a federal condemnation assignment con-
cerned with multiple tracts that have a unity of highest and best use, but lack 
identical ownership, should seek the advice of legal counsel, whether the client is 
the property owner or the government. 
In most jurisdictions, unity of ownership does not necessarily mean that the 
quality of the title is identical. Two parcels, one owned in fee and one owned 
equitably by a vendee's interest in a real estate contract, could be considered to 
have unity of title.24 One California case held that unity of title existed where an 
individual owned one parcel in fee and was the equitable owner of an abutting 
parcel because he had exercised an option to purchase the second parcel.25 In 
another California case, however, where the interest in the second parcel existed 
only in the form of an unexpired, but unexercised option, the court held that 
there was no unity of title.26 
Unity of title generally requires equal legal control over the ownership and 
future of the lands in question. Acquisition of the parts of a whole at different 
times does not destroy unity of title,27 nor, in some cases, does the fact that one 
parcel is owned by an individual and the second parcel is owned by a corpora-
tion under the control of that individual.28 Some courts, however, have ruled 
conversely. 29 
A fee interest in one parcel and a leasehold interest in an abutting parcel, as 
depicted in Figure 5.7, can operate as one larger parcel for the remaining term of 
the lease.30 Similarly, if three individuals independently own separate parcels of 
land and lease them to a fourth individual, there could be unity of title during the 
term of the lease of all the parcels,31 and the compensation would flow to the lessee. 
22. United States v. 57.09 Acres of Land, 706 F.2d 280, 281 
(9th Cir. 1983). 
23. United States v. 429.59 Acres of Land, 612 F.2d 459,464 
(9th Cir. 1980). 
24. State Highway Comm. v. Miller, 155 N.W.2d 780 (S.D. 
1968). 
25. County of Santa Clara v. Curtner, 54 Cal. Rptr. 257 (Cal. 
1966). 
26. People v. Hemmerling, 58 Cal. Rptr. 203 (Cal. 1967) 
reversed on other grounds, Hemmerling vs. Jombeau 
432 P.2d 697 (Cal. 1967). 
27. Baetjerv. United States, 143 F.2d 391 (1st. Cir. 1944), 
cert. denied 323 U.S. 772 (1944). 
28. M.T.M. Realty Corp. v. State, 261 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. 
1965); United States v. 429.59 Acres of Land, 612 F.2d 
459 (9th Cir. 1980). 
29. Sams v. Redevelopment Authority, 244 A.2d 779 (Pa. 
1968). 
30. Chicago, etc., R Co. v. Dresel, 110 Ill. 89 (Ill. 1884). 
31. Berman v. Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh, 
324 A.2d 811 (Pa. 1974). 
1179 of 1617
84 
REAL ESTATE VALUATION IN LITIGATION 





















I A N 
Roadway 
UNITY OF USE 
The second test of the larger parcel requires that the parcel or parcels of land can 
be devoted to the same use as, or an integrated use with, the land from which the 
taking is made. It is generally not the presence or absence of actual unity of use 
that is considered; rather the unity of highest and best use is the controlling factor.32 
If a property is not being put to its highest and best use, but has a common 
highest and best use, the current use of the land does not generally destroy the 
unity of use.33 Some courts that have ruled conversely, however.34 These decisions, 
which seem to contradict the well-established premise that property is appraised 
at its highest and best use, are generally based on the reasoning that the unity of 
use has to exist because potential unity of use is too speculative and conjectural 
to be considered.35 A careful reading of many of these cases (e.g., the case cited 
above) suggests that the court may well have found that the proffered highest 
and best use of the property would have been too conjectural and speculative to 
be considered by the jury, even if the larger parcel were not at issue. 
Appraisers must recognize that stronger proof of unity of use is required 
when the parcels are not currently being used as a unit, but merely have a com-
mon highest and best use. "The question of unity of use of two or more tracts is a 
question of fact to be determined upon the facts and circumstances of the par-
ticular case, and is not to be based upon fanciful claims, speculation or conjec-
ture, and in such cases the burden of proof is upon the landowner to prove his 
claim:'36 · 
Political boundaries do not interrupt the continuity ofuse if the government's 
land-use controls permit a continuous highest and best use. 37 Moreover, unity of 
use does not require physical adjacency. There may be physical separation by 
32. Baefjer v. United States, 143 F.2d 391 (1st Cir. 1944), 
cert. denied 323 U.S. 772 (! 944). 
33. United States v. Mattox, 375 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1967). 
34. Cole Investment Co. v. United States, 258 F.2d 203 (9th 
Cir. 1958). 
35. City of Washington v. Koch, 456 S.W.2d 628 CMo. 1970). 
36. Ives v. Kansas Tpke.Authority, 334 P2d 399,407 (Kan. 
1959). . 
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baJriers such as streets, railroads, and creeks, but again this type of separation 
requires stronger proof of unity.38 
CONTIGUITY 
The third element of the larger parcel trinity, contiguity, normally requires that 
physical contiguity be present for a larger parcel to exist. However, this condition 
is not always mandatory and jurisdictions have ruled differently on this issue. 
Most courts hold unity of title and unity of use as the most important tests of the 
larger parcel.39 For this reason, the Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acqui-
sitions states: 
To constitute a "whole" for purposes of assessing severance damages, the law 
requires the property to meet two tests. First, there must be a unity of ownership 
in all parts of the whole. Second, there must be a unity of use as to all parts of the 
whole.40 
Whether a real estate ownership constitutes a single larger parcel as distin-
guished from separate parcels is best reflected by unity of use, and does not pre-
clude a reasonable separation. Such a separation does, however, require study .. 
The appraiser must be able to answer "yes" to the question: "Is it probable that the 
separated tracts would sell as an integrated single entity, even with the separa-
tion?" Only then can the separated tracts can be considered as a single larger 
parcel. As a Rhode Island court put it: 
Quite a different situation is presented when, as here, the two parcels in question 
are unequivocally separated from each other by fixed and definite boundaries, 
such as a highway. In such a case it is generally held that the two tracts can be 
considered as one only when they are so inseparably connected in the use to 
which they are applied that the taking of one necessarily and permanently injures the 
other.41 
An important factor to bear in mind, particularly (but not only) where the 
taking involves non-contiguous parcels devoted to a unitary use (e.g., a mill site 
and one or more parcels providing raw material for the milD is the availability of 
replacement property for the parcel taken, since a reasonable buyer and seller 
V./ould consider L11e availability of a replacement:'42 
The greater the separation between the parcels, the more likely it is that suitable 
replacement property will be available. 
Sometimes a larger parcel exists in the before situation but, in the after situ-
ation, the parcel has been severed by the taking and becomes two separate par-
cels. Such a situation is illustrated in Figure 5.8. Although the property had unity 
of ownership, unity of use, and contiguity in the before situation, it is no longer 
contiguous in the after situation. Quite probably, one or both of the tracts will 
have a different highest and best use after the taking than they did before. It is 
38. Tucker v. Massachusetts C.R Co., 118 Mass. 546 (Mass. 
1875); State v. Hoblit!, 288 P. 181 (Mont. 1930). 
39. Barnes v. North Carolina State Highway Comm., 109 S.E. 
2d 219 (N.C. 1959); Baetjer v. United States, 143 F.2d 
391 (1st Cir. 1944), cert. denied 323 U.S. 772 Cl 944). 
40. Unifonn Appraisal Standards for federal Land Acquisi-
tions, §A-11, pp. 28-29 (emphasis added). 
41. Sasso v. Housing Authority of the City of Providence, 111 
A2d 226, 230 (RI. 1955). 
42. Unifonn Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisi-
tions, §A-11, p. 30. 
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highly unlikely that unity of use, or integrity of use, will exist between the two 
parcels in the after situation. Thus, it is unlikely they would be sold as a single 
parcel and, in all probability, they would be considered two separate larger par-
cels. 
FIGURE s.s Two LARGER PARCELS-AFTER SITUATION 
" ___ ):{~~~<----
(Limited Access Freeway) -7-- ------ --~- A 
N 
Roadway 
Figure 5.9 illustrates a very different situation in which two tracts that were 
separate in the before situation could become a single larger parcel in the after 
situation. If Parcel A could be developed to a greater density in the after situation 
by using Parcel B for required parking, special benefits could accrue; in those 
jurisdictions that allow the offsetting of special benefits against both damages 
and the value of the property taken, the property owner might not be entitled to 
any monetary compensation. (See Chapter 12 for information on the offsetting of 
special benefits.) 
FIGURE 5.9 ONE LARGER PARCEL-AFTER SITUATION 
___________ T~k~n~ f~r _N::w_ R_?~d':":~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~: 
i1 
Landlocked Tract Improved Industrial £: -
Tract OJI 
Parcel A i: A 
._ ________ ___.~! N 
























































THE LARGER PAR' 
Another problem which the courts have ad.dressed upon occasion is illus-
. trated in Figure 5.10. This could be described as the problem of the paper plat. The 
tract identified as Parcel A, the whole parcel, is, of course, considered the larger 
parcel and the entire remainder parcel is subject to potential compensable dam-
ages by reason of the taking. In regard to Parcel B, however, the determination of 
the larger parcel will often depend on the specific status of the paper plat. 
FIGURE 5,10 PAPER PLATS 
Lot 5 
Lot 4 Lot 6 
Lot 3 Lot 7 Parcel A 
- ---- -----
Lot 2 Lot 8 
----- ---- -
-- -- -- - -- -- -- -




If the property owner has not dedicated the proposed street rights of way, or 
has only granted easements thereto while retaining the underlying fee, and no 
lots have been sold, the courts have generally ruled that all of Parcel B constitutes 
the larger parcel. The current status of the particular paper plat appears to be the 
key determinant. If the plat processing is beyond its initial stages, there could be 
two larger parcels (i.e., Lots 1 and 9), with Lots 2 through 8 falling outside the 
larger parcel and not subject to any compensable damages and/ or special ben-
efits. 
An Ohio court expressed this situation well: 
As an allotment develops, as it progresses from open land to individual lots, there 
comes a point where the lots not only can be but must be considered as separate 
entities. When this point arrives and a part of the allotment only is taken, consist-
ing of a number of lots, the question arises as to what is the remaining land to 
which damage may occur. Is it the whole remaining subdivision, or is it just the 
fragment of an individual lot not taken? 
Whether certain lots, taken by appropriation proceedings, constitute part of an 
entire tract so as to entitle the owner of the remaining continuous lots to damages 
within the rule is principally a question of unity of use and, as such, constitutes a 
factual matter to be determined by the jury under proper instructions.43 [Citations 
omitted] 
43. In re Appropriation For Highway Purposes, 239 N.E.2d 
110, 115 (Ohio 1968). 
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MYTHS ABOUT 
THE LARGER PARCEL 
As has been demonstrated, nearly all of the court decisions relating to the larger 
parcel involve either alleged damages or special benefits to the remainder. Two of 
the definitions of the larger parcel quoted previously specifically relate the term 
to damages to the remainder property. However, determination of the larger par-
cel is also important in cases in which damages and/or benefits are not claimed. 
In nearly all jurisdictions, the value of the land taken is measured as it contrib-
utes to the whole (larger parcel), rather than as a separate entity, regardless of 
whether the before and after or taking plus damages rule is applicable. Thus, 
appraisers must make a determination of the larger parcel in all cases. 
Even when damages or benefits are not alleged, determination of the larger 
parcel can have a significant impact on the amount of compensation indicated. 
Two economic factors can come into play in larger parcel valuations: plottage (or 
assemblage) and size regression. 
Plottage is an increment of value that results when two or more sites are combined 
to produce greater utility. Sometimes highest and best use results from assem-
bling two or more parcels of land under one ownership. If the combined parcels 
have a greater unit value than they did separately, plottage value is created.44 
Size regression is the basic economic principle that as the number of units of a 
commodity increases, the price per unit paid for the commodity decreases. It is 
the concept of the bulk sales discount. As applied to land, as the number of units 
(e.g., acres, square feet) in a tract of land increases, the price, or value, per unit 
tends to decrease. "Common sense tells us that a larger tract of land, holding 
other factors equal, would sell for less per unit:'45 
The courts seem to recognize piottage, but faii to acknowiedge the effect of 
size regression. In fact, at least two courts have ruled, as a matter of law, that two 
assembled tracts of land always have a larger square foot value than they would 
if considered as two separate tracts.46 
Appraisers are well aware of size regression. In fact, a favorite technique of 
the biased (and unethical) appraiser who is attempting to support a high value 
estimate is to compare the prices paid per acre for.small tracts against the price of 
a substantially larger subject parcel, without making a size adjustment. Con-
versely, the biased appraiser attempting to support a low value will compare the 
prices paid per acre for large tracts against a small tract under appraisal without 
making a size adjustment. 
The situation shown in Figure 5.11 illustrates the importance of the larger 
parcel determination even when damages and/or benefits are not at issue. As-
sume that the physical characteristics of all parts of the 100-acre farm are equal 
and that sales data show that farms of 75 to 125 acres sell for $2,000 per acre. If no 
damages or benefits are involved and the entire farm is considered a single larger 
44. The Appraisal of Real Estate, 10th ed., 211-212. 
45. Gene Dillmore, "Size Adjustment Tables," The Real 
Estate Appraiser (May-June 1976), 23. 
46. City of Buffalo v. Goldman, 406 N.Y.S2d 407 (N.Y. 1978); 
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THE LARGER PA: L 
. ' parcel, the indicated compensation for the two-acre taking would be $4,000, re-
gardless of whether the before and after rule or the taking (as a part of the whole) 
plus damages rule is applied. 
FIGURE 5.11 PARTIAL TAKING OF 100-ACRE FARM 
90 Acres 
Taking-2 Acres 
However, the situation might be more complicated. Further assume that small 
acreage sales in the area, ranging from five to 15 acres, typically sell for $5,000 per 
acre for use as rural homesites. If the appraiser concluded that the IO-acre parcel 
separated from the balance of the ownership by the creek had an independent 
highest and best use as a homesite, and thus a value of $5,000 per acre, the 
indicated compensation would be $IO,000. 
Even if the IO-acre tract had the same highest and best use as the 90-acre 
tract (i.e., farming), the two parcels could constitute separate larger parcels. A 
conclusion that two larger parcels existed could probably be justified if there 
were no actual unity of use between the parcels and/ or no bridge across the creek 
physically connecting the two parcels. In such a case, it would not be surprising 
to find that IO-acre tracts were selling for substantially more per acre than IO0-
acre tracts because of size regression, even though the tracts had the same highest 
and best use. 
Appraisers, whether they are retained by the condemnor or the condemnee, 
have a tendency to estimate the value of the parcel shown on the condemnor's 
right-of-way map, often without adequately analyzing the larger parcel. If an 
appraiser receives an assignment from a condemnor to appraise the property 
shown in Figure 5.11, and is provided with a right-of-way map depicting the 
entire 100-acre ownership as the parcel to be appraised, it is the appraiser's obli-
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I 0-acre parcel. If the appraiser reasonably concludes that the I 0-acre parcel is the 
larger parcel and thus the value of the taking, as a part of the whole, is $10,000, it 
is possible that he will receive resistance and/or criticism from the client. Never-
theless, the larger parcel determination, as a part of highest and best use analysis, 
is the appraiser's decision, and it must be made objectively regardless of the 
desires, or opinions, of the client. 
The condemnor may disagree with the appraiser's conclusion as to the larger 
parcel and reject the appraiser's value conclusion; that is the condemnor's pre-
rogative. However, a distinction must be made between rejection of the appraiser's 
conclusion and rejection of the appraiser's report. Appraisal reports are rejected 
for technical deficiencies; conclusions are rejected because of a difference of opinion. 
If an appraisal report is technically sufficient but the conclusion is rejected, the 
appraiser has fulfilled his or her obligation under the terms of the appraisal as-
signment and the appraisal contract. The appraiser has been retained to furnish 
the client with an adequately supported opinion of value. There is no guarantee 
that the client is going to like the opinion. As a matter of fact, it is considered a 
compliment by some appraisers to have their reports approved, but their opin-
ions rejected because appraisal reviewers tend to look harder for technical defi-
ciencies in appraisal reports when they disagree with the appraiser's conclusion. 
A report must be well supported to pass such scrutiny. 
The property owner's appraiser also has an obligation to make a proper analysis 
of the larger parcel, rather than merely to appraise an entire ownership or the 
parcel shown on the condemnor's map. Returning to the situation depicted in 
Figure 5.11, improper analysis of the larger parcel in this case could result in the 
appraiser's client receiving only 400/o of the compensation due. 
Figure 5.12 shows the same property shown in Figure 5.11, but in this in-
stance it is assumed that the taking is of the entire frontage of the property. 
Condemnors wouid invariabiy treat this situation as one taking from one parcel, 
even those condemnors who would be astute enough to recognize that the 10 
acres shown in Figure 5.11 might constitute a separate parcel. Nevertheless, the 
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~xtent or location of the taking should not alter the analysis of the larger parcel in 
the before situation. The larger parcel determination made under the circum-
stances shown in Figure 5.11 would be the same under the circumstances shown 
in Figure 5.12, or under the circumstances of any other taking configuration, in-
cluding the taking of the entire ownership. 
The Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions states: 
It should be noted, however, that since unity of use is one of the elements for an J 
integrated unit, it would not necessarily follow that a contiguous body of land in 
the same ownership constitutes a unit for valuation if the highest and best use for 
various parts are different. Failure to value the property as an integrated unit 
should, however, always be explained and supported [in much the same way that 
highest and best use is supported].47 
If the appraiser concludes that the IO-acre tract south of the stream is a 
separate larger parcel, iff,the situation depicted in Figure 5.12 the appraiser would 
estimate the values of the IO-acre parcel and the 90-acre parcel as two separate, 
independent tracts. If the client has requested a single appraisal report, the ap-
praiser can simply include two separate valuations within a single report. In such 
a report, many of the report sections (e.g., regional data, neighborhood data, 
assumptions and limiting conditions) will be applicable to both parcels, while 
other sections (e.g., highest and best use, sales comparison approach to value) will 
have to be developed separately for each parcel. 
If the appraiser is following the before and after rule, the value conclusions 
might be reported as follows: 
Homesite parcel: 
Before value (lo acres @ $5,000) 
After value (8 acres @ $5,000) 
Difference (just compensation) 
Farm parcel: 
Before value (90 acres @ $2,000) 
After value (83 acres @ $2,000) 







Note that the before value of the homesite parcel and the before value of the farm 
parcel are not added together and reported as a single figure. Together the value 
of the farm parcel and the value of the homesite parcel do not equal the value of 
the two parcels as a single entity. The above value estimates are separate apprais-
als and should be reported as such. If the client insists that a single figure be 
reported before and after the takings, this can be done, but it must be shown as 
the sum of the two independent value estimates. Moreover, it must be explained, 
every time the sum is reported, that the total is the mathematical sum of two inde-
pendent value estimates and does not (or at least may not) represent the value of 
the properties if sold as a single entity. 
47. Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisi-




REAL ESTATE VALUATION IN LITIGATION 
Although the courts seldom address the issue, larger parcel determination 
can be important in cases that do not involve alleged damages and/ or benefits. 
Because most legal treatises on eminent domain do not recognize this fact, they 
usually state that property owners often advocate the expanded parcel (so as to 
claim damages to the remainder), while condemnors advocate the limited larger 
parcel (to limit the property subject to compensable damage).48 As the preceding 
discussion demonstrates, however, reducing the larger parcel can, in some cir-
cumstances, substantially increase an owner's claim of compensation. 
The myth that the larger parcel determination is only important in damage 
and/ or benefit cases can only be broken if appraisers carefully analyze properties 
subject to eminent domain action, properly support larger parcel determinations, 
and properly explain the valuation principles involved. 
ADVANCED PROBLEMS 
There are a number of larger parcel questions that have not been adequately 
addressed by the courts and by condemnors and thus no definitive guidance on 
these matters can be provided to the appraiser. This is not because these prob-
lems are rarely encountered; rather, it is because they are frequently unrecog-
nized or ignored. Some of these issues are not really valuation problems, but 
inequalities in the treatment of property owners. 
The best advice for the appraiser in these situations is to remember two 
things. First, the appraiser is estimating market value, so any approach to value 
should mirror market realities. Second, the goal is to place the owner in the same 
position, monetarily, after the taking that he or she was in before the taking. 
To demonstrate the potential inequality in the treatment of property owners, 
assume that all of the property depicted in Figure 5.13 is under the same owner-
ship and that the condemnor is acquiring all of Lot I. Under these circumstances, 
the condemnor would undoubtedly treat Lot I as a separate parcel, claiming that 
FIGURE 5.13 TREATMENT OF PROPERTY OWNERS 
Road 
Lot 1 Lot2 Lot3 Lot4 































































THE LARGER PAI J.. 
. 'the balance of the property is not part of the larger parcel because it consists of 
legally platted lots that have separate highest and best uses. Such treatment would 
deny the owner the right to any damages to the remainder lots. However, if all of 
the lots were being taken, many condemnors would take the position that all of 
the lots should be valued as if they were sold as a single parcel because all of the 
lots are being acquired by the government as a single parcel. Valuing the land as 
if it would be sold as a single parcel would typically lead to a value estimate 
lower than the sum of the values of the lots valued individually. 
This variation in treatment suggests that many condemnors attempt to apply 
different standards in larger parcel determination, depending on the extent of the 
taking. This different treatment appears to have no basis in either the law or 
market realities. The extent of the taking does not alter the larger parcel in the 
before situation. If the four lots are considered independent parcels when only 
Lot I is being taken, they should remain independent parcels when all four are 
taken, and they should be valued as such. 
The argument advanced by condemnors · that they are acquiring the entire 
property in one transaction, and therefore the property should be valued on the 
basis of a single sale, is without merit. The fact that the government is condemn-
ing the entire ownership should not preclude the prop<';rty owner from receiving 
compensation equal to the market value of the pn>per-ty as if voluntarily mar-
keted in the most advantageous way. The owner should not be forced to take a 
bulk sales discount when a bulk sale of the property does not produce its highest 
value, and is therefore not the highest and best use of the property. 
Another potential inequity can be demonstrated by referring to Parcel B in 
Figure 5.10. If Parcel B were fully developed, the courts and condemnors would 
undoubtedly recognize Lots I and 9 as independent parcels. However, they often 
fail to recognize that the larger parcel in the after situation can include lands that 
were not part of the larger parcel in the before situation, as was demonstrated in 
Figure 5.9. This failure can result in overcompensation in some instances. For 
example, assume that Lots I, 2, 8, and 9 each contain 12,000 square feet of area in 
the before situation and that comparable sales indicate that residential lots are 
selling for $3.00 per square foot. Further assume that the taking from Lots I and 9 
removes 9,000 square feet of area from each lot and that, in the after situation, the 
two remainders would be uneconomic remnants as independent parcels with only a 
nominal value of $0.60 per square foot. 
If Lots I and 9 are treated as two separate larger parcels in both the before 
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Before value: 
Lot 1, as separate parcel (12,000 sq. ft. @ $3.00) 
Lot 9, as separate parcel (12,000 sq. ft. @ $3.00) 
Sum of before values 
After value: 
Lot 1, as separate parcel (3,000 sq. ft. @ $0.60) 
Lot 9, as separate parcel (3,000 sq. ft. @ $0.60) 
Sum of after values 
Difference (indicated compensation) 








However, the reality of the situation is that the owner of Lots 1 and 9 also 
owns Lots 2 and 8. Recognizing this market reality, and the fact that the remnants 
of Lots 1 and 9 could be merged with Lots 2 and 8 after the taking, compensation 
could be computed as follows: 
Before value: 
Lot 1, as separate parcel 02,000 sq. ft. @ $3.00) 
Lot 2, as separate parcel (12,000 sq. ft. @ $3.00) 
Lot 8, as separate parcel (12,000 sq. ft. @ $3.00) 
Lot 9, as separate parcel (12,000 sq. ft. @ $3.00) 
Sum of before values 
After value: 
Lots 1 & 2 merged, as separate parcel 
(15,000 sq. ft. @ $3.00) 
Lots 8 & 9 merged, as separate parcel 
(15,000 sq. ft @ $3.00) 
Sum of after values 
Difference (indicated compensation) 









This second method of analysis produces an indicated compensation amount 
that is 210/o lower than the compensation calculated by the first method. More-
over, this second method mirrors the realities of the marketplace and puts the 
owner in exactly the same position, pecuniarily, in the after situation as he would 
have been in had the taking never occurred. 
Another inconsistency in the treatment of property owners can be demon-
strated by considering Parcel Bin Figure 5.10. Assume that all lots in 1;he subdivi-
sion are fully developed and all are to be taken. Under Premise 1, each lot is 
owned by a different party and each, as a independent entity, has a market value 
of $36,000. The typical condemnor would have each lot valued independently 
and pay each lot owner $36,000 in compensation; thus the condemnor would pay 

























































THE LARGER PA' L 
Now consider the same property under another premise. Under Premise 2, 
the fully developed lots have not yet been sold and ownership of the lots remains 
with the developer. In this situation the typical condemnor would attempt to 
apply a modified development approach to value. (See Chapter 12 for a detailed 
description of the development approach.) Compensation, under Premise 2, might 
be computed as follows: 
Retail value of lots (9 lots @ $36,000) 
Less costs: 
Sales costs (10%) 
Developer's (entrepreneur's) profit (20%)* 
Net sale proceeds 
Market absorption: 
Absorption rate - 3 lots per year 
Absorption time (9 lots + 3 lots per year) 
Annual net sales income ($226,800 + 3 years) 
Factor to convert 3-year income stream into 
present value discounted @ IQD/ot 
Value of property (compensation) 









t Present worth of$1 per period for 3 years discounted at 10%. (See The Appraisal of Real Estate, 10th ed., 710.) 
Rate supported by market data. 
In comparing the results of these two approaches, a number of interesting 
and perplexing questions arise. First, how can the market value of a property 
change by more than 400/o due to its ownership, particularly when an eminent 
domain action is in rem and not in personam. The answer is, of course, it cannot. 
Therefore, it is necessary to look at the elements, or assumptions, that are built 
into these two different value indications. 
Under Premise 2, sales costs are deducted from the retail value of the lots, but 
no such deduction is made under Premise 1. Realistically, sales costs would be 
incurred in both situations. However, it is a long-standing policy in eminent 
domain valuation, and in estimating market value for other purposes, that sales 
costs are not deducted from the price at which a property could be sold. No 
definition of market value in use today suggests that market value is the price 
that could be received for a property less the costs of sale. Thus, it must be con-
cluded that to penalize a property owner by deducting sales costs from the mar-
ket value of his lots merely because he owns more than one lot is inappropriate. 
The other amount deducted from the retail value of the lots using the modi-
fied development method of valuation was identified as developer's, or 
entrepreneur's, profit. Developer's profit is obviously an appropriate part of any 
real estate development proposal, be it the subdivision of land or improvement 
of the land with a building. However, a distinction must be drawn between a 
proposed development and an existing development. In this instance all of the 
lots are fully developed, not proposed. Therefore, the developer has already de-
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signed the development, obtained all necessary permits, procured financing (if 
necessary), and made all improvements to the land necessary for the sale of the 
individual lots. This is an existing subdivision, not a proposed subdivision. 
Developer's, or entrepreneur's, profit compensates the developer for the time 
and risks assumed in undertaking the development. In this case the developer 
has already expended the time and money to develop the land and already as-
sumed the risks associated with the land's development. In other words, the de-
veloper has already earned his profit associated with the development. (The risks 
inherent in the actual sale of the lots is reflected in the discount rate applied to 
the projected annual net sales income.) This position was supported in a Louisi-
ana case. In fact, the court went beyond allowing developer's profit for fully de-
veloped lots, saying: 
Thus, where an owner-developer owns land forming part of a subdivision actu-
ally developed and in the process of being sold as individual lots, and where a 
portion of the tract destined for that use but not actually yet developed is taken, 
the owner-developer is entitled to receive just and adequate compensation for 
the tract taken on the basis of the retail value of the lots to individual purchasers 
(assuming that the evidence shows such sales to be reasonably prospective), rather 
than artificially limited to a value based upon a hypothetical sale as a single-tract 
unit to another developer. The owner-developer should not be excluded from the 
land-profit the evidence shows he was reasonably certain to receive, except that 
the taking took place. 
The owner-developer is entitled to receive as just and adequate compensation 
the actual pecuniary loss caused by the taking which the evidence shows to be 
attributable to the loss of the value of the land itself. He should not be deprived of 
the profit attributable to the retail (as compared with the wholesale) value of the 
land simply because of some arbitrary formula that bases the market value ofti¾e 
tract, not upon its actually prospective retail sales to lot-purchasers, but instead 
upon a fictitious, unintended, and unlikely sale of it as a single tract to a nonex-
isting third person who would himself develop and retail the land (and keep the 
la~d-profit), just as the owner-developer was in the process of doing.49 
However, because this Louisiana case dealt with land that was not fully de-
veloped, as is the land in our example, the court added: 
Nevertheless, as the Department correctly contends, an owner of land is not en-
titled to recover on the basis of its retail value if sold as lots, simply because the 
land's highest and best use is for subdivision purposes. The evidence must addi-
tionally show that it was reasonably certain that the owner could and would have 
sold them on such basis, had it not been for the intervening expropriation.50 
The issue of absorption, or marketing time, is more difficult to relate to the 
factual situation and market realities. First, there must be a clear understanding of 
the definition of market value. Implicit in all definitions of market value is the 
presumption that "a reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open mar-
49. State, DepL of Highways v. Terrace Land Co, Inc., 298 So.2d 
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' · ket'.'51 Exposure time, as used in the definition, is retrospective, not prospective. It 
has already occurred on the date of value. If a reasonable exposure time for the 
property under appraisal is 90 days, the question to be answered by the estimate 
of market value is "What would the property have sold for today (the date of 
value) had it been placed on the open market 90 days ago?': not "What would the 
property sell for within the next 90 days if it were placed on the market today?" 
When this definition is applied to an individual lot valued under Premise 1 
(with each lot owned by a different party), it is assumed that the exposure time 
has already occurred. There is no presumption that the other eight, individually 
owned lots being acquired by the condemnor were placed on the market at the 
same time, thereby skewing the supply and demand for such lots and resulting in 
abnormally excessive competition for the lot under appraisal. Yet that is precisely 
the presumption made under Premise 2. 
Under Premise 2 it is assumed that all nine lots will be placed on the market 
at same time, outstripping the demand for such lots so that they must compete 
for a limited number of buyers. This is obviously treating, and valuing, the lots 
differently because of the nature of their ownership, which would appear to vio-
late the in rem nature of the condemnation action. It would also appear to violate 
the definition of market value applied under Premise 1, inasmuch as prospective, 
rather than retrospective, market exposure time is being assumed. 
However, treating the nine lots owned by the developer in exactly the same 
manner as the lots owned by nine individuals is to ignore the realities of the 
situation and the market. The nine lots are, in fact, owned by the developer and if 
he were to sell them individually, it would take him three years to do so. 
The source of this apparent conflict is found in the various definitions of just 
compensation handed down by the courts. Black's Law Dictionary states that "'just 
compensation' means the full monetary equivalent of the property taken," but 
goes on to say that "[i]t means a settlement which leaves one no poorer or richer 
than he was before the property was taken. It requires that the owner be put in as 
good position pecuniarily as he would otherwise have been if the property had 
not been taken'.'52 
Applying the first part of this definition to the example would indicate just 
compensation of $324,000 because the market value of the lots is not altered by 
the form, or nature, of t.1-ieir mvnership. However, applying the second part of the 
definition (i.e., putting the owner in the same position pecuniarily that he would 
have been without the take) leads to a different conclusion. Recognizing that sales 
costs are never deducted from the estimate of market value and that the devel-
oper has already earned his profit from developing the land, and further recog-
nizing the market realities of the situation, the developer's "pecuniary position" 
before the taking is essentially: 
51. The Appraisal Foundation, Vnifonn Standards of Pro-
fessional Appraisal Practice, 1994 ed., p. 8. 
52. Black's, s.v. "just compensation:' 
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Retail value of lots (9 lots @ $36,000) 
Absorption rate (9 lots + 3 lots per year) 
Annual income stream ($324,000 + 3) 
Factor to convert 3-year income stream into 
present value discounted @ 100/o* 






* Present worth of$1 per period for 3 years discounted at 10%. (See TheAppraisalojRealEstale, 10th ed., 710.) 
Rate supported by market data. 
Resolving this conflict is ultimately the obligation of the courts, not apprais-
ers. Nevertheless, the appraiser must understand the conflict and why it exists 
and should make the client aware of the conflict when it is encountered. Until 
this conflict is settled by the courts, if it ever is, the best policy for appraisers is to 
estimate the market value of the real estate unaffected by its ownership. While 
the courts have deviated from the market value standard of measuring just com-
pensation in some instances, for every such instance there are literally hundreds 
of instances in which the courts have adhered to the market value standard. 
Thousands of the public acquisitions that occur each year are based on the mar-
ket value standard. To encourage appraisers to use a different standard of mea-
surement and then proclaim, as some lawyers do, that "[a]n appraiser's mission in 
a condemnation case is to estimate 'just compensation"'53 is misleading. Accepting 
such advice places a burden on appraisers that even the U.S. Supreme Court has 
found difficult to shoulder. The appraiser should never deviate from estimating 
market value without clearly written legal instructions that are reasonable and 
adequately supported. 
If the appraiser's condemn or client wants to argue to the court that the Premise 
2 method of valuation results in just compensation, rather than the Premise 1 
valuation, the appraiser can, upon receipt of proper legai instructions, prepare a 
double-premise appraisal and report both value estimates. It will then be up to 
the court, or trier of fact, to determine whether just compensation requires pay-
ment of the market value of the individual lots (Premise 1) or whether the owner 
should merely be put back in the same pecuniary position enjoyed before the 
taking (Premise 2). 
Although one of the rules of the larger parcel specifies that for two or more 
parcels to be considered part of a single larger parcel, there must be unity of 
ownership, there is no inverse rule. There is no rule that prescribes that two or 
more tracts under the same ownership must be treated as a single larger parcel. 
With regard to subdivided lots, or legally separate parcels, case law supports the 
conclusion that they are separate larger parcels and should be treated as such: 
In the case now before the court there is no evidence whatsoever as to the adapt-
ability of the plaintiff's land for any purpose other than building lots, and there-
fore each lot, primafade, is a separate and distinct entity .... Where the entire tract 
has no adaptability peculiar to itself as an entity, and can be subdivided without 
53. Jay Dushoff and Denise Henslee, "When Eminent 
Domain 'Working Rules' Don't Work," The Appraisal 
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injury to its adaptability for use as an entire tract, and the value of a particular 
subdivision thereof is not dependent upon being incorporated in the tract as a 
part of the entity, as where the entire tract has been subdivided and plotted into 
building lots, and the value of no individual lot is dependent upon its relation-
ship to the entire tract, each lot, for the purpose of assessment of damages ... may 
be regarded as a separate distinct tract.54 
It is clear that the nine lots used in our example are separate and distinct 
parcels, each with their own highest and best use, and therefore should be valued 
independent of one another. 
The example above referred to nine subdivided lots, but lands under the 
same ownership do not necessarily have to be subdivided for the appraiser to 
conclude that they constitute two or more separate and distinct larg{'.!r parcels. If 
there are two or more distinct highest and best uses in geographically different 
portions of the property, the ownership may consist of two or more larger parcels, 
and each larger parcel should be treated and valued as a separate and distinct 
entity. In fact, it has been ruled that they must be valued as separate parcels.55 
If a client requests that the value of an entire ownership be reported as a 
single figure, the appraiser can comply with such request, but only if the single 
figure is identified as the mathematical sum of the two or more estimates of 
market value, which is not or may not be indicative of the market value of the 
entire ownership as a single entity. 
SUMMARY 
The larger parcel is a premise unique to eminent domain valuation. The premise 
asserts that it is the larger parcel which is considered in condemnation valuation, 
and that the larger parcel must generally possess unity of title, unity of use, and 
contiguity. Court rulings clearly indicate that all three of these elements need not 
be present in every case. The courts have been most lax in requiring physical 
contiguity, but unity of use and unity of title have been almost universally held 
to be prerequisites of the larger parcel. 
The courts in the various jurisdictions disagree as to whether unity of use 
must be an existing unity, or a highest and best unity, of use. The latter view 
appears to be prevalent in the majority of jurisdictions. In many of the cases in 
which the courts have ruled that unity of use must be existing, it appears that the 
alleged highest and best use would have been ruled so remote and speculative as 
to merit no consideration, even if the larger parcel were not in question. 
Unity of title is generally a legal question. The quality of title to the various 
tracts making up the larger parcel need not be identical; as a general rule, if the 
same individual or group of individuals control the title and future use of all of 
the tracts, unity of title is considered to be present. Physical contiguity, which is 
generally an engineering matter, is not always necessary, nor does it follow that a 
whole parcel constitutes the larger parcel just because it possesses contiguity and 
54. Gains v. City of Calhoun, 42 GaApp. 89 (Ga. 1931). 55. Foster v. Sanders, 557 S.W.2d 205 (Ky. 1977). 
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unity of ownership. Right-of-way maps do not control the determination of the 
larger parcel and, in fact, may have no bearing on the question. The same is true 
of appraisal contracts or assignments. 
Unity of use is an appraisal question, and the ultimate determination of the 
larger parcel is typically in the strict purview of the appraiser. This is strongly 
supported by two court rulings. First: 
The method of valuation of the parcels taken, whether as a separate entity or in a 
relationship to the whole tract, then becomes a matter of opinion of appraisers to 
be weighed by the jury .... We conclude that in this case the use of either method 
of valuation by the expert witnesses was proper and their testimony admissible, 
subject only to the inherent risk of nonpersuasion.56 
And second: 
Where the property taken is less than the entire tract, other considerations arise. 
The highest and best use of the part taken may be as a separate and distinct piece 
of property unrelated to the entire property endowing such part with a fair cash 
market value. On the other hand the highest and best use of the part taken may 
be so related to the entire property that the value of the part taken for its highest 
and best use is dependent upon the value of the entire tract Such a relation or 
dependence may present an issue of fact and either party is entitled to present his 
theory of independent or dependent valuation.57 
It is commonly believed that determination of the larger parcel is only im-
portant in cases in which damages and/or special benefits are alleged. This belief 
is false. Due to the effects of size regression and plottage, determination of the 
larger parcel can have a significant effect on the indicated compensation in cases 
in which neither damages nor benefits are claimed. 
Because of the importance of the appraiser's determination of the iarger par-
cel and its potential effect on value, the appraiser should exercise the same care in 
developing the larger parcel determination as is exercised in developing highest 
and best use conclusions and value estimates. A complete description of the analysis 
of the larger parcel and the reasoning on which the appraiser's conclusion is 
based should be included in the appraisal report. 
The extent of a condemnor's taking does not alter the standards under which 
the larger parcel is determined. A larger parcel determination made prior to the 
government's taking should be made without any reference whatsoever to the 
taking. The appraiser should only be concerned with contiguity, or proximity, as 
it relates to highest and best use, unity of ownership, and unity of highest and 
best use. 
"It should be noted ... that since unity of use is one of the elements for an 
integrated unit, it would not necessarily follow that a contiguous body of land in 
the same ownership constitutes a unit for valuation if the highest and best use for 
various parts are different:'58 Thus, parcels that are contiguous and under the 
same ownership may have independent highest and best uses. Those highest and 
56. Territory of Hawaii v. Adtlmeyer, 363 P2d 979,986 (Haw. 
1961). 
57. Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Oberlaender, 
235 N.E2d 3, 9 Cill 1968), Affd 247 N.E2d 888 (1969). 
58. Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisi· 
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THE LARGER PAR< 
best uses may be identical (e.g., single-family homesite), but if the highest and 
best uses of the tracts do not require a common, or integrated use, they are 
separate larger parcels and should be valued as such. 
Proper application of the larger parcel premise can reduce the scope and 
complexity of the appraisal assignment. Moreover, it will often prevent misappli-
cation of the backland theory. 
Court applications of the larger parcel premise can be quite contradictory. 
Therefore, it is important that the appraiser fully understand the court's applica-
tion of this premise in the jurisdiction where the property being appraised is 
located. If, after proper analysis, the appraiser concludes that the larger parcel is 
unquestionably that tract or tracts that are physically contiguous, are under the 
same ownership, and have the same existing, and highest and best, use, it is 
usually safe to complete the appraisal assignment without legal guidance. Under 
any other circumstance, however, the legal permissibility of the appraiser's larger 
parcel determination should be reviewed by legal counsel. 
If there is a question as to the legal acceptability of the appraiser's detepnina-
tion of the larger parcel, the appraiser must obtain legal instructions from the 
appropriate attorney, with supporting citations as to the legal acceptability of 
such a determination. If these instructions are contrary to the appraiser's deter-
mination of the larger parcel, and the legal instructions are reasonable and sup-
ported by applicable citations, the appraiser must alter his or her determination 
to conform with jurisdictional law. This is the only way appraisers can fully com-
ply with their professional obligations. The inclusion of such legal instructions in 
the appraiser's report is a prudent appraisal practice and is required by profes-
sional and technical appraisal standards.59 
59. USPAP, 1994 ed., Ethics Provision (Conduct), p, 2 
and Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Ac-





















he development approach to value 
car, ;e applied in valuations for eminent domain purposes. According to Nichols; 
The best illustration of the rule that market value is not limited to value for the 
existing use, and the situation in which this rule is most frequently invoked (and 
also most frequently abused), is where evidence is offered of what the value of a 
tract ofland that is used for agricultural purposes (or is vacant and unused) would 
be if cut up into house-lots.1 
The development approach, or anticipated use method of valuation, is described in an-
other source as 
[al method of estimating the value of vacant land. The usual application is to 
[value] raw, unsubdivided land by deducting from the estimated gross selling 
price, the direct expense of development such as cost of streets, utilities, sales, 
advertising, and overhead (taxes, carrying charges, inspection). Profit and "time 
lag" (interest on the money invested for the time needed to complete the project) 
are also deducted, after which the land value is indicated.2 
This method of land valuation has also been referred to as the lot method3 and the 
developer's residual approach.4 
The development approach to value is examined in detail here not because it 
is widely applied in eminent domain valuation, but for two other reasons. First, 
there has been a great deal of controversy and confusion among the various 
I. Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain, rev. 3d ed. (New (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 
York: Mathew Bender Co., Inc., 1990), vol. 4, 1981), 14. 
§12B.14[l][a]. 3. United States v. 47.3096 Acres, etc., 583 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 
2. American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers and 1978). 
the Society of Real Estate Appraisers, Real Estate 4. United States v. 147.47 Acres of Land, 352 F.Supp. 1055 
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courts as to the applicability of this approach. Thus a considerable amount of case 
law has been developed on the subject. Second, in many cases the development 
approach has been applied under the wrong circumstances or in the wrong way. 
If all of the land that has been appraised by the development approach were 
actually subdivided, there would be enough subdivision lots on the market to 
last hundreds of years and little, if any, farmland left in the United States. 
There is no single correct way to apply the development approach to value. 
In 1978 the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers published Subdivision Analy-
sis, an educational memorandum on subdivision analysis and the development 
approach to value.5 Seven different methods of subdivision analysis were dem-
onstrated in this publication. All of the- methods are correct, but some are more 
applicable under certain circumstances. In 1993 the Appraisal Institute published 
a monograph titled Subdivision Analysis,6 which emphasizes market analysis, fore-
casting techniques, and financial modeling. The new text delves into the theory 
and economics of subdivision analysis and contains some excellent discounted 
cash flow examples. Nevertheless, the 1993 book is not a replacement for the 1978 
publication which focuses on the mechanics of the development approach. Both 
publications are useful to appraisers, but an attorney preparing to present, or 
rebut, a development approach appraisal to a trier of fact will probably find the 
1978 memorandum more helpful. 
APPLICABILITY 
The development approach is the primary, and sometimes the only, method of 
valuation in a condemnation case when: 
1. The appraiser concludes through proper market analysis that the property in 
question does, in fact, have a highest and best use for subdivision purposes; 
2. Comparable before and/or after sales are lacking, and 
3. Sufficient market and technical data are available to estimate the value of the 
property being appraised reliably using the development approach. 
In determining that a property's highest and best use is for subdivision purposes, 
the appraiser must consider factors such as supply and demand, zoning, the avail-
able utilities, the direction of population growth, the physical characteristics of 
the property being appraised, local land development regulations, and legislative 
attitudes towards the development of properties in the area. Properties valued 
with the development approach may range from raw acreage to sites that are 
nearly 1000/o developed. With a partially developed site, of course, there is a stronger 
case for determining that the highest and best use is for subdivision purposes 
and that the development approach to value is appropriate. If data on recent 
sales of developed lots that were originally part of the tract being appraised are 
available, the demand for developed lots can be demonstrated with factual mar-
ket data. "The bald assertion by the condemnee or his witnesses that such a de-
5. American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, Sul,-
division Analysis (Chicago: AI REA, 1978). 
6. Douglas D. Lovell and Robert S. Martin, Subdivi-
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mand exists is not enough. Such a demand must be established by competent 
proof'.'7 
If comparable sales are available, they should be used in evaluating the prop-
erty under appraisal. "Bona fide sales data provide a better indication of value 
than a subdivision development prospectus'.'8 If the sale property is truly compa-
rable, it will have the same potential as the property being appraised. As one 
court put it, 
The comparable sales relied upon by both expert witnesses in valuing the subject 
property involved properties purchased by developers for development purposes 
and accordingly were sales in which development costs have been considered 
and were reflected in the sale price. To add an increment to the value established 
on the basis of these sales is to inflate and distort the market value of the subject 
property.9 [Citations omitted] 
A New York decision stated, 
[t]he court actually valued the property as having a residential development po-
tential by relying upon the State's comparable sales. In the present case there was 
no need for a separate increment value to be found by the appraisers or the court 
because the market data inherently included the value in raw acreage sales.10 
This is not to say that under such circumstances the development approach 
should be totally disregarded. Rather, it should be used to support the indicated 
value of the property developed using comparable sales, if additional support is 
needed. The procedure applied in the development approach can often give the 
appraiser greater insight into the relative comparability of the sale property. Al-
though many condemning agencies will not allow the development approach to 
be used as the only measure of value, they recognize it as supporting evidence. 
According to a Washington State Department of Transportation rule, 
The employment of the hypothetical subdivision to develop raw land value may 
be introduced to support the market data and to illustrate the amount of money 
a prudent purchaser would likely pay for raw subdivision land. However, due to 
the many variables and speculative elements, the estimate of value is never based 
solely upon such a hypothesis." 
If the appraiser cannot find any raw acreage sales with development poten-
tial comparable to the property being appraised, the analysis of supply and de-
mand for developed lots may need to be re-examined as well as the estimate of 
highest and best use. Similarly, if market data on retail lot prices, development 
costs, and sellout times in the neighborhood are not available, a review of the 
supply and demand analysis and estimate of highest and best use may be re-
7. Shillito v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 252 A2d 650, 65 l 
(Pa. 1969), 
R. The Appraisal of Real Estate, 10th ed. (Chicago: Ap-
praisal Institute, 1992), 307. 
9, Ridgeway Associates, Inc. v. State, 300 N.Y,S.2d, 944, 947 
(N.Y, 1969). 
10, United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. State, 384 N,Y,S.2d 
543, 544 (N,Y, 1976). 
11. Washington State Dept. of Transportation, Right 
of Way Manual, Chapter 4-1, p. C-11, Tab C, §4A 
(revised August 1991). 
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quired. While a lack of sales and/ or development activity may indicate an insuf-
ficient supply of land suitable for such use, it can also indicate a lack of demand. 
Any appraiser who uses the development approach to value should confirm that 
the lack of market data is a result of the first condition, rather than the latter. 
Technical data can be obtained from engineering firms involved in plat de-
sign and development cost estimating or from contractors who install under-
ground utilities or construct other subdivision improvements. "[T]his approach to 
value is complex, often requiring the assistance of other experts and always re-
quiring substantial amounts of research, analysis and supporting documenta-
tion'.'12 
APPRAISAL PROCEDURE 
If the development approach is applicable, the appraiser must apply it in a logical 
sequence. The development approach to value replicates the land residual tech-
nique13 applied to land with a highest and best use for subdivision purposes. In 
fact, if an owner-developer were planning to develop lots and lease them on a 
long-term basis rather than sell them, the two procedures would be identical. 
The procedure described below is a typical application of the development 
approach to valu.e. It is not necessarily the only workable procedure nor the most 
appropriate in every instance. 
First, the appraiser determines the number and size of the lots that can be 
developed. After completing the highest and best use analysis, the appraiser should 
be totally familiar with the applicable subdivision ordinances regarding mini-
mum lot sizes, widths, and depths; minimum street right-of-way width; pave-
ment width; etc. The appraiser must remember, however, that land often is not 
developed to its maximum allowable density or to the minimum improvement 
requirements. Analyzing existing subdivisions and lot sales in the area will help 
the appraiser determine the typical conditions, as well as the minimums and 
maximums legally allowed. 
It is often advisable, particularly in preparing for trial, to request that an 
engineering consultant be retained to help lay out the most economical and physi-
cally practical plan for subdividing the property. Topographic maps of the prop-
erty in question can be extremely useful in this process. The appraiser and the 
engineer should work together to construct a subdivision plan that develops 
marketable lots and produces the greatest residual value for the raw acreage. 
The appraiser will work with a paper plat showing the number, size, and 
shape of the anticipated lots as well as the proposed street rights-of-way and 
open space. The retail value of each proposed lot is estimated by comparing it 
with similar, fully developed lots in the same neighborhood which have been 
sold recently. If no such lot sales exist, the value of the lots can be estimated using 
the abstraction or extraction method of site valuation.14 However, as mentioned ear-
lier, lack of comparable lot sales in the area might suggest that the estimate of 
highest and best use should be reconsidered. 
12. Unifonn Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisi-
tions (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1992), §B-1 15, p. 74. 
13. The Appraisal of Real Estate, 10th ed., 307-308. 
14. Ibid., 304-305. 
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DEVELOPMENT APPRO. Ai 
It is not always necessary to estimate the retail value of each potential lot 
within the parent tract; often only the average or typical value of a lot is esti-
mated. From this estimate, the cumulative retail market value of all the proposed 
lots within the appraised property can be computed. 
The next step in the valuation process is to estimate the direct and indirect 
costs of developing the subject tract into a completed subdivision. Direct devel-
opment costs include items such as engineering, street construction, installation 
of underground utilities, street light installation, and construction of sidewalks. 
Indirect development costs cover items such as the increasing d,evelopment fees 
charged by many local municipalities to generate additional revenues or discour-
age further development within their boundaries. Other indirect costs to be con-
sidered include municipal exactions, advertising expenses, sales costs, and 
administration and overhead expenses incurred during the development and 
sellout period. Administrative and overhead expenses cover taxes, insurance, in-
terest, financing, and inspection fees. Cost information can be extracted from 
market data on similar developments; gathered from engineers, contractors, and 
real estate agents; or obtained from a combination of these sources. 
The estimated direct and indirect costs of development are deducted from the 
cumulative retail value of all the potential lots. Then the appraiser allocates the amount 
remaining to entrepreneurial (developer's) profit, raw land value, and a discount that 
reflects the time required for full development and market absorption of the lots. 
A profit factor is deducted from the value of the lots to compensate the de-
veloper for the time, trouble, and risk incurred in the undertaking. A deduction 
for time is necessary because, in the construction of any large subdivision, a 
considerable period could elapse from the beginning of the development process 
to the sale of the last lot. Thus, the developer could receive net income over a 
period of years. The income stream from the development must be converted 
into a current value by discounting it at an appropriate risk rate. The result will 
be the indicated market value of the property being appraised in its present, 
undeveloped state. 
The steps in the development approach are summarized below. 
1. Prepare a subdivision layout to determine the number, typical size, and shape 
of all potential lots. 
2. Estimate the retail value of the lots. 
3. Estimate direct development costs. 
.4. Estimate indirect development costs. 
5. Compute the income attributable to developer's profit and land value (Step 2 
minus Steps 3 and 4). 
6. Deduct developer's profit. 
7. Estimate the amount of time required to develop and sell out the subdivision. 




REAL ESTATE VALUATION IN LITIGATION 
The federal court has summarized the procedural steps in the development ap-
proach as follows: 
In arriving at their values, the owner's witnesses took into consideration the mar-
ket data of sales of adjacent subdivided lots and made deductions for selling and 
advertising expenses, engineering and development costs, overhead costs, taxes, 
buyer's anticipated profits, and for acreage loss for streets, etc., in order to reflect 
or indicate the value of the property at the time of taking. In this case, the data 
relied on was derived from the market and facts as had been generated in the 
development of adjacent land. This method is referred to as the "developer's re-
sidual approach'.'15 
Figure 12.1 illustrates how a relatively small tract (19.90 acres) might be sub-
divided into 60 lots. Table 12.1 demonstrates the application of the development 
approach to this property. 







































All direct unit costs have been applied to the linear measure of the streets to be 
developed in the tract (i.e., 2,740 linear feet). This methodology is commonly used 
in making preliminary estimates of this type and is also employed in some cost 
manuals. 16 
The costs per linear foot used in Table 12.1 include all engineering, plan, and 
inspection fees. Direct costs can generally be more accurately estimated with unit 
costs for various items than with a cost per linear foot of street. Unit costs might 
include the cost per streetlight, per sewer manhole, or per fire hydrant. Costs per 
cubic yard of grading or base rock are also generally accurate. The figures used in 
15. United States v. IOO Acres in Marin County, 468 F.2d 
1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1972) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822 
(1973). 
16. Marshall Valuation Service (Los Angeles: Marshall and 










































DEVELOPMENT APPr.. .CH 
Table 12.l were selected merely to demonstrate the application of the develop-
ment approach; they should not be construed as typical or all-inclusive. The 
sellout time, developer's profit, and discount rate shown were also selected for 









TABLE 12.1 DEVELOPMENT APPROACH TO VALUE 
19.90 acres @ 3.02 lots per acre 
60 lots@ $17,500 
Direct costs: 
Grading (2,740 lin. ft.@ $6.72) 
Base rock (2,740 lin. ft.@ $8.96) 
Paving (2,740 lin. ft. @$20.14) 
Curbs & gutters (2,740 lin. ft. @$11.10) 
Concrete walks (2,740 lin. ft.@ $10.40) 
Sewer main (2,740 lin. ft.@ $12.40) 
Sewer laterals (2,740 lin. ft.@ $9.50) 
Sewer manholes (2,740 lin. ft.@ $2.43 
Fire hydrants (2,740 lin. ft.@ $4.27) 
Street lighting (2,740 lin. ft.@ $6.50) 
Water main (2,740 lin. ft.@ $13.20) 
Water laterals (2,740 lin. ft.@ $3.25) 
Electric (2,740 lin. ft.@ $7.25) 
Total direct costs 
Indirect costs: 
Overhead and sales costs 
($1,050,000@ 10%) 
Management and supervision 
Taxes and insurance 




Developer's profit & raw land value 
Developer's profit ($1,050,000@ 20%) 
Net before cost of capital 
Sellout in 3 years @ 20 lots per year. 
Annual income stream ($368,331 + 3) 
Discount rate factor (present worth of 
one per period, 3 years, 12%) 


























Both the appraiser and the attorney should be aware of the basic assump-
tions built into this methodology. First, it is assumed that the expenses of devel-
opment will be incurred steadily over the three years of project development, 
and that sales income will be spread evenly over the life of the project. In this 
case, it is assumed that exactly 20 lots will be sold each year. 
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Such assumptions will be true only under the most unusual circumstances. 
The procedure has merit, however, because it is probably the most easily under-
stood application of the development approach. Also, the actual pattern of devel-
opment expenses and sales income may approximate the assumptions built into 
the method enough to warrant its use. After all, the development approach is an 
appraisal tool, not an exact mathematical formula. In using this methodology, the 
appraiser should be aware of the value differential that would result if the sales 
income and expenses were treated as they are actually anticipated to occur, rather 
than being spread evenly over each year. If the differential is significant, the ap-
praiser may have to use one of the more complex methods of applying the devel-
opment approach. These methods are demonstrated in the 1978 publication, 
Subdivision Analysis.17 
PROBLEM AREAS 
Much of the data used in applying the development approach can be supported 
by market evidence, but in two areas the appraiser must reach conclusions that 
cannot be readily supported. First, the appraiser's estimate of the sellout or mar-
ket absorption period is affected by so many factors that the appraiser could 
spend hours answering hypothetical questions about how various economic trends 
could affect the development's absorption. The appraiser might be asked: 'What 
if mortgage interest rates go up three points? What if the largest employer in the 
area reduces its workforce by 500/o? What if two competing subdivisions opened 
up directly across the street?" If the cross-examiner has done his homework, he 
may be able to question the appraiser about absorption rate projections made by 
the appraiser in prior development approach applications and ask why they did 
not come to fruition. 18 
To estimate absorption time, the appraiser must be fully familiar wit.½ t.½e 
economic factors affecting the market in which the property being appraised is 
located. After ascertaining the general economic trends in the area, the appraiser 
should establish the geographic boundaries of the areas that will compete with 
the parcel under appraisal. The area of competition may be a neighborhood, a 
city, or an entire county. After this determination is made, the appraiser should 
make a physical inventory of the lots in developed subdivisions that could com-
pete with the lots to be developed from the parcel being appraised. The appraiser 
should also investigate whether any preliminary plats have been submitted for 
projects that could foreseeably compete with the property being appraised. 
Next, the appraiser should ascertain the number of dwellings constructed an-
nually in the neighborhood over the past several years. Under normal circum-
stances, this will indicate how many lots can be absorbed each year within the 
subject's market area. Based on this local economic information, the appraiser can 
logically estimate the absorption time required to sell the lots to be developed from 
the property under appraisal. The appraiser must make this estimate carefully. If 
the appraiser testifies that a hypothetical subdivision of 400 lots can be sold out 
17. Subdivision Analysis (1978). 
18. In responding to such questions, the appraiser 
may properly state that the absorption projec-
tion made in the approach is an attempt to mir-
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within two years, when historically only 150 lots have been absorbed each year in 
the entire area of competition, the court or trier of fact will be skeptical. 
The appraiser's estimate of sellout time can be supported by some historical 
data, but the second problem area requires more pure judgment. The appraiser 
must estimate the developer's profit to be deducted from the retail price of the 
developed lots. In Table 12.l a developer's profit equal to 20°10 of the retail value 
of the lots is indicated for purposes of illustration. Many developers estimate 
potential profit as a percentage of gross retail sales, so the procedure used to 
compute developer's profit in the table is representative of the, thinking and ac-
tions of typical buyers in the marketplace. 
However, the appraiser should recognize that not all developers estimate profit 
as a percentage of gross retail sales. Some developers estimate profit at a certain 
dollar amount per lot; others project profit as a percentage of raw land costs; and 
still others calculate profit as a percentage of raw land costs plus development 
costs. No matter which method is used by the developer, the question for the 
appraiser remains: How much should be allowed for developer's profit in apply-
ing the development approach to value? 
One way to select an appropriate profit factor is to examine the actual profit 
earned by developers of completed subdivisions similar to the one contemplated 
for the property being appraised. Table 12.2 illustrates how a developer's profit 
can be extracted from sales data It concerns a 22-acre parcel purchased for $286,000 
and subdivided into 66 lots that sold for an average price of $14,500 each. In 
actual practice, of course, several subdivisions would be analyzed in this manner 
to establish a pattern of the net profit realized by developers. 
The problem with this procedure is that the computations are based on the 
amount of money the developer ended up with after the development was com-
pleted, and that amount is not of concern to the appraiser. Rather, the appraiser 
wants to know what the developer envisioned when the raw acreage was pur-
chased. Unless the 27.3% profit factor computed is the amount of profit the devel-
oper anticipated when the land was purchased, it is of little or no use to the 
appraiser in estimating an appropriate profit factor for the property being ap-
praised. 
The computations shown in Table 12.2 may support the appraiser's estimate 
TABLE 12.2 ABSTRACTION OF DEVELOPER'S PROFIT 
Gross retail price (66 lots@ $14,500) 
Direct costs 
Indirect costs 
Less total development costs 
Profit and land cost 
Less land cost 
Profit 
Percent of profit ($261,000 + $957,000) 











REAL ESTATE VALUATION IN LITIGATION 
of developer's profit, but this estimate must be based on the developer's expecta-
tions going into the project, not the profit eventually gotten out of it. Extremely 
careful and extensive sales verification is required. It may also be helpful for the 
appraiser to determine whether developers active in the area have any rules of 
thumb for anticipated profit that they use when purchasing raw acreage for sub-
division purposes. 
THE COURT'S VIEW 
In an all too infrequent moment of lucidity and comprehension, one court said: 
It is significant that the method of valuation used [by the appraiser] has been 
recognized by the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers. Indeed, income 
capitalization in general and the anticipated use or development method in par-
ticular are standard appraisal practices. It would be unwise for us to require ex-
clusion of such a widely recognized method of valuation through unduly rigid 
evidentiary rules.19 
However, "[t]here is some authority for the proposition that valuation evi-
dence based on the lot method of appraisal should never be admitted in con-
demnation cases involving unimproved raw land'.'20 Nor is the development 
approach necessarily applicable because a legal plat of the property being ap-
praised has been recorded. "[T]he fallacy of treating land as subdivision land or as 
farm land depending upon whether or not a plat thereof had been recorded, is 
the conclusion that there is magic in the recording of a subdivision plat. Obvi-
ously the highest and best use of the land is not transformed from one thing into 
another by that ministerial act'.'21 
This is not to say that the subdivision plan of a tract of land is inadmissible. 
These plans generally are admissible, but often only in support of a witness's 
opinion as to the highest and best use of the land.22 Thus it is often good trial 
strategy for a condemnor to stipulate that the highest and best use of the land is 
for subdivision purposes, if the question of highest and best use is not contested. 
This stipulation will often preclude the submission of any specific development 
plan, which can severely restrict the effective presentation of the condemnee's 
case. 'Where both parties have conceded or agreed upon adaptability to the highest 
and best use of the land in question, the introduction of a plat showing the land 
as subdivided lots is merely cumulative and is subject to misconception by the 
jury, and should therefore be excluded by the trial court'.'23 [Citations omitted] 
As a general rule, it can be said that as a tract of land physically and legally 
progresses from a state of raw acreage to a completed subdivision, the develop-
ment approach also progresses from inadmissibility to admissibility. The two ex-
tremes were discussed in a federal case. 
It may well be that even though the highest and best use of a property is for a 
residential subdivision, if no meaningful steps have been taken in that direction, 
19. Dashv.State,491 P.2d 1069, 1075 CAk.1971). 
20. United States v. 4Z3096 Acres, 583 F.2d 270, 271 (6th 
Cir. 1978). 
21. State v. Maplewood Heights Corp., 302 N.E.2d 782, 785 
(Ind. 1973). 
22. Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Co. v. Riley, 299 N.E.2d 
173 (Ind. 1973). 
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viz., construction expenses and actual lot sales, then a "lot method" appraisal or a 
"developer's residual" approach, as it is also known, would be inappropriate. But 
that is not the situation here. The status of the subdivision and its availability for 
sale within the reasonably foreseeable future was an actual and real one, certainly 
not hypothetical, remote or speculative. Someone about to purchase the property 
on ... the date of condemnation, would have to regard it as having a highest and 
best use as a subdivision and, in determining what purchase price he would be 
willing to pay, would have to consider all factors, including sales price for indi-
vidual lots and additional expense of development, in arriving at,his decision .... 
This is not a case where a landowner dreamily contemplates the use to which his 
property may be put at some undefined future time but rather one where the 
property is geographically suited for development; is located in a booming devel-
opmental area; has been subdivided into lots according to a duly certified map; 
has been cleared and graded and improved with the creation of a spring-fed lake, 
the construction of access roads, and the digging of a deep well sufficient to sup-
ply water to 150 homes; and where actual sales of lots as identified on the map 
have taken place, the deeds of which contain building restrictions co~patible 
only with a residential real estate development.24 
According to another source, 
The First, Sixth and Ninth [federal] Circuits have indicated that [the development 
approach] is a permissible approach to valuation, but only if the costs of subdivi-
sion are taken into account; the rationale is that the potential value of land if 
subdivided could be considered by a willing buyer and a willing seller where 
subdivision is a reasonable possibility and the costs of subdivision are not specu-
lative or uncertain.25 
Nichols' also addresses the admissibility of the development approach: 
It is well settled that if land is so situated that it is actually available for building 
purposes, its value for such purposes may be considered, even if it is used as a farm 
or is covered with brush and boulders. 
In some easels], however, condemnees have attempted to go so far as to show 
the number of lots into which a tract is divisible, estimate sales prices per lot and 
sales prices of comparable sales in t.l-1.e viciPity. In most cases, however, t_he courts 
have adopted the approach that raw land as such, with little or no improvements or 
preparation for subdivision may not be valued as if the land were in fact a subdi-
vision. Thus, the "lot method" approach to valuation may not be used. 
In the case ofland that has actually been fully subdivided, or nearly so, the courts 
are in agreement that the "lot method" or" developer's residual approach" valuation is 
proper. The problems involved in the partially developed subdivision have evapo-
rated. The costs to the developer are no longer speculative, the value of the individual 
lots in the market may be ascertained with as much certainty as in any other con-
demnation proceeding, and the possibility of such a use is no longer remote.26 
24. United States v. 147.47 Acres of Land, 352 F.Supp. 1055, 
1060 (M.D. Pa. 1972). 
25. Jacques B. Gelin and David W. Miller, "The Fed-
eral Law of Eminent Domain" (Charlottesville, Vir-
ginia: The Michie Company, 1982), §42, p. 344, 
citing United States v. 125.07 Acres of Land, 667 
F.2d 243, 245, 246, 251 (1st Cir. I 981); United States 
v. 47.3096 Acres, 583 F.2d 270, 272 (6th Cir. I 978); 
United States v. 100 Acres, 468 F2d 1261, 1266, 1267 
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822, 864 (I 973). 
26. Nichols, vol. 4, §12B.14[1][a] and [dl (! 990). 
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Thus, the admissibility of the development approach is not questioned in 
most jurisdictions when the property being appraised is either raw land or fully 
subdivided land. In the latter circumstance, the appraiser should carefully ana-
lyze the determination of the larger parcel (see Chapter 5). If the lots affected by 
the taking are fully developed and salable as separate entities, it is possible that 
each individual lot represents a separate larger parcel and each should be ap-
praised independently. 
A problem arises when the land being appraised is neither raw acreage nor a 
fully developed subdivision, but falls somewhere in between. There is no clear-cut 
rule applicable to such properties. For one property, a legal plat may have been 
filed, while on another a portion of the property may have been physically and 
legally subdivided. There is simply no uniform rule as to what point the develop-
ment process must reach before the development approach is admissibie.27 
The weight of authority, however, appears to favor starting with raw acreage 
value and adding incremental upward adjustments for subdivision potential as 
well as the legal and physical steps taken towards actual subdivision develop-
ment. 
The actual market value of the lots insofar as that value is presently enhanced by 
the property's availability for subdivision may be shown, but the possible future 
value if subdivision were made may not be shown.28 
There being no dispute that the most advantageous use of claimants' property at 
the time of taking was as a potential residential subdivision, the correct rule to be 
applied "was to treat the premises not as raw acreage nor as part of the completed 
development but as a potential subdivision site giving the acreage an increment 
in value because of that potential use:'29 [Citations omitted] 
Whenever such an increment must be added to the raw acreage value to reflect a 
property's subdivision potential, then the specific increment which is selected 
and applied must be based upon sufficient evidence and be satisfactorily ex-
plained.30 
If a comparable sale has subdivision potential equal to that of the property under 
appraisal, no additional adjustment for that factor is required. 
There is conflicting case law as to the admissibility of the actual costs of 
subdivision development such as the engineering and platting fees incurred by 
the owner of the property. Some jurisdictions allow the admission of such evi-
dence, but only to better estimate the incremental value present in the property 
under appraisal, not as a separate value or damage item.31 In other words, only 
the contributory value, not the actual cost of such items, may be considered. 
27. Dover Housing Authority v. George, 220 A2d 156 (N.H. 
1966). 
28. Santa O.ara County Flood Con!roL etc., IP.st. v. Freitas, 2 
Cal Rep. 129, 131 (Cal. 1960). 
29. County of Suffolk v. Firesle:r, 339 N.E.2d 154, 156 (N.Y. 
1975). 
30. Ridgeway Associates, Inc. v. Stale, 300 N.Y.S2d 944, 946-
947 CN.Y. 1969). 











































































DEVELOPMENT APPRI. >H 
The courts' resistance to admitting the development approach stems from a 
fear that testimony in regard to the approach may mislead the trier of fact into 
determining just compensation based on a fully developed subdivision, rather 
than the land as it existed on the date of taking. Before attempting to present a 
case or testify to a value based on the development approach, extensive review of 
applicable law in the jurisdiction is required. This review must consider the spe-
cific circumstances surrounding the property under appraisal. 
Extensive pretrial conferences between the attorney and the appraiser will be 
required. The admissibility of the development approach may tum on a single 
question put to the appraiser by the attorney or on the appraiser's response to 
that question. Because the courts' views on this issue vary, it is difficult to predict 
the admissibility of development approach evidence. Even the courts can find the 
absence of definite rules on this issue confusing. 
The line of demarcation between those circumstances in which testimony of spe-
cific intended use and lot by lot evaluation is admissible, and those circumstances 
under which it is not, is too finely drawn for us to follow. We remain uninstructed 
as to the appropriate method for "properly guarding" such evidence so as to allow 
its admission.32 
THE PARTIALLY DEVELOPED 
PROPERTY 
As noted previously, the admissibility of the development approach is less ques-
tionable when the property being appraised is either raw acreage or fully subdi-
vided land. Divergent rulings are more prevalent when the property being 
appraised falls somewhere between these extremes. Factual circumstances, appli-
cable case law, and/or the condemnor's appraisal reporting requirements may 
necessitate some modification of the traditional development approach to value. 
Only the written and/ or verbal presentation of the approach may be modified, or 
the factual situation may require modification of the application of the approach. 
To illustrate the application of the development approach in a before and 
after situation, consider the following set of circumstances. The tract of land de-
picted in Figure 12.2 contains 25 acres and was acquired iO years ago by a broker/ 
developer. A preliminary plat, or master development plan, of the land was sub-
mitted to the planning commission three years ago. This plan is shown in Figure 
12.3. While the planning commission was considering the master plan, it was 
learned that the state planned to widen the freeway right-of-way to the north, 
which would have a direct effect on the property. For this reason, the property 
owner requested only preliminary approval of the master plan (Figure 12.3) and 
final approval of the development of the northerly portion of the property (the 14 
lots depicted in Figure 12.4). The preliminary master plan (Figure 12.3) and the final 
plat of the northerly portion of the property (Figure 12.4) were both approved. 




REAL ESTATE VALUATION IN LITIGATION 
The property is located in a rural area, about 10 miles from a small city with 
a population of 40,000. There are no public water or sanitary sewer facilities in the 
area. Consequently, in developing the 14 northerly lots, the property owner drilled 
a well and constructed a community water system adequate to supply domestic 
water to all 32 lots proposed in the original master plan. Then the 14 northerly 
lots were developed and sold. About one year later, the state's right-of-way plans 
were made public and the owner made no attempt to develop the tract further. 
The state's right-of-way plan is superimposed over the original master plan in 
Figure 12.5. Because the original 14 lots were sold, the larger parcel is the unplatted 
portion of the tract, which consists of 15.21 acres. 








































DEVELOPMENT APPi< .CH 














FIGURE 12.S LARGER PARCEL 
Freeway 








REAL ESTATE VALUATION IN LITIGATION 
In the before situation, the tract is quite unique for several reasons: 
• It abuts a successful existing subdivision. 
A community water system is available to it. 
• It is suitable for development with septic tanks. 
• It has "preliminary master plan" approval. 
• Preliminary engineering on the tract is complete. 
• Proposed streets have been roughed in. 
Due to the unique features of the tract, a market search uncovered no comparable 
sales. Analysis of the site indicates that the highest and best use of the tract in the 
before situation is completion of the subdivision improvements in conformity 
with the original master plan. Based on the foregoing factors, the development 
approach to value is deemed appropriate. 
The appraiser's research indicates that all lots in the original subdivision sold 
for $12,500, regardless of their size, and that lot prices at a more recently com-
pleted subdivision across the freeway were $12,750, regardless of size. Based upon 
these data, a developed lot price of $12,750 is considered reasonable. With infor-
mation from an engineering consultant, cost indexes, an analysis of comparable 
subdivisions, and the appraiser's data files, the following development costs were 
estimated. 
Direct costs: 
(Final plat and construction 
engineering, grading, clearing, 
streets and water lines) 
Indirect costs: 
Overhead and sales expense 
Management and supervision 
Taxes during sellout 
$55,000 
150/o of gross sales 
100/o of direct costs 
$1,000 
A two-year.sellout period has been estimated based on the historical experience 
of the subdivision across the freeway. 
From these data, the estimated before value of the property can be com-
puted. These calculations are shown in Table 12.3. Analyzing the remainder in the 
after situation leads to the conclusion that the highest and best use of the re-
mainder tract is for a residential subdivision and that the best method of devel-
opment would follow the plan shown in Figure 12.6. To analyze the property in 
the after situation, the following factors must be considered: 
• Only nine lots can be developed, so nine lots have been lost. 
• The property contains 9.85 acres in the after situation. 
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TABLE 12.3 BEFORE SITUATION - VALUE COMPUTATIONS 
Gross sales (18 lots@ $12,750) 
Direct costs: 
Final platting and engineering, grading, 
clearing, street improvements, water lines 
Subtotal 
Indirect costs: 
Sales and overhead ($229,500 x 0.15) 
Management and supeNision ($55,000 x 0.10) 
Taxes 
Total indirect costs 
Net income before return on capital and profit 
Discount income stream for two years @ 10% 
($133,575 + 2) X 1.735537* 
Less profit ($229,500 x 0.10) 




($92,962 + 15.21 acres) $6,111.90 per acre, say, $6,100 per acre 









• All previous master plan approvals are void and all historical engineering data are 
of little or no value. 
• The average lot size will be larger than it was in the before situation. 
• The tract will have 1,300 linear feet of frontage on the new frontage road and few 
interior streets will need to be constructed. 
• The new frontage road will cany a fairly high volume of traffic. 
FIGURE 12.6 PLOT PLAN-AFTER SITUATION 
........ ........ .... __ -- - -- -New Frontage Road 
Freeway 
















REAL ESTATE VALUATION IN LITIGATION 
Investigation indicates that lots fronting on arterial streets or frontage roads 
are typically larger than interior lots, but this advantage is offset by the disadvan-
tage of fronting on a highly traveled street. 
Based on these data, discussions with a consulting engineer, reference to cost 
indexes, and the actual costs of comparable subdivisions, an indication of the 
after value of the property could be computed (see Table 12.4). In the after situa-
tion, the cost of street improvements per linear foot increased because part of the 
new street had not previously been roughed in. Also, water costs per linear foot 
increased because the water line could not be extended across the street. Engi-
neering expenses per lot increased because preliminary engineering plans were 
invalidated by the taking. 
TABLE 12.4 AFTER SITUATION-VALUE COMPUTATIONS 
Gross sales (9 lots@ $12,750) 
Less direct costs: 
Engineering, grading, street improvements, water lines 
Subtotal 
Less indirect costs: 
Sales and overhead ($114,750 x 0.15) 
Management and supervision ($40,900 x 0.10) 
Taxes 
Total indirect costs 
Net income before profit 
Less profit ($114,750 x 0.10) 












Under the federal (before and after) rule the appraiser's conclusion would be: 
Before value (15.21 acres @ $6,100) 






Under the state (taking plus damages) rule, the appraiser's conclusion would be: 
Value before taking 
Less value of part taken (5.36 acres @ $6,100) 
Remainder (before) 
Less remainder(after taking 
Damage 
Less special benefits 
Net damage 
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DEVELOPMENT APPR, .. ~CH 
The foregoing example demonstrates a relatively simple application of the 
traditional development approach to value in a partial taking case. As the com-
plexity of the application increases, the chances of the approach being approved 
by either the court or the condemnor's review appraiser decrease. As mentioned 
earlier, it may be necessary to modify the development approach or its presenta-
tion to ensure its acceptance. 
For example, in analyzing the before situation of the tract (Figure 12.3), the 
appraiser must first investigate and verify sales of vacant land comparable to the 
parcel under appraisal but without development improvements. The costs to de-
velop each comparable are then estimated just as the costs to develop the prop-
erty under appraisal were estimated. For comparison purposes, it is often convenient 
to convert these cost factors into a cost per lot or a cost per acre. This process is 
demonstrated in Table 12.5 using the 15.21-acre larger parcel as the subject and a 
hypothetical comparable sale of 20.2 acres which sold for $79,000. In actual prac-
tice, the appraiser may want to break this adjustment down for individual items 
of dissimilarity such as "comparable's lack of water system," or "comparable's 
lack of preliminary engineering'.' 
TABLE 12.5 DEVELOPMENT LAND-COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Size 
Number of potential lots 
Sale price per lot 
Less direct costs per lot* 
Less indirect costs per lot* 
Net before capital and profit 
Discount 
$4,940/2 X 1.735537 
$7,420/2 X 1.735537 
Less profit 10% 
Indicated value per lot "as is" 
Lots per acre 
Indicated value per acre "as is" 
$3,012 X 1.287 
$5,164 X 1.183 
Indicated per-acre adjustment for subject's 
well, physical developments, and greater 
development potential ($6,109 - $3,876) 
Comparable price 
Comparable price per acre ($79,000/20.2) 
Adjustment for subject's lesser development cost 
Indicated value for subject per acre 



































REAL ESTATE VALUATION IN LITIGATION 
From an appraisal standpoint, the comparative analysis shown in Table 12.5 
is nothing more than a slightly modified application of the development ap-
proach to value. However, in this case the development approach has not been 
used to estimate the value of the property under appraisal; rather, it has been 
used to help the appraiser estimate and· support a proper adjustment for the 
physical and economic differences between the comparable property and the 
property under appraisal. This adjustment factor is subsequently used in the sales 
comparison approach to value. 
Although this methodology may seem a bit devious (and perhaps it is), ap-
praisers must sometimes resort to such procedures to ensure the acceptance of 
standard appraisal practices, which are widely recognized in the industry as valu-
able appraisal tools. This process is much like giving your dog his medication 
rolled up in a piece of hamburger; it's good for him - he just doesn't know it. The 
use of this methodology is valid and can mean the difference between the accep-
tance or rejection of an appraisal report by the condemnor's review appraiser. It 
can also mean the difference between the admissibility or inadmissibility of valua-
tion testimony. 
If an adjustment methodology has been used, the appraiser may want to 
meet with legal counsel to consider how much detail about the specific elements 
of the adjustment factor counsel will want or be allowed to present under direct 
examination. The appraiser may choose only to testify about the differences be-
tween the comparable and the property under appraisal or about the gross ad-
justment called for. The appraiser may state: 
I considered the fact that the sale property has no water system and the property 
under appraisal has a water system. I also considered the fact that the preliminary 
master plan has been approved for the subject, but none exists for the compa-
rable. After considering these differences, the indicated adjustment factor would 
be +$2,200 per acre, which would indicate a value for the property being ap-
praised in the before situation of $6,100 per acre, or approximately $92,800. 
Further explanation of the adjustment factor could meet with objection and 
be ruled inadmissible. If in cross-examination, however, opposing counsel is so 
bold as to ask, ''.And how, Mr. Appraiser, can you justify this outrageous adjust-
ment of $2,200 per acre?" the appraiser should be prepared to explain the adjust-
ment down to the smallest detail. 
ADVANCED PROBLEMS 
TIME LAG AND THE RISK OF 
DEVELOPMENT 
At one time an appraiser or engineer could walk into a local planning office, 
pick up a copy of the local zoning ordinance and subdivision ordinance, and 


















































































and the amount of time required to obtain the necessary approvals. This is no 
longer possible. Zoning and subdivision ordinances are now written in such a 
way that the local government agency can alter development requirements on a 
project-by-project basis, which places unique, and sometimes outrageous, 
demands on developers.33 Two common demands are development fees and ex-
actions of land or easements for public use. Dedications of road rights-of-way or 
access easements are common, as are exactions of land for parks, schools, and 
other public purposes. 
In addition to zoning and subdivision land use controls, >there are a myriad 
of new land use regulations. Wetlands, open space, shoreline, water detention (or 
run-off), and low-income housing ordinances are just a few of these additional 
ordinances. (See Chapter 7 for more information on land use regulations.) A regu-
lation that required a developer to comply with a city-established wage rate to 
obtain a building permit was ruled not to be a taking.34 
The flexibility of land use regulations, the introduction of new regulations, 
and the practice of exacting money and land from developers have substantially 
increased the risks of land development. The participation of citizen and environ-
mental groups in the development approval process has also increased the risks, 
as has the time required to obtain development permits. "Resistance from local 
residents and the general public has stopped many real estate developments'.'35 
For these reasons, most sales of land acquired for development purposes are 
subject to the condition that the purchaser obtain necessary development per-
mits prior to closing. This takes considerable risk out of the development process. 
If the development approach is applied to a tract of land and development per-
mits have not been issued for its development on the date of valuation, the risks 
and time lag associated with procuring such permits remain present. 
The appraiser must take these factors into consideration in projecting the 
sellout period for a development and in estimating the appropriate entrepre-
neurial profit factor to be applied in the development approach to value. It is not 
unusual for two or three years to be spent obtaining all the permits necessary for 
the subdivision of land, especially if development approvals are appealed. 
The sample application illustrated in Table 12.1 assumed no delay was in-
volved in obtaining permit approvals. If there had been a two-year delay in 
obtaining such approvals, and the lot prices and costs remained constant, the 
indicated value of the land would have been reduced from $14,819 per acre to 
$11,813 per acre. The equation is 
([3.604776 - L690051)* x $122,777) + 19.90 acres 
• Present worth of $1 per period factor for 5 years discounted at 12% (3.604776) minus present 
worth of $1 per period factor for 2 years discounted 120/o (l.690051) = present worth of $1 per 
period factor for three years, deferred for two years. 
This reduction in the indicated value of the property by more than 200/o high-
lights the importance of considering permit processing time. It is also probable 
that a developer who anticipates a delay of two years before development can 
33. When these demands become outrageous, the 
courts have, on occasion, found them to be tak-
ings, requiring the payment of just compensa-
tion. See Chapter 17. 
34. Associated Builders & Contractors v. Baca, 769 F.Supp. 
1537 (N.D. Cal. I 991). 
35. The Appraisal of Real Estate, 10th ed., 281. 
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begin would want a higher percentage of profit than is shown in Table 12.1. 
Moreover, the cost of holding the land for two years while permits are processed 
would have to be accounted for, further reducing the present value of the land. 
The increased speculation brought about by new development ordinances 
and more land use regulations will probably make the courts even more reluc-
tant to accept development approach evidence, especially in the appraisal of raw 
land when no meaningful steps toward development have actually been made. 
DEVELOPMENT APPROACH AND DCF 
ANALYSIS 
The development approach lends itself to discounted cash flow analysis and some 
form of DCF analysis is often employed by market participants in making various 
development decisions. From a practical standpoint, a development seldom pro-
duces level cash flows over its development and sellout period. Returning to the 
example shown in Table 12.1, such a development would probably not produce 
level cash flows of $122,777 per year. Because the development is small, all the 
development costs would probably be incurred during the first year. To attempt 
to develop this land in three phases would likely increase actual construction 
costs beyond the amount that could be saved by not incurring all of the direct 
costs in the first year of development. A more accurate picture of the actual cash 
flows of such a development is shown in the DCF analysis in Table 12.6. 
TABLE 12.6 DEVELOPMENT APPROACH-DEVELOPMENT COSTS IN YEAR 1 
Year1 Year2 Year3 
Lot inventory-beginning of year 60 40 20 
Sales (20 lots @$17,500) $350,000 $350,000 $350,000 
Less: Direct costs 318,169 0 0 
Overhead and sales costs 35,000 35,000 35,000 
Management and supervision 12,000 12,000 12,000 
Taxes and insurance 6,250 __ilgfi 2083 
Profit and raw land value ($21,419) $298,834 $300,917 
Less profit - 70 000 - 70 000 - 70,000 
Net before cost of capital ($91,419) $228,834 $230,917 
Times present value factor at 12% 0.892857 0.797194 0.711780 
Present value of income streams ($81,624) $182,425 $164,362 
Indicated raw land value: $265,163 
Indicated value per acre: $13,325 
The projected cash flows in Table 12.6 show that all of the development costs 
are anticipated to be incurred during the first year. The only other difference in 
the computations made in Tables 12.1 and 12.6 is the assumption that taxes and 






































































DEVELOPMENT APPR<. .H 
paring the tables, it can be seen that the indicated value of the land under ap-
praisal has been reduced from $14,819 per acre in Table 12.1 to $13,325 per acre in 
Table 12.6. This 10% reduction was computed after the income stream was revised 
to reflect more realistic expectations. 
An appraiser who applies the development approach using DCF analysis has 
the advantage of being able to test various development schemes to determine 
which one will produce the highest residual value to the land. For instance, as-
sume that direct development costs of the subject tract would increase by 15% if 
the physical development of the land were accomplished over three years rather 
than one. As demonstrated in Table 12.7, the indicated value of the property un-
der appraisal would then be $12,880 per acre. Thus the optimum development 
plan would be to complete the development in a single year. 
TABLE 12.7 DEVELOPMENT APPROACH-3-YEAR DEVELOPMENT COSTS 
Year 1 Year2 Year3 
Lot inventory-beginning of year 60 40 20 
Sales (20 lots@ $17,500) $350,000 $350,000 $350,000 
Less: Direct costs (per Table 12.1) 121,965 121,965 121,965 
Overhead and sales costs 35,000 35,000 35,000 
Management and supervision 12,000 12,000 12,000 
Taxes and insurance ~ __A,j_QQ 2083 
Profit and raw land value $174,785 $176,869 $178,952 
Less profit - 70 000 - 70,000 - 70,000 
Net before cost of capital $104,785 $106,869 $108,952 
Present value factor at 12% 0.892857 0.797194 0.711780 
Present value of income streams $93,558 $85,195 $77,550 
Indicated raw land value: $256,303 
Indicated value per acre: $12,880 
DCF analysis is particularly useful when the development approach is being 
applied to a relatively large development that will take several years to sell out. It 
also is helpful when development financing is being contemplated. Within the 
DCF framework, appraisers can project different numbers of lot sales in the vari-
ous years of the development process, use different projection periods (e.g., quar-
terly rather than annual), and build in anticipated increases or decreases in lot 
prices and/or expenses. However, appraisers should keep in mind that as the 
complexity of the development approach and the number of different projections 
increase, it becomes less likely that the court will find the approach to value 
admissible and that the trier of fact will understand it. 
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SUMMARY 
The development approach to value can be used to estimate the market value of 
a tract of land that has a highest and best use for subdivision purposes. The 
approach is simply the land residual technique applied to undeveloped land. 
There are many ways to apply the development approach and selecting the cor-
rect methodology often depends on the specific facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the property under appraisal. Various applications of the development 
approach are discussed in detail in other publications.36 
The best evidence of the value of raw subdivision land is derived from com-
parable sales. Although the use of comparable sales, when available, is the pre-
ferred approach to value, the development approach can, and often should, be 
used to support the value of the property indicated by the sales comparison 
approach. If an appraiser testifies that the highest and best use of a property is for 
subdivision purposes and estimates its value using comparable sales only, with 
no reference to the development approach on direct examination, the appraiser 
may still be subject to cross-examination concerning development cost factors. 
An Illinois court stated, 
The appellants' theory was that the highest and best use for the tract was for 
subdivision. This being a question in issue, there was no error, based on the 
record in this case, in allowing cross-examination of their witnesses regarding the 
cost of improving the property for the sale of lots for dwelling purposes. 
The same reasoning applied to the rebuttal testimony offered by the appellee. 
It being proper to examine the appellants' witnesses as to the basis of their opin-
ions on costs of subdividing, it was proper for the appellee to introduce evidence 
on its side as to such costs.37 
The procedural steps in applying the development approach to value are: 
l. Prepare a subdivision layout to determine the number, typical size, and shape 
of aU potential lots. 
2. Estimate retail value of the lots. 
3. Estimate direct development costs. 
4. Estimate indirect development costs. 
5. Compute the income residual attributable to developer's profit and land value 
(Step 2 minus Steps 3 and 4). 
6. Deduct developer's profit. 
7. Estimate th1e amount of time required to develop and sell out the subdivision. 
8. Discount the anticipated income stream into an indication of the current raw 
land value. 
The most difficult items for an appraiser to support with market data are the 
estimated sellout, or absorption, rate (including the time required to procure nee-
36. Subdivision Analysis (1978). 37. Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County v. Krol, 145 N.E.2d 
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essary development permits) and the appropriate amount of developer's profit to 
be deducted from the retail sale price of the lots. 
In estimating developer's profit, the appraiser must remember that this amount 
should reflect what a developer would consider a reasonable profit going into a 
proposed development project, not the amount of profit that a particular devel-
oper actually received at the conclusion of a similar project. Analyzing the actual 
profits received by various developers on completed subdivision projects can 
help the appraiser select an appropriate profit factor to use in the development 
approach, but it is not a conclusive test The appraiser must l;>e certain that the 
estimate of developer's profit reflects the risk, time, and costs associated with 
obtaining all necessary development permits as well as the risks associated with 
the physical development and sellout of the lots. 
As a general rule, the courts will not allow the development approach to be 
admitted into evidence when it is applied to raw subdivision land On the other 
hand, when the land under appraisal is fully developed, or nearly so, most juris-
dictions will allow use of the development approach and admit evidence in this 
regard. Case law pertaining to the admissibility of the development approach 
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, primarily because circumstances differ in 
each specific case. Some courts are reluctant to admit development approach 
testimony because they fear it will be misconstrued or misused by the trier of fact. 
It is imperative that case law in the applicable jurisdiction be extensively investi-
gated before any attempt is made to use or testify to the development approach 
to value. 
The development approach to value is most often applied to tracts that fall 
between the two extremes of raw acreage and fully subdivided land. Therefore, 
modification of the procedural steps in the development approach is sometimes 
warranted. Complex applications of the development approach are less likely to 
be approved by the condemnor' s review appraiser or by the court. Although use 
of DCF analysis tends to increase the complexity of the development approach, 
market conditions and the nature of the anticipated cash flows sometimes re-
quire the flexibility DCF analysis offers. If the appraiser chooses to apply DCF 
analysis, care must be taken to ensure that the analysis undertaken conforms 
with the The Appraisal Foundation's requirements with regard to DCF analysis.38 
The methodology of the development approac..h to value can help the ap-
praiser in analyzing the differences between a property in the before situation 
and the after situation. The methodology can also be modified and applied to the 
· comparative analysis of sales in the sales comparison approach to value. 
Because the development approach to value is complex and case law con-
cerning its admissibility is conflicting, the appraiser should not attempt to use 
this approach, or testify to it, without the assistance of legal counsel, a consulting 
engineer, and other technical advisors. It follows, therefore, that an uninitiated 
appraiser should not attempt to apply this unless he or she is associated with an 
appraiser who has had experience in its use. Similarly, an attorney with little 
38. The Appraisal Foundation, Uniform Standards of Pro-
fessional Appraisal Practice, 1994 ed., Statement on 
Appraisal Standards No. 2, p. 55-57. 
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eminent domain trial experience should not attempt to undertake a condemna-
tion case involving the development approach to value without obtaining the 
assistance of an individual experienced in, and thoroughly familiar with, the le-
gal and appraisal intricacies of this approach. 
Applying the development approach to value is generally quite time-con-
suming and expensive. Preparation for trial and the trial itself are lengthy proce-
dures for both the appraiser and the attorney, and thus expensive for their client. 
As a general rule, no other type of condemnation case requires as much pretrial 
conferences and pretrial preparation as a case involving the development ap-
proach to value. For these reasons, such a case should not be undertaken by an 
appraiser or attorney unless the client is fully aware of the potential cost involved 
and is prepared to pay the price. Under no circumstance should an appraiser or 
attorney go to trial in a case involving the development approach to value with-
out extensive pretrial preparation. 
C 










































Construction of the Public 
Improvement 
11 ftl,e acquisition of a parrel ofland is 
a total taking, as opposed to a partial acquisition, the proposed use of the land 
taken is of no consequence to the appraiser, nor is it of consequence to the attor-
ney once the question of public use and necessity has been adjudicated by the 
court. At least theoretically, the proposed use of the land taken in a total taking is 
of no significance to the trier of fact and should have no bearing on the determi-
nation of just compensation. Only in the case of a partial acquisition 9-oes the 
proposed use of the land taken need to be considered. 
Although some may argue that not all public construction constitutes the 
construction of a public improvemmt, discussion of this question is beyond the 
scope of this work. For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that all public 
construction constitutes public improvements. Historically, the value of a remainder 
property in a partjal taking case was estimated assuming the public improvement 
was complete and operational on the date ofvaluation.1 Because the size of pub-
lic projects and the cost of money have increased, as has the amount of time 
between land acquisition and the completion of many public projects, it is now 
more common to estimate the value of a remainder property in its physical con-
dition as it exists on the date of valuation, giving consideration to the proposed 
public construction and its anticipated effect. "The 'after value' is based on the 
value of the remainder property assuming that the actual construction of the 
proposed project will not be completed until an estimated future date'.'2 In esti-
mating the remainder property's value, the appraiser must exclude from consid-
eration any diminution in the value of the remainder property attributable to 
I. Joseph M. Montano, &cognition of Benefits to Remain-
der Property in Highway Valuation Cases, National Re-
search Program Report No. 88 (Washington, D.C.: 
Highway Research Board, 1970), 8. 
2. Washington State Dept. of Transportation, Right of 
Way Manual (revised August 1991), Chapter 4-1, Part 
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any temporary inconvenience during or caused by the actual construction of the 
public improvement. Thus one hypothetical condition (i.e., that the public im-
provement was complete on the date of value) has been replaced with another 
hypothetical condition (i.e., that disruption of the remainder property during con-
struction of the public improvement will have no impact on its market value). 
The significance of this change will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Although the appraiser is to view the remainder property as it physically 
existed on the date of value, he or she must consider the impact of the pending 
construction on the remainder property. Therefore, the appraiser must be able to 
visualize the remainder property after the proposed public project is complete to 
estimate its value and reflect the damages and/ or special benefits that will accrue 
to it. 
The appraiser demonstrates a full and accurate understanding of the after 
situation by describing it in writing, in an appraisal report, and verbally, on the 
witness stand. The appraiser must understand not only the portion of the public 
project that will abut the remainder property, but also the entire public improve-
ment. 
There is considerable case law indicating that damage to the remainder prop-
erty is limited to the damage caused by only that portion of the public project that 
occupies the area taken from the original larger parcel.3 This theory is based on the 
fact that " ... the just compensation assured by the Fifth Amendment [of the U.S. 
Constitution] to an owner, a part of whose land is taken for public use, does not 
include the diminution in value of the remainder caused by the acquisition and 
use of adjoining lands of others for the same undertaking:'4 This concept, and the 
difficulty of attempting to apply it in the real world, is discussed in Chapter 14. 
ENGINEERING, PROPERTY 
STAKING, AND INSPECTION 
The first thing the appraiser must do is become familiar with the property being 
appraised. This is accomplished by performing a site inspection, examining the 
title to the property, and making a preliminary investigation of the zoning, neigh-
borhood trends, and general economic conditions. Then the appraiser should 
meet with the condemnor's engineer to learn about the proposed construction. If 
the appraiser has been employed by the condemnee, it is often necessary for the 
condemnee' s attorney to make arrangements for such a meeting. If the condemnor' s 
attorney or engineer is uncooperative, the required information may be elicited 
through interrogatories or by deposition. 
The amount ahd quality of information concerning construction plans and 
specifications that is available for review by the appraiser will generally depend 
on the specific condemnor and the type of public project proposed. Whenever 
possible, the site should be inspected by the appraiser and the engineer together. 
If the appraiser does not understand the proposed construction perfectly, he must 
3. St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 313 F.2d 45 (9th. Cir. 
1962). 
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CONSTRUCTION OF THE PUBLIC I. OVEMENT 
FIGURE 13.1 PARTIAL TAKING 
Drain Field 200' 






construct a small retaining wall west of the proposed taking line and move the 
take line enough west to avoid the underground septic tank drain field. 
In analyzing the value of a property after a taking, the appraiser must con-
sider the proposed use to which the condemnor will put the land taken.6 How-
ever, the appraiser must remember that the condemnor is generally not limited to 
the use proposed at the time of the taking unless the condemnor limited or re-
stricted itself to specific plans and specifications submitted at that time. If such a 
limitation is made by the condemnor, and the condemnor subsequently expands 
or changes the use of the land, the condemnee may be entitled to additional 
compensation.7 If no such limitation is made, however, the condemnor is not 
restricted in its use of the land taken and the appraiser must consider what the 
condemnor is acquiring a right to do, not what the condemnor plans to do as of the' 
date of trial. The appraiser must assume that the condemnor will use the land 
taken to the fullest legal extent possible.8 
On the other hand, the appraiser cannot assume that the condemnor will put 
the land taken to the use that, in the appraiser's opinion, would be the most 
injurious to the remainder.9 Any potential uses must be so reasonably probable 
as to have a detrimental effect on the current market value of the remainder. As 
one court stated: 
While it is true that a condemnation award must "once and for all" fix the dam-
ages, present and prospective, that will accrue reasonably froin the construction 
of the improvement, and in this connection must consider the most injurious use 
of the property reasonably possible, that does not mean that the jury may specu-
late on the possibility of damage from some future abandonment of the improve-
6. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
7. McCubbin v. Village of Gretna, 116 N.W,2d 287 (Neb, 
1962). 
8, Western Union TeL Co. v. Polhemus, 178 F. 904 (3rd Cir. 
1910). 
































DAMAGES IN PARTIAL TAKINt.. _:ASES 
first easement area would require a permit from the condemnor and that the 
appraiser was to assume that such a permit would be denied. The appraiser re-
fused to accept the legal instruction and, after a review of the appraiser's ap-
praisal report for the first easement taking (which included the drawing of 
"allowable construction" and the written assumption and limiting condition that 
such construction would be permitted), the legal instrnction was withdrawn. If 
the appraiser had not insisted upon written clarification of the rights retained by 
the owner of the land when the first easement was taken and included a compre-
hensive description of these rights, the owner of the property might well have 
received substantially less than that to which he was due. 
In many jurisdictions appraisers are not technically required to identify spe-
cifically or estimate the dollar amount of damages for condemnation trial pur-
poses. They need only estimate the market value of the property before the partial 
acquisition and the market value of the remainder property immediately after 
the proposed acquisition. "Notwithstanding the foregoing, appraisals should con-
tain an allocation between the value of the property being acquired and damages 
to the remainder.'17 Many condemning agencies require this allocation.18 One rea-
son for this requirement is that payment for the taking and payment for damages 
to the remainder property are treated differently for income tax purposes. Also, 
from a practical standpoint, the appraiser must attempt to isolate and identify all 
elements of damage present in the remainder property. This is not to say that the 
appraiser must, or even should, estimate a specific dollar amount for each item of 
damage, only that each should be acknowledged and considered. 
Whether the appraiser is working under the federal mle or state mle of measur-
ing just compensation, the procedural steps of valuation are the same. (See Chap-
ter 3 for a discussion of these two measures of just compensation,) The estimate of 
damages should be no more conjectural or speculative than the appraiser's esti-
mates of market value before and after the acquisition. Damage estimates must 
exclude highly improbable damages, but reflect those damages that would be 
considered significant by prudent buyers and sellers. "[Sltrict proof of the loss in 
market value to the remaining parcel is obligatory.'19 "[T]he extent to which the 
utility of the property has been destroyed and its market value diminished must 
necessarily be established by factual data having a rational foundation in support 
of such a claim'.'20 
The appraiser measures damages, not as an end in itself, but to assist in X 
estimating the value of the remainder tract "Under the Federal rule, compensa-
tion is paid for 'takings' not 'damages'."21 In other words, the estimate of damages 
is the basis for arriving at an adjustment that will be applied to various market 
data in valuing the property in the after situation. One of the most commonly 
used and reliable methods of estimating damage is by analyzing comparable 
sales using the matched pairs, or paired data analysis, technique.22 Damages can 
also be estimated by capitalizing the net rent loss resulting from the damage. 
17. Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisi· 
lions (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1992), §A-11, p. 34. 
18. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal High-
way Administration. The Appraisal Guidt (Washing-
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 9. 
19. United States v. Honolulu Plantation Co., 182 F.2d 172, 
179 (9th Cir. 1950), cert, denied, 340 U.S. 820 (1950). 
20, United States v. 26.07 Acres of Land in Hempstead, 126 
F.Supp. 374,377 CE.D.N.Y, 1954). 
21. Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisi· 
lions, §A-11, p. 31. 
22. For a description of this analytical technique, see 
The Appraisal of Real &tale, 10th ed. (Chicago: Ap-
praisal Institute, 1992), 394-397. 
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A third method applied to estimate a proper adjustment for damage is known 
as the cost to cure. This method can be used when the property being appraised has 
suffered damage that can be physically and economically corrected,23 e.g., through 
correction of drainage, replacement of fencing, reestablishment of physical ac-
cess, or replacement of sewage or water systems. Under no circumstances can the 
cost to cure measure of damage be applied if the cost to cure exceeds the diminu-
tion in value that would result if such a cure were not undertaken.24 However, if 
the cost to cure is less than the diminution in the value of the remainder, the cost 
to cure measure of damage must be used.25 
Although Nichols' suggests that the cost to cure measure of damage is an 
exception to the before and after method of valuation and determination of com-
pensation,26 this measure of damage actually ensures conformance with the rule. 
If a property with a deficiency is placed on the market, both the buyer and seller 
will consider the cost to cure the deficiency, if it is physically and economically 
curable. The price at which the property will sell is the value of the property as 
deficient or the value of the property without the deficiency minus the cost to 
cure the deficiency, whichever is higher. If a remainder property lacks a connect-
ing road approach, or driveway, to an abutting road, it would be illogical to 
estimate the market value of the remainder property as if it would be landlocked 
in perpetuity. If a road approach could physically and legally be constructed, the 
value of the property would be its market value with access minus the cost of 
constructing the access, unless the cost to construct the access exceeded the dif-
ference between the value of the property with access less the value of the prop-
erty as landlocked. 
The measure of damages cannot be based on an assumption that adjacent 
land can be acquired,27 but the appraiser can consider the general availability of 
suitable replacement property. This is particularly true when the property in ques-
tion is a noncontiguous larger parcel.28 Figure 14.5 illustrates the misuse of such 
an assumption. In this situation it would be improper to estimate the damage to 
the remainder of Parcel A as the cost of acquiring Parcel B. 







11111!11 Area of Taking N 
23. State Highway Comm. v. Speck, 324 S.W.2d 796 CArk. 26. Nichols', vol. BA, §16.01[2] (1992). 
1959). 27. Utah Depl of Trans. v. Rayco, 599 P.2d 481 (Utah 1979); 
24. Arkansas State Hway. Comm. v. Ptak, 364 S.W.2d 794 Jefferyv. Osborne, 129 N.W. 931 (Wis. 1911). 
<Ark 1963). 28. International Paper Company v. United States, 227 F.2d 
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DAMAGES IN PARTIAL TAI .:; CASES 
For instance, if legal counsel instructed the appraiser who is appraising the 
remainder depicted in Figure 14.2 that, as a matter of law, the noise damage 
resulting from cars using the portion of the highway located in the area taken 
must be separated from the noise damage resulting from cars using the rest of the 
highway, the appraiser would undoubtedly have to inform legal counsel that 
such separation is impossible. The law does not require appraisers to guess. If the 
condemnor thinks it can find an appraiser who is capable of making the separa-
tion and convincing a trier of fact of the logic and reasonableness of the separa-
tion, the condemnor is free to retain that individual. However, \tis the appraiser's 
professional reputation that is on the line on the witness stand, not the condemnor' s. 
In the federal courts, it is for the district judge "to decide 'all issues' other than 
the precise issue of the amount of compensation to be awarded:'44 Therefore, if it 
is unclear whether the Campbell rule applies to a specific set of circumstances or 
the Pope & Talbott exception is applicable, the best course of action may well be to 
obtain a court ruling on this matter prior to trial. 
VALUATION PROCEDURE. 
Regardless of the methodology used or the specific rules applied, the estimation 
of compensable damage in the appraisal must be done thoroughly and in logical 
steps. 
The appraiser's first step is to determine the larger parcel or parcels in the 
before situation. (See Chapter 5 for more discussion on identifying the larger 
parcel.) It is important that the appraiser's determination of the larger parcel 
reflect unity of use, unity of ownership, and physical contiguity. The second step 
is to estimate the highest and best use of the property in the before situation. 
(Highest and best use is covered in Chapter 6.) In estimating highest and best use, 
the appraiser must try to overlook the fact that he will later be considering an 
after situation. The appraiser should adhere to the principle of reasonable probability 
in estimating both highest and best use and the larger parcel. As a third step in 
the valuation process, the market value of the property being appraised must be 
estimated in the before situation, utilizing all applicable approaches to value. In 
most circumstances, all three approaches will have some applicability. If an ap-
proach to value is not applicable, the appraiser must explain why.45 A client's 
request or instruction that one or more of the standard approaches to value be 
excluded is not an acceptable reason to exclude an otherwise applicable approach. 
The fourth step starts this procedure all over again, but this time the after 
situation is studied. The appraiser begins by identifying the larger parcel in the 
after situation. A property may consist of one larger parcel in the before situation 
and two in the after situation, or vice versa. As stated by one court: 
It is unfortunate that no witness on either side was asked to express an opinion as 
to the market value of the two remainder tracts if sold separately .... [I]n the ab-
44. United States v. &ynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 20 (1970); Fed. 
R. Evid. 71 A(h). 
45. The Appraisal Foundation, Unifonn Standards of Pro-
fessional Appraisal Practice (USPAP), 1994 ed., Stan-
dards Rule 2-2(j), p. 16; Unifonn Appraisal Standards 
for Federal Land Acquisitions, §B-1-8, p. 67. 
1229 of 1617
REAL ESTATE VALUATION IN LITIGATION 
sence of evidence to the contrary it may be assumed that the highest and best use 
of a farm cut in two by a condemnation remains the same after the taking as 
before, and that its highest value is still as a single unit, [but] this case is differ-
ent .... The case presents a classic instance in which the remainder tracts should 
have been evaluated separately.46 
In the fifth step the appraiser estimates the remainder parcel's highest and 
best use. In making such a determination in the after situation, the appraiser 
should specifically consider several factors, including the proximity of the new 
public improvement to the remainder parcel and the possible existence of special 
or general benefits resulting from the project. (See Chapter 15 for more informa-
tion on special and general benefits.) The reduced land area and the change in the 
shape of the remainder parcel are also important considerations, as are changes 
in access to the remainder property and the nature of the public improvements to 
be constructed. The appraiser must not only consider changes in the highest and 
best use of the property between the before and after situations, but also, "in 
fairness to the condemnee, consideration should be given to any material change 
in the intensity of use within a highest and best use:'47 The final step in the valu-
ation process is to estimate the value of the remainder property, again using all 
applicable approaches to value. 
In ·estimating the value of the remainder tract, it is important that the ap-
praiser consider all observations made in determining the highest and best use of 
the tract in the after situation and the effect, if any, of the proposed public im-
provement. It is also important to look beyond the immediate boundaries of the 
remainder property to identify other forces that could affect the property's after 
value. 
Figure 14.9 illustrates the before and after situations of a single-family dwell-
ing affected by the widening of an interstate highway. In the before situation, the 
property could be accessed via the frontage road and the interstate or the front-
age road and County Roads 1 and 2. In the after situation, the depth of the re-
mainder parcel was only nominally reduced and the traveled lanes of the frontage 
road were no closer to the dwelling than they were before. However, the highway 
project called for: 1) the closure of the intersection of the interstate and County 
Road 1; 2) the closure of the intersection of the interstate and County Road 2; and 
3) the construction of a new roadway extending County Road 2 to connect with a 
new interchange on the interstate. The remainder parcel did suffer from some 
circuity of travel due to the closure of the two intersections, but this item of 
damage was ruled noncompensable before the trial. 
Based on these facts alone, it would appear that the property in question 
suffered little, if any, diminution in value by reason of the taking and that there 
was no compensable damage. However, the appraiser for the property owner 
testified during the trial that, in the preceding 15 years, County Road 1 had flooded 
an average of 45 days per year at a point two miles from the remainder property 
and that during future flooding the only access to the remainder property would 
46. Commonwealth, Dq,'t of Highways v. Rowland, 420 
S.W.2d 657, 660 (Ky. 1967). 
47. Unifonn Appraisal Standards for Ftdual Land Acquisi-
tions, §A-3, p. 10. 
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As directed by the Court, Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD"), 
files its response to the post trial brief filed by Defendant HJ Grathol ("Grathol"). 
I. SUMMARY OF ITD,S RESPONSE 
A. LARGERP ARCEL. 
1. At the close of trial, the Court directed Grathol to cite Idaho law that would 
support the larger parcel opinion of its appraiser, Mr. Skip Sherwood. Grathol did not cite any 
Idaho statutes, case law, or jury instructions that support Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel. 
2. Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel is contrary to Idaho law. See ITD's Post 
Trial Brief, at 3-11 .(filed March 23, 2012). 
3. Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel is based on his belief that the western 30 
acres has a higher value than the other 26.8 acres. "Higher value" is not a factor in detennining 
the larger parcel under either Idaho law or the field of real estate appraisal. The three elements 
are unity of title, unity of use, and contiguity. If higher value were the test, then every property 
owner could use the comer or frontage of its property to set the unit value for the condemned 
property and the before and after value of the remainder. This is not allowed Ullder Idaho law. 
4. Sherwood testified that the Grathol property is all contiguous and is all owned by 
Gtathol, thus conceding two of the three elements making the larger parcel the 56.8 acres owned 
by Grathol. 
5. No legal subdivision or physical barrier separates Sherwood's hypothetical 
30-acre parcel from the rest of the Orathol property. 
6. Sherwood based his opinion of the'larger parcel on bis unsubstantiated belief that 
commercial real estate developers and end-users do not buy parcels larger than 30 acres for 
commercial development. This is refuted by the fact that Otathol bought this 56.8 acre parcel for 
commercial development and had the entire property rezoned for commercial development. 
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His opinion is also refuted by his own comparable sales, which show commercial properties 
ranging in size from 9 acres to 235 acres. 
7. Sherwood did not perform any study or provide any documentation to support his 
ciaim that commercial real estate developments do not exceed 30 acres. He also did not offer 
any eXplanation for why Grathol bought a 56.8 acre paxcel and rezoned the entire property for 
commercial use. 
8. Sherwood claimed that the western 30 acres has a different use than the eastern 
26.8 acres. However, he did not testify as to what the use of the 26.8 acres might be. He did not 
testify or provide any study or documentation to show that the eastern 26.8 acres would have a 
different "highest and best use" than his hypothetical 30-acre paxcel. All other witnesses agreed 
that the highest and best use of the entire property is for commercial development. 
9. Site plans prepared by Grathol show commercial development on the eastern 
26.8 acres in the before condition (without the new freeway). Therefore, Grathol's own site 
plans refute Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel. 
10. Sherwood testified that Grathol would need part of the eastern 26. 8 acres for the 
waste water treatment system for development on his hypothetical 30-acre paxcel. Grathol's 
witness, Jaines Coleman, testified that Orathol would need between 13 and 16 acres for the waste 
water treatment system and land application for the treated water. Coleman speculated that 
Grathol might be allowed to pipe its waste water onto someone else's property, but he did not 
testify that any such arrangexnent had been made. ITD witness George Hedley testified that 
Grathol would need 19 to 25 acres of land application for its waste water based on detailed 
analyses by senior engineers with David Evans and Associates. Thus, both Orathol witness 
Coleman and ITD witness Hedley testified that a substantial portion of the eastern portion of the 
Grathol property would be needed to support commercial development on Sherwood's 
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hypothetical 30-acre parcel. All witnesses, including Sherwood, agreed that the waste water 
treatment system would be located on the eastern 26.8 acres, making its use necessary for 
commercial development on Sherwood's hypothetical 30-acre pazcel. These facts negate 
Sherwood's argmnent1:hat the eastern portion will not be used for commercial development. 
11. In its brief, Gtathol suggests that ITD failed to provide evidence to establish that 
the western 30 acres needs the eastern 26.8 acres to develop. In fact, both Coleman and Hedley 
testified that a substantial part of the 26.8 acres would be used for the waster water treatment 
system and land application of waste water for commercial development on the Grathol property. 
Moreover, under Idwi.o law, C'1'athol has the burden of proving ju.st compensation. Therefore, 
Orathol has the burden of proving Sherwood's theory. Sherwood did not testify or prove that the 
eastern acreage would not be used for commercial development. All testimony at trial was that 
the highest and best use of the Grathol property is for commercial development. Grathol' s own 
site plans for the "before" condition show commercial development on the eastern part of the 
property. 
12. None of Grathol's witnesses testified at trial that the 26.8 acres would be rezoned 
to a different highest and best use, such as industrial or residential. Moreover, without a rezone, 
the 26.8 acres cannot be used for industrial or residential uses. 
13. Orathol has cited cases from outside Idaho to attempt to support Sheiwood's 
theory of the larger parcel in this case. However, the cases cited by Grathol either reinforce the 
conclusion that Sherwood's larger parcel is contrary to law or are so different factually that they 
have no application to this case. In some instances, Grathol has mischaracterized or omitted the 
key facts or holding of the cases. 
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B. "SEVERANCE" DAMAGES. 
1. Sherwood testified at trial that the property did not suffer any severance damages. 
His testimony was consistent with his opinion that the remainder property has a value of $2.25 
per square foot-be/or-e-thetaking and $2.25 per square foot (,lj'ter the takin_g .. Und~~ Idaho law, 
the formula for determining severance damages is to subtract the fair market value of the 
remaining property after the talcing from the fair market value of the remaining property before 
the talcing. Using that formula, and Sherwood's testimony that the remaining property is worth 
$2.25 before and after the taking, his opinion of severance damages is $0.00. 
,, ,.,, Grathol freely admits that the discounting by Sherwood is a calculation based on 
the future value of the property 1.5 to 2.5 years after the date of taking, to account for the time 
needed to complete the US-95 Project. Sherwood did not testify to any reason for the 
discounting other than the time needed to complete the US-95 Project. The Comt has already 
dismissed Gtathol's construction delay claim. 
3. Idaho law requires that just compensation be assessed as of the date of taking, 
including "damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned, by reason of 
its severance from the portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the improvement 
in the manner proposed by the plaintifft,]" I.C. § 7-711(2). This requires the property to be 
valued in the after condition as if the public project has been built as of the date of taking, 
Sherwood did not do this. He used future dates of 1.5 and 2.5 years after the date of taking and 
then added $280,757 and $176,757, respectively, to his opinion of the value of the condemned 
property. Sherwood's additional swns for delay are not 1'severanee" damages. It is a claim for 
compensation for the time it takes to complete the us.95 Project, and that claim has been 
dismissed by the Court. 
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4. In its post trial brief, Grathol suggests that Sherwood's construction delay claim is 
some variant or component of an "income approach" to the valuation of real estate. However, 
Sherwood testified that he did not use the income approach, and only used the sales comparison 
itpproach. He alstnestified that the income approach only-applies to improved prQperty that is 
producing income. The Grathol property is bare land and is not producing income. In addition, 
Sherwood's appraisal report makes no mention of the income approach or discounting future 
income. 
5. In its post trial brief. Gtathol also suggests that Sherwood's future value 
discounted back to the date of taking is the sa.--ne thlng as the ~~Justm.ents for "date of sale" that 
appraisers make to comparable sales used in the sales comparison approach. This argument 
demonstrates a fundamental lack of understanding of appraisal principles and the sales 
comparison approach. Suffice it to say that adjustments to comparable sales as part of the sales 
comparison approach to real estate valuation are completely different from. Sherwood's claim for 
additional compensation in the amounts of $176,757 and $280,757 based on construction delay. 
Sherwood certainly did not testify that his discounting for delay had anything to do with 
adjustments made to comparable sales in the comparable sales approach. 
6. In its post trial brief, Grathol made no attempt to explain or justify the 
"severance" damage claim by Mr. Alan Johnson. ITO has previously shown that Johnson's 
"severance" damage claim mirrors his construction delay claim before it was dismissed by the 
Court. This thinly disguised construction delay claim should be dismissed again. 
II. THE GRATHOL PROPERTY AND THE TAKING 
Grathol owns 56.8 acres of contiguous real property located at the comer ofUS-95 and 
State Highway 51 near Athol, Idaho. ITO is condemning 16.3 acres of the property, leaving a 
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remainder of 40.5 acres. The Gtathol property and the land taken by ITD are illustrated in Trial 
Exhibit 166. 
A small but contiguous parcel of0.4 acres is located at the southwest comer of the 
· property. Some-apptaisers included the 0.4 acres in the l~ger parcel, others-did not. All agreed, 
however, that whether the 0.4 acres was included in the larger parcel or not bad no bearing on the 
issue of just compensation. Accordingly, for ease of discussion, this brief will refer to the entire 
Grathol property, the "larger parcel," as 56.8 acres. 
m. SHERWOOD'S OPINION OF THE LARGER PARCEL IS CONTRARY TO 
IDAHO LAW AND THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THE CASE 
Sherwood did not value the larger parcel owned by Grathol. Rather, he used an 
imaginary 30-acre parcel bounded by US-95 on the west and an imaginary line on the east. 
Grathol bought the 56.8 acres in one transaction. All of the property is contiguous. The property 
has not been subdivided. No legal division or physical barrier separates Sherwood's hypothetical 
30-acre parcel from the rest of the 56.8-acre larger parcel. Grathol sought and obtained a rezone 
for the entire property in 2008. All of the property is now zoned commercial. The property is all 
owned by Gtathol. All witnesses agree that the highest and best use of the property is for 
commercial development. Thus, the larger parcel is unquestionably 56.8 acres. 
Sherwood testified that the Grathol property was all contiguous and under the same 
ownership, thus concedmg two of the three elements demonstrate that the larger parcel is the 
56.8 acres owned by Orathol. See Trial Transcript ("Tr.'1 at S01:7-21. It is undisputed that no 
legal subdivision and no physical barrier exist creating the 30-acre parcel. The 30-acre parcel 
only exists in the opinion offered by Sherwood. 
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A, Sherwood's Opinion Of The Larger Parcel Is Contrary To Idaho Law. 
At the close of trial, the Court directed Gtathol to cite Idaho law that would support the 
larger parcel opinion of Sherwood. Grathol did not cite any Idaho statutes, case law, or jury 
· · ~instructions that-support Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel. Sherwopd's. opiniOJl of the 
larger parcel in this case is contrary to Idaho statutes and jury instructions. See ITD Post Trial 
Brief at 3-5 (filed March 23, 2012). It is also contrary to holdings of the Idaho Supreme Court. 
In State ex rel. Symms v. City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528,531,493 P.2d 387, 390 
(1972), the Idaho Supreme Court held that 1'[i]f, as a matter of fact, the parcel t.aken is part of a 
larger tract heJd by the same owner, it is error to cora.sider such parcel a.s if it constituted an 
entire tract separate and apart from other property in the possession of the same owner.,. Id. at 
S21, 493 P.2d at 390 (emphasis added). This principle is controlling in the case at hand. 
Moreover, in the present case, no 30-acre tract exists. It is not the product of any legal division 
or any physical separation from the other Orathol property. 
In City of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 136 P.3d 310 (2006), the Idaho 
Supreme Court noted that "Courts typically reject the so-called 'conceptual severance' theory-
the notion that whole units of property may be divided for the pmpose of a takings claim." Id. at 
848, 136 P.3d at 319. This is precisely the situation here. Grathol is attempting to divide the 
whole for the purpose of enhancing its recoveiy in a takings case. 
In City o[Caldwel/ v. Roark, 92 Idaho 99, 101, 437 P.2d 615, 617 (1968), the City of 
Caldwell condemned a portion of the Roark property for the expansion of the Caldwell airport. 
Id at 100,437 P.2d at 616. The Roarlcs had previously platted their property for residential 
development and the plat had been accepted and approved by the city. Additionally, the Roatks 
had marked the proposed streets and alleys for their development and utility services had been 
made available to the property. Id. 
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At trial, the Roarks sought just compensati~n based upon the value of individual lots in 
their development plan. On appeal, the Roarks challenged the trial court's instructions requiring 
the jury to determine the fair market value of the property as one parcel and instructing the jury 
·., that the values-·given·to hypothetical parcels in the Roark-s'· development.plans. were not to be . 
considered. Id The Idaho Supreme Court rejected the Roarlcs' argument and upheld the trial 
court's instructions. Id at 101-102, 437 P.2d at 617-18. 
These and other Idaho Supreme Court decisions, as well as Idaho's eminent doinain 
statutes and jury instructions bar consideration of Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel. 
B. "High~r Value" Is Not A Criterion For Determining The Larger Parcel, 
Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel is based on his belief that the western 30 acres is 
more valuable than the other 26.8 acres. "Higher value'' is not one of the criteria for determining 
the larger parcel under either Idaho law or professional real estate appraisal. The undisputed 
criteria are· unity of title, unity of use, and contiguity. If higher value were the test, then every 
property owner could use the comer or frontage of its property to set the unit value for the 
condemned property and the "before" and "after" value of the remainder. This is not allowed 
under Idaho law. 
C. The Basis Offered By Sherwood For His Opinion Of The Larger Parcel 
Being 30 Acres Is Refuted By His Own Comparable Sales And Gratbol's 
Own Rezone of The Property. 
Sherwood based his opinion of the larger parcel on his belief that commercial real estate 
developers and end-users do not buy parcels larger than 30 acres for commercial development. 
This is refuted by the fact that Grathol bought this 56.8 acre parcel for commercial development, 
and had the entire property rezoned for commercial development 
Sherwood's belief is also refuted by his own comparable sales, which consist of 
commercial properties ranging in size from 9 acres to 235 acres. See Ex. 154 (pp. 7-9 of tie 
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Sherwood restricted appraisal report). His comparable sale No. 2 was 235 acres. In his 
discussion of that sale, Sherwood notes that Cabela's committed to 40 acres alone, which refutes 
his claim that no end·users want anything larger than 30 acres, He also notes that a Wal-Mart is 
· ·going in atthanite~ ·which again demonstrates that a mixed use development like the one 
proposed by Grathol needs more than 30 acres, which Sherwood suggests is the largest size 
sought by commercial developers. Grathol has proposed one to two motels, an undefined 
"major" tenant, a travel plaza, and multiple pad sites for 1estaurants and other smaller users. 
In addition, the development will need land for setbacks, landscaping, roads, parking lots, storm 
drainage, waste water treatment facilities, and land application of treated waste water. 
Sherwood's opinion that 30 acres is the universal size for commercial development or 
end-users is not reflected in his other comparable sales. Comparable sale No. 1 is 9 acres; No. 2 
is 23S acres; No. 3 is 13.S acres; No. 4 is 50,44 acres; No. 5 is 4.41 acres; No. 6 is 17 acres; No. 
7 is 29 acres; No. 8 is 18.71 acres; No.9 is 18.98 acres; and No. 10 is 22.98 acres. In short, his 
arbitrary 30-acre parcel is not reflected in the market 
Sherwood did not perform any market based study or analysis to support his personal 
belief that commercial real estate developments do not exceed 30 acres. He also did not offer 
any explanation for why Grathol bought a 56.8 acre parcel and had the entire property rezoned 
for commercial use. 
D. Sherwood Offered No Testimony Of A Different Highest And Best Use For 
The Eastern 26.8 Acres. 
Sherwood claimed that the western 30 acres and the eastern 26,8 acres have different 
uses. He admitted that in the "before" condition the entire 56.8 acres is vacant and is not being 
put to any use. Tr. at 502:1-8. He did not testify as to what the use of the 26.8 acres would be or 
how it would be different, He also did not testify that the eastern 26.8 acres has a different 
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"highest and best use," or that Grathol intends to rezone the property to some other use such as 
industrial or residential. 
Sherwood's appraisal report contains no analysis of the three criteria for determining the 
·· larger parcel.-Thereport also does not do an analysis·ofhighest and best1..1£eor give a 
conclusion of highest and best use. The report speculates that residential or light industrial uses 
might occur on the 26.8 acres. Exhibit 154 (p. 4 of Sherwood appraisal report). However, 
neither residential nor industrial uses are permitted in a commercial zone. Specifically, 
residential uses are only allowed in a commercial zone if located on the second or third floors of 
a commercial building or in a separate st..ructure provided that it is accessory to the commercial 
use of the site. Kootenai County Ordinance No. 401, Chapter 9-Commercial Zone,§ 9-9-4, 
Item I. Likewise, industrial uses are not allowed. Processing and manufacturing are not allowed 
unless they are part of the operation of a business or services specifically permitted in a 
commercial zone. Kootenai County Ordinance No. 401, Chapter 9-Commercial Zone,§ 9-9-7, 
Item B. Neither Sherwood nor the two Gtathol representatives testified that Grathol intends to 
rezone the property to industrial or residential. 
The witnesses at trial unifonnly testified that the highest and best use of the entire 
property is for commercial development The site plans prepared by Grathol for both the before 
condition (without the new freeway) and the after condition (with the new freeway) show 
commercial development on the 26, 8 acres. Below is a "before" site plan prepared by Grathol 
(without any change to US-95), which shows commercial development (a Travel Plaza) east of 
Sherwood's hypothetical 30-acre parcel. Specifically, the eastern edge of the hypothetical 
Sherwood parcel is the edge of where Gratb.ol expects to construct Sylvan Road running from 
State Highway 54 on the south.em edge of the property due north (shown by a yellow line). 
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Defendant's Ex. H, at p. S. 
At trial, Geoffrey Reeslund, Grathol's vice president for project development, testified 
that Grathol is proceeding with the development as planned. Tr. at 432:12-18. Reeslund did not 
testify that Grathol will not develop the eastern portion with commercial uses. Therefore, 
Sherwood's larger parcel determination is contrary to the stated intention of his client. 
E. Shenvood Testified That Some Of The 26.8 Acres To The East Would Be 
Used In The Development Of His 30-Acre Parcel, 
Sherwood testified that Grathol would need part of the eastern. 26.8 acres for the waste 
water treatment system for development on the western 30 acres. Tr. at 504: 15-24. He also 
testified that he believed the waste water treatment facility and land need for treated water 
application would be located on the eastern portion of the property. Id. and Tr. at 505:15 to 
506:20. 
Orathol's witness, James Coleman, testified that Grathol would need between 13 and 16 
acres of land for the waste water treatment system and land application of the treated water. 
Tr. at 657:10-14. Coleman speculated that Grathol might be able to pipe its waste water and put 
it on someone else's property, but his testimony was only speculation. He did not testify that 
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Gtathol had made any arrangements to treat its waste water or dispose of the treated waste water 
elsewhere. ITD witness George Hedley testified that Grathol would need from 19 to 25 acres for 
the waste water treatment system and land application for its treated waste water based on 
· analyses by senior engineers with David Evans and Associates. Tr. at687:9·24 .. All witnesses, 
including Sherwood, agreed that the land needed for waste water application would be on the 
eastern 26. 8 acres, making its use necessary for commercial development on the Grathol 
property. See Tr. at 504:20-24 (where Sherwood testified that waste water treatment and land 
application would be located on the eastern 26.8 acres). 
Grathoi clearly needs more than just the west 30 acres to do a mixed use development on 
the scale shown on their site plans and for which the whole property has long range potential. 
The trial testimony is that Grathol needs as much as 25 acres for land application of treated waste 
water to support Orathol's development plans. Speculation about the possibility of piping the 
treated water onto someone else's land or into ITD right-of-way (which certainly would not be 
allowed) is not sufficient to support a finding that the 26.8 acres described by Sherwood as the 
"eastern" portion of the property has a different highest and best use than commercial 
development. 
F. Grathol Has The Burden Of Proving Sherwood's Theory Of The Larger 
Parcel 
In its brief, Gratbol suggests that ITD failed to provide evidence to establish that the 
western 30 acres needs the eastern 26.8 acres to develop. In Idaho, Orathol has the burden of 
proving just compensation. See IDJI2d § 7.03; and Rocky Mountain Power v. Jensen,_ Idaho 
_, _ PJd _ 2012 WL 231254, *S (Idaho Jan. 26, 2012) ("The burden of proving just 
compensation is bome by the landowner.'). Therefore, Grathol has the burden of proving 
Sherwood's theory that the large mixed-use commercial development planned by Grathol can be 
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developed exclusively on his hypothetical 30.acre parcel. He certainly failed to do that since 
Grathol' s own development plans show commercial development on the eastern portion. 
In addition, Sheiwood did not testify that the eastern 26.8 acres would not be used for 
' commercial development. It-is certainly clear from Grothol' s succeesful rezoning- and its site 
plans that Grathol intends to use all of the property for commercial development. All other 
witnesses testified that the highest and best use of the property is for commercial development. 
Sherwood did not offer any proof, study, or market analysis to support his theory of a 30-acre 
larger parcel. 
G. The Cases Cited By Grathol From Ouwide Idaho Do Not S!!pport 
Sherwood's Opinion Of The Larger Parcel. 
Otathol has failed to cite any Idaho cases in support of Sherwood's theory of the larger 
parcel in this case-as instructed by the Court-and instead has cited cases from outside Idaho in 
an attempt to support Sherwood's contentions, The cases cited by Grathol either reinforce the 
conclusion that Sherwood's larger parcel is contrary to law or me so different factually that they 
have no application to this case. In some instances, Grathol has mischaracterized the facts or 
holding of the cases. 
Grathol first cites City of Phoenix v, Wilson, 200 Ariz. 2, 21 P.3d 388 (Ariz. 2001). 
The Wilsons owned 23. 34 acres of land. The city sought to condemn 1.4 acres at the comer of 
the property. Id. at 390. At the time of the taking, the entire property was zoned as low density 
residential development. Id. However, the ''General Plan for the City of Phoenix" classified the 
area as one that should be rezoned for high-density residential use, such as apartments. Id 
On that basis, the Wilsons' appraiser testified that the highest and best use of a 5-acre portion of 
the 23 .34 acres was for "a school, place of worship, or other commercial but residentially 
compatible uses such as professional offices, dependent care facility, hotel, or mini-storage." Id. 
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The appraiser also testified that it was '\rery likely" that the S acres would be rezoned. Id. 
Thus, the appraiser concluded that the 5-acre parcel had a different highest and best use than the 
remaining portion of the Wilson property. Id. 
Inruling on-the propriety of the appraiser's opinion of the larger, pare.el, .the S:upreme. 
Court of Arizona held: 
Unlike the strip-takinwstreet-widening cases on which the court of 
appeals relied, the subject property could clearly be so divisible. 
The jury concluded that a 5-aere intersection comer, which could 
probably be rezoned for different and higher use than the rest of 
the tract, would have a different and higher value than the 
remainder of the property. Once that is accepted, the owner is 
entitled to that highei value when the property is taken, whether 
the taking is of all or only a part of the more valuable portion. 
Id at 8, 21 P.3d at 394. 
In this case, neither Sherwood nor any other witness testified that the 30-acre parcel 
identified by Sherwood could or would be rezoned to a higher and better use than commercial 
development. Nor was there any testimony that the eastern acreage not valued by Sherwood 
would be rezoned to a lower or different highest and best use other than commercial. Grathol 
had all of the 56.8 acres rezoned to commercial soon after it bought the property in 2008. Its 
plans call for commercial development on property outside of Sherwood's hypothetical 30-acre 
parcel. All of the witnesses agreed that the highest and best use of the property is for 
· commercial development. 
In Wilson) the premise of the appraiser was that a rezone was "very likely." The holding 
of the court was further premised on the fact that the rezone would lead to a "different and higher 
use than the rest of the tract." Id. In this case, the property has already been rezoned. In the 
absence of testimony of another "very likely" re2oning, or even a different highest and best use 
than commercial development, the holding in Wilson has no bearing on this case. 
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Grathol next cites People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Corp. of Latter-Day Saints, 13 
Cal.App.3d 371 (Cal.App, 1970), In Latter-Day Saints, the defendant owned 264 acres adjacent 
to a major roadway, Id. at 373. The state condemned a strip of land 240 feet deep along the 
· length of the--ptoperty1 s front.age on the roadway. Id. The defendant'.s ex.perts .testified that the. 
property taken had a highest and best use as commercial development near the intersection and 
"multiple residential" along the remainder of the frontage. Id. at 374. They also testified that the 
remaining property not taken had a highest and best use of single-family residential. Id. 
The issue before the court was not whether the appraiser could pick an arbitrary portion 
of the property and value it separately from the rest. Ratner, the issue was if the property raken 
could be valued separately from the whole. Under the circumstances of that case, the California 
Court of Appeals held that it could. 
Where the property taken is not of a size and shape which renders 
it independently usable, it cannot be valued on the basis of the 
amount that a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for the land 
taken, for by definition there could not be a willing buyer and 
seller of unusable land. The property must be valued as a part of a 
larger whole. In that situation, says Allen, the whole of which the 
condemned property is a part cannot arbitrarily be separated into 
zones of value where the possibility of those zones is unaffected by 
the t.aking. Where, however, the property condemned is of a size 
and shape that renders it independently usable, it is appropriate to 
determine what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for the 
parcel taken. 
Id. at 379 (emphasis added). 
In the case at hand1 Sherwood did not designate the 16.3 acres condemned by ITD as the 
larger parcel, nor did he testify that the 16.3 acres was "of a size and shape that renders it 
independently usable." Rather, he arbitrarily chose a 30-acre parcel. In addition, Sherwood did 
not testify that the 30·acre parcel had a different highest and best use than the other 26.8· acres, 
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whieh was critical to the decision in Latter-Day Saints. Consequently, LatterrDay Saints has no 
bearing on the case at hand. 
Grathol also cites Latter.Day Saints for the principle that a condemning authority cannot 
offset special benefits against the value of the properr1-taken, and spee.iaLbenefits can only be 
used to offset a severance damage claim. Grathol Post Trial Br. at 8-9. Although ITO does not 
believe that Grathol has asserted a lawful claim for severance damages, ITD has not argued that 
the claim should be offset by special benefits. Nor has ITD argued or offered testimony that the 
value of the property taken should be offset by special benefits. 
Gtathol next cites State v. Lacey, 8 Wash.App. 542, 507 P.2d 1206 (Wash.App. 1973), 
and argues that where there is no unity of use between separate parcels those separate parcels 
cannot constitute a larger parcel. Grathol Post Trial Br. at 9-10. Grathol fails to cite the key 
facts in Lacey. When those facts are considered, Lacey clearly supports the views of Mr. Moe, 
Mr. Pynes, and Mr. Johnson {vice president of Grathol), who all valued the entire 56.8 acres of 
the Grathol property. 
In Lacey, the State of Washington sought to acquire approximately 31 acres from a 
237-acre tract known as the Lacey Farm. Id. at S43, 507 P .2d at 1208. The state argued that the 
entire 237 acres was the larger parcel. Id at 544,507 P.2d at 1208. The 237 acres were divided 
into five separate parcels and four of the parcels were separated by streets. Id. The Washington 
Court of Appeals analyzed whether the five separate parcels constituted a larger parcel by 
applying the larger parcel test: 
In determining that an entire tract of land constitutes a separate or 
independent parcel of land for the purpose of determining just 
compensation (sometimes termed the larger parcel test) there :must 
be established (1) unity of ownership, (2) unity of use, and 
(3) contiguity. 
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Id. at 546, 507 P.2d at 1209. The court further held that "[e]ach of these three elements must be 
present to find an independent unit or larger parcel to exist," Id. In this case, Sherwood is not 
seeking to establish that a larger parcel exists. Rather, he wants to value an artificial segment of 
.• •a ; a la1ger parcel.- .. ·" -· . 
The facts of Lacey highlight how no reasonable minds could differ that the S6.8-acre 
parcel in Grathol is the larger parcel. In Lacey, there were five separate parcels designated 
parcels A, B, C, D, and E. Id at 544, 507 P.2d at 1208. Four of these parcels were physically 
separated by roads. Id. The five parcels all had different uses. Parcel A had a welding shop and 
a dairy pasture, Id at 545, 507 P.2d at 1209. Pa."Ce! B had a gas station, a store. and a portion 
leased for growing raspberries. Id. Parcel C had a tavern, an airport hanger, an air school, and a 
rhubarb patch. Id. Parcel D had a fruit stand and crops, Id. Parcel E was leased for advertising 
signs. Id Over the entire 237 acres there were 15 separate leases. Id 
Based on these facts, the Washington Court of Appeals held that there was no unity of 
use and no contiguity between parcels A, B, C, D, and E. Id. Therefore, the court held that, as a 
matter of law, the five parcels should be valued separately. Id. 
The facts in Lacey contrast sharply with the case at hand, Here, the 56.8 acres of the 
Grathol property are contiguous. The 56.8 acres are not divided by any streets. Nor have the 
56.8 acres been divided into separate parcels, Nor do the 56.8 acres have different uses as in the 
Lacey case. Lacey aptly illustrates when separate parcels should be valued separately. The facts 
and holding in Lacey do not support Sherwood's separate valuation of an arbitrary portion of the 
Grathol property. 
Grathol next cites M&R Inv. Co., Inc. v. State ex rel. Dept. o/Transp., 103 Nev. 445, 
744 P.2d 531 (Nev. 1987), for the proposition that its 56.8 acres can be divided into parcels if 
one part of the 56.8 acres is not dependent on the other. Grathol Post Trial Br. at i0-12. 
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In M&R, the State of Nevada sought to condemn 14 acres ofM&R's 27-acre parcel located on 
the west side of Interstate 15. Id. at 447, 744 P.2d at 533. M&R also owned the Dunes Hotel 
located on the east side ofl-15 directly across from the 27-acre parcel. Id The issue before the 
court was whether the Dunes Hotel could be considered part of a larger parcel. Id Thus, the 
holding of the Nevada Supreme Court inM&R deals with the issue of assemblage, which is 
irrelevant to the Grathol case. 
Assemblage involves joining separate parcels for purposes of valuation. Id. at 451, 744 
P .2d at 535. Under the theory of assemblage, if separate parcels have the same use then they 
may be joined for the purpose of valuation. Id. 
If the highest and best use of separate parcels would involve a 
prospective, integrated, unitary use, then such prospective use may 
be considered in fixing the value of the property condemned 
providing joinder of the parcels is reasonably practicable. 
Id (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Nothing in the decision of the Nevada Supreme Court stands for the proposition that a 
single, unified parcel such as the Gtathol property can be arbitrarily separated into different 
parts. Nor does Sherwood argue that property beyond the 56.8 acres of contiguous property 
owned by Grathol should be included in the larger parcel. 
Grathol next cites State v. Wandermere, 89 Wash.App. 369, 949 P.2d 392 (Wash.App. 
1997). In that case, the state argued that the larger parcel was 24.45 acres of land that the owners 
leased to a third party mining company as a gravel pit. The landowner argued that the larger 
parcel should include an additional 37 acres they owned that had not yet been leased or mined. 
Id. at 394-95. Thus, the case is factually distinguishable because in this case Orathol is arguing 
that only part of a piece of property should be deemed the larger parcel, whereas the property 
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owners in W andermere argued that additional property should be added to an existing parcel, for 
a combined larger parcel. 
In addressing the larger parcel issue, the Washington Court of Appeals held that "[t]he 
larger parcel test requires that the landowner establish that the parcel ~nd~mned is part of a 
single tract." Id. at 397. Sherwood's analysis in the Grathol case is exactly the opposite. He is 
attempting to establish that a single tract of land should be valued as if it were two tracts. The 
decision in Wandermere in no way sanctions the opinion offered by Sherwood in this case. 
The court in Wandermere also held that ''in eminent domain cases: Parcels must have a 
present unified use before they are part of a si.'1gle, larger parcel for conderri..nation. pu..TPoses." 
Id. at 398 (emphasis added). In this case, thepresentuse of all of the 56.8 acres ofthe Grathol 
property is the same. It is all unimproved bare land (except for an old building at the southwest 
corner). The 30 acres identified by Sherwood are not presently being put to a use that is different 
than the rest of the property that would permit the hypothetical 30-acre parcel to be valued 
separately from the rest of the Grathol property. Therefore, rather than supporting Grathol, the 
decision in Wandermere precludes the property from being valued ~ suggested by Sherwood in 
this case. 
Grathol's argument that Sherwood used the same methodology in the Wandermere case 
as in this case is contrary to the facts. In Wandermere, Mr. Sherwood calculated the value of 
anticipated royalties from a gravel mining operation. Id. at 382,949 P.2d at 399-400. The 
Grathol property is not a mining property and Sherwood has not done any estimates of the 
income to be produced by the Gtathol property. 
Grathol next cites State Through Dept. of Highways v. Landry, 171 So.2d 779, 780 
(La.App. 1965). In Landry, the Louisiana Highway Department condemned 1.3 acres from 
25 acres owned by the defendant. Id. at 779. The sole issue in Landry was whether the 1.3 acres 
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were properly valued under Louisiana law. Id. "The sole issue on appeal is whether this is the 
proper method of arriving at the market value of the highway frontage taken.'' Id. Landry does 
not address, analyze, or mention the "larger parcel." The case also does not say whether the 
entire 25-a~te·parcel was zoned the same, or whethedt was divided-into-parcels. Landry only 
involved interpretation of a Louisiana statute regarding the methods of valuation used by the 
parties. Id. at 780-81. Therefore, Landry does not support Sherwood's "larger parcer• opinion 
in this case. 
Grathol then cites State Through Dept. of Highways v. LeDoux, 184 So.2d 604 
(La.App.1966). In LeDoux, the Louisiana Department of Highways condemned 2.914 acres of 
LeDoux's approximately 41 acres in order to expand a highway. Id. at 606. LeDoux's experts 
determined that land 300 feet deep along the front of the highway was best suited for commercial 
development and the remainder was best suited for either a residential subdivision or agricultural 
uses. Id. The appraisers then gave a high value to the commercial property. Id The Louisiana 
Court of Appeals held that Louisiana law pennitted this method of valuation. Id at 609-10. 
LeDoux does not support Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel in this case. It did not 
analyze or address the larger parcel issue or the criteria for detennining the larger parcel. 
LeDoux's appraisers testified that different parts of the property had different highest and best 
uses. Id at 606. LeDoux held that the determination of highest and best use drives the market 
value of the property. Id. at 607. Sherwood did not testify that the 26.8 acres east of his 
hypothetical parcel has a different highest and best use. Neither Sherwood nor any other GTathol 
witness testified that Grathol intends to rezone the property to permit residential or agricultural 
uses. In fact, Grathol's representatives testified at length of their efforts to have the entire 
property rezoned to commercial after Grathol bought the property. 
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Lastly, Grathol cites State Through Dept. of Highways v. Stegemann, 269 So.2d 480 
(La.App. 1973), and characterizes a quote from the case as one of the ''best descriptions" of 
valuing one part of a property higher than a different part of the same property. Grathol Post 
Trial Br: att5-i"6. However, Orathol stops the quote one sentence short. · 
The very next sentence after Grathol' s quote makes it clear that the method of valuing 
one portion of a property higher than another portion is only applicable when there is a different 
highest and best use between the different portions of the same property. ''This jurisdiction has 
long recognized that different portions of an ownership tract [may] have different highest and 
best uses and, thus, different per unit values." Stegemann, 269 So. at 482 (brackets added), 
It is understandable why Grathol would omit this part of the Stegemann quote. No 
evidence was offered that one portion of Grathol's 56.8 acres has a different highest and best use 
from another portion. Consequently, the quote from Stegemann does not apply to Grathol. 
Stegemann also does not apply because it did not address the larger parcel issue or apply the 
criteria involved in determining the larger parcel. 
In summary, none of the cases cited by Grathol in its post trial brief provide a legal or 
factual basis to allow Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel to be used in determining just 
compensation in this case. Moreover, as discussed in section III.A above, numerous Idaho 
Supreme Court decisions, as well as Idaho's eminent domain statutes and jury instructions, bar 
consideration of Sherwood's opinion of the laraer parcel. 
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IV. SHERWOOD TESTIFIED THAT HE DID NOT FIND ANY SEVERANCE 
DAMAGES. HE ALSO TESTIFIED THAT BE ADDED AMOUNTS TO HIS 
OPINION OF THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE LAND TAKEN 
FOR DELAY IN COMPLETION OF THE US-95 PROJECT 
A. Sherwood Testified That The Remainder Suffered No Severance Damages, 
Sherwood testified at trial that the property did not suffer any severance damages. Both 
his trial testimony and his appraisal report states that the remainder property has a value of 
$2.2S per square foot before the taking and $2.25 per square foot after the taking. 
Tr. at 523:8-18. 
8 Q. All right. Where you used the same per unit 
9 value in all of your calculations, you used it -- in 
10 the before value, you used $2.25 a square foot, you 
11 used the after value of $2.25 a square foot -- excuse 
12 me -- that was the part taken at $2.25 a square foot, 
13 and the after value at $2.25 a square foot. Would it 
14 be fair to say that you conclude there's zero severance 
15 damages? 
16 A. There's zero severance, correct. 
17 Q. So I'm going to put a circle around .zero. 
18 A. Okay. 
Idaho's jury instructions establish the method for calculating severance damages. 
"Severance damages are calculated by ascertaining the fair market value of the remainder 
immediately before the talcing, and deducting from this value the fair market value which results 
after the severance of the part taken and after the construction of the project in the manner 
proposed by the plaintiff." IDJI2d 7.16.S. 
Stated as a formula, the method fot determining severance damage in Idaho is: 
Value of Remainder Before Takinm 
-Value of Remainder After Taking 
a Severance Damages 
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Using the Idaho formula, Sherwood's opinion that the remainder is worth $2.25 before 
the taking, minus his opinion that the remainder is worth $2.25 after the taking, equals $0.00 
severance damages. 
B. - The Additional Amount Added B'; Sherwood To His Determination Of 
The Fair Market Value Of The Condemned Property Is A Claim For 
Construction Delay. 
Sherwood determined that the fair market value of his "larger parcel" was $2,940,300. 
He reached this figure by multiplying his 30-acre parcel by $2.25 per square (30 acres x $2.25 per 
square foot'"" $2,940,300). ITD condemned t 6.31 acres. Although the basis for it was unclear, 
Sherwood testified that the remainder of his 30-acre parcel is 13.14 acres. Tr. at S21:1-3. He 
detennined that both the before and after value of the 13.14-acre remainder is $1,341,757 
(13.14 acres x $2.25 per square foot= $1,341,757). (The figure originally cited by Sherwood was 
$1,344,757, but a math error revealed that the correct figure is $1,341,757) (Tr. at 522). 
Sherwood next determined the present value of$1,341,757, assuming that construction 
of the US-95 Project will not be completed until 1.5 to 2.5 years from the date oft.aking in 
November of 2010. He testified that the present value of $1,341,757 based on the Project being 
completed in 1.5 years is $1,060,000, and the present value of $1,341,757 based on the Project 
being completed in 2.5 years is $1,165,000. Using these discounted present values, he restated 
his opinion of just compensation (the value of the property taken) to be either $1,880,000 or 
$1,755,000 depending on whether he uses 1.S years of delay or2.5 years of delay. 
Sherwood testified at trial that for his discounting to take into account the time needed to 
complete the project, he adds either $280,757 to his opinion of just compensation using l.S years 
to complete the project, or $176,757 using 2.5 years to complete the project, Tr. at 618:13 to 
619: 13. Sherwood is thus asking for compensation for the length of time it will take to construct . 
the project. That claim has been dismissed by the Court. 
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Putting these figures into mathematical form shows the following calculations. 
Sherwood Opinion Of Just Compensation Using 1.5 Years Of Delay: 
Value of Sherwood's 30-acre "larger" parcel, at $2.25 s.ft.: 
-Before And After Value of Sheiwood's 13.14 remainder at $2.2S sg. ft.: 
Sherwoodealculation of just compensation using no delay: · · --- · · -
Value of Sherwood's 30-acre "larger" parcel, at $2.25 s.ft.: 
-Discounted value of $1,341;7S7 using 1.5 years of delay 
Sherwood determination of just compensation using 1.5 years of delay: 
Sherwood's calculation of just compensation using 1.5 years of delay: 
-Sherwood's calculation of just comP.ensation using no delay: 










Sherwood Opinion Of Just Compensation Using 2.5 Years Of Delay: 
Value of Sherwood's 3Q.acre "larger" parcel, at $2.2S s.ft.: 
-Before And After Value of Sherwood's 13.14 remainder at $2.2S sg. ft.: 
Sherwood calculation of just compensation using no delay: 
Value of Sherwood's 30-acre 11larger'' parcel, at $2.25 s.ft.: 
-Discounted value of$ 1,341,757 using 2.5 years of delay 
Sherwood detennination of just compensation using 2.S years of delay: 
Sherwood's calculation of just compensation using 2. S years of delay: 
-Sherwood's calculation of just compensation using no delay: 










C. Sherwood's Opinion Of Just Compensation Should Be Stricken Because 
He Added A Construction Delay Claim That Has Been Dismissed And 
He Did Not Use The Correct Date Of Valuation. 
Sherwood testified that he added the above amounts to his opinion of the fair market 
value of the condemned property based on anticipated dates in the future for completion of the 
US-95 Project. Tr. at 603:1 to 606:9. 
Sherwood also testified that the amounts he was adding to his opinion of just 
compensation had nothing to do with the fair market value of $2.2S per square foot that he 
assigned to the condemned property. Tr. at 606: 19-22, 
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Sherwood also testified that he used two dates of valuation for his opinion of just 
compensation. He used dates of valuation of the spring of2012 and the spring of2013 in his 
opinion, despite the fact that the date of value in this case is November 17, 2010. 
· 23 Q. Okay. Now, when you did rhis calculation, 
24 you actually had to use two different valuation dates 
25 for your after analysis; is that co"ect1 
1 A. That's correct. 
2 Q. And so in one of those analyses, you used an 
3 after date of valuation of the spring of 2012, correct? 
4 A. I believe that's correct. 
5 Q. All right. And in the second scenario, you 
6 used a different after valuation date of value of 
7 spring of 2013, co"ect? 
8 A. Co"ect. 
9 Q. So you used a different date of valuation 
10 from your before analysis, which you said was 
11 September 2010, which was pretty close to the date of 
12 taking in this case, and then as compared to the after 
13 date of valuation, which is either spring of 2012 or 
14 spring of 2013; is that correct? 
15 A. Correct. 
Tr. at 606:23 to 607:15 (emphasis added). 
Idaho law requires that just compensation be assessed as of the date of taking, including 
"damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned, by reason of its 
severance from the portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the improvement in 
the manner proposed by the plaintiff[.)" I.C. § 7-711(2). This requires the property to be valued 
in the after condition as if the public project has been built as of the date of taking. Sherwood 
did not do this. He used future dates of 1.5 and 2.5 years after the date of taking and then added 
$280,757 and $176,757, respectively, to his opinion of the value of the condemned property. 
Sherwood's additional S\ll11S for delay are not "severance" damages. It is a claim for 
compensation for his estimate of the time it will take Im to complete the US-95 Project, and 
that claim has been dismissed by the Court. 
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D. Sherwood Testified That Be Found No Dama=es To The Remainder 
Propeny Due To Severance Of The Condemned Property. . 
Sherwood testified that he did not assess any severance damages for loss of access. Tr. at 
524:17-19. He also testified that he did not assess any severance damages for loss of visibility. 
Tr. at S27: 16-18. And he testified that he did not assess any damages based on utilities. Tr. at 
524:S-8. He offered no testimony of damages to the remainder property due to the severance of 
the condemned property from the remainder. 
Under Idaho law, "severance" damages are "damages which will accrue to the portion not 
sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned, 
and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff[.]" I.C. § 7-
711(2), Based on the statutory definition and Sherwood's own testimony, the additional sum he 
added to his determination of the fair market value of the property taken is rl()f severance 
damage. 
E. Sherwood Did Not Use An Income Approaeh, 
In its post trial brief, Orathol uses yet another disguise for its construction delay claim. 
Specifically, Grathol now refers to Sherwood's calculation ·of construction delay as some variant 
or component of an "income approach" to real estate valuation. However, Sherwood's appraisal 
report (Exhibit 154) makes no mention of the income approach to real estate appraisal. In 
addition, he testified at trial as follows: 
2 Q. What process did you use to conduct that 
3 evaluation? 
4 A. Well, we're dealing with vacant land. There 
S are three recognized approaches: The value and income 
6 approach, which is not applicable unless you have 
7 improved property; cost approach is another method, but 
8 applicable only when you're dealing with the cost to 
9 build something; and the third method is the market 
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10 data comparable data approach to value, and that's the 
11 method for appraising vacant land. 
Tr. at 447:2-11 (emphasis added). 
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Thus, as stated by Sherwood at trial, the income approach is only used in cases involving 
improved property. The Grathol property is bare land, and is not producing any income. 
Sherwood testified that the sales comparison approach is used to value vacant land. Therefore, 
Grathol' s post trial attempt to justify the discounting by Sherwood as an income approach is. 
simply untrue and contrary to the fact that the income approach only applies to improved 
property. 
For all of these reasons, Sherwood's inclusion of construction delay damages should be 
dismissed, again. 
V. SHERWOOD'S OPINION OF VALUE SHOULD BE STRICKEN BASED 
ON HIS ABUSES OF THE SALES COMPARISON APPROACH 
A, Shenvood's Appraisal Report Placed Primary Emphasis On A Transaction 
That Occurred Under Threat Of Condemnation, 
Sherwood's comparable sale No. S was a transaction that occurred under threat of 
condemnation. In his report, Sherwood states: "I understand this sale was negotiated under 
threat of condemnation and courts have ruled that these sales may not represent true market 
value for this reason." Ex. 154 (Sherwood restricted appraisal report at 8). At trial~ Sherwood 
testified that ''I've been in a condemnation case before where the purchase by a government 
entity was disallowed for that reason [does not represent market value)." Tr. at 5S6:22~24 
(brackets added). Sherwood is correct in his understanding of the law. The clear weight of 
authority shows that courts exclude such sales. See ITD Brief In Support Of Motion In Limine 
at 17-18 (filed Jan. 6, 2012). 
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Nevertheless, in his report, Sherwood states that HJ considered the values of the 
comparable sales with primary emphasis on comparables 5 and 7 .... " Id. at 9 (emphasis 
added). By his own admission, Sherwood's appraisal places primary emphasis on a transaction 
that does not represent fair market value. For this ieason, his opinion of value should be 
stricken. Since he placed primary emphasis on a transaction that does not represent market 
value, his opinion cannot serve as the basis for an award of just compensation which, by law, is 
based on the fair market value of the condemned property. See, e.g., IDJI2d 7.05. 
B. Shenvood Did Not Use "Comparable" Sales. 
Sherwood's testimony at trial demonstrated that he used sales in far superior locations in 
Spokane, Coeur d'Alene, and Post Falls that were not in any way "comparable.,, The sales he 
used from Spokane had as much as a 2700% difference in market support than from the GTathol 
property in Athol. Since the Grathol property is being appraised as undeveloped commercial 
property, this factor is critical. His sales from Coeur d'Alene had as much as 1800% difference 
in market support. Having to adjust a sale by more than 100% typically means it is not a 
"comparable" sale and should not be used to value the subject property. At a minimum, his use 
of sales requiring adjustments of 2700% and 1800% reflects extreme bias on his part, making his 
appraisal a piece of advocacy for his client rather than an objective evaluation of the fair market 
value of the property. 
Sherwood also used comparable sales that had all utilities in place or available to the site. 
The testimony at trial showed that it will be very expensive to construct water and waste water 
treatment systems for the Grathol development. However, Sherwood did not make any 
adjustments to his sales to reflect these major differences. It is inherently unfair for Sherwood to 
use developed parcels with utilities in place to set the value of Grathol' s raw land. 
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Sherwood also used sales that occurred at the top of the real estate market before the 
recession and before the sharp drop in real estate values. However, he failed to make any 
adjustments to these sales to take that critical factor into account. 
· · She-rwood also used sales that were subst&ntially smaller in·size1han the Grathol 
property. For example, his sale No. 1 was 9 acres, and sale No. 5 was 4.41 acres, However, he 
made no adjustment for the great disparity in size, even when compared to Sherwood's 
hypothetical 30Macre subdivision as opposed to the 56.8 acres owned by Grathol. 
. Despite extensive questioning on cross-examination, Sherwood could not identify, 
explain, or quantify any adjUS1ments that he made to the sales he used. This 5'"..ands in sharp 
contrast to appraisers Stan Moe and Larry Pynes who identified all adjustments to their 
comparable sales, and explained and quantified all of their adjustments. 
In short, Sherwood's work for Grathol is sheer advocacy. It is in no sense an objective 
analysis of the fair market value of the condemned property, and should be disregarded by the 
Court. 
VI. JOHNSON ALSO INCLUDED A CLAIM FOR CONSTRUCTION DELAY 
AND ATTEMPTED TO V ALOE THE LAND AS IF DEVELOPED. 
A. Construction Delay. 
In his expert disclosures, Alan Johnson stated, in part, as follows: 
Hughes Investments factors in the value for the remaining 
property on the assumption of at least an additional three year 
delay in the ability to sell by reason of construction. 
* * * 
To summarize $2,532,578 in the land value of the take+ $300,000 
for construction materials + a reduction in value for the remaining 
property waiting/or completion of construction of $947,000 = 
$4,779,578. 
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Trial Ex. 156 (Orathol's Third Supp. Resp. to Disc., p. 7) (emphasis added). Johnson reached his 
$947,000 figure by estimating the value of the 40 acres remaining after the taking, assuming that 
Grathol's development were completed ($3,669,300). Johnson then used this figure 
($3,669;300)·and discounted it to the net present value of the remainder ($2;722,000). Id. The 
difference between these two numbers is $947,000, which was Johnson's initial amount for 
construction delay damages ($3,669,300 ~ $2,722,000""" $947,000 (rounded)). Id. 
After hearings on ITD's motion for summary judgment and motions in limine, the Court 
directed Grathol to supplement its expert disclosures to provide a "before and after" valuation of 
the Grathol property. On February 10, 2012, Grathol served its Supplemental Expert Witness 
Disclosure. Trial Ex. 158. In that disclosure, Johnson rounded up his calculation for 
construction delay to $948,000 and relabeled it as a "downward time and impact adjustment" 
Id. at 3. The figure of $948,000 is derived by taking the difference between his opinion of the 
value of the remainder after the taking ($3,670,000 (which is the $3,669,300 figure noted above 
rounded up to $3,670,000)) and subtracting the figute given after his time adjustment 
($2,722,000), which is $948,000. In other words: $3,670,000-$2,722,000 = $948,000 for 
construction delay. 
This calculation is reflected in Defendant's Trial Exhibit J. In Exhibit J, Johnson again 
concluded that the total value of the remainder after the take is $3,670,140, which he discounted 
to $2,722,000. He again calls this adjustment a "Downward Time Value and Impact 
Adjustment." The amount of that adjustment is equal to his two previous calculations for 
construction delay. Specifically, $3,670,000- $2,722,000""" $948,000. 
Then, 1ohnson calculates his "severance'' damages by using the discounted figure of 
$2,722,000, which is his opinion of the value of the take minus $948,000 for construction delay. 
To calculate, what he calls, severance damages, he uses two values of the remainder before the 
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taking ($3,060,133 and $3,519,648) and subtracts his value of the remainder after the taking 
($3,670,140) reduced by his amount for construction delay ($948,000) to reach his figure for 
severance damages of either $338,000 or $798,000. 
·- "' · -- _.,_Toe-most important thing to be noted about Johnson's opinicnofjust compensation is 
his conclusion that the value of the remainder after the taldng is greater than the value of the 
remainder before the taldng. Compare Johnson's $3,670,140 value for the remainder after the 
taldng to either $3,010,133 or $3,519,648 before the taking, 
The Idaho fonnula for severance damages is: 
Value of Remainder Before Taking 
- Value of Reroainder After Taking 
= Severance Damages 
Since Johnson believes that the remaining property is worth more after the taking, 
then no claim for severance damages can be sustained. Although J obnson cites a figure of 
"severance" damages, it is based entirely on the $948,000 for construction delay, which he said 
in his expert disclosures represented a period of at least three years after the date of talcing. 
B. Johnson's "As Developed" Valuation. 
Johnson's opinion of just compensation was based on ''developed" land values. This 
violates Idaho law, and his opinion should be disregarded as a matter oflaw. See ITD's Post 
Trial Brief at 25-29 (filed March 23, 2012). 
VII. THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT HAS RULED THAT IT IS ERROR TO ADMIT 
TESTIMONY OF VALUE BASED ON ANY DATE OTHER THAN THE DATE 
OF TAKING. THEREFORE, IT WOULD BE REVERSmLE ERROR TO BASE 
JlJST COMPENSATION ON SHERWOOD AND JOHNSON'S OPINIONS, 
WHICH USE FUTURE DATES YEARS AFTER THE DATE OF TAIONG, 
In Spokane & Palouse Ry Co.~ the Idaho Supreme Court held that the disttict court erred 
lzy even allowing a witness to testify as to a date of valuation other than the date mandated by the 
statute. 
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[O]ne of the witnesses for defendant, upon his cross-examination, 
testified that he based his estimate of damages upon the present 
value of the property, while the statute fixes the value of the 
property at the time it was t.aken as the rule. We think the court 
erred in allowing this testimony to stand against the plaintiffs 
motion to strike it out, but we think such error was rendered 
· · · · . harmless by the reiterated charge of the court to ·the jury that they 
were to find from the evidence the value of the property on 
September 27, 1890, the time of the taking. 
NO. 4514 P. 34/36 
2 Idaho 1101, 29 P. at 854 (emphasis added). In its decision, the Court relied on Section 5221 of 
the Idaho Revised Statutes, which contained the identical language as the current Idaho Code 
§ 7-712, requiring compensation and damages to be determined as of the date of summons. Id 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that it is error to allow testimony of an opLnion of 
value based on a date other than the date of the taking. Therefore, it would certainly be 
reversible error to base a determination of just compensation on the opinions of either Sherwood 
or Johnson, who use dates of value years after the date of taking in fonnulating their opinions of 
just compensation. 
Because they did not value the property as of the date of taking, and instead used dates 
years after that date in order to inflate their opinions, these opinions cannot, as a matter of law, 
be considered in determining just compensation in this matter. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel is contrary to law. Despite the Court's request at 
the close of trial, Grathol failed to cite any Idaho law to support Sherwood's opinion. 
Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel also has no basis in fact. The 56.8 acres owned by 
Grathol are contiguous, under common ownership, and have the same highest and best use as 
commercial development. Grathol purchased the 56.8 acres for commercial development and 
had the property rezoned to commercial. Their site plans show commercial development to the 
east of Sherwood's imaginary 30-acre larger parcel. No witness testified at trial that the 26.8 
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acres east of Sherwood's imaginary parcel had a different highest and best use. Nor did any 
witness testify that Grathol intends to rezone the 26.8 acres for industrial, residential, or use other 
than commercial use. Sherwood's own "compaiable" sales refute his claim that developers and 
end~users-only purchase 30 acre parcels for coul.illercial development:~ His "Sales show developers 
and end-users buying commercial property for development ranging in size from 4.41 to 235 
acres. 
Sherwood testified that he found no damages to the remaining Grathol property caused 
by the severance of the condemned property. He also testified that his before and after value of 
the remainder were the same. He freely admitted that the figures of $280,757 and $176,757 that 
he added to his opinion of the market value of the taking were an additional sum to compensate 
Grathol for delay in completion of the US-95 Project of 1.5 to 2.S years. This claim for 
construction delay is barred by Idaho law and was previously dismissed by the Court. 
Johnson also included additional compensation for construction delay in his opinion 
of just compensation. The construction delay in his calculations is the sole source of the 
"severance" damage figure given compensation. Johnson's claim for "severance" damage 
cannot be sustained because bis opinion of just compensation showed that the value of the 
remainder after the taking is higher than the value of the remainder before the taking. This 
conclusion by Johnson bars any claim for severance damage. 
In swnmary, Sherwood and Johnson's opinions were fonnulated in violation ofldaho 
law, have no basis in fact, and are inherently biased and unreliable. Accordingly, their opinions 
should not be used in detenniningjust compensation in this case. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF T:mr 
OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ GRA THOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES l through 5, 
Defendants. 
) CASE NO. CV-10-10095 
) 
) 
) POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM 







I. Statement of the Case 
This case is an eminent domain action brought by Plaintiff the State of Idaho, Idaho 
Transportation Board ("ITD") seeking to condemn a portion of real property owned by 
Defendant HJ Grathol ("Grathol") as part of ITD's project to widen and improve US Highway 
95 from Garwood to Sagle, Idaho (the "Project'). Grathol's property is located in Kootenai 
County, near the City of Athol, and situated by the intersections of US Highway 95 and State 
Highway 54. 
A. Pre-Trial History 
On November 19, 2010, ITD filed its Complaint in this matter, and the court issued the 
Grathol summons. On December 21, 2010, ITD filed its Motion for Order Granting Possession 
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of Real Property, wherein ITD moved this Court to issue an order granting ITD possession of a 
portion of Grathol's property pursuant to I.C. § 7-721 (known as the "quick-take" process). 
On December 22, 2010, ITD filed its Notice of Dismissal of Defendant Sterling Savings 
Bank. On December 23, 2010, Grathol filed its Answer, wherein Grathol admitted that ITD has 
the lawful power to acquire land necessary to locate, design, construct and maintain state 
highways; however, Grathol asserted affirmative defenses that ITD failed to comply with the 
eminent domain statutes and that the quick take procedure was unconstitutional. 
On January 21, 2011, ITD's Motion for Order Granting Possession of Real Property 
came on for hearing before the Honorable Lansing Haynes, District Judge, and ITD and Grathol 
made argument in support of and in opposition to the motion and sworn testimony was heard. At 
the conclusion of the hearing, District Judge Haynes entered his oral ruling that the taking was 
necessary and Complaint complied with the statutory requirements. Additionally, the Court 
ruled that the taking did not include an expansion of Sylvan Road to Roberts Road, and that ITD 
had offered fair market value for the portion of the property being taken plus an additional ten 
percent (10%), but Grathol refused the offer. Also, at the conclusion of the hearing, District 
Judge Haynes signed the Order Granting Possession of Real Property, which was entered on 
January 27, 2011. The Order provides that the amount of just compensation to be paid by ITD 
for possession of Grathol's property is $571,000.00, which was to be tendered to the court as a 
deposit toward the eventual just compensation award. Further, the Order provided that upon the 
entry of the Order, ITD could take possession of and use the portion of Grathol's property that 
was taken. 1 
1 Also at the conclusion of the January 21, 2011, hearing, Grathol requested that the Court issue an l.R.C.P. 54(b) 
Certificate, to allow Grathol to appeal the talcing order. ITD opposed the certification request, and the Court 
certified the Order. The Rule 54(b) Certification was signed on January 25, 2011, and entered on January 27, 2011. 
The record shows that Grathol appealed the Order on February 1, 2011, but because the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
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On February 9, 2011, ITD filed its Notice of Tender of Funds and deposited $571,000.00 
with the court. On February 23, 2011, Grathol filed its Application to Partially Withdraw Funds, 
wherein Grathol requested that the court disperse to Grathol $456,800.00, representing eighty 
percent (80%) of ITD's deposit. On March 3, 2011, ITD filed its non-opposition to Grathol's 
application. On March 4, 2011, District Judge Haynes entered his Order Approving Application 
to Partially Withdraw Funds, wherein the Court directed the Clerk of the Court to disperse 
$456,800.00 to Grathol and to retain $114,200.00 pending the final determination of just 
compensation. 
On January 6, 2012, ITD filed a Motion in Limine and a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In the Motion in Limine, ITD argued that the valuation opinions of Grathol's experts Sherwood 
and Johnson failed to meet admissibility standards pertaining to an eminent domain proceeding. 
In the Motion for Summary Judgment, ITD sought to dismiss Grathol's seven claims for just 
compensation. 
The seven claims ITD sought to dismiss included a claim for the alleged taking of land 
for the future construction of a proposed road known as Sylvan Road, and six claims for money 
damages for what is referred to herein as items of special damages claimed as severance 
damages: (1) construction delay; (2) loss of visibility; (3) loss of access; (4) loss of profits; (5) 
loss of the value of an alleged gravel deposit; and (6) loss due to adverse impacts on Grathol's 
development plan. 
On February 2, 2012, ITD's motions came on for hearing, and during the hearing 
Grathol's counsel conceded that three of Grathol's claims for items of special damages claimed 
found the Order and Certification in non-compliance with the civil and appellate rules, this Court entered a Final 
Judgment as to the Order, along with another certification on March 4, 2011. Grathol's appellate oral argument was 
recently heard by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
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as severance damages could be dismissed, to wit: (1) construction delay; (2) lost profits; and (3) 
loss of an alleged gravel deposit. At the conclusion of the hearing, this Court took the Motions 
for Summary Judgment under advisement. In its oral pronouncement, the Court found that the 
disclosures, in the record before it of Grathol's expert witness testimony, did not disclose any 
opinions as to fair market value of the remaining property before and after the take occurs. In 
addition, there were no disclosures of any opinion regarding any amount of damage Grathol was 
seeking as special damages claimed as severance damages. 
On February 3, 2012, this Court entered two separate orders as to ITD's motions. In the 
Order Re: Plaintiff's Motion in Limine this Court ordered Grathol to file and serve a 
supplemental expert witness disclosure that provided expert witness opinions and the basis 
therefore of a fair market value for the remainder of Grathol's property before and after the take, 
and also provided the nature and amount of any items of special damages claimed as severance 
damage. In the Order Re: Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment this Court granted the 
motion in part and dismissed the three conceded items of special damages claimed as severance 
damages and dismissed the alleged Sylvan Road taking damages claim. The Court denied the 
ITD Summary Judgment motion as to Grathol's claims for severance damages arising out of 
alleged adverse impacts of the ITD project upon visibility, access, and the impact on a proposed 
development plan. 
On February 10, 2012, Grathol filed its Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, as 
ordered by this Court's February 3, 2012, Order Re: Plaintiff's Motion in Limine. Grathol did 
not set forth any opinions as to the amount of money damages for any of the items of special 
damages Grathol was claiming as severance damages. 
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On February 13, 2012, an additional hearing was held in regards to ITD's Motion in 
Limine and Grathol's expert witnesses. At the hearing, Grathol's counsel conceded that no 
money damages were being sought for loss of visibility, loss of access, or loss due to adverse 
impact on Grathol's proposed development. Grathol's claims for severance damages to the 
remainder were limited to its expert witness disclosures that provided opinion testimony as to the 
amount of severance damages claimed for the remainder parcel, based upon the difference 
between the fair market values for the remainder parcel before and after the take. Grathol's 
counsel affirmatively stated that Grathol's claims for damages to the remainder, i.e., based upon 
adverse impact upon visibility, access, and development plan (the claims that survived ITD's 
Motion for Summary Judgment), were not claims for additional compensable amounts of 
damages. Any loss based upon those claims was incorporated within the amount of severance 
damages established by the difference in fair market value of the remainder before and after the 
take, as those values were set forth in Grathol's supplementary expert witness disclosures. 
On February 16, 2012, this Court entered its Order Re: Defendant HJ Grathol's 
Severance Damages wherein this Court granted ITD' s Motion in Limine prohibiting any 
testimony as to an amount of severance damages sought for any specific alleged adverse impact 
of the ITD project on the remainder, and dismissed all of Grathol's claims for money damages 
for any items of special damages claimed as severance damage, leaving only the severance 
damage claim based upon the amount of the difference in the fair market value of the remainder 
before and after the taking. Grathol was barred from seeking any separate discreet amounts for 
specific items of severance damages for loss of visibility, loss of access and development. 
However, Grathol would be allowed to present fact testimony on these issues as evidence 
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relevant to the expert witness opinion testimony as to the amount of severance damage, based 
upon the difference in the fair market value of the remainder before and after the taking. 
The matter proceeded to trial with this Court having continued to reserve its ruling on 
ITD's Motion in Limine as to Grathol's evidence relevant to the alleged loss of visibility, loss of 
access, the impact of the ITD project on Grathol's proposed development project. Grathol argued 
that even though it was not seeking specific dollar amounts for these alleged losses, the evidence 
of the adverse impact was still relevant to support the testimony of Grathol's expert witnesses, 
who would be testifying to opinions of an amount of severance damages to the remainder, based 
upon their opinion as to the difference in the fair market value of the remainder before and after 
the taking. 
B. Trial and Post-Trial History 
On March 5, 2012, a five-day court trial commenced. On the first day of trial, the parties 
informed the Court that they had stipulated to the admission of several exhibits, reserving 
objections as to relevance only.2 At the conclusion of the trial, the parties were ordered to 
submit post-trial briefing in regards to two issues: the larger parcel and valuation methodology. 
On March 23, 2012, the parties filed their post-trial briefs. On April 6, 2012, the parties filed 
their reply briefs and proposed findings and conclusions. 
The Court has carefully reviewed and considered the pleadings, post-trial briefing, and 
the previous orders entered in the record and the Court now enters its Memorandum Decision 
and Order, which shall constitute its findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
52(a). Any of the following findings of fact that should be denominated as a conclusion of law 
2 Defendants Exhibits: A, B, Hand I. Plaintiffs Exhibits: 1-20; 25-34; 36-37; 40-42; 44-46; 48-49; 51-59; 61-64; 
67-72; 74-76; 78-93; 96; 112; 130-136; 142; 151-163; and 173. 
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shall be deemed to be a conclusion of law. Any of the following conclusions of law that should 
be denominated a finding of fact shall be deemed a finding of fact. 
II. Statement of the Facts 
In 2002, ITD initiated a comprehensive study of US-95 between Garwood and Sagle. 
The study determined that US-95 should be redesigned and expanded to improve public safety 
and enable the highway to accommodate increasing traffic volumes. Based upon the study, ITD 
is now engaged in a project to widen and improve a section of US-95 between the communities 
of Garwood and Sagle in north Idaho ("the Project"). Complaint at p. 2, ,r 3. Due to the size of 
the US-95 Garwood to Sagle Project, it has been divided into seven segments. The Grathol 
property is located in the "Athol Segment" of the Project, ITD Project No. A009(791), Key No. 
9791. The Athol Segment will convert approximately 1.8 miles of US-95 from a two-lane, 
unrestricted access highway to a four-lane divided and access-controlled highway. The Athol 
Segment will also construct an interchange with State Highway 54 just outside the town of 
Athol. Plaintiff's Ex. 3. 
In order to construct the Project, ITD must take and condemn a portion of Grathol's 
property. Therefore, this is a partial taking case. Order Granting Possession of Real Property, 
entered January 27, 2011. ITD filed this action and had the summons issued on November 17, 
2010. As such, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 7-712, the date of taking and the date of valuation in 
this case are November 17, 2010. 
On May 28, 2008, Grathol purchased its property for the sum of $1,450,000. Plaintiff's 
Ex. 36; Tr. Vol. 4 at p. 675. The property consists of 56.8 acres located in Kootenai County, 
Idaho, just outside the town of Athol, near the northeast corner of present US-95 and State 
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Highway 54.3 More specifically, the property is also bounded by US-95 on the west, State 
Highway 54 on the south, Howard Road on the east, and the Farragut Trail on the north. The 
property is bare, undeveloped land, except for an old building located at the southwest comer of 
the property. Upon completion of the US-95 Project, a small portion of the Grathol property will 
be west of the project's new four-lane freeway and will continue to have frontage on the former 
US-95. The remaining property will be adjacent to the new interchange with State Highway 54, 
at the northeast quadrant of the interchange lying to the east of the Project as constructed. 
Plaintiff's Ex. 3. 
ITD is condemning 16.314 acres, leaving Grathol with 40.486 acres after the taking. A 
metes and bounds legal description of the 16.314 acres condemned in the Complaint is attached 
as Exhibit A to the Complaint.4 
Grathol is a California general partnership owned by Hughes Investments ("Hughes"). 
Tr. Vol. 4 at p. 716; Plaintiff's Ex. 25. Hughes is a commercial property developer specializing 
in the acquisition, ownership and development of retail shopping centers. Tr. Vol. 1 at p. 332; 
Tr. Vol. 4 at p. 725. Before Grathol purchased the property on May 28, 2008, Grathol began 
work on an application to Kootenai County to change the zoning of the property from Rural to 
Commercial and submitted its application on May 30, 2008. Plaintiff's Ex. 130. Grathol's 
rezone application referred to the US-95 Project and cited the Project as one of the reasons why a 
zoning change to Commercial was warranted for the property. Id On November 20, 2008, the 
Kootenai County Board of Commissioners issued an Order of Decision granting Grathol's 
3 56.39 acres lies outside of Athol's town limits, while .419 lies in the town limits. Tr. Vol. I at pp. 136-137. The 
total is 56.8 acres. 
4 This Court found the following depictions helpful in visualizing Grathol's property, the area of the take, and the 
future US-95 improvement: Plaintiff's Exhibits 4-8 and 166 at pp. 2-4. 
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requested zoning change, and the property was rezoned from Rural to Commercial. Plaintiff's 
Ex. 135. 
III. Discussion 
There are three main issues presented for discussion and analysis. First, there is a dispute 
over what constitutes the larger parcel for purposes of valuing the partial taking of the 16.314 
acres. Second, there is the issue of valuing the partial taking of the 16.314 acres. Third, there is 
the issue of severance damages and just compensation. 
A. The Larger Parcel 
The Grathol property is a 56.8 acre parcel. ITD is taking a 16.314 acres parcel. There is 
no dispute that this is a partial taking. The dispute is what constitutes the larger parcel. ITD 
claims that the larger parcel is either the entire 56.8 parent tract, or 56.39 acres that does not 
include the small .419 acre parcel at the southwest comer of the parent tract. Grathol claims the 
larger parcel is the westerly thirty (30) acres of the 56.8 acre parent tract. 
All parties agree that the entire 56.8 acre parent tract has a highest and best use of 
commercial/retail development. There is no significant disagreement over the type of 
commercial/retail development for which the property is suited. Grathol's property is located on 
the northeast comer of the intersection between US-95 running north-south and State Highway 
54 running east-west. The town of Athol is at the same intersection. The intersection of State 
Highway 54 and US-95 will be a major intersection between Coeur d'Alene and Sandpoint once 
the freeway project between Coeur d'Alene and Sandpoint is completed. The evidence, and 
common sense, dictates that Grathol' s property has a highest and best use of a commercial/retail 
development serving freeway traffic and the general Athol area. 
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At trial, ITD argued that Grathol needed the entire 56.8 acres for its commercial/retail 
development; however, this Court finds that there is insufficient evidence, if any evidence at all, 
in support of ITD's argument. Grathol's expert witness and appraiser Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood 
("Sherwood") testified repeatedly that he used 30 acres because he could not find any instances 
where a commercial/retail development, that was comparable to the type of project he believed 
to be appropriate for the property, had needed more than 30 acres. Tr. Vol. 3 at p. 464. 
Sherwood also testified that he assumed the wastewater system for the particular project 
Grathol had designed for the property would use the easterly 26 acres; however, because 
Sherwood's whole theory of valuation was based upon developing a commercial/retail project on 
the westerly 30 acres as the larger parcel, this Court finds his testimony incomprehensible. 
Certainly, any comparable commercial/retail developments that Sherwood had in mind would 
have had to include wastewater disposal capability. Furthermore, Grathol put in evidence that 
wastewater for its proposed project could be disposed of on-site in a number of different ways. 
Therefore, this Court rejects the suggestion that Grathol's proposed project required the 
easterly 26 acres in order to dispose of waste, because Grathol's theory of the larger parcel for 
this case was that it would not need more than the 30 acres to develop its commercial/retail 
project. 
The larger parcel dispute arises out of the premise that, everything else being equal, a 
larger parcel will appraise for less on a square foot basis than will a smaller parcel. There is no 
evidence in the record as to what ITD's appraised value for the 16.314 acres would be if the 
larger parcel was found to be only 30 acres. This is because ITD staunchly rejected Grathol's 30 
acres larger parcel theory before and during trial. Likewise, there is no evidence in the record of 
what Grathol' s appraised value would be for the 16.314 acres if the larger parcel is found to be 
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56.8 ( or 56.4) acres because Grathol only put into evidence appraisals as to the 30 acre larger 
parcel theory. Nonetheless, this Court, as the trier-of-fact, accepts the parties premise that a 
larger parcel of 56.8 acres would typically decrease the square foot value as compared to the 
square foot value if the larger parcel were found to be only 30 acres. Put another way, this Court 
finds and concludes that a larger parcel typically appraises at a lower square foot value and a 
smaller parcel appraises at a higher square foot value. 
Additionally, Sherwood testified that the location of the westerly 30 acres was better 
suited for commercial development than the easterly 26 acres, because the westerly 30 acres was 
located at the existing intersection of Hwy 95 and State Highway 54. The westerly boundary of 
the 30 acres fronts on existing Hwy 95 and the southerly boundary fronts on State Highway 54. 
As stated above, 30 acres was selected by Sherwood because all comparable projects of which he 
was aware were 30 acres or less. The easterly 26 acres is basically "surplus," in Sherwood's 
opinion, and is unnecessary to the contemplated commercial/retail development. The 26 acres is 
of less value according to Sherwood, and is therefore excluded. 
Grathol conceded at the pre-trial hearings and at trial that there is no controlling Idaho 
case law supporting Sherwood's approach, for defining the larger parcel by utilizing a proposed 
future development to create a hypothetical 30 acre parcel, as an appropriate methodology for 
defining a larger parcel. ITD argues that Sherwood's methodology is barred under existing 
Idaho law. 
This Court finds that Grathol has made convincing arguments that the larger parcel for a 
partial taking does not necessarily have to include the entire parent tract as a matter of law. 
Indeed, ITD's appraiser, Stan Moe ("Moe"), testified at trial that an appraiser exercises his 
discretion in making a determination as to what constitutes the larger parcel. Tr. Vol. 2 at p. 287. 
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This testimony is supported by the fact that at trial Larry Pynes ("Pynes"), another ITD 
appraiser, determined the larger parcel to be the entire 56.8 acre parent tract, while Moe testified 
that he found the larger parcel to be 56.4 acres. 
On the other hand, this Court is persuaded that ITD' s argument that creating a 
hypothetical parcel within the parent tract to constitute the larger parcel for valuing the part taken 
(that is, where the part taken is only a portion of the hypothetical parcel) is not recognized in 
existing Idaho case law. In fact, the existing case law appears to be to the contrary. For 
example, if Blackacre is a four acre tract of bare land, with a highest and best use of one acre 
residential, and the taking is of a portion within one of the four acres (say, the southwest quarter 
of the acre which is the southwest quarter of Blackacre ), then the partial taking analysis would 
use Blackacre's entire four acres as the larger parcel for purposes of valuation. It would be 
improper to use the one acre that is the southwest quarter acre of Blackacre as the larger parcel, 
even if Blackacre were zoned for one acre residential. See State ex. rel. Symms v. City of 
Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528, 531, 493 P.2d 387, 390 (1972); City of Coeur d'Alene v. 
Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 136 P.3d 310 (2006). 
Both parties have done an excellent job briefing the issues. As Grathol repeatedly 
pointed out in its arguments, each condemnation case is fact specific, and it is often the case that 
a great deal of confusion can arise from citing perfectly good law on an issue in one case that 
does not fit the same issue in another case because of factual differences. 
To support Sherwood's 30 acre appraisal theory, Grathol heavily relies upon City of 
Phoenix v. Wilson, 200 Ariz. 2, 21 P.3d 388 (2001), which it argues is "spot on." This Court has 
carefully reviewed Wilson and understands the Arizona Supreme Court's holding to be that an 
appraiser can create a hypothetical parcel within the parent tract, and then use that hypothetical 
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parcel as the larger parcel for valuing the part taken, consisting of only a portion of the 
hypothetical parcel. In reviewing the appellate history of Wilson, the Arizona Court of Appeals 
thought the appraisal methodology described above was precluded by Arizona law. The Arizona 
Supreme Court thought otherwise. The problem for Grathol is that our Supreme Court has not 
addressed this issue. Grathol invites this Court to adopt Wilson and create new law for Idaho. 
This Court finds that trying to guess whether our Supreme Court will adopt the Wilson 
holding will not solve the issue at this stage in the proceedings. Wilson is distinguishable from 
the facts in the present case. In Wilson, the landowner's appraiser was allowed to testify as to a 
probable zone change which would give a five acre comer of the parent tract a different highest 
and best use from the parent tract. The taking in Wilson was a partial taking of a portion within 
the 5 acre comer. In this case, there is no different highest and best use for any portion of the 
56.8 acre parent tract. The undisputed highest and best use for the entire 56.8 acre Grathol 
property is, and will be, commercial/retail development. Even if Wilson were controlling 
authority, it does not resolve this case, where the larger hypothetical parcel is based upon a 
theory that it has a higher value than the rest of the ground within the parent tract which is 
outside the hypothetical parcel. Even though the hypothetical parcel has the same highest and 
best use as the rest of the parent tract, Sherwood creates a larger parcel within the parent tract 
based on value. 
The analysis that this Court must perform in determining the larger parcel involves the 
elements of (1) unity of title, (2) unity of use and (3) contiguity. State ex rel. Symms v. Nelson 
Sand & Gravel, Inc., 93 Idaho 574,581,468 P.2d 306, 313 (1970). In Idaho, determination of 
the larger parcel is for the trier-of-fact. State ex rel. Symms v. City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 
528,532,493 P.2d 387,391; I.C. § 7-711. 
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As to the unity of title, it is undisputed that the entire 56.8 acre parent tract of the Grathol 
property is in one ownership, to wit: Grathol. The evidence presented is that Grathol purchased 
the entire property in 2008, and owns the property. There was no evidence the Grathol property 
had ever been other that one ownership. No evidence suggests more than one owner in the future. 
No one presented any evidence to the contrary. This Court finds that there is a unity of title for 
the 56.8 acres. 
Contiguity is a more complicated issue. The northeast comer of the .4 acre parcel 
touches the southwest comer of the 56.4 acres. So, there is a point of contact by legal 
description, but there is no physical access between the .4 acre parcel and the rest of the property. 
The trial evidence shows that historically the owner accessed the rest of the property from the .4 
acres, as if it was contiguous, but there is no legal easement. 
As to unity of use, the evidence shows that prior to Grathol's ownership, the zoning was 
rural, except for the .4 acres, which was commercial. The entire 56.8 acres has been 
undeveloped property, except for the .4 acre parcel. The .4 acre parcel is located in the town 
limits of Athol and presently has a building that has been used for a commercial purpose; 
however, the evidence shows that the use of the building has apparently been sporadic and it has 
been vacant for quite some period of time. Additionally, when the .4 acre parcel was zoned 
commercial, and the 56.4 acres was zoned rural, the previous owners used the .4 acre parcel as 
the entrance to the rest of the property, notwithstanding lack of legal access and different zoning. 
Grathol has zoned the entire 56.8 acres commercial. Grathol, and previous owners, have used the 
56.8 acres as one integral unit. Therefore, this Court finds that the 56.8 acres has been used as an 
integral unit. 
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The difference in use and the lack of contiguity might raise an issue about the .4 acre 
parcel being within the larger parcel in different circumstances. But, considering the unity of use 
and the current commercial zoning, the .4 acre parcel should be included with the rest of the 
property. Sherwood included the .4 acre within his hypothetical 30 acre larger parcel. This is not 
substantively contradicted by Moe's trial testimony. Moe, who excluded the .4 acre parcel in his 
larger parcel determination, testified that it would not have made any difference in his appraisal 
if his larger parcel determination included the .4 acre parcel. 
The issue for this Court is whether the larger parcel should be the 56.8 acres as claimed 
by ITD or the 30 acres claimed by Grathol. Grathol's reason for separating the 30 acres out of 
the 58.6 is based upon Sherwood's opinion of increased value of the thirty acres, due to the 
suitability of its location for Grathol's proposed commercial/retail development within the 56.8 
acre parent tract. 
The dispute over using a proposed future development as a valid basis for creating a 
hypothetical parcel within the parent tract for purposes of defining the larger parcel illustrates an 
underlying dispute that runs throughout this litigation. Grathol has designed a proposed 
commercial project for the Grathol property, and focuses on the impact the taking has on this 
proposed project. ITD has consistently and continuously argued that this Court exclude 
Grathol' s evidence because Idaho law focuses on the difference to the fair market value of the 
property as of the date of the taking. ITD argues Grathol is really seeking damages to its 
proposed project, and that damage to a proposed development is not evidence of fair market 
value of the real property. Indeed, Grathol often concedes that its evidence as to its proposed 
project is not evidence of fair market value, but argues that the evidence would be relevant for an 
expert witness to consider in reaching an opinion as to fair market value. At trial, this Court has 
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largely addressed this dispute as it came up by ruling that ITD's objection to a witness' 
testimony about loss of visibility, loss of access, and adverse impact on Grathol's proposed 
project went to the weight, and allowed the evidence. 
At the pre-trial Motion in Limine hearing, this Court cautioned Grathol that if this were a 
jury trial, the law was not clear as to whether this Court should allow the jury to consider 
Sherwood's use of the 30 acre hypothetical parcel as the larger parcel. Even if the Court were to 
consider adopting Wilson, that case does not hold that the jury, as fact finder, could consider 
Sherwood's methodology, because the highest and best use in this case is the same for the entire 
56.8 acres. The fact that there is no existing Idaho law similar to Wilson would raise this Court's 
concern over allowing a jury to consider Sherwood's 30 acres as the larger parcel. It is even 
more problematic where the basis for defining the larger is based not upon a different highest and 
best use, but solely upon a greater dollar value for the hypothetical parcel than for the rest of the 
parent tract. No case law on point has been submitted which this Court has found to address this 
issue. However, because this is a court trial, this Court has not needed to rule as a matter of law 
on the admissibility of Sherwood's larger parcel, although ITD has continuously requested such 
a ruling. 
Assuming Sherwood's methodology is permitted under Idaho law, as finder of fact, this 
Court finds that the preponderance of the evidence favors finding that the appropriate larger 
parcel for this partial taking, as of the date of the taking, is the entire 56.8 acres. The history of 
unity of title, contiguity and unity of use for the 56.8 acres, and the evidence of potential future 
use, supports a common sense, logical finding, based upon the factual record, that the 56.8 acres 
is one integral unit. Even Grathol's evidence of the future use for the 56.8 acres is the same, to 
wit: commercial development. Grathol's proposed future project had design plans, admitted into 
Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment Page 16 of 34 
1281 of 1617
evidence, showing an encroachment into Sherwood's "surplus" easterly 26 acres. Defendant's 
Exs. Hand I 
There is no persuasive evidence that would lead this Court to believe that an owner 
would divide the 56.8 acres in developing the tract in its highest and best use of 
commercial/retail. The fact that the current owner would have developed the 30 westerly acres 
first if there were no freeway project is simply unconvincing under the Idaho test of unity of title, 
unity of use, and contiguity that the larger parcel should be the westerly 30 acres. Sherwood's 
opinion that a proposed 30 acre development could be built on the 56.8 acres, and, if there were 
no freeway, the development would have been located on the westerly 30 acres, is both credible 
and logical. But assigning a higher value to the 30 acres does not change the fact that the 
preponderance of the evidence establishes that the larger parcel on this record is the entire 56.8 
acre parent tract. Sherwood's methodology of creating a larger parcel based on its value to a 
proposed future commercial development is factually unpersuasive when considered in light of 
all the other evidence in the record. 
The Court finds it is unnecessary to decide whether unpersuasive facts are inadmissible. 
B. The Valuation of the Partial Taking 
Now having determined as the trier of fact that the larger parcel is 56.8 acres, and that the 
highest and best use of the 56.8 acres, both before and after the taking, is commercial 
development, the Court must now determine the valuation of the 16.314 acres partial take. 
Idaho Code§ 7-711 governs the assessment of just compensation in Idaho condemnation 
cases. It requires the finder of fact to "ascertain and assess" the "value of the property sought to 
be condemned, and all improvements thereon pertaining to the realty[.]" I.C. § 7-711(1). 
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Grathol's first expert that testified was Sherwood. Sherwood had prepared an appraisal 
report and testified that in his opinion the fair market value of the 16.314 acres condemned by 
ITD is $1,598,543.00 ($2.25 per sq. ft.). Tr. Vol. 3 at p. 484; Plaintiff's Ex. 163A. 
This Court has several issues with Sherwood's valuation. The threshold problem with 
Sherwood's appraisal is that it provides an appraisal based upon the 30 acre larger parcel only. 
While the Court understands the logic of Sherwood's reason to use 30 acres, the Court has found 
the logic to be unpersuasive in its determination of the larger parcel. This Court has found the 
larger parcel to be 56.8 acres. Sherwood concedes that his 30 acre larger parcel necessarily 
results in an increased per square foot price. Tr. Vol. 3 at pp. 499-501. Sherwood testified at trial 
that he gave no consideration to the eastern 26 acres in his appraisal. Tr. Vol. 3 at pp. 464-65. If 
he had, the square foot values presumably would have been less than $2.25/sq. ft. 
A second issue is the format of Sherwood's appraisal. Sherwood's appraisal report states 
that his appraisal "is limited in scope ... presented in a restricted appraisal format . . . and the 
restricted report is the most abbreviated of the report formats and as such may be difficult to 
clearly understand by a third party." Plaintiff's Ex. 154, as attached to Grathol's Second 
Supplemental Discovery Responses (Sherwood's Report at p. 1). The Court finds itself in the 
position of that ''third party." 
The report has several comparative sales comps, but several of those were based upon the 
cities of Spokane, Washington; Coeur d'Alene and Post Falls, Idaho. Those cities are quite a bit 
larger in size than the town of Athol, and those cities are situated around an interstate (I-90), not 
highways. Sherwood agreed they were not good comps, but, in the absence of other data, were 
the best available. Just how the comps supported the $2.25 per square foot was unclear to this 
trier-of-fact. 
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Sherwood's comparative sales included properties with utilities and other improvements 
m place, while Grathol's property, as stated above, essentially is vacant land with no 
improvements. Many of Sherwood's comparative sales are somewhat dated and show property 
values before the real estate bubble burst, rather than sales that occurred closer to the November 
17, 2010, date of taking in this case. One sale in particular (No. 5) was a transaction that 
occurred under the threat of condemnation. IDJI 7.09 clearly explains that fair market value is 
the cash price at which a willing seller would sell and a willing buyer would buy the property in 
an open marketplace. There is also a presumption that the seller is desirous of selling. None of 
those can truly be applied to a condemnation sale. 
Sherwood made no attempt to explain why the square foot fair market value for the 16.3 
acre parcel would increase from 58 cents a square foot to $2.25 a square foot in a little over two 
years during a stagnant, or even declining, market for commercial properties. Sherwood agreed 
his comparative sales were not very reliable, and, justified using them because there was so little 
market activity. Some of the increase from 58 cents to $2.25 would presumably be due to 
Sherwood's decision to use 30 acres as the larger, rather than the entire 56.8 acres. But even 
putting that aside, Sherwood provides no convincing testimony that the market supported his 
opinion of a sharply increasing fair market value during Grathol's ownership. While Grathol did 
rezone this property, the rezone was pretty much a done deal before Grathol's purchase. An 
appraiser could have legitimately assigned a highest and best use of commercial zoning to the 
entire 56.8 acres even before Grathol's purchase. The Court finds Sherwood opinion as to fair 
market value is based more upon Grathol's proposed development of the westerly 30 acres than 
it is upon comparative sales and market data establishing fair market value of the 56.8 acres as of 
the date of the taking. 
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This Court does not find Sherwood's testimony or report persuasive, for the above 
reasoning, in determining the value of the partial taking. When an appraiser is presenting an 
opinion, utilizing the methodology of a hypothetical parcel based upon its value to a proposed 
future development, and created by the appraiser for his own use in preparing his opinion as to 
value, the appraiser would be well served by presenting a full appraisal report, in its most 
complete fashion, and made easy to understand. Instead, Sherwood did not explain how the 
market data supported Sherwood's $2.25 per square foot. Therefore, this Court finds that 
Sherwood's report, calculations and trial testimony were all difficult to understand and provided 
little assistance to the trier-of-fact in attempting to determine the value of the partial take. 
Alan Johnson ("Johnson"), Grathol's vice president and partial owner, also testified as to 
the value of the partial taking. Johnson testified that the value of the 16.314 acres is 
$2,295,360.00 ($3.23 per square foot), based upon his review of the comparables with his own 
adjustments. Tr. Vol. 4 at pp. 764. Johnson also testified that based upon his beliefs as owner of 
the property that the 30 acres larger parcel, which contains the 16.314 partial take, was worth 
$4.00 per square foot. Tr. Vol. 4 at pp. 765 and 767. Johnson, like Sherwood, also relied on the 
larger parcel being 30 acres. Plaintiff's Ex. 162; Defendant's Ex. J Unlike Sherwood, Johnson 
testified that the value of the easterly 26 acres had a $1.00 per square foot value, both before and 
after the partial take. Tr. Vol. 4 at p. 746; Defendant's Ex. J 
Although Johnson is not a real estate appraiser he did provide testimony as to one 
comparative sale (also Sherwood's No. 7), a property located in nearby Sagle, Idaho, which is a 
growing community near Sandpoint. Tr. Vol. 4 at p. 735. This Court finds that relying solely 
upon this one comparable not particularly helpful due to the comparable's smaller size, 
improvements (including available water and sewer/septic) and pre-real estate bust sale date 
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(March 4, 2008), which provided no valuation adjustment to the time of the condemnation date. 
Further, although Johnson testified that the Sagle sale was the most comparable property to 
Grathol's property, Johnson also testified that the Sagle comparable was inferior to Grathol's 
property. Tr. Vol. 4 at p. 749. 
Johnson testified that Hughes was involved in other commercial developments and the 
Grathol property would make an ideal location for Grathol's proposed commercial development. 
While Johnson's opinion about the anticipated success of Grathol's proposed development was 
no doubt in good faith, the record does not support any finding that the development would in 
fact occur when and where as Johnson testified. For example, the admitted evidence shows that 
Johnson had met with Super 1 Foods regarding the property, but that Super 1 Foods did not show 
much interest because it already had grocery stores in nearby Hayden and Rathdrum and was 
concerned about oversaturation. Plaintiff's Exs. 29 and 32. There is little or no other evidence 
of any third party with a specific, immediate interest in becoming part of Grathol's proposed 
development. 
Johnson's testimony as to Grathol's proposed development and its anticipated success is 
not persuasive as having much probative value as to the fair market value of the 56.8 acres as of 
the date of the taking. To the degree the Court could follow Johnson's methodology of valuation, 
and assuming its admissibility, the Court found Johnson's opinion of fair market value for the 
16.3 acres parcel of little or no probative value, particularly since his own appraiser (who created 
the 30 acre larger parcel) testified to a value substantially lower than Johnson's. 
While Grathol's proposed development looked good on paper, there is little evidence that 
Grathol had lined up businesses as tenants. Grathol has designed these types of projects before 
that have not been built out. Tr. Vol. II at p. 336. How much of the project would be built, and 
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when, rests upon what the Court finds to be more speculative than probative. Furthermore, 
Grathol did not show how the fair market value of the property as of the date of the taking was 
dependent upon Grathol's anticipated success of its proposed future development. 
Although Sherwood and Johnson were not able to find good comparables, the ITD 
appraisers had their difficulties as well. All the appraisers used some of the same comparables. 
The difficulty arose from the fact that there was very little sales activity. The Court finds that for 
the relevant period of Grathol's ownership, the real estate market for comparable properties 
showed declining values, and was, at best, stagnant. 
As stated earlier, ITD presented two appraisers at trial, Moe and Pynes. Both testified 
that they had prepared complete before and after appraisal reports. 
Moe testified that the value of the 16.314 acres partial take was $570,990.00 (rounded up 
to $571,000.00, which is approximately $0.80 per square foot). Tr. Vol. 1 at p. 87; Plaintiff's Ex. 
13. In his appraisal report, Moe determined the larger parcel was 56.39 acres. He arrived at this 
number by taking Parcel 1 's acreage of 46.390 and adding Parcel 3's acreage of 10.000. He did 
not include Parcel 2's acreage of .419 acres. Plaintiff's Ex. 12 (Moe's Appraisal Report). Moe 
explains in his report that he did not consider the .419 acres in the larger parcel because the .419 
lies within the Athol town limits and the other parcels are outside the town limits. Further, Moe 
explains that in his opinion, "the .419-acre comer parcel will not be negatively impacted by the 
proposed acquisition. It may even be positively impacted by the fact it will be the only private 
ownership between the new freeway off-ramp and existing Highway 95." Id. at p. 3. 
Moe's adjusted values for the comparable land sales ranged from $24,408.00 to 
$69,172.00 per acre. Moe further adjusted the comparables downward in his reconciliation to 
reach the $0.80 per sq. ft. Plaintiff's Ex. 18. 
Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment Page 22 of34 
1287 of 1617
The determination of the larger parcel in a condemnation valuation analysis is significant 
because it can materially alter the applicability of size adjustments to comparable land sales and 
the calculation of severance damages to the remainder of the larger parcel. 
This Court finds that while Moe utilized a recognized appraisal methodology 
(comparative market approach), Moe's appraisal was based upon the larger parcel being 56.39 
acres, not 56.8 acres. Further, the evidence adduced at trial established that Moe made 
significant adjustments to the comparable land sales and then further adjusted those values 
downward through a "reconciliation" to arrive at a value conclusion for the Grathol property. As 
such, this Court did not find Moe's valuation as persuasive as Pynes. 
Pynes testified that the value of the partial take was $675,000.00 ($0.95 per square foot). 
Tr. Vol. 5 at 793. Pynes' valuation was based upon the larger parcel being the entire 56.8 acres, 
for both the before and after values, and he also used the sales comparison approach in 
establishing his appraisal. Plaintiffs Ex. 141A. Pynes used sales that had similar characteristics 
to the Grathol property, and explained and quantified the adjustments he made to the comparable 
sales in order to provide accurate and reliable indications of the market value of the Grathol 
property at the time of the taking. Pynes' comparables range from $0.46 to $1.19 per square 
foot. Plaintiff's Exs. 139 and 145. Pynes' appraisal report is easy to read and understand. See 
Plaintiffs Ex. 139 (Pynes' Appraisal Report). Pynes trial testimony was also persuasive in that 
Pynes provided detailed testimony as to how he came to his valuations. Further, his valuation of 
the partial take is easy to calculate, he took the before value and subtracted the after value. 
Therefore, this Court found Pynes' valuation as to the partial taking to be very persuasive and 
credible. 
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The testimony at trial shows that when Grathol bought the property in early 2008, for 
$1,450,000.00, the square foot value was approximately $0.58 a square foot. Tr. Vol. 4 at p. 675, 
ll. 20-22. The persuasive testimony was to the effect that between 2008 and 2010 commercial 
real estate was, at best, in a lull. There was evidence of declining real estate values in that time 
period. Tr. Vol. 4 at pp. 678-679. Although Grathol's testimony was that they had satisfied 
themselves that the rezone to commercial would be approved prior to purchase, Grathol did 
rezone the entire 56.8 acres to commercial. Even considering the benefit of accomplishing the 
rezone, the value by Pynes of $0.95 a square foot reflects an increase in value of over 60% in a 
two-year period of declining or stagnant real estate values. Sherwood's figure of $2.25 a square 
foot is an increase unsupported by persuasive market data. Johnson's figure of $3.23 a square 
foot is no doubt Grathol's asking price if someone wanted to buy it, but the Court finds 
Johnson's opinion, as to his selling price, offers little probative value to finding the fair market 
value of the 56.8 acres in November 2010. 
Therefore, this Court, as trier-of-fact, finds based upon all of the above provided 
reasoning that Pynes' testimony is the most persuasive testimony provided as to valuing the 
partial take. As such, this Court determines that the fair market value of the 16.314 acres partial 
take is $675,000.00 ($0.95 per square foot). 
C. Severance Damages, Damages to Remainder and Just Compensation 
Under Idaho Code§ 7-711, "[i]fthe property sought to be condemned constitutes only a 
part of a larger parcel," then the finder of fact must also "ascertain and assess" "(a) the damages 
which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance from the 
portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the improvement in the manner 
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proposed by the plaintiff; and (b) the damages to any business qualifying under this 
subsection[.]" LC.§ 7-711(2)(a), (b). 
As this Court has determined, the Grathol property consists of 56.8 acres of contiguous 
land. Therefore, the condemned property of 16.314 acres is part of a larger parcel owned by 
Grathol. Accordingly, Grathol is entitled to recover damages, if any, to the remaining 40.486 
acres by reason of the severance of the 16.314 acres from the remaining property. LC. § 7-
711(2)(a). Grathol did not have an existing business on the property, so there are no business 
damages. 
In Sherwood's appraisal, Sherwood's fair market value of Grathol's property (the 30 
acres only) before the take is $2,940,300.00. Sherwood assigned the value of $1,598,543.00 to 
the take of what Sherwood identified as a 16.41 parcel. The after take value of Sherwood's 
remainder parcel was $1,344,457.00. Plaintiff's Ex. 163; Plaintiff's Ex. 154, as attached to 
Grathol's Second Supplemental Discovery Responses (Sherwood's Appraisal Report at p. 10). 
Sherwood's testimony as to what he calls his remainder is not precise. In his report, Sherwood 
identifies the remainder as consisting of 3 parcels of 8.85, 3.87 and .419 (total of 13.139 acres). 
The report also refers to a larger parcel of 30 acres with a taking of 16.41 acres, leaving a 
remainder of 13.59 acres. At trial, Sherwood, testifying to Plaintiff's Exhibit 163A, identified a 
13 .4 acre remainder. 
While Sherwood's differences in size are not great, the fact that Sherwood cannot be 
consistent as to the size of his remainder demonstrates why his testimony as to severance 
damages is unpersuasive. The factual situation is that Sherwood's remainder parcel should be the 
56.8 acres Grathol property less the 16.41 acres taking, as he defines the partial taking in his 
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report, or 40.39 acres.5 Therefore, Sherwood's approximate 13.4 acres remainder is factually 
incorrect by at least 27 acres.6 
As provided above, Sherwood's square foot value for his 30 acres larger parcel was $2.25 
per square foot. At trial, Sherwood testified that the valuation for his remainder parcel, whatever 
size that actually was, remained at $2.25 per square foot for both the before and after take. When 
he was asked if there were any severance damages he testified, "[t]here's zero severance, 
correct." Tr. Vol. 3 at p. 523, 1. 16; Plaintiff's Ex. 163A. 
As fact finder, the Court is extremely impressed that Sherwood never actually testified to 
any value of severance damage other than "zero."7 In his report, Sherwood computed the value 
of the take at $1,598,543. The value of Sherwood's remainder is therefore $1,344,457. 
Plaintiff's Ex. 154, Sherwood's Report at p. 10. Sherwood then runs through two versions of a 
discounted-to-present value analysis, one based upon a 1.5 year period, the other based upon a 
2.5 year period. Sherwood's report implies that Grathol's loss is the difference between the 
$1,344,457 value of the remainder and the discounted to present value figures of either 
$1,165,354 for 1.5 years or of $1,059,413 for 2.5 years. Id. at p. 11. 
5 The actual partial take is 16.314 acres, not 16.41, which leaves a remainder of 40.48 acres. It was never explained 
why Sherwood's report does not use the correct figure for the partial take. 
6 Sherwood's uncertainty as to size and the irrelevancy of Sherwood's remainder relates to the 30 acre parcel created 
for the purpose of valuing the partial take. The approximate 13 .4 acres remainder parcel never existed, and there is 
no evidence that it ever will exist. As such, this Court finds Sherwood's remainder has no foundation in fact. 
7 This impression is because when this Court granted ITD's Motion in Limine, based upon Grathol's concession, as 
to any expert witness testimony to dollar amounts for damages claimed as severance damage for specific items of 
loss, i.e., visibility, access, or impact upon Grathol's proposed development project, Grathol's counsel affirmatively 
stated Sherwood would present his opinion as to the amount of severance damages to the remainder post-taking, 
which would be based upon Sherwood's opinion regarding a difference in the fair market values of the remainder 
parcel before and after the take. An expert's credibility is irretrievably damaged when that expert, who is supposed 
to provide a number other than "zero," does not do so. 
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Sherwood testified at trial that the value of the remainder after the partial take was less 
than the before take value because of certain market factors relating to what a future purchaser 
would pay for the remainder. Specifically, Sherwood testified: 
I cannot see anybody having a use for [the remainder] until that 
they [sic] can visualize and see the actual project, those roads 
completed by. Therefore, I forecast from that date forward about 
one and a half to two and a half years into the future, took the 
difference between the before and after and discounted that 
amount. 
Tr. Vol. 3 at p. 486, ll. 20-25; p. 487, l. 1. 
Sherwood went on to testify that he assigned a ten percent (10%) discount to the two 
dates that he believed the Project would be completed. Tr. Vol. 3 at p. 490, l. 24. In his report, 
Sherwood states that he used the 10% discount of the future value "due to all the unknowns 
concern this condemnation including the unknown timing of the project being finished, issues 
with regard to access, Sylvan Road being built, the cost of who will be responsible for the cost of 
Sylvan Road, and the pending condemnation of the right of way for Sylvan Road." Plaintiff's 
Ex. 154, Sherwood's Reportatp. 11. 
Sherwood never refers to severance damages in his report, nor does the math, but the 
Court, doing Sherwood's subtraction for him and assuming that Sherwood's position is that the 
Court as trier-of-fact should label that number as "severance damage" for him, comes up with a 
loss of either $179,457.00 based upon 1.5 years or $284,457.00 based upon 2.5 years. 
Further, in his report, Sherwood gives a range of values for something Sherwood calls 
"Difference Rounded." These values are from $1,775,000 to $1,880,000. Id. at p. 12. If one 
then subtracts Sherwood's fair market value of the partial take ($1,598,543), one arrives at the 
amount of loss to the remainder that Sherwood refers to in his present value analysis. Doing the 
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math, Sherwood's report then should show a loss with a range of values of $176,457 to 
$281,457. The problem for the fact finder is that the report does not contain those numbers, 
much less label these figures as "severance damages" and Sherwood did not proffer these 
numbers in his trial testimony. 8 
At trial, ITD objected to the "Difference Rounded" testimony, arguing that Sherwood's 
present values for 1.5 and 2.5 years were nothing more than construction delay damages. In its 
post-trial briefing, ITD argues that Sherwood, and Johnson, both used dates of value years after 
the date of taking. As such, ITD argues that this Court is barred by Idaho case law from relying 
on Sherwood and Johnson's just compensation opinions. In its post-trial briefing, Grathol argues 
that Sherwood used an income approach in arriving at just compensation, and the 1.5 and 2.5 
years are not construction delay damages. Grathol argues that Sherwood applied his 10% per 
annum discount rate to 1.5 and 2.5 years and arrived at the present value of the remainder, which 
he then subtracted from the before-take value of the 30 acres arriving at a just compensation 
value of either $1,775,000.00 or $1,880,000.00. Again, the dollar value that Sherwood 
presumably wants the fact finder to find as an amount of severance damage is never mentioned 
by Sherwood, and it is up to the fact finder to do the math. 
This Court allowed Sherwood to testify to the discounted present values and stated that it 
would give Sherwood's valuation and his methodology in arriving at those values the weight it 
deserved. 
While the Court does not find an income approach probative of fair market value in this 
case, the larger problem with Sherwood is that he has carefully avoided stating that he has 
8 A more direct computation would be to subtract the discounted values of$1,165,000 for 1.5 years and $1,060,000 
for 2.5 years from Sherwood's fair market value of$1,344,457 for his remainder. That subtraction provides a range 
ofnumbers from $179,457 to $284,457; however, pursuant to a present value analysis, and under the rubric of 
"Difference Rounded," Sherwood sets this range from $176,457 to $281,457. 
Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment Page 28 of34 
1293 of 1617
computed a difference between the fair market value of his remainder before and after the take. 
Indeed, his testimony has been that there is no severance damage to the remainder; that the fair 
market value of the remainder is $2.25 both before and after the take; and has indeed avoided 
identifying any amount as severance damage. Coming up with a computation entitled 
"Difference Rounded" is no substitute for that opinion testimony. The Court understands the 
logic of Grathol's argument that inferences can be drawn, but this Court is quite unconvinced. 
Overall, the nature and manner of Sherwood's testimony leads the Court to find that 
Sherwood was more comfortable with indirect, confusing, opaque and brief testimony than with 
clear and direct testimony. As mentioned before, Sherwood's report expressly states that it is 
"restricted," "abbreviated," and "difficult to clearly understand." The Court makes no attempt to 
question the reasons this was done, but the down side for Sherwood is that the Court finds his 
testimony, particularly on the severance damage claim, unpersuasive and of little probative value 
for the trier-of-fact, other than his stated opinion under oath that the severance damage was 
"zero."9 
Similarly, this Court finds Johnson's severance damage conclusions unpersuasive, and 
even more confusing than Sherwood's. Johnson's testimony as to the remainder was 
contradictory at best. 
9 For example, at no point has Sherwood provided any testimony stating the specific amount of severance damage he 
would want a jury to place in the blank on a special verdict for the amount of severance damage to be awarded. In 
Grathol's Proposed Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, no number for severance damage is provided. The 
values are only as to the value of the partial take and Sherwood's "Difference Rounded," which Grathol argues is 
Sherwood's term for ''just compensation." In reviewing the trial transcript, Sherwood never actually used the words 
''just compensation" directly; rather, when Grathol's counsel presented Sherwood with a leading question as to 
whether Sherwood's term of "Difference Rounded" was Sherwood's opinion of ''just compensation," Sherwood 
responded with "[t]hat's correct." Tr. Vol. 4 at p. 597, I. 8. It is hard to imagine a less convincing manner in which 
an expert witness could give an opinion. 
Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment Page 29 of34 
1294 of 1617
Although Johnson had used a 30 acre parcel as the larger parcel for purposes of valuing 
the 16.3 partial take, when it came to severance damages, Johnson used a 40.48 acre parcel as the 
remainder. Johnson testified that he then assigned two values to the remainder before take, to 
wit: $3,060,133 (at $3.23/ sq. ft.) and $3,519,648 (at $4.00/sq. ft.). Defendant's Ex. J. This 
Court finds that using different sizes for the remainder for purposes of valuing the take and also 
for valuing the remainder in the same taking is novel but ultimately unpersuasive. 
Additionally, Johnson's after take remainder is split up into various parcels with assigned 
values ranging from $4.50, $4.00, and $1.00/sq. ft., which is what he considered the remainder to 
be worth after the ITD project was completed and Grathol's commercial/retail development 
project was completed, arriving at a after take value for the remainder of $3,670,140. Tr. Vol. 4 
at p. 768, ll. 11-18; Defendant's Ex. J. Where this methodology came from was unexplained, 
but, interestingly enough, resulted in a higher value for Johnson's remainder of 40.48 acres after 
the taking than before. It is only after launching into a "time adjustment" discount does 
Johnson's after take value for the 40.48 remainder become worth less than the before take value. 
As to the discount, Johnson testified that he created a downward time discounted value 
for the remainder of $2,722,000.00, which was his opinion of the reminder's value calculated as 
of the date of taking if ITD's project was completed and Grathol's development project had not 
been completed. Tr. Vol. 4 at p. 769, ll. 2-13. Johnson then calculated severance damages by 
taking the value of the remainder before take less the discounted after take value and arrived at 
severance damages between $338,000 (at $3.23/sq. ft.) or $798,000 (at $4.00/sq. ft.). He then 
arrived at a just compensation value of between $2,633,360.00 to $3,093,360.00, by adding the 
value of the partial take to the severance damages. Defendant's Ex. J. 






This Court doesn't find Johnson's op1mon as to severance damages persuasive. 
Johnson's valuation as to the remainder before take utilizes the same $3.23 and $4.00 per square 
foot values that this Court found unpersuasive as applied to the valuation of the partial take. 
Again, those values are a result of Johnson's reliance on the larger parcel being 30 acres. 
Additionally, Johnson's valuation as to the remainder after take is contingent on Grathol 
having completed its commercial/retail development on the remainder, but that has not occurred. 
Johnson did not explain how he came up with $4.00 and $4.50 per square foot. He only testified 
that if both ITD's and Grathol's projects were completed, then the value of the remainder of the 
30 acres would increase, but the remaining 26 acres would not. He doesn't support that with any 
market data or other evidence. Indeed, Johnson's range of values for severance damages, where 
the higher value is twice that of the lesser based upon an unexplained and mysterious 
methodology incorporating an assumed completion of Grathol's proposed development, is totally 
unpersuasive in proving fair market value as of the date of the taking. If the Court understood 
what Johnson was trying to establish, the Court suspects the testimony was probably 
inadmissible, but its complete absence of any probative value for the fact finder renders the 
question of its admissibility moot. 
As to the approximately one million dollar discount, Grathol's counsel asked Johnson 
how he arrived at the downward/discounted value and Johnson's only explanation was "[t]he 
impact to the project because of the freeway." Tr. Vol. 4 at p. 773, fl. 12-13. This is 
contradictory because Johnson had testified earlier that the discount was based upon Grathol not 
having completed its project. Tr. Vol. 4 at p. 769, fl. 2-13. Further, Johnson did not support his 
assertion with any market data or other evidence. The Court finds that Johnson's testimony may 
have been relevant if Grathol was seeking damages due to the alleged adverse impact of the ITD 
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project upon Grathol's proposed commercial development, but, before trial, Grathol had agreed 
that it was not seeking damages for development plan damages. The measure of severance 
damages in this case, as agreed to by Grathol, was to be based upon opinion testimony as to the 
differences in the fair market value of the remainder before and after the taking. As such, as trier-
of-fact, the Court found Johnson's testimony was of no relevance to the measure of damages 
Grathol was seeking to recover. 
ITD's experts Moe and Pynes both testified that the remaining property did not suffer any 
severance damages. Further, they each testified that they had found no basis for concluding that 
Grathol's ability to proceed with commercial development of the remainder was in any way 
impaired or damaged due to the taking for ITD's project. There was little, if any, evidence to the 
contrary. Sherwood testified that commercial developments comparable to Grathol's proposed 
development plan did not exceed 30 acres. After the 16.3 partial take, the Grathol property 
consists of a remainder of 40.48 acres (with over 30 acres east of the freeway). 
Out of all of the witnesses, this Court finds that the most persuasive testimony and 
evidence as to the before-take value and the after-take value was provided by Pynes. Pynes' 
valuation for the 56.8 acres before the partial taking was $2,350,000.00 and his after-take 
valuation as to the remaining 40 acres was $1,675,000.00. Pynes' square foot valuation 
($0.95/sq. ft.) remained the same for all calculations. His valuation as to the remainder before 
and after the take remained at $1,675,000.00. 
Grathol's evidence attempting to establish a decrease in the fair market value of the 
remainder after take was unpersuasive. This Court finds that there was insufficient evidence to 
establish any difference in the fair market value of the remainder before and after the take, and 
that was the only measure of severance damage for which Grathol was making a claim. 
Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment Page 32 of34 
1297 of 1617
Therefore, by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court finds the amount of severance damage 
is zero. 
IV. Conclusion and Order 
Grathol's property totals 56.8 acres, which is the larger parcel in this matter. The fair 
market value of the 16.314 partial taking is $675,000.00. There is no severance damage to the 
remainder. Therefore, just compensation in this matter is $675,000.00. 
ITD has deposited $571,000.00 with the Court, and Grathol has removed $456,800.00 of 
that amount. Therefore, subtracting the $456,800.00 already tendered to Grathol and the 
$114,200.00 that the Clerk of the Court will release to Grathol, there is an additional 
$104,000.00 to be tendered to Grathol for just compensation. 
ITD shall provide this Court with the appropriate judgment and a final order of 
condemnation that complies with this decision and the statutory requirements, to include LC. § 
7-716. 
Dated this c!J3/ day of May, 2012. 
04)~--,-
CHARLES W. HOSACK 
Senior District Judge 
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This matter came on regularly for a bench trial commencing on the 5th day of March, 
2012, before the Honorable Charles W. Hosack, Senior District Judge of the First Judicial 
District of the State ofldaho. The above-named Defendant HJ Grathol ("Grathol") appeared and 
was represented by its counsel ofrecord, Douglas S. Marfice and Christopher D. Gabbert of 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP, and the above-named Plaintiff ("ITD") appeared through its counsel of 
record, Mary V. York and Steven C. Bowman of Holland & Hart LLP. After hearing the evidence 
and the arguments of counsel, and after considering the parties' post-trial briefing, proposed 
findings of fact and conclusion of law, and the previous orders entered in the record, the Court 
issued its Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment awarding the Defendant the 
sum of SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO/100 DOLLARS 
($675,000) as the amount of just compensation owed to Grathol in this case. 
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Grathol is the owner in fee simple of the real property, which is the subject of this 
condemnation action. 
2. Defendant Sterling Savings Bank was dismissed as a party to this action on 
December 22, 2010. 
3. In this action, ITD seeks to condemn and acquire a portion of Grathol' s real 
property as part ofITD's project to widen and improve Highway 95. The particular segment of 
the Project for which Grathol's property is required is U.S. 95, Garwood to Sagle, Athol Stage, 
Project No. A009(791) Key No. 9791. 
4. As part of its US-95 Project, ITD requires 16.314 acres ofGrathol's 56.8 acre 
parcel. A legal description of the portion of Grathol' s property to be condemned and acquired by 
ITD is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit A. 
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5. The taking of a portion of Grathol' s property is for a public use, authorized by 
law, and the property sought to be condemned is necessary for the public use as a right-of-way 
for public highway, which has been and is located in a manner most compatible with the greatest 
public good and the least private injury. 
6. ITD has sought in good faith to purchase from Grathol the necessary and required 
real property and improvements located on that real property for the Project. 
7. Grathol shall recover Judgment against ITO in the sum of SIX HUNDRED 
SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($675,000), together with 
accrued interest on this sum in the amount of $36,813.58, less the sum of $571,000 previously 
paid by ITO to the Court, making a net Judgment in the amount of $140,813.58. 
8. On February 9, 2011, ITD tendered to the Court the sum of$571,000 as just 
compensation in this matter, of which Grathol has removed $456,800. Accordingly, there is an 
additional $114,200 to be tendered from the Court to Grathol, which is the difference between 
the $571,000 previously tendered by ITD and the $456,800 removed by Grathol. 
9. The remaining balance of the just compensation owed by ITD to Grathol is 
$104,000, which represents the difference between the amount of just compensation determined 
by the Court and the $571,000 previously tendered by ITD to the Court. 
10. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 7-712, Grathol is entitled to interest in the amount of 
$36,813.58, which was calculated at the legal rate per annum of 12%. The sum represents 
$18,419.36 of interest on the entire amount of just compensation of $675,000 calculated from the 
date of the Summons ofNovember 19, 2010 until February 9, 2011 when ITD deposited 
$571,000 with the Court. The sum further represents $18,394.22 of interest on $104,000 (the 
difference between the total amount of just compensation owed to Grathol and the $571,000 




11. Thus, the total amount due to Grathol on the Judgment is $140,813.58. 
12. ITD shall tender to the Court the remaining sums due on the Judgment, in the 
amount of $140,813.58. The sum shall be deposited in the existing account with the funds 
previously deposited by ITD in this matter. The funds on deposit will then be disbursed to 
Grathol by the Clerk of the Court. 
13. The total amount to be paid, combined with the sums previously paid by ITD in 
this matter, constitutes "Just Compensation" to Grathol within the meaning of Article I, Section 
14 of the Constitution of the State ofldaho and includes payment for the value of the property 
taken by ITD, the value of any resulting damages to Grathol's property, and any and all claims 
by Grathol for the taking of a portion of its property by ITD. 
14. In consideration of the aforementioned payment and other consideration by ITD 
to Grathol, and upon payment to Grathol of the sum of $140,813.58, ITD shall be entitled to a 
Second Judgment and Decree of Condemnation that will convey to ITD: 
(a) All right, title, interest and fee title in approximately16.314 acres of 
property more particularly described in Exhibit A, attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
15. Payment of the above-described sum to Grathol shall constitute a full and 
complete satisfaction and settlement of all claims between ITD and Grathol in this matter, 
including all claims for just compensation, damages and interes_; t:<--;/1-i AMY_ c/.-f,M f'o-a-
t11/ltJti-/1.i._y f~s ,.._,,,..,.f co,;;fr -fo /o.,_ d-e,l~"llU •N-ed' /' tv-S Lcct.,4'(,f 'f-e f?~ S '1 
SU ORDERED this --f day of June, 2012. ' 
~ /i\-
H~~hWe~~t -
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correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 ~ 
Mary V. York, Esq. 
Ted S. Tollefson, Esq. 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Fax: (208) 343-8869 ~-tj-
J. Tim Thomas, Esq. 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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Key No. 09791 
PARCEL19 
ITD PID 0044775 
FEE ACQUISITION 
A tract ofland being a portion of the Southwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter (SW4 
SW4) of Section 10, Township 53 North. Range 3 West, Boise Meridian, Kootemu County, 
Idaho, more particularly described as follows: 
COMMENCING at the Southwest Comer of said Section 10, marked by a found railroad 
spike as referenced by Comer Perpetuation and Filing Record No. 207654000; thence along 
the west line of said Section 10, North 1°27'15" East, a distance of2652.41 feet to the West 
Quarter Corner of said Section 10, monumented by a found 2-1 /2 inch diameter aluminum 
cap marked "E 1/4 Sect. 9 T53N R3W'', as referenced by Comer Perpetuation and Filing 
Record No. 1213669; thence South 1 °27' 15n West, a distance of 1431.97 feet; thence South 
89°43'43" East, a distance of23.30 feet to the intersection of the south line of that parcel of 
land taken by the United States of America by Decree of Condemnation. recorded in Book 20 
of Miscellaneous Records, Page 436, records of Kootenai County, Idaho with the east right 
of way line of State Highway 95, Project No. F AP I 0OD(2); thence along the southerly 
boundary of that parcel described by said Decree of Condemnation, South 89°43'43" East, a 
distance of256-.23 feet to a point being 206.83 feet left of Station 983+30.84 ofUS-9S, 
Proj~t No. A009(791) Highway Survey said point being the TRUE POINT OF 
BEGINNING; 
thence continuing along the southerly boundary of that parcel described by said Decree of 
Condemnation, South 89°43'43" East) a distance of 471.67 feet to a point being 255.32 feet 
right of Station 982+37.0l ofUS-95, Project No. A009(791) Highway Survey; 
thence South 21 °05'02" East, a distance of 177.16 feet to a point 165.00 feet south of the 
southerly boundary of that parcel described by said Decree of Condemnation, said point 
being 291.85 feet right of Station 980+76.27 ofUS-95, Project No. A009(791) Highway 
Survey; 
thence South 21°05'02" East, a distance of537.93 feet to a point on a 1173.00 foot radius 
curve to the right, concave to the southwest, the center of which bears South 68°54'58" West, 
said point being 449.91 feet right of Station 976+11.17 ofUS-95, P~oject No. A009(791) 
Highway Survey; 
thence southerly, on said curve, through a central angle of 17°47'36,., an arc distance of 
364.28 feet, a chord bearing of South 12°11 '14° East, and a chord distance of 362.81 feet to 
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31, 1967 as Instrument No. 504394, said point being 532.67 feet right of Station 972+69.12 
ofUS-95, Project No. A0O9(791) Highway Survey; 
Key No. 09791 
thence along the north boundary of said strip North 89°43'25,, West, a distance of923.35 
feet to a point 165.00 feet (10 rods) east of the east right of way line of said State Highway 
95, Project No. FAP 100D(2) and from which a 5/8" rebar with plastic cap, as shown per 
Record of Survey, instrument No. 1621187, bears South 89°48'01" East, 1.88 feet, more or 
less, said point being 390.57 feet left of Station 972+54.46 ofUS-95, Project No. A009(791) 
Highway Survey; 
thence pa.ra!!el with and 165.00 feet east of said east right of way line, North 1 °29'39" East, a 
distance of 429.85 feet to a point 528.00 feet (32 rods) north of the north right of way line of 
State Highway 54, Project No. FAP ANFAS 61 and from which al" steel pin, as shown per 
Record of Survey, instrument No. 1621187, bears North 62°05'52" East, 3.13 feet, more or 
less, said point being 384.24 feet left of Station 977+03.96 ofUS-95, Project No. A009(791) 
Highway Survey; 
thence South 89°43'25" East, a distance of 115.52 feet, to a point on a 1738.51 foot radius 
non-tangent curve to the left, concave to the west, the center of which bears North 81 °05'00" 
West. said point being 268.78 feet left of Station 976+99.56 ofUS-95, Project No. 
A009(791) Highway Survey; 
thence northerly, 011 said curve, through a central angle of 14°03 '44", an arc distance of 
426.69 feet, a chord bearing of North 1 °53'08° East, and a chord distance of 425.62 feet to a 
point being 165.00 feet south of the south line of that parcel described by said Decree of 
Condemnation; said point being 214.69 feet left Station 981 +53.58 ofUS-95, Project No. 
A009(791) Highway Survey; 
thence continuing northerly, on said curve, through a central angle of 5°29'44", an arc 
distance of 166.75 feet, a chord bearing of North 7°53'36" West, and a chord distance of 
166.69 feet, to the POINT OF BEGINNING .. 
Said Tract contains 710t634 square feet or 16,314 acres, more or less. 
Located between Project Centerline Stations 972+54.46 Left and 983+30.84 Left. 
Together with and subject to covenantsi easements and restrictions of record. 
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Basis of bearing is North I 0 27' 15" East, a distance of 2652.41 feet, between· a fourid railroad 
spike, per Comer Perpetuation and Filing Record No. 207654000 marking the Southwest 
comer of Section 10, and the found 2-1/2 inch diameter aluminum cap monument, per Comer 
Perpetuation and Filing Record No. 1213669, marking the West Quarter corner of Section 
10, both in Township 53 North, Range 3 West, Boise Meridian. 
Prepared by David Evans and Associates, Inc August 2, 2010 
End of Description 
Duane L Zimmennan, P.L.S. License No. 8655 
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Plaintiff.Respondent, ) Coeur d'Alene, May 2012 Term f 
v. 
HJ GRATHOL, a California general 
partnership, 
2012 Opinion No. 85 t,v I 0- l(X)qS 
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Appeal from the district court of the First Judicial District of the State ofldaho, 
Kootenai County. Hon. Lansing Haynes, District Judge. 
The decision of the district court is filf!nned. Neither party is awarded 
attorney's fees. Costs on appeal are awarded to Respondent. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP, Coeur d'Alene, for Appellant. Christopher D. 
Gabbert argued. 
Holland & Hart, Boise, for Respondent. Mary V. York argued. 
W. JONES, Justice 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
HJ Grathol ("Grathol") is a California general partnership that owns real estate in 
Kootenai County, Idaho. Grathol purchased a parcel for commercial real estate development, 
which is located at or near the northeast comer of US Highway 95 and State Highway 54 in 
Kootenai County (hereinafter referred to as "Grathol's parcel" or "the parcel"). 'The Idaho 
Transportation Board ("the Board") later sought to condemn sixteen acres of the parcel 
(hereinafter the portion of Grathol's parcel that is subject to condemnation shall be referred to as 
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··the subject property") in order to realign US Highway 95 and to construct an interchange with 
State Highway 54. Grathol contends that the Board failed to negotiate for the subject property in 
good faith because the Board's offer did not account for the extension of Sylvan Road to Roberts 
Road ("the Sylvan/Roberts Extension"), which Grathol contends would front the subject property 
and significantly increase its value. Grathol further asserts that the Board failed to file its 
Complaint and Order of Condemnation in accordance with I.C. § 7-707 before moving for early 
possession of the subject property pursuant to the "quick-take" provisions ofl.C. § 7-721. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Grathol engages in the business of commercial real estate development in Idaho. It has 
taken significant steps to commercially develop the parcel, which it originally purchased as a 
commercial real estate investment venture. To further the development of its parcel, Grathol 
filed site plans, submitted a traffic impact study, and successfully secured commercial rezoning 
from Kootenai County. Moreover, C'.Jfathol has marketed the parcel and engaged in negotiations 
with potential tenants. 
As it currently exists, US Highway 95 is primarily a two-lane highway. In 2002, the 
Board initiated a comprehensive study of US Highway 95 between the communities of Garwood 
and Sagle to determine the feasibility of improvLr1g the highway to a four-lane divided highway 
with Type V Access Control. The study concluded that the highway should be improved in 
order to increase safety and accommodate present and future traffic demands. The study was 
eventually incorporated into the Garwood to Sagle Project, which primarily sought to realign US 
Highway 95 and to construct an interchange with State Highway 54. The Board approved the 
Garwood to Sagle Project through its annual approval of the federally funded State 
Transportation Improvement Plan ("the STIP"), which incorporated the Garwood to Sagle 
Project. Due to the size of the Garwood to Sagle Projec~ the Board divided it into seven 
segments. Grathol 's parcel is located within the Athol Segment. 
The Board has the power of eminent domain pursuant to LC. § 40-311(1). The Board 
contends that the subject property is needed for the Garwood to Sagle Project, Athol Segment, 
and that it authorized the condemnation of the subject property through its annual approval of the 
STIP. According to MAI appraiser Stanley Moe, the fair market value of the subject property is 
$571,000. In an effort to avoid a condemnation action, the Board offered Grathol an additional 
ten percent above the appraised fair market value for a total offer of $628,100. Grathol 
2 
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countered the Board's offer with a demand for $3 million to $3.5 million on June 28, 2010, 
contending that the appraisal does not account for the subject property's frontage, which would 
result from the Sylvan/Roberts Extension. 
The Board contends that it is not seeking to condemn any portion of the parcel in order to 
construct the Sylvan/Roberts Extension. It points out that neither the Complaint nor the Order of 
Condemnation references the condemnation of any portion of the parcel for construction of the 
Sylvan/Roberts Extension. In this regard, Jason Minzghor, Project Development Engineer with 
the Board, contends that Grathol is under the mistaken belief that the Board intends to condemn 
a portion of its parcel for the Sylvan/Roberts Extension because of a meeting held on August 1, 
2010. During that meeting, two property owners, Jameson Mortgage and Frederick Krasnick, 
approached the Board with a proposal to extend Sylvan Road to Roberts Road through their 
respective properties. Minzghor asserts that the proposal was contingent upon Mortgage, 
Krasnick and Grathol dedicating a portion of their properties for the Sylvan/Roberts Extension in 
exchange for the resulting frontages that would run through their properties. Minzghor claims 
that after Grathol rejected the proposal, there have been no further plans in this regard. 
On November 19, 2010, the Board filed its Complaint with an attached Order of 
Condemnation, which was dated November 17, 2010, and was signed by the Director of the 
Idaho Transportation Department ("the Director") on behalf of the Board. On December 21, 
2010, the Board filed its Motion for an Order Granting Possession of Real Property pursuant to 
the "quick-take" provisions of LC.§ 7-721. Grathol filed its Response to the Board's Motion for 
an Order Grdilting Possession of Real Property on January 10, 2011, contending, among other 
things, that the Complaint and the Order of Condemnation failed to meet the statutory 
requirements of I.C. § 7-707 and that the Board failed to negotiate in good faith. The district 
court filed its Order Granting Possession of Real Property on January 27, 2011, holding that the 
requirements of LC. § 7-721 were satisfied and that the amount of just compensation was 
$571,000. The district court then filed a Rule 54(b) Certificate on January 27, 2011, holding that 
there was no just reason for delay of the entry of final judgment because the Board established 
the "quick-take" provisions ofl.C. § 7-721. On February l, 2011, Grathol timely filed its Notice 
of Appeal. Thereafter, the district court entered Final Judgment on March 4, 2011. 
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
3 
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1. Whether the Complaint and Order of Condemnation were filed in accordance with LC.§ 
7-707? 
2. Whether the Board failed to negotiate in good faith pursuant to I.C. § 7-721(2)(d)? 
3. Whether Grathol is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to l.C. § 12-117? 
4. Whether the Board is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to J.C.§ 12-121? 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The "quick-take" provisions ofl.C. § 7-721(2) allow state entities that possess the power 
of eminent domain to "obtain property ... for a public purpose without the delay of a lengthy 
trial." Payette Lakes Water and Sewer Dist. v. Hays. 103 Idaho 717,718,653 P.2d 438,439 
(1982). After commencing an action for condemnation, the state entity may deposit with the 
court the amount initially detennined as "just compensation" for the property. Id After a 
hearing is held, the court can then enter an order enabling the state entity to take possession of 
and use the property pending a fuil triai. id. Subsection (2) of LC. § 7-721 states that the court 
"shall first determine whether or not plaintiff (a) has the right of eminent domain, 
(b) whether or not the use to which the property is to be applied is a use 
auth01ized by law, (c) whether or not the taking is necessary to such use, and {d) 
whether or not plaintiff has sought, in good faith, to purchase the lands sought to 
be taken .... " 
A. The Complaint and the Order of Condemnation Were Filed in Accordance with I.C. 
§ 7-707 
Grathol contends that the Order of Condemnation was not filed in accordance with I.C. § 
7-707(6) because the Director signed the Order of Condemnation and the Board never approved 
the condemnation of the subject property through a fonnal board meeting, which Grathol asserts 
is contrary to a strict construction of I.C. §§ 40-308, 40-311 (1 ), and 40-505, among others. 
Grathol further asserts that because the Order of Condemnation, which Grathol claims contains 
an expr~s& declaration that the Board is extending Sylvan Road to Roberts Road through 
Grathol' s parcel, conflicts with the Complaint, which Grathol asserts does not address the 
Sylvan/Roberts Extension, both are invalid pursuant to I.C. § 7~ 707(6) because they do not 
provide a clear description of the property rights acquired. 
1. The Director May Sign the Order o/Condemnalion on Behalf of the Board 
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free 
review." Doe v. Boy Scouts of Am., 148 Idaho 427, 430, 224 P.3d 494, 497 (2009). Judicial 
interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the statute's literal words. State v. 
4 
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Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214. 219 (1999). "This Court interprets statutes 
according to their plain, express meaning and resorts to judicial construction only if the statute is 
ambiguous, incomplete, absurd, or arguably in conflict with other laws." Arel v. T & L Enter., 
Inc., 146 Idaho 29, 32, 189 P.3d 1149, 1152 (2008). 
Idaho Code section 7-707(6) states: 
An order of condemnation, or resolution, or other official and binding document 
entered by the plaintiff which sets forth and clearly identifies all property rights to 
be acquired including rights to and from the public way, and permanent and 
temporary easements known or reasonably identifiable to the condemning 
authority. 
According to the plain language of the statute, an order of condemnation must be "entered" by 
the Board. Pursuant to I.C. § 40-505, the Director possesses "necessary incidental powers" of 
administration on behalf of the Board. Black's Law dictionary defines an "incidental power" as 
"[a] power that, although not expressly granted, must exist because it is necessary to the 
accomplishment of an express purpose." Black's Law Dictionary 1288 (9th ed. 2009). 
Therefore, according to LC. § 40-505, the Director possesses broad powers to carry out the 
express actions of the Board. In this regard, the plain language of I.C. § 40-505 states that the 
Director acts as the administrative arm of the Board. The power of eminent domain is one of the 
powers exclusively vested by law in the Board. See LC.§ 40-311(1). As the record establishes, 
the Director did not unilaterally condemn the subject property without the authority of the Board. 
Instead, the Board approved of the condemnation of the subject property through its annual 
approval of the STIP. See I.C. § 40-310. Although the Order of Condemnation was signed by 
the Director, it was filed in the name of the Board, not the Director, and expressly invoked the 
Board's power of condemnation pursuant to LC.§ 40-311(1). It is the Board, not the Director, 
who is exercising the power of eminent domain in the Order of Condemnation. The Director is 
merely acting in an administrative capacity on behalf of the Board pursuant to LC. § 40-314(3) 
and Board Policy B-03-01 in order to carry out the Board's express power of condemnation. 
Grathol's assertion that the Board must hold a board meeting every time it condemns 
private property for a public purpose is unsupported by the plain language of the statutes that 
Grathol cites in its opening brief and impractical due to the sheer size of public roads projects 
and the relative infrequency of board meetings. It is for these reasons that the Director typically 
signs orders of condemnation on behalf of the Board. Furthermore, the cases that Grathol cites 
in its opening brief are irrelevant and unconvincing because the Board never ceded its power to 
5 
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condemn private property for public purposes to the Director. Grathol's assertion that the Board 
violated Idaho's Open Meeting Act because it did not hold a formal board meeting to condemn 
the subject property is similarly unconvincing. 
2. The Complaint and Order of Condemnation Do Not Express Any Intention to 
Condemn Any Portion of Grathol 's land for the Purpose of lhe Sylvan/Roberts 
Extension 
Although the Order of Condemnation refers to the Sylvan/Roberts Extension, that section 
deals with rights of access to and from the remaining non-condemned portions of Grathol's 
parcel to various roads and highways. Furthermore, the Order of Condemnation specifically 
identifies the subject property as being such "property [as] has been designated and shown as the 
above parcel number on the plans of said project now on file in the office of the Idaho 
Transportation Department." The plans refer to the US-95, Garwood to Sagle, Athol Stage, and 
Sylvan/Roberts Extension. The Complaint makes reference to those plans as well when it 
identifies the subject property, but it also makes no reference to the Sylvan/Roberts Extension. 
Instead, it states that the Board seeks to condemn the subject property in order to "widen[] and 
improv[e] ... U.S. Highway 95 south of State Highway 52 to north of the community of Sagle .. 
. . " The Complaint further elaborates that "[t]he particular segment of the Project for which 
Defendants' property is required is U.S. 95 Garwood to Sagle - Athol Stage, Kootenai County, 
Idaho, ITD Project No. A009(791 ), Key No. 9791.'' 
Thus, there is no basis for Grathol' s assertion that the Order of Condemnation conflicts 
with the Complaint. Grathol would like this Court to consider the possible extension of Sylvan 
Road to Roberts Road through Grathol's property in the future in detennining just compensation 
and whether the Complaint conflicts with the Order of Condemnation. If Sylvan Road is 
extended to Roberts Road through Grathol' s property in the future, then, at that time, the Board 
will be required to determine the just compensation due for that portion of Grathol's property 
that is necessary for the project. At this time, this Court refuses to engage in such speculative 
contemplation. 




Grathol contends that the Board did not negotiate in good faith to purchase the subject 
property pursuant to LC. § 7-721(2)(d) because the appraisal did not include any consideration 
for the extension of Sylvan Road to Roberts Road across Grathol's parcel. 
Idaho Code section 7-721 states that "[i]n any proceeding under the provisions of this 
chapter for the acquisition of real property, the plaintiff may take possession of and use such 
property at any time after just compensation has been judicially determined and payment thereof 
made into court." Judicial determination of just compensation is satisfied when the court 
determines, among other requirements, that the 
plaintiff has sought, in good faith, to purchase the lands sought to be taken and the 
court shall enter an order thereon which shall be a final order as to these issues 
and an appeal may be taken therefrom; provided, however, no appeal therefrom 
shall stay further proceedings. 
I.C. § 7-721(2){d). Just compensation is based on fair market value, which is the price for which 
the property that is taken could be sold by an owner willing to sell to a willing purchaser on the 
date of the taking. Ada Cnty. Highway Dist. v. A1agwire, 104 Idaho 656, 65&--59, 662 P.2d 237, 
239-40 (1983). 
Neither the Order of Condemnation nor the Complaint proposes condemnation of any 
portion of Grathol's parcel for the purpose of the Sylvan/Roberts Extension. Though the Order 
of Condemnation briefly mentions the Sylvan/Roberts Extension, that section describes right of 
access to and from the remaining property belonging to Grathol to the Sylvan/Roberts Extension. 
The Affidavit of Jason Minzghor asserts that the Board has no intention of condemning any 
portion of Grathol's parcel for the construction of the Sylvan/Roberts Extension. As mentioned 
before, Grathol elected not to dedicate its property for the Sylvan/Roberts Extension, causing the 
~ard to abana6n Jlr~t pr}:5po§at'.:'. l3~ca(i&J the basis of Grathol' s argument relies entirely on its 
\:Jf"· ·:· > j?i~ ·:' _,. ',:'. 'G,1, .; . ,, _,-,. ;\ .·.i ''i\.\·l,..' .. :,:·I ,fJ 
assertion-thaethe'·-;Boi'.rrd~s=offer'.aoes"nof"account for the Sylvan/Roberts Extension, this Court 
/'!(.' ··.· i• ()'\f, +HJbJ ~lY!trn i~Vl)fb <.,:)I "' • , .. , .r;f; 
holds that the Board negotiat'edt'h'l' go9fl'. faith for the subject property pursuant to LC. § 7-
--~,., .... ' - .,: .~~' if:.{ft t-c~ ~s,,.:r~e :3(f.1 ~}fl~ tJf':.bf~ 1,rr· f'!(:. ·_\;¼~ 1VV 
721(2)(d). 
;,, 
~(). __ ... G.r.it..hol.b..No.t Entitle.d.to .. Attor.ney's Fees on Appeal Pursuant to J.C. § 12-117 
... ,-- . .Grathol requests attorney) fees q~ appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-117. Because Grathol is 
V',1<.J~d . . ·-·'"" ••.. ., •.. - .... _ .................. ·---· , -
not the prevailing party on appeal, it is not entitled to attorney's fees. 
D. The Board Is Not Entitled to Attorney's Fees on Appeal Pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 
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The Board contends that it is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-
121 because Grathol acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law in filing this appeal. 
Pursuant to I.C. § 12-121, the prevailing party may be awarded attorney's fees "when this Court 
is left with an abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation/' Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 571, 97 P.3d 428,438 
(2004). This Court denies the Board's request because I.C. § 12-117 is the exclusive means for 
awarding attorney's fees for actions involving state entities. See Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch 
Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630,635,226 P.3d 1277, 1282 (2010). 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Because the Board negotiated in good faith for the su~ject property and filed its 
Complaint and Order of Condemnation in accordance with I.C. § 7-707, this Court affoms the 
district court's decision holding that the "quick-take" provisions of I.C. § 7-721(2) were 
satisfied. Neither party is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal. Costs are awarded to the Board. 
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices EISMANN, J. JONES and HORTON CONCUR. 
I; Stephen W. Kenyon, Clert< o1 tbe w 
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Plaintiff Idaho Transportation Department ("ITD"), by and through its attorneys of 
record, Holland & Hart LLP, respectfully move this Court for an Order awarding ITD its 
reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred in this matter, totaling $724,136.00 in attorney fees, 
$13,079.06 in costs as a matter of right and $169,103.59 in discretionary costs. ITD is the 
prevailing party in the present lawsuit, and properly entitled to an award of their reasonable costs 
and fees pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho case law governing the award 
of costs and fees in condemnation cases. 
After a five day trial, the Court awarded HJ Grathol $675,000.00 for just compensation. 
In doing so, the Court adopted the conclusion ofIID's expert and rejected HJ Grathol's expert.s 
and conclusions. HJ Grathol had initially sought over $7 million in just compensation, but that 
number was reduced before trial through motions filed by ITD. At trial, HJ Grathol sought over 
$3 million. In addition to being substantially less than the amounts sought by HJ Grathol, the 
final award was less than the $1.1 million settlement offer made by ITD before trial. 
ITD's Motion is based upon and supported by the records and files in this case, as well as 
ITD's Brief in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, and the Affidavit of Mary V. 
York in Support oflTD's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs filed with this motion. 
DATED this 18th day of June, 2012. 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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700 Northwest Blvd. 
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Fax: 208-664-5884 
Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol 
5645368_1 
D U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivered 
D Fax 
D E-mail 
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Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") files this brief in support of 
its Motion For Attorney Fees And Costs. The amount of the attorney fees, costs as a matter of 
right, and discretionary costs sought by ITD in this motion are set forth in detail in the Affidavit 
Of Mary V. York In Support Of ITD's Motion For Attorney Fees And Costs (hereinafter the 
"June 18, 2012 York Affidavit"). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As happens all too often, Defendant HJ Grathol attempted to tum the condemnation of a 
portion of its property into the equivalent of winning the state lottery. Grathol bought the entire 
56.8-acre parcel for $1.4 million in May of 2008. The real estate market only went down, 
dramatically, from May of2008 to November 17, 2010, the date of taking. Yet Grathol made 
demands and sought to recover as much as $7,369,500.00 for the taking of 16.314 acres of the 
56.8-acre parcel (see Grathol's Third Supp. Resps. to Discovery, at 7-8 (Ex. K to Feb. Feb. 29, 
2012 York Aff.), and at trial sought as much as $3,093,360.00 (see Grathol Tr. Ex. J). 
Grathol' s outlandish demands for compensation had no connection with fair market value 
and were not based on sound principles or reasoning. They fought aggressively to avoid 
answering discovery and disclosing expert opinions and made every effort to prevent their claims 
from being subjected to scrutiny and evaluation. Grathol engaged in improper and abusive 
tactics throughout the case, which made it substantially and needlessly more expensive. 
After a five-day trial, the Court awarded Grathol just compensation in the amount of 
$675,000.00 for the taking. See Post Trial Memorandum Decision And Order For Judgment, at 
33 (filed May 24, 2012). The award was far below the amounts sought by Grathol in the case. 
The award was also far below the pretrial offer of settlement by ITD in the amount of $1.1 
million. See Ex. B to the June 18, 2012 York Aff. Accordingly, ITD is clearly the prevailing 
party in this case. 
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As the prevailing party, ITD is entitled by law to recover its reasonable attorney fees and 
costs. In addition, this case was extremely costly and vexatious due entirely to abuses and 
improper tactics by Grathol in an effort to obtain a wholly unjustified and unfair windfall, not 
just compensation. These abuses and tactics included: 
• opposing the motion for possession on meritless grounds; 
• At the Status Conference for Scheduling and Planning on March 31, 2011, 
counsel for Grathol rejected the Court's suggestion for a Court-ordered mediation, 
indicating the unwillingness of Grathol to try to resolve this matter; 
• repeatedly failing and refusing to answer discovery; 
• repeatedly failing and refusing to disclose expert opinions; 
• hiding expert opinions behind an inapplicable and improper assertion of the 
federal "actor-viewer" exception, which only applies in federal court and only 
applies to the drafting of expert reports; even in federal court, the exception does 
not excuse the duty to disclose expert opinions and does not circumvent written 
discovery asking for expert opinions; 
• making repeated and continuing demands for compensation based on an alleged 
taking for Sylvan Road - despite having no factual basis for the claims and 
despite repeated rulings from the Court denying and dismissing the claims; 
• presenting improper valuations that had no "before and after" analysis, no 
understandable explanation, and numerous violations of law and deviations from 
accepted appraisal standards; 
• making claims for damages that were clearly barred by Idaho law; 
• dropping claims for damages barred by law only after forcing ITD to engage in 
expensive briefing and preparation for oral argument on a motion for summary to 
dismiss these claims; and 
• making outlandish demands for compensation that were not supported by the 
market, had no relation to "fair market value," and were soundly rejected by the 
Court. 
For these reasons, and as discussed in more detail below, ITD should be awarded its 
reasonable costs and attorney fees in this case. 
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II. LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND 
COSTS IN IDAHO CONDEMNATION CASES 
Generally, the award of costs and attorney fees is governed by Idaho Code § 12-121 and 
Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Under those provisions, costs and attorney fees 
may be awarded to the prevailing party, with the restriction that an award of fees under section 
12-121 may only be granted upon a finding that the case was brought, pursued or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. LC.§ 12-121; I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l), 54(e)(l). The 
determination of which party is the prevailing party requires the trial court to "in its sound 
discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the 
respective parties, ... , and the extent to which each party prevaiied upon each of such issue or 
claims." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). 
As with other issues unique to the law of eminent domain, the award of costs and 
attorney fees in Idaho condemnation cases has developed its own set of rules and applications. 
The award of costs and attorney fees in a condemnation case involves a two part analysis: First, 
a determination must be made as to who the prevailing party is under Rule 54(d)(l)(B) and 
guidelines established in Ada County Highway Dist. v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873,673 P.2d 1067 
(1983) and its progeny. Second, once the prevailing party has been identified, the amount of 
costs and attorney fees to be awarded shall be determined based on the provisions of Rules 
54(d)(l) and 54(e)(3). The trilogy ofldaho cases that set forth these rules are: Ada County 
Highway Dist. v. Acarrequi, supra; State ex rel Ohman v. Talbot Family Trust, 120 Idaho 825, 
820 P.2d 695 (1991); and State of Idaho v. Jardine, 130 Idaho 318,940 P.2d 1137 (1997). 
In Acarrequi, the Idaho Supreme Court first announced the rules that govern the award of 
costs and attorney fees in condemnation cases. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 875,673 P.2d at 1069 
(holding that "we deem it necessary to adopt a new standard governing an award of both 
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attorneys' fees and costs, only as it relates to a condemnation proceeding."). In establishing the 
new costs and fee rules that would apply in condemnation actions, the Acarrequi Court 
distinguished an award of just compensation from an award of costs and attorney fees. The 
Court was careful to make clear that costs and attorney fees are not required to be awarded as 
part of just compensation. Id. at 876,673 P.2d at 1070. The Court rejected the landowner's 
argument and the trial court's holding to the contrary, and specifically disagreed with "the trial 
court's conclusion that such fees and costs are mandatory as within the definition of just 
compensation." Id. 
Under rules set forth in Acarrequi, awards of costs and attorney fees in a condemnation 
proceeding lie within the discretion of the trial court and an award of costs and fees do not 
require a finding by the trial court that the case was "brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation." Id. at 876-77, 673 P.2d at 1070-71. Additionally, 
Acarrequi established factors and guidelines to assist the trial court in making its determination 
of the prevailing party and whether an award of costs and fees should be made in a 
condemnation action. Id at 878,673 P.2d at 1072. Those guidelines are: 
(1) whether the condemner reasonably made a timely offer of settlement of at 
least 90 percent of the ultimate jury verdict; 
(2) whether the offer was timely and not made "on the courthouse steps an hour 
prior to trial"; 
(3) whether the offer was made within a reasonable period after the institution of 
action. 
( 4) whether the condemnee contested the allegations of public use and necessity; 
( 5) the outcome of any hearing on such a challenge; 
( 6) whether the condemnor made any modifications in the plans or designs of 
the project that resulted from the landowner's challenge; and 
(7) whether the condemnee voluntarily granted possession of the property 
pending the resolution of the just compensation issue. 
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Id. 
In State v. Ivan H Talbot Family Trust, 120 Idaho 825, 829, 820 P.2d 695, 699 (1991), 
the Idaho Supreme Court gave additional guidance on how the trial court is to determine the 
prevailing party. In Talbot, the State made a settlement offer to the landowner approximately 15 
(fifteen) months after the complaint was filed. While the offer was considerably less than the 
amount of the jury's verdict, the trial court determined that the State, and not the landowner, was 
the prevailing party in the action and denied the landowner's request for attorney fees. The 
landowner appealed, arguing that the trial court had abused its discretion in failing to award them 
attorney fees. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Talbot held that "in addition to considering the Acarrequi 
guidelines the trial court must apply I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) to determine the prevailing party." Id 
The Idaho Supreme Court rejected the landowner's arguments, upholding the trial court's 
determination that the State was the prevailing party and that the landowner should be denied its 
attorney fees. Id. This ruling is significant in that it expanded application of the Acarrequi cost 
and fee rules to apply to both the landowner and the State. 
The third in the trilogy of Idaho cases on costs and fees in condemnation cases is State ex 
rel. Smith v. Jardine, 130 Idaho 318,940 P.2d 1137 (1997). In Jardine, the Court reaffirmed the 
Acarrequi and Talbot rules, and established a hierarchy between the Acarrequi guidelines and 
Rule 54(d)(l)(B). After Jardine, the Acarrequi guidelines and Rule 54(d)(l)(B) are still to be 
applied to determine the prevailing party, but the provisions of the Rule only apply to the extent 
that they do not conflict with theAcarrequi guidelines. Jardine, at 321,940 P.2d at 1140. The 
Court in Jardine also held that the issue of whether a reasonable offer of settlement was timely 
made is a case-specific determination. "[E]ach case will depend on its own circumstances." Id 
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When the Idaho Supreme Court first announced the rules to be applied in determining 
awards of costs and fees in condemnation actions, they appeared to apply only to condemnees 
and not to the condemnor. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 876,673 P.2d at 1070 (stating that I.C. § 7-
718, which provides for costs to be allowed and apportioned to either the condemnor or the 
condemnee, requires the condemnor to pay all costs and referencing the attorney fee rules for 
awards to condemnees). However, in Talbot, a unanimous Court announced that the State could 
be determined to be the prevailing party such that the landowner was not entitled to attorney 
fees, which are considered to be costs under Rule 54(e)(5). Talbot, 120 Idaho at 829, 820 P.2d at 
699. In Jardine, the Court, again in a unanimous decision, reviewed the Talbot decision at length 
and did not change or limit the extension of the cost and fee rules to condemners. Based on these 
decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court, the award of costs and fees to condemners is permitted under 
Idaho condemnation law. As such, ITD is entitled to its costs and attorney fees in this case as set 
forth in the June 18, 2102 York Affidavit filed with this brief. 
After reaching a determination of the prevailing party using the above rules, a 
determination is then to be made as to the amount of costs and attorney fees to be awarded. In 
making this determination, the factors set forth in Rule 54(e)(3) are applied, as they would in any 
other civil case. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho at 878, 673 P.2d at 1072. 
III. ITD IS THE PREVAILING PARTY 
Based upon the criteria set by the Idaho Supreme Court in Acarrequi, I 05 Idaho at 878, 
673 P .2d at 1072, ITD is the prevailing party in this action: 
A. ITD Made A Timely Offer Of Settlement Of At Least 90% Of The Verdict. 
On December 15, 2011, ITD made an offer of settlement to Grathol in the amount of $1.1 
million. See Ex. B to the June 18, 2012 York Aff. The just compensation award was 
$675,000.00. Thus, ITD clearly made an "offer of settlement of at least 90 percent of the 
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ultimate jury verdict," and satisfied this element of the prevailing party analysis. Acarrequi, 105 
Idaho at 878, 673 P .2d at 1072. 
B. ITD's Settlement Offer Of $1.1 Million Was Timely Made. 
ITD's made its offer of settlement on December 15, 2011. Trial began on March 5, 2102. 
Therefore, the offer was not made "on the court house steps an hour prior to trial." Jardine, 130 
Idaho at 320, 940 P.2d at 1139. In addition, the parties expressly agreed to extend the deadline 
for making an Acarrequi offer to December 16, 2011. See Ex. C to the June 18, 201~ York Aff. 
Therefore, the offer of December 15, 2011 was timely made. 
C. Grathol Did Not Voluntarily Grant Possession Of The Property Pending 
Resolution Of The Just Compensation Issue. 
Grathol had known since ITD sent its right-of way acquisition packet in June of2010 that 
ITD was seeking possession of the property in order to move forward with the US 95 Project. 
ITD counsel contacted Grathol's attorney in October of2010 to ask that Grathol agree to 
possession. At the time, Grathol' s counsel acknowledged that possession stipulations were 
common, and indicated that an agreement was likely. 
On November 2, 2010 counsel for ITD sent a proposed stipulation for possession to 
Grathol's counsel. Over the next 2 months, counsel for ITD repeatedly contacted Grathol's 
counsel seeking a response to the November 2, 2010 stipulation for possession. Despite 
assurances from Grathol's counsel that a response would be forthcoming, Grathol failed to 
respond to the proposed stipulation. 
Because of Grathol's delay, ITD began to be pressed by funding and construction 
deadlines on the US 95 Project. ITD had no choice but to file a Motion for Possession on 
December 21, 2010. 
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1. Grathol opposed ITD's motion for possession on meritless grounds. 
In opposing the motion for possession of the condemned property, Grathol did not 
challenge the statutory requirements for possession: (1) that ITD has the power of eminent 
domain; (2) that the US 95 Project is a public use; (3) that the condemned property was 
necessary for that use, or (4) that ITD had negotiated in good faith to purchase the property to be 
condemned. See LC.§ 7-721(2). Instead, Grathol made two baseless arguments. 
First, Grathol argued that only the ITD Board, and not the Director, could sign the 
administrative order of condemnation. This argument had no merit because the Director has 
both statutory and administrative authority to execute administrative orders of condemnation 
once public highway projects are approved by the Board. See Idaho Code§ 40-505 (the Director 
is the administrative officer of the Board and shall exercise all necessary administrative powers); 
and Aff. of Karl D. Vogt (filed Jan. 18, 2011) (describing express delegation of authority by the 
Board to the Director to execute administrative orders of condemnation). After losing this 
argument before the District Court, Grathol appealed the Order Granting Possession of Real 
Property (filed Jan. 27, 2011) to the Idaho Supreme Court. Grathol's argument was soundly 
rejected by unanimous decision of the Idaho Supreme Court on June 1, 2012. See Decision in 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38511, at 4-6 (attached as Ex. E to the June 18, 2012 York Aff.). 
Second, Grathol opposed ITD's motion for possession on the grounds that ITD did not 
negotiate in good faith to purchase a portion of the Grathol property to construct Sylvan Road 
across the Grathol property. This argument was also baseless because ITD is not constructing an 
extension of Sylvan Road on the Grathol property, and ITD did not acquire or condemn any 
portion of the Grathol property for that purpose. Therefore, ITD was not under any obligation to 
negotiate for the purchase of land for Sylvan Road. 
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After evidentiary hearing, the District Court ruled that ITD was not condemning land for 
Sylvan Road and was not constructing Sylvan Road across Grathol's property. Grathol appealed 
this ruling also, and the Supreme Court rejected all claims and arguments by Grathol relating to 
Sylvan Road. See id. at 6-7. 
In short, Grathol took the routine issue of possession of the condemned property and 
turned it into a prolonged legal battle that had no factual or legal merit whatsoever. This 
needless battle cost ITD substantial amounts in attorney fees and costs. 
action. 
D. Conclusion. 
Based on the factors established in Acarrequi, ITD is clearly the prevailing party in this 
IV. AS THE PREVAILING PARTY, ITD IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
ITS REASONABLE COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES. 
As the prevailing party, ITD is entitled to recover its reasonable costs and fees in this 
matter. As noted above, once the determination of the prevailing party is made, the amount of 
attorney fees and costs is governed by the factors under Rule 54( e )(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Those factors are: 
(1) the time and labor required; 
(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; 
(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience 
and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law; 
( 4) the prevailing charges for like work; 
( 5) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 
( 6) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case; 
(7) the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(8) the undesirability of the case; 
(9) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 
(10) awards in similar cases; 
(11) the reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted Legal 
Research), if the Court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a 
party's case; 
(12) any other factors, which the Court deems, appropriate in the particular case. 
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I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). 
V. DISCUSSION OF FACTORS UNDER RULE 54(e)(3) RELATING TO THE AMOUNT 
OF FEES AND COSTS. 
A. The Amount Involved And The Results Obtained. 
The just compensation award in this case was $675,000.00. Grathol made demands and 
sought to recover as much as $7,369,500.00 for the taking. See Grathol's Third Supp. Resps. to 
Discovery, at 7-8 (Ex. K to Feb. Feb. 29, 2012 York Aff.). At trial, Grathol sought as much as 
$3,093,360.00. See Grathol Tr. Ex. J. Therefore, the amounts involved and the results obtained 
more than justified the fees and costs incurred by ITD in this case. 
B. 'Whether The Fee Is Fixed Or Contingent. 
ITD agreed to pay attorney fees on an hourly basis. Hourly fee agreements are an 
appropriate basis for attorney fees under Acarrequi, supra. 
C. The Skill Requisite To Perform The Legal Service Properly And The 
Experience And Ability Of The Attorney In The Particular Field Of Law. 
Mary York and Steve Bowman are experienced litigators with extensive advocacy 
records. Ms. York and Mr. Bowman have been lead counsel on more than 50 condemnation 
cases for state and local agencies. Ted Tollefson also has several years of experience as a 
litigator. Paralegal Barbara Feraci has worked on dozens of condemnation cases. All of the 
unique skills possessed by these practitioners contributed to the successful outcome for ITD in 
this case. 
D. The Prevailing Charges For Like Work. 
Mary York, Steve Bowman, Ted Tollefson, Katherine Georger, Matthew Gunn, Barbara 
Feraci, and Stephanie Omsberg are all experienced, efficient, knowledgeable practitioners whose 
billable rates are commensurate with prevailing local rates for attorneys of similar levels of 
experience and areas of practice. Ms. York, with an hourly rate of $325-$340, has 18 years of 
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experience. Mr. Bowman, with an hourly rate of $335-$350, has 21 years of experience. Mr. 
Tollefson, with an hourly rate of $245-$255, has 9 years of experience. Ms. Georger, with an 
hourly rate of $200, has 3 years of experience. Mr. Gunn, with an hourly rate of $195-$210, has 
4 years of experience. Ms. Feraci, with an hourly rate of $160-$165, has 36 years of experience. 
Ms. Omsberg, with an hourly rate of $160, has 14 years of experience. Additionally, ITD relied 
upon the technical experience of David Carter and Nick Bouck to assist in the preparation of trial 
exhibits and to provide technical support at trial. Mr. Carter's hourly rate is $185 and Mr. 
Bouck's hourly rate is $145. 
Court decisions confirm the reasonableness of the hourly rates charged by Holland & 
Hart practitioners. See, e.g., LaPeter v. Canada Life, 2007 WL 4287489, at *2 and *2, n. l. (D. 
Idaho May 11, 2007); Restoration Industry Ass 'n v. Certified Restorers Consulting Group, 2008 
WL 821078, at *1 (D. Idaho March 24, 2008). 
Additionally, in 2009 in the case of AVP Restaurant Group v. Godzilla, et al., CVOC-
0711663, the District Court for the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for the 
County of Ada approved the hourly rates of Mary V. York ($270 per hour) and Ted S. Tollefson 
($215 per hour). No reason exists to value the services of these attorneys at an hourly rate below 
that established by the market. See, e.g., Christensen v. Stevedoring Services of America, 557 
F.3d 1049, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2009) (once the prevailing attorney offers evidence of a market 
rate, there is a presumption of reasonableness, and the court may not reduce that rate without 
explaining the basis for its decision). 
E. The Nature And Length Of The Professional Relationship With The Client. 
Holland & Hart has represented ITD for over 11 years. Holland & Hart represents ITD in 
condemnation, construction, contract, environmental, and employment matters. Holland & Hart 
also became the designated counsel for ITD's GARVEE/Connecting Idaho Partners Program on 
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November 2, 2006. Holland & Hart was the successful applicant for ITD's open-bid "Request 
for Proposal" for the GARVEE work. A true and correct copy of the November 2, 2006 
appointment by the Idaho Attorney General is attached as Ex. A to the June 18, 2012 York Aff. 
VI. DISCUSSION OF FACTORS UNDER RULE 54(E)(3) RELATING TO THE CAUSE 
OF THE AMOUNT OF FEES AND COSTS 
Numerous factors under Rule 54(e)(3) relate to the cause of the amount of attorney fees 
and costs incurred in the case. These factors include the time and labor required; the difficulty of 
the case; the undesirability of the case; time limitations imposed by the circumstances of the 
case; and any other factors deemed appropriate by the Court in the particular case. 
In this case, the attorney fees and costs were substantiaiiy increased by deiays, abuses, 
and unnecessary and meritless claims and side battles by Grathol. These circumstances are 
discussed below. 
A. Grathol's Persistent Attempt To Recover Compensation For Sylvan Road. 
On January 21, 2011, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on ITD's motion for 
possession. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court held that ITD was not condemning any 
land for Sylvan Road and was not constructing Sylvan Road across Grathol's property. Hearing 
Transcript ("Tr."), at 61 :2-25 (Ex. 1 to Jan. 6, 2012 York Aff.). The Court further concluded that 
"[t]he complaint itself, the controlling portions of that complaint, does not show a taking of 
defendant's property for the expansion of Sylvan Road into Roberts Road or the expansion of 
Sylvan Road through the Grathol property[.]" Tr. at 61:18-25. 
The Court's ruling was fully supported by the record. Of particular note for purposes of 
the present motion, Grathol never offered any contrary facts to support its Sylvan Road claim. 
The Court later entered a written order granting possession that barred Grathol's claims 
based on Sylvan Road. See Order Granting Possession of Property (filed Jan. 27, 2011). The 
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Idaho Supreme Court also rejected Grathol's claims based on Sylvan Road. See Idaho Supreme 
Court Decision of June 1, 2012, at 6-7 (Ex. E to the June 18, 2012 York Aft). 
Despite the prior oral and written rulings of the Court, Grathol persisted in its pursuit of 
compensation based on Sylvan Road. Long after the Court's ruling barring the claim, Grathol 
submitted expert disclosures that included claims for compensation based on a taking of land for 
Sylvan Road. Specifically, the valuation by Mr. Alan Johnson of Grathol included claims for 
compensation for taking land for Sylvan Road, and damage claims based on construction of 
Sylvan Road across the Grathol Property. Johnson Dep. at 92:6-16; 93:16-94:2; 94:8-10; 
102:14-103:3 (Ex. 3 to Jan. 6, 2012 York Aff.); Grathol Third Suppl. Discovery Resp., at 6 (Ex. 
6 to Jan. 6, 2012 York Aff.). 
After the Court's prior rulings, Grathol also served discovery seeking information and 
documents relating to Sylvan Road. When ITD refused to respond to discovery on a claim that 
had been rejected by the Court and dismissed from the case, Grathol filed a Motion to Compel on 
September 13, 2011. 
Finally, because Grathol's experts and attorneys continued to press claims for 
compensation and damages based on Sylvan Road, ITD was forced to file a motion for summary 
judgment on any and all claims relating to Sylvan Road. See Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Brief, and Affidavit filed Jan. 6, 2012. ITD moved for an order that ITD was not acquiring any 
land from Grathol for Sylvan Road, based on undisputed facts in the record and the prior rulings 
of the Court that the taking in this case does not include any land for Sylvan Road. ITD Brief, at 
6-12 (filed Jan. 6, 2012). 
ITD was also forced to file a Motion in Limine to preclude testimony and argument at 
trial based on an alleged taking of land for Sylvan Road and damages based on the alleged 
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taking. See ITD Motion in Limine, and Brief in Support of Motion in Limine, at 15-16, (filed 
Jan. 6, 2012). 
On February 3, 2012, the Court granted ITD's motion for summary judgment: "ITD's 
Motion for Summary Judgment re: a taking claim for Sylvan Road and damages for such alleged 
taking is granted, and this claim is hereby stricken." Order Re: Plaintiff's Motion For Summary 
Judgment, at 2 (filed Feb. 3, 2012). 
Despite clear rulings from the Court barring the claims early in the case, Grathol 
continued to press its claims for compensation based on Sylvan Road. In doing so, Grathol 
needlessly forced ITD to incur substantial attorney fees and costs in the continuing fight over 
Sylvan Road. As the prevailing party, both on this claim and the entire case, ITD should now be 
allowed to recover its attorney fees and costs. 
B. Grathol's Refusals And Delays In Answering Written Discovery. 
Throughout this litigation, Grathol failed and refused to comply with ITD's discovery 
requests and refused to provide disclosures of expert opinions. For example, the following is a 
chronology ofITD'sfirst set of discovery served on Grathol, which typifies Grathol's conduct 
toward discovery in this case. 
February 2, 2011 - ITD served its First Set of Discovery Requests 
on Grathol with a due date of March 7, 2011. (Sept. 23, 2011 York 
Aff. ,I 3, Ex. A). 
March 15, 2011 -No discovery responses and no request for 
extension of time have been received from Grathol. Counsel for 
ITD and counsel Grathol discuss the fact that Grathol has failed to 
answer the February 2, 2011 Discovery Requests. ITD grants an 
extension to March 25, 2011 for Grathol to respond. (Sept. 23, 
2011 York Aff. ,I 4, Ex. B). 
March 22, 2011 - Counsel for Grathol requests an additional 
extension of time and counsel for ITD agrees to extend the 
discovery due date to April 5, 2011. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff. ,r 4, 
Ex. B). 
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April 13, 2011 - ITD still has not received discovery responses 
from Grathol. ITD sends a letter to counsel for Grathol. (Sept. 23, 
2011 York Affi! 6, Ex. C). 
April 15, 2011-Grathol finally serves its responses to the 
February 2, 2011 discovery requests, however Grathol does not 
send copies of the documents with its discovery requests. (Sept. 
23, 2011 York Aff. iii! 7-8, Ex. D). 
May 16, 2011 - Grathol serves its Supplementary Responses to the 
February 2, 2011 discovery requests which consists of a single 
page. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff. ,i 9, Ex. E). 
July 22, 2011 - ITD sends a letter to counsel for Grathol detailing 
the substantial deficiencies in Grathol's responses to the February 
2, 2011 discovery requests. ITD provides specific explanations 
why Grathol's responses are deficient as to Interrogatories No. 2, 
0 0 1 A 1 C. ;.-,.1 n~~ .. ~n+n +-~~ n~~,.1 .. n+:~~ l\T~ 1 <:;: 0 1 'l 1 A 1 t:.. o, 7, 1"'1', lV a.u.u. J.'-.Ci\.J.UC,.:SL.:> J.Vl .J.. lVUU\,,,UVU . ..L~V • .1, _,, ..,, .1-1, .1-.-, .1.v. 
ITD requests complete responses by August 5, 2011. (Sept. 23, 
2011 York Aff. ,r 10, Ex. G). 
August 24, 2011 - ITD has not received any response from 
Grathol. ITD sends yet another letter to counsel for Grathol, again 
requesting that Grathol respond to the discovery deficiencies by 
August 31, 2011. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff. ,i 13, Ex. I). 
August 29, 2011 - Grathol responds to ITD's letters of July 22, 
2011 and August 24, 2011 letter by focusing on the issue of 
disclosure of expert opinions, and refuses to provide the opinions 
of Grathol's experts. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff. ,i 14, Ex. J). 
September 9, 2011 -Counsel for ITD speaks with counsel for 
Grathol via telephone regarding Grathol's expert and discovery 
deficiencies. Counsel for Grathol assures ITD that it will follow 
up on the issues identified by ITD. However no response is 
received. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff. ,i 16). 
Grathol's steadfast refusal to comply with discovery substantially increased the costs and 
fees in this case. These circumstances warrant an award of costs and attorney fees to ITD. 
C. Grathol's Repeated Refusals To Disclose Expert Opinions. 
The Court's Pretrial Order dated April 5, 2011 established pretrial deadlines in this case, 
including the deadlines for disclosure for expert witnesses. Pretrial Order, at ,i 2. Under the 
terms of the Order, ITD was required to disclose its expert witnesses by July 21, 2011. Id. 
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Grathol was then required to disclose responsive experts on August 19, 2011. Id. The parties 
were then to file any rebuttal expert disclosures on October 19, 2011. Id. The Order did not 
place any limitations on which experts were required to be disclosed and, with respect to the 
substance of the information to be provided for each parties' respective experts, the expert 
disclosures were to "consist of at least the information required to be disclosed pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i)." Id. 
On August 19, 2011, Grathol filed its Expert Witness Disclosure in which it identified 
three expert witnesses who were expected to be called to testify at the trial of this matter: Dewitt 
Sherwood, Geoffrey Reeslund, and Alan Johnson. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff., Ex. H). With 
respect to Mr. Sherwood's expert testimony, Grathol stated that "[h]e will testify in accordance 
with his appraisal report, which will be provided to Plaintiff upon completion." Id. at Ex.Hat 2; 
Despite the specific reference to Mr. Sherwood's appraisal report, Grathol did not produce Mr. 
Sherwood's appraisal report as required by the deadline imposed by the Court for expert 
disclosures. 
With respect to Grathol's expert disclosures for Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson, Grathol 
outlined in broad terms only the general subject matter of the anticipated testimony. Grathol's 
disclosures did not provide any information as to the "opinions to be expressed and the basis and 
reasons therefore," as required by Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, nor did it 
"consist of at least the information required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b )( 4)(i)," as 
required by the Court's Pretrial Order. Grathol's expert disclosure as to Mr. Reeslund stated 
that: 
Mr. Reeslund will give opinion testimony as to the 
development plans for the Property, testimony as to its potential 
uses, its value (before and after the condemnation), the limitations 
on uses of the Property remaining after condemnation, and land 
use planning/entitlement, construction planning activities; efforts 
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and expenses associated with the purchase, holding and 
development of the Property; planning and design work associated 
with the property; and the effects of the condemnation on the 
development of the remaining property. 
(Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff. 1111-18, Ex. H). Grathol's expert disclosure as to Mr. Johnson stated 
that: 
Mr. Johnson will give opinion testimony as to the 
acquisition, ownership and development plans for the Property, 
testimony as to its potential uses, its value (before and after the 
condemnation), the values of the Property remaining after 
condemnation and before and after construction and 
entitlement/construction planning activities; efforts and expenses 
associated with the purchase, holding and development of the 
Property; planning and design work associated with the property; 
marketing efforts of the property prior to and after condemnation; 
and the effects of the condemnation on the remaining Property. 
Id. Grathol failed to provide any actual opinions or any information underlying the opinions of 
either expert. Grathol gave no detail as to the experts' value opinions, opinions on the impacts of 
the condemnation, or opinions on damages. Furthermore, Grathol gave no information about the 
basis, reasons or support for the experts' opinions. 
On August 24, 2012, counsel for ITD notified Grathol's counsel that its expert 
disclosures were deficient in that they did not comply with the Court's Pretrial Order, the 
disclosure requirements of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, or with ITD's discovery requests 
and the corresponding supplementation requirements of the Rules. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff., 
Ex. I). ITD's August 24th letter requested that Grathol provide full and complete disclosures. 
Id. 
Counsel for Grathol responded to ITD's August 24th letter by stating that it believed that 
the disclosures did in fact comply with the Court's Pretrial Order and contained all of the 
information required by Rule 26(b)(4). (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff., Ex. J ). Grathol claimed that 
its disclosure complied with the Court's Pretrial Order and Rule 26(b)(4) because it believed that 
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Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson were "actor-viewer" experts and, therefore, were not subject to 
the requirements of Rule 26(6 )( 4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. In support of its 
assertion, Grathol cited to the Committee Notes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but 
provided no argument or analysis to support its cited references. Grathol had made a similar 
statement in its original responses to ITD's First Set oflnterrogatories and Requests for 
Production of Documents. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff., Ex. D, at 5-6). 
On September 9, 2011, counsel for ITD held a conference call with counsel for Grathol 
as a formal "meet and confer" conference on the issue of Grathol' s deficient expert disclosure, as 
well as its refusal to answer written discovery. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff., at ,-i,-i 18-19). During 
the conference, counsel for ITD attempted to reach an agreement with counsel for Grathol on the 
issue of Grathol's refusal to disclose opinions of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson. Id. At the 
close of conference, counsel for Grathol stated that he would follow up on the expert issues the 
following week. Id. 
Grathol's counsel did not respond within the agreed time frame, but a week later, on 
September 19, 2011, Grathol's counsel sent a letter once again refusing to disclose the expert 
opinions of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff., at ,-i 19 and Ex. M). In its 
September 19th letter, Grathol reiterated its contention that Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson were 
"actor-viewer" experts and therefore not subject to the requirements of the Court's Pretrial Order 
or Rule 26(6)(4). Id. Notably, Grathol's letter did not explain why it refused to produce the 
experts' opinions and supporting information in response to ITD's Interrogatory No. 2, which 
asked for "a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the reasons 
therefore, the substance of the expert witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions, 
the underlying facts and data upon which those opinions are based." 
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ITD's counsel responded on September 20, 2011 and stated its express disagreement with 
Grathol's argument and conclusion. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff., Ex. N). The September 20th 
letter from ITD's counsel also notified Grathol that it would be filing a motion to exclude expert 
testimony by Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson or, alternatively, to compel the disclosure of their 
opinions and supporting information. Id. 
1. ITD Is Forced To File A Motion To Exclude Experts Or Compel 
Expert Disclosures. 
Finally, after all of the efforts outlined above had failed, ITD was forced to file a Motion 
To Exclude Expert Testimony Or, Alternatively, To Compel Expert Disclosures on September 
23, 2011. ITD set this motion for hearing on October 19, 2011. 
2. Grathol's "actor-viewer" argument was contrary to the Pretrial 
Order. 
The Court's Pretrial Order required that all expert disclosures "shall consist of at least 
the information required to be disclosed pursuant to IR.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i)." Pretrial Order, at 2. 
3. Grathol's argument defied its duty to respond to discovery seeking 
disclosure of expert opinions. 
ITD propounded discovery requests in which it sought "a complete statement of all 
opinions to be expressed by the expert and the reasons therefore, the substance of the expert 
witness' opinions, the basis and reasons for the opinions, the underlying facts and data upon 
which those opinions are based," as well as all information referenced in and required by Rule 
26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff., Ex. A). 
Grathol's explanation of why it refused to produce the expert opinions of Mr. Reeslund 
and Mr. Johnson was that these experts "are not 'expert witnesses' in the traditional sense of a 
Rule 26(b)(A)(i) disclosure." Id. at Ex. M. According to Grathol, these individuals "fall within 
the 'actor/viewer exception' possessing information not acquired in preparation for litigation but 
instead are actors/viewers with respect to the occurrences that are part of the subject matter of 
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this litigation." Id. In support of its argument, Grathol cited to the Committee Notes of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26, Subdivision (b)(4). 
Grathol' s argument was completely baseless because both Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson 
clearly intended (and did in fact) offer expert testimony that was obtained or created in 
anticipation of this condemnation litigation. In particular, Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson were 
both identified as offering expert testimony on specific issues relating to the condemnation 
action. Mr. Reeslund was identified as providing expert testimony on the issue of the value of 
the subject property before and after the condemnation, the limitations on uses of the Property 
remaining after condemnation, and the effects of the condemnation on the development of the 
remaining Property. (Sept. 23, 2011 York Aff., Ex. H). Similarly, Mr. Johnson was identified as 
providing expert testimony as to ITD's acquisition of a portion of the subject Property, the value 
of the Property before and after the condemnation, the values of the Property remaining after 
condemnation, construction and entitlement activities prior to and after the condemnation, and 
the effects of the condemnation on the remaining Property. Id. Each of these identified areas of 
expert testimony was directly related to the condemnation suit and could not have been created 
prior to the condemnation action or independent of this action. These subject areas of expert 
testimony of Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson fell directly within the bounds of Rule 26(b)(4) and 
should have been disclosed by Grathol on August 19, 2011. Grathol's failure to do so violated 
the Court's Pretrial Order and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4. The "actor-viewer" exception does not permit a party to refuse to 
disclose expert opinions. 
The actor-viewer exception only exists in the Committee Notes of Rule 26 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. No counterpart exists in the Idaho Rules. 
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The exception noted in the Committee Notes only excuses preparation of a formal expert 
report by "actor-viewer" experts. It does riot allow a party to refuse to disclose the opinions of 
such experts. Rather, the federal rule requires the party advancing the expert to disclose the 
subject matter on which the witness is expected to present evidence and provide "a summary of 
the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(b). 
See also ITD Brief, at 14-15 (filed Sept. 23, 2011). 
The federal exception in no way excuses compliance with discovery requests seeking the 
opinions of such experts. See ITD Brief, at 12-13 (filed Sept. 23, 2011). Identical arguments 
made by Grathol in this case were flatly rejected by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Clark v. Raty, 
137 Idaho 343, 344-45, 48 P.3d 672, 673-74 (Ct. App. 2002). 
The decision in Clark makes clear that Grathol was required to disclose the opinions of 
Mr. Reeslund and Mr. Johnson and was certainly required to provide the opinions and the bases 
for the opinions in response to ITD's discovery requests. Grathol's argument to the contrary was 
baseless and violated Idaho law. 
As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Clark v. Klien, 
In cases of this character [involving expert testimony], a 
prohibition against discovery of information held by expert 
witnesses produces in acute form the very evils that discovery has 
been created to prevent. Effective cross-examination of an expert 
witness requires advance preparation .... Similarly, effective 
rebuttal requires advance knowledge of the line of testimony of the 
other side. If the latter is foreclosed by a rule against discovery, the 
narrowing of issues and elimination of surprise which discovery 
normally produces are frustrated. 
137 Idaho 154, 157-58, 45 P.3d 810, 813-14 (2002) (quoting Advisory Committee Notes, Rule 
26, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.). "The purpose of our discovery rules is to facilitate fair and expedient 
pretrial fact gathering." Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 873, 136 P.3d 338, 344 (2006). "It 
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follows, therefore, that discovery rules are not intended to encourage or reward those whose 
conduct is inconsistent with that purpose." Id. 
Grathol' s continuous and egregious efforts to hide the opinions of its experts throughout 
this case violated the very purpose of the discovery rules. As the prevailing party, ITD should 
now be awarded its attorney fees and costs, in light of Grathol's conduct in the case. 
5. When Finally Faced With A Court Hearing, Grathol Disclosed Expert 
Opinions. 
ITD set a hearing date of October 19, 2011 for its Motion To Exclude Expert Testimony 
Or, Alternatively, To Compel Expert Disclosures. On October 16, 2011, three days before the 
hearing, Grathol reversed course and served expert disclosures for Mr. Johnson, Mr. Reeslund, 
and Mr. Sherwood. Grathol dropped its "actor-viewer" argument as to Johnson and Reeslund, 
and finally produced the appraisal report of Mr. Sherwood, which showed that it had been 
completed back in August, 2011. 
The entire dispute over expert disclosures was unnecessary and based on an argument 
that was contrary to both Idaho and federal law. Grathol' s abuses and improper tactics in 
refusing to comply with discovery and refusing to disclose expert opinions needlessly and 
substantially increased the costs and attorney fees in this case. 
D. Grathol Continued To Abuse The "Actor-Viewer" Exception. 
Two weeks before the March 2012 trial, Grathol identified two additional expert 
witnesses for trial, Mr. Brett Terrell and Mr. Tom Vandervert. Despite having disclosed these 
individuals as fact witnesses and after the depositions of these witnesses, Grathol served 
supplemental discovery responses identifying Mr. Terrell and Mr. Vandervert as expert 
witnesses late on Friday, February 17, 2012. (Feb. 29, 2012 York Aff., Ex. Q). Counsel for ITD 
did not see these disclosures until Monday, February 20, 2012, two weeks before triai. 
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This disclosure was clearly untimely, coming many months after the deadline for Grathol 
to disclose experts and expert opinions. Even worse, Grathol failed and refused to disclose any 
of the opinions that would be offered at trial or the basis of any opinions. (Feb. 29, 2012 York 
Aff., Ex. Q). Grathol once again invoked the "actor/viewer" exception to try to hide the 
opinions of Mr. Terrell and Mr. Vandervert, and refused to comply with the requirements of Rule 
26 and ITD's long-standing discovery requesting the opinions of Grathol's experts and the basis 
of the opinions. Id. 
Under the circumstances, ITD was forced to file a motion to exclude Mr. Terrell and Mr. 
Vandervert from testifying at trial. See Motion To Exclude Expert Witnesses (filed Feb. 29, 
2012). Had these experts been allowed to testify, the Court's Pretrial Orders, the Stipulation 
between the parties (resolving the long running dispute over expert disclosures), and the Idaho 
rules governing discovery would all have been rendered meaningless. 
At the start of the trial, the Court ruled that these witnesses would not be permitted to 
testify as to opinions, but could testify as to facts within their knowledge. Based on this ruling, 
Grathol elected not to call either expert. 
Once again, this entire fight was unnecessary and should never have happened. The 
additional costs and attorney fees incurred in this side battle were caused solely by Grathol's 
continuing refusal to comply with the rules of discovery and obey the Court's pretrial orders. 
E. Grathol Asserted Numerous Claims For Compensation And Damages That 
Were Barred By Law. 
During the course of the case, Grathol asserted numerous claims for compensation and 
damages that were barred by law. Ultimately, ITD was forced to file a motion for summary 
judgment on January 6, 2012 to dismiss these improper claims. The following is a summary of 
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the improper claims by Grathol and the legal principles that barred them. (The Sylvan Road 
claim, dismissed again on summary judgment, has already been addressed). 
1. Construction Delay. 
Grathol sought to recover money damages based on what it characterized as "delay" on 
the part of ITD in constructing the US-95 Project. The law is clear that a condemnee may not 
recover damages for alleged delay in the construction of a public project. Moreover, Grathol had 
no factual basis to claim that ITO had failed to meet a construction schedule constituting 
"construction delay" that would support this claim. 
2. Visibility. 
Grathol sought to recover severance damages based, in part, on a claim that its proposed 
commercial development would be less visible by cars traveling on US-95 after the Project. 
Idaho does not recognize claims for "loss of visibility." Idaho law holds that no property owner 
is entitled to a particular pattern or flow of traffic past its property. Therefore, no property owner 
is entitled to a particular level of visibility by passing automobile traffic. This claim is also 
uniformly rejected in other states. 
3. Access. 
Grathol sought compensation for an alleged loss or restriction of access to its property 
after construction of the US-95 Project. The Grathol property is bare land. Grathol is planning a 
commercial development on the property. It was undisputed that Grathol did not have any 
commercial access or any permits for commercial access to the property before the US-95 
Project. Therefore, ITO had not "taken" any commercial access to the property. Moreover, 
Idaho law does not permit compensation for a taking of access unless all access to the public 
road system has been lost or "destroyed." The record showed that Grathol will be permitted 
accesses in the "after" condition. 
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4. Lost Profits. 
Grathol sought to recover as much as $7,369,500.00 in this case, based on a lost profits 
analysis by Mr. Alan Johnson. Idaho law bars recovery of lost profits except when made under 
Idaho's eminent domain statute authorizing "business damages." Idaho Code § 7-711 (2). 
Grathol did not qualify under § 7-711 (2) because it had not operated a business on the site for 5 
years. No business exists on the site. It is bare land. Lastly, Idaho law bars claims for lost 
profits based on new businesses because such claims are inherently speculative. 
5. Gravel. 
Grathol sought to recover compensation for the value of gravel it believed to be located 
on the property and which Grathol alleged ITD could use for the US-95 Project. This claim 
failed as a matter of law because ITD is paying for the condemned property in its entirety -
including any gravel or anything else of value that may or may not be under the property. 
Grathol could not recover the fair market value of the property and an additional amount for 
gravel. Grathol also had no idea whether there was any usable gravel under the property or not, 
how much there was, or what it was worth. It had simply made a demand for $300,000.00 for 
gravel. Lastly, ITD showed that it could not remove the substructure on the property and then 
construct a freeway overpass on it. If any substructure were removed, it would have to be 
replaced with like material or better, and then re-compacted. Consequently, it would have been 
far more expensive to remove gravel, then buy new gravel, truck the new gravel to the site, fill, 
and then compact the new gravel to restore the site, than it would be to simply use gravel from a 
supplier. 
6. Severance Damages For Impacts On Development Plan. 
Grathol' s attempt to seek separate and specific damages for impacts on a proposed 
development plan was likewise barred by Idaho law. The Grathol property was bare land and no 
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development of any kind had occurred at either the date of taking or the trial in this case. 
Development plans may only be used to illustrate potential uses on the property. Specifically, 
IDJI2d 7 .14 states that the fact finder "may consider the owner's particular plan for development 
and use of the property only for the purposes of determining uses for which the property is 
adaptable." Id. In other words, Grathol could not seek or recover damages by pointing to an un-
built site plan and claiming "we cannot build this here now," or "this building will have to be 
smaller," and ask that specific dollar amounts be assigned to such alleged "losses" or 
"severance" damages. Grathol' s attempts to use a development plan for specific damages to 
specific parts of the property were barred by Idaho law. 
7. Results Of ITD's Motion For Summary Judgment. 
a) Construction Delay, Lost Profits, and Gravel. 
At the hearing February 2, 2012 hearing on ITD's motion for summary judgment, 
Grathol conceded that the claims for construction delay, lost profits, and gravel could be 
dismissed. Id. The Court therefore dismissed these claims on summary judgment. Id. 
Under these circumstances, ITD should be awarded its attorney fees and costs. These 
claims should never have been asserted, as clearly demonstrated by Grathol's dropping the 
claims when confronted before the Court on a motion for summary judgment. 
It should also be noted that ITD was forced to retain an expert, Mr. Dennis Reinstein, 
CPA, to prepare a rebuttal report responding to the lost profits claim by Grathol. The costs and 
legal fees associated with the defense of this claim were made necessary only by Grathol's 
assertion of a claim clearly barred by Idaho law. 
It should also be noted that, despite dismissal of the construction delay claim, Grathol's 
two valuation witnesses, Mr. Sherwood and Mr. Johnson, continued to seek compensation for 
construction delay at trial. This resulted in continued litigation over a claim that had been 
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dropped by Grathol at the hearing on summary judgment, and dismissed by the Court. The 
additional attorney fees in the continued litigation of this claim should not have had to be 
incurred, and ITD should be awarded its attorney fees as the prevailing party. 
b) Visibility, Access, and Impacts on Development Plan. 
After the hearing on ITD's motion for summary judgment, Grathol submitted revised 
expert disclosures for Mr. Sherwood and Mr. Johnson. These disclosures showed that Grathol 
had given up any claim for separate severance damages for loss of visibility, access, or impacts 
on its development plan. Thus, in its Order Re: Defendant HJ Grathol's Severance Damages, 
the Court held as follows: 
Grathol is hereby barred from seeking any separate discreet 
severance damages, to include loss of visibility, access and 
development plan damages, because these claims are incorporated 
in Grathol' s expert witness disclosures as to the before and after 
fair market values for the remainder parcel. 
Id. at 2 (filed Feb. 16, 2012). 
Up to that time, Grathol' s expert disclosures and the depositions of Grathol 's experts 
showed that they intended to seek separate and discreet damage awards for alleged loss of 
visibility, access, and impacts on its proposed development plan. Because these claims should 
never have been asserted as separate claims, and should only have been offered as factors 
affecting fair market value before and after the taking, ITD should not have had to file a motion 
for summary judgment to resolve these claims. ITD should not have had to expend attorney fees 
and costs in defending against these claims for compensation and damages. 
F. Improper Methods And Tactics By Grathol's Valuation Experts. 
Grathol's two valuation experts employed improper appraisal methods and tactics that 
initiated a host of battles that were unnecessary and involved fights over issues clearly barred by 
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law or wholly unsupported by the facts in the case. Grathol's tactics substantially and 
unnecessarily increased the attorney fees and costs in this case. 
The improper methods and tactics included the following: 
• Failure to use the date of taking as the date of value, as required by Idaho statute. 
• The use of multiple dates of value. 
• Failure to do a "before and after" analysis of the value of the property. 
• Failure to use the entire Grathol property as the "larger parcel" for purposes of 
determining the "before and after" value. 
• Using sales as alleged "comparable sales" that were in far superior locations, with 
substantially greater demand for commercial development, and substantially 
better situated for the installation of utilities or with utilities already installed. 
• Sherwood's use of a negotiated settlement of a condemnation as one of his 
primary "comparable sales," despite his testimony that such a transaction is not an 
indication of "market value." 
• Failure to identify, quantify, or explain any adjustments to sales as part of the 
"comparable sales approach" to real estate appraisal. 
• Producing only a limited, restricted appraisal report that expressly noted that third 
parties would have difficulty understanding the report. 
• Repeatedly changing valuation conclusions and the explanations for the 
conclusions reached. 
• Continuing to assert claims for compensation based on the time needed for 
construction of the US-95 Project (i.e., "construction delay"). 
• Johnson based his valuation after the taking as though a hypothetical development 
were completed. This approach is barred by law. 
G. Sherwood's Larger Parcel Was An Artificial Construct That Was Contrary 
To Law, Not Supported By The Facts, And Created A Prolonged, Expensive, 
And Unnecessary Fight Over Proper Valuation Of The Grathol Property. 
At the close of trial, the Court directed Grathol to cite Idaho law that would support the 
larger parcel opinion of its appraiser, Mr. Sherwood. Grathol did not cite any Idaho statutes, 
case law, or jury instructions that supported Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel. In fact, 
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Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel was contrary to Idaho law. See ITD's Post Trial Brief, 
at 3-11 (filed March 23, 2012). 
As found by the Court, Sherwood's opinion of the larger parcel was contrary to the facts 
of the case. See Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment, at 9-17. Of 
particular note, all evidence and testimony at trial was uniform that the entire 56.8-acre parcel 
had the same "highest and best use" as land for commercial development. 
H. "Severance" Damages. 
At the close of trial, the Court allowed Grathol another opportunity to explain and 
quantify its claims for severance damages, if any. The parties had engaged in a long battle over 
the issue of severance damages throughor1;t the case. The primary difficulty in resolving the issue 
was Grathol's refusal to quantify its claims for severance damages and explain the cause of the 
alleged damages. Even after trial, this never happened. As noted by the Court, 
Grathol's counsel affirmatively stated Sherwood would present his 
opinion as to the amount of severance damages to the remainder 
post-taking, which would be based upon Sherwood's opinion 
regarding a difference in the fair market values of the remainder 
parcel before and after the take. An expert's credibility is 
irretrievably damaged when that expert, who is supposed to 
provide a number other than "zero," does not do so. 
Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment, at 26, n. 7. 
In its post trial brief, Grathol made no attempt to explain or justify the "severance" 
damage claim by Mr. Alan Johnson. ITD had previously shown that Johnson's "severance" 
damage claim mirrored his construction delay claim before it was dismissed by the Court. 
Although the claim had been dismissed, Grathol forced ITD to continue to incur legal fees and 
costs fighting it. 
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For all of the above reasons, the abuses and tactics by Grathol and its valuation experts 
justify an award of attorney fees and costs to ITD, particularly where ITD is so clearly the 
prevailing party in the case. 
DATED this 18th day of June, 2012. 
MaryV. Yor 
Ted S. Toll s n 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Idaho Transportation Department 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 18th day of June, 2012, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol 
5007423_1.DOC 
D U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivered 
D Fax 
D E-mail 
~ Overnight UPS 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 · 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8803 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V. York (ISB #5020) 
Steven C. Bowman (ISB #4404) 
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
Mary V. York, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am a partner in the Boise office of the law firm of Holland & Hart LLP and am 
duly licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho. 
2. I one of the attorneys of record for Plaintiff, State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation 
Board ("ITD") in the above-captioned matter. I am familiar with the firm's billing and record-
keeping practices, and I have personal knowledge of the facts regarding the legal representation 
provided to ITD by Holland & Hart and of the attorney fees and other costs incurred by ITD in 
this case. 
3. Holland & Hart is designated counsel and I am a Special Deputy Attorney 
General appointed to represent ITD in the GARVEE/Connecting Idaho Partners Program. The 
designation and appointment is the result of Holland & Hart being the successful applicant for 
ITD's open-bid RFP for the GARVEE work. A true and correct copy of the November 2, 2006 
letter of appointment as Special Deputy Attorney General from the Idaho Attorney General is 
attached to this affidavit as Exhibit A. 
4. The summary of costs and attorney fees listed in this affidavit are true and correct 
to the best of my knowledge and belief and reflect actual costs and fees incurred by and billed to 
ITD. The costs and attorney fees have been reasonably and necessarily incurred in this action, 
are in compliance with Rule 54(d)(5) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and should be 
awarded under Idaho Code§ 7-718 and Rules 54(d)(l)(C), 54(d)(l)(D) and 54(e)(l) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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5. In this case, ITD sought to acquire a portion of property belonging to Defendant 
HJ Grathol ("Grathol") as part ofITD's project to reconstruct and improve US-95 from Garwood 
to Sagle. ITD filed the present condemnation action on November 19, 2010. On December 15, 
2010; ITD made a settlement offer to Grathol in the a.mount of $1,100,000. The settlement offer 
was timely made pursuant to the requirements of Ada County Highway Dist. v. Acarrequi, 105 
Idaho 873,673 P.2d 1067 (1983) and its progeny, State ex rel. Ohman v. Talbot Family Trust, 120 
Idaho 825, 820 P.2d 695 (1991) and State ex rel. Smith v. Jardine, 130 Idaho 318, 940 P.2d 1137 
(1997) (referred to as the "Acarrequi offer"). A true and correct copy oflTD'sAcarrequi offer is 
attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
6. Counsel for Grathol granted ITD an extension to submit its Acarrequi offer until 
December 16, 2010 in order to allow sufficient time to have the Idaho Transportation Board 
consider the Acarrequi offer. A true and correct copy of counsel for Grathol' s grant of an 
extension to submit its Acarrequi offer is attached hereto as Exhibit C. ITD made its offer on 
December 15, 20 I 0-one day prior to the extended deadline granted by Grathol' s counsel. 
7. The matter was tried in a five-day bench trial before the Honorable Charles 
Hosack, District Judge on March 5, 2012. After post-trial briefing and proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions oflaw were submitted by the parties, on May 25, 2012, the Court issued its 
Post-trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment in which it concluded that the total 
amount of just compensation to be awarded to Grathol in this matter was $675,000. 
8. On June 4, 2012, the Court entered Judgment on the $675,000 just compensation 
award and stated that "any claim for attorney fees and costs [ would be] determined pursuant to 
Rule 54, I.R.C.P." (Judgment, at 4.) 
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9. The amount offered to Grathol by ITD as just compensation was $425,000 more 
than the award of just compensation as determined by the Court and was well-beyond the 90% 
rule for determining an award of costs and attorney fees in a condemnation action, as established 
by the Ida.Ito Supreme Cou..rt in Ada County HighiA;ay Dist. v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873,673 P.2d 
1067 (1983) and its progeny. 
10. Additionally, the award of just compensation in this matter is the same amount 
offered by ITD at trial and is well below the $7,000,000 originally sought by Grathol and the 
range of $1,775,000 to $3,000,000 sought by Grathol at trial. 
EXPLANATION OF COSTS INCURRED BY THE STATE 
11. In this lawsuit, ITD reasonably and necessarily incurred considerable costs and 
attorney fees in this matter to defend against the multi-million dollar damage claims sought by 
Grathol. ITD is not seeking to recover all of the costs and attorney fees it incurred in this action. 
Rather, the sums sought in the present motion are less than the actual total costs incurred in this 
matter, which ITD has reduced for purposes of this motion. 
12. ITD is seeking $182,182.65 of the costs incurred by ITD in this matter. 
13. COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT: ITD claims the following costs as a 




Court itling fees: $ 0.00 
No filing fees were incurred in this matter. 
Fees for service pleadings $ 0.00 
No fees for the service of pleadings were incurred in this matter. 
Witness Fees: $ 0.00 
No witness fees for the testimony of non-expert or non-party 
witnesses were incurred in this matter. 
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Travel expenses of testifying witnesses: 
Herron Companies 
($0.30/mile x 1269 miles) 
Hedley Construction & Development 
($0.30/mile x 1279 miles) 
Expenses for certified copies of documents: 
Certified Copy Lis Pendens 
Certified Copy Possession Order 
f. Preparation of exhibits: 
Trial Exhibits 
g. Cost of all bond premiums: 
h. Expert witness fees: 
Columbia Valuation Group 
Herron Companies 
Hedley Construction & Development 
i. Charges for reporting and transcribing: 
M&M Court Reporting - Johnson Deposition 
M&M Court Reporting - Reeslund Deposition 
M&M Court Reporting - Sherwood Deposition 
M&M Court Reporting - Terrell Deposition 
M&M Court Reporting - V andervert Deposition 
j. Charges for one copy of Deposition: 
M&M Court Reporting - Minzghor Deposition 
M&M Court Reporting - Moe Deposition 


















14. DISCRETIONARY COSTS: For its discretionary costs claimed pursuant to 
Rule S4(d)(l)(D) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, ITD is only seeking to recover the 
expert costs incurred in the defense of this matter. 
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a. Expert Fees: 
The primary disputes in this matter were the valuation of the subject property and the 
damage caused to the property and Grathol's proposed development as a result of the ITD's 
taking of a portion of t.i.e prope&J. At the out-set of ITD' s process of acquiring Grathol' s 
property for the US-95 Project, the State hired the appraisal firm of Columbia Valuation Group 
to appraise the property and determine an estimate of fair compensation that should be paid to 
Grathol as a result of the taking and any damage that might occur as a result of the taking. 
During the course of the litigation, it became evident that Grathol would seek to raise various 
issues regarding its proposed development, lost profits, access, visibility, and sewer treatment 
issues, as well as issues relating to the larger parcel, comparable sales, and the market value of 
the property. Grathol identified numerous individuals as possible witnesses to provide testimony 
on these various issues. That number was ultimately narrowed now and included the land owner, 
the architect who designed the proposed development, an appraiser, a sewer treatment engineer, 
a broker, and a land planner. As a result, !TD was required to hire several individuals and firms 
to confirm the validity or invalidity of the issues raised and to rebut the expertise and testimony 
expected to be presented by Defendant on the various issues. 
The services rendered by each expert retained by the State in this matter, as well as the 
amount charged by each expert follows: 
I. Columbia Valuation Group, Inc. : Stan Moe $18,975.00 
The appraisal finn of Columbia Valuation Group was hired to perfonn a complete, 
narrative before and after appraisal report for the Grathol property to detennine the amount of 
compensation owed to Grathol. The testimony of Mr. Stan Moe, an MAI appraiser, was required 
to establish ITD's position on the amount of just compensation. 
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In establishing his opinions of value, Mr. Moe visited the subject property, researched the 
real estate market and comparable sales in and around Athol, assessed the market and made 
adjustments for the differences between the comparable properties and the subject property and 
made a reasoned deterrnination of the value of the subject property botl-i before and after the 
highway project to reach his conclusion of fair compensation. Mr. Moe testified to his methods, 
opinions and conclusions at the trial of this matter. 
In addition to performing the appraisal and report, Mr. Moe also reviewed the appraisal 
report and depositions of Grathol's appraiser, Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood and Grathol's owner, 
Alan Johnson, and discovered several weaknesses, errors and omissions in the analysis and 
opinions of both individuals. These weaknesses, errors and omissions were brought out during 
cross-examination. Mr. Moe was present during Mr. Sherwood's testimony at trial and was 
available throughout the trial to be informed and available to provide information to counsel 
during trial. Additionally, Mr. Moe testified during ITD's rebuttal case to respond to the 
testimony presented by Mr. Sherwood and Mr. Johnson. 
ITD requests that $18,975.00 be awarded as discretionary costs pursuant to Rule 
54( d)(l )(D). 
2. Herron Companies: Jeffrey Key & Larry Pynes $40,249.30 
The appraisal firm of Herron Companies was hired to perform an independent analysis of 
the case after it became apparent that there was such a wide spread in values between the 
valuation experts. As part of the Herron Companies' assignment, they were asked to complete, 
narrative before and after appraisal report for the Grathol property to determine the amount of 
compensation owed to Grathol and also to provide a rebuttal report of Mr. Sherwood's appraisal 
and Mr. Johnson's valuation opinions. 
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In establishing his opinions of value, Mr. Larry Pynes, who holds a J.D. and an ASA 
designation, visited the subject property and the surrounding area, researched the real estate 
market and comparable sales in and around Athol, assessed the market and made adjustments for 
the differences be't'.-i1een the comparable properties and the subject propelt'J and made a reasoned 
determination of the value of the subject property both before and after the highway project to 
reach his conclusion of fair compensation. Mr. Pynes testified to his methods, opinions and 
conclusions at the trial of this matter. 
In addition to performing the appraisal and report, Mr. Pynes also reviewed the appraisal 
report and depositions of Grathol' s appraiser, Dewitt "Skip" Sherwood and Grathol' s owner, 
Alan Johnson, and discovered several weaknesses, errors and omissions in the analysis and 
opinions of both individuals. These weaknesses, errors and omissions were brought out during 
cross-examination. Mr. Pynes was present during Mr. Sherwood's testimony at trial and was 
available throughout the trial to be informed and available to provide information to counsel 
during trial. Additionally, Mr. Pynes testified during ITD's rebuttal case to respond to the 
testimony presented by Mr. Sherwood and Mr. Johnson. 
ITO requests that $40,249.30 be awarded as discretionary costs pursuant to Rule 
54( d)(l )(D). 
3. Hedley Construction and Development, Inc.: George Hedley 
$28,893.56 
ITO retained the services of Hedley Construction and Development, Inc. to address and 
refute several issues ITD retained the services of Mr. George Hedley of Hedley Construction and 
Development, Inc. to address and refute several issues raised by Grathol in this case, including 
claims relating to the feasibility of Grathol's proposed development project. Grathol claimed 
damages relating to its proposed commercial development on the subject property, which 
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Grathol contended could be constructed and completed in 2011. Mr. Hedley reviewed all 
aspects of the Grathol development plan including the site, the zoning, the economic conditions 
and the financials. 
Mr. Hediey testified at trial Grathol's proposed commercial development was not 
financially feasible and would not be developed in the foreseeable future. Further, Mr. Hedley 
provided testimony regarding Grathol' s failure to do proper due diligence before they purchased 
the property and the multitude of problems with Grathol's proposed commercial development. 
Mr. Hedley's report and testimony was necessary to refute Grathol's claims that the proposed 
commercial development was a viable and valuable project that could be constructed in the 
immediate future. 
ITD requests that $28,893.56 be awarded as discretionary costs pursuant to Rule 
54( d)(l )(D). 
4. Dave Evans and Associates, Inc.: Carole Richardson, 
Ken Geibel, Kevin Picanco $68,174.48 
ITD retained the services of Dave Evans and Associates, Inc. to address and refute 
Grathol's claims regarding several issues raised by Grathol in this case, including claims relating 
to the sewer treatment facility that Grathol intended to build on the property, issues relating to 
access to the property both before and after the project, and issues relating to Grathol's claims of 
loss of visibility. 
Ms. Richardson, Mr. Geibel and Mr. Picanco were requested to review the claims and 
issues raised by Grathol and provide a rebuttal report responding to those claims and issues. 
The rebuttal report was prepared and produced as part oflID's expert rebuttal disclosures. 
Ms. Richardson, Mr. Geibel and Mr. Picanco did not testify at trial because either ITD 
was able to exclude the testimony to which these individuals were prepared to respond or 
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Grathol decided not to raise the issues at trial. Nevertheless, the review, analysis and report by 
Ms. Richardson, Mr. Geibel and Mr. Picanco were necessary to refute Grathol's claims in this 
case. 
ITD requests that $68,i74.48 be awarded as discretionary costs pursuant to Rule 
54( d)(l )(D). 
5. Hooper Cornell, PLLC: Dennis Reinstein $12,811.25 
ITD retained the services of Hooper Cornell, PLLC to address and refute Grathol's claims 
regarding lost profits in this case. Mr. Dennis Reinstein is a CPA and was requested to review 
and analyze Grathol's claims oflost profits. Mr. Reinstein was also requested to prepare a 
rebuttal report, which was produced as part ofITD's expert rebuttal disclosures. 
Ms. Reinstein did not testify at trial because ITD was able to exclude the evidence of 
claimed lost profits. Nevertheless, the review, analysis report by Mr. Reinstein were necessary 
to refute Grathol's claims in this case. 
ITD requests that $12,811.25 be awarded as discretionary costs pursuant to Rule 
54(d)(l)(D). 
15. In summary, the total amount of discretionary costs requested, which are the 
expert costs reasonably and necessarily incurred by ITD in this matter, less the $2,000 per expert 
claimed above as a matter of right pursuant to Rule 54( d)(l )(C)(8): 
Columbia Valuation Group, Inc.: 
David Evans and Associates, Inc.: 
Hooper Cornell, PLLC: 
Herron Companies: 
Hedley Construction & Development, Inc.: 
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EXPLANATION OF ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED BY THE STATE 
16. The attorney fees requested by ITD are only those incurred by Holland & Hart in 
this matter. ITD is not seeking an award of the attorney fees of Deputy Attorney General J. Tim 
Thomas in this matter. 
17. The attorney fees requested are based upon a total of 2,720 hours billed by the 
attorneys and paralegals at the hourly rates listed below. These sums are less than the actual total 
fees incurred in this matter, which ITD has reduced for purposed of this motion. 
Timekeeper Position Hourly Rate Hours Total Fees 
MaryV. York Partner $305-$325 839.5 $272,235.50 
Steven C. Bowman Of. Counsel $325-$335 542.5 $181,701.50 
Ted S. Tollefson Associate $230-$245 575.1 $140,686.50 
Katherine Georger Associate $200 155.6 $ 31,120.00 
Matthew G. Gunn Associate $195 45.1 $ 8,794.50 
Barbara K. Feraci Paralegal $160-$165 408.7 $ 65,375.00 
Stephanie M. Omsberg Paralegal $160 29.2 $ 4,695.50 
David Carter Tech Support $185 37.6 $ 6,956.00 
Nick Bouck Tech Support $145 86.7 $ 12,571.50 
TOTAL HOURS & FEES 2,720.0 $724,136.00 
18. In sum, the ITD has incurred total attorney fees and costs, for purposes of this 
motion, in the amount of $906,318.65. 
19. Attached as Exhibit D is a detailed statement of the fees incurred ITD in this 
matter, in compliance with I.RC.P. 54(e). 
20. Attached as Exhibit E is the decision issued by the Idaho Supreme Court decision 
on Grathol's appeal in the present case entitled State of Idaho, Department o/Transportation v. 
HJ Grathol, et al., 2012 Opinion No. 85 (June 1, 2012). 
21. Attached as Exhibit Fis a true and correct copy of the United States District 
Court ofldaho caseLaPeter v. Canada Life Ins., No. CV-06-121-S-BLW, 2007 WL 2608837 
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(Dec. 4, 2007), in which the Honorable B. Lynn Winmill, Chief U.S. District Judge held that the 
rates charged by Holland & Hart are reasonable. 
22. Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of the United States 
District Court of Idaho case Restoration Industry Ass 'n v. Certified Restorers Consulting Group, 
2008 WL 821078 (D. Idaho March 24, 2008), in which the Court also held attorneys in Boise 
with approximately 23-24 years of experience "charge somewhere between $250.00 and $350.00 
per hour," and that attorneys with 3-4 years of experience "charge somewhere between $100.00 
and $180.00 per hour." Id. at *l. 
23. Attached hereto as Exhibit H is a true and correct copy of the Memorandum 
Decision inAVP Restaurant Group, LLC v. Godzilla, LLC, et al., CV OC 07-11663 entered 
January 16, 2009 by the Honorable District Judge Michael McLaughlin holding that the rates 
charged by Holland &Hart were reasonable. (Ex. G. at 5.) 
24. All costs and attorney fees identified in this Affidavit are true and correct and 
reflect the actual costs and fees incurred by and billed to ITD. The costs and attorney fees 
required to prosecute this lawsuit and obtain a Judgment in favor of ITD were necessary and 
reasonably incurred, and the information contained herein is in compliance with Rule 54 of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this 18th day of June, 2012. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 18th day of June, 2012 . ........... ,, ,,, CR ,,, ,<#' a.~" ,,,_ 
·</l~r~·,.. ········ .. .. , ""' •• .... ~~ .. -r-1 ~ t,.i-'{ \ \ _ _,_v __ u.,c,,_._ w~ ___._______ _ 
I t'l I ct(. , '-' \ 0 i N ofu.0,ublic for Idaho 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 18th day of June, 2012, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Attorneys for Defendant, HJ Grathol 
5641515_1 
D U.S.Mail 
D Hand Delivered 
D Emaii 
IZ! Overnight Mail 
D Telecopy (Fax) (208) 664-5884 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARY V. YORK IN SUPPORT OF ITD'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY 




November 2, 2006 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
SPECIAL DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL APPOINTMENT 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
Mary V. York of the firm of Holland & Hart, LLP, P. 0. Box 2527, Boise, Idaho 
83701-2527, is hereby appointed Special Deputy Attorney General for the 
purpose of researching, analyzing legal issues, and advising the Idaho 
Transportation . Department (Department), as well as representing the 
Department in administrative and/or judicial proceedings, related to the 
Connecting Idaho Program. 
The appointment is effective for the duration of the above-stated matter. 
Any courtesies you can extend to Ms. York in her conduct of business for the 
State of Idaho, as my delegate, will be appreciated. 
Sincerely, 
r , A. 
~
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
LGW:blm 
P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-001 O 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400, FAX: (208) 334-2530 





December 15, 2011 
MaryV. York 
Phone (208) 342-5000 
Fax (208) 343-8869 
myork@hollandhart.com 
OFFER OF SETTLEMENT PROTECTED BY RULE 408 
OF THE IDAHO RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Via Fax: 208-664-5884 and 
E-mail: dmarfice@ramsdenlyons.com and 
U.S. Mail 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 814 
Re: !TD v. HJ Grathol, et al., Case No. CVl 0-10095, First Judicial District 
Court, State of Idaho, County of Kootenai 
Dear Doug: 
I have been authorized by the State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") 
to make an offer of settlement to your clients in the case of ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al., 
Case No. CVl0-10095, First Judicial District Court, State ofldaho, County of Kootenai. 
Specifically, in accordance with Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 
873,673 P.2d 1067 (1983), the succeeding cases, and other relevant provisions ofldaho 
law, ITD hereby offers to pay your clients the sum of$1,100,000.00 as settlement of all 
claims in this case. 
This offer is made for settlement purposes only. This settlement offer shall remain 
open and available for acceptance by your clients until end of business on December 30, 
2011. 
Please convey ITD's offer to your clients, and we will await a response from you. 
In the meantime, if you have any questions or if I can be of any assistance, please do not 
hesitate to contact me. 
MVY:ntp 
S343328_1 
Holland & Hart UP 
Phone [208] 342-5000 Fax [208] 343-8869 www.hollandhart.com 
10·1 South Capitol Boulevard Suite 1400 Boise,ID 83702 Mailing Address P.O.Box2527 Boi~,1O 83701-2527 




From: Doug Marfice [mailto:dmarfice@ramsdenlyons.com] 
Sent: Friday, December 02, 2011 2:57 PM 
To: Mary York 
Subject: RE: H.J. Grathol 
Mary; 
We're ok with the extension to Dec. 16. 
I will also be sending you some information on the utility sleeve needs that were discussed at the depositions. Those 
issues might need to be part of your discussions with the Board. 
Douglas S. Marfice 
Ramsden & Lyons LLP 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d Alene, ID 83816 
(208) 664-5818 - phone 
(208) 664-5884 - fax 
www.ramsdenlyons.com 
This e-mail is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and contains information belonging to Ramsden & Lyons, LLP which is confidential and/or legally privileged. 
If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or taking of any action in reliance on the contents of this e-mail 
information is strictly prohibited. If you have received the e-mail in error, please immediately notify the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original 
message. 
From: Mary York [mailto:MYork@hollandhart.com] 
Sent: Friday, December 02, 2011 9:29 AM 
To: 'Doug Marfice' 
Subject: RE: H.J. Grathol 
Doug, 
I left you message yesterday evening, but just to follow up to your email as well -yes the reason for the request is for 
the board to consider the Accarrequi offer. 
Please let me know if the extension until Dec. 16th is acceptable. 
Regards, 
MVY 
Mary V. York 
Holland & Hart LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Building 
101 S. Capitol Blvd. 
1 
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Boise, ID 83702 
Phone (208) 342-5000 
Fax (208) 343-8869 
E-mail: myork@hollandhart.com 
HQl,_tA.ND& HAR"r:UJI' 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This message is confidential and may be privileged. If you believe that this email has been sent to you in 
error, please reply to the sender that you received the message in error; then please delete this e-mail. Thank you. 
Disclaimer of Electronic Transaction: This communication does not reflect an intention by the sender or the sender's client to conduct a 
transaction or make any agreement by electronic means. Nothing contained herein shall constitute an electronic signature or a contract 
under any law, rule or regulation applicable to electronic transactions. 
From: Doug Marfice [mailto:dmarfice@ramsdenlyons.com] 
Sent: Thursday, December 01, 2011 10:38 AM 
To: Mary York 
Subject: H.J. Grathol 
Mary; 
I got your voice mail yesterday. Question: is your request for additional time for making the Accarequi offer because the 
offer will be discussed at the Dec.14-15 Transportation Board meeting? Please advise. Thanks 
Douglas S. Marfice 
Ramsden & Lyons LLP 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d Alene, ID 83816 
(208) 664-5818 - phone 
(208) 664-5884 - fax 
www.ramsdenlyons.com 
This e-mail is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and contains information belonging to Ramsden & Lyons, LLP which is confidential and/or legally privileged. 
If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or taking of any action in reliance on the contents of this e-mail 






Date Name Billed Amt Hours Narrative 
10/07/2010 York, Mary V. $ 1,037.00 3.4 
Review and analyze condemnation file from ITD; work on case summary and outline of important 
facts and issues and work on complaint, summons and lis pendens; 
10/08/2010 York, Mary V. $ 91.50 0.3 
Several rounds of email correspondence with client regarding details for case, coordination of 
meeting, and obtaining documents from ITD; 
10/14/2010 York, Mary V. $ 61.00 0.2 Conference with ITD to discuss case; 
10/15/2010 York, Mary V. $ 579.50 1.9 
Work on Summons, Complaint and Lis Pendens; conferences with client regarding coordination of 
case management, documents and files; 
10/19/2010 York, Mary V. $ 30.50 0.1 Telephone call to Doug Marfice regarding case; 
Work on complaint; review case files and title documents to confirm information received from 
counsel for HJ Grathol; conference with TSTollefson regarding case; work on lis pendens and notice 
10/20/2010 York, Mary V. $ 1,281.00 4.2 
of special deputy attorney general appointment; work on summons, confirming statutory 
requirements of Idaho's eminent domain statutes; research secretary of state website to confirm 
details of Sterling Bank as party in case and incorporate information into pleadings; finalize 
pleadings; draft memo to client regarding condemnation action; 
10/21/2010 York, Mary V. $ 457.50 1.5 
Correspondence with client; confirm details of access issues for remainder property and revise order 
of condemnation; finalize pleadings for filing; 
10/22/2010 York, Mary V. $ 152.50 0.5 
Research information regarding landowner's appraiser and determine title; correspondence with 
client; 
10/25/2010 York, Mary V. $ 183.00 0.6 
Correspondence with client; telephone conference with client; telephone conference with Kootenai 
Title and follow up regarding title of parcel; 
10/26/2010 York, Mary V. $ 122.00 0.4 
Correspondence with Kootenai County Title Company regarding confirmation of title information; 
finalize language of Order of Condemnation and correspondence with client regarding same; 
10/28/2010 York, Mary V. $ 61.00 0.2 Review and analyze correspondence from client and respond to same; 
10/29/2010 York, Mary V. $ 335.50 1.1 
Review and analyze lengthy correspondence from Doug Marfice regarding HJ Grathol parcel, 
comparing information referenced with appraisal report; draft memo to client; 
11/01/2010 York, Mary V. $ 335.50 1.1 
Research information on Skip Sherwood and his disciplinary record with the bureau of occupational 
licenses; correspondence with client; telephone conference with client; 
Review and analyze comp sales used by experts; telephone conference with client; work on 
11/02/2010 York, Mary V. $ 701.50 2.3 
possession agreement; confer with TSTollefson regarding case and issues presented; telephone 
conference with Doug Marfice regarding possession agreement, comparable sales, and record owner 
of property; 
11/02/2010 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 62.00 0.4 Set up key electronic folders for case materials; 
.. ---------·---------·--·-· ---·-----------------------·------~ ---·- ·--- --
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Telephone conference with expert regarding Grathol property and comps from Skip Sherwood; work 
on assessment of case and identify key issues and bases for Grathol's compensation claims; 
11/03/2010 York, Mary V. $ 1,189.50 3.9 
correspondence with client; review language on order of condemnation; identify potential categories 
of expert witnesses based upon claims by Grathol and development plans; research Kootenai County 
information for details of zoning change applications and development proposals; draft public 
records request to Kootenai County; telephone conference with client; 
11/04/2010 York, Mary V. $ 488.00 1.6 
Review notes from conference call with client; draft correspondence to client and follow up with call 
to client; brief conference with client; 
Review correspondence and information regarding Grathol property from ITD, including Kootenai 
11/08/2010 York, Mary V. $ 579.50 1.9 
County Commissioner's re-zone decision and ITD's administrative policy on access control; research 
ITD's access policies (IDAPA) referenced in ITD's Access Control Administrative Policies; revise draft 
order of condemnation per comments from client; draft correspondence to client; 
11/08/2010 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 62.00 0.4 
Review recent case communications and update and create additional key electronic folders for 
access control policy and zoning issues; 
11/09/2010 York, Mary V. $ 305.00 1.0 
Email correspondence with client; review Kootenai County's response to public records request and 
draft response; telephone conference with expert; 
Review, edit and finalize letter to Kootenai County; review comp sales used by expert versus those 
11/11/2010 York, Mary V. $ 884.50 2.9 referenced by counsel for HJ Grathol in preparation for conference call; conference call with expert; 
telephone conference with Steve Bowman regarding case and strategies issues for moving forward; 
11/12/2010 York, Mary V. $ 335.50 1.1 Telephone conferences with client; draft email to client; 
11/12/2010 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 368.00 1.6 
Research regarding discovery requests for case; analyze appraisal report; prepare draft discovery 
request; 
11/15/2010 York, Mary V. $ 518.50 1.7 
Review and analyze correspondence from counsel for Grathol; correspondence with client; 
telephone conference with clients; 
11/15/2010 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 299.00 1.3 Continue to revise and prepare discovery requests; 
11/16/2010 York, Mary V. $ 549.00 1.8 Telephone conference with client; draft response to Doug Marfice's letter; 
11/16/2010 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 46.50 0.3 Update electronic folders with key information and documents; 
11/17/2010 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 322.00 1.4 
Research regarding public records request documents; prepare draft outline regarding same; edit 
and revise draft discovery requests; 
11/17/2010 York, Mary V. $ 213.50 0.7 
Finalize correspondence to Doug Marfice regarding settlement offer, stipulation for possession and 
other matters; send copy of correspondence to client; 
11/17/2010 Bowman, Steve C. $ 325.00 1.0 Work on response to correspondence received from counsel for property owner; 
11/17/2010 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 62.00 0.4 
Review recent case communications and continue to monitor and update key documents onto 
external network; 
-------------··--·---·--. -----·--·-·----------- --- ____ ..... 
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11/18/2010 York, Mary V. $ 213.50 0.7 
Finalize pleadings to initiate condemnation action and coordinate details for filing; draft 
correspondence to Doug Marfice regarding acceptance of service; 
11/18/2010 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 92.00 0.4 Analyze documents and prepare email memorandum regarding same; 
11/22/2010 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 124.00 0.8 
Run Secretary of State searches in Washington and Idaho for Agent for Service of Process for serving 
of complaint on Sterling Savings Bank; update electronic folders; 
11/22/2010 Bowman, Steve C. $ 260.00 0.8 
Draft acceptance of service form; draft letter to opposing counsel regarding potential acceptance of 
service and stipulation for possession; 
11/23/2010 Bowman, Steve C. $ 97.50 0.3 Review and edit documents and letter to be sent to opposing counsel; 
11/30/2010 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 92.00 0.4 Research regarding possession and service; 
Review correspondence and other communications in case forwarded and/or received during past 
12/02/2010 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 93.00 0.6 week; follow up on status of acceptance of service of Complaint and Summons for the HJ Grathol 
parcel; update case electronic folders; 
12/03/2010 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 92.00 0.4 Correspondence and telephone conference with opposing counsel; 
12/06/2010 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 31.00 0.2 Review Acceptance of Service of Complaint and forward to client; 
12/15/2010 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 92.00 0.4 
Review documents and correspondence regarding possession; telephone calls to opposing counsel 
and court regarding possession; 
Telephone conference with opposing counsel regarding possession; telephone conference with court 
12/20/2010 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 667.00 2.9 
regarding scheduling; correspondence regarding same; legal research for possession hearing; 
prepare draft motion for possession; prepare draft memorandum in support of motion for 
possession; 
Prepare motion for possession; draft memorandum in support of motion for possession; 
12/21/2010 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 414.00 1.8 correspondence and telephone conference with client; finalize motion and memorandum and notice 
for filing; 
12/21/2010 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 46.50 0.3 Brief review of pleadings filed with court; update electronic folders; 
12/21/2010 Bowman, Steve C. $ 325.00 1.0 Work on motion for possession and supporting pleadings; 
Telephone conference with opposing counsel regarding hearing; correspondence regarding same; 
12/22/2010 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 322.00 1.4 telephone conference with appraiser; prepare and file draft motion for voluntary dismissal; 
correspondence regarding same; 
12/23/2010 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 230.00 1.0 
Correspondence regarding hearing date; analyze and compare opposing counsel's draft stipulation 
for possession; email memorandum regarding opposing counsel's proposed changes; 
12/23/2010 Bowman, Steve C. $ 162.50 0.5 
Review letter from opposing counsel and his proposed stipulation for possession; confer with 
T5Tollefson regarding continued pursuit of hearing on motion for possession; 
12/27/2010 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 161.00 0.7 Correspondence with clients; telephone conference with court regarding hearing; 
12/29/2010 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 115.00 0.5 Correspondence regarding hearing; telephone conference with appraiser regarding hearing; 
01/03/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 49.00 0.2 Conference with MVYork regarding possession hearing, stipulation and status; 
---·----------------------·--··-··-.. _________________ ,. ______ ...... 
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01/03/2011 York, Mary V. $ 227.50 0.7 
Review and analyze correspondence and information regarding case and conference with 
TSTollefson regarding status of proceedings and possession of property; 
01/03/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 134.00 0.4 Review defendant's answer to complaint and note admissions; 
01/04/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 98.00 0.4 Telephone conference with opposing counsel; 
Work on developing strategies for case and begin identifying experts to respond to issues raised by 
Grathol; conference with SCBowman to discuss possession hearing and make assignments; review 
and analyze correspondence from counsel for Grathol regarding Possession Agreement and 
01/04/2011 York, Mary V. $ 1,267.50 3.9 
proposed changes to Agreement; review ITD's motion and brief in support of order for possession; 
confer with TSTollefson regarding Grathol's position on Possession Agreement, assess arguments 
presented by Grathol, and determine response; telephone conference with client; analyze Grathol's 
answer and affirmative defenses, research Idaho statutes referenced by Grathol and prepare 
responses to issues raised by Grathol; telephone conference with client; telephone call to client; 
01/04/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 435.50 1.3 Work on arguments for hearing on motion to obtain possession of Grathol property; 
01/05/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 441.00 1.8 
Work on preparations for possession hearing, including prep for witnesses; telephone conference 
with expert; continue to prepare for possession hearing; 
Outline issues for possession hearing and discussion with TSTollefson to prepare for hearing; 
01/05/2011 York, Mary V. $ 715.00 2.2 extended conference with TSTollefson and SCBowman to strategize for possession hearing, identify 
issues and responses for hearing, and to prepare for hearing; telephone conference with client; 
01/05/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 402.00 1.2 Assist with preparations for hearing on motion for possession; 
01/06/2011 York, Mary V. $ 325.00 1.0 
Review correspondence from counsel for Grathol; confirm details of issues raised in correspondence 
and draft response; further correspondence with opposing counsel; 
01/06/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 134.00 0.4 
Review correspondence from opposing counsel regarding negotiations for possession of property; 
work on negotiations; 
Legal research regarding scope of taking and relationship between complaint and order of 
01/06/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 637.00 2.6 condemnation; correspondence with opposing counsel regarding possession hearing; 
correspondence and preparation for possession hearing; 
Review additional correspondence from counsel for Grathol and determine appropriate response; 
01/07/2011 York, Mary V. $ 877.50 2.7 
telephone conference with client; work on prep for witnesses for possession hearing; conference call 
with client; follow up and prepare argument responsive to counsel's proposed amendments; 
conference with TSTollefson regarding possession hearing and issues that may arise; 
Prepare for witness prep and examinations; telephone conference with appraiser; telephone 
01/07/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 931.00 3.8 conference with clients; work on preparing for possession hearing and conference with MVYork 
regarding same; 
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01/07/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 80.00 0.5 Review recent case communications; update documents on external network; 
Review and analyze pleadings filed by counsel for Grathol and determine appropriate response to 
01/10/2011 York, Mary V. $ 357.50 1.1 
pleadings; telephone conference with client; conference with SCBowman regarding ITD's response to 
Grathol's motion to shorten time to file brief; review draft response to Grathol's argument and 
provide edits and comments to same; 
Review pleadings from opposing counsel; correspondence with client regarding maps and exhibits; 
01/10/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 563.50 2.3 research and conference regarding response to motion to shorten time; research and prepare draft 
response to motion to shorten; conference with client; 
01/10/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 201.00 0.6 
Review defendant's court filings to obtain an extension of time to respond to motion for possession; 
work on response to motion; 
Analyze and review opposing counsel's response to motion for possession; prepare response to 
motion to shorten time; conference with MVYork regarding court clerk and client; telephone 
01/11/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,249.50 5.1 conferences with client; telephone conference with expert; prepare draft outline for affidavit for 
possession motion reply; research regarding minutes and authority for taking; continue to prepare 
reply and outline; 
Review brief and affidavits opposing ITD's motion for possession; work on developing approach to 
01/11/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 502.50 1.5 reply brief; work on identifying additional affidavits needed to support motion for possession and 
outline content of affidavits; 
Review and analyze responsive pleadings from Grathol on ITD's motion for possession; assess 
appropriate response and confer with SCBowman regarding same; research information to respond 
01/11/2011 York, Mary V. $ 877.50 2.7 to Grathol's argument; telephone conferences with client; telephone conferences with clerk for 
Judge Haynes regarding hearing; review and analyze information regarding delegation of authority to 
Director for issuance of orders of condemnation; 
01/11/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 352.00 2.2 
Review HJ Grathol's response to motion for possession, along with affidavits of Alan Johnson and 
Christopher Gabbert; research regarding Board; compile references pulled and provide to MVYork; 
Continue legal research regarding legal authority of board to delegate condemnation authority to 
director; continue legal research regarding board actions and minutes regarding project; work on 
01/12/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,984.50 8.1 draft reply in support of motion for possession; prepare draft reply affidavit in support of motion for 
possession; telephone conference with client regarding authority of director; correspondence 
regarding research and reply; 
- -~-. ·--·----- -~-- -- . ----------· -·------------···-~-----------------------
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Legal research regarding history and authority of Board's delegation to director the authority to 
condemn property; legal research regarding administrative order of condemnations and complaint; 
01/13/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 2,401.00 9.8 research regarding opposing counsel's cases and citations; continue to draft reply in support of 
motion for possession; telephone conference with client; continue research regarding history of 
Board and approval of project; revise draft affidavit; prepare exhibits for affidavit; 
01/14/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 569.50 1.7 Work on reply brief and affidavits to be filed in support of motion for possession; 
01/14/2011 York, Mary V. $ 715.00 2.2 
Conference with client; review and edit draft brief in response to Grathol's motion for possession; 
review draft affidavit; 
Revise and edit draft reply brief; revise and edit draft affidavit; continue research regarding nature 
01/14/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,960.00 8.0 
and scope of project; continue research regarding history of project and board authorization and 
minute entries; research regarding negotiations between the parties; prepare additional arguments 
and sections for reply brief; prepare additional affidavit section; prepare additional affidavit exhibits; 
01/15/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 392.00 1.6 
Correspondence regarding affidavit and reply brief; research regarding affidavit for reply; prepare 
draft reply affidavit; 
01/16/2011 York, Mary V. $ 227.50 0.7 Work on reply to motion for possession; review and edit affidavit; 
01/16/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,474.00 4.4 
Review exhibits to be attached to affidavits; work on affidavits; work on reply brief in support of 
motion for possession; 
Review and edit draft final version of affidavits; conference with TSTollefson regarding affidavits and 
01/17/2011 York, Mary V. $ 877.50 2.7 
briefs for reply on motion for possession; research Idaho Code for provisions relating to delegation of 
authority from ITD Board to Director; forward draft affidavit and exhibits to client; telephone 
conference with client; meet with client; follow up with AKerby, notary for client; 
Revise and draft reply affidavits and exhibits; conference with regarding affidavit; telephone 
01/17/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 759.50 3.1 conferences with client regarding affidavit and exhibits; revise exhibits; correspondence regarding 
reply brief and affidavits; 
01/17/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,239.50 3.7 Complete work on affidavits; work on reply brief in support of motion for possession; 
Edit and revise draft reply brief; telephone conferences with client regarding filing and finalization of 
01/18/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 710.50 2.9 brief; correspondence regarding reply brief and affidavits; continue to prepare for possession 
hearing; 
Telephone conference with client; telephone conference with Judge Haynes' clerk; coordinate details 
01/18/2011 York, Mary V. $ 1,007.50 3.1 
for filing of brief and affidavit; edit proposed order for condemnation; conduct final review and edit 
of brief and affidavits and finalize documents for reply to motion for possession for filing; follow up 
conference with Judge Haynes' clerk; 
01/18/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,172.50 3.5 Complete work on reply brief and reply affidavits in support of motion for possession; 
01/19/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 49.00 0.2 Correspondence regarding possession hearing and negotiation; 
----- --- ---- ------~ ---- --- ···-·······------------------- --------------. ---------------- ·---
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01/19/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 100.50 0.3 
Assist with preparations for hearing on motion for possession and assessing most recent arguments 
by counsel for Grathol; 
01/20/2011 York, Mary V. $ 227.50 0.7 
Meet with TSTollefson in preparation for possession hearing; telephone conference with Doug 
Marfice; 
01/20/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,641.50 6.7 
Continue preparation for possession hearing; correspondence with witnesses regarding meetings; 
travel; preparation with appraiser; 
01/21/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,592.50 6.5 
Meeting with client for trial preparation and site visit; final research and preparation for hearing; 
possession hearing; correspondence and telephone conference regarding outcome of hearing; 
01/22/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 392.00 1.6 Return travel from Coeur d'Alene reviewing documents and notes from hearing in route; 
Conference with TSTollefson regarding hearing on motion for possession, arguments made, evidence 
presented and Court's decision; review Court's order, with delineations; review proposed 54(b) 
01/24/2011 York, Mary V. $ 682.50 2.1 certification and research significance of scope of proposed order; confer with TSTollefson regarding 
proposed 54(b) certification; review and edit proposed letter to Court; telephone conference with 
client; 
01/25/2011 York, Mary V. $ 97.50 0.3 Telephone conference with client; 
01/25/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 147.00 0.6 
Research regarding draft letter to court and counsel; conference with MVYork regarding draft letter; 
revise and finalize letter; 
01/26/2011 York, Mary V. $ 390.00 1.2 
Conference with TSTollefson regarding discovery requests for Grathol; review and analyze Court's 
notice of hearing for scheduling conference; 
01/26/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 220.50 0.9 
Correspondence regarding hearing and scheduling; prepare draft discovery requests; 
correspondence regarding court's scheduling order and status; 
01/26/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 134.00 0.4 
Review final draft of letter to Court regarding defendant's request for Rule 54(b) certificate; discuss 
approach to upcoming scheduling conference with MVYork TSTollefson; 
01/27/2011 York, Mary V. $ 32.50 0.1 Telephone conference with client; 
01/27/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 98.00 0.4 Telephone conference with court regarding order; correspondence with client regarding orders; 
Review Court's order granting possession and entry of rule 54(b) certification; draft correspondence 
to clients regarding orders and request payment for possession; assess issues being raised by Grathol 
01/28/2011 York, Mary V. $ 390.00 1.2 and identify areas of research needed; conference with TSTollefson to discuss research assignment 
and discuss potential expert witnesses and issues needing to be addressed by each; conference with 
client; 
01/28/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 49.00 0.2 Correspondence regarding court order and certification; 
·-·-··-·----·- ·-··· -----·------··----- ----- ---- - -- ·----···· 
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Telephone conference with SCBowman to discuss potential experts needed for case and identify 
01/31/2011 York, Mary V. $ 292.50 0.9 
possible individuals for experts; telephone message and conference with Chris Gabbart regarding 
payment for possession, potential appeal, stipulation for scheduling order; correspondence with 
client; 
01/31/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 234.50 0.7 
Work on identifying potential expert witnesses for case; review correspondence and pleadings 
related to landowner's request for Rule 54(b) certificate; 
02/01/2011 York, Mary V. $ 162.50 0.5 Telephone conference with client; 
02/02/2011 York, Mary V. $ 422.50 1.3 Review and edit draft discovery responses to HJ Grathol; draft stipulation for scheduling order; 
02/02/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 134.00 0.4 Review first set of discovery to be served on defendant; 
02/03/2011 York, Mary V. $ 65.00 0.2 Work on stipulation for scheduling order; 
Locate appraisal information requested by SCBowman and forward same to him; do search on Mr. 
02/03/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 128.00 0.8 Sherwood and forward background information to SCBowman, along with disciplinary action 
Stipulation and Consent Order issued from the Court on Mr. Sherwood; 
Conference call with SCBowman and TSTollefson to discuss Grathol notice of appeal, identify issues 
to be researched, make assignments for brief and research projects; draft scheduling order, confirm 
potential dates for trial, expert disclosures, etc., and confirm request for jury setting; finalize draft 
02/04/2011 York, Mary V. $ 1,137.50 3.5 scheduling order and incorporated noted edits from SCBowman and forward same to client; review 
correspondence from Chris Gabbert and respond to same; review proposed stipulation for release of 
funds, confirming details of requirements contained in IC 7-721; correspondence with client; follow 
up with client; 
Review appraisal prepared for ITD; review correspondence from opposing counsel regarding value of 
land and damages; draft memorandum regarding experts needed for case; review Grathol's 
02/04/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 703.50 2.1 proposed stipulation for release of funds, and confer with team regarding response to stipulation; 
work on stipulation for scheduling, with particular attention to expert disclosures, requested number 
of trial days, jury trial vs. bench trial, and order of proof; 
Finalize ITD's Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning; correspondence with Chris Gabbert regarding 
02/07/2011 York, Mary V. $ 260.00 0.8 
stipulation for scheduling order, for withdrawal of funds and woodcutting operations; conference 
with client; review warrant and confirm information; review and edit draft notice of tender of funds 
and transmittal letter to Clerk; 
02/08/2011 York, Mary V. $ 162.50 0.5 
Coordinate filing of notice of tender of funds, including confirming with clerk of court details of filing 
and delivery of check to court civil case supervisor; work on outline of experts needed for case; 
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02/09/2011 York, Mary V. $ 162.50 0.5 Finalize memo on expert witnesses; 
02/11/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 122.50 0.5 
Telephone conference with opposing counsel and MVYork regarding dispersal of funds, sureties, 
experts and scheduling stipulation; 
02/17/2011 York, Mary V. $ 1,007.50 3.1 
Research possible development expert for case; review public records information for experts 
retained by Grathol; conduct research on Grathol's experts; 
Research potential experts for case; correspondence with SCBowman regarding same; investigate 
02/18/2011 York, Mary V. $ 877.50 2.7 information regarding Hughes Development and North Alpine Development; conference call with 
expert; 
02/18/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 96.00 0.6 
Review website links pertaining to Hughes Investment and print out biographical information on 
principals and project work done by company and compile for MVYork's review; 
Review recent S.Ct. decision relating to Hughes development efforts in Coeur d'Alene; telephone 
02/22/2011 York, Mary V. $ 357.50 1.1 conference with Ron Harvey; research potential experts for case; telephone conference with 
SCBowman to discuss potential experts for case,in particular mix-use development experts; 
02/22/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 48.00 0.3 Follow-up with Kootenai County hearing transcript assignment; 
02/23/2011 York, Mary V. $ 260.00 0.8 
Review and edit draft agreement for experts; forward document to ITD for review and approval; 
conduct research for potential experts for case; 
02/23/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 32.00 0.2 Set up electronic expert files for experts retained to date; 
02/24/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 49.00 0.2 Correspondence regarding litigation and scheduling; 
Review proposed judgment on order for possession; review proposed stipulation for release of 
02/24/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 167.50 0.5 funds; follow up on preparations for status conference and determine status of joint stipulation for 
scheduling; 
Review and analyze motion to withdraw funds from Grathol and proposed judgment; telephone 
02/24/2011 York, Mary V. $ 715.00 2.2 
conference with Chris Gabbert, counsel for Grathol; draft memo to file outline conversation with Mr. 
Gabbert; revise stipulation for scheduling order to ITD's proposed schedule; telephone conference 
with client; draft notice of non-opposition to withdrawal; 
02/25/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 416.50 1.7 
Analyze and review opposing counsels scheduling motion and motion for jury trial; legal research 
regarding motion for jury trial; prepare draft outline regarding same; 
02/25/2011 York, Mary V. $ 97.50 0.3 Review and analyze Grathol's proposed pre-trial schedule and motion for jury trial; 
-------------------------
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Complete Public Records Request for Kootenai County Building & Planning office for obtaining copies 
of various hearing records and records related to Hughes Investments Zoning Application and 
forward back to Kootenai with transmittal memo; review Plaintiff's Response to Court's Notice of 
02/25/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 384.00 2.4 Status Conference for Scheduling and Planning; begin to compile documents needed for upcoming 
status conference for MVYork and set up same into notebook for conference; prepare index to 
notebook documents; review HJ Grathol's Response to Status Conference Notice and their Motion 
for Jury Trial; update electronic files; review additional case communications; 
Continue legal research regarding motion for jury trial; telephone conference with judge's clerk; legal 
02/28/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,249.50 5.1 research regarding court trial in eminent domain proceedings; continue to draft response to motion 
for jury trial; correspondence regarding same; 
02/28/2011 York, Mary V. $ 97.50 0.3 
Telephone conference with client; review correspondence from Doug Marfice and determine 
appropriate response; 
Review materials received from Kootenai County Building & Planning Department per our public 
02/28/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 128.00 0.8 records request, including agendas and DVD, and prepare e-mail to team regarding general contents 
of what was received and need for further review of actual public hearings, etc.; 
Draft response to email from Doug Marfice; correspondence and follow up conference with client; 
research Idaho case law regarding jury trials in Idaho; telephone conference with Doug Marfice to 
03/01/2011 York, Mary V. $ 617.50 1.9 discuss motion for jury trial and scheduling conference; review and analyze information from Court 
regarding scheduling of motion for jury trial and scheduling conference; conference with TSTollefon 
regarding arguments in response to Grathol's motion for jury trial; 
Continue legal research regarding right to a jury trial and effect of rule 38 waiver and discretion of 
03/01/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,127.00 4.6 court; conference with MVYork; revise and edit draft response to motion; correspondence regarding 
motion and status; 
03/02/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 49.00 0.2 Correspondence and documents regarding scheduling conference and notice of hearing; 
Listen to recording of Hearing Examiner's public hearing of 08/21/2008 and presentation made by 
representative from Hughes Investments, taking notes regarding the same; obtain check and prepare 
03/02/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 208.00 1.3 letter to Ms. Sandi Gilbertson at Kootenai County Building and Planning Office with transmittal of 
check for DVD of public hearings; review amended Notice of Hearing and Status Conference and 
update electronic folders; 
03/03/2011 York, Mary V. $ 227.50 0.7 
Review notice of hearing from Grathol and correspondence with client; draft letter to Doug Marfice 
regarding hearing date for motion for jury trial; 
03/04/2011 York, Mary V. $ 65.00 0.2 Review and respond to email correspondence from Doug Marfice; 
03/07/2011 York, Mary V. $ 1,430.00 4.4 
Confirm status of expert's reports and analysis; review signed version of judgment and order to 
partially withdraw funds; work on draft of ITD's response to motion for jury trial; 
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03/07/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 49.00 0.2 Research and review public hearing regarding zoning change; 
03/08/2011 York, Mary V. $ 1,170.00 3.6 Work on response to motion for jury trial; 
03/09/2011 York, Mary V. $ 1,722.50 5.3 
Work on SharePoint update with case information; work on response brief to motion for jury trial; 
telephone conference with client; 
03/14/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 268.00 0.8 Work on identifying expert witnesses; telephone calls to potential experts; 
03/14/2011 York, Mary V. $ 130.00 0.4 Work on identifying and retaining expert witnesses; 
03/15/2011 York, Mary V. $ 130.00 0.4 Review correspondence and signed retainer agreement from expert; correspondence with client; 
03/15/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 98.00 0.4 Prepare draft letter to opposing counsel and conference with MVYork regarding same; 
03/18/2011 York, Mary V. $ 260.00 0.8 
Finalize brief in support of jury trial and forward same to client; review information regarding Hughes 
Investments developments and respond to correspondence; 
03/18/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,072.00 3.2 Work on brief in opposition to defendant's motion for jury trial; 
03/21/2011 York, Mary V. $ 357.50 1.1 
Work on affidavit in support of response to Grathol's motion for jury trial; amend response brief so is 
consistent with affidavit; finalize response brief for filing; 
Locate and compile exhibits for MVYork's affidavit for filing with ITD's brief in opposition to Grathol's 
03/21/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 128.00 0.8 
motion for jury trial; draft Affidavit of Mary V. York in Support of ITD's Brief in Opposition to 
Defendant Grathol's Motion for Jury Trial; prepare external folder for exhibits to affidavit and 
forward same for filing; 
Review correspondence from Doug Marfice; research information regarding issues referenced in 
03/22/2011 York, Mary V. $ 552.50 1.7 
correspondence and draft response email to Mr. Marfice; finalize documents relating to motion to 
dismiss appeal and execute documents for filing; review newspaper article on Grathol development; 
receive voicemail from client and follow up with conference with WGMyers and phone calls to client; 
Telephone conference with SCBowman to discuss hearing and procedural issues relating to Grathol's 
03/30/2011 York, Mary V. $ 260.00 0.8 motion; telephone call to clerk of the Court regarding hearing on Grathol's motion for jury trial; 
telephone conference with Chris Gabbert regarding motion for jury trial;follow up with client; 
03/31/2011 York, Mary V. $ 1,950.00 6.0 
Travel to North Idaho for hearing on motion for jury trial and scheduling conference; site visit to 
inspect subject property; attend status conference with Court; 
Telephone conference with SCBowman, TSTollefson and BKFeraci to discuss status conference and 
04/01/2011 York, Mary V. $ 292.50 0.9 trial setting at yesterday's hearing and to discuss pending issues in case, status of expert witnesses 
and discovery; 
04/01/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 98.00 0.4 Prepare litigation response to Grathol's litigation strategy; 
04/04/2011 York, Mary V. $ 325.00 1.0 Meeting with expert; 
04/04/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 496.00 3.1 
Review notes from conference call and begin preparing bullet point of issues after review of case 
communications and pleadings; meet briefly with MVYork to discuss case issues; 
------------- -- -- ----- ------- ·------------- -----------~-----·-···-. - --~ 
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04/06/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 288.00 1.8 
Make additions to summary memo regarding issues and locate additional information related to 
particular issue; 
04/11/2011 York, Mary V. $ 65.00 0.2 Follow up on status of discovery responses from Grathol; 
Research correspondence with opposing counsel and prepare timeline of events in preparation of 
04/12/2011 York, Mary V. $ 325.00 1.0 motion to compel; correspondence with SCBowman regarding same; review and edit 
correspondence to counsel for Grathol regarding discovery responses; 
Review correspondence and emails relating to ITD's first set of discovery and extensions of time to 
04/12/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 335.00 1.0 respond granted to defendant; work on final letter to opposing counsel demanding discovery 
responses; 
04/13/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 16.00 0.1 Review finalized letter to Mr. Douglas Marfice from MVYork; 
04/13/2011 York, Mary V. $ 195.00 0.6 
Confirm information for letter to counsel for Grathol regarding late discovery and research additional 
information; revise draft of letter to Grathol and finalize same; 
04/13/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 122.50 0.5 
Research regarding deficiency letters, motion to compel and related documents; correspondence 
regarding same; 
04/15/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 368.50 1.1 
Review defendant's responses to first set of discovery; work on outline of follow up letter regarding 
deficiencies in responses; 
04/15/2011 York, Mary V. $ 260.00 0.8 Review and analyze discovery responses from Grathol; 
Research list of names and companies referenced by Defendant HJ Grathol (Answers and Responses 
04/18/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 768.00 4.8 
to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents) as possible 
experts and/or consultants, and run searches on each to obtain background information; print our 
large amount of materials and start preparation of summary memo to litigation team; 
04/19/2011 York, Mary V. $ 130.00 0.4 
Conference with expert regarding Grathol's request for zoning change and follow up to obtain 
information for expert; 
04/19/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 512.00 3.2 
Complete searches on additional company entities and individuals identified as experts and/or 
consultants by Grathol and prepare/complete summary memo to litigation team; 
04/20/2011 York, Mary V. $ 32.50 0.1 Telephone call and email correspondence with client; 
Locate documents received by way of Public Records Request and arrange for CD to be burned of 
04/20/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 256.00 1.6 same for expert; prepare letter to expert with CD; compile documents downloaded from Internet on 
Grathol's experts and consultants and compile into master notebook for MVYork; 
04/29/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 64.00 0.4 
Go through Planning and Zoning documents and other case materials to locate information 
requested by MVYork and SCBowman; 
05/02/2011 York, Mary V. $ 130.00 0.4 
Review and analyze expert witness designations by Grathol and determine appropriate response to 
Grathol regarding same; 
. ...... ...... . .. .... - ............... _______ _ --------·---·--·· -·-··--·-·--·-··-----···--,· .. •·· .... ,. 
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Research Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and waiver of objections and discovery responses; research 
05/02/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 710.50 2.9 regarding opposing party's discovery responses; continue to prepare draft letter regarding trial, 
witnesses, objections and deficiencies; correspondence regarding same; 
05/02/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 32.00 0.2 
Review various e-mail communications regarding discovery issues, potential trial witnesses offered 
by opposing side, and compelling production of documents; 
Review memorandum by BKFeraci giving background information on experts identified by Grathol in 
05/02/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 268.00 0.8 
discovery responses; confer with MVYork and TSTollefson regarding long list of experts identified by 
Grathol and impact on trial preparation and scheduling order, and discuss letter to be sent to 
opposing counsel; 
Review Grathol's discovery responses in preparation for conference call with counsel for Grathol; 
conference call with Chris Gabbert regarding documents for production, number of identified 
05/03/2011 York, Mary V. $ 520.00 1.6 witnesses, and responses to discovery requests; follow up conference with TSTollefson regarding 
draft of letter to Mr. Gabbert confirming details of conference call; review and analyze memorandum 
regarding development uses of Grathol property and possible development experts; 
05/03/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 220.50 0.9 Telephone conference with opposing counsel; continue to prepare draft letter to opposing counsel; 
Complete review of P&Z files for information needed by SCBowman and MVYork; locate developer 
05/03/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 272.00 1.7 and box chain experts used in previous cases; prepare memo to SCBowman and MVYork regarding 
findings from review of P&Z files and provide names of potential experts; 
05/04/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 98.00 0.4 Continue research regarding discovery responses and draft letter; 
Work on identifying types of uses and tenants being proposed by property owner for development of 
05/04/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 971.50 2.9 property; work on identifying experts to address development issues and impacts on development 
by US 95 Project; 
05/06/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 392.00 1.6 
Work on draft letter to opposing counsel regarding expert witnesses, discovery deficiencies and trial 
schedule; research documents regarding same; edit letter; 
05/06/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 100.50 0.3 
Review and edit draft letter to opposing counsel regarding deficiencies in discovery responses and 
issue of number of potential expert witnesses identified; 
05/09/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 134.00 0.4 Telephone conference with potential expert witness; 
05/10/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 569.50 1.7 Conduct research and interviews of potential expert witnesses; 
05/16/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 196.00 0.8 
Analyze and research opposing party's discovery request; prepare email memorandum regarding 
response; 
05/16/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 301.50 0.9 
Review first set of discovery served by defendant on ITD and make notes for responses; review 
memorandum by TSTollefson analyzing first set of discovery served by defendant; 
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05/18/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 49.00 0.2 Review opposing party's supplemental interrogatory answers; 
05/18/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 469.00 1.4 
Review correspondence from opposing counsel regarding supplemental discovery responses; review 
supplemental discovery responses by HJ Grathol; compile notes for follow up discovery; 
05/19/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 710.50 2.9 Research and review Grathol's discovery response; prepare draft outline regarding same; 
05/19/2011 York, Mary V. $ 97.50 0.3 Conference with client; 
05/20/2011 York, Mary V. $ 260.00 0.8 Review key documents from Grathol's discovery responses and determine next steps for case; 
05/20/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 392.00 1.6 
Conference with MVYork regarding discovery; continue to research Grathol discovery responses and 
prepare outline regarding discovery responses; 
05/23/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 588.00 2.4 
Work on research discovery responses and prepare outline regarding same; research regarding 
litigation plan and outline regarding same; 
05/24/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 804.00 2.4 Research potential expert witnesses for case; telephone calls with potential experts; 
05/25/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 196.00 0.8 Continue to research discovery responses and outline regarding same; 
05/25/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 48.00 0.3 
Set up electronic folder for Grathol document production and arrange for project assistant to save 
production documents to external folder for further review by TSTollefson, etc.; 
05/27/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 147.00 0.6 Continue discovery research and outline regarding same; 
06/02/2011 York, Mary V. $ 390.00 1.2 Work on responses to Grathol's discovery; 
06/02/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 367.50 1.5 Continue to prepare response to request for discovery; 
06/03/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 100.50 0.3 Confer with expert regarding initial work to be done on Grathol case; 
06/04/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 402.00 1.2 Draft memorandum with recommendations for experts to be retained to work on case; 
06/06/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,053.50 4.3 
Continue research regarding response to request for discovery; continue to prepare draft response 
to request for discovery; 
06/07/2011 York, Mary V. $ 292.50 0.9 
Work on expert witness issues; telephone conference with Doug Marfice regarding discovery 
requests; email exchanges with client; 
06/07/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 703.50 2.1 Review correspondence regarding expert; work on identifying experts; 
06/09/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 737.00 2.2 Work on retaining experts for case; research commercial real estate experts; 
06/13/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 147.00 0.6 
Continue to prepare responses to discovery; telephone conference with client regarding discovery; 
telephone conference with appraiser regarding discovery; 
Correspondence with client; follow up on request to obtain photograph of subject property, edit 
06/14/2011 York, Mary V. $ 422.50 1.3 exhibits of property to identify subject property; coordinate expert disclosures and discovery 
responses with SCBowman; 
06/14/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 49.00 0.2 Correspondence regarding discovery; 
06/14/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 569.50 1.7 
Telephone conference with expert to discuss case background and outline work to be done; work on 
compiling documents to be sent to experts; 
06/15/2011 York, Mary V. $ 130.00 0.4 Work on details of retaining experts for case; correspondence with client; 
- --"---· -------------- -·------------------------------
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06/15/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 171.50 0.7 
Continue to prepare discovery responses; telephone conference with appraiser regarding same; 
correspondence with appraiser; 
06/16/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 343.00 1.4 
Research regarding documents to experts and correspondence regarding same; continue to prepare 
documents for discovery; 
06/16/2011 York, Mary V. $ 227.50 0.7 
Work on compiling and assembling documents to be sent to experts and ensuring completeness of 
document sets; telephone conference with client; 
Various communications with regarding documents needed for experts; complete compiling 
06/16/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 288.00 1.8 documents for expert review; locate additional documents for production and update materials to 
be sent; 
06/16/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 636.50 1.9 
Telephone conference with experts; coordinate retention of experts and execution of engagement 
agreements; 
06/16/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 268.00 0.8 Identify and compile documents to be sent to experts in case; 
06/17/2011 York, Mary V. $ 162.50 0.5 
Review proposed engagement letter from experts and follow up with SCBowman regarding issues 
relating to retaining experts; forward letter to client; 
Create electronic folder for storing documents for production in responding to Grathol's First Set of 
06/17/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 496.00 3.1 
Discovery to ITD; update deadlines chart; draft detailed transmittal letter; update and add electronic 
folders; work oncompiling another group of documents to be sent; prepare letter with transmittal of 
CD and other hard copy documents; 
06/17/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 134.00 0.4 
Review and edit letters to be sent to experts with documents; review engagement letter received 
from expert and forward to MVYork; 
06/21/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 96.00 0.6 Work on compiling key documents for case notebook for MVYork; 
06/22/2011 York, Mary V. $ 357.50 1.1 Work on expert disclosures for ITD; confer with SCBowman regarding same; 
Research regarding expert disclosure requirements; prepare draft letter to opposing counsel 
06/23/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 882.00 3.6 
regarding appeal documents; analyze and review potential documents for discovery responses; 
telephone conference with client regarding expert exhibits; research regarding affidavits, notices and 
project goals and plans and correspondence regarding same; 
06/24/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 171.50 0.7 Correspondence regarding expert exhibits; continue to prepare discovery response and documents; 
06/24/2011 York, Mary V. $ 65.00 0.2 Correspondence with client; 
06/27/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 171.50 0.7 Research regarding status of discovery responses and requests; continue to prepare litigation plan; 
06/28/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,172.50 3.5 Work on identifying qualified experts; telephone calls to potential experts; 
06/30/2011 York, Mary V. $ 195.00 0.6 
Correspondence with Doug Marfice regarding pending discovery requests; work on expert 
disclosures and review of exhibit materials; 
06/30/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 171.50 0.7 
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07/05/2011 York, Mary V. $ 130.00 0.4 Work on discovery responses to Grathol's requests and confer with TSTollefson regarding same; 
Review documents to be produced in discovery; discuss in-house vs. vendor processing and 
07/05/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 144.00 0.9 numbering of data with MVYork and TSTollefson; meet with project assistant AGreen to go over 
documents to be converted into pdf files, and numbering of documents for production, etc.; 
07/05/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 514.50 2.1 
Continue to research and prepare documents and exhibits for discovery; revise and edit discovery 
responses and correspondence regarding same; 
Complete finalization of documents to be produced, including overseeing the Bates numbering and 
07/06/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 336.00 2.1 
final burning of documents to CDs, reviewing final product and making slight changes to document 
identification, etc.; review recent case e-mails and communications, and update case electronic 
folders; meet briefly with TSTollefson to give him update on discovery status, etc.; 
07/06/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,239.50 3.7 
Telephone conference with client to discuss their site visit and analysis of issues; work on expert 
witness disclosures; 
07/06/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 269.50 1.1 Continue to prepare documents for production; revise and edit draft discovery responses; 
07/07/2011 York, Mary V. $ 390.00 1.2 
Review and edit ITD's responses and production of documents in response to Grathol's discovery 
requests; 
Make additions to document production, and meet with project assistant AGreen to discuss 
07/07/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 160.00 1.0 
additional numbering of photographs and burning of new CDs; add photo exhibits and documents to 
be produced in attorney notebooks on condemnation matters; locate additional key case documents 
for attorney notebooks; 
07/08/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 167.50 0.5 Review draft responses to discovery served by Grathol and begin work on edits to responses; 
07/08/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 367.50 1.5 
Correspondence regarding discovery; revise and edit discovery responses; prepare draft letter 
regarding discovery; finalize discovery for service; 
07/09/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 171.50 0.7 Research regarding discovery responses and revise demand letter regarding same; 
07/11/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 402.00 1.2 Work on expert disclosures to be served by July 15, 2011; 
07/12/2011 York, Mary V. $ 357.50 1.1 Finalize letter responding to settlement offer; draft email memorandum to client; 
07/13/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 201.00 0.6 Work on expert witness disclosures; 
07/14/2011 York, Mary V. $ 97.50 0.3 Work on expert witness issues and confer with SCBowman regarding expert witness disclosure; 
07/14/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 569.50 1.7 
Work on expert witness disclosures for ITD case in chief; confer with MVYork regarding remaining 
expert witnesses needed for case; 
07/15/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,139.00 3.4 
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07/15/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 220.50 0.9 
Continue to prepare and organize relevant documents produced by both parties; revise draft 
discovery letter; 
07/18/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,105.50 3.3 
Work on summary of status of retaining experts and work done by experts to date; research 
potential experts in Idaho and neighboring states; work on first round of expert witness disclosures; 
07/20/2011 York, Mary V. $ 162.50 0.5 Review and edit expert disclosures; correspondence with client; 
07/20/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 588.00 2.4 
Analyze and edit draft expert disclosures; correspondence regarding same; telephone conference 
with client; continue to research key documents in preparationfor summary judgment and trial; 
Conduct final review and edits of expert disclosures; correspondence with client; finalize pleadings 
07/21/2011 York, Mary V. $ 520.00 1.6 and exhibits and coordinate filing of same; review correspondence from Chris Gabbert regarding 
ITD's discovery responses; 
Telephone conference with client; edit and finalize expert disclosures and exhibits regarding same; 
07/21/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 416.50 1.7 edit and revise draft letter; analyze and review opposing counsel's demand letter; correspondence 
regarding same; 
07/21/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 871.00 2.6 Work on disclosure of advancing experts on behalf of ITD; revised and edit disclosures; 
07/22/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,494.50 6.1 
Revise letter regarding discovery; continue to separate and analyze opposing party's discovery 
response and correspondence; prepare outline regarding same; correspondence regarding same; 
07/22/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 469.00 1.4 
Telephone conference with expert; complete work on expert disclosures; draft notice of service of 
expert disclosures; 
07/25/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 514.50 2.1 
Continue to analyze and organize documents; continue to prepare outline regarding same; 
correspondence regarding demand letter; 
Review correspondence from opposing counsel on discovery issues, and confer with TSTollefson 
07/25/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 368.50 1.1 regarding response; work on letter to opposing counsel responding to deficiencies in Grathol's 
discovery responses; 
Research regarding correspondence file and discovery; continue research regarding opposing party's 
07/27/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 392.00 1.6 
deficiency letter and related pleadings; correspondence regarding same; telephone conference with 
court regarding scheduling and correspondence regarding same; telephone conference with client 
regarding discovery documents; 
07/28/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 343.00 1.4 
Correspondence regarding summary judgment scheduling and response to demand letter; continue 
research regarding response to discovery letter; prepare draft response letter; 
07/29/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 147.00 0.6 Edit and revise draft letter to opposing counsel; correspondence regarding construction plans; 
. ----·-- ---------·-----·--------- ---------------- ---------- ---•·-·· ·-·· 
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Work on letter to opposing counsel in response to letter requesting supplementation of discovery 
07/29/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,206.00 3.6 responses by ITD; work on narrative and exhibits to illustrate issues relating to Sylvan Road 
extension; work on retaining commercial development expert; telephone conference with expert; 
08/01/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 710.50 2.9 
Correspondence regarding frontage road; continue to analyze relevant, key and non-essential 
documents produced by ITD; 
08/02/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,005.00 3.0 
Telephone conferences with potential experts; follow up telephone conference call with expert to 
discuss case and outline work to be done on case; compile documents to be sent to expert; 
08/03/2011 Tollefson, Ted 5. $ 1,200.50 4.9 
Continue to analyze and prioritize discovery documents for litigation and trial; prepare outline 
regarding same; prepare letter and documents for experts; 
08/03/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 569.50 1.7 
Revise and edit chart of deadlines in case; draft correspondence to each expert retained on behalf of 
ITD explaining case deadlines, order of proof at trial, and order of submission of expert reports; 
08/04/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 367.50 1.5 
Document analysis, review and organization; legal research regarding public records request and 
correspondence regarding same; 
Send ITD's disclosures of opening experts to all lTD experts on case; work on compiling documents to 
08/04/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 435.50 1.3 
be sent to expert; telephone conference with expert regarding personnel additions and discuss 
progress of their work on case; review public records request served by one of the members of the 
Grathol partnership, and confer with MVYork and TSTollefson regarding response to request; 
Review supplemental CD of documents to be sent to expert; prepare letter to expert with additional 
documents for review; send e-mail to litigation team updating all on status of materials sent to 
08/05/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 544.00 3.4 
expert; complete review of recent communications, correspondence and pleadings recently 
received; complete updating all expert files and compiling materials forwarded to each expert; 
review public records request letter from HJ Grathol to ITD and various e-mail communications 
regarding improper use of public records request and legal authority backing the same; 
08/05/2011 York, Mary V. $ 195.00 0.6 
Research issues relating to public records requests and draft response to client; follow up 
correspondence with client; 
08/05/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 220.50 0.9 Research and organize documents for litigation and trial; prepare outline regarding same; 
08/05/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 268.00 0.8 
Draft correspondence to expert outlining case deadlines and initial work on case; review CV and 
proposed contract received from expert and forward contract to MVYork; 
08/08/2011 York, Mary V. $ 97.50 0.3 Work on engagement agreement and retainer payment for expert; 
08/09/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 80.00 0.5 Review correspondence from SCBowman to experts; update expert folders; 
08/09/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 837.50 2.5 Telephone conferences with experts; 
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08/10/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 208.00 1.3 
Search for and locate document requested by expert and forward the same; review and respond to 
various case e-mails; update expert files with additional CVs and contract agreements; 
08/10/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 703.50 2.1 
Telephone conferences with experts; compile additional documents to be sent to experts; work on 
outlines of expert reports; 
08/11/2011 York, Mary V. $ 65.00 0.2 Confirm details regarding Sterling Saving's interest in the Grathol property; 
08/11/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 49.00 0.2 Research and correspondence regarding dismissal of bank; 
08/11/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 502.50 1.5 
Telephone conference with consultants with expert to discuss their site visit and their review of 
documents provided, and outline work to be done by them on case; 
08/18/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 134.00 0.4 Work on coordinating site visits and area tours by experts; 
08/19/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 402.00 1.2 Work on coordinating site inspection and vicinity tour by experts; 
08/22/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 514.50 2.1 
Analyze and research opposing party's expert disclosures; legal research regarding compliance with 
rules and pre-trial orders; draft email memorandum and correspondence regarding same; 
08/22/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 402.00 1.2 
Review HJ Grathol's expert witness disclosures; send disclosures to all experts retained on behalf of 
ITD, with explanatory note; 
08/22/2011 York, Mary V. $ 65.00 0.2 Review and edit draft correspondence to experts; 
Analyze and research expert disclosures; legal research regarding actor/viewer expert exception; 
08/23/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,078.00 4.4 legal research regarding rules of procedure and affect on court order; prepare draft expert disclosure 
deficiency letter; 
08/23/2011 York, Mary V. $ 325.00 1.0 
Coordinate site visit with expert and telephone conference with expert; review and analysis of 
Grathol's expert disclosures; 
Correspondence regarding expert disclosures; edit and finalize expert deficiency letter; research 
08/24/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 490.00 2.0 regarding appellate extension; prepare draft motion and affidavit for extension; correspondence 
regarding same; prepare draft supplemental discovery responses and edits regarding same; 
08/25/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 49.00 0.2 Edit draft discovery requests and correspondence regarding same; 
Review recent correspondence to Mr. Doug Marfice regarding deficiencies in their Expert Witness 
08/25/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 48.00 0.3 Disclosures and request for a response to our earlier demand for further responses to discovery; 
update case files; 
Telephone conference with expert regarding site tour and discuss preliminary valuation opinion in 
08/25/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 536.00 1.6 
expert disclosures by defendant HJ Grathol; work on supplemental discovery to be served on 
defendant; work on letter to opposing counsel addressing deficiencies in HJ Grathol's expert 
disclosures; 
08/25/2011 York, Mary V. $ 260.00 0.8 
Review and edit draft discovery to Grathol; review correspondence to opposing counsel regarding 
meet and confer for expert disclosures; edit motion for extension of time for supreme court brief; 
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08/26/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 245.00 1.0 
Research regarding URM studies and correspondence; prepare additional discovery requests 
regarding same; correspondence regarding discovery; 
08/29/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 147.00 0.6 Research regarding Kootenai county district court decision; finalize second discovery request; 
Review and edit additional set of discovery to be served on defendant; review correspondence from 
08/29/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 335.00 1.0 opposing counsel responding to most recent deficiency letter sent to defendant; confer with MVYork 
regarding reply to letter from opposing counsel; 
08/29/2011 York, Mary V. $ 260.00 0.8 
Review draft correspondence and discovery requests to Gratho; review lengthy correspondence from 
opposing counsel; 
Draft letter to opposing counsel regarding motion to compel and litigation deadlines; review and 
08/30/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 938.00 2.8 respond to correspondence received from opposing counsel; conference with experts as part of site 
tour; review document prepared by expert; 
08/30/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 122.50 0.5 Correspondence regarding expert witnesses; prepare draft deposition notices for experts; 
09/01/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 171.50 0.7 
Edit draft deposition notices; correspondence regarding same; finalize deposition notices and draft 
letter to opposing counsel; 
09/06/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 49.00 0.2 Opposing counsel correspondence regarding depositions and correspondence regarding same; 
09/06/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 16.00 0.1 
Review letter from Mr. Christopher Gabbert regarding unavailability of Mr. Johnson and Mr. 
Reeslund for their depositions, etc.; 
09/06/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 603.00 1.8 
Telephone conferences with experts to discuss their progress on work assignments and discuss 
content and approach to rebuttal reports; 
Review and analysis of correspondence from opposing counsel and assess response to same; work 
09/07/2011 York, Mary V. $ 877.50 2.7 on motion to compel; review prior insufficient disclosures from Grathol and outline arguments for 
motion; confer with TSTollefson regarding meet and confer with opposing counsel; 
Work on compiling documents needed by MVYork for upcoming trip to Northern Idaho; run Google 
09/07/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 752.00 4.7 map searches on all comparable property sales set forth in HJ Grathol's expert disclosures and 
correspondence, as well as all properties listed by expert; update case file materials; 
09/07/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 301.50 0.9 
Work on addressing defendant's failure to disclose expert witnesses, and impacts on deposition 
scheduling, disclosure of rebuttal experts, and other litigation deadlines; 
Review appraisal reports and expert disclosures in preparation for site visit and tour; telephone 
09/08/2011 York, Mary V. $ 1,007.50 3.1 conference with expert; work on motion to compel; review expert disclosures and deficiency letters 
and outline arguments for meet andconfer; correspondence with opposing counsel; 
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Complete locating and compiling materials needed by MVYork related to land valuation reports and 
09/08/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 576.00 3.6 
communications, and comparable sales data on properties in area of HJ Grathol property; prepare 
detailed index to notebook of documents collected; locate additional Google maps for No. Idaho trip 
for MVYork; finalize compilation of materials into master notebook; 
Telephone conference with expert regarding site visit to view subject property and comps; prepare 
for site visit, reviewing comparable sales and information provided by Grathol; prepare for meet and 
09/09/2011 York, Mary V. $ 1,105.00 3.4 confer conference, reviewing discovery responses, expert disclosures and correspondence between 
counsel and conduct research relating to discovery requirements under the rule; extended meet and 
confer conference with Chris Gabbert; 
Draft memo to file regarding meet and confer conference with Chris Gabbert; travel to Coeur d'Alene 
09/12/2011 York, Mary V. $ 2,145.00 6.6 for site visit with experts, review expert reports and information in transit; prepare for site visit and 
meeting with experts; site visit to view and inspect comp sale in Mullen used by opposing expert; 
09/13/2011 York, Mary V. $ 3,087.50 9.5 
Meet with experts and tour of Garwood to Sagle Project and comp sales used by expert Grathol's 
valuation expert, Skip Sherwood; return travel to Boise, review notes and case documents in transit; 
09/14/2011 York, Mary V. $ 97.50 0.3 
Conference with TSTollefson to discuss site visit and issues relating to comp sales used by opposing 
expert and assign research project; 
Continue to prepare annotated statement of facts; research regarding statement of facts; revise 
09/15/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,617.00 6.6 
statement of facts; correspondence regarding statements of facts; prepare draft motion to compel 
and exclude; research regarding motion to compel and exclude; prepare draft brief in support of 
motion to compel and exclude; opposing counsel's motion to compel; 
Research information about Mr. Dewitt ("Skip") Sherwood, confirming real estate appraiser licenses 
09/15/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 384.00 2.4 
in Washington and Idaho, checking for disciplinary actions, and locating cases he testified in, etc.; 
prepare summary memo for MVYork and distribute to team; review HJ Grathol's Motion to Compel 
and accompanying affidavit; update summary memo with recent case developments; 
Draft letter to opposing counsel regarding motion to compel; work on affidavit regarding motion to 
compel and motion to exclude, including review of case file and documents; research case law 
09/16/2011 York, Mary V. $ 1,852.50 5.7 regarding sanctions available under motion to compel; work on exhibits for affidavit in support of 
motion to compel; research timelines for Accarequi offer and conference with expert; work on brief 
insupport of motion to exclude; 
---- ---- ---- - --
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Continue research regarding motion to compel and documents regarding same; edit draft motion to 
09/16/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,298.50 5.3 compel; continue to prepare draft brief in support of motion to exclude and/or compel expert 
reports and discovery responses; 
Continue to prepare draft statement of facts for appellate brief; research documents regarding 
09/18/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 563.50 2.3 motion to compel and exclude; continue to prepare brief in support of motion to exclude and 
compel; edit draft affidavit in support of motion to compel and exclude; 
Work on motion to compel; research Idaho and federal case law regarding actor/viewer exceptions 
to expert disclosure requirements; revise affidavit in support of motion to compel and add additional 
09/19/2011 York, Mary V. $ 1,917.50 5.9 information; correspondence to client regarding soils testing information; receive information from 
client and review documents provided; research information regarding ITD's processes for approving 
projects; 
09/20/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 514.50 2.1 
Research regarding supplemental discovery responses and motion to compel; prepare draft 
supplemental discovery response; correspondence regarding motion to extend briefing schedule; 
Work on motion to exclude; telephone conference with Doug Marfice regarding extension of time 
and regarding expert disclosures; research Idaho and federal case law regarding actor-viewer 
09/20/2011 York, Mary V. $ 1,852.50 5.7 exceptions to expert disclosure rules; additional review of case file and incorporate additional 
information into affidavit and motion to exclude; confer with SCBowman regarding arguments in 
motion to exclude; 
Confer with experts regarding site inspections and tour of surrounding areas; confer with experts 
regarding deadlines and content of expert reports; review ITD documents relating to approval of 
09/20/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,809.00 5.4 road projects and individual administrative orders of condemnation; review and edit letter to 
opposing counsel regarding ongoing discovery disputes; review concept plans prepared by expert 
team and prepare for upcoming meeting with experts; review and analyze invoice from expert; 
Conference with MVYork and SCBowman regarding litigation; research regarding discovery and 
09/21/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 686.00 2.8 
expert standards under Idaho rules and correspondence regarding same; edit and review affidavit 
and exhibits in support of motion to compel and or exclude; continue to prepare supplemental 
response to discovery request; 
Research case law regarding court authority to waive disclosure rules; review information provided 
by client; finalize motion for extension of time and coordinating filing of same; review andanalyze 
09/21/2011 York, Mary V. $ 2,145.00 6.6 proposed site plan from Carole Richardson and provide comment to same; review and edit motion to 
exclude; review and edit motion and affidavit in support of motion to exclude and finalize same for 
filing; review, edit and finalize brief; 
09/21/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 64.00 0.4 Review various case e-mail communications and information needed to supplement discovery; 
------------------·-~·---·"· ··- ··--------- ---- ---·- ---····---·-·----- --- -----
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09/22/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 318.50 1.3 
Edit and review motion, brief and affidavit for motion to compel and exclude; correspondence 
regarding same; finalize the same for service and filing; 
09/23/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 122.50 0.5 Work on edits to draft supplemental discovery response; correspondence regarding same motions; 
09/27/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 73.50 0.3 Edit draft supplemental discovery response and correspondence regarding same; 
09/29/2011 York, Mary V. $ 195.00 0.6 Review and edit draft supplemental discovery responses; 
Review recent case e-mails, pleadings and other communications of past two weeks and update 
09/29/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 192.00 1.2 electronic files; review Defendant HJ Grathol's Second Supplemental Answers and Responses to 
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production; 
09/30/2011 York, Mary V. $ 455.00 1.4 
Review and analyze appraisal report of Skip Sherwood and draft additional discovery requests 
relating to same; 
09/30/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 268.00 0.8 
Review defendant's responses to ITD's second set of discovery, and documents produced by 
defendants; 
Compile pleadings needed by MVYork for upcoming October hearing on HJ Grathol's Motion to 
Compel and ITD's Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony/Compel Expert Disclosures; prepare index of 
pleadings collected and set up in notebook; review Defendant HJ Grathol's Answers and Responses 
09/30/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 784.00 4.9 
to Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production, and do a brief review of 
documents produced, arranging them for scanning; set up electronic folder for documents to be 
scanned, and meet with project assistant to arrange for scanning of production documents; update 
case electronic materials; compile additional materials to send to experts and prepare transmittals to 
experts and client; e-mail to SCBowman regarding questions about experts; update expert files; 
10/03/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 588.00 2.4 
Research discovery responses; edit and finalize supplemental discovery responses, notice and letter 
to opposing counsel; analyze and review opposing party's appraisal; 
Review Grathol's motion to compel and work on response to motion; additional analysis of appraisal 
10/03/2011 York, Mary V. $ 617.50 1.9 report from Skip Sherwood; work on third set of discovery requests to include additional information 
referenced in Grathol's appraiser's report; 
Follow up with MVYork regarding numbering issues with documents produced by HJ Grathol; review 
scanning project done by project assistant and discuss additional numbering of same; telephone call 
10/03/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 192.00 1.2 
to Mr. Shane Sawyer at Ascensio regarding need for getting scanned copies of two oversized 
engineering plans produced by HJ Grathol; meet with Mr. Sawyer briefly to provide him with plans 
and instructions; locate information requested by TSTollefson and bring him up to date on discovery 
issues; review in-house status communications; 
-- ---------- ----- ----- ----------~ -------·--·-···-·-·---·-----·-··-----
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Telephone conference with client and SCBowman regarding condemnation approval processes; 
10/05/2011 York, Mary V. $ 520.00 1.6 review and edit correspondence to opposing counsel; research Idaho jury instructions; provide 
information to experts; 
10/05/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 318.50 1.3 
Research regarding Grathol's motion to compel; prepare draft outline regarding response to motion 
to compel; 
10/05/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 134.00 0.4 Review and send Idaho jury instructions on fair market value and just compensation to expert; 
Send out e-mail to team regarding recent documents produced by HJ Grathol and issues regarding 
10/05/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 176.00 1.1 the same; e-mail to Mr. Shane Sawyer regarding enlarged plans; set up additional case files; locate 
Idaho jury instruction requested by SCBowman and forward copy to expert; 
10/06/2011 York, Mary V. $ 552.50 1.7 
Correspondence with expert and follow up to obtain information requested by expert; research case 
law in support of arguments for response to motion to compel; 
10/06/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 833.00 3.4 
Continue legal research regarding motion to compel and scope of condemnation trial and discovery; 
continue drafting response to motion to compel; 
10/09/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 980.00 4.0 
Continue to prepare draft response to motion to compel; continue to research public records 
request, scope of discovery and meet and confer; 
Work on response to motion to compel and confer with TSTollefson regarding same; confirm status 
of expert reports; conduct initial review of Grathol's third supplemental discovery response and 
10/10/2011 York, Mary V. $ 845.00 2.6 assess effect of disclosure on ITD's motion to exclude; correspondence with SCBowman regarding 
scheduling of expert depositions and issues relating to motion to exclude Grathol's experts; review 
and edit draft response to motion to compel; 
Continue to prepare draft response to motion to compel; continue research regarding same; 
10/10/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,568.00 6.4 correspondence regarding expert disclosures and Grathol supplements; research Grathol's 
supplementary expert disclosure; prepare draft affidavit in support of response to compel motion; 
Work with experts on rebuttal reports; review Grathol's supplemental disclosures of expert opinions; 
10/10/2011 Bowman, Steve C:. $ 502.50 1.5 confer with MVYork regarding impact of Grathol's supplemental disclosures on ITD's motion to 
compel; 
Review and edit draft response to motion to compel and conference with TSTollefson regarding 
additional arguments for response; conference with SCBowman to discuss expert reports, 
10/11/2011 York, Mary V. $ 1,430.00 4.4 
depositions of Grathol's experts and coordination of depositions of ITD's experts, Grathol reply brief, 
and in limine motions; telephone conference with expert regarding scheduling of deposition; 
telephone conference with client; review and edit revised version of response to motion to compel; 
work on scheduling for depositions; outline issues for phone conference with opposing counsel; 
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Conference with MVYork regarding legal research and revisions and structure of response brief; legal 
10/11/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,617.00 6.6 research regarding public records requests, compel standards, and law of the case; revise and edit 
response brief; 
Work on rebuttal reports by experts retained on behalf of ITD; telephone conference with expert to 
10/11/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,273.00 3.8 discuss appraisal and his rebuttal report; draft correspondence to experts to accompany Grathol's 
supplemental disclosure of expert opinions, and work on rescheduling meetings with experts; 
Revise draft affidavit in support of response to motion to compel; prepare exhibits regarding same; 
10/12/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,249.50 5.1 revise draft response to motion to compel; correspondence with opposing counsel; edit and finalize 
response to motion to compel; review response to motion to exclude experts; 
Review additional case communications and e-mail among litigation team; update case status on 
10/12/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 112.00 0.7 case summary memo; additional updating of expert files; review Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's 
Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony or Alternatively, to Compel Expert Disclosures; 
10/12/2011 Bowman, Steve C:. $ 502.50 1.5 
Work on brief in opposition to Grathol's motion to compel; review Grathol's brief in opposition to 
ITD's motion to compel; 
10/12/2011 York, Mary V. $ 1,430.00 4.4 
Work on draft response to motion to compel; work on affidavit in support of motion to compel and 
finalize for filing; finalize pleadings for filing; 
10/13/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 269.50 1.1 
Conference regarding filing; correspondence regarding same; research regarding stipulation; revise 
draft stipulation and correspondence regarding same; 
Review ITD's Response to Motion to Compel and Affidavit of MVYork; update electronic folders; 
10/13/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 144.00 0.9 
review memo from MVYork following telephone conference with Mr. Douglas Marfice; update case 
status memo with new information; review e-mail transmittals between MVYork and Mr. Marfice 
regarding tentative dates for upcoming depositions; 
Telephone conference with Doug Marfice regarding ITD's motion to exclude experts and scheduling 
10/13/2011 York, Mary V. $ 520.00 1.6 
of depositions; correspondence with client and follow up correspondence with Mr. Marfice; edit and 
revise draft deposition notices for Grathol's experts; draft stipulation for extension and conference 
with TSTollefson regarding same; 
10/14/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 245.00 1.0 Correspondence regarding stipulation; edit draft stipulation; prepare draft order; 
10/14/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 167.50 0.5 
Revise and edit stipulation regarding disclosure of rebuttal experts and reports; revised and edit 
proposed order extending time for disclosure of rebuttal experts; 
-· ···- ·-··· _,_ .. ,, . ----··--·----------------·--···-·---------------···-··--·-· -------
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Telephone conferences with client; telephone conference with opposing counsel to confirm 
deposition dates and stipulation re: motion to exclude; finalize deposition notices for filing; review 
10/17/2011 York, Mary V. $ 650.00 2.0 
and analysis of draft exhibits from experts regarding development of Grathol property; review 
proposed edits to stipulation for extension of time and respond to same; revise stipulation for 
extension; additional correspondence with opposing counsel and new revisions to stipulation and 
proposed order; 
Print out most recently filed pleadings and update MVYork notebook for upcoming hearing, including 
10/17/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 144.00 0.9 updating of index to hearing materials; discuss upcoming depositions in matter with MVYork and 
preparation needs for depositions; update case materials in external folders; 
10/17/2011 Bowman, Steve C:. $ 100.50 0.3 
Work on stipulation between the parties addressing deadlines for expert disclosures and resolving 
ITD's motion to compel; 
10/18/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 147.00 0.6 Analyze and review new appraisal and correspondence regarding same; 
10/18/2011 York, Mary V. $ 455.00 1.4 
Review and analysis of expert invoices and time; draft notice of withdrawal of motion to exclude; 
telephone conference with Judge Haynes' clerk; prepare for hearing on motion to compel; 
10/19/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 73.50 0.3 Research regarding fees and motion to compel and correspondence regarding same; 
Travel to Coeur d'Alene for hearing, reviewing documents and case files en route; prepare for 
10/19/2011 York, Mary V. $ 3,802.50 11.7 hearing; argument ITD's opposition to Grathol's motion to compel and follow up discussion with 
client; return travel to Boise; 
10/19/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 48.00 0.3 
Update case tracking index with updated case status, including new dates for expert rebuttal 
disclosure, Acarrequi offer, and upcoming depositions, etc.; 
10/19/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 402.00 1.2 Work on follow up interrogatories and requests for production to be served on Grathol; 
10/20/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 416.50 1.7 
Research regarding compel order compliance; legal research regarding administrative use of eminent 
domain powers; legal research regarding delegation of eminent domain powers; 
Conference with expert's office to confirm details of deposition; review notes from hearing on 
motion to compel and outline next steps for case; confer with TSTollefson to make assignments 
10/20/2011 York, Mary V. $ 780.00 2.4 regarding depositions, and in Ii mine motions; review court reporters estimate for transcript of 
hearing and place order for same; work on outline for deposition of Grathol's experts; review case 
files and documents in preparation for depositions; 
····- -· .. ·- ·----·- ,_,, ........ ··--·· -- -· ---- --·-- -······-. ,, _____ ·---·------ -·· --------·---- ____ ,._, ··------··--·-··--··-.. -- --·--·---·-·----··-- ....... . 
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Assist with deposition preparation; prepare electronic folders for deposition preparation for each 
deponent; review list of questions from SCBowman regarding past interrogatories and requests for 
10/20/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 640.00 4.0 production propounded by ITD and HJ Grathols' responses thereto; review all propounded discovery 
and responses provided by HJ Grathol, along with various referenced documents, and prepare 
lengthy response to SCBowman, attaching key documents; 
10/20/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 268.00 0.8 Work on additional discovery requests to be served on Grathol; 
Telephone conference with client; correspondence regarding documents and expert disclosures; 
10/21/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 710.50 2.9 continue legal research regarding administrative issues and delegation; continue research regarding 
new appraisal; 
Telephone conference with client and follow up with TSTollefson regarding information; telephone 
10/21/2011 York, Mary V. $ 552.50 1.7 
call to Chris Gabbert to confirm timeline for production of documents; finalize discovery requests for 
filing; review appraisal report from expert; confirm availability for status conference and calendar 
same; correspondence with client; 
Work on reviewing HJ Grathol production documents for SCBowman for discovery purposes, and for 
10/21/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 832.00 5.2 TSTollefson in preparation for upcoming depositions; review various case e-mails and case related 
communications; follow-up with SCBowman regarding status of document review; 
10/24/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 73.50 0.3 Research regarding depositions; 
Review e-mail communications regarding obtaining better exhibit which shows the taking on the 
10/24/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 544.00 3.4 Grathol property; continue reviewing and pulling key documents for upcoming depositions and for 
SCBowman to use in drafting additional discovery requests; 
10/24/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 971.50 2.9 Telephone calls with experts to discuss their progress on reports; review appraisal experts; 
10/25/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 392.00 1.6 
Prepare for conference with client regarding discovery responses; conference with client regarding 
discovery responses; continue to prepare draft supplemental discovery responses; 
10/25/2011 York, Mary V. $ 195.00 0.6 Review deposition notices; draft messages and forward same to ITD's deponents; 
Assist with deposition preparation and exhibits; review notices of deposition from opposing council, 
10/25/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 544.00 3.4 update electronic files, and update status of case on case status memo; continue to pull documents 
for upcoming depositions and for review by SCBowman; 
Prepare for and participate in status conference with Court; follow up conference with SCBowman 
10/26/2011 York, Mary V. $ 357.50 1.1 and TSTollefson to discuss issues presented by Court and strategies for case; telephone conference 
with client; 
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Set up additional external folders for potential trial exhibits; review pleadings and Order regarding 
10/26/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 336.00 2.1 Motion to compel filed by HJ Grathol; continue review and pulling of documents for upcoming 
depositions and use by SCBowman; 
10/27/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 608.00 3.8 Continue reviewing and pulling documents for upcoming depositions; 
10/28/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 784.00 3.2 
Correspondence with client; continue research regarding compel documents and correspondence; 
correspondence regarding same compel order; continue to prepare draft discovery responses; 
Complete review and pulling of documents for SCBowman and for upcoming depositions of Mr. Alan 
Johnson and Mr. Geoff Reeslund; prepare status memo with link to all documents pulled for their 
10/28/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 608.00 3.8 
review; meeting with TSTollefson to discuss documents needed to be produced in response to 
Motion to Compel and additional work to be done in responding to discovery; review documents 
forwarded from TSTollefson and specific interrogatories and requests for production which need to 
be supplemented, etc.; set up additional electronic folders for documents to be produced; 
10/31/2011 York, Mary V. $ 390.00 1.2 
Review and analysis of documents provided by ITD in response to Grathol's discovery, determine 
privileged documents and which may be produced; telephone conference with client; 
10/31/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 49.00 0.2 Correspondence regarding documents responsive to Grathol's discovery request; 
11/02/2011 York, Mary V. $ 325.00 1.0 Review and analysis of documents to be produced in response to discovery requests; 
11/02/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 402.00 1.2 
Review draft rebuttal report by expert; work on outline of additional work and areas to be addressed 
by expert; 
Correspondence with opposing counsel regarding order to compel; telephone conference with client 
11/03/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,372.00 5.6 regarding documents; research documents regarding response to compel order; continue to prepare 
draft discovery responses regarding compel order; 
11/03/2011 York, Mary V. $ 487.50 1.5 Work on discovery responses and review documents to be produced; conference call with client; 
Telephone call from client; follow up with client; review, update and finalize materials in folders for 
production; meet with TSTollefson to go over documents to be produced; telephone call to client; 
meet with project assistant to provide instructionsfor numbering of documents and burning to CD 
11/03/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 528.00 3.3 for production; complete compiling documents previously produced by HJ Grathol related to 
lntermountain Transportation Solutions and prepare memo to MVYork regarding findings and 
attaching all pertinent documents located; additional telephone calls and e-mail communications 
with client; 
Telephone conference with expert to discuss progress of his work on case and assistance he needs to 
11/03/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 670.00 2.0 
complete his report; review expert disclosures by Grathol and second telephone conference with 
expert to answer questions raised in first call and clarify work he needs to do and issues he should 
address; 
··-··············-···---· ····-····-· --- ·-···-······ ········----
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Revise and edit draft discovery responses; telephone conferences with client; correspondence 
11/04/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,078.00 4.4 regarding discovery responses and exhibits; analyze documents to be produced; revise and add 
exhibits and documents; finalize discovery and exhibits for production; 
11/04/2011 York, Mary V. $ 260.00 0.8 Review and edit supplemental discovery responses and disclosures; 
Follow-up further with client; review Bates-numbered documents prior to burning to CD; work on 
11/04/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 368.00 2.3 
compiling additional documents for upcoming deposition of Mr. Alan Johnson and Mr. Geoff 
Reeslund; finalize production (Second Supplemental) and provide final CDs to TSTollefson for 
production; 
11/04/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 402.00 1.2 Telephone conference with expert to discuss additional work to be done and address questions; 
11/07/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 98.00 0.4 Research plan sheet documents regarding supplemental production and conference regarding same; 
Confirm details for status conference with new judge, Judge Hosack and outline discussion points for 
11/07/2011 York, Mary V. $ 587.50 1.5 same; telephone conference with expert to discuss deposition preparation; work on preparations for 
depositions; 
Prepare for deposition of Skip Sherwood; review and analysis of case files and documents; draft 
11/08/2011 York, Mary V. $ 1,950.00 6.0 outline of deposition questions; review case law with references to Skip Sherwood; telephone 
conference with expert regarding deposition preparation; 
Review Amended Notice of Hearing and update case status summary; forward information to 
11/08/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 112.00 0.7 SCBowman related to Mr. Skip Sherwood; oversee getting additional colored photographs printed in 
large size for use as exhibits at upcoming deposition; 
11/08/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 268.00 0.8 Telephone calls with experts to request questions for upcoming depositions of Grathol's experts; 
11/08/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 931.00 3.8 Continue research regarding deposition and exhibit documents; continue deposition preparation; 
11/09/2011 York, Mary V. $ 2,145.00 6.6 
Prepare for deposition of Grathol's experts, including extensive document review, outlining of 
arguments and questions, and conferences with client and expert; 
Analyze client and expert reports and supporting documentation; analyze and prepare exhibits for 
11/09/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 2,229.50 9.1 depositions; conferences with MVYork regarding coordination of deposition topics and deposition 
strategies; continue to prepare deposition outline; prepare deposition questions, exhibits and topics; 
Work on preparations for depositions; review documents and draft outline for deposition; telephone 
11/10/2011 York, Mary V. $ 2,015.00 6.2 conference and correspondence with client; prepare for and participate in status conference with 
Judge Hosack; 
-- ------------- ------ - ----- -- ------------ ---------- - --------------- ------ ----------- ---- - ---------------------------- -- ------ -- -
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Meet with MVYork to discuss items needed for upcoming depositions; begin pulling together 
additional documents to be printed out as potential deposition exhibits; set up exhibit folder for 
project assistant to begin printing out of deposition exhibits and discuss project with her; meet with 
MVYork and TSTollefson following telephonic status conference with Judge; prepare e-mail 
11/10/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 768.00 4.8 correspondence to experts to inform them of new trial date, new deadline for expert rebuttal 
reports, and upcoming depositions of HJ Grathol's experts, etc.; begin work on preparing labels for all 
potential exhibit folders for expert depositions; telephone call from client; review documents 
forwarded by client; e-mail communication to MVYork regarding additional Sherwood materials; 
locate additional documents needed for exhibits; 
11/10/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,053.50 4.3 
Analyze and breakdown actor/viewer expert proposed testimony and supporting documents; 
continue to prepare draft deposition outline; continue to prepare deposition questions and topics; 
Complete preparation of labels for deposition exhibits and compiling of all documents into folders; 
11/11/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 608.00 3.8 calculate new Acarraqui offer for matter based on new March 5th trial date and provide information 
to MVYork; add additional exhibits and set up drop files/labels, etc.; 
11/11/2011 York, Mary V. $ 2,405.00 7.4 Prepare for deposition of Skip Sherwood and defense of deposition of Stan Moe and Jason Minzghor; 
Research regarding development plans and access issues for depositions; continue to prepare outline 
11/11/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,274.00 5.2 for depositions of opposing party principals; continue to prepare draft questions and exhibits 
regarding depositions; 
11/13/2011 York, Mary V. $ 682.50 2.1 Prepare for deposition of Skip Sherwood; 
11/14/2011 York, Mary V. $ 3,900.00 12.0 
Travel to Coeur d'Alene, reviewing documents and preparing for depositions en route; depo prep 
meeting with client; depo prep meeting with expert; 
11/14/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 128.00 0.8 
Oversee adding more exhibits to files of deposition files; add materials regarding Mr. Skip Sherwood 
to electronic case folder; review additional discovery propounded by HJGrathol; 
Research regarding comparable sales and opposing party's claim for damages; research opposing 
11/14/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,421.00 5.8 party's appraiser's complaint files, depositions and disciplinary actions; correspondence regarding 
same; continue to prepare depositions questions; 
11/15/2011 Georger, Katherine L. $ 740.00 3.7 
Research Idaho Rule of Procedure 26 as it pertains to expert disclosures; research scope of Rule 26 as 
it pertains to expert reports; draft up research findings and submit for review and comment; 
11/15/2011 York, Mary V. $ 3,965.00 12.2 
Prepare for and defend depositions of Stan Moe and Jason Minzghor; post-deposition conference 
with client; prepare for deposition of Skip Sherwood; 
----------~--·---- ---· ----------------------
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Research deposition questions regarding development potential of property and impact of project; 
11/15/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,151.50 4.7 
prepare deposition exhibits and documents; prepare deposition outline; research regarding damage 
calculations and elements of damages; correspondence regarding depositions; prepare depositions 
questions and topics; 
11/16/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,421.00 5.8 
Continue deposition question preparation; conference with MVYork regarding deposition and 
deposition preparation; research regarding zoning and comparable; continue to prepare outline; 
Prepare for deposition of Skip Sherwood; take deposition of Mr. Sherwood; conferences with client 
11/16/2011 York, Mary V. $ 3,96S.00 12.2 and expert during and after deposition; meeting with TSTollefson to discuss depositions of Jason 
Minzghor, Stan Moe and Skip Sherwood and assist in prep for deposition of Geoff Reeslund; 
Assist in preparations for deposition of Geoff Reeslund; attend Mr. Reeslund's deposition; 
11/17/2011 York, Mary V. $ 2,990.00 9.2 conference with TSTollefson after Mr. Reeslund's deposition and assist in preparations of deposition 
of Mr. Johnson; 
11/17/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,764.00 7.2 
Continue and finalize deposition preparation for Mr. Reeslund; deposition of Mr. Reeslund; continue 
deposition preparation for Mr. Johnson; 
11/17/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 100.50 0.3 Review public records requests to Panhandle Health District and DEQ; 
11/17/2011 Georger, Katherine L. $ 440.00 2.2 
Review documents to obtain legal property description; draft public records request letters and 
proper documentation and submit to DEQ, PHD and local DEQ agency; 
11/18/2011 York, Mary V. $ 3,185.00 9.8 
Meeting with client; assist in prep for deposition of Alan Johnson; attend deposition of Mr. Johnson; 
return travel to Boise, reviewing notes from depositions and case documentsen route; 
11/18/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,911.00 7.8 
Continue and finalize deposition preparation for Mr. Johnson; deposition of Mr. Johnson; 
correspondence regarding depositions; 
11/19/2011 York, Mary V. $ 162.50 0.5 Review correspondence from counsel for Grathol regarding Acarraqui offer; draft response to same; 
Review and organize notes and files from week of depositions and confirm upcoming deadlines for 
case; conference with TSTollefson to discuss depositions; draft correspondence to client; 
11/21/2011 York, Mary V. $ 1,495.00 4.6 
correspondence with Doug Marfice; telephone conference with client; work on calculations and 
strategies for Acarraqui offer; meeting/conference with SCBowman, TSTollefson, KLGeorger and 
BKFeraci to discuss depositions, rebuttal expert disclosures and upcoming pretrial deadlines and 
assign tasks; review and analysis of updated appraisal report from expert; 
11/22/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 122.50 0.5 Telephone conference with clients and MVYork regarding extension of road and project plans; 
_____________ , _______ ,, __________ , _______ ------·- ---- -
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Work on issues relating to Sylvan Road/Roberts Road; conference calls with clients; confirm status of 
11/22/2011 York, Mary V. $ 1,007.50 3.1 
negotiations on parcels adjacent and review additional documents provided; confirm timeline for 
receipt of depositions and coordinate sending transcripts to experts; telephone conference with 
client; review deposition transcript; 
11/23/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 220.50 0.9 
Continue research regarding opposing party's discovery requests and referenced documents; 
telephone conference with client; correspondence with client; 
11/23/2011 York, Mary V. $ 325.00 1.0 
Correspondence with client; telephone conference with expert regarding depositions, rebuttal report 
and fact witnesses; 
11/23/2011 Georger, Katherine L. $ 300.00 1.5 
Review documents pertaining to title of property; submit addendum public records request 
supplementing initial request; 
Telephone message from expert and follow up calls to coordinate conference call with experts; 
11/28/2011 York, Mary V. $ 455.00 1.4 review and analysis of deposition; follow up conference with expert; telephone conference with 
expert regarding appraisal report and depositions in case; 
Update case status on case tracking chart; brief review of deposition transcripts of Mr. Stan Moe, Mr. 
Jason Minzghor, Mr. Geoffrey Reeslund and Mr. Alan Johnson, covert them to pdf files, and save 
word indices to pdf files and add to electronic folders; prepare e-mails to experts with copies of all 
electronic deposition transcripts; update expert electronic folders; review e-mail correspondence 
11/28/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 528.00 3.3 from SCBowman regarding items needed to be sent to expert; forward Complaint and copies of 
various Internet website information on Hughes Investment to expert; locate and compile additional 
documents for review by expert and have project assistant burn to a CD; prepare cover letter to 
expert with transmittal of CD of documents and arrange for hand-delivery of same; review and 
respond to e-mail regarding question as to opposing counsel; 
11/28/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 201.00 0.6 Telephone conference with expert; select documents to provide to expert; 
Correspondence with client; meeting with KLGeorger to discuss pretrial motions and make research 
11/29/2011 York, Mary V. $ 2,177.50 6.7 
assignments on several issues for anticipated motions; review and analysis of comments on 
appraisal; conference(s) with client; conference with TSTollefson to discuss issues relating to Roberts 
Road/Sylvan Road; work on analysis of appraisal reports and of Acarraqui offer; 
11/29/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 147.00 0.6 Analyze review appraiser's review of appraisal; continue to prepare draft expert summaries; 
Meet with MVYork to review motion in limine case law and research issues related to summary 
11/29/2011 Georger, Katherine L. $ 340.00 1.7 judgment and Daubert motions pertaining to lost profits, methodology, lost visibility, severance 
damages and valuation; 
Review transcripts of depositions of Mr. Minzghor and Mr. Moe on behalf of ITD; review transcript of 
11/29/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,641.50 4.9 deposition of Mr. Sherwood; work on assessing settlement offer in preparation for upcoming 
deadline under Acarraqui; 
--- -------------- ----- ---- - --- --------- -------------------------------------------- --------------- -- ------
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11/30/2011 York, Mary V. $ 877.50 2.7 
Work on obtaining extension of time for Acarraqui offer; extended telephone conference with 
experts; 
11/30/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 48.00 0.3 
Confer with MVYork regarding additional documents needed by expert for his review, and begin 
compiling the same; 
11/30/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 637.00 2.6 
Continue research regarding depositions and expert testimony; continue to prepare outline and 
summary of expert testimony; 
Work on issues relating to extension and access issues; conference with TSTollefson regarding 
deposition summaries and rebuttal expert reports; telephone conference with client; review 
12/01/2011 York, Mary V. $ 2,210.00 6.8 
deposition transcript regarding discussion of extension; confirm deadline and status of Grathol's 
discovery responses and coordinate follow up of same; follow up and provide additional information 
to appraiser and correspondence relating to same; work on presentation materials for meeting with 
ITD and prepare for same; meet with ITD; 
Complete compiling documents to send to expert and forward same to him with e-mail transmittal; 
review case communications; follow up on status of discovery responses from HJ Grathol; compile 
12/01/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 432.00 2.7 
deposition transcripts; look for exhibit needed by MVYork and TSTollefson and forward results to 
them for their review; pull exhibits to all depositions taken to date from court reporter's depository 
site and download to folder; arrange for project assistant to create separate pdf files for each 
deposition exhibit; e-mail to client; locate additional deed needed by expert; 
12/01/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 98.00 0.4 Research and correspondence regarding deeds, expert documents and exhibits; 
12/02/2011 York, Mary V. $ 260.00 0.8 
Correspondence with client and expert regarding engagement of expert; conference with SCBowman 
regarding Acarrequi offer; correspondence with Doug Marfice; 
Research case law and statutes for motion for summary judgment on improper damage claims by 
12/02/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,072.00 3.2 Grathol and to bar introduction of improper and irrelevant evidence by Grathol; work on outline of 
brief in support of motion for summary judgment; 
12/02/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 686.00 2.8 
Prepare draft letter to opposing counsel; continue to research regarding expert depositions; continue 
to prepare summary and outline of expert testimony; 
12/04/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 49.00 0.2 Correspondence regarding discovery responses; 
Review and edit draft correspondence to Doug Marfice regarding discovery responses; additional 
12/05/2011 York, Mary V. $ 455.00 1.4 email correspondence with Mr. Marfice regarding extension for Acarrequi offer and correspondence 
with client; telephone conference with client; review appraisal report from expert; 
12/05/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 392.00 1.6 
Research regarding potential discovery response documents; telephone conferences with client; 
work on discovery responses; 
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Review and analysis of revised draft of appraisal; telephone conference with expert; meeting with 
12/06/2011 York, Mary V. $ 390.00 1.2 KLGeorger to discuss status of research on pre-trial briefs; review correspondence to Doug Marfice 
regarding last discovery responses; 
Research case law prohibiting a landowner from purchasing property subject to impending 
condemnation and then claiming business losses and other severance damages based on a partial 
12/06/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,077.00 6.2 taking of the property; research case law and statutes for motion for summary judgment on 
Grathol's "business loss" and construction delay claims; telephone conference with experts; review 
deposition transcript of Alan Johnson; 
Arrange for colored copy of report to be printed and save new version on external network; load all 
deposition transcripts, exhibits and indices to transcripts to external folder; review various 
correspondence to client with case materials; review HJ Grathol's Responses to Third Set of 
12/07/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 288.00 1.8 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production, briefly review CD of documents produced for contents 
of same,and prepare brief e-mail summary to team regarding latest production; update case status 
on case summary chart/memo; review e-mail with additional assignment from SCBowman; prepare e 
mail to expert with copy of HJ Grathol's latest discovery responses; prepare letter to expert with copy 
of CD containing HJ Grathol's additional discovery responses; 
Review expert report; correspondence with client; telephone conference with client regarding 
12/07/2011 York, Mary V. $ 682.50 2.1 discovery responses, expert testimony, and potential factwitnesses; review information and 
documents provided by client; 
12/08/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,943.00 5.8 
Work on reports by ITD rebuttal experts; research case law and statutes for summary judgment 
motion against damage claims and improper evidence being asserted by Grathol; 
12/08/2011 York, Mary V. $ 227.50 0.7 Review information provided by client; work on rebuttal report; 
12/09/2011 York, Mary V. $ 650.00 2.0 
Work on exhibits for client; review documents received from DEQ in response to public records 
request; review Skip Sherwood's file produced by Grathol; 
12/09/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,249.50 5.1 
Telephone conference with client; continue to prepare discovery responses and legal research 
regarding same; continue to research expert disclosures, depositions and synopsis; 
Commence researching damage issues stemming from severance damages, visibility and right of 
12/12/2011 Georger, Katherine L. $ 1,000.00 5.0 way; commence drafting research findings in anticipation of larger memorandum for summary 
judgment; 
12/12/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 64.00 0.4 
Pull together hourly rates for experts retained by ITD; upload Mr. Jason Mingzhor's deposition 
transcript from Jameson matter to external folder; 
12/12/2011 York, Mary V. $ 1,267.50 3.9 Work on rebuttal expert disclosure statement; work on rebuttal disclosures; 
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12/12/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,077.00 6.2 
Review and work on reports to be produced; telephone conference with expert; compile research for 
motion for summary judgment to be filed against improper damage claims by Grathol in case; 
12/12/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,274.00 5.2 
Research and analysis of documents responsive to discovery requests and preparation of the same; 
continue to prepare draft discovery response; 
Conference with TSTollefson to discuss discovery responses and issues relating to same; 
12/13/2011 York, Mary V. $ 487.50 1.5 correspondence with Doug Marfice; research and review Idaho statutes and information relating to 
STIP; review rebuttal expert statement and follow up with client regarding same; 
12/13/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 64.00 0.4 
Review of Plaintiff's Disclosure of Rebuttal Experts; insert hourly wages for each rebuttal witness into 
pleading; 
12/13/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 392.00 1.6 
Work on discovery responses; correspondence regarding experts; edit and revise discovery exhibits 
and correspondence regarding same; 
Prepare for client meeting and attend the same; review and edit ITD's discovery responses; follow up 
12/14/2011 York, Mary V. $ 1,202.50 3.7 conference with TSTollefson regarding discovery; confirm extension of time for discovery responses 
and review correspondence from Doug Marfice; 
Review documents to be produced for production, meet with project assistant to provide 
12/14/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 304.00 1..9 instructions for Bates numbering and burning to CD, and oversee numbering of same; review and 
respond to various case e-mails; 
Research case law and statutes for motions for summary judgment to strike improper evidence and 
12/14/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,110.50 6.3 damage claims to be presented by Grathol at trial; work on responses to most recent set of discovery 
served by Grathol; telephone conference with expert regarding status of his work on expert report; 
Prepare draft discovery responses; edit and revise draft discovery responses; telephone conferences 
12/14/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,445.50 5.9 
with client; correspondence with client; correspondence with opposing counsel; continue to research 
expert witness testimony and depositions; continue to prepare expert synopsis; prepare draft offer 
letter and correspondence regarding same; 
Discuss client meeting with MVYork; review correspondence; update case status on case summary 
12/15/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 128.00 0.8 chart; review additional e-mails and communications with team regarding upcoming rebuttal reports 
and follow up with additional items needed to be done; 
----------------------------- ----~-·--·-------
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Conference with TSTollefson regarding ITD's responses to Grathol's discovery and Acarrequi offer; 
telephone conference with client; email correspondence with client; review and edit draft Acarrequi 
12/15/2011 York, Mary V. $ 1,560.00 4.8 
offer letter to Grathol; review Acarrequi case and other Idaho case law governing attorney fee 
awards in condemnation; review information provided by Grathol regarding request for utility 
conduits and forward same; email correspondence with and phone message for expert; review and 
analyze rebuttal reports; telephone conference with client; telephone conference with expert; 
12/lS/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,412.00 7.2 
Work on upcoming disclosure of rebuttal experts; work on responses to Grathol's second set of 
interrogatories and requests for production; telephone conference with expert; 
Continue research regarding expert testimony, depositions and documents; continue to prepare 
12/15/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,200.50 4.9 
draft summary and analysis of expert testimony; correspondence regarding expert rebuttals; 
research regarding prior Sylvan road testimony and issues; correspondence regarding offer and 
utilities; 
12/16/2011 Georger, Katherine L. $ 80.00 0.4 
Review documents contained in public records request response from DEQ; draft summary of 
documents and submit to team for review and comment; 
12/16/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 465.S0 1.9 
Continue to research expert opinions and testimony; continue to prepare draft synopsis and facts for 
expert witnesses; 
12/16/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,110.50 6.3 Work with experts on rebuttal reports; review and edit draft rebuttal reports; 
Review list of various documents, exhibits, and HJ Grathol production documents needed for expert 
12/16/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 848.00 5.3 
review and begin to compile and forward to expert; various communications to/from client; prepare 
detailed listing of all materials forwarded and reviewed by each of ITD's experts for our disclosure 
pleading; 
12/17/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,909.50 5.7 Work on ITD's disclosure of rebuttal experts; work on expert reports; 
12/18/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,038.50 3.1 Work on ITD's disclosures of rebuttal experts; 
12/19/2011 York, Mary V. $ 260.00 0.8 
Review and edit draft expert rebuttal disclosures and correspondence with SCBowman regarding 
same; 
12/19/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,077.00 6.2 
Telephone conferences with experts; work on rebuttal expert reports; review and edit final draft 
disclosures; 
Continue to prepare expert disclosure; research regarding disclosure and expert qualifications and 
12/19/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,053.50 4.3 
background; edit and revise draft expert disclosures; correspondence regarding same; finalize expert 
disclosures; research regarding public records request and correspondence regarding same; continue 
to prepare expert summary and research regarding same; 
Work with SCBowman in finalizing rebuttal documents for production, including locating CVs for all 
12/19/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 704.00 4.4 
experts, reviewing finalized reports, uploading finalized reports, communications with various 
experts, adding further attachments to documents, overseeing burning of CD of documents; and 
obtaining information still needed; 
----·--. -------------------- -·-----·------ ---
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Confirm details of filing of expert rebuttal reports; conference with BFeraci regarding distribution of 
12/20/2011 York, Mary V. $ 260.00 0.8 rebuttal disclosures and reports and coordinate same; confirm details of public records request and 
telephone conference with client; 
Review deposition transcripts and expert reports and supporting documents; research Idaho case 
12/20/2011 Georger, Katherine L. $ 1,420.00 7.1 
law on standards to disqualify or strike portions of expert's testimony that rely upon flawed 
methodology to generate opinions; draft section of draft memorandum moving to exclude expert 
opinion testimony premised on flawed methodology; 
12/21/2011 York, Mary V. $ 650.00 2.0 
Conference with SCBowman and KLGeorger regarding status of research for pre-trial motions; review 
ITD's rebuttal expert reports; 
12/21/2011 Georger, Katherine L. $ 140.00 0.7 
Draft brief containing summary judgment issues and separate brief containing evidentiary issues; 
research case law in support of summary judgment issues; 
Research case law for motion for summary judgment on improper damage claims by Grathol and 
12/21/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,708.50 5.1 motions in Ii mine to exclude certain evidence sought to be used by Grathol at trial; work on outline 
for summary judgment motion and motion in limine; 
Follow up with status of ITD's extension for responding to second set of HJ Grathol's discovery 
12/21/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 64.00 0.4 
requests and possible re-numbering of production documents; discuss status of numbering project 
with project assistant MTualaulelei; various communications to/from SCBowman regarding discovery 
status; 
12/22/2011 York, Mary V. $ 97.50 0.3 
Review and analysis of Grathol's correspondence relating to public records request; correspondence 
with TSTollefson regarding same; 
12/22/2011 Georger, Katherine L. $ 1,000.00 5.0 Research and draft supporting summary judgment memorandum; 
Analysis and correspondence regarding public records request; correspondence regarding 
12/22/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 416.50 1.7 depositions; edit and revise draft expert summary and synopsis; work on outline of Sylvan Road 
issues; 
12/22/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 569.50 1.7 Work on responses to Grathol's second set of discovery served on ITD; 
12/22/2011 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 32.00 0.2 Correspondence regarding receipt of CD of expert reports; 
12/23/2011 Georger, Katherine L. $ 300.00 1.5 
Research Idaho case law on issue of non-recovery of construction delay damages in condemnation 
proceedings; 
Work on motion in Ii mine to exclude claims by Grathol based on Sylvan Road, improper use of 
12/23/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,641.50 4.9 "comparable" sales, claims for lost profits, and flawed appraisal; research case law for motion in 
limine; 
12/23/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 661.50 2.7 Edit draft expert summary; edit and revise draft discovery responses and responsive documents; 
Research Idaho case law on issue of non-recoverable construction delay damages; draft legal section 
12/24/2011 Georger, Katherine L. $ 360.00 1..8 of summary judgment memorandum and incorporating deposition transcript and expert report 
content on issue of construction delay damages; 
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12/26/2011 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,273.00 3.8 
Research case law for motion for summary judgment on Grathol claims for severance damages and 
lost profits; research case law for brief in support of motion in Ii mine; 
Review and edit draft responses to Grathol's 2nd set of discovery to ITD and documents to be 
12/27/2011 York, Mary V. $ 1,527.50 4.7 
produced; review deposition correction sheet from Stan Moe; work on fact section of pre-trial 
motions; review Skip Sherwood's appraisal file; review of ITD's rebuttal expert reports for use in pre-
trial motions; work on pretrial motions; 
Research Idaho case law pertaining to Grathol's gravel loss damage claim made in its expert reports 
12/27/2011 Georger, Katherine L. $ 1,040.00 5.2 
and expert deposition testimony; draft section of supporting memorandum draft rejecting gravel loss 
claim; research Idaho case law on issue of lost profits and non-recovery of such damages in 
condemnation cases; 
Continue to prepare discovery response; finalize documents and exhibits regarding discovery 
12/27/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,127.00 4.6 response; correspondence with opposing counsel regarding same; continue research regarding 
Sylvan road claim; continue to prepare memorandum regarding same; 
Review correspondence regarding Grathol's renewed public records request; telephone conference 
12/28/2011 York, Mary V. $ 780.00 2.4 
with client; work on fact section for in Ii mine motion on exclusion of damages where purchased with 
knowledge of project; research deposition transcripts and exhibits in support of in Ii mine motion and 
incorporate information into memorandum; 
Review deposition transcripts and expert reports to obtain arguments made by Grathol supporting 
its purported loss of business, lost profit and lost opp_ortunity cost claims; research Idaho statute on 
12/28/2011 Georger, Katherine L. $ 1,120.00 5.6 
business damages and "qualifying" business standard that must be met as threshold matter before 
being eligible to recover statutory lost business damages in partial taking; draft lost profit section of 
brief including attacks on speculative nature of claims, lack of support in Idaho common law and 
failure to comport with Idaho's business damages statute; 
Telephone conference with client; continue research regarding expert opinions and testimony; 
12/28/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,396.50 5.7 continue to prepare draft synopsis and expert opinions; continue to prepare draft memorandum 
regarding Sylvan Road claim; 
12/29/2011 Georger, Katherine L. $ 540.00 2.7 
Research Idaho and ninth circuit case law supporting argument that severance damages are not 
recoverable as a matter of law; 
12/29/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 931.00 3.8 
Continue research regarding expert opinions and deposition transcripts; continue to prepare draft 
synopsis and factual section for summary judgment and in limine briefs; 
12/30/2011 York, Mary V. $ 715.00 2.2 Draft motion in Ii mine to exclude expert testimony; work on brief in support of motion in Ii mine; 
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Continue researching case law outside of Idaho pertaining to a landowner's prior knowledge of scope 
12/30/2011 Georger, Katherine L. $ 740.00 3.7 and nature of project as being grounds to dismiss severance damages claim; commence drafting 
section of summary judgment brief challenging Grathol's claims for severance damages; 
Continue research regarding depositions, expert rebuttals and reports regarding motions in limine 
12/30/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,788.50 7.3 and factual section; continue to prepare draft factual brief sections regarding same; correspondence 
regarding same; 
Continue researching additional state jurisdiction for support to proposition that severance damages 
12/31/2011 Georger, Katherine L. $ 640.00 3.2 
are not recoverable where landowner has prior knowledge of project before purchasing property; 
revise section of brief on severance damages; submit draft of summary judgment brief and summary 
of analysis, structure and overall organizational components; 
12/31/2011 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 514.50 2.1 Research lost profit claims and related documents; prepare draft factual section regarding same; 
Confirm pretrial deadlines for case and calendar same; work on brief in support of summary 
01/02/2012 York, Mary V. $ 2,080.00 6.4 judgment motion regarding Sylvan Road, damages for loss of access and damages for loss of 
visibility; work of statement of facts for summary judgment motion; 
Analyze counter offer and correspondence regarding same; research regarding opposing counsel's 
discovery response to letter; legal research regarding standards for challenging expert methodology; 
01/03/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,323.00 5.4 prepare draft section regarding same; legal research regarding legal standards for larger parcel; 
prepare draft section regarding same; legal research regarding date of valuation; prepare draft 
section regarding same; 
Research additional cases on lost profit argument made by Grathol for summary judgment brief; 
01/03/2012 Georger, Katherine L. $ 1,320.00 6.6 
draft additional section for lost profit argument; research Idaho case law on issue of new business 
being denied recovery of lost profits as a matter of law; draft additional brief insert and submit for 
review and comment; 
Several exchanges of email correspondence with client; review and analysis of Grathol's counter 
01/03/2012 York, Mary V. $ 2,502.50 7.7 offer and of options for responding; draft correspondence to client; work on brief in support of 
motion in limine; 
Follow up with expert; review case e-mails and other communications of past week; review ITD's 
Response to Defendant HJ Grathol's Second Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
01/03/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 288.00 1.8 
Documents, and documents produced in connection with same; review communications regarding 
public records request and response thereto; update case status on case tracking summary chart; 
review letter from Mr. Douglas Marfice in response to offer of settlement; discuss trial preparation 
and accommodations needed with SCBowman; follow up with additional trial needs with team; 
- ------··------ -----------------~-------·----
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Research case law in to support motion for summary judgment; work on brief in support of motion 
01/03/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,445.50 7.3 for summary judgment; review correspondence from opposing counsel rejected Acarrequi offer and 
making counteroffer; 
Legal research regarding striking appraisal for failure to quantify adjustments to comparable sales; 
01/04/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,592.50 6.5 
prepare draft argument regarding same; prepare draft factual citations regarding same; legal 
research regarding failure to appraise on date of taking; legal research regarding appraisal of only 
portion acquired; 
Research Idaho case law supporting policy reasons behind rejecting an award of construction delay 
damages to a prospective business; research additional authority from other jurisdictions and 
01/04/2012 Georger, Katherine L. $ 1,520.00 7.6 reputable treatises supporting denial of construction delay damages, and more specifically denial of 
business damages alleged to be attributed to construction delay; draft additional brief insert with 
additional supporting authority and submit for review; 
01/04/2012 York, Mary V. $ 2,307.50 7.1 
Review project plans for information relating to elevations of interchange on Grathol property; 
telephone conference with client; work on motions in limine; 
01/04/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 112.00 0.7 
Locate dates and documents needed by SCBowman; review electronic files for early construction 
plans, etc.; 
01/04/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,613.00 7.8 Work on brief in support of motion for summary judgment; research case law for brief; 
Continue legal research regarding larger parcel; continue legal research regarding date of valuation; 
email memorandum regarding same; continue to prepare draft affidavit; continue legal research 
01/05/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,837.50 7.5 regarding striking appraisals; research regarding transcript and deposition citations; legal research 
regarding appellate stay and correspondence regarding same; continue to revise and edit draft 
summary judgment brief and motion in limine brief; 
Conduct additional research of state and federal jurisdictions on implications of a land owner's 
knowledge of a governmental condemnation and/or project prior to purchasing property as 
01/05/2012 Georger, Katherine L. $ 1,620.00 8.1 preventing land owner to recover severance damages in such a situation; draft up research findings 
and additional cases and submit; revise and edit memorandum in support of motions in limine, 
including revisions submitted by TSTollefson, and submit revisions to MVYork; 
Work on brief in support of motions in limine, including research of case law, drafting of brief, 
obtaining documents in support of motion; review and analysis of documents relating to 
01/05/2012 York, Mary V. $ 2,730.00 8.4 construction schedule; review and edit motion and brief for overlength filing and research First 
Judicial District local rules for page limits on briefs; research case law regarding larger parcel analysis; 
work on summary judgment motion and brief; 
-----~·-·------- ---- -----·· ------------- -
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Follow up on outstanding discovery issues with Mr. Douglas Marfice and prepare summary e-mail to 
litigation team; assist with finalizing of Motion for Summary Judgment and Motions in Limine 
01/05/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 1,328.00 8.3 documents, including pulling all citations, deposition excerpts, exhibits to depositions cited, expert 
reports, discovery, etc. and electronically highlighting relevant pages and references cited, along with 
adding exhibit numbers to Affidavit of MVYork; 
01/05/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,881.00 8.6 
Research additional case law for brief in support of motion for summary judgment; work on brief in 
support of motion for summary judgment; 
Revise and edit draft affidavit; edit and research citations to record in motion in Ii mine brief; edit and 
01/06/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,176.00 4.8 revise exhibits; edit and research citations to record to summary judgment brief; continue to edit 
and revise briefs for filing; 
01/06/2012 Georger, Katherine L. $ 900.00 4.5 
Edit and revise memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment; review memorandum in 
support of motions in limine; 
01/06/2012 York, Mary V. $ 2,502.50 7.7 Work on summary judgment brief and in limine brief; 
Meet with MVYork to confer as to status of exhibits and items needed to be added; add further 
deposition citations, excerpts from expert reports, deposition exhibits, etc. to exhibits to Motion in 
01/06/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 784.00 4.9 Limine and Motion for Summary Judgment, and proof both briefs to confirm that all citations have 
been included as exhibits, etc.; meet with project assistant to oversee printing of final exhibits, 
compilation of same, etc.; 
01/06/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,507.50 4.5 Work on brief in support of motion for summary judgment; 
01/09/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 49.00 0.2 Research regarding hearing and status and correspondence regarding same; 
Correspondence with client; outline pre-trial deadlines and strategies for preparing for trial; draft 
01/09/2012 York, Mary V. $ 650.00 2.0 response to Grathol's settlement offer; telephone conference with client; review, edit and finalize 
notice of hearing; 
01/09/2012 Georger, Katherine L. $ 100.00 0.5 
Draft notice of hearing and submit to MVYork and SCBowman and TSTollefson for review and 
comment; 
01/09/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 268.00 0.8 Review discovery deficiency letter sent by opposing counsel; work on response to deficiency letter; 
Prepare letters to experts; review case communications, including MVYork letter to Mr. Douglas 
01/10/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 240.00 1.5 Marfice rejecting his client's counter-offer, ITD's Notice of Hearing, etc. and update status of matter 
on case tracking memo; 
Review and analysis of deficiency letter from opposing counsel and work on response to same; 
01/11/2012 York, Mary V. $ 715.00 2.2 conference call with client; review and edit draft letter to opposing counsel requesting extension of 
time for discovery responses; draft motion to compel; 
01/11/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 98.00 0.4 
Telephone conference regarding discovery and supplement issues; prepare draft letter to opposing 
counsel regarding same; 
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Work on compiling data needed for upcoming trial preparation meeting, including pulling all expert 
reports, opinions included in discovery responses, appraisals, rebuttal reports, etc. and compile lists 
of potential lay and expert witnesses for both parties, etc.; review recent communications from Mr. 
01/12/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 736.00 4.6 Marfice's office and team e-mails regarding discovery issues; pull document needed by SCBowman 
for his review; discuss trial witnesses briefly with SCBowman and make additions/revisions to trial 
witness list; print out case deadlines and attend to other minor items for upcoming team trial 
meeting; 
01/12/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 465.50 1.9 
Continue preparation for meeting and presentation; prepare draft overview of appraisals; 
correspondence regarding discovery; 
Prepare for pretrial meeting with litigation team and clients; draft correspondence to Chris Gabbert, 
01/13/2012 York, Mary V. $ 2,307.50 7.1 researching issues raised by Mr. Gabbert in prior correspondence and responding to same; review, 
edit and finalize correspondence to Mr. Gabbert; 
Research discovery regarding public notices and negotiations regarding neighboring parcels; prepare 
01/13/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 661.50 2.7 email memorandum regarding same; conference regarding discovery responses; continue to prepare 
draft supplemental discovery responses; 
Work on trial preparations; review documents and work on response to deficiency letter regarding 
01/13/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,646.50 7.9 
ITD responses to Grathol's second set of discovery; work on letter to opposing counsel responding to 
recent letter from him refusing to grant extension of time to compile additional documents in 
response to defendant's discovery requests; 
Review correspondence from client; confirm whether new information has been produced to Grathol 
01/16/2012 York, Mary V. $ 390.00 1.2 
and incorporate same into supplemental discovery responses; review Grathol's list of witnesses and 
research information regarding listed individuals; draft correspondence to Doug Marfice regarding 
scheduling depositions; 
Follow-up with client; review MVYork's response e-mail to Mr. Christopher Gabbert regarding no 
relationship between documents requested in Grathol's second set of discovery requests and 
01/16/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 304.00 1.9 
necessity for responding to ITD's motion in limine and motion for summary judgment; update case 
electronic folders; review draft of our supplemental response to HJ Grathol's Second Discovery 
requests and make minor revisions to same as to Bates numbering references, etc.; review case 
materials; begin preparation of list of trial assignments; 
Continue research regarding supplemental response to second discovery request; continue to 
01/16/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 882.00 3.6 prepare supplemental responses to second discovery request and documents regarding same; edit 
draft supplemental discovery response and correspondence regarding same; 
-----· ·--. ---- -·-··----·· ------------· ... --·--------·· ____ ,. __________ ~---- --------·-· ---··-···. 
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01/16/2012 Georger, Katherine L. $ 760.00_ 3.8 
Research Idaho legislative history and case law pertaining to recent amendment to Idaho Code 7-
707(6); commence drafting reply arguments to Grathol's summary judgment response; 
Work on letter to opposing counsel regarding their need to identify fact witnesses to be called at trial 
01/16/2012 Bowman, Steve C:. $ 502.50 1.5 and available dates for deposition; work on supplemental responses to second set of discovery 
requests by Grathol; 
Continue to edit draft discovery responses; prepare draft notice regarding discovery responses; 
01/17/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 857.50 3.5 telephone conference with client; research documents regarding test pits and correspondence 
regarding same; telephone conference with client regarding notice and public hearing; 
Review and edit discovery responses; telephone conferences with client; incorporate information 
01/17/2012 York, Mary V. $ 1,202.50 3.7 
into discovery responses; draft letter to Gabbert regarding discovery responses; email 
correspondence with client; finalize discovery; review and analysis of information and documents 
regarding test pits for Athol Segment; 
01/17/2012 Georger, Katherine L. $ 900.00 4.5 
Continue researching issues pertaining to Grathol's summary judgment response; continue drafting 
summary judgment response and submit draft for review; 
01/17/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 904.50 2.7 
Work on supplemental responses to Grathol's second set of discovery responses; work on 
preparation of demonstrative exhibits to be used at trial; telephone conference with client; 
Review recent case communications and e-mails; review materials provided by ITD on test pits issue; 
01/17/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 240.00 1.5 
discuss case status with MVYork; update case tracking memo with information from recent 
correspondence and filings; review notes from recent team meeting and begin to prepare chart of 
key trial issues and assignments to be completed for trial; 
Review documents previously produced in discovery responses to confirm that various 
environmental impact documents were produced to opposing counsel, etc.; load Garwood to Sagle 
Administrative Record to external network for easy accessibility by litigation team; follow-up with 
01/18/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 400.00 2.5 TSTollefson and MVYork regarding various items needed for trial and demonstrative exhibits needed 
for trial; telephone call to Mr. Dave Carter in Denver to discuss availability to work on electronic trial 
exhibits, etc.; additional meeting with MVYork and TSTollefson to discuss graphics, etc.; 
communications with client; attend to other miscellaneous trial matters; 
Conferences with MVYork and BKFeraci regarding trial and trial exhibits; telephone conference with 
01/19/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 637.00 2.6 client regarding exhibits; continue to prepare and research potential trial exhibits and trial 
preparation; 
01/19/2012 York, Mary V. $ 1,105.00 3.4 
Work on trial preparations, including assessment of pre-trial deadlines, planning of strategies for 
preparing for trial, and working on exhibits for trial; 
--- -- --- --· ------ ··- --------------- ----------------------------- -----------------------
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Update electronic folders with information from CDs provided by ITD; e-mail to team regarding 
01/19/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 208.00 1.3 access to various ITD information; meet briefly with TSTollefson to discuss trial exhibits; locate 
additional deposition exhibits off court reporter's website and add to electronic folders; 
01/20/2012 Georger, Katherine L. $ 300.00 1.5 
Review defendant's response to summary judgment, motion in limine response and supporting 
affidavit in anticipation of drafting reply; 
01/20/2012 Georger, Katherine L. $ 80.00 0.4 Meet with MVYork to discuss response motion for summary judgment and motion in Ii mine; 
Analyze and review response to summary judgment motion; analyze and review response to motion 
01/20/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 465.50 1.9 in Ii mine; correspondence regarding same; prepare draft letter to opposing counsel regarding 
witnesses; 
Telephone conference with Doug Marfice to discuss depositions of fact witnesses and scheduling of 
01/20/2012 York, Mary V. $ 682.50 2.1 
hearing on pre-trial motions; telephone conference with client and follow up with expert; 
preliminary review of Grathol's response to ITD's pretrial motions and conference with SCBowman to 
strategize response to same; 
Follow up with recording of additional court deadlines; begin pulling potential demonstrative 
exhibits for trial; prepare e-mail to PVolkman in Denver regarding possible electronic demonstrative 
01/20/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 304.00 l..9 exhibit needs of trial team; update status on case tracking memo; compile documents requested by 
SCBowman for additional briefing; start reviewing Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
Research cases cited by Grathol in their response brief; draft brief insert on loss of visibility 
01/21/2012 Georger, Katherine L. $ 880.00 4.4 distinguishing case law on basis of distinct constitutions in other jurisdictions, including Utah, 
Louisiana, California, and Alaska; 
01/21/2012 Gunn, Matthew G $ 253.50 l.3 
Research relevant case law and secondary sources regarding inclusion of gravel in just compensation 
calculations; 
01/21/2012 Bowman, Steve C:. $ 1,072.00 3.2 Work on reply briefs in support of motion for summary judgment and motion in Ii mine; 
01/21/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 490.00 2.0 
Prepare draft outline for reply brief in support of motion in limine; continue to prepare draft 
narrative time line of purchase of property; 
Review and analysis of Grathol's response to ITD's pretrial motions and outline issues and 
01/21/2012 York, Mary V. $ 1,430.00 4.4 
assignments to respond to same; extended meeting with litigation team to discuss Grathol's 
pleadings, issues for research, strategies for responses, and make assignments; research information 
relating to Grathol's argument relating to project knowledge; 
Continue drafting brief insert on visibility and submit draft to SCBowman for review and comment; 
01/22/2012 Georger, Katherine L. $ 1,020.00 5.1 commence researching issue pertaining to lost profits, including review prior briefing; commence 
drafting reply on issue of lost profits; 
01/22/2012 Gunn, Matthew G $ 273.00 1.4 
Research relevant case law and secondary sources regarding inclusion of gravel in just compensation 
calculations; 
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01/22/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 128.00 0.8 
Set up Real Legal Binder for running searches for upcoming depositions and trial, and add all 
deposition transcripts taken to date and begin running preliminary searches; 
Research relevant case law and secondary sources regarding inclusion of gravel in just compensation 
01/23/2012 Gunn, Matthew G $ 1,560.00 8.0 
calculations; draft reply brief inserts regarding same; research relevant case law regarding 
recoverable damages for construction delay after announcement of intent to condemn private 
property; 
Continue legal research regarding reply to motion in Ii mine regarding date of valuation and 
01/23/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 2,156.00 8.8 standards for expert witnesses; continue to prepare draft outline regarding reply in support of 
motion in limine; continue to prepare draft reply in support of motion in limine; 
01/23/2012 Georger, Katherine L. $ 1,320.00 6.6 Continue drafting brief inserts on lost profits and Sylvan Road issue; 
Review and edit correspondence to Doug Marfice regarding fact witnesses; work on prep for 
01/23/2012 York, Mary V. $ 1,300.00 4.0 
deposition of Jim Coleman and correspondence regarding same; work on response to construction 
delay portion of brief; review research memorandum regarding response to Grathol's argument 
regarding damages for gravel; research information regarding gravel claims; 
Research and analyze relevant case law regarding damages for construction delays related to 
01/24/2012 Gunn, Matthew G $ 604.50 3.1 condemned property; research and analyze case law regarding highest and best use and inability of 
owner of condemned land to aggregate uses; 
Continue to prepare draft reply in support of motion in limine; continue to research deposition 
01/24/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,935.50 7.9 
regarding same; continue regarding date of valuations and indicia of reliability for experts; 
conferences with MVYork regarding depositions and trial; research and correspondence regarding 
non testifying experts; 
Research case law on issue of severance damages and quick-take statute; continuing drafting section 
01/24/2012 Georger, Katherine L. $ 1,640.00 8.2 of brief on Sylvan Road, including severance damages section; review possession hearing transcript, 
depositions and prior briefing to weave into argument sections of brief; 
Confer with BKFeraci regarding logistics and preparations for trial; review correspondence and 
01/24/2012 York, Mary V. $ 1,397.50 4.3 
information from client; draft portion of reply brief regarding Grathol's claim for gravel damages; 
review correspondence from Doug Marfice, assess issues regarding depositions, and respond to 
same; 
-----······-·- _, -·····-····-------------------------------------~ 
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Meet with project assistant to go over all documents needed to be printed for notebooks for 
upcoming hearing on ITD's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion in Li mine; send e-mail and 
issues memo to client; continue working on compiling discovery documents for upcoming 
01/24/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 928.00 5.8 depositions; send copies of Defendant's Responses to ITD's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Motion in Li mine, along with Affidavit of Christopher Gabbert to experts; update expert files; 
telephone call from client; run additional searches and review additional productions of documents 
by HJ Grathol, pulling and printing documents for possible exhibits for depositions; 
Edit and revise draft section regarding lost profits and sylvan road; research and correspondence 
01/25/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,911.00 7.8 regarding change in project plans; continue to revise and edit draft reply brief in support of motion in 
limine; research regarding consequential damages; 
01/25/2012 Gunn, Matthew G $ 429.00 2.2 
Research and analyze case law relevant to construction delay damages and draft reply brief insert 
regarding same; draft brief insert regarding construction delay as inverse condemnation; 
Continue researching issues pertaining to lost business profits and Sylvan Road, including reviewing 
prior briefing and examining case law on issue of recovery of damages under theory of severance 
01/25/2012 Georger, Katherine L. $ 1,920.00 9.6 damages; continue drafting lost profits and Sylvan Road brief inserts and submit drafts for review 
and comment; review, edit and revise reply brief in support of motion in limine and submit revisions 
and edits; 
Work on sections of reply brief relating to damage claims for gravel and for construction delays, 
01/25/2012 York, Mary V. $ 3,347.50 10.3 researching case law and factual information, making assignments for research projects, and 
incorporating information and argument into brief; 
01/25/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 737.00 2.2 
Review response brief by Grathol on summary judgment in detail; review cases cited by Grathol in 
response brief; work on reply brief in support of motion for summary judgment; 
Complete compiling and finalizing packet of documents for upcoming depositions; work on 
compiling packet of documents and compiling written responses to discovery and documents 
produced by way of discovery, including pulling of pertinent deposition testimony previously taken 
in case; confer with KLGeorger on status of briefing; work on preparing PowerPoint Presentation for 
01/25/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 1,056.00 6.6 upcoming hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion in Li mine; locate additional 
documents needed for PowerPointand make additions and revisions to PowerPoint; various 
communications to/from SCBowman regarding getting ready for the deposition of Mr. Jim Coleman 
and additional documents to expert; re-organize electronic folders of Coleman materials for better 
usage and printing; follow-up on status of briefing and documents needed to be pulled, etc.; 
-·· . -··--·-··-------------·--·· ·---· ----- -------··-----·-· 
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01/26/2012 Gunn, Matthew G $ 507.00 2.6 
Cite and source check ITD's reply brief in support of motion in Ii mine; research relevant case law and 
analyze issues related to construction delay; 
Research Idaho case law and other jurisdictions on issue of consequential damages; draft brief insert 
on consequential damages and submit for review, comment and insertion into reply brief; research 
01/26/2012 Georger, Katherine L. $ 1,580.00 7.9 cases cited by Grathol in their brief regarding consequential damages and "cost to cure" method of 
calculating severance damages; commence drafting brief in insert distinguishing case law on "cost to 
cure" issue raised; 
01/26/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,788.50 7.3 
Continue research regarding motion in Ii mine; continue research regarding exhibits and depositions; 
continue to revise and draft reply in support of motion in limine; 
Review and edit draft reply to motions in Ii mine, meeting with MGGunn to discuss case law regarding 
construction delay damages and arguments to respond to Grathol's arguments; review and edit reply 
01/26/2012 York, Mary V. $ 3,022.50 9.3 brief in support of motion in limine; conference with TSTollefson to discuss edits; draft section of 
reply brief on construction delay damages and finalize section on gravel damages; research case law 
regarding consequential damages in condemnation cases; 
01/26/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,445.50 7.3 
Research case law for reply brief in support of ITD's motion for summary judgment; work on reply 
brief; 
Prepare index to pleadings for hearing notebooks for next week's hearing; meet with project 
assistant to go over printing of Mr. Jim Coleman's file materials; telephone call to Judge Hosack's 
clerk regarding questions about court room technology for next week's hearing; organize two sets of 
Jim Coleman's file materials for sending overnight to expert and SCBowman; telephone call with 
client; prepare letter to expert; follow-up with KLGeorger regarding information as to exhibits and 
01/26/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 896.00 5.6 status of writing her portion of brief, etc.; locate information for additional Power Point slide and 
create another slide for Power Point presentation; review various case communications, both 
internal and from Mr. Marfice; update expert files; proof read draftof reply brief in support of ITD's 
Motion in Limine, and make minor changes related to grammar and punctuation, etc.; follow up on 
additional items needed for briefing with TSTollefson and MVYork; do one additional review of reply 
proof to confirm that all documents have been pulled/referenced; 
01/27/2012 Georger, Katherine L. $ 940.00 4.7 
Continue drafting insert distinguishing Grathol's case law and submit draft insert for insertion into 
brief; review and edit summary judgment brief in anticipation of filing; 
Edit and revise draft reply in support of motion in limine; research regarding exhibits and references 
01/27/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,102.50 4.5 and correspondence regarding same; research citations and edits regarding construction delay 
damages and correspondence regarding same; 
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Coordinate deposition schedules and correspond with Doug Marfice regarding same; work on 
01/27/2012 York, Mary V. $ 3,185.00 9.8 summary judgment brief and motion in Ii mine, draft arguments, review and edit and finalize 
pleadings for filing; 
01/27/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,546.00 7.6 
Work on reply brief in support of ITD's motion for summary judgment, review and edit brief, and 
prepare brief for filing; 
Follow up with upcoming depositions, gathering additional items needed, including running 
Real Legal search on Tom Vandervert; additional assistance with finalizing of reply briefs, including 
additional proof-reading and checking of all references to affidavit exhibits and deposition pages, 
01/27/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 1,040.00 6.5 
etc.; various communications with MVYork, SCBowman, TSTollefson regarding case needs and 
briefing status; send SCBowman items needed for his reply brief; forward materials to client 
regarding re-zoning application of Hughes Investments; update electronic files; final proofing of 
Motion in Li mine; start working on demonstrative exhibits for trial; telephone call from court clerk 
regarding trial needs in court room; discuss additional case needs with MVYork; 
01/29/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 64.00 0.4 Complete review of final reply brief in support of ITD's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
01/30/2012 York, Mary V. $ 1,820.00 .5.6 Work on prep for hearing on motion for summary judgment; telephone conference with client; 
01/30/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 563.50 2.3 
Continue to prepare for oral argument; research regarding exhibits in record for hearing; continue 
research regarding potential trial exhibits; 
01/30/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 603.00 1.8 
Review materials for upcoming deposition of Mr. Jim Coleman; begin work on outline for deposition 
of Mr. Coleman; 
Work on pulling call key cases cited in both parties' briefing related to ITD's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and save as pdf files; meet with project assistant to arrange for printing of all cases pulled; 
organize all pulled cases alphabetically and prepare index of all cases and set up into binders; 
telephone call to M&M Court Reports (Ms. Debby Roden) to discuss "LiveDeposition and to get 
details regarding same; review e-mail from Ms. Roden with further details regarding the possibility of 
01/30/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 1,024.00 6.4 using LiveDeposition for deposition of Mr. Jim Coleman and report information back to MVYork; 
send response e-mail to Ms. Roden; pull together rezone application and County of Kootenai's 
decision materials for MVYork meeting with Mr. Scott Clark; review various case communications; 
update case status on case tracking chart; additional communications to/from Ms. Roden; update 
Powerpoint slide; finalize hearing notebooks for MVYork and TSTollefson and attend to 
miscellaneous assignments; 
Work on prep for summary judgment hearing, drafting outline of argument, reviewing and analyzing 
01/31/2012 York, Mary V. $ 2,242.50 6.9 arguments and preparing response arguments; conference call with client; correspondence with 
Doug Marfice; 
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Correspondence with client; continue research regarding motion in Ii mine and summary judgment 
01/31/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,568.00 6.4 hearing; continue to prepare for motion in limine and summary judgment hearing; research and 
prepare draft exhibits for trial; 
Review various e-mail communications regarding case assignments and needs; work on adding 
additional power point slides for upcoming hearing; forward materials for demonstrative exhibits for 
trial with commentary to TSTollefson for his review; arrange for thumb drive of case pleadings to be 
made for MVYork for hearing, and compile additional items for trip; make additions and revisions to 
existing slides for PowerPoint presentation, and locate better copies of several exhibits and re-build 
01/31/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 944.00 5.9 
PowerPoint slides; compile additional documents in preparation for deposition and forward copies 
of the same, highlighting pertinent portions thereof; attendance at team meeting to discuss various 
key issues; send ITD's recent reply briefs to experts; load expert disclosures to thumb drive for 
MVYork and finalize materials to be taken to hearing; discuss demonstrative exhibits with 
TSTollefson and format needed to be compiled for each comparable for use by Denver graphics 
team; update experts folders with additional materials sent to each; follow-up with miscellaneous 
assignments; 
02/01/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,298.50 5.3 
Research regarding hearing exhibits; continue to prepare for oral argument; legal research regarding 
same; 
Prepare for hearing on motion for summary judgment; travel to Coeur d'Alene, reviewing documents 
02/01/2012 York, Mary V. $ 3,867.50 11.9 and preparing for hearing en route; prepare for hearing on motion for summary judgment; meeting 
with Mel Palmer from Kootenai County Community Planning Department and client; 
Prepare two additional power point slides for hearing for MVYork; locate information requested by 
TSTollefson needed for his oral argument; meet with project assistant to have summary judgement 
02/01/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 864.00 5.4 
binders and expert disclosures/report binders made; telephone calls (2) to Judge Hosack's clerk 
regarding courtroom availability prior to hearing and communicate message to MVYork and 
TSTollefson; work on compiling data sheets for each comparable sale by all four appraisers to be 
used as demonstrative exhibits to send to Denver Graphics for trial purposes; 
02/02/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,911.00 7.8 Continue to prepare for oral argument and outline regarding same; oral argument; 
02/02/2012 York, Mary V. $ 3,965.00 12.2 
Prepare for hearing on summary judgment; oral argument on motion summary judgment and 
motion in limine; meet with client; return travel to Boise; 
02/02/2012 Georger, Katherine L. $ 140.00 0.7 
Research Idaho case law on issue of cost-to-cure damages and recovery of severance damages in 
partial takings case and submit research findings to MVYork for summary judgment arguments; 
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Prepare issue list for MVYork and TSTollefson related to trial exhibits for afternoon conference with 
the Judge; proof information provided on each comparable sales sheet to be used for trial 
demonstratives prior to sending to DCarter in Denverand make minor revisions; prepare detailed 
02/02/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 800.00 5.0 memo/e-mail to DCarter with transmittal of materials for demonstrative exhibits and instructions 
regarding the same; complete compiling materials for client; telephone call to client; review and 
respond to various case e-mail communications; confer with KLGeorger on case issues; telephone 
call from MVYork regarding hearing and follow-up on assignments; 
02/03/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 318.50 1.3 
Telephone conference with MVYork and SCBowman regarding oral argument and litigation; analyze 
and review written ruling; correspondence regarding same; 
Review notes from summary judgment hearing and from meeting with Kootenai County; identify 
new issues and action items as a result from hearing, including identifying exhibits, additional 
02/03/2012 York, Mary V. $ 1,365.00 4.2 
research, and potential motions; meeting with BKFeraci to discuss exhibits for trial; conference call 
with SCBowman to discuss summary judgment hearing and court's rulings, effects of rulings on case, 
and also discuss deposition of Jim Coleman; make assignments for research projects; work on prep 
for Coleman deposition and correspondence with opposing counsel regarding same; 
Telephone call to Kootenai County Courthouse to request a copy of the transcript from the motion 
for summary and motion in Ii mine hearings; review Planning and Zoning materials received pursuant 
to ITD's public record request and begin to pull potential exhibits for trial to be used with witness Ms. 
Mel Palmer from Kootenai County Community Development Office; telephone call with Mr. Shane 
02/03/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 496.00 3.1 Sawyer to discuss preparation of enlarged copy of Kootenai County Zoning District Map for use at 
trial, and meet briefly with him to go over details regarding same; forward additional information to 
DCarter in Denver for trial graphics; review Order from Court and follow up with team regarding 
same; review and respond to various case communications; begin compiling materials for trial 
notebook; 
Review deposition transcripts and deposition exhibits; work on outline for deposition of Mr. 
Coleman; prepare outline of demonstrative exhibits needed for trial showing Grathol property and 
02/03/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,445.50 7.3 
vicinity, and comparable sales used by all valuation witnesses; work on obtaining Mr. Coleman's 
work files; review site plans faxed by Mr. Coleman and compare with site plans produced by Grathol 
in discovery; review orders on summary judgment motion and motion in Ii mine; confer with team 
about steps going forward based on new court orders; 
02/06/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 637.00 2.6 
Research regarding site plans and correspondence regarding same; research regarding appraisals and 
basis for opposing party's claims; 
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Confirm and calendar new pretrial deadlines and outline action items for trial prep; review and 
analysis of court order and outline discussion points; telephone conference with client; review site 
02/06/2012 York, Mary V. $ 2,047.50 6.3 
plans used by Jim Coleman and compare to plans used by ITD's experts; work on prep for Jim 
Coleman's deposition; conference with TSTollefson regarding research to respond to Grathol's 
supplemental expert disclosures; review documents for fact witness depositions and prepare for 
meeting; meeting with client; 
Telephone call with DCarter regarding graphics; arrange for access rights for DCarter to case 
documents on external drive; compile additional documents for MVYork for upcoming depositions 
and print out new sets of documents for each deponent; telephone call to Ms. Debby Roden at M&M 
Court Reporters to discuss using Realtime at deposition of Mr. Jim Coleman; review link forward by 
Ms. Roden and test for connection; additional telephone calls with Ms. Roden to confirm changes 
needed; compile additional information for Mr. Carter and forward the same to him; telephone call 
02/06/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 1,424.00 8.9 to Mr. Jim Coleman to discuss need for obtaining his file on the HJ Grathol project; review and 
respond to various case e-mails regarding various pre-trial assignments, etc.; additional telephone 
call to Mr. Coleman's office regarding confirmation of overnight delivery for sending of Mr. 
Coleman's file; add exhibits to potential trial exhibit electronic folder; send e-mails to experts with 
copies of Court's Orders from recent hearing; attendance at meeting with MVYork and client; update 
external folders; update folders of experts; various communications to/from SCBowman regarding 
trial needs; return e-mail to expert; review additional e-mail from SCBowman to expert; 
Research Idaho Code provisions regarding conflicts of interests by appointed public officials; prepare 
02/06/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,541.00 4.6 for upcoming deposition of Mr. Coleman; telephone conference with Mr. Coleman to discuss 
deposition; 
02/07/2012 Gunn, Matthew G $ 546.00 2.8 
Research relevant case law, statutes, and secondary sources regarding a recused board member's 
ability to testify for a party in opposition to the board; draft research memorandum regarding same; 
Telephone conference regarding trial exhibits; continue research regarding appraisal claims and 
02/07/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 931.00 3.8 scope of summary judgment order; continue to prepare outline regarding same; continue to prepare 
time line; 
02/07/2012 York, Mary V. $ 422.50 1.3 
Telephone conference with expert; analyze issues relating to fact witness depositions and work on 
preparations for same; telephone conference with client; email correspondence with client; 
02/07/2012 Carter, David E. $ 740.00 4.0 Work out programing directions, save out images and work out basic programing structure; 
..... ···------·-··----····-· ---·- -- .. ······------· ········-- ---···- . --------·------------------ ----------·-····· -- .. 
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Telephone call from Ms. Debby Roden to discuss upcoming depositions in Northern Idaho and 
RealTime Deposition needs for Mr. Jim Coleman's upcoming deposition; follow-up with IT 
department regarding needs presented by Ms. Roden and respond further to Ms. Roden; telephone 
call from Mr. Bryl Cinnamon, first court reporter who covered Motion for Summary Judgment 
hearing, regarding estimate for preparing his portion of the transcript; telephone calls (2) with Ms. 
JoAnn Schaller, second court reporter at hearing, regarding timing for turnaround for transcript, cost, 
etc.; prepare memo to MVYork and trial team regarding conversations with both court reporters, 
02/07/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 1,072.00 6.7 estimated fees, and estimated turn-around times, etc.; additional telephone calls with both 
reporters; telephone call with DCarter in Denver regarding issues related to demonstratives for trial; 
review documents received from Mr. Jim Coleman prior to his deposition, organize same, and meet 
with project assistant to scan, number and print out copies; prepare e-mail to SCBowman regarding 
status of Mr. Coleman's records; make revisions to demonstrative comparable sales sheets; forward 
copies with memo to DCarter in Denver; review Bates-numbered set of documents for Ms. expert 
and prepare transmittal letter to her with the same, with copy to SCBowman; pull additional 
materials needed by SCBowman; 
Prepare correspondence to experts regarding recent summary judgment filings and court orders on 
summary judgment motion and motions in limine, and alert experts to be prepared to address new 
02/07/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,407.00 4.2 
valuations by Grathol's experts pursuant to the court's recent orders; assist with preparations for 
upcoming depositions of Mr. Terrell and Mr. Vandervert; work on addressing ongoing issue of 
Defendant's refusal to identify experts and to continue to hide experts either as "fact" witnesses or 
use of "actor-viewer" exception under federal rule; work on computer graphics to be used at trial; 
02/08/2012 Gunn, Matthew G $ 292.50 1.5 
Research relevant case law, statutes, and secondary sources regarding a recused board member's 
ability to testify for a party in opposition to the board; 
02/08/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 196.00 0.8 
Correspondence and research regarding exhibits and comparable sales; correspondence and exhibits 
regarding taking and project; 
Confer with client; work on trial exhibits; outline issues for conference with Court; telephone 
02/08/2012 York, Mary V. $ 1,332.50 4.1 conference with law clerk for Judge Hosack; review and analysis of file documents from Jim Coleman; 
work on outline of cross examination for Skip Sherwood; 
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Compile Mr. Coleman's file documents for Mr. Doug Marfice for upcoming deposition; update case 
electronic folders; various e-mail communications with SCBowman regarding upcoming Jim Coleman 
deposition and various related needs; reviewdraft demonstratives from DCarter in Denver office; 
02/08/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 480.00 3.0 obtain oversized demonstrative exhibit showing Kootenai County Zoning Department Map; review 
and respond to various case communications; follow up with SCBowman regarding his recent 
telephone conversation with Mr. Jim Coleman, issues relating to same, and need to possibly vacate 
deposition; attend to various other trial needs and re-organize materials in electronic files, etc.; 
02/08/2012 Carter, David E. $ 1,110.00 6.0 
Review comp information, enter data of comp and construct buttons and navigation for interactive 
exhibit; 
Prepare for deposition of Mr. Coleman; review documents and compile exhibits to be used in 
02/08/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,876.00 5.6 
deposition of Mr. Coleman; confer with MVYork regarding approach to deposition of Mr. Coleman; 
telephone conference with Mr. Coleman regarding his analyses of work done by experts retained by 
ITD on case; 
02/09/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 245.00 1.0 
Correspondence regarding exhibits and preparation for meeting regarding same; continue research 
regarding damages and time line; 
Review and analyze correspondence from SCBowman and follow up conference call with him; work 
on issues relating to Jim Coleman's deposition; telephone conference with client; meeting with 
02/09/2012 York, Mary V. $ 2,242.50 6.9 MGGunn to discuss research findings on conflicts of interest; prepare for conference with Court, 
reviewing and confirming details of Grathol's witness disclosures; review case law cited by Court at 
summary judgment hearing; finalize correspondence to Mr. Marfice; work on trial exhibits; 
02/09/2012 Gunn, Matthew G $ 136.50 0.7 
Research relevant case law, statutes, and secondary sources regarding a recused board member's 
ability to testify for a party in opposition to the board; draft research memorandum regarding same; 
02/09/2012 Carter, David E. $ 222.00 1.2 Continue work on trial exhibits including adding info to comp and programing; 
1424 of 1617
Date Name Billed Amt Hours Narrative 
Follow up on status of Mr. Jim Coleman and anticipated deposition testimony, etc.; telephone call to 
Ms. Debby Roden at M&M Court Reporting to cancel deposition; telephone call from Mr. Bryl 
Cinnamon regarding completion of part one of hearing transcript; brief review of transcript 
forwarded from Mr. Cinnamon, forward to litigation team and saved to electronic file; review and 
respond to various case communications; prepare letter to Mr. Douglas Marfice with transmittalof 
Mr. Coleman's work file; meet briefly with MVYork to discuss case status and recent issues; compile a 
02/09/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 1,136.00 7.1 
single pdf document from all of Grathol's Responses and Supplemental Responses to ITD's 
Interrogatories #1 and #2 which seek the identity of all persons Grathol expects to call as a lay or 
expert witness at trial and the subject matter upon which each expert witness is expected to testify, 
etc. for SCBowman; review e-mail from client; begin compiling documents relating to HJ Grathol's 
disclosure of Mr. Skip Sherwood's report and their expert disclosures for MYYork for upcoming court 
hearing, compiling and highlighting HJ Grathol's original disclosures, our follow up deficiency letters, 
their production of Mr. Sherwood's report, all follow up letters, etc. motion to compel/exclude 
pleadings, stipulation, amended order; follow-up with other trial needs including various comm 
Evaluate whether to depose Mr. Coleman; confer with MVYork regarding recommendation; confer 
with client and MVYork; review expert report; confer with DEA personnel regarding trial testimony 
02/09/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,407.00 4.2 
in response to testimony from Mr. Coleman; review transcript of hearings on summary judgment 
motion and motion in Ii mine; telephone conference with opposing counsel; work on letter to 
opposing counsel regarding ongoing disputes over expert witnesses and discussion of fact witnesses 
who should have been disclosed as experts; 
Conference with litigation team regarding trial exhibits; continue research regarding exhibits; 
02/10/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,837.50 7.5 
continue research regarding damages; continue to prepare exhibits regarding appraisals and 
remainder valuations; analyze and review supplemental expert disclosure; prepare draft outline 
regarding same; 
Prepare for and attend meeting to review trial exhibits and discuss trial prep; telephone conference 
02/10/2012 York, Mary V. $ 2,112.50 6.5 with client; research case law regarding issues addressed by Court at pretrial hearing; work on trial 
exhibits and trial prep; 
02/10/2012 Carter, David E. $ 407.00 2.2 Work on trial exhibits, inputting info for comps and programming; 
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Telephone call with DCarter to briefly review demonstratives created thus far; attendance at team 
meeting to go over trial graphics and other trial issues; lengthy conference call with DCarter to relay 
changes to demonstratives requested by SCBowman and MVYork; work on completing project for 
MVYork regarding compiling of materials related to HJ Grathol's disclosure of Mr. Skip Sherwood's 
report and disclosures, compile same into notebook, and prepare table of contents to documents 
compiled; additional telephone call from DCarter; review letter from MVYork to Mr. Doug Marfice 
02/10/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 1,248.00 7.8 
relating to Mr. Winger and Mr. Coleman and print for trial notebook; work on preparing various 
demonstrative charts comparing comparable sales of appraiser; confer with MVYork on charts and 
other case assignments; review and respond to e-mail requests from SCBowman; prepare list of 
questions for MVYork for upcoming hearing based on e-mails with questions raised by team 
members; send additional corrections to be made by DCarter to him; additional telephone call with 
DCarter; save pleadings and deposition transcripts to thumb drive for MVYork for upcoming hearing; 
telephone call with client; attend to other miscellaneous assignments, including setting up Excel 
format for preparing draft exhibit list; 
02/10/2012 Carter, David E. $ 980.50 5.3 Work on trial exhibits and incorporate edits from SCBowman; 
02/10/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 402.00 1.2 Meeting to review preliminary demonstrative exhibits for use at trial; 
02/11/2012 Carter, David E. $ 407.00 2.2 Made changes to code and document for trial exhibits; 
02/12/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 367.50 1.5 
Continue to research and analyze supplemental expert disclosure; prepare email memorandum 
regarding same; research and correspondence regarding exhibits and charts; 
Review and analysis of supplemental expert disclosures from Grathol; travel to Coeur d'Alene, 
02/12/2012 York, Mary V. $ 2,567.50 7.9 reviewing case documents and preparing for hearing en route; continue prep for hearing upon arrival 
in Coeur d'Alene, comparing prior expert disclosures and outlining arguments for hearing; 
Complete preparation of comparison charts of comparable sales using numbers of Mr. Stan Moe, Mr. 
Skip Sherwood, Mr. Alan Johnson, and Mr. Larry Pynes; prepare sales information sheet for subject 
HJ Grathol property, and pull various photographs for possible usage for trial overlays; various 
02/12/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 944.00 5.9 
communications to/from team members; review all of Kootenai County Planning and Zoning 
documents and mark potential documents for exhibits, compiling various pdf documents for 
potential trial exhibits; e-mail to MVYork regarding need to review planning and zoning documents 
for using as potential exhibits with Ms. Mel Palmer at trial; work on drafting initial trial exhibit list 
and pulling additional potential documents for exhibits; 
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Research regarding supplemental damages claim; prepare draft response to supplemental disclosure 
and correspondence and edits regarding same; prepare email memorandums regarding 
02/13/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 906.50 3.7 supplemental disclosures; correspondence regarding supplemental filings and deposition; edit draft 
public records request letter and correspondence regarding same; continue to prepare exhibits for 
trial; 
Review and analysis of Grathol's supplemental expert disclosures and prior disclosures and prepare 
for hearing; conference calls and email correspondence with experts; deposition of Tom Vandevert; 
02/13/2012 York, Mary V. $ 4,030.00 12.4 hearing on Grathol's supplemental expert disclosures; conference with client; resume deposition of 
Mr. Vandevert; work on cross examination for Alan Johnson; work on prep for deposition of Brett 
Terrell and confer with client; 
02/13/2012 Carter, David E. $ 592.00 3.2 Make changes to project and coding for trial exhibits; 
Continue with trial preparation and needs, including forwarding information requested by MVYork 
for upcoming hearing; telephone calls with expert; review communications from Mr. Douglas Marfice 
regarding Grathol's attorney's fees and provide findings to MVYork; review public records requests 
previously prepared by KLGeorger and check on status of production; prepare additional public 
records request to DEQ regarding updating their search of records, and in particular, requesting any 
letters of approval issued to HJ Grathol by DEQ related to their wastewater sewer system, and pulling 
02/13/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 912.00 5.7 form request form off their websiteto include with written letter; review/respond to team e-mail 
communications; go through discovery responses for SCBowman and highlight all references to Mr. 
Geoff Reeslund; compile exhibits from Mr. Reeslund's deposition and have notebook compiled for 
SCBowman with exhibits, deposition transcript, and discovery documents compiled; prepare memo 
to SCBowman regarding the same; meet briefly with TSTollefson to discuss case issues and public 
records request; continue pulling potential deposition exhibits; review additional status update 
communication from MVYork and respond to same; 
02/13/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,144.00 6.4 
Compile and review materials on witnesses expected to testify at trial; work on exhibits to be used 
with each witness; work on outlines of direct and cross examinations; 
02/14/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 269.50 1.1 
Continue to research appraisals and damages calculations; continue to prepare draft chart regarding 
same; 
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Convert draft ptx. copies [2] of draft deposition transcript of Mr. Tom Vandervert into pdf format and 
send copies, with e-mail message, to experts; telephone call to court reporter in Coeur d'Alene to 
order copy of transcript from hearing of 1/13/2012 before Judge Hosack; confer with KLGeorger 
regarding earlier public records request to Panhandle District Health, etc.; telephone call with 
DCarter in Denver to go over revisions to demonstratives; various additional communications with 
experts; review all new demonstratives prepared by DCarter, and make list of punctuation, spelling 
02/14/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 1,088.00 6.8 and factual information that needs correcting and send list to DCarter; meet with TSTollefson to 
discuss trial witness order, testimony and exhibits; additional communications with DCarter; locate 
additional aerial photographs for possible usage and forward to TSTollefson with comments and 
questions; update experts files; finalize additional potential demonstratives for sending to DCarter; 
draft witness list by responsible attorney; work on compiling additional trial exhibits; additional call 
to court regarding request for transcript; have project assist print out potential exhibits to be used 
with Ms. Mel Palmer and arrange in file for MVYork's review; 
02/14/2012 Carter, David E. $ 536.50 2.9 Make changes to comps and programing for trial exhibits; 
02/14/2012 York, Mary V. $ 2,990.00 9.2 
Review and analysis of deposition transcript of Tom Vandervert; deposition of Brett Terrell; meeting 
with client; return travel to Boise, reviewing case files and documents en route; 
Review notes from hearing with Court and identify next steps for case; conference with SCBowman, 
TSTollefson, BKFeraci to discuss hearing and next steps for case; work on preparations for trial, 
02/15/2012 York, Mary V. $ 2,145.00 6.6 including working on exhibits, coordinating pretrial details, and identifying trial issues requiring 
pocket briefs; telephone conferences with client; analyze issues relating to Sylvan Road and east 
Frontage Road; 
Follow up on miscellaneous trial assignments; convert draft deposition transcript of Mr. Brett Terrell 
to pdf document and forward copy of draft deposition transcript; review revisions to demonstrative 
02/15/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 640.00 4.0 
exhibits made by DCarter in Denver and print out for TSTollefson and forward to SCBowman; forward 
SCBowman additional documents for his review; confer with DCarter on demonstratives and set up 
meeting with him and SCBowman; review additional charts created by TSTollefson with fair market 
values used by all appraisers, etc. and for possible usage at trial; 
02/15/2012 Carter, David E. $ 666.00 3.6 
Continue adding info to comps for trial exhibits and work on programming; make corrections to 
information on trial exhibits; same; 
02/15/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 931.00 3.8 
Continue research regarding exhibits and trail; continue to prepare chart regarding appraisers and 
compensation; correspondence and edits regarding exhibits and charts; 
02/15/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,172.50 3.5 Work on creating demonstrative exhibits for trial; work on trial brief and exhibit list; 
....... --- -·-. ···-··------ - ---·· -- -·· -- ·--·- ···-···· -------- - . . .... -·--· ··-- ----·---- . ... ·------ ------·-····· ...... ·--- ------- -- -·-·. -··-··---- . ---·-· -· -·-·- ·-·· 
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Research and edits regarding comparable sales and demonstrative exhibits; research and edits 
02/16/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,494.S0 6.1 
regarding comparable sale locations and exhibits; correspondence regarding overlays and maps; 
analyze and review court order regarding severance damages; research and correspondence 
regarding severance damages claimed; 
Review/respond to various case e-mail communications; locate additional graphic needed by 
TSTollefson; telephonic conference call with DCarter and SCBowman regarding case graphics; follow 
up with status of transcript from 2/13/2012 hearing, sending e-mails to Ms. Jamie Johnson, Assistant 
to Trial Court Administrator, and court reporter, Ms. Anne MacManus; meet with TSTollefson to 
discuss comparable sales demonstratives, and prepare additional detailed e-mail to DCarter; update 
02/16/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 1,024.00 6.4 
witness list for trial based on discussions at 2/15/2012 team meeting; additional telephone call from 
DCarter with questions on changes to be made; prepare chart of all comparable sales used by all 
appraisers; confer further with TSTollefson regarding placement of locations of comparable sales, 
and follow up further with DCarter; work on gathering additional documents for potential exhibits; 
confer with MVYork regarding exchange of trial exhibits, witness preparation meetings, and other 
potential trial exhibits; review demonstratives made by DCarter and additional telephone call with 
him; follow-up in responding to e-mails from client, expert and court reporter; 
02/16/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 469.00 l.4 Work on computer graphics for trial; 
Review and analysis of correspondence from Doug Marfice; analyze public records request from Alan 
Johnson and correspondence with client; conference with SCBowman regarding recent information 
from Doug Marfice and strategize next steps for case; research prior offers from Grathol and analyze 
02/16/2012 York, Mary V. $ 2,535.00 7.8 
same in light of recent discussions with Mr. Marfice; telephone conference with client; review and 
edit direct examination outline for Jason Minzghor; telephone conference with Doug Marfice; draft 
memo to client; review and analyze Court order on severance damages; identify issues for trial brief 
and for trial and draft outline of same; coordinate prep session for Jason Minzghor and prepare for 
same; telephone conference with expert; 
02/16/2012 Carter, David E. $ 425.50 2.3 Work on images for HJGrathol comp on trial exhibits and work on programing for same; 
Update trial file folders; confer with MVYork re: status update and print out various materials for 
upcoming meeting with ITD; review additions/revisions made by DCarter to further demonstratives 
02/17/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 272.00 1.7 for trial; telephone call with DCarter regarding demonstratives; provide MVYork with potential 
exhibits for trial witness Ms. Mel Palmer and get update on trial status; begin to compile key 
documents for trial notebook; 
... --- _____ , -· ........ --- ---·--··- ------ ,. ____________________ ., ________________________ . ·--·----·------·-·-··" 
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Review and analysis of correspondence from Doug Marfice and follow up correspondence with 
02/17/2012 York, Mary V. $ 2,177.50 6.7 
client; telephone conferences with client; work on prep for trial, including coordinating logistics for 
trial and working on trial exhibits; analyze issues relating to Sylvan Road and prepare for meeting 
with client; attend meeting at ITD; draft email correspondence to Mr. Marfice; 
02/17/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 770.50 2.3 Work with experts to prepare for testimony at trial; 
02/18/2012 York, Mary V. $ 195.00 0.6 
Correspondence with client; telephone conference with SCBowman to discuss recent developments 
in case and analysis strategies for case; 
Review and analyze certificate of changes for Alan Johnson's deposition; research and obtain 
02/19/2012 York, Mary V. $ 812.50 2.5 information requested by expert; work on exhibits for trial and work on direct examination of Jason 
Minzghor; 
Correspondence with court reporter regarding transcript from hearing of 2/13/2011, and respond to 
same; confer with MVYork regarding trial exhibits; telephone call to DCarter with additional changes 
to be made to interactive map, etc.; confer with MVYork regarding various trial needs and issues; 
telephone calls to AmeriTel regarding changes in arrival times and rooms, etc.; follow up with 
02/20/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 480.00 3.0 MVYork and SCBowman on changes in rooms; work on compiling additional materials for trial 
notebook; review changes made by DCarter to interactive map; additional communications with 
DCarter regarding the same; review files of Mr. George Hedley for information requested by 
SCBowman and forward information to him; review additional exhibits forwarded by MVYork for use 
with Mr. Stan Moe; 
02/20/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 938.00 2.8 
Work on outline for trial brief; work on exhibit list; review and comment on computer graphics for 
trial; 
Work on outline for direct and rebuttal testimony and on trial exhibits for Stan Moe; several 
extended telephone conferences with client; draft correspondence to Doug Marfice regarding 
settlement discussions; telephone conference with Stan Moe; email exchanges and conferences with 
02/20/2012 York, Mary V. $ 2,827.50 8.7 SCBowman regarding trial preparations, exhibits, and witnesses; email correspondence with client; 
review and analyze supplemental discovery responses from Grathol and determine response to 
same; meet with MGGunn and assign motion and brief to exclude witnesses; work on direct 
examination outline for Jason Minzghor; 
02/20/2012 Carter, David E. $ 222.00 1.2 Make revisions to HJGrathol comp on trial exhibits, work on programming; 
·- ... --------- ---------- ----- ···-·-- ---- ----- --------· -···------
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Review additional work of DCarter and make minor changes/additions thereto; meet with MVYork 
regarding trial exhibits to be used with Mr. Jason Minzghor; print out additional key materials for 
trial notebook; upload transcript from 2/13/2012 hearing and circulate to team; various 
02/21/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 1,136.00 7.1 communications to/from M&M Court Reporting regarding exhibits to depositions of Mr. Vanderwert 
and Mr. Terrell and upload transcripts received; work on drafting Plaintiff's Exhibit List, locating 
information needed on various witnesses, and sending out draft to team to review; work on entering 
exhibits to exhibit list on Excel spreadsheet and pulling potential documents needed at trial; 
Research relevant case law and pleadings regarding exclusion of untimely disclosed expert witnesses; 
02/21/2012 Gunn, Matthew G $ 1,306.50 6.7 draft motion to exclude expert testimony; draft affidavit in support of motion to exclude expert 
testimony; draft brief in support of motion to exclude expert testimony; 
02/21/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,474.00 4.4 Review transcript from 2/13/12 hearing; work with experts to prepare for trial; 
Work on trial exhibits for Jason Minzghor and work on direct testimony for Mr. Minzghor; telephone 
conference with client; work on trial exhibits for Larry Pynes and correspondence with expert; draft 
02/21/2012 York, Mary V. $ 2,892.50 8.9 outline for direct examination for Stan Moe and work on trial exhibits for Mr. Moe; telephone 
conference with expert; correspondence with client; correspondence and telephone conference with 
expert; 
02/21/2012 Carter, David E. $ 55.50 0.3 Revise trial exhibits per BFeraci; 
Forward finalized deposition transcripts of Mr. Tom Vandervert and Mr. Brett Terrell to experts; 
meet with MVYork to discuss changes to exhibits; forward photos of Grathol property to DCarter in 
Denver for making property boundary lines thicker; run search of all hearing transcripts for 
references to witnesses for MGGunn; create key contact list of experts, court personnel, and other 
key names and numbers for trial notebooks for team members; update experts' electronic files; e-
02/22/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 1,168.00 7.3 mail to SCBowman with trial information; follow up on various miscellaneous assignments; work on 
pulling exhibits identified by attorneys and adding them to Excel Exhibit list; telephone call to expert 
regarding appraisal questions; confer with MVYork regarding call to Mr. Marfice regarding exhibit 
exchange and other trial issues; update external folder; work with MVYork in identifying and locating 
additional documents for exhibits and start adding exhibits to be used by Tim Thomas to electronic 
folders; 
02/22/2012 Gunn, Matthew G $ 526,50 2.7 Revise brief in support of motion to exclude expert testimony; 
02/22/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,541.00 4.6 
Review transcripts of depositions of Mr. Terrell and Mr. Vandervert; work on trial brief; review 
documents and identify trial exhibits; 
--· -· -------·-···· _ .. _____ -- . - ...... -·····--·--------·------·-- -----·- ---····-------------·-.. ··· ----- -----------··-------···-···-·· ·---.. - -- . 
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Work on expert's direct examination and preparation of exhibits; review and edit revised trial 
02/22/2012 York, Mary V. $ 2,892.50 8.9 
exhibits from graphics department; review information for public records request and conference 
with client; draft statement regarding Grathol case; work on outline for direct examination; work on 
trial exhibits; 
E-mail communication regarding need for better copy of potential trial exhibit; prepare e-mail 
transmittals to all experts to obtain personal cell phone numbers for contact information for trial 
team while in trial, etc.; continue working on pulling trial exhibits and preparing draft trial exhibit list; 
02/23/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 1,264.00 7.9 
additional communications with Mr. Dennis Reinstein; telephone call from expert; review exhibit; 
review box of documents sent from Mr. Doug Marfice regarding documents produced pursuant to 
deposition duces tecum for Mr. Brett Terrell and Mr. Tom Vandervert; review documents produced 
pursuant to public records request from DEQ and discuss the same with MVYork and SCBowman and 
distribute to team; 
02/23/2012 York, Mary V. $ 2,827.50 8.7 
Work on trial exhibits for witnesses and cross examinations for Skip Sherwood and Alan Johnson; 
telephone conference with client; telephone conference with expert; 
02/23/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,876.00 5.6 
Review documents and work on narrowing list of trial exhibits; prepare list of exhibits tied to each 
witness; work on trial brief; 
02/24/2012 York, Mary V. $ 2,990.00 9.2 Work on trial exhibits for cross examination of Alan Johnson, trial logistics, and general trial prep; 
02/24/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,574.50 4.7 
Complete work on identifying exhibits and pairing with witnessed to be called at trial; work on trial 
brief; 
02/24/2012 Omsberg, Stephanie M. $ 1,008.00 6.3 Detailed edits to plaintiff's trial exhibit list in Excel; rename and hyperlink exhibits into spreadsheet; 
Meeting with MVYork to discuss trial logistics and assignments; meet briefly with CRMontgomery 
and SOmsberg to discuss additional help with exhibits; telephone call to AmeriTel regarding changes 
in hotel accommodations; work on pulling rest of SCBowman's trial exhibits; confer with TKillian 
regarding technology in court room; work on finalizing balance of exhibits to be pulled and adding to 
02/24/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 1,296.00 8.1 
external folder; work with SOmsberg to transfer groupings of exhibits to Excel spreadsheet; arrange 
for linking of exhibits by SOmsberg; arrange for project assistant to upload additional deposition 
exhibits to folder on external network; telephone call to arrange for two additional exhibits to be 
enlarged for trial; telephone calls with DCarter in Denver to discuss demonstratives; locate and 
forward documents needed by SCBowman; update key trial contact information sheet; follow-up 
with MVYork on various trial issues; begin work on cleaning up descriptions to exhibits in Excel; 
02/25/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,077.00 6.2 Work on trial brief; prepare for direct and cross examinations; 
- ----~ --·- ·----------------------------------- ----------·--·-·- .. 
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Review exhibit list and confirm all exhibits for witnesses are included in exhibit list; work on cross 
02/25/2012 York, Mary V. $ 2,470.00 7.6 
examination; draft portion of trial brief relating to deficiencies in Grathol's valuation opinions; 
research and obtain information for trial brief; research case law and draft section of brief relating to 
insufficient and untimely expert disclosures; 
02/26/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,876.00 5.6 Work on trial brief and exhibit list; 
02/26/2012 Omsberg, Stephanie M. $ 64.00 0.4 Assist with additional edits to trial exhibit list; 
Pull exhibits needed by SCBowman for trial brief and send to him; work on finalizing exhibits and 
02/26/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 1,456.00 9.1 exhibit list; additional communications to/from SCBowman regarding trial brief exhibits and changes 
to demonstratives of DCarter; 
02/27/2012 Gunn, Matthew G $ 175.50 0.9 
Research relevant case law regarding use of deposition testimony when witness is unavailable to 
testify due to work-related hardship; 
Review status of exhibits and exhibit list; work on cross examination; create trial exhibits for 
02/27/2012 York, Mary V. $ 3,217.50 9.9 
valuations of Johnson and Sherwood; telephone conference with client; several exchanges of email 
correspondence with client; review and edit trial brief, exhibit list and witness list; telephone 
conference with client; conduct initial review of pretrial filings from Grathol; 
02/27/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,445.50 7.3 Work on trial brief, witness list, and exhibit list for filing today; 
Continue with trial preparation: telephone conference call regarding equipment needs; various 
communications to/from DCarter with additions and revisions to interactive map slides; make 
revisions to ITD's witness list; complete pulling and finalizing photos of subject property to be used 
as exhibits to trial brief; add further exhibits to exhibit list, make changes to various descriptions of 
exhibits, pull up various excerpts from expert reports and convert to pdf documents for adding as 
02/27/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 1,280.00 8.0 exhibits, and update draft list various times with changes and additions; arrange for additional 
exhibits to be enlarged and various communications to/from Mr. ShaneSawyer regarding the same; 
prepare pleading for exhibit list and arrange for finalized version of exhibit list to be incorporated 
into list; various discussions with MVYork regarding minor changes to both witness and exhibit lists; 
telephone conference with SCBowman to discuss pleadings filed and witness preparation; update 
trial notebook materials; review fillings of Defendants; 
02/27/2012 Carter, David E. $ 111.00 0.6 
Make changes to trial exhibits including changes to comps, changes to comp title name, exported 
and make screen grabs of camps and make PDF of comps; 
02/28/20121 Gunn, Matthew G $ 1,053.00 5.4 
Research relevant case law and secondary sources regarding admissibility of affidavits of unavailable 
witnesses at trial; draft research memorandum regarding same; 
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Review and analyze Grathol's trial brief and analyze strategies for case; correspondence with Judge 
Hosack's clerk; correspondence and telephone conference with expert; various correspondence with 
client and trial team; review and edit direct examination outline; review and edit affidavit; edit and 
02/28/2012 York, Mary V. $ 3,120.00 9.6 update cross examination outline in light of Grathol's pretrial filings; work on rebuttal examination 
outline; review and analyze information provided expert; work on fact section for motion to exclude; 
telephone conference with Doug Marfice; review research memo regarding admissibility of affidavit 
from unavailable witness and conference with MGGunn regarding same; 
02/28/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,110.50 6.3 
Work on motion and brief to exclude untimely experts disclosed by Grathol; work on direct and cross 
examinations for trial; 
02/28/2012 Omsberg, Stephanie M. $ 1,104.00 6.9 Load trial exhibits into Trial Director and begin marking exhibits; 
Meet briefly with MVYork to discuss status of various assignments; meet with project assistant to 
discuss printing out of exhibits and setting up trial notebooks; locate document needed by MVYork; 
send trial brief, exhibit list and witness list to all our experts, along with trial pleadings filed by 
opposing counsel; meet with SOmsberg to discuss making of exhibit stickers on Trial Director; 
telephone call with DCarter regarding interactive map and sending of lap top to Boise; work on 
arranging to get equipment needed for trial; convert deposition transcripts into full pdf files to use 
02/28/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 1,472.00 9.2 with Trial Director; telephone call to Mr. Shane Sawyer regarding enlarged trial exhibits; review 
enlarged trial exhibits with MVYork; telephone call to court clerk in Coeur d'Alene regarding trial 
notebooks, internet access, etc; telephone call to bailiff regarding getting early access to courtroom; 
telephone call with jury commissioner regarding courtroom for trial and other arrangements, etc.; 
additional telephone calls with DCarter for additional trial needs; follow up with status of exhibit 
stickers with SOmsberg; contact experts with trial information and hotel arrangements, etc.; pdate 
various trial materials and continue with additional trial preparation tasks; 
02/28/2012 Carter, David E. $ 259.00 1.4 
Modified comps after talking to BKFeraci and work with SOmsberg to solve exhibit problems for trial 
director; 
Review correspondence from Judge Hosack's clerk and follow up on issues raised; meeting with 
02/29/2012 York, Mary V. $ 1,625.00 5.0 
BFeraci regarding trial logistics and exhibits; review and edit revised versions of exhibits; work on 
general trial prep, including cross examination outlines, direct examination outlines, motion to 
exclude, and preparing experts for trial; 
02/29/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,273.00 3.8 Work on motion and brief to exclude expert witnesses not timely disclosed; 
02/29/2012 Gunn, Matthew G $ 897.00 4.6 
Research relevant case law and secondary sources regarding admissibility of affidavits of unavailable 
witnesses at trial; revise research memorandum regarding same; 
------------···· 
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02/29/2012 Omsberg, Stephanie M. $ 1,744.00 10.9 
Finalize electronic marked trial exhibits; download relevant N drive folder to external drive; 
Trial Director training with BFeraci; 
02/29/2012 Georger, Katherine L. $ 720.00 3.6 
Research case law pertaining to "developer's approach" in anticipation of drafting pocket brief 
regarding inadmissibility of land owner's appraisal valuation; 
02/29/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 1,792.00 11.2 Trial preparation and intensive work on exhibits for submittal to court; 
02/29/2012 Carter, David E. $ 148.00 0.8 Make corrections to trial exhibits; 
03/01/2012 York, Mary V. $ 3,412.50 10.5 
Coordinate and assemble materials, exhibits, and supplies for trial; travel to Coeur d'Alene, 
discussing trial strategies and depositions of Grathol's witnesses en route; 
03/01/2012 Omsberg, Stephanie M. $ 775.50 4.7 Final trial exhibit prep; draft letter to Mr. Gabbert enclosing CD of marked trial exhibits; 
Research evidentiary issues related to public records requests and curing foundational and hearsay 
03/01/2012 Georger, Katherine L. $ 1,320.00 6.6 issues; research issues pertaining to developer's approach of valuing property and commence 
drafting pocket brief of the same; 
03/01/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 1,696.00 10.6 
Complete packing up for trial, meet with TKillian to get computer items, projector, printer, etc. and 
travel with MVYork to Couer d'Alene for trial; 
03/02/2012 York, Mary V. $ 4,875.00 15.0 
Work on outlines for direct and cross examinations; witness prep session with client; visit court room 
for trial; witness prep session with expert; work on cross examination and rebuttal outlines; 
Revise memorandum on developer's approach to valuation and submit to MVYork for review; 
03/02/2012 Georger, Katherine L. $ 780.00 3.9 research evidentiary issues pertaining to self authentication and exceptions to hearsay and draft 
research findings into electronic memorandum to MVYork for comment and review; 
03/02/2012 Carter, David E. $ 37.00 0.2 Review and revise interactive map with NBouck; 
03/02/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,747.00 8.2 
Meetings with experts to go over anticipated testimony and exhibits to be used with their testimony; 
work on outlines for direct and cross examinations; 
Revise direct examination outline; trial prep with expert; meet with client; work with BFeraci and 
03/03/2012 York, Mary V. $ 3,672.50 11.3 tech support on exhibits; work on cross examination for Skip Sherwood, reviewing deposition and 
outlining examination; 
03/03/2012 Bouck, Nick A. $ 1,856.00 12.8 Travel to Coeur d'Alene for trial and trial support; 
Compile materials for continued meeting with expert; telephone call to TKillian regarding assistance 
on various items; meet with NBouck to go over issues with Trial Director; update all sets of trial 
03/03/2012 Feraci, Barbara I<. $ 704.00 4.4 exhibit notebooks with replacement exhibits for various exhibits along with addition of new exhibit; 
review all Trial Director exhibits; update ITD's trial exhibit list with new exhibit and documents 
stipulated by opposing counsel; assist with miscellaneous needs of trial team; 
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03/03/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,613.00 7.8 
Meeting with expert regarding trial; review expert disclosures, discovery responses, and deposition 
transcripts in preparation for cross examinations; work on outlines for direct and cross examinations; 
03/04/2012 York, Mary V. $ 4,550.00 14.0 
Work on revisions to Stan Moe direct; work on cross examination outline for Skip Sherwood; pre-trial 
strategy meeting with trial team; draft outline for opening statement and prepare for presentation; 
03/04/2012 Georger, Katherine L. $ 420.00 2.1 
Draft motion and supporting memorandum to strike expert witness testimony of Grathol's vice 
president; submit draft of motion and supporting memorandum for review and comment; 
03/04/2012 Bouck, Nick A. $ 1,450.00 10.0 Work on trial preparation and provide ITD Trial Support; 
Meet with NBouck to add new exhibits to Trial Director and to go over Trial Director operation, etc.; 
03/04/2012 Feraci, Barbara I<. $ 1,008.00 6.3 set up file of new exhibits and amended trial exhibit list for giving to Mr. Douglas Marfice; organize 
case materials and pack up supplies and materials for court room for first day of trial; 
03/04/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,479.00 7.4 
Work with tech support to prepare exhibits for demonstration at trial; strategy meeting with trial 
team; work on preparations for direct and cross examinations; 
03/05/2012 York, Mary V. $ 4,387.50 13.5 
Prepare for opening statement and argument for motions in Ii mine; first day of trial, including pre 
trial meeting; meeting with litigation team, expert and client; meeting with expert; 
Contact DEQ officials in Coeur d'Alene to discuss acquisition of certification for public records 
03/05/2012 Georger, Katherine L. $ 500.00 2.5 
request; contact DEQ officials in Boise to discuss the same; draft up proposed certification to include 
all applicable information; contact DEQ officials in Coeur d'Alene and transmit proposed certification 
and discuss finalization of certification; 
Arrive at courthouse early to assist with setting up for 8-day trial; de-briefing meeting following trial 
03/05/2012 Feraci, Barbara I<. $ 944.00 5.9 day; locate additional documents needed by MVYork and SCBowman, mark additional exhibits; 
update exhibit list, review and respond to various case email, and organize materials for next day; 
03/05/2012 Bouck, Nick A. $ 1,450.00 10.0 Trial support in Coeur d'Alene; 
03/05/2012 Carter, David E. $ 37.00 0.2 Gather equipment to ship to NBouck and ship equipment; 
03/05/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 3,718.50 11.1 Prepare for and attend first day of trial; prepare for second day of trial; 
03/06/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 73.50 0.3 Research and correspondence regarding zones of value; 
Prepare for final direct examination and re-direct of expert and cross examination of Skip Sherwood; 
03/06/2012 York, Mary V. $ 4,550.00 14.0 second day of trial, including pre-trial meetings; work with expert on Direct examination; 
continuework on prep for cross examinations; 
03/06/2012 Georger, Katherine L. $ 140.00 0.7 
Teleconference with DEQ representative regarding public records request certification; review and 
revise email on business damages; 
03/06/2012 Bouck, Nick A. $ 1,261.50 8.7 Trial support Coeur d'Alene; 
-----------------------·-·· ··-----·----------- ·---- -
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Early morning trial preparation, including printing out of attorney outlines, etc. and set up at court; 
03/06/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 432.00 2.7 various e-mail communications to/from MVYork and SCBowman regarding other trial needs; provide 
SCBowman with information needed for outline for Mr. Reeslund; 
03/06/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 4,154.00 12.4 Prepare for and attend second day of trial; prepare for third day of trial; 
03/07/2012 York, Mary V. $ 4,712.50 14.5 
Prepare for cross examination; third day of trial, including pretrial meetings; revise and update cross 
examination; work with expert; 
03/07/2012 Bouck, Nick A. $ 1,740.00 12.0 Trial support Coeur d'Alene; 
Pre-trial day preparation, including printing out of attorney outlines, organizing new exhibits and 
03/07/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 928.00 5.8 
materials for court day, and setting up at court; work on compiling additional exhibits needed for 
next day, updating exhibit list, and printing out new documents at Staples; review and follow up with 
various case related e-mail communications; 
03/07/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 4,422.00 13.2 Prepare for and attend third day of trial; prepare for next day of trial; 
03/08/2012 York, Mary V. $ 4,875.00 15.0 
Prepare for cross examination of Alan Johnson; fourth day of trial, including pretrial meetings; 
meeting with Larry Pynes and work on direct examination of Mr. Pynes; 
03/08/2012 Bouck, Nick A. $ 2,059.00 14.2 Trial support Coeur d'Alene; 
03/08/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 352.00 2.2 Pre-trial day preparation; 
03/08/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 4,623.00 13.8 Prepare for and attend fourth day of trial, and prepare for fifth day of trial; 
03/09/2012 York, Mary V. $ 3,087.50 9.5 
Prepare for direct examination; fifth day of trial, including pretrial meetings; post trial meeting and 
de-briefing with client and experts and trial team; 
03/09/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 288.00 1.8 Pre-trial preparation and set-up for the day; 
03/09/2012 Bouck, Nick A. $ 1,377.50 9.5 Trial support Coeur d'Alene (pack and ship equipment, book return travel); 
03/09/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 3,182.50 9.5 Prepare for and attend fifth day of trial; 
03/10/2012 York, Mary V. $ 2,437.50 7.5 Return trip to Boise from CDA trial; 
03/10/2012 Bouck, Nick A. $ 1,377.50 9.5 Trial support in Coeur d'Alene and return travel; 
03/10/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 1,280.00 8.0 Return trip from Couer d'Alene to Boise; 
Unpack various trial materials; prepare final exhibit list based on conference with Court clerk and Mr. 
03/12/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 368.00 2.3 Chris Gabbert to go over all documents admitted; arrange for documents to be picked up from ITD; 
follow-up on miscellaneous matters; 
03/13/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 441.00 1.8 
Research regarding construction damages testimony and reports; research regarding post trial 
briefing issues; outline regarding same; 
Telephone conference with client; telephone conference with SCBowman to discuss post-trial brief 
03/13/2012 York, Mary V. $ 487.50 1.5 and research needing to be done; make research assignments and begin work on outline for 
severance damage issues for post-trial brief; 
~~----- -·----·---------- --- ·------------ ---
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Unpack other trial materials and re-organize case materials; e-mail and telephone call to court 
03/13/2012 Feraci, Barbara I<. $ 256.00 1.6 reporter at M&M who covered trial to discuss getting post trial discussion with Judge Hosack, etc.; 
follow up on several matters for MVYork; 
03/14/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 955.50 3.9 
Continue legal research regarding changes in valuation testimony and theories; continue to prepare 
outline regarding same; continue research regarding appraisal issues; 
03/14/2012 York, Mary V. $ 97.50 0.3 Telephone conference with client; 
03/14/2012 Feraci, Barbara I<. $ 128.00 0.8 
Follow up on miscellaneous post trial assignments, including arranging to download complete copy 
of IDJl2d jury instructions to a CD for SCBowman; 
Prepare transmittal memo to SCBowman with CD of Idaho Jury Instructions; review draft transcript 
03/15/2012 Feraci, Barbara I<. $ 144.00 0.9 
received from court reporter of concluding remarks of Judge Hosack; convert transcript to pdf 
document and circulate to team; forward copy of Defendant's Just Compensation exhibit to Mr. Stan 
Moe; 
03/15/2012 York, Mary V. $ 422.50 1.3 
Telephone conference with expert regarding information needed for post-trial briefing; work on 
severance damage issue on post trial brief and review expert information; 
03/15/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,764.00 7.2 
Continue legal research regarding post trial briefing; continue research regarding expert disclosures 
and facts; continue to prepare draft factual and expert background brief; 
03/15/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,144.00 6.4 
Review transcript regarding post trial briefing; research case law for post trial brief; work on outline 
for post trial brief; work on post trial brief; 
03/16/2012 York, Mary V. $ 357.50 1.1 
Review and analysis of Court's closing instructions; work on chart to support post trial argument on 
severance damages; 
03/16/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,249.50 5.1 
Continue post trial briefing research; continue to draft and revise draft expert and valuation section; 
correspondence regarding same; 
Work on severance damage piece of post trial brief, including review and analysis of information 
03/19/2012 York, Mary V. $ 357.50 1.1 provided by expert; review and edit draft fact section for construction delay section of post trial 
brief; 
03/19/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 759.50 3.1 
Continue legal research regarding post trial issues; edit and revise draft factual section regarding 
construction delays 
Review and analysis of settlement offer from Grathol; correspondence with client; conferences with 
03/20/2012 York, Mary V. $ 942.50 2.9 client; work on severance damage portion of post-trial brief, including correspondence with experts 
regarding arguments to be made by Grathol; 
03/20/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 833.00 3.4 
Continue research regarding expert opinions; continue to draft valuation section and expert analysis; 
correspondence regarding post trial brief and changes; 
03/20/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,909.50 5.7 
Review research and case analyses from TSTollefson; review trial exhibits to be referred to in post 
trial brief and pull excerpts for brief; work on post trial brief; 
-------------·--··--·--------
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Edit and revise demonstratives for severance damage portion of post-trial brief; telephone 
conferences and email correspondence with client; correspondence with opposing counsel regarding 
03/21/2012 York, Mary V. $ 1,722.50 5.3 settlement offer; correspondence with expert regarding post-trial brief; telephone conference with 
client; research information and review appraisal report used as impeachment during trial; draft 
analysis regarding construction delay damages; 
03/21/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,053.50 4.3 
Continue research regarding larger parcel issue and opposing expert reports and testimony; continue 
legal research regarding divisible property for valuation; correspondence regarding research; 
03/21/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,742.00 5.2 Research case law and work on post trial brief; 
03/21/2012 Feraci, Barbara I<. $ 144.00 0.9 
Telephone phone call to court reporter in Couer d'Alene to check on status of transcripts from trial; 
pull various items and information needed by SCBowman for post trial brief; 
03/22/2012 Gunn, Matthew G $ 234.00 1.2 
Research relevant case law and secondary sources regarding the termination of the litigation 
exception to public records request; draft research email regarding same; 
03/22/2012 York, Mary V. $ 1,755.00 5.4 
Correspondence with client; draft portions of post-trial brief regarding severance damages; research 
case law regarding interpretation of public records laws; 
03/22/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 318.50 1.3 Continue research regarding post trial brief; 
03/22/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,077.00 6.2 Research case law for post-trial brief; work on post trial brief; 
Research case law regarding use of developed land to value undeveloped property; draft portion of 
post-trial brief regarding inadmissibility of development approach; conference with client; prepare 
03/23/2012 York, Mary V. $ 3,055.00 9.4 for presentation to client; meetings with client; review, edit and finalize post-trial brief; conference 
with SCBowman regarding meeting, post-trial brief and preparations for response brief; draft letter 
to opposing counsel responding to settlement offer; 
Edit and review draft brief; analyze and review opposing counsel post trial brief; legal research 
03/23/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,494.50 6.1 regarding cases cited by opposing counsel; prepare draft outline regarding opposing counsel's post 
trial brief; 
Confer with MVYork re: various case issues and status; telephone calls with court clerk regarding 
03/23/2012 Feraci, Barbara I<. $ 256.00 1.6 possession of enlarged trial exhibit and handling of same; assist with proof reading of post trial brief; 
follow-up with MVYork on status of enlarged exhibit and briefing issues, etc.; 
03/23/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,445.50 7.3 Work on post-trial brief; 
03/23/2012 Georger, Katherine L. $ 100.00 0.5 Cite and source check post-trial briefing; 
Analyze and prepare outline of Grathol post-trial brief; edit and revise draft outline; correspondence 
03/24/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,519.00 6.2 regarding post trial briefing; continue legal research regarding cases relied upon by Grathol; continue 
to analyze and prepare response to cited cases; 
~~~- -·--·-·----- --------·-----····- --
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Date Name Billed Amt Hours Narrative 
Review Grathol post trial brief and outline arguments and case law; review case law cited by Grathol; 
03/25/2012 Bowman,_Steve C. $ 1,876.00 5.6 begin review of trial transcripts to refute misstatements of testimony and omissions by Grathol in 
post-trial brief; 
Legal research regarding cases cited by Grathol; work on analysis and response to each case; 
03/26/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,715.00 7.0 telephone conference with SCBowman regarding response brief and cases; edit and revise draft 
analysis and response; 
03/26/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,909.50 5.7 Review trial transcripts and work on brief responding to post trial brief filed by Grathol; 
Legal research regarding cases cited; analyze and prepare response to cited cases law; research 
03/27/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 2,278.50 9.3 
regarding exhibits and maps and preparation for response brief regarding same; continue research 
within the recordto refute claims made in post trial brief; prepare memorandum regarding citations 
to the record regarding same; 
Review trial transcripts for brief in response to Grathol post trial brief; review case law cited by 
03/27/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,780.50 8.3 Grathol in post trial brief and make notes for ITD response brief; work on ITD brief in response to 
Gratholposttrial briet 
Research regarding transcript and excerpts and correspondences regarding same; continue research 
03/28/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 980.00 4.0 regarding severance damages and correspondence regarding same; continue to prepare draft 
demonstrative exhibits for brief; 
03/28/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,546.00 7.6 Review trial transcripts, review case law, and work on brief in response to Grathol post trial brief; 
03/29/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 1,519.00 6.2 
Research regarding exhibits, testimony and citations; correspondence regarding same; revise, 
comment and edit draft response brief; 
03/29/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,144.00 6.4 
Work on brief in response to post-trial brief by Grathol; start work on proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law; 
03/30/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 122.50 0.5 Research regarding Idaho and larger parcel issues; correspondence regarding deadlines; 
03/30/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 1,474.00 4.4 
Work on response to Grathol post trial brief; work on proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law; 
04/02/2012 York, Mary V. $ 422.50 1.3 Review recent correspondence relating to post-trial briefing; conference with client; 
04/02/2012 Feraci, Barbara I<. $ 80.00 0.5 Review case communications and pleadings of past week and respond to various e-mails; 
04/02/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 514.50 2.1 Conduct research regarding post trial brief issues; 
04/03/2012 York, Mary V. $ 195.00 0.6 Review and edit draft response to Grathol's post-trial brief; 
04/04/2012 York, Mary V. $ 520.00 1.6 
Work on proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law; conference with SCBowman regarding 
additional information needed for post trial brief; 
04/04/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,646.50 7.9 
Work on brief in response to Grathol post-trial brief; work on proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law; 
04/05/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 147.00 0.6 Research regarding transcript and testimony; correspondence regarding same; 
------------------------------------~---
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Date Name Billed Amt Hours Narrative 
04/05/2012 York, Mary V. $ 455.00 1.4 Conduct final review and edit of post-trial response brief; correspondence regarding same; 
04/05/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 288.00 1.8 
Assist SCBowman with pulling of documents, exhibits and providing him with information needed for 
completing drafting of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; 
04/05/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 3,115.50 9.3 
Research case law for brief to be filed in response to Grathol post-trial brief; work on brief 
responding to Grathol post-trial brief; work on proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law; 
04/06/2012 York, Mary V. $ 455.00 1.4 
Review, edit and finalize findings of fact and conclusions of law; coordinate filing of response post-
trial brief and findings and conclusions; 
04/06/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 2,747.00 8.2 
Work on proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and prepare for filing; complete work on 
brief to be filed in response to Grathol post-trial brief; 
04/07/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 98.00 0.4 Analyze and review response brief and findings of fact; 
04/09/2012 York, Mary V. $ 227.50 0.7 
Review and analysis of Grathol's post-trial response brief and proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law; 
04/09/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 171.50 0.7 
Continue to analyze and review reply brief and proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law; 
legal research regarding same; 
04/11/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 32.00 0.2 Follow up with TSTollefson regarding HJ Grathol briefing and other related matters; 
04/16/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 171.50 0.7 Analyze and review supplemental pleading in appeal; research regarding same; 
04/17/2012 Feraci, Barbara K. $ 304.00 1.9 
Continue pulling cases and code sections for upcoming appeal; compilation of materials into binder 
with project assistant; 
04/18/2012 York, Mary V. $ 292.50 0.9 
Review draft response to Grathol's public records request and draft proposed revisions to same; 
correspondence client; 
05/25/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 514.50 2.1 Analyze and review memorandum decision on trial; 
05/25/2012 York, Mary V. $ 487.50 1.5 
Receive Memorandum Decision and Order from Grathol trial and review and analysis of same; 
forward decision to clients and email correspondence and telephone conferences with clients; 
Research civil rules of procedure to confirm timeline for appeal; draft proposed judgment and order 
05/28/2012 York, Mary V. $ 975.00 3.0 of condemnation; research rate of interest to be awarded in condemnation cases and review Idaho 
case law regarding same; 
05/28/2012 Bowman, Steve C. $ 134.00 0.4 Review draft order of condemnation and judgment, and check calculations of interest due; 
05/29/2012 York, Mary V. $ 97.50 0.3 Work on proposed judgment for Grathol case; 
05/29/2012. Bowman, Steve C. $ 971.50 2.9 
Meeting to discuss potential application by ITD for attorney fees and costs; work on outline of brief 
in support of motion for attorney fees and costs; legal research for motion for attorney fees; 
05/29/2012 Tollefson, Ted S. $ 514.50 2.1 
Research regarding judgement and interest calculation; review and edit draft judgment; 
correspondence regarding same; 
-------·---- ----•- •-••••--• --•-••• ""•••- ••-•H --•••••••••• •••••-• • 
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Date Name Billed Amt Hours Narrative 
05/30/2012 York, Mary V. $ 130.00 0.4 Correspondence with client; edit and revise draft judgment; 
TOTAL $ 724,136.00 2720.0 
~~---·~---------·-- ----- . 
1442 of 1617
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 38511 







) Coeur d'Alene, May 2012 Term 
) 
) 2012 Opinion No. 85 
) 
HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership, 









STERLING SA VIN GS BANK, a 








Appeal from the district court of the First Judicial District of the State ofldaho, 
Kootenai County. Hon. Lansing Haynes, District Judge. 
The decision of the district court is affirmed. Neither party is awarded 
attorney's fees. Costs on appeal are awarded to Respondent. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP, Coeur d'Alene, for Appellant. Christopher D. 
Gabbert argued. 
Holland & Hart, Boise, for Respondent. Mary V. York argued. 
W. JONES, Justice 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
HJ Grathol ("Grathol") is a California general partnership that owns real estate in 
Kootenai County, Idaho. Grathol purchased a parcel for commercial real estate development, 
which is located at or near the northeast comer of US Highway 95 and State Highway 54 in 
Kootenai County (hereinafter referred to as "Grathol's parcel" or "the parcel"). The Idaho 
Transportation Board ("the Board") later sought to condemn sixteen acres of the parcel 
(hereinafter the portion of Grathol's parcel that is subject to condemnation shall be referred to as 
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"'the subject property") in order to realign US Highway 95 and to construct an interchange with 
State Highway 54. Grathol contends that the Board failed to negotiate for the subject property in 
good faith because the Board's offer did not account for the extension of Sylvan Road to Roberts 
Road ("the Sylvan/Roberts Extension"), which Grathol contends would front the subject property 
and significantly increase its value. Grathol further asserts that the Board failed to file its 
Complaint and Order of Condemnation in accordance with I.C. § 7-707 before moving for early 
possession of the subject property pursuant to the "quick-take" provisions ofl.C. § 7-721. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Grathol engages in the business of commercial real estate development in Idaho. It has 
taken significant steps to commercially develop the parcel, which it originally purchased as a 
commercial real estate investment venture. To further the development of its parcel, Grathol 
filed site plans, submitted a traffic impact study, and successfully secured commercial rezoning 
from Kootenai County. Moreover, Grathol has marketed the parcel and engaged in negotiations 
with potential tenants. 
As it currently exists, US Highway 95 is primarily a two-lane highway. In 2002, the 
Board initiated a comprehensive study of US Highway 95 between the communities of Garwood 
and Sagle to determine the feasibility of improving the highway to a four-lane divided highway 
with Type V Access Control. The study concluded that the highway should be improved in 
order to increase safety and accommodate present and future traffic demands. The study was 
eventually incorporated into the Garwood to Sagle Project, which primarily sought to realign US 
Highway 95 and to construct an interchange with State Highway 54. The Board approved the 
Garwood to Sagle Project through its annual approval of the federally funded State 
Transportation Improvement Plan ("the STIP"), which incorporated the Garwood to Sagle 
Project. Due to the size of the Garwood to Sagle Project, the Board divided it into seven 
segments. Grathol' s parcel is located within the Athol Segment. 
The Board has the power of eminent domain pursuant to LC. § 40-311(1). The Board 
contends that the subject property is needed for the Garwood to Sagle Project, Athol Segment, 
and that it authorized the condemnation of the subject property through its annual approval of the 
STIP. According to MAI appraiser Stanley Moe, the fair market value of the subject property is 
$571,000. In an effort to avoid a condemnation action, the Board offered Grathol an additional 
ten percent above the appraised fair market value for a total offer of $628,100. Grathol 
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countered the Board's offer with a demand for $3 million to $3.5 million on JW1e 28, 2010, 
contending that the appraisal does not account for the subject property's frontage, which would 
result from the Sylvan/Roberts Extension. 
The Board contends that it is not seeking to condemn any portion of the parcel in order to 
construct the Sylvan/Roberts Extension. It points out that neither the Complaint nor the Order of 
Condemnation references the condemnation of any portion of the parcel for construction of the 
Sylvan/Roberts Extension. In this regard, Jason Minzghor, Project Development Engineer with 
the Board, contends that Grathol is under the mistaken belief that the Board intends to condemn 
a portion of its parcel for the Sylvan/Roberts Extension because of a meeting held on August 1, 
2010. During that meeting, two property owners, Jameson Mortgage and Frederick Krasnick, 
approached the Board with a proposal to extend Sylvan Road to Roberts Road through their 
respective properties. Minzghor asserts that the proposal was contingent upon Mortgage, 
Krasnick and Grathol dedicating a portion of their properties for the Sylvan/Roberts Extension in 
exchange for the resulting frontages that would run through their properties. Minzghor claims 
that after Grathol rejected the proposal, there have been no further plans in this regard. 
On November 19, 2010, the Board filed its Complaint with an attached Order of 
Condemnation, which was dated November 17, 2010, and was signed by the Director of the 
Idaho Transportation Department ("the Director") on behalf of the Board. On December 21, 
2010, the Board filed its Motion for an Order Granting Possession of Real Property pursuant to 
the "quick-take" provisions of LC. § 7-721. Grathol filed its Response to the Board's Motion for 
an Order Granting Possession of Real Property on January I 0, 2011, contending, among other 
things, that the Complaint and the Order of Condemnation failed to meet the statutory 
requirements of J.C. § 7-707 and that the Board failed to negotiate in good faith. The district 
court filed its Order Granting Possession of Real Property on January 27, 2011, holding that the 
requirements of LC. § 7-721 were satisfied and that the amount of just compensation was 
$571,000. The district court then filed a Rule 54(b) Certificate on January 27, 2011, holding that 
there was no just reason for delay of the entry of final judgment because the Board established 
the "quick-take" provisions of 1.C. § 7-721. On February l, 2011, Grathol timely filed its Notice 
of Appeal. Thereafter, the district court entered Final Judgment on March 4, 2011. 
Ill. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
3 
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1. Whether the Complaint and Order of Condemnation were filed in accordance with LC. § 
7-707? 
2. Whether the Board failed to negotiate in good faith pursuant to I.C. § 7-721 (2)(d)? 
3. Whether Grathol is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to I. C. § 12-117? 
4. Whether the Board is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to LC. § 12-121? 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The "quick-take" provisions ofl.C. § 7-721(2) allow state entities that possess the power 
of eminent domain to "obtain property ... for a public purpose without the delay of a lengthy 
trial." Payette Lakes Water and Sewer Dist. v. Hays, 103 Idaho 717, 718, 653 P.2d 438, 439 
(1982). After commencing an action for condemnation, the state entity may deposit with the 
court the amount initially determined as ~~just compensation" for the property. Id. After a 
hearing is held, the court can then enter an order enabling the state entity to take possession of 
and use the property pending a full trial. Id. Subsection (2) of I.C. § 7-721 states that the court 
"shall first determine whether or not plaintiff (a) has the right of eminent domain, 
(b) whether or not the use to which the property is to be applied is a use 
authorized by law, (c) whether or not the taking is necessary to such use, and (d} 
whether or not plaintiff has sought, in good faith, to purchase the lands sought to 
be taken .... " 
A. The Complaint and the Order of Condemnation Were Filed in Accordance with J.C. 
§ 7-707 
Grathol contends that the Order of Condemnation was not filed in accordance with LC. § 
7-707( 6) because the Director signed the Order of Condemnation and the Board never approved 
the condemnation of the subject property through a fonnal board meeting, which Grathol asserts 
is contrary to a strict construction of LC. §§ 40-308, 40-311(1), and 40-505, among others. 
Grathol further asserts that because the Order of Condemnation, which Grathol claims contains 
an exprl.!s& declaration that the Board is extending Sylvan Road to Roberts Road through 
Grathol's parcel, conflicts with the Complaint, which Grathol asserts does not address the 
Sylvan/Roberts Extension, both are invalid pursuant to I.C. § 7-707(6) because they do not 
provide a clear description of the property rigltts acquired. 
1. The Director May Sign the Order of Condemnation on Behalf of the Board 
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free 
review." Doe v. Boy Scouts of Am., 148 Idaho 427, 430, 224 P.3d 494, 497 (2009). Judicial 
interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the statute's literal words. State v. 
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Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). "This Court interprets statutes 
according to their plain, express meaning and resorts to judicial construction only if the statute is 
ambiguous, incomplete, absurd, or arguably in conflict with other laws." Arel v. T & L Enter., 
Inc., 146 Idaho 29, 32, 189 P.3d 1149, 1152 (2008). 
Idaho Code section 7-707(6) states: 
An order of condemnation, or resolution, or other official and binding document 
entered by the plaintiff which sets forth and clearly identifies all property rights to 
be acquired including rights to and from the public way, and pennanent and 
temporary easements known or reasonably identifiable to the condemning 
authority. 
According to the plain language of the statute, an order of condemnation must be "entered" by 
the Board. Pursuant to LC. § 40-505, the Director possesses "necessary incidental powers" of 
administration on behalf of the Board. Black's Law dictionary defines an "incidental power" as 
"[a] power that, although not expressly granted, must exist because it is necessary to the 
accomplishment of an express purpose." Black's Law Dictionary 1288 (9th ed. 2009). 
Therefore, according to LC. § 40-505, the Director possesses broad powers to carry out the 
express actions of the Board. In this regard, the plain language of LC. § 40-505 states that the 
Director acts as the administrative arm of the Board. The power of eminent domain is one of the 
powers exclusively vested by law in the Board. See I.C. § 40-311 (1 ). As the record establishes, 
the Director did not unilaterally condemn the subject property without the authority of the Board. 
Instead, the Board approved of the condemnation of the subject property through its annual 
approval of the STIP. See I .C. § 40-310. Although the Order of Condemnation was signed by 
the Director, it was filed in the name of the Board, not the Director, and expressly invoked the 
Board's power of condemnation pursuant to LC. § 40-311(1). It is the Board, not the Director, 
who is exercising the power of eminent domain in the Order of Condemnation. The Director is 
merely acting in an administrative capacity on behalf of the Board pursuant to LC. § 40-314(3) 
and Board Policy B--03-01 in order to carry out the Board's express power of condemnation. 
Grathol's assertion that the Board must hold a board meeting every time it condemns 
private property for a public purpose is unsupported by the plain language of the statutes that 
Grathol cites in its opening brief and impractical due to the sheer size of public roads projects 
and the relative infrequency of board meetings. It is for these reasons that the Director typically 
signs orders of condemnation on behalf of the Board. Furthermore, the cases that Grathol cites 
in its opening brief are irrelevant and unconvincing because the Board never ceded its power to 
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condemn private property for public purposes to the Director. Grathol's assertion that the Board 
violated Idaho's Open Meeting Act because it did not hold a formal board meeting to condemn 
the subject property is similarly unconvincing. 
2. The Complaint and Order of Condemnation Do Not Express Any Intention to 
r'n»Ao,-.u,t J.,,,, p,..,.,;,...,, ,..,r 1--:,,.,,,1,,,..1•,. T ,..,,..,.; /',-,,. tho p., .. ",,,.e n.f' ,z.,,,, Qylvn.,,/1),,J..e.,.1 .. 
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Extension 
Although the Order of Condemnation refers to the Sylvan/Roberts Extension, that section 
deals with rights of access to and from the remaining non-condemned portions of Grathol's 
parcel to various roads and highways. Furthermore, the Order of Condemnation specifically 
identifies the subject property as being such "property [as] has been designated and shown as the 
above parcel number on the plans of said project now on file in the office of the Idaho 
Transportation Department." The plans refer to the US-95, Garwood to Sagle, Athol Stage, and 
map out the 16.314 acres of the subject property, but they make no reference to the 
Sylvan/Roberts Extension. The Complaint makes reference to those plans as well when it 
identifies the subject property, but it also makes no reference to the Sylvan/Roberts Extension. 
Instead, it states that the Board seeks to condemn the subject property in order to ''widen[] and 
improv[e] ... U.S. Highway 95 south of State Highway 52 to north of the community of Sagle .. 
. . " The Complaint further elaborates that "[t]he particular segment of the Project for which 
Defendants' property is required is U.S. 95 Garwood to Sagle - Athol Stage, Kootenai County, 
Idaho, ITD Project No. A009(791 ), Key No. 9791.'' 
Thus, there is no basis for Grathol' s assertion that the Order of Condemnation conflicts 
with the Complaint. Grathol would like this Court to consider the possible extension of Sylvan 
Road to Roberts Road through Grathol's property in the future in determining just compensation 
and whether the Complaint conflicts with the Order of Condemnation. If Sylvan Road is 
extended to Roberts Road through Grathol's property in the future, then, at that time, the Board 
will be required to determine the just compensation due for that portion of Grathol's property 
that is necessary for the project. At this time, this Court refuses to engage in such speculative 
contemplation. 




Grathol contends that the Board did not negotiate in good faith to purchase the subject 
property pursuant to LC. § 7-721 (2)( d) because the appraisal did not include any consideration 
for the extension of Sylvan Road to Roberts Road across Grathol's parcel. 
Idaho Code section 7-721 states that "[i]n any proceeding under the provisions of this 
chapter for the acquisition of real property, the plaintiff may take possession of and use such 
property at any time after just compensation has been judicially determined and payment thereof 
made into court." Judicia] determination of just compensation is satisfied when the court 
determines, among other requirements, that the 
plaintiff has sought, in good faith, to purchase the lands sought to be taken and the 
court shall enter an order thereon which shall be a final order as to these issues 
and an appeal may be taken therefrom; provided, however, no appeal therefrom 
shall stay further proceedings. 
I.C. § 7-721(2)(d). Just compensation is based on fair market value, which is the price for which 
the property that is taken could be sold by an owner willing to sell to a willing purchaser on the 
date of the taking. Ada Cnty. Highway Dist. v. Magwire, 104 Idaho 656, 658-59, 662 P.2d 237, 
239-40 (I 983). 
Neither the Order of Condemnation nor the Complaint proposes condemnation of any 
portion of Grathol's parcel for the purpose of the Sylvan/Roberts Extension. Though the Order 
of Condemnation briefly mentions the Sylvan/Roberts Extension, that section describes right of 
access to and from the remaining property belonging to Grathol to the Sylvan/Roberts Extension. 
The Affidavit of Jason Minzghor asserts that the Board has no intention of condemning any 
portion of Grathol's parcel for the construction of the Sylvan/Roberts Extension. As mentioned 
before, Grathol elected not to dedicate its property for the Sylvan/Roberts Extension, causing the 
Board to abandon that proposal. Because the basis of Grathol's argument relies entirely on its 
assertion that the Board's offer does not account for the Sylvan/Roberts Extension, this Court 
holds that the Board negotiated in good faith for the subject property pursuant to LC. § 7-
721(2)(d). 
C. Gratbol Is Not Entitled to Attorney's Fees on Appeal Pursuant to J.C. § 12-117 
Grathol requests attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-117. Because Grathol is 
not the prevailing party on appeal, it is not entitled to attorney's fees. 




The Board contends that it is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to J.C. § 12-
121 because Grathol acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law in filing this appeal. 
Pursuant to LC.§ 12-121, the prevailing party may be awarded attorney's fees "when this Court 
is left with an abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, 
W1reasonably, or without foundation." Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 571, 97 P.3d 428,438 
(2004). This Court denies the Board's request because LC. § 12-117 is the exclusive means for 
awarding attorney's fees for actions involving state entities. See Potlatch Educ. Ass'n v. Potlatch 
Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630,635,226 P.3d 1277, 1282 (2010). 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Because the Board negotiated in good faith for the subject property and filed its 
Complaint and Order of Condemnation in accordance with I.C. § 7-707, this Court affinns the 
district court's decision holding that the "quick-take" provisions of I.C. § 7-721(2) were 
satisfied. Neither party is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal. Costs are awarded to the Board. 
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United States District Court, 
D. Idaho. 
Alfred R. LaPETER and Sharon R. LaPeter, as 
Trustees of the LaPeter 1985 Living Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
CANADA LIFE INSURANCE OF AMERICA, De-
fendant. 
No. CV-06-121-S-BLW. 
Dec. 4, 2007. 
William A. Morrow, Jill S. Holinka, Kevin Eugene 
Dinius, White Peterson, Nampa, ID, for Plaintiffs. 
Robert A. Faucher, B. Newal Squyres, Kevin C. 
Braley, Holland & Hart LLP, Boise, ID, for De-
fendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
B. LYNN WINMILL, Chief Judge. 
INTRODUCTION 
*1 The Court has before it Canada Life Insur-
ance Company of America's ("Canada Life") Mo-
tion for Attorney Fees and Costs (Docket No. 94), 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Second Declaration of 
Robert A. Faucher (Docket No. 105), and Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Consolidate Cases (Docket No. 108). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs 
Idaho law governs the award of attorney fees in 
this matter because federal courts follow state law 
as to attorney fee awards in diversity actions. See 
Interform Co. v. Mitchell, 575 F.2d 1270, 1280 (9th 
Cir.1978) (applying Idaho law). Pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 12-120(3), the prevailing party is entitled to 
an award of attorney fees when a commercial trans-
action is the gravamen of the lawsuit. See Erickson 
v. Flynn. 64 P.3d 959 (Idaho Ct.App.2002). 
Page 1 
"The determination of whether a litigant is the 
prevailing party is committed to the discretion of 
the trial court." Sanders v. Lanl((ord, 1 P.3d 823, 
826 (Idaho Ct.App.2000); see also I.R.C.P. 
54(d)(l)(B). In Idaho, governing legal standards on 
the prevailing party issue are provided by LRCP 
54(d)(l )(B). "[T]here are three principal factors the 
trial court must consider when determining which 
party, if any, prevailed: (1) the final judgment or 
result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2) 
whether there were multiple claims or issues 
between the parties; and (3) the extent to which 
each of the parties prevailed on each of the claims 
or issues." Id. 
There is no dispute that this case involved a 
commercial transaction for purposes of Idaho Code 
§ 12-120(3). Moreover, based on the Court's final 
Judgment in this matter, Canada Life is clearly the 
prevailing party. In litigation, avoiding liability is 
as good for a defendant as winning a money judg-
ment is for a plaintiff. See Eighteen Mile Ranch, 
LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 117 P.3d 
130, 133 ([daho 2005). Canada Life avoided liabil-
ity in this matter when the Court granted summary 
judgment in its favor on all of Plaintiffs' remaining 
claims. 
A. Amount of Attorney Fees and Costs 
Plaintiffs contend that Canada Life's requested 
attorney fees should be reduced because their 
hourly rates are too high and the time expended was 
excessive. 
1. Hourly Rates 
The Court must determine a reasonable hourly 
rate by considering the experience, skill and reputa-
tion of the attorneys requesting fees. See Schwarz v. 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, 73 F.3d 
895, 906 (9th Cir.1995). "A district court should 
calculate this reasonable hourly rate according to 
the prevailing market rates in the relevant com-
munity, which typically is the community in which 
the district court sits." Id. (internal quotations and 
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citations omitted). The relevant community in this 
case is Boise, Idaho, where this Court sits. 
Here, Plaintiffs specifically object to the rates 
charged by Newal Squyres and Bob Foucher, who 
charged $350.00 and $335.00/$355 .00 respectively 
for their time. This Court is intimately familiar with 
the hourly rates charged in the Boise market be-
cause the Court deals with motions for attorney fees 
on a constant basis. Canada Life correctly points 
Ol.\t that this Court recently awarded fees to a party 
based on typical hourly rates charged by Canada 
Life's attorneys at Holland & Hart. Canada Life has 
also provided the Court with Mr. Faucher's declara-
tion, which establishes the credentials and billing 
rates for the Holland & Hart professionals who 
worked on this matter. (See Faucher Declaration, 
pp. 2-3). It has also been this Court's experience 
that attorneys at regional firms, such as Holland & 
Hart, charge hourly rates at or near, but not above, 
the high end of acceptable rates for the Boise area. 
*2 Based· on the Court's knowledge of typical 
attorney rates in the Boise area, coupled with Mr. 
Faucher's affidavit, the Court finds that the rates 
charged by Canada Life's professionals are within 
the Boise community standard, with the exception 
of Mr. Faucher's rate. Mr. Faucher's hourly rate is 
near, and even exceeds for some tasks, Mr. Squyres' 
hourly rate, even though Mr. Squyres has practiced 
for over 30 years, but Mr. Faucher has practiced for 
less than 20 years. (See Faucher Declaration, pp. 
2-3). Although Mr. Faucher indicates that he rep-
resents lending institutions throughout the country, 
he has not persuaded the Court that his rate should 
exceed that of his colleague who has practiced for 
over 30 years. Accordingly, the Court will reduce 
FNl Mr. Faucher's rate to $300.00 per hour. 
FN 1. Mr. Faucher's declaration lists the 
following attorneys, their experience level 
and billing rates: (1) Mr. Bithell-nearly 40 
years-$405.00 per hour; (2) Mr. Squyers-
over 30 years-$350.00 per hour; (3) Mr. 
Braley-9 years-$235.00 per hour; (4) Mr. 
Goergen-5 years-$185.00; (5) Mr. Fisc-
Page 2 
henich-3 years-$185.00; and (6) Ms. Dav-
is-2 years-$175.00. Considering the experi-
ence and billing rates of Mr. Faucher's col-
leagues, $300.00 per hour is the reasonable 
rate for Mr. Faucher in this matter. 
2. Number of Hours Charged 
Plaintiffs also contend that the number of hours 
claimed by Canada Life are excessive. Plaintiffs es-
sentially contend that Canada Life's attorneys spent 
too much time researching, drafting, editing and fi-
nalizing briefs, and too much time preparing for or-
al argument. Plaintiffs contend that any fee award 
should be reduced by at least 30 percent. 
The Court recalls that the briefs were well or-
ganized and well researched, and that counsel's oral 
argument was persuasive. It has been the Court's 
experience that the more concise briefs, and more 
persuasive arguments, require the most preparation. 
The high quality of the work, coupled with the 
Court's decision to grant summary judgment in fa-
vor of Canada Life, and against Plaintiffs, reveals 
that the significant effort spent on the briefs and 
preparation for oral argument in this case was war-
ranted. Additionally, the high quality work done at 
the front end of this case saved the parties the addi-
tional expense of trying this matter. 
Moreover, Canada Life's attorneys sufficiently 
itemized their fees by describing the services per-
formed. (Faucher Declaration, Ex. A). Accordingly, 
the Court does not find that the number of hours 
charged by Canada Life's attorneys were excessive. 
3. Declaration Related to Mr. LaPeter's Convic-
tion 
Plaintiffs argue that Canada Life's attorney fees 
should be reduced as a sanction for Canada Life's 
filing of a declaration attaching documentation of 
Mr. LaPeter's felony convictions. Plaintiffs suggest 
that Canada Life introduced Mr. LaPeter's criminal 
convictions into the record as an attempt to intimid-
ate Mr. LaPeter and blacken Mr. LaPeter's reputa-
tion in they eyes of the Court. Plaintiffs also ask the 
Court to strike that declaration. 
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Based on the record, it is clear that Plaintiffs, 
not Canada Life, introduced Mr. LaPeter's criminal 
history into this litigation. Plaintiffs first disclosed 
Mr. LaPeter's criminal record to the Court in Mr. 
LaPeter's affidavit filed in December 2006 in sup-
port of Plaintiffs' motion for a protective order. 
(See Docket nos. 21-22). Thus, it was not improper 
for Canada Life to address the issue or to file the 
records with the Court. Accordingly, there is no 
reason to sanction Canada Life. Likewise, there is 
no reason to strike Mr. Faucher's declaration. 
4. Non-Taxable Costs 
*3 Canada Life requests its non-taxable costs 
pursuant to lRCP 54(d)(l)(D). Plaintiffs do not dis-
pute application of IRCP 54(d)(l)(D), but argue 
that Canada Life has not fulfilled the rule's require-
ment that the costs were necessary and exceptional. 
Rule 54(d)(l)(D) states that additional, non-taxable, 
costs "may be allowed upon a showing that said 
costs were necessary and exceptional costs reason-
ably incurred, and should in the interest of justice 
be assessed against the adverse party." IRCP 
54( d)(l )(D). Discretionary costs may include costs 
related to long distance telephone calls, photocopy-
ing, faxes, travel expenses, and expert witnesses. 
See Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 
109 P.3d 161, 168 (Idaho 2005). The Court must 
make express findings as to why a party's discre-
tionary costs should or should not be allowed. Id.; 
see also I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). The Court need not 
evaluate the requested costs item by item. Instead, 
"express findings as to the general character of re-
quested costs and whether such costs are necessary, 
reasonable, exceptional, and in the interests of 
justice is sufficient to comply with this require-
ment." Puckett v. /lerska, 158 P.3d 937, 945-946 
(Idaho 2007). 
Here, the Court finds that although Canada 
Life's discretionary costs were for the most part 
reasonable and necessary, they were not exception-
al. The nature of this case, essentially a breach of 
contract case, was not exceptional. The Idaho Su-
preme Court has consistently construed the require-
Page 3 
ment that costs be "exceptional" under IRCP 
54( d )(1 )(D) "to include those costs incurred be-
cause the nature of the case was itself exceptional." 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also stated that 
"[c]ertain cases, such as personal injury cases gen-
erally involve copy, travel and expert witness fees 
such that these costs are considered ordinary rather 
than "exceptional" under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D)." Id. 
(citing Inama v. Brewer, 973 P.2d 148, 155 (Idaho 
l 999). This case is more akin to the ordinary per-
sonal injury case. Canada Life's discretionary costs 
were "routine costs associated with modern litiga-
tion overhead" in commercial litigation. City of Mc-
Call v. Seubert, 130 P.3d 1118, II 26-27 (Idaho 
2006). Accordingly, the Court will deny Canada 
Life's request for non-taxable costs. 
5. Idaho Code§§ 45-15-3 and 45-1512 
Idaho's anti-deficiency statute provides that in 
order to recover a deficiency from a grantor person-
ally after foreclosure, the beneficiary must sue the 
grantor within three months after the trustee's sale. 
Additionally, the beneficiary can recover only the 
difference between the debt and the fair market 
value of the property at the date of sale or the sale 
amount, whichever is greater. I.C. § 45-1512. 
Idaho's single action statute provides that a benefi-
ciary under a deed of trust cannot sue the grantor on 
the debt except under certain limited circumstances. 
J.C. § 45-1503. The statute's purpose is to compel a 
creditor who is secured by real property to recover 
from the grantor's pledged real estate before recov-
ering from the grantor's other assets. Plaintiffs con-
tend that these statutes prevent Canada Life from 
recovering its attorney fees and costs. 
*4 Plaintiffs' argument is based on a contention 
that Canada Life, for all intents and purposes, is the 
beneficiary of the deed of trust that secures the 
ParkCenter Mall. However, Canada Life is not the 
beneficiary of that deed of trust. Through assign-
ment, Canada Life Assurance Company is the bene-
ficiary of the deed of trust. (See Schwartz Aff., ~ 
7-10, Exs. 1-3, Docket No. 57). Plaintiffs admit as 
much, but contend that because Canada Life and 
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Canada Life Assurance Company are both subsidi-
aries of Great West Insurance, the Court should re-
gard the two companies as the same entity. 
Plaintiffs cite no case law or ru.les explaining \.vhy 
the Court should not treat the separate entities as 
separate entities. Accordingly, the Court will not 
treat them as the same entity. 
The anti-deficiency and single action statutes 
do not apply to parties, like Canada Life, who are 
not beneficiaries of a deed of trust securing in-
debtedness owed by the grantor. Accordingly, the 
Court finds that the statutes do not preclude recov-
ery of attorney fees and costs in this case. 
6. Total Fees and Costs 
Based on the above analysis, Canada Life is en-
titled to $437,742.50 in attorney fees. The Court 
reached this amount by reducing Mr. Faucher's 
hourly rate from $335.00/355.00 to $300.00 per 
hour, which reduced Mr. Faucher's bill by 
$51,498.50. The Court then subtracted that amount 
from the total amount outlined and claimed in 
Canada Life's fee bill ($491,310.00-$51,498.50 = 
$439,811.50). The Court then subtracted an addi-
tional $2,069.00 based on Canada Life's concession 
that it mistakenly included $2,069 .00 in fees for 
work pertaining to the receivership litigation (See 
Canada Life Reply Brief, p. 8, n. 18). The Court 
will not award any non-taxable costs. 
II. Motion to Consolidate 
Months ago, the Court suggested that, at least 
for purposes of appeal, the parties should consider 
whether it would be in the interest of judicial eco-
nomy to consolidate this case with the other two re-
lated matters-Case Nos. 07-254 and 07-228. 
However, because Plaintiffs have already separ-
ately appealed all three cases, the Court finds no 
reason to consolidate them at this point. Based on 
the outcome of the appeals, the Court may revisit 
this issue. However, at this point, the Court will 
deny the Motion to Consolidate. 
ORDER 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY 
Page 4 
ORDERED that Canada Life's Motion for Attorney 
Fees and Costs (Docket No. 94) shall be, and the 
same is hereby, GRANTED IN PART and DENIED 
IN PART. Plaintiffs shall pay Canada Life 
$437,742.50 in attorney fees. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Strike Second Declaration of Robert A. 
Faucher (Docket No. 105) shall be, and the same is 
hereby, DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Consolidate Cases (Docket No. 108) 
shall be, and the same is hereby, DENIED. 
D .Idaho,2007. 
LaPeter v. Canada Life Ins. of America 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2007 WL 4287489 
(D.Idaho) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, 
D. Idaho. 
RESTORATION INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, 
INC., 9810 Patuxent Woods Drive, Suite K, 
Columbia, MD 21046, Plaintiff, 
V. 
CERTIFIED RESTORERS CONSULTING 
GROUP, LLC, 1401 Shoreline Drive, Suite 2, 
Boise, ID 83702, Disaster Restoration, Inc. 4725 
Forest Street, Denver, CO 80216, Michael Griggs, 
4275 Forest Street, Denver, CO 80216, RSR2, 
LLC, d/b/a Ree-Construction 66 Willow Creek, 
Hailey, ID 83333, Onald K. Reese, 66 Willow 
Creek Hailey, ID 83333, Thomas C. Geoffroy, 
24932 Avenue Kearny, Unit# 6, Valencia, CA 
91355, Michael Cosley, 24932 Avenue Kearny, 
Unit# 6, Valencia, CA 91355, Americraft Con-
structors, Inc. d/b/a American Craftsman, Restora-
tion, a Disaster Kleenup International (DKI) Com-
pany 24932 Avenue Kearny, Unit# 6, Valencia, 
CA 91355, Brian Boone, 27309 Blueberry Hill 
Drive, Oak Ridge North, TX 77385, Boones Res-
toration, Inc., 11943 Scarlet Oaks Trail, Conroe, 
TX 77385, Michael Eggman, 6521 Sky Creek 
Drive, Suite G, Sacramento, CA 95828, Certified 
Restoration & Construction Inc., 6251 Sky Creek 
Drive, Suite G, Sacremento, CA 95828, Defend-
ants. 
No. CV-07-227 SBLW. 
March 24, 2008. 
Jason D. Scott, Hawley Troxell Ennis and Hawley, 
Boise, ID, Jordan S. Weinstein, Richard Thomas 
Matthews, Obion, Spivak, Mcclelland, Maier & 
Neustadt, P.C., Alexandria, VA, for Plaintiff. 
Stephen A. Spataro, Spataro & Associates, Ring-
gold, GA, Steven B. Andersen, Holland & Hart, 
Boise, ID, Robert G. Wing, Prince Yeates & 
Geldzahler, Salt Lake City, UT, David P. Hersh, 
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Sarah Van Arsdale Beny, Burg Simpson Eldredge 
Hersh & Jardine, PC, Englewood, CO, Robyn Mad-
dox Brody, Hepworth Lezamiz & Janis, Twin Falls, 
ID, Neil D. Mcfeeley, Richard W. Stover, Stanley 
J. Tharp, Eberle Berlin Kading Turnbow & 
McKlveen, Chartered, Boise, ID, for Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
B. LYNN WJNMILL, District Judge. 
INTRODUCTION 
*1 The Court has before it Plaintiffs Motion 
for Attorney Fees (Docket No. 56) and Plaintiffs 
Motion to Amend (Docket No. 69). The Court has 
determined that the decisional process on these mo-
tions would not be significantly aided by oral argu-
ment. Therefore, the Court will address the motions 
without a hearing. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Motion for Attorney Fees 
The Court conditionally granted Defendants 
Boone and BRI, Inc. 's Motion to Set Aside Entry of 
Default. The condition required Defendants Boone 
and BRI, Inc. to pay RIA for all of its costs and fees 
associated with the Motion to Set Aside Entry of 
Default. To that end, the Court required RIA to sub-
mit a cost bill. The Court has now reviewed the cost 
bill, as well as Boone and BRl's response brief. 
Defendants take issue with the hourly rates 
charged by Plaintiffs lead counsel, Obion, Spivak, 
McClelland, Maier & Neustadt, P.C, a Washington 
D.C. firm. Specifically, Defendants dispute Mr. 
Weinstein's $400.00 hourly rate and Mr. Matthews' 
$260.00 hourly rate. 
The Court must determine a reasonable hourly 
rate by considering the experience, skill and reputa-
tion of the attorneys requesting fees. Schwarz v. 
Secretmy of Health and Human Services, 73 F.3d 
895, 906 (9th Cir.1995). "A district court should 
calculate this reasonable hourly rate according to 
the prevailing market rates in the relevant com-








IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDlCIAL DISTRICT OF TH 
2 STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
By---',:::::;;AL-~~~q,,c:._ __ 
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AVP RESTAURANT GROUP, a limited 






a GODZILLA, LLC, a limited liability 
company, and CHEERLEADERS SPORTS 












ROBERT E. GODSILL, an individual, 
17 GODZILLA, LLC, a limited liability 
company, and CHEERLEADERS SPORTS 
1a BAR & GRILL, INC., an Idaho corporation, 
Defendants, 
Case No. CVOC0711663 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
1) DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
DISALLOW FEES AND COSTS 
2) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS; 











For Plaintiff AVP Restaurant Group: Dennis M. Charney and Jacob D. 
Deaton of Charney and Associates, PLLC 
For Plaintiffs David and Karen Buich: Mary York and Ted Tollefson of 
Holland and Hart 
For Defendants: Matthew J. Ryden, Wyatt Johnson, and T.J. Angstman 
of Angstman, Johnson & Associates, PLLC 
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This matter came before the Court on December 4, 2008 upon 1) the 
Defendants' Motion to Disallow Fees and Costs relating to Rule 11 sanctions; 2) the 
Defendants' Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs; and 3) the Buiches' Motion for Rule 
54(b) Certification. After oral argument, the Court took the matter under advisement. 
BACKGROUND 
This litigation arises from a dispute over contracts to buy rent property, AVP 
8 










a restaurant. Based upon a belief that their contract with AVP had expired, the 
Defendants entered into an agreement to sell the same restaurant property to Dave and 
Karen Buich. In the meantime, AVP filed suit for specific periormance, breach of 
contract and other related claims. AVP also filed a lis pendens on the property, and at 
one point obtained a preliminary injunction. Despite the Defendants hiring legal 
counsel to attempt to remove the lis pendens to allow the Defendants to sell the 
property to the Buiches, no sale occurred and the Buiches recelved their earnest money 
back. Consequently, the Buiches also sued the Defendants for breach of contract. The 
18 









On September 25, 2008, the Court granted summary judgment against the 
Buiches and dismissed their claims because their contract with the Defendants limited 
buyer's damages to return of earnest money, The motions addressed in this decision 
involve disputes between the Defendants and the Bulches. 
DISCUSSION 
1. Defendants' Motion ta Disallow Fees and Costs 
Prior to the grant of summary Judgment on September 11, 2008, the 6uiches 
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filed a Motion for Sanctions against the Defendants under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
11 (a)(1 ), arguing that the Defendants filed and pursued a frivolous Motion in Umine to 
exclude the Buiches' expert witnesses. The Defendants filed their Motion in Limine on 
grounds that the Buiches' July 28, 2008 expert disclosures were untimely based on the 
Court's March 13, 2008 written scheduling order, which stated that the deadline for 
expert disclosures was June 23, 2008. However, the Court had previously stated at the 
scheduling conference on March 10, 2008 that the deadline for the Buiches' expert 
disclosures would be July 28, 2008. After receiving the Defendants' Motion in Limine, 
the Buiches reminded the Defendants on more than one occasion that the deadline 
provided by the Court was July 28th. After looking into the matter, the Defendants 
acknowledged that the Court did state at the scheduling conference that tho deadline 
12 
13 would be July 28th. Still, the Defendants continued to prosecute their motion on 
14 grounds trial ihe Buiches did not comply with the disclosure deadline. 
15 The Court granted the Buiches' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions on the ground that 









disclosure deadline given by tl1e Court was July 28, 2008." The Court then requested 
from the Buiches an affidavit detailing the expenses and fees incurred in responding to 
the Motion in Limine and pursuing the Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. The Buiches filed 
the requested affidavit, which reported attorney fees in the amount of $10,626.50 
incurred from 4.8 hours in conferences, 4.7 hours researching legal issues, 25 hours 
preparing pleadings and letters, and 8.5 hours attending hearings on the two motions, 
The Defendants request that the Court disallow the fees as being excessive for 
2s the time and effort required to respond to the Motion in Limine. Specifically, the 
26 Defendants assert that it was not until September 2, 2008 that the Court clarified its 
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statements regarding the expert witness disclosure deadline, and therefore, the fees 
should be calculated from September 2, thereby reducing the amount of fees incurred 
2 
3 by at least $2,500.50. The Defendants also assert that the total time they spent 
4 pursuing the Motion in Limine and defending the Rule 11 sanctions after September 2 







Buiches. Defendants further argue that the fees charged by Holland and Hart ($245 
and $275 for Mary York and $195 and $215 for Ted Tollefson) are not reasonable 
compared to attorney fees in Boise and those charged by Angstman, Johnson, & 
Associates ($225 for T J Angstman 1 $195 for Wyatt Johnson I and $150-$175 for 
others). Considering all this, the Defendants contend that a reasonable award of fees 




The imposition of attorney fee sanctions for litigative misconduct is governed by 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (a)(1). Lester v. Salvino, 141 ldaho 937, 939, 120 P.3d 






"If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule 1 the 
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person 
who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which 
may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the 
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, 
motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee." LR.C.P. 
11(a)(1). 
This rule gives the Court discretion to determine the appropriate sanction for a violation 
22 of the rule. Campbell v. Ki/dew, 141 Idaho 640, 650-51, 115 P.3d 731 (2005). It also 




"may serve as a guide for determining an amount of sanctions." Id. (citing McKay v. 
Owens, 130 Idaho 1481 159, 937 P.2d 1222, 1233 (1997)). 
In addition, the Intent behind Rule 11 Is to give courts 11a management tool ... to 
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weed out, punish, and deter specific frivolous and other misguided filings." Id. (citing 
Curzon v. Hansen, 137 Idaho 420, 421~22, 49 P.3d 1270, 1272-73 (Ct. App. 2002) 
(citation omitted)). Accordingly, "Ru!e 11 sanctions must be sufficient to deter the 
misuse of the judicial process." Id. 
In this case, tile Court will find that an award of attorney fees and costs incurred 
by the Buiches in defending against the Defendants' motion to exclude expert 
witnesses and in obtaining Rule 11 sanctions serve the intent behind Rule 11 and are 
an appropriate sanction. The Buiches' attorneys have stated in an affidavit under oath 
triat they incurred over $10,000 in fees as a result of the Defendant's Rule 11 violation. 
The expenses U1e Buiches were forced to incur as a result of this violation appropriately 
deters the Defendants and others from "misguided filings" and appropriately 
compensates the Buiches. 
Furthermore, there is no basis to limit the attorney fees and costs to those 
incurred by the Buiches after September 2, 2008. The Court did not sanction the 
Defendants because they pursued the Motion in Limine after September 2. The Court 
ordered sanctions because "the Buiches were forced to respond to and defend against 
a baseless argument." that the Defendants reasonably should have known was not 
based in fact. In addition, the fees charged in this case were reasonable. In the United 
States District Court of Idaho case of LaPeter v. Canada Life lnsurance1 No. CV-06-
121-S-BLW, 2007 WL 2608837 (Sept. 5, 2007), the court found tees of over $300 to be 
reasonable in Boise. Accordingly, the sanctions Imposed upon the Defendants in the 
amount of attorney fees and costs incurred should be awarded to the Buiches. 
The Court will enter an award of fees In the amount of $10,626.50 in favor of the 
Buiches. However, the Court wlll defer signing a judgment for the amount awarded 
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pending the litigation and finalization of AVP's claims against the Defendants. By 
entering the award without issuing a judgment, the Court allows all parties the equal 
2 
3 opportunity to appeal any issue in this matter without forcing the payment of attorney 
4 fee awards in the interim, while at the same time preventing the increase of the award 







2. Buiches' Objection to Defendants~ Request for Fees and Costs 
The Defendants ree:iuest an award of attorney fees and costs under Rule 
54(d)(1), Rule 54(e)(1), and Idaho Code 12"120(3) in the amount of $49,892.29 
incurred ln defending the Buiches' claims. The Buiches tiled an objection to the 
Defendants' request for attorney fees and costs on November 20, 2008, arguing that 
the Defendants wrongfully included in their request fees incurred in pursuing the Motion 
12 
13 in Limlne to exclude expert witnesses, for which the Defendants were sanctioned under 
14 Rule 11, and fees incurred in defending against the Bulches' successful Motion for Rule 
15 11 Sanctions. The Buiches also argue that seeking fees tor seven different lawyers 
16 who worked on this case Is unreasonable and excessive. Finally, the Buiches argue 
17 that the Defendants have claimed costs relating to an expert witness that do not meet 
16 






Rule 54{e)(1) provides that "[i]n any civil action the court may award reasonable 
attorney tees, ... , to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(1)(B), when 
provided for by any statute or contract." Idaho Code§ 12-120(3} states that the Court 
may award attorney fees in any civil action involving a commercial transaction. The 
24 determination of the amount of attorney fees to award is left to the discretion of the trial 
2s court. Spidell v. Jenkins, 111 Idaho 857, 727 P.2d 1285 (Ct. App. 1986). In 
26 determining the amount of attorney fees, the Court must consider twelve factors listed 
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in Rule 54( e )(3). Some of these -factors include 1) the time and labor required; 2) the 
novelty and difficulty of the questions; and 3) the skill requisite to perform the legal 
~e~·1·c~ P""P'"'rl\/ I Or- p t:::4(0)/-=l\ U IV C:: IV v, Y· 1.1 t.U.1 • Y >.J ,u,. 
In this case, the Defendants prevailed and ace entitled to an award of attorney 
fees because this litlgation involved a commercial transaction under Idaho Code § 12-
120(3). In addition, the contract between the Buiches and the Defendants contains a 
provision entitling the prevailing party to attorney fees. However, the Defendants are 
not entitled to the total amount of costs and fees requested. 
The Defendants included in their Memorandum of Costs and Fees $4,368 
related to the Motion in Limine regarding the Buiches' expert witnesses and the 
Buiches' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. The Defendants recognize that the Court 
ordered sanctions pertaining to these motions, but argue that "the pursuit and defense 
of these two motions was directly related to defending Defendants in this matter, and 
dealt with maUers of significant substance to the Defendants' case. The sanctions were 











Defendants are entitled to compensation for these fees as well." 
The Court will find that fees incurred in pursuing the Motion in Limine and in 
defending the Motion for Sanctions should not have been included in the Defendants' 
total request for fees and costs. If the Defendants are allowed to recover this expense, 
it would effectively reward the Defendants' counsel for their misconduct and render the 
Court's sanction meaningless. Therefore, $4,368 wlll be deducted from Defendants1 
request of $49,892.2$. 
The Bu!ches also argue the Defendants' requested fees are excessive because 
Defendants' counsel overstaffed this case with seven attorneys resulting in 
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unnecessary meetings 1 duplicative work, and excessive fees. The Buiches cite 
Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425, 111 P .3d 110, 120 (2005) in arguing that an 
award of attorney fees can be vacated where a case is overstaffed. ln Lettunich, the 
Court vacated an award of attorney fees in part because: 
Over the span of one and a half months, Mike's attorneys spent 267 hours 
drafting or discussing briefs. Much of this time involved two attorneys 
working on the· same project, according to the billing statements. Further, 
two of Mike's three attorneys were partners in their firm and well seasoned 
litigators. Some consideration should have given as to the necessity of 
this legal firepower. While the time and labor expended is certainly a 
factor to consider, it is to be considered under a standard of 
reasonableness. 







additional reasons for its decision to vacate the award, including excessive hours spent 
in preparation for trial and the fact that the trial court did not consider all 54(e)(3) 
criteria. Ultimately, the question of awardable attorney fees is one of reasonableness. 
After review of the Defendants' Memorandum of Costs and Fees and supporting 
affidavit, the Court cannot find that use of seven attorneys was excessive or repetitive. 
At any given stage of the proceedings of this case, only 2 or 3 of the Defendants' 
17 









among the Plaintiffs' 'counsel. The mere fact that multiple attorneys performed work on 
I 
one case does not by itself mean that the work performed and fees incurred were 
excessive. After considering all factors under Rule 54(e)(3), the Court will find that the 
amount of fees incurred by tl1e Defendants' counsel was reasonable. 
The Buichas also claim that the $100 expert consulting fee tor Glen Olson, CPA 
is not awardable because he did not testify. Under Rule 54(d)(1)(C) 1 reasonable expert 
witness fees for an expert who "testifies" at a deposition or at trial are allowed. The 
Court will agree with the Buiches and decline to award $10~ for Mr. Olson as a cost of 
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right because Mr. Olson did not testify. 
In sum, the Court will reduce the Defendants requested aitorney fees by $4,468 
($4,368 + $100) and enter an award of $45,424.29 in favor of the Defendants. 
4 Moreover, at the request of the Defendants, the Court will offset the $10,626.50 
s sanction awarded to· the Buiches from the $45,424.29 awarded to the Defendants. 






and costs. Again, however, the Court will defer signing a judgment for the amount 
awarded pending the ·litigation and finalization of AVP's claims against the Defendants. 
3. Rule 54(b} Certification 
On September 28, 2008, the Court granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, dismissing all claims made by the Buiches against the Defendants. On 
12 
13 November 5, 2008, the Buiches filed a Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification. The Buiches 
14 seek a 54(b) certificate directing the entry of final judgment on the Buiches' claims to 
15 allow the Buiches to proceed with an appeal. 
16 For the reasons below, the Court will deny 54(b) certification. Rule 54(b)(1) 
' 










[T]he court may direct the entry of final judgment upon one or more but 
less than all of the claims or parties only upon the express determination 
that there is n9 just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the 
entry of the judgment. 
If a court grants 54(b) certification and an appeal is filed, the court loses jurisdiction 
over the entire cas~, except as provided in Rule 13 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I.R.C.P. 54(b)(2). Idaho Appellate Rule 13.4 states that when an appeal is taken from a 
54(b) certification, the Idaho Supreme Court 11can delegate jurisdiction to the District 
Court to take specific actions and rule upon specific matters, which may include 
jurisdiction to conduct a trial of issues." I.A.R. 13.4. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has cautioned that Rule 54(b) certification "should not 
be granted routinely, or as a matter of course; it should be reserved only tor 'the 
3 infrequent harsh case."' Ko/fn v. Saint Luke's Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 328, 940 
4 P.2d 1142, 1147 (1997) (citation omitted). "The party requesting certification must 
s show that it will suffer some hardship or injustice, or provide some other compelling 
6 reason why the certlf~cation should be granted." Id. (citation omitted). In other words, 
7 except where an injustice would result from denial of an immediate appeal, .Rule 54-(b) 
a 




Richards, 118 Idaho 791, 793, BOO P.2d 678, 680 (1990). Mere delay Is not a hardship 
in and of itself. Kolln, 130 Idaho at 328, 940 P.2d at 1147 (citation omitted). The 
decision to grant or deny a Rule 54(b) certificate is left to the discretion of the trial court. 
12 
13 See Id. 
14 In this case, the Court can find no hardship, injustice, or compelling reason to 
1s grant a Rule 54-{b) certification. The Buiches have expressed concern over having to 
16 wait to appeal until after March 2009 when the AVP trial has ended, but such an 
17 inconvenience does not amount to the hardship required for a Rule 54(b) certification. 
18 




and AV P's case is a ·compelling reason to direct the entry of final judgment. However, if 
the Court were to grant 54(b) certification and the Buiches were to appeal, this Court 
22 would lose jurisdictiqn over the AVP case. Even though the Idaho Supreme Court "can 
23 delegate jurisdiction" to this Court, the Idaho Appellate Rules are permissive in that 
24 regard. Thus, there is a real possibility the Idaho Supreme Court would not delegate 
2s jurisdiction; adjudication of the remaining issues would be delayed and a piecemeal 
26 appeal would a possible threat. The prejudice to AVP and the remaining claims is 
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greater than any prejudice the Buiches would suffer by having to wait to file an appeal 
until after the AVP case is adjudicated. Therefore, there is a just reason for delaying 
the entry of finai judgment as to the Buiches' claims, and the Court will deny 54(b) 
certification. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court will DENY Defendants' Motion to Disallow Fees, GRANT in part 
Defendants' Motion for Fees and Costs, and DENY the Buiches' Motion for Rule 54(b) 
Certification. 
DATED this J{g__ day of January 2009. 
CHAEL McLAUGHLIN 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION - CASE NO. CVOC11663 • PAGE 11 
·----.. 
1469 of 1617


























CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
~ 
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101 S Capitol Blvd,Ste 1400 
PO Box2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
Fax: 343-8869 
J. DAVfD NAVARRO _ 
Clerk of the District Coy rt · _ ~- __ . 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ GRA THOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND NOTICE 
OF TENDER OF FUNDS AND 
SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT 




Pursuant to the Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment filed May 25, 
2012 and the Court's Judgment filed June 4, 2012, Plaintiff State ofldaho, Idaho Transportation 
Board ("ITD"), by and through its attorneys of record, Holland & Hart LLP, hereby tenders 
payment to the Court by way of the State's Warrant No. 125506469 in amount of $140,813.58 
made payable to the Kootenai County, Clerk. 
The attached payment by ITD constitutes satisfaction in full of the Judgment entered in 
this case and payment of just compensation to Grathol pursuant to the May 25th Post-Trial 
Memorandum Decision and Order and the June 4th Judgment. 
DATED this 19th day of June, 2012. 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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JUDGMENT -2 
1472 of 1617
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 19th day of June, 2012, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Fax: 208-664-5884 
















COUNTY C}F i<OOTENAJ } SS 
Alff: LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V. York (ISB #5020) 
Ted S. Tollefson (ISB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
IO I South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
7012 JUN 26 AM 8: 58 
CLEnK orsrrn~:, coum 
~~~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES I through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-I 0-10095 
SECOND JUDGMENT AND 
DECREE OF CONDEMNATION 
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THIS COURT on the 4th day of June, 2012, entered a Judgment adjudging that 
Defendants are entitled to recover from the Plaintiff the sum of $140,813.58. Plaintiff has now 
fully satisfied said Judgment. Therefore, pursuant to the Judgment and Idaho Code§ 7-716, 
THIS COURT now enters this Second Judgment and Decree of Condemnation: 
NOW THEREFORE, IT rs HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Grathol is the owner in fee simple of the real property, which is the subject of this 
condemnation action. 
2. Defendant Sterling Savings Bank was dismissed as a party to this action on 
December 22, 2010. 
3. In this action, ITD has condemned and acquired a portion of Grathol' s real 
property as part ofITD's project to widen and improve Highway 95. The particular segment of 
the Project for which Grathol's property is required is U.S. 95, Garwood to Sagle, Athol Stage, 
Project No. A009(791) Key No. 9791. 
4. As part of its US-95 Project, ITD requires 16.314 acres ofGrathol's 56.8 acre 
parcel. A legal description of the portion of Grathol's property condemned and acquired by ITD 
is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit A. 
5. The taking of the property and property rights condemned herein, and hereinafter 
described is for a public use, authorized by law, and is necessary for the public use as a right-of-
way for a public highway known as U.S. 95, Garwood to Sagle, Athol Stage, Project No. 
A009(791) Key No. 9791, which has been and is located in a manner most compatible with the 
greatest public good and the least private injury. 
6. ITD has sought in good faith to purchase from Grathol the necessary and required 
real property and improvements located on that real property for the Project. 
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7. Grathol has recovered Judgment against ITD in the sum of SIX HUNDRED 
SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($675,000), together with 
accrued interest on this sum in the amount of $36,813.58, less the sum of $571,000 previously 
paid by ITD to the Cou..rt, making a net Judgment in the amou.11t of $140,813.58. 
8. Pursuant to the Notice of Tender of Funds and Satisfaction of Judgment filed by 
ITD on June 19, 2012, ITD has tendered to the Court all sums due in on the Judgment in the 
amount of $140,813.58 and thereby satisfied in full the Judgment entered in this case. This sum 
has been deposited with the Court. The funds on deposit will be disbursed to Grathol by the 
Clerk of the Court. 
9. This total amount paid, combined with the sums previously paid by ITD in this 
matter, constitutes "Just Compensation" to Grathol within the meaning of Article I, Section 14 of 
the Constitution of the State of Idaho and includes payment for the value of the property taken by 
ITD, the value of any resulting damages to Grathol's property, and any and all claims by Grathol 
for the taking of a portion of its property by ITD. 
10. The described property and property rights are hereby condemned and taken for 
the use of the State ofldaho. 
11. The property condemned and taken herein is situated in Kootenai County, State of 
Idaho, and is more particularly described as follows: 
a) All right, title, interest and fee title in approximatelyl6.314 acres of 
property more particularly described in Exhibit A, attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
12. In consideration of the aforementioned payment and other consideration by ITD 
to Grathol, all right, title, interest and fee title to the requirement described in Exhibit A is hereby 
vested in and conveyed to the State of Idaho. 
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DATED thisdl_ day of June, 2012. 
Hon. Charles W. Hosack 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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Idaho Transportation Department 
US-95, Garwood to Sagle - Athol Segment 
Project No. A009(791) 
August 2, 2010 
Assessor's Parcel No. 53N03W-10-5000 
And 53N03W-10-6100 
710,634 Sq.Ft (16.314 Acres) 
Page I of 3 
Key No. 09791 
PARCEL19 
ITD PID 0044775 
FEE ACQUISITION 
A tract ofland being a portion of the Southwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter (SW4 
SW 4) of Section 10, Township 53 North, Range 3 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, 
Idaho, more particularly described as folJows: 
COMMENCING at the Southwest Comer of said Section 10, marked by a found railroad 
spike as referenced by Comer Perpetuation and Filing Record No. 207654000; thence along 
the west line of said Section 10, North 1°27'15" East, a distance of2652.41 feet to the West 
Quarter Corner of said Section 10, monumented by a found 2-1 /2 inch diameter aluminum 
cap marked "E 1/4 Sect. 9 T53N R3W", as referenced by Comer Perpetuation and Filing 
Record No. 1213669; thence South 1 °27' 15'' West, a distance of 1431.97 feet; thence South 
89°43'43" East, a distance of23.30 feet to the intersection of the south line of that parcel of 
land taken by the United States of America by Decree of Condemnation, recorded in Book 20 
of Miscellaneous Records, Page 436, records of Kootenai County, Idaho with the east right 
of way line of State Highway 95, Project No. FAP 100D(2); thence along the southerly 
boundary of that parcel described by said Decree of Condemnation, South 89° 43 '43" East, a 
distance of256.23 feet to a point being 206.83 feet left of Station 983+30.84 ofUS-95, 
Proj~t No. A009(791) Highway Survey said point being the TRUE POINT OF 
BEGINNING; 
thence continuing along the southerly boundary of that parcel described by said Decree of 
Condemnation, South 89°43'43" East, a distance of 471.67 feet to a point being 255.32 feet 
right of Station 982+37.0l ofUS-95, Project No. A009(791) Highway Survey; 
thence South 21°05'02" East, a distance of 177.16 feet to a point 165.00 feet south of the 
southerly boundary of that parcel described by said Decree of Condemnation, said point 
being 291.85 feet right of Station 980+76.27 ofUS~95, Project No. A009(791) Highway 
Survey; 
thence South 21°05'02" East, a distance of537.93 feet to a point on a 1173.00 foot radius 
curve to the right, concave to the southwest, the center of which bears South 68°54'58" West, 
said point being449.91 feet right of Station 976+1 l.17 ofUS-95, Project No. A009(79i) 
Highway Survey; 
thence southerly, on said curve, through a central angle of 17°47'36", an arc distance of 
364.28 feet, a chord bearing of South 12°11 '14" East, and a chord distance of362.81 feet to 




Idaho Transportation Department 
US-95, Garwood to Sagle - Athol Segment 
Project No. _A009(791) 
August 2, 2010 
Assessor's Parcel No. 53N03W-10-5000 
And 53N03W-10-6100 
710,634 Sq.Ft (16.314 Acres) 
Page 2 of3 
31, 1967 as Instrument No. 504394, said point being 532.67 feet right of Station 972+69.12 
ofUS-95; Project No. A0O9(791) Highway Survey; 
Key No. 09791 
thence along the north boundary of said strip North 89°43'25,. West, a distance of923.35 
feet to a point 165.00 feet (10 rods) east of the east right of way line of said State Highway 
95, Project No. FAP 100D(2) and from which a 5/8" rebar with plastic cap, as shown per 
Record of Survey, instrument No. 1621187, bears South 89°48'01" East, 1.88 fee4 more or 
less, said point being 390.57 feet left of Station 972+54.46 ofUS-95, Project No. A009(791) 
Highway Survey; 
thence parallel with and 165.00 feet east of said east right of way line, North 1°29'39" East, a 
distance of 429.85 feet to a point 528.00 feet (32 rods) north of the north right of way line of 
State Highway 54, Project No. F AP ANF AS 61 and from which a 1" steel pin, as shown per 
Record of Survey, instrument No. 1621187, bears North 62°05'52" East, 3.13 feet, more or 
less, said point being 384.24 feet left of Station 977+03.96 ofUS-95, Project No. A009{791) 
Highway Survey; 
thence South 89°43'25" East, a distance of 115.52 feet, to a point on a 1738.51 foot radius 
non-tangent curve to the left, concave to the west, the center of which bears North 81 °05 '00" 
West, said point being 268.78 feet left of Station 976+99.56 of US-95, Project No. 
A009{791) Highway Survey; 
thence northerly, on said curve, through a central angle of 14°03'44", an arc distance of 
426.69 feet, a chord bearing of North 1 °53 '08" East, and a chord distance of 425.62 feet to a 
point being i65.00 feet south of the south line of that parcel described by said Decree of 
Condemnation; said point being 214.69 feet left Station 981+53.58 ofUS-95, Project No. 
A009(791) Highway Survey; 
thence continuing northerly, on said curve, through a central angle of 5°29'44'', an arc 
distance of 166. 75 feet, a chord bearing of North 7°53 '36'' West, and a chord distance of 
166.69 feet, to the POINT OF BEGINNING .. 
Said Tract contains 710,634 square feet or 16.314 acres, more or less. 
Located between Project Centerline Stations 972+54.46 Left and 983+30.84 Left. 
Together with and subject to covenants, easements and restrictions of record. 
. .. 
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Idaho Transportation Department 
US-95, Garwood to Sagle- Athol Segment 
Project No. A009(791) 
Key No. 09791 
August 2, 2010 
Assessor's Parcel No. 53N03W-10-5000 
And 53N03W-10-6100 
710,634 Sq.Ft (16.314 Acres) 
_ Page3 of3 
Basis of bearing is North 1 °27' 15" East, a distance of 2652.41 feet, between a fourid railroad 
spike, per Comer Perpetuation and Filing Record No. 2076S4000 marking the Southwest 
comer of Section 10, and the found 2-1/2 inch diameter aluminum cap monument, per Comer 
Perpetuation and Filing Record No. 1213669, marking the West Quarter comer of Section 
10, both in Township 53 North, Range 3 West, Boise Meridian. 
Prepared by David Evans and Associates, Inc August 2, 2010 
End of Description 
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STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington) 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
2012 JUL -2 AH 9: IJ6 
REMITTITUR 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38511 
Kootenai County Court No. 2010-
10095 
TO: FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF KOOTENAI. 
The Court having announced its Opinion in this cause June 1, 2012, which has 
now become final; therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the District Court shall forthwith comply with 
the directive of the Opinion, if any action is required, and; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent IDT's costs on appeal in the 
amount of$463.40 be, and herew are, allowed. 
DATED this 05 day of June, 2012. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Judge 
Publisher(s) 
Clerk of the~ Court 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Dougias S, Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE IDAHO TRANSPORTATION 




HJ GRATHOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VIN GS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISALLOW COSTS AND 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS 
CO1\1ES NOW Defendant HJ Grathol, by and through their counsel of record, Ramsden 
& Lyons, LLP, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6) and (e)(6), and hereby objects and moves to 
disallow the claimed costs and attorney's fees of the Plaintiff set forth in the memorandum filed 
by Plaintiff on June 18, 2012. Defendant's objection to the claimed costs and attorney's fees is 
made on the following basis: 
(a) Plaintiff has failed to identify the statutory basis for an award of fees to a 
government entity ; 
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR 
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(b) Plaintiff fails to argue that the Defendant acted without a reasonable basis in fact 
or law; 
( c) The Acarrequi factors only provide for an award of attorney fees to a condemnee 
in the event such condemnee is found to be a prevaiiing party; 
(d) Plaintiffs December 15, 2011 offer was not made within a reasonable time after 
the institution of the action for condemnation; 
(e) The Judgment entered by the Court exceeded Plaintiffs pre-litigation offer by 
$104,000 (18%); 
(f) The application for costs and fees fails to comport to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3); and 
(g) The costs and attorney's fees claimed are unreasonable and excessive. 
This objection is further supported by Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Disallow and Objection to Plaintiffs Application for Attorneys Fees and Costs and the 
supporting Affidavits filed concurrently herewith. 
DATED this 2nd day of July, 2012. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
~,,~~·~.opher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
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P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
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__ Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
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Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
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CU'4mAJ&l 
DEPOT~- rr 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VIN GS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
DISALLOW COSTS AND 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS 
COMES NOW, Defendant HJ Grathol, by and through its counsel of record, Ramsden 
& Lyons, LLP, and hereby submits Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Fees and 
Costs. 
INTRODUCTION 
This case involved the condemnation of private property for a highway improvement 
project. As condemnation cases go, it was more complicated than some, but nothing about this 
case merits ITD's claimed expenditures (of costs and attorney fees) totaling over $906,000.00, 
and nothing about this case merits ITD trying to impose those costs and fees upon HJ Grathol 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 





as the condemnee. 
ARGUMENT 
1. ITD is not entitled to attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
In order to be awarded attorney fees, a part'y must actually assert the specific statute or 
common law rule on which the award is based. It is incumbent on the moving party to assert the 
grounds upon which it seeks an award of attorney fees. The district court is not empowered to 
award fees on a basis not asserted by the moving party. Bingham v. Montane Resource 
Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 987 P.2d 1035 (1999). Further, the support for the request for fees 
must be garnered by the court and counsel at the time the request is made. Fournier v. Fournier, 
125 Idaho 789, 791, 874 P.2d 600,602 (Ct.App.1994). 
In support of its claim for attorney's fees, ITD has only argued it is entitled to fees under 
one authority: Idaho Code § 12-121. ITD has not argued any other authority in support of its 
request for fees and costs. Because ITD has failed to cite any other statutory basis in its request 
for fees, and because §12-121 is inapplicable, ITD's claim for fees must be denied. 
Section § 12-121 of the Idaho Code is inapplicable to ITD as demonstrated through prior 
case law and specifically the "law of the case;" - that is the law of this case. On June 1, 
2012, two weeks prior to ITD's filing of its Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, the Idaho 
Supreme Court issued its decision on Grathol's appeal (of the grant of early possession taken 
during these condemnation proceedings). 1 On appeal ( as here), ITD sought attorneys fees 
citing Idaho Code § 12-121. ITD argued that HJ Grathol acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law in contesting the scope of the take. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected ITD's 
1 A copy of that decision is even attached as Exhibit E to the Affidavit of Mary York in Support of ITD' s Motion 
for Fees. 
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argument for fees and expressly held that Idaho Code § 12-121 is inapplicable to ITD. The 
Court's ruling could not be clearer: 
This Court denies the Board's request because LC. § 12-117 is the 
exclusive means for awarding attorney's fees for actions 
involving state entities. See Potlatch Educ. Ass 'n v. Potlatch Sch. 
Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630,635,226 P.3d 1277, 1282 (2010). 
See, State v. HJGrathol, Docket No. 38511, June 1, 2012 at p. 8. (emphasis added) 
The "law of the case" doctrine provides that when "the Supreme Court, in deciding a 
case presented, states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such 
pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent 
progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal." Suitts v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, 
NA., 110 Idaho 15, 21, 713 P.2d 1374, 1380 (1985) (quoting Fiscus v. Beartooth Elec. Coop., 
Inc., 180 Mont. 434, 435, 591 P.2d 196, 197 (1979); Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709, 201 
P.3d 1282, 1286, 2009 WL 213074 (2009). 
Here, the Idaho Supreme Court explicitly ruled only four weeks ago that§ 12-121 does 
not allow for fees to ITD, yet ITD now again requests an award under that code section, 
contrary to the Supreme Court's decision. ITD makes no effort to explain any basis for 
differentiating this fee application from the one that the Supreme Court just rejected and ITD 
offers no argument for the modification of that "law of the case." If any action is worthy of 
§12-121 sanctions (or I.R.C.P. ll(a)(l)) in this case, it is ITD's filing of this motion in direct 
contravention of the Supreme Court's clear directive in this very case. 
2. ITD is not entitled to attorneys' fees or costs under Acarrequi. 
Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983) does 
not provide any authority for the notion that the condemning party may recover attorney fees 
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from the condemnee. In Acarrequi, the Idaho Supreme Court considered the appeal of the trial 
court's automatic award of fees to the landowner in a condemnation proceeding. In that case 
the landowner moved for costs/fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5). The 
Idaho Supreme Court rejected the district court's automatic award of attorney's fees and 
adopted a new standard governing the award of attorney's fees to condemnees. 
The Acarrequi Court recognized that the requirements of demonstrating frivolity, 
unreasonableness or lack of foundation by the State to award a condemnee attorneys fees 
( under Idaho Code § 12-121) presented too great a burden on the landowner since it is "seldom 
that that a government entity can be shown to have initiated a condemnation action frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation." Id. at 876-877, 673 P.2d 1070-1071. Thus the Court 
found that "any opportunity to seek attorney's fees by the condemnee would lie only in the 
condemnor's failure to make a reasonable offer of settlement, which inaction forces the 
condemnee to trial with the resultant expenses for attorneys' fees." Id. at 877, 673 P.2d 1071. 
( emphasis added) The Acarrequi Court recognized that a condemnee has done nothing to bring 
an action upon himself except by having owned property the State has chosen to appropriate. 
Id. Therefore, holding the condemnee to a standard of proof that the State acted unreasonably 
or frivolously would all but deprive the condemnee of a basis to recoup his legal costs for 
having been sued in the first place. 
The Acarrequi Court noted that under prior case law, condemnors were required to pay 
all costs incurred in the condemnation proceedings. Id. at 876, 673 P.2d 1070, citing Idaho 
Code§ 7-717; Bassett v. Swenson, 51 Idaho 256, 5 P.2d 722 (1931); Rawson-Works Lumber 
Co. v. Richardson, 26 Idaho 37, 141 P.74 (1914). Based on these holdings, the Acarrequi 
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Court carved out a new "rule" that would allow for an award of attorney's fees to the 
condemnee, guided by the court's discretion and the condemnee's costs could be awarded 
under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C). Id. at 877,673 P.2d at 1071. 
Acarrequi then laid out some guiding principles for the trial court to consider m 
exercising its discretion to award fees and costs to a condemnee. In doing so, the Court 
emphasized that those principles were not rigid guidelines within which a trial court is required 
to operate but instead were factors to be considered in evaluating a condemnee's fee request. Id. 
at 878, 673 P.2d at 1072. Nowhere did the Acarrequi court hold that its guiding principles 
should ever inure to the benefit of the condemnor. 
In fact, Acarrequi holds that "except in the most extreme and unlikely situation, we 
cannot envision an award of attorneys' fees and costs to a condemnor." Id. at 878, 673 P.2d 
1072. ( emphasis added) The Court then observed that, while a ultimate verdict is far from a 
perfect point of departure in gauging the reasonableness of the positions of the parties prior to 
trial, the Court would assume that a jury verdict would approximate the true just compensation 
owed. Id. Because a verdict should be more reliable than the "highly divergent evidence of 
values," the Court held that such verdict would approximate true "just compensation" within a 
margin of error of 10% ±- Thus, was created the "Acarrequi rule," holding that "in considering 
whether to award attorneys' fees to a condemnee, a condemnor must have reasonably made a 
timely offer of settlement of at least 90% of the ultimate [ award]." Id. at 878, 1172. ( emphasis 
added) 
Clarifying what is meant by way of a "timely" offer of settlement, the Court stated: 
An offer should be made within a reasonable period after the 
initiation of the action, to relieve the condemnee not only of the 
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expense but of the time, inconvenience and apprehension 
involved in such litigation, and also to eliminate the cloud which 
may hang over the condemnee's title to the property. 
Id. at 878, 1172. 
Subsequently, in State ex rel. Smith v. Jardine, 130 Idaho 318 (1997), the Idaho 
Supreme Court upheld the lower court's award of attorneys' fees to the condemnee who did not 
"beat" the State's "Acarrequi offer." The Jardine Court found that the lower court did not 
abuse its discretion when it refused to consider the State's "Acarrequi offer" because the offer 
was not made within a "reasonable period after the institution of the action." In Jardine, the 
condemnor's offer was made more than eight months after it filed the condemnation action, and 
by the time the offer was made, Jardine had already incurred substantial costs and the net result 
of any of such offers would have "netted" the condemnee little benefit. Id. at 322, 940 P.2d 
1141. 
Here, ITD claims that it should be entitled to attorneys' fees and costs solely by reason 
that the ultimate award of $675,000 was less than ITD's "Acarrequi offer" of December 15, 
2011. However, ITD initially offered Grathol only $571,000 as total just compensation for the 
subject property. This was ITD's offer at the time the Complaint was filed on November 19, 
2010, and no subsequent offer was made by ITD until thirteen months after the Complaint was 
filed. Moreover, by the time ITD's subsequent "Acarrequi offer" was made, Grathol had 
already retained lawyers, experts, defended extensive motion practice, attended depositions, 
engaged in extensive discovery and had incurred significant costs. It was not until over a year 
of litigation had taken place that ITD finally offered something greater than what the court 
ultimately awarded. 
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3. Idaho case law has never held that a condemnor is entitled to attorneys' fees or 
costs in a condemnation proceeding. 
There is not a single published Idaho case in which attorneys' fees have been awarded to 
a condemnor. In fact, Defendant's counsel has been unable to locate a single case anywhere -
which supports ITD's claim for fees. Presumably, if any such case existed, ITD would have 
cited to it. 
Instead, to support its motion, ITD flatly misrepresents the holding in State v. Ivan H. 
Talbot Family Trust, 120 Idaho 825, 820 P.2d 699 (1991). ITD claims (erroneously) that 
Talbot extended the application of the Acarrequi cost and fees analysis to apply to both the 
landowner and the State. Not so. The Supreme Court in Talbot simply clarified the construction 
of the Acarrequi factors for a condemnee so as to reconcile those factors with I.R.C.P. 
54(d)(l)(B). Id. at 829, 820 P.2d 699. The Talbot Court never extended those factors for an 
award of fees to a condemnor. Instead, Talbot simply reaffirmed the lower court's ruling that 
the landowner in that case was not the 'prevailing party' for an award of attorneys' fees. This 
holding is dramatically different from what ITD claims Talbot says. ITD asserts that Talbot 
says a condemning agency was found to be a prevailing party for purposes of a fee award. 
Nonsense. No such finding was made in Talbot. Indeed the State was even denied attorneys' 
fees on appeal in that case. Id. ITD misrepresents Talbot to support its arguments. Grathol 
implores this Court to simply read Talbot to see the truth. 
4. ITD is not the prevailing party for purposes of assessing costs. 
The application of the Acarrequi factors are to be applied as part of the discretionary 
function of the court in determining whether to award a condemnee not just fees, but also costs. 
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In the conclusions of the Jardine opinion, the Idaho Supreme Court summarized the 
intent, rationale and application of Acarrequi: 
Acarrequi created a basis for the discretionary award of attorney 
fees "to the condemnee without a showing and finding that the 
action was brought and pursued 'frivolously, unreasonable or 
without foundation,' as required under LC. § 12-121 and 
LR.C.P.54(e)(l). 105 Idaho at 876-77, 673 P.2d 1070-71. The 
Court said that one of the rationales for this approach is to relieve 
the condemnee of the expense of defending against the 
condemnation where the condemnee is determined to be the 
prevailing party. Id. at 878, 673 P.2d at 1072. Otherwise a 
condemnee who is determined to be a prevailing party will be 
deprived of part of the just compensation to which the condemnee 
is entitled. Idaho Const. art. I, § 14; LC. § 7-717. See also 
Rawson-Works Lumber Co. v. Richardson, 26 Idaho 37, 46, 141 
P. 74, 76 (1914) ("It has been established by the decisions of this 
court and is well supported by the principles of justice and the 
constitution that the condemnor must pay just compensation for 
the property taken and must pay all costs necessarily incurred in 
the condemnation proceedings.") 
Jardine at 322-23, 940 P.2d 1141-42. The Idaho Supreme Court has clearly defined the 
discretionary parameters for an award of attorneys' costs to a condemnee. It has never applied 
such factors to a request for fees or costs by a condemnor as it "could not envision" an award of 
fees and costs to a condemnor. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873,673 P.2d 1072. 
ITD's interpretation of Acarrequi and Jardine is legally unsupported. The factors 
enunciated in those cases do not apply in the reverse to allow a condemnor to claim fees and 
costs. ITD's argument fails factually as well as procedurally. As stated in Acarrequi and as 
reaffirmed in Jardine, in order to constitute a reasonable offer of settlement, a condemnor must 
make the offer within a reasonable period of time after initiation of the action in order to 
relieve the condemnee of the expenses involved in such litigation. Acarrequi at 878, 673 P .2d at 
1072. Jardine at 322-23, 940 P.2d 1141-42. In Jardine, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
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court's discretionary finding that an offer made eight months after the suit was filed would not 
be taken into account in determining whether the condemnee was entitled to fees. Instead, the 
trial court only considered the State's initial offer and compared that with the verdict; finding 
that the condemnee prevailed when compared to the initial offer. 
In this case, on June 17, 2010, four months before the Complaint was filed, ITD 
presented an offer to Grathol in the amount of $571,000.00 - based on the appraisal of Stan 
Moe. Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Opposition to Fees, Exhibit C. 
On June 28, 2010, Grathol rejected ITD's offer, indicating what its review of 
comparable properties would yield. Grathol did not present a demand, merely an assessment of 
its view of values. Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Opposition to Fees, Exhibit D. 
On October 27, 2010 (prior to the Complaint), Grathol informed ITD's counsel that it 
valued the take in the area of $3.5M. Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Opposition to Fees, 
Exhibit E. Further discussions led to Grathol offering to settle for $2.8M. 
On November 17, 2010, ITD rejected Grathol's offer of $2.8M but did not make a 
counter proposal for settlement. Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Opposition to Fees, 
Exhibit F. {Of note in this communication is that ITD impresses on Grathol the importance of 
granting early possession of the property as an element for the Court to consider in awarding a 
property owner attorney fees in a condemnation case. ITD never once claimed that it would be 
entitled to attorneys' fees under the same grounds until it filed this specious motion.} 
On that same date, November 17, 2010, ITD filed its Complaint. On December 21, 2010 
ITD moved for possession of the Subject Property and tendered the amount of $571,000.00 as 
just compensation to the Court pending the ultimate resolution on the issue of just 
compensation. 
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On November 17, 2011, Grathol communicated with ITD questioning the status of 
Grathol's prior offer of settlement. Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Opposition to Fees, 
Exhibit G. Grathol suggested to ITD that it should avoid the risks associated with trial and 
possibly an appeal and advised ITD that even if the Court did not award any additional 
amounts, ITD would not be entitled to attorneys fees and costs. 
On December 15, 2011, ITD submitted its purported "Acarrequi" off er in the amount of 
$1.lM, which Grathol rejected after determining that the offer included the amount already 
deposited with the Court. Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Opposition to Fees, Exhibit 
H. On December 19, 2011, ITD disclosed its "rebuttal experts" and produced a copy of the 
Pynes appraisal which set forth an estimate of"just compensation of $625,000.00." Affidavit of 
Christopher D. Gabbert in Opposition to Fees, Exhibit I. 
On December 29, 2011, Grathol presented a counter offer in the amount of 
$2,450,000.00 together with payment of either all of Grathol's attorney's fees to date or 80% of 
ITD's attorneys' fees, whichever was less. Affidavit a/Christopher D. Gabbert in Opposition to 
Fees, Exhibit J. On January 10, 2012, ITD rejected Grathol's offer of settlement. Affidavit of 
Christopher D. Gabbert in Opposition to Fees, Exhibit K. 
More than a year after making its only "timely" offer of $571,000, ITD produced a 
"rebuttal" appraisal report of Pynes, which provided a value of just compensation in the amount 
of $675,000. Pynes' opinion of value was $104,000 higher than ITD's initial offer. The Court 
ultimately adopted Pynes' value opinion and awarded Grathol $675,000.00. This amount is in 
addition to over $906,000.00 ITD claims it spent in fees and costs to achieve the outcome. Yet, 
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ITD now claims that it is the "prevailing party." Spending nearly $1.58 million2 to condemn a 
parcel supposedly worth $571,000.00 does not sound like a "prevailing party. Even if 
Acarrequi and its progeny allowed the condemnor to be awarded fees and costs (which they do 
not), ITD never submitted a qualifying "Acarrequi offer" within a reasonabie period of time 
after the action was initiated. Waiting thirteen months to submit an offer, while burning 
through hundreds of thousands of dollars in costs and fees is unreasonable. 
A condemnation "is not a market overt situation ... there is no room for the condemnor to 
offer less than the ascertained value, and thereafter bargain and haggle. The condemnor ... must 
fairly and openly deal with the landowner." Acarrequi at 879 (Bistline, dissenting). ITD's 
best "offer" was only made after Grathol had incurred substantial costs and fees defending the 
litigation. Because ITD delayed the submission of its "Acarrequi offer" until well into the 
litigation, and Grathol had already been forced to incur substantial costs; the December 15, 
2011 communication was not a qualifying "Acarrequi offer" and the Court should rightly 
compare the ultimate award to the only timely off er made. The only off er that was timely 
submitted by ITD was its initial offer of $571,000. The ultimate award was $104,000.00 
greater than that offer, an increase in favor of Grathol of 18% ($104,000/$571,000). That 
makes Grathol the prevailing party. By reason of its efforts in defending the litigation, Grathol 
received 18% more than was ever timely offered by ITD. 
5. ITD's attorneys repeatedly misrepresent Grathol's position on "just 
compensation" in order to justify their excessive attorneys' fees. 
There is a quote widely attributed to Germany's infamous Propaganda Minister Joseph 
Goebbels that is apropos here: 
"If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will 
2 $675,000.00 plus ITD's claimed costs and fees of$906,000.00 = $1,581,000.00. 
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eventually come to believe it.*** The truth is the mortal enemy of the 
lie, and thus by extension, the truth is the greatest enemy of the State. " 
Here the "State" ( or perhaps more accurately the attorneys for the State) repeatedly 
misrepresent what Grathol sought as just compensation. In fact, in the motion papers filed in 
support of its request for fees and costs, ITD states no less than five times that Grathol allegedly 
demanded over $7 million as just compensation.3 For ITD to make such a claim on five 
separate occasions, it must be of significant importance to that party and must be supported by 
facts. However, as with much of the arguments for its outrageous fee request, the truth behind 
ITD's hyperbole is non-existent. 
Grathol never demanded $7,369,500.00 in just compensation in this case. Never - and 
ITD's counsel knows it.4 Normally such misrepresentations could be chalked up to overly 
exuberant advocacy. However, given the context in which this argument is raised, and raised 
again and again, it is apparent that ITD's counsel is trying to mislead this Court, and perhaps 
others, in order to try to justify the enormous fees it claims and the lavish costs it expended. 
Such actions cannot be countenanced and such misrepresentations should not be tolerated by 
this, or any, Court. 
3 ITD's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, p. 2. ("HJ Grathol had initially sought over $7 million in just 
compensation.") 
ITD's Brief in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, pp. 2, 11, 26. ("Yet Grathol made demands and 
sought to recover as much as $7,369,500.00 for the taking of J 6.314 acres of the 56.8-acre parcel.") ("Grathol 
made demands and sought to recover as much as $7,369,500.00 for the taking.") ("Grathol sought to recover as 
much as $7,369,500.00 in this case ... ") 
Affidavit of Mary York in Support ofITD's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, p. 4. (" ... $7,000.000 originally 
sought by Grathol. .. ") 
4 Hrg. on Feb. 22. 2011, M. York preliminary remarks: " ... Grathol has asserted more than $7 million in 
damages ... " Hrg. Tr. p.5. 
D. Marfice: Regarding York's representation to the court that Grathol seeks: " ... $7 million - it has never been the 
defendant's position that that's the measure of compensation that is appropriate here." Hrg. Tr. P. 656. 
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ITD's brief repeatedly claims that Grathol "made demands" and "sought to recover" as 
much as $7,369,500.00 for the taking. As support, ITD cites as follows: "(see Grathol's Third 
Supp. Resps. To Discovery, at 7-8 (Ex. K to Feb. 29, 2012 York Affidavit.)" ITD's Brief at pp. 
2, 11. However, the discovery responses cited to by ITD don't say anything of the sort. The 
specific response provides, in pertinent part: 
Hughes Investments factors in the value for the remammg 
property on the assumption of at least an additional three year 
delay in the ability to sell by reason of construction. Also, it 
should be noted that spreading the cost of the $1,000,000 sewer 
system to significantly fewer users will greatly decrease the 
value of the remainder land. At a discount rate of 10% per 
annum, the NPV of the remainder property is $2,722,000, a 
reduced value of $947,000. To summarize $2,532,578 in the 
land value of the take+ $300,000 for construction materials 
+ a reduction in value for the remaining property waiting 
for completion of construction of $947,000 = $3,779,578. This 
is the absolute minimum value that should be used as just 
compensation for the take. 
(See, Grathol's Third Supplemental Responses to Discovery at 7-8), Affidavit of Christopher D. 
Gabbert in Opposition to Fees, at Exhibit A. It is important to note that the information 
provided above was in response to ITD's broad, all-encompassing interrogatory requesting the 
subject matter and every nuance upon which all experts were expected to testify. The 
information provided in response above was about Alan Johnson's potential testimony. The 
interrogatory cited does not, in any reasonable interpretation, support the position asserted by 
ITD that Grathol "demanded" or even "sought" $7M. The response to interrogatories was not a 
demand for just compensation. It was an explanation by Johnson of the potential profit 
expected by Grathol. ITD knows this, and the offers of settlement confirm it. 
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None of the Grathol's offers of settlement described in Section 4 above even come close 
to the $7.4 million dollar number being repeatedly, and disingenuously, thrown around by ITD. 
The simple truth of the matter is this: The highest settlement demand/request ever made by 
Grathol was $2.8 million. ITD rejected that and then proceeded to spend a minion doHars 
litigating. 
In fact, the only talk of any numbers even approximating the amounts ITD is alleging as 
"demands" was during the deposition of Alan Johnson on November 18, 2011 when Johnson 
was asked (by ITD's counsel) to explain what Johnson described as an "alternative analysis" 
which was intended to "give a different perspective as to if we were to develop the property 
what the anticipated value would be of the site if it was developed as it exists today without the 
take." Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Support of Defendant's Objection to Fees, Exhibit 
B, Depa. Johnson at p. 104, 11. 15-18. This was Johnson's analysis as to why the development 
of the Grathol parcel made economic sense to him. It was not a "demand." 
Johnson testified that the potential profit to be realized from the development of the 
property with and without the take: 
Q. And that, I have written down as $1,493,000. So we'll say 
according to this alternative theory, in the after condition, or after 
the project's completed --- let me rephrase that. How would you 
characterize the 1.493 million dollars? 
A. I would characterize that as the potential profit after the 
take. 
Q. Potential profit after the take. And the potential profit 
without the take is $8,670,000. Correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. To get what you believe --- what you'll be damaged by the 
take is you would take the 8.67 number and subtract the 
$1,493,000. Is that correct? 
A. That would be legitimate, yes. 
Q. Is that what you anticipate testifying to regarding this 
alternative theory? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. So then if my numbers are correct, if you subtract those 
two numbers, that's approximately $7,177,000 in lost profits. 
A. I've not done the calculation, but I will agree to use your 
number. 
Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Opposition to Fees, Exhibit B, Depa. Johnson at pp. 
111-112, 11. 20-2, 1-17. Again, in this response to ITD' s attorney's questioning, Johnson talked 
about the fact that, in his opinion, the condemnation could affect the profitability of the 
development. Is this the support for ITD's claims that Grathol "demanded" $7.4M in just 
compensation for the taking? Johnson never said that. Grathol never demanded that. 
ITD's counsel is fully aware of the scope and extent of Grathol's settlement demands 
and are acutely aware that Grathol never demanded anything even close to $7 million. 
Unfortunately it appears that ITD ( or more accurately ITD's counsel) are purposely 
misrepresenting Grathol's settlement communications to the Court in order to justify the 
exorbitant amounts of attorney's fees and costs being claimed. While ITD's attorneys may have 
been able to justify spending nearly $IM in fees and costs to avoid a fictional $7.4M claim, 
such justifications are eroded when one acknowledges the demands by Grathol were far less. 
ITD's representations to the Court as to the nature of these settlement discussions is 
especially troubling in light of the legally unsupported position it is taking with respect to the 
authority to award a condemn or attorneys' fees in the first instance. These assertions are both 
factually and legally unsupported and calls into question ITD's obligations toward truthfulness 
in its representations to the Court. ITD's Motion accuses Grathol of "costly ... abuses and 
tactics" but ITD misrepresents legitimate discovery disagreement and arguments for damages 
as somehow being "vexatious." ITD even claims that Grathol's declination of court-ordered 
mediation indicated "the unwillingness of Grathol to try to resolve this matter." See, ITD's 
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Brief in Support, p. 3. This is also directly misleading in that it was Grathol which proposed 
mediation (more than once) and ITD declined! 
6. An award of attorneys' fees and costs to a condemnor would be unconstitutional. 
The just compensation clause of the Fifth A.i11endn1ent of the United States Constitution 
provides: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
United States Constitution 5th Amendment. 
The Idaho Constitution also guarantees its citizens the right of due process if private 
property is taken for a public use, pursuant to Article I, § 13, and provides for just 
compensation for such a taking, pursuant to Article I,§ 14. 
The failure to award attorney's fees incurred by a condemnee when it is determined to 
be prevailing under the Acarrequi factors would unconstitutionally deprive the condemnee of 
part of the just compensation to which it is entitled. State ex rel. Smith v. Jardine, 130 Idaho 
318,940 P.2d 1137 (1997). 
While Idaho Courts appear to have moved away from the premise that a condemnee is 
automatically entitled to its costs and fees in a condemnation action, there is no authority for 
ITD's proposition that a condemnor should ever be awarded fees. Such holding would not only 
reduce the actual just compensation owed for the taking as found by the court or jury, but could 
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result in the perverse outcome of a landowner being forced to pay the condemnor more than the 
landowner's just compensation. In fact, that is precisely the result ITD seeks here. 
In this case, ITD seeks $906,318.65 in fees and costs to be off-set against the award of 
$675,000.00 determined as just compensation. Tne obvious impact of this request is that, if 
granted, Grathol would be liable to ITD for $231,318.65 5 above and beyond the amount of just 
compensation Grathol received for 16 acres of its prime development property. At the end of 
the day, not only would the condemnee have its property taken but it would end up paying for 
the privilege simply because it opposed the State's assertion of what the property is worth. This 
result is even more perverse when you consider that as a result of Grathol's efforts at litigation, 
it increased the ultimate award by 18% over ITD's only timely offer. 
While Idaho case law has placed some constraints on the ability of a property owner to 
recover its own fees and costs, no courts in Idaho, nor anywhere else, have suggested that the 
amount of constitutionally required just compensation could ever be reduced by the 
condemnor's costs. Indeed, Idaho courts even recognize that interest must be paid on amounts 
offered by the condemnor to avoid failing to fully compensate the property owner for the loss of 
use of the property before just compensation is determined at trial. The failure to include such 
interest violates the intent of Article 1, Section 14 of the Idaho Constitution. Coeur d'Alene 
Garbage Serv. v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 114 Idaho 588, 593, 759 P.2d 879, 884 (1988). 
Idaho case law has recognized for over a century that condemnations are special actions 
where the condemnor should be required to pay for all costs of the proceeding. Rawson-Works 
Lumber Co. v. Richardson, 26 Idaho 37, 141 P.74 (1914), citing PortneufMarch Irr. Co. v. 
5 This amount does not include Grathol's attorneys' fees. See, Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert. 
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Portneuf Irr. Co., 19 Idaho 483, 114 P. 19 (1911). These cases have not been overturned or 
abrogated and no other case has ever held that a condemnee's right just compensation could be 
reduced by an award of attorneys' fees back to the condemnor. Because such a reduction 
would be constitutionally infirm under both Idaho's Constitution and the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment; IID's request for costs and fees must be denied on that basis as well. 
7. ITD's Claim to costs must be denied. 
Rule 54( d)( 1 ), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure deals with costs and the items allowed. 
Costs are allowed to the prevailing party unless otherwise ordered by the court; the court 
determines who the prevailing party is, and whether a party prevailed in part and did not 
prevail in part and apportions costs accordingly. Some costs are allowed as a matter of right, 
while others are discretionary and allowed when " ... they were necessary and exceptional 
costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interests of justice be assessed against the 
adverse party." (Emphasis added.) However, in condemnation actions, Idaho case law 
provides that a condemnor is liable for all costs of the proceeding. Rawson-Works Lumber 
Co. v. Richardson, 26 Idaho 37, 141 P.74 (1914), citing Portneuf-March Irr. Co. v. Portneuf 
Irr. Co., 19 Idaho 483, 114 P. 19 (1911). Further, even if there were legal support on which 
the court could award costs to the condemnor, ITD was not a "prevailing party" under the 
traditional interpretation of Rule 54( d)(l) since it ended up paying more than the amount of 
its own initial appraisal/offer for the Grathol property. ITD's December 15, 2011 offer was 
not presented within a reasonable time after the initiation of the litigation and was only made 
after Grathol had incurred substantial costs and fees in defending the condemnation action. 
As such, ITD cannot claim it is the prevailing party for an award of costs. Further objections 
to ITD's claimed costs "as a matter of right" under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C) are as follows: 
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d. Travel expenses of witness - ITD's claim of travel expenses for Hedley 
Construction at $386.70 is unreasonable. Hedley's testimony added nothing to further ITD's 
position as demonstrated by the fact that Hedley wasn't even mentioned in the court's 
1 1 • • 6 memoranaum aec1s1on. 
e. Expenses for certified copies of documents (Lis Pendens and Possession Order) -
IRCP 54(d)(l)(C)(5) allows this cost to a prevailing party if the certified copies were admitted 
as evidence in a hearing or the trial of an action. ITD fails to identify when such certified copies 
were admitted into evidence or for what purpose. 
f. Preparation of exhibits - ITD fails to provide any information to support the claim of 
$295.46 for the preparation of trial exhibits. 
h. Expert witness fees -ITD request $6,000.00 for expert witness fees for its experts to 
testify at trial. Grathol objects that some of these expert fees were not reasonably incurred. Stan 
Moe's testimony was severely impeached by inconsistencies in his reporting practices and 
subscribing different values to appraisals of the same property at the same time and the trial 
court apparently disregarded his testimony. Additionally, ITD's claim of expert witness fees for 
George Hedley is not reasonably incurred in the sense that Hedley's testimony added nothing to 
further ITD's position and instead only supported Grathol's claim of severance damage. 
i. Charges for reporting and transcribing - ITD seeks $5,684.10 for charges of 
reporting and transcribing depositions of Johnson, Reeslund, Sherwood, Terrell and 
Vandervert. The costs of these depositions are not reasonable, and are objected to by reason of 
the fact that they were unnecessary for the preparation of the case for trial. Not one of the 
6 Additionally, Grathol maintains that Hedley actually proved greater severance damages than Grathol was seeking. 
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depositions was entered into evidence or read to a witness at trial. 
j. Charges for copy of Deposition - ITD also seeks to recover $319.10 for copies of 
depositions of its own appraiser. These costs were unnecessary to prepare for the trial on the 
vaiuation of the Subject Property and as with all costs, are those to be borne by the condemn.or 
in condemnation proceedings. 
Last, ITD requests $196,103.59 as "discretionary costs" under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). 
These costs are mostly attributed to the expert fees of five different experts retained by ITD and 
are in addition to the expert fees claimed under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(c). Under this provision of the 
rule, a court may allow such costs "upon a showing that said costs were necessary and 
exceptional costs reasonably incurred." ITD has presented zero argument to demonstrate how 
any of these costs were necessary or exceptional. There is nothing exceptional about a 
condemnation of commercially zoned ground that would justify these costs as a discretionary 
award. Condemnation proceedings require expert opinion on valuation, and the fact that ITD 
hired two appraisers does not make this case unique, especially where one of the appraiser's 
opinions was rejected. Further, ITD is requesting expert fees for witnesses who never even 
testified at trial (Evans and Associates and Hooper Cornell). Idaho courts have rejected such 
claims for fees of non-testifying experts as discretionary costs. See, Swallow v. Emergency Med. 
of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 67 P.3d 68 (2003). 
Because ITD has failed to present any argument or explanation as to why such costs 
were necessary, exceptional or reasonable, ITD's request should be rejected. 
8. ITD"s requested attorney fees are unreasonable and unwarranted. 
Finally, ITD requests an award of fees incurred in the prosecution of its case for 
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attorneys, associates, paralegals and technical support personnel with rates rangmg from 
$145/hour up to $335/hour under I.R.C.P. 54(e). Again, an award of attorneys' fees under this 
rule is permissible only if provided for by statute or contract. ITD has failed to identify any 
statute from which its claim for fees originates. Tnus the Court does not even need to get to the 
reasonableness of the attorneys' fees request under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), because it has not been 
provided any legal basis from which to make an award. 
However, if this Court were to consider the fees requested, a consideration of the factors 
ofl.R.C.P 54(e)(3) shows that the fees claimed are extravagant and unreasonable. 
First, the judgment entered by the Court on June 26, 2012 did two things; it confirmed 
title in the Grathol property to ITD and it acknowledged receipt of payment (into the court) 
for the judicially determined amount of just compensation. 
As to the final resolution of these issues, both parties are prevailing in the sense that a) 
ITD successfully prosecuted its claim for acquiring title to the Grathol property and b) 
Grathol successfully increased the amount of just compensation for the taking above and 
beyond ITD's initial offer by $104,000.00 (18%). However, as this case is a condemnation 
proceeding, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that the traditional rules of attorney's 
fees and costs awards do not apply, since a condemnee could never really "prevail." Idaho 
courts have also recognized that in these proceedings the condemnor is required to pay all 
costs, and a condemnee would be entitled to fees (as well) if it is determined to be a 
prevailing party under the Acarrequi factors. 
In this respect, even if this Court found that ITD was a prevailing party and somehow 
entitled to an award of attorneys' fees; ITD has included in its request fees incurred on 
matters which it could not be found the prevailing party. (See Order Re: Plaintiffs Motion 
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for Summary Judgment, February 3, 2012, denying summary judgment on issues of visibility, 
access and impacts on development plans; Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Compel, 
dated October 26, 2011). York's Affidavit in support of fees and costs dated June 18, 2012, 
reveais Holland & Hart requests fees even reiated to issues where ITD clearly did not prevail, 
including the motions for summary judgment and their opposition to Grathol's Motion to 
Compel. For example, Holland & Hart's detailed fee report, shows that between September 
15, 2011 and October 19, 2011, ITD's attorneys billed over 90 hours related solely to 
Grathol' s Motion to Compel. Grathol prevailed on that motion by decision of the Court and 
ITD was compelled to respond to the outstanding discovery. Grathol did not move for costs 
and fees as a result of that motion, but ITD now claims an entitlement to its fees related to 
that issue. 
Also, ITD's fee report is replete with references to research regarding the authority of 
ITD's director to authorize and execute administrative orders of condemnation. Those issues 
were appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court and were not part of this proceeding after they 
were appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court denied ITD's claim of attorney's fees on appeal, 
yet those fees have now reappeared in this matter. 
Next, the attorney's fees charged by Grathol's lawyers for defense of the case differ 
dramatically from the fees applied for by ITD's legal team for prosecution of the action. The 
variance is astounding. The Grathol total attorney hours are 930.6 compared to ITD's 
counsel's total claimed hours of 2,720. Remember, this entire litigation spanned only 14 
months, start to finish. The dollar amounts are $212,699.00 for Grathol compared to 
$724,136.00 for ITD. The time records submitted by ITD are replete with duplicate internal 
entities for conferences and discussions involving multiple attorneys at the same time. 
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Frankly, the number of hours claimed in this case is simply unreasonable by any stretch of 
imagination. 
For example Holland & Hart billed more than 24 hours per day in the following 
entries: 
• 2/21/12 - 27.4 hours; 
• 2/24/12 - 28.3 hours; 
• 2/27/12 - 26.7 hours; 
• 2/28/12 - 38.8 hours; 
• 2/29/12 - 39.9 hours; 
• 3/4/12 - 39.8 hours; 
In fact for just the four and a half days of the court trial, ITD's attorneys and staff billed a 
total of 203 hours. 
The amount oftime and fees claimed by ITD's lawyers in this case is absurd. First, it 
tells the public that there is no limit to the amount of taxpayer dollars or resources that the 
State will pledge to get its way. A greater chilling effect on property owners resisting a 
condemnation could hardly be imagined. Second, ITD seems to be oblivious to the fact that 
the case could have probably been resolved without trial for less than the combined award, 
fees and costs it incurred. However, neither of these conclusions informs the Court on the 
question of the reasonableness of the hours and fees claimed. Objectively, they are excessive 
and exorbitant and were incurred simply by the reason that the State's lawyers had nearly 
inexhaustible resources and apparently little accountability. 
Finally, Grathol's position that Holland & Hart's hourly rates are too high (especially 
for State work) and the number of hours billed are too many, is confirmed by the Affidavits 
of Magnuson and Hazel, both experienced and reputable lawyers practicing in Idaho, 
including Kootenai County. They testify that the hours and rates for defense should not differ 
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substantially from the hours and rates of the Grathol lawyers who worked on the defense of 
the action. "What is a reasonable attorneys' fee is a question for the determination of the 
court ... it is proper that the court may have before it the opinion of experts." Smith v. Great 
Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 281, 561 P.2d 1299, 1314 (1977). See, Affidavits of John 
Magnuson and Joel Hazel. 
There is nothing about this case that was so unique or complicated to justify such 
expenses by the condemnor. ITD's explanation of such costs is deficient and unavailing and 
instead simply seeks to rehash old discovery disputes and arguments long since resolved by 
the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein above, ITD's Motion for Costs and Fees must be denied 
and Grathol should be declared the prevailing party under Acarrequi and Jardine and awarded 
its costs and fees. 
DATED this 2nd day of July, 2012. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
By:~~/~ 
Douglas.Marfice,OfeFirm 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
stopher D. Gabbert, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
> 
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I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of July, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas ~ Mail 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
__ OverrJ.ght tv1ail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
~Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 25 
1510 of 1617
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. l'.-farfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
STATE Of IOAHO l . : 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAlf SS FILED: .. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE IDAHO TRANSPORTATION 
DEPARTMENT, by and through THE 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ GRATHOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VIN GS 
BANK, a Washington corporation; and 
DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTOPHER D. 
GABBERT RE: ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AND COSTS 
CHRISTOPHER D. GABBERT, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as 
follows: 
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1. I am an attorney of record for the Defendant HJ Grathol in this action and 
therefore am aware of the facts surrounding this matter. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A are true and correct copies of pp. 7 and 8 of 
Grathol's Third Supplemental Discovery Responses, dated October 6, 2011. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of p. 104 and pp. 111-
112 of the Deposition of Alan Johnson, dated November 18, 2011. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of correspondence 
received on or about June 17, 2010, from ITD to Grathol. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of correspondence 
dated June 28, 2010, from Grathol to ITD rejecting ITD's offer. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of correspondence 
dated October 27, 2010, from Grathol to ITD proposing a settlement amount of $3.5M. 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of correspondence 
dated November 17, 2010, from ITD to Grathol rejecting ITD's settlement offer in the 
amount of $2.8M. 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of correspondence 
dated November 17, 2011, from Grathol to ITD requesting information on the status of any 
offers for settlement. 
9. Attached hereto as Exhibit H is a true and correct copy of correspondence 
dated December 15, 2011, from ITD to Grathol submitting a settlement offer in the amount 
of$1.1M. 
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10. On or about December 19, 2011, ITD disclosed its Rebuttal Experts and first 
provided Grathol a copy of the Pynes appraisal. Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a true and 
correct copy ofITD's Notice of Disclosure of Rebuttal Experts. 
11. Attached hereto as Exhibit J is a true and correct copy of correspondence 
dated December 29, 2011, from Grathol to ITD rejecting ITD;s offer and proposing a 
settlement amount of$2,450,000, and the payment of either all of Grathol's attorney's fees to 
date or 80% ofITD's attorneys' fees, whichever was less. 
12. Attached hereto as Exhibit K is a true and correct copy of correspondence 
dated January 10, 2012, from ITD to Grathol rejecting the offer of settlement. 
13. The total hours that Grathol's counsel spent on the defense of this condemnation 
action were 930.6 hours at an average hourly rate of$230 at a total cost of$212,699.00. 
14. Grathol incurred court filing fees of $58.00 and expert witness fees for Sherwood 
in the amount of$15,000.00. 
15. The attorneys' fees are based upon a total of 930.6 hours billed by the attorneys 
at their respective hourly rates. 
16. The costs and attorney fees described above are true and correct to the best of my 
knowledge and belief and reflect actual costs and fees and billed to Grathol. The costs and fees 
were reasonably and necessarily incurred in this action and are in compliance with I.R.C.P. 
54(d)(5) and should be awarded to Grathol under LC. § 7-718 and I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C), 
54(d)(l)(D) and 54(e)(l). 
17. By comparison, Holland & Hart seeks attorney's fees and paralegal fees which 
total $724,136.00 for 2,720 hours of work. 
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18. I have an opinion that the Holland & Hart charges for attorney's and paralegal 
fees. My opinion are: 
a. Excessive and unreasonable and not in keeping with the prevailing 
charges for like work in Idaho, or at the least, in the First Judicial District. 
b. Unreasonable because the hourly rates of the lawyers involved are too 
high; and 
c. Unreasonable because too much time was spent by the lawyers working 
on the case; the time is excessive. 
19. I have an opinion as to what reasonable attorney's and paralegal fees ought to 
be for this case. My opinion is: The fees for prosecution of the suit brought by ITD ought to 
be similar to the fees for defense of the case, because the time spent by the lawyers for the 
plaintiff and for the defendant ought to be approximately the same; and, there is no reason 
that the Holland & Hart hourly rate should be substantially higher than the prevailing hourly 
rate for like work in this geographic area. Doug Marfice and myself charge $250 and $230, 
respectively. Mr. Marfice's rate is the same charged by most similarly qualified and similarly 
experienced attorneys in this region, as is my rate. 
20. This case was not overly complex and the mere fact that it involved a 
condemnation does not make the case exceptionally novel or difficult; the law involving 
takings and just compensation in this case is not hard to understand even through there were 
some issues which would not be typical in a condemnation case. 
21. There was not anything about this case in terms of the issues or the 
circumstances that justifies the prosecution with six different lawyers, two paralegals and 
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two "tech support," with a total of at least 2,720 hours of work. The case was not so unique 
as to be either desirable or undesirable and we handled the case on an hourly fee basis in 
furtherance of a long-standing relationship with the defendant. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on this day ,2:~f July, 2012. ,,,,,,,,,,,, --
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P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
~Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
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It is estimated that the value in the subsurface gravel for road construction materials 
located underneath Hughes Investments property is approximately $300,000. However, the 
most important component to the determination of the value of the take is the time period still 
needed to complete construction. 
It is Mr. Johnson's op1nion that the remainder property, after the take, would be worth 
$3,669,300 (at the time of completion and the opening of the interchange) calculated as 
follows: 
(1) 3.87 acres west of the take is given a value of $674,300 (value is reduced due 
to the inability to provide sewer to the parcel across ITD's ROW; 
(2) 3.19 acres east of the ROW and west of Sylvan road at a value of$625,300; 
(3) · Travel Plaza east of Sylvan, 7 acres at $1,219,000; and 
(4) Remaining 26.42 acres with limited commercial viability priced at $1,150,000. 
Hughes Investments factors in the value for the remaining property on the assumption 
of at least an additional three year delay in the ability to sell by reason of construction. Also, 
it should be noted that spreading the cost of the $1,000,000 sewer system to significantly 
fewer users will greatly decrease the value of the remainder land. At a discount rate of l 0% 
per annum, the NPV of the remainder property is $2,722,000, a reduced value of $947,000. 
To summarize $2,532,578 in the land value of the take+ $300,000 for construction materials 
+ a reduction in value· for the remaining property waiting for completion qf construction of 
$947,000 = $3,779,578. This is the absolute minimum value that should be used as just 
compensation for the tak~. 
In the alternative, looking at the development potential before the take for the 
property's "highest and best use" the value is significantly higher. The potential profit, as is 
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shown in the pre-take budget, is estimated at just over $8,670,000. This approach provides 
Hughes Investments with the investment strategy required in our projects, developing and 
holding of at least a portion of the asset. The expected value after the take is: ITD 
condemnation $571,000 + NPV of the remainder property $2,722,000 = $3,293,000. 
Subtract the land and expenses to date of approximately $1,800,000 and the potential profit is 
only about 15% of that of the "highest and best use". 
GeoffReeslund anticipates testifying in the following areas: 
• Retail/commercial site planning and design, including building orientation, 
sight line and visibility criteria: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that the proposed elevated 
freeway, as it traverses the site, will greatly limit visibility and sight lines to the tenant 
buildings and signage in the development. Without at-grade pass-by visibility and identity, 
many potential customers may simply speed by the site without stopping. Conversely, the 
current at-grade highway with its signalized intersection provides superior visibility to the 
traveling public and also provides better access and an opportunity for encouraging 
customers to pull off the highway and patronize the project. 
• Division of property/parcel configurations: Mr. Reeslund intends to testify that 
the land taken for the freeway construction bifurcates the most usable portion of the property 
into two pieces, one of which is very small with limited use applications, poor access and · 
visibility; the other with poor visibility and very poor access opportunities: A third parcel will 
be created when right-of-say is acquired for the Sylvan frontage road_ use, further isolating a 
large portion of the property from the remainder and limiting the amoupt of property that 
could be developed for (highest and best-use) retail/commercial tenants. 
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Q. So then the difference between that, 
between the $3,669,000 number and the $2,722,000 is the 
$974,000. Correct? 
A. Correct. If I can use your calculator, I 
can confirm that. 
Q. That's okay for now. 
A. Okay. 
Q. And so this $947,000, those are damages 
that you believe you're entitled to because of the 
length it'll take -- the time it'll take ITD to complete 
the construction of the project? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And then you went back and added numbers 
altogether, the $2,532,000, which was for the 18 acres 
which is for the 16.34 acres plus Sylvan Road. Correct? 
A. Please state that again. 
Q. I apologize. Right now I'm going to run 
through -- you had a calculation here at the end. I 
just want to run through that really quick so we've got 
all those numbers worked out. 
A. Okay. 
Q. You said, to summarize, you added the 
$2,532,578, which you got from -- which was calculated 
on page 61 which included the 16.34 acres being acquired 
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Q, And then you added the $300,000 for the 
construction materials, which would be the gravel. 
Correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q, And then you added that to the $947,000, 
which is the damages you believe you're entitled to for 
the length it'll take ITD to complete the project? 
A. Correct. 
Q. That's how you arrived at $3,779,578? 
A. Correct. 
Q, And Is that the amount you're going to 
anticipate testifying to at trial? 
A. I'm not sure yet. 
Q, Why are you not sure? 




Why would the number change? 
If ITD delayed construction of the road. 
What other reasons would cause you to 
change your anticipated testimony? 
A. If the size of the take increased or 




















































is no value to the gravel. You know, obviously we can't 
ask for that and we won't ask for that. But those are 
the numbers that are the most accurate as of this date. 
Q. And other than the factors you've just 
listed, what other factors would cause you to change 
your anticipated testimony as to value? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. The next -- and you'll have to bear with 
me here. It says in the alternative you provide this 
alternative analysis here, the next paragraph. Do you 
see that? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. What was the purpose of providing that 
alternative analysis? 
A. To give a different perspective as to if 
we were to develop the property what the anticipated 
value would be of the site if it was developed as it 
exists today without the take. 
Q. And just to save us some time, are you 
anticipating testifying to this alternative theory? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Let's go through It then. It says, 
"In the alternative, looking at the development 
potential before the take for the property's 'highest 
and best use' the value is significantly higher. The 
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potential profit, as is shown in the pre-take budget, is 
estimated at just over $8,670,000." Is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And where did that $8,670,000 number come 
from? 
A. Bates sheet 1416 has a project budget. 
Q. Okay. I think that's also been previously 
introduced as Deposition Exhibit 34. Can you just 
confirm that that's the same one? 
A. Yes, it is. 
MR. TOLLEFSON: And Doug, if it's all right with 
you, I'd like to push back for a few minutes so we can 
get this section done before we break for lunch. 
MR. MARFICE: Sure. 
BY MR. TOLLEFSON: 
Q. So it might be easier to look at Exhibit 
No. 34. 
A. Okay. 
Q, And then flip back to page 8 of Exhibit 11 
so we've got those two in the same place. That might be 
the easiest way to go about doing this. 
MR. MARFICE: Just for my edification, is Exhibit 
34 the same as Bates --
MR. TOLLEFSON: Yes. 
MR. MARFICE: Okay. Thank you. 







Okay. How does that number relate to the 
$8.6 potential profit number? 
A. In its highest and best use as it is 
4 today, the potential profit, we have the potential of 
5 $8,671,994. 







the $8,671,000 number? 
A. That is our -- after the take, that's the 
anticipated value of what we think the potential profit 
would be. 
Q. So if I'm understanding you correctly, 
what you're saying is that this $3,293,000 number, 













after the take? 
A. The potential profit, but you've got to 
subtract $1.8 million for the value of the property when 
we bought it and our costs to date. 
Q. And where does that 1.8 million dollars 
come from? 
A. The value of the property, 1,450,000, and 
the budget soft costs that we've discussed earlier. And 
it's rounded down. It's probably closer to two million 
dollars now. 
Q. So even just -- we'll use the numbers 
you've got listed here. That If you take the 
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from that. Correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And then you would get -- your potential 
profit after the take you believe would be approximately 
$1,493,000? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And so then if I'm understanding this 
testimony correctly, then, in order to get under this 
alternative -- what we're calling alternative theory 
here -- is that you would subtract or you would take the 
8.6 million and then you would subtract the 1.493 
million, and that would be the number that you would be 
testifying to. Is that correct? 
A. Please state that again. 
Q. Sure. No problem. All right. So we've 
got what we'll call your after-take profits, which Is 
the 3.293 minus 1.88? 
A. Correct. 
Q, And that, I have written down as 
$1,493,000. So we'll say, according to this alternative 
theory, In the after condition, or after the project's 
completed -- let me rephrase that. How would you 
characterize that 1.493 million dollars? 
A. I would characterize that as the potential 
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l profit after the take. 
2 
3 
Q. Potential profit after the take. And the 
potential profit without the take is $8,570,000. 
4 Correct? 
5 A. That's correct. 













































be damaged by the take is you would take the 8.57 number 
and subtract the $1,493,000. Is that correct? 
A. That would be legitimate, yes. 
Q. Is that what you anticipate testifying to 
regarding this alternative theory? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So then if my numbers are correct, If you 
subtract those two numbers, that's approximately 
$7,177,000 In lost profits. 
A. I've not done the calculation, but I will 
agree to use your number. 
Q. Okay. So do you anticipate testifying 
that this project -- or excuse me -- that ITD's 
condemnation and construction will cost you 
approximately $7,177,000 In profits? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that number Is based upon lost 
profits, not based upon the value of the land. Correct? 
A. That ls correct. 
Q, 
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So if I understand your proposed testimony 
correctly is that you'll be testifying to both a 
$3,779,000 number and a $7,177,000 number? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you believe that both of those should 
be compensated -- excuse me. Would you add those two 
numbers together to get your ultimate just compensation 
or are those two separate valuations? 
A. They're two separate valuations. 
Q. So you believe that -- is it fair to say 
that your anticipated testimony will be that HJ Grathol 
should be compensated somewhere between 3.7 million and 
7.1 million dollars In damages? 
A. That would be my testimony. 
Q. Is that not accurate? 
A. It is accurate. That ls my testimony. 
Q. Do you believe that that's how much HJ 
Grathol has been damaged? 
A. I believe we have potential to be damaged 
that much, yes. 
Q, When you say potential to be damaged that 
much, what do you mean by potential? 
A. Again, It depends on, again, timing of the 
freeway, Is the take going to be larger/smaller, access 
off of 54, those sorts of things, I mean, just even as 
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P.O. Box 8700 
US-95, Garwood to Sagle, Athol Stage 
Newport Beach, CA 92658 
(208) 772-1200 
itd.idaho.gov 
The above project has been programmed for construction by the IDAHO TRANSPORTATION 
DEPARTMENT A portion of your property is required for construction. The property needed has been 
appraised to determine the fair market value payable to you. A qualified review appraiser has established 
the just compensation. As a Right of Way Agent for the State, I have been authorized to purchase the 
portion of your property that is required for this project. 
Our offer includes consideration for control of access and: 
14.46 acres land 
JUST COMPENSATION 
Incentive 






The above amount includes an incentive payment. The contract must be signed within 45 days of receipt of 
this offer to collect the incentive payment 
Enclosed is an acquisition packet containing the following items: 
Right of Way Contract (2 each) 
Warranty deed 
Project Plan Sheet(s) 
Acquisition Brochure 
Copy of Appraisal 
Advice of Rights Form 
Claim for Payment form 
Claim for Incidental Expenses DH-2041(1) 
Authorization Letter 
IRS Form W-9 
Memorandum of Contract of Sale 
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The deed and legal description identify the property being acquired and the interests therein. The Right of 
Way Contract shows the breakdown of the just compensation being offered. If this offer is satisfactory, 
please sign and complete the original documents and forms accordingly. Also, sign the copy of the Right of 
Way Contract, which will be executed and returned to you for your records. Return these items to this office 
and I will process them for the payment. 
Normal processing takes about 45 days. If there are other parties of interest (liens, mortgages etc.) on your 
property, the necessary clearances will have to be obtained prior to making the acquisition payment This 
can cause some delay, but generally does not present a problem. The State will obtain the clearances, title 
insurance and pay closing and recording fees. 
If I do not hear from you within 10 days, I will contact you by phone to answer any questions you may have or 
to set up a meeting date with you. If you wish to contact me, please call me at (208) 772~ 1200 and I should 
be able to answer any questions you might have. 
Your cooperation and prompt attention to this matter is appreciated. 
Sincerely, 
Ronald A. Harvey 
District 1 Right of Way Supervisor 
Idaho Transportation Department 
Enclosures 
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June 28, 2010 
District 1 Right of Way Supervisor 
Idaho Transportation Department 
600 West Prairie Ave .. 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815 









700 NORTIIWESJ BL.VD 
COEUR o·ALENE. ID 83814 
AU- A lTORNllYS LICENSED IN IDAIIO 
• LICENSED IN WASHINGTON 
Project Name: US-95, Garwood to Sagle, Athol Stage 
Dear Mr. Harvey: 
We've now had an opportunity to review the packet of materials which you dropped 
off last week concerning the proposed right of way acquisition of property on the northeast 
comer of US 95 and Hwy 54 owned and being developed by our client, HJ Grathol, a 
California general partnership, an affiliate of Hughes Investments, {collectively "Hughes"). 
This property has been approved by the Federal Highway Transportation Administration 
("FHTA") for a protective acquisition by ITD even though final environmental approvals are 
pending.. When this protective acquisition approval was granted several months ago, we 
were optimistic that ITD and FHTA were desirous of making a meaningful effort to acquire, 
at a fair price, property that will ultimately have to be acquired for the prqject to be 
completed. Based on the purchase offer you presented, it does not appear that the same 
desire exists from ITD's perspective. 
Hughes purchased this property and pursued the requisite zone change entitlements to 
do what they are in the business of doing - developing the property for profit. Various site 
plans have been formulated and discussion with prospective purchasers, tenants and 
commercial end-users have been underway for some time. Hughes has every intention of 
proceeding with its development plans. It will not, however, do so in a manner which takes 
into account the portion of the property which you need, knowing the unce1iainty of whether 
that acquisition ever actually takes place. In other words, if this acquisition cannot be 
negotiated and completed forthwith, my clients intend to forge ahead with their development 
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plans on the current highway aligument and you will be faced with ultimately having to 
condemn (and pay compensation for), improved commercial property. Perhaps this would 
include a hotel, travel plaza, grocery store, or myriad of other facilities based upon interested 
parties with whom our clients have been in negotiations for some time. While this property 
is vacant at this time, it will not remain so for long. Hughes is in the enviable position of not 
having to service debt on this parcel and has the wherewithal to develop and subdivide it, 
utilizing its own resources. 
I point these factors out not as threats, but as simple, factual statements justifying why 
it is in the best interest of ITD to promptly complete this acquisition at a fair price. Unless 
the Department is prepared to realign the highway corridor and abandon the interchange at 
this location, it seems inevitable that the subject portion of this property will have to be 
acquired. We can assure you it will be far more affordable to do so now while the property is 
vacant, than later. Having said that, this is all about price; and the price you have offered is 
not nearly enough. 
We have carefully reviewed the acquisition appraisal which you commissioned .. 
Suffice to say, we believe that the value opinion reached in that appraisal is woefully 
deficient Indeed, if Hughes Investments was not a sophisticated property owner with a keen 
understanding of the vagaries of the appraisal "arts," it could have easily have been insulted 
by the offer. Rather than spend an inordinate amount of time and effort critiquing the 
numerous apparent deficiencies in your appraisal, I would prefer to simply get to the bottom 
line as quickly as possible. Rest assured though, if it becomes necessary to do so, we are 
prepared to dissect your valuation analysis in excruciating detail. In the meantime, a11ow me 
to just point out the obvious: based on a comparative market valuation approach, there is no 
legitimate argument that the portion of Hughes' property you seek to acquire is not the 
"prime" piece of commercially developable property on that segment of highway, and is 
worth much more than your appraisal implies. 
According to your appraisal, of the three general1y accepted methods of evaluating 
property value, only the sales comparison approach appears to be apropos here. We concur. 
Your appraisal also correctly notes that when sufficient sales data of good comparable 
quality is available, this can be the most reliable indicator of market value. It is the 
utilization of "good comparable quality" sales data within your appraisal that is sorely 
lacking. Of the four "comparable" land sales selected in your valuation, only one seems to 
be a legitimate comparable. That is land sale No. 1 on the northeast corner of US Hwy 41 
and Prairie Avenue. Without critiquing the physical qualitative adjustments made to that sale 
by your appraiser, I would point out that it is at least highway frontage/corner property with 
commercial zoning in the same county as the subject parcel. It sold in October 2007 for 
approximately $3.00/sq. ft. By contrast, the remaining three comparables, one in 
Smelterville (Shoshone County), one in Sagle (Bonner County), and one light industrial 
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without highway frontage are not remotely on par with the Hughes propertJ and thus are not 
comparable, in the slightest Yet, utilizing these (not very) comparable properties and some 
creative adjustments, your valuation comes to the apparent conclusion that the comparable 
market value of the 16 acres of prime, commercial, highway frontage property is roughly . 84 
cents per square foot! 
Our cursory research indicates at least four legitimate comparables which are far 
superior in tem1s of their similarity, utility, location, etc.; these comparables range anywhere 
from $4,50/sq, ft. to $10.50/sq. ft. with the mean falling somewhere around $4.75 - $5.25/sq. 
ft for similar quality highway frontage/interchange property suitable for commercial 
development. 
Anecdotally, I would note that ($4.75 - $5.25) value range roughly equates to the 
price recently paid by your department for the acquisition of a parcel at the intersection of 
Hwy 95 and Garwood Road in July of 2008 ($5.30/sq. ft.). Therefore, our belief that the 
Hughes property is similarly valued, should come as no great surprise. Based on this range 
of values, the 16.34 acres you propose to acquire is realistically worth between 3 and 3 .5 
million dollars, taking into account only the land value and no ancillary impacts. If you can 
find examples of commercially zoned, highway frontage (on two highways), development 
ready land at the intersection of two highways for .84 cents per square foot, we would like to 
buy it. 
My clients are ready, willing and able to negotiate in good faith on the protective 
acquisition, but they have no interest whatsoever in considering a voluntary disposition of a 
significant piece of its property at a "fire sale" price. Likewise, my clients do not see any 
good purpose that will be served by engaging in some long, attenuated negotiation to sell this 
property to ITD when similar efforts could be directed toward its development to much better 
purposes. 
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1529 of 1617
EXHIBIT "E '' 
1530 of 1617
MICHAEi.. E RAMSDEN' 
M,\RC A I. YONS" 
DOUGLASS MAllFICE' 
MICl!Aol A EAi y• 
TEIUlANCF. R llt\llHlS' 
CiiiliSTOPiiEll ii GAUUEiil 
VIRGINIA McNUl .. f\' llOIIINSON 
1 lll(RON J DE SM EI 
WIJ.l-lAM F BOYD OF COUNSEL 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
ATTORNEYS AT L-AW 
PO llOX 1336 
COEUR D'AlENE, ID 83016-1336 
Hl El'IION£: (208) 664-SIJIO 
l',\CSIMJI.E: (200) 66•l·S08·1 
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WEBS!l'E: www ramsdenlyo11s com 
October 27, 2010 
Mary V. York 
Holland & Hart, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701 
srnEEr ADDRESS: 
700 NORTIIWEST Bl-VD 
COF.UH D'J\lf.NF., ID 831114 
J\[.[. A110RNF.YS LICENSF.U IN IDAIIO 
'l-lCF.NSED IN W/\SIIINGION 
Re: US - 95 Condemnation,- "Grathol" (Now "Hughes") Parcel No. I 9 
Dear Mary: 
Thank you for your call the other day. I know ITD, is anxious to get closure on this. 
As we discussed, the points of contenti"on here are, the value of the property ITD proposes to 
take and the delays, past and future. 
In the interest of brevity, I won't rehash all of our initial criticisms ofITD's valuation 
of the property. I will however, attach a copy of a letter I sent to Ron Harvey ( dated June 28, 
2010) which summarized our position at that time. Since then, we met with Ron and Jason 
Minzghor to discuss the project in further detail. Additionally, we conferred with several 
brokers and retained an appraiser, Skip Sherwood, who has generated a considerable amount 
of additional research data for us which is pertinent to the property valuation. Based upon 
this data, the value range ($4.75 - $5.25/sq. ft.) set forth in my June 28th letter was perhaps 
somewhat high, but it ,:vas far closer to the real value of the property than the .84¢/sq. ft. 
value placed on it by ITD's appraiser, Stan Moe. 
Hughes, which is in the business of acquiring, entitling and developing large 
commercial sites, acquired this property at a virtual fire-sale price of $1,450,000.00 in the 
spring of 2008. The property at that time was encumbered by debts significantly higher than 
the price paid by Hughes" It sits at the major signalized intersection of Highway 95 and 
Highway 54 and is ideally situated for any number of commercial or mixed use 
opportunities. Since then, Hughes has expended can-ying costs of around $390,000.00 
positioning the property for development. This includes engineering and traffic studies, 
valuation work, marketing to end users/tenants, securing a zone change (to commercial) for 
the entire parcel and related expenses. Futhermore Jill's delays have resulted in Hughes' 
inability to develop the property for its intended use and in fact stalled negotiations that 
Hughes and a grocer were in for a potential super market deal. Hughes has developed site 
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pian alternatives for submission of a subdivision proposal to Kootenai County based upon 
the current highway alignment and, at this juncture, they are fully prepared to go forward 
with development of the property, either based on the existing Highway 95 alignment or on 
the post-take alignment, whichever the case may be. 
In tem1s of development and marketability of the property, my clients feel that access 
and visibility will be impacted by replacing the existing signal and access points with a 
freeway off ramp. Frankly, my clients do not care whether the new interchange is built, or 
not. They are ready and able to develop the property either way. Assuming that ITD gets on 
with acquiring the property and building out the prqject in due course, my client is well 
positioned to move forward with development at that time, but it is not willing to "give 
away" 16+ acres of prime frontage just to get there. 
Mary, I know you have seen a lot of condemnation appraisals, as have L There is 
ample room for variability in the comparative market approach for a property like this. 
However, some of the comps and the adjustment to the comps in Stan Moe's appraisal 
simply don't hold water. (See, June 28, 2010 letter) We believe that the following eight 
sales comps are much more "fitting" to this parcel and, collectively, justify a considerably 
higher valuation. 
1. Northwest corner Ramsey and Appleway - Coeur d'Alene (11/07) 
Buyer: Coeur d'Alene Tribe 
Size: 17± Acres 
Price: Approx. $10.53/SF 
Comments: Superior demographic/location; Spec purchase 
Adjustment: -65% $3.68/SF 
2. Northeast corner Ramsey and Appleway - Coeur d'Alene (8/09) 
Buyer: Win co 
Size: 9± Acres 
Price: $8/SF 
Comments: Superior location demographic; Owner/Seller retains pad 
sites; Inferior Access 
Adjustment: -60% $3.60/SF 
3. Southeast corner Hwy. 41 and Prairie- Post Falls (11/06) 
Buyer: Parkwood Business Properties 
Size: 13.48 Acres 
Plice: $5/SF, no sewer, CCS zoning 
Comments: Superior location; Similar access/traffic flow 
Adjustment: -25% $3.75/SF 
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4. Northeast comer Hwy. 41 and Prairie -Kootenai County (10/07) 
Buyer: Phillips Edison 
Size: 50 Acres 
Price: $3/SF, no utilities, AG zoning 
Comments: Similar size; Inferior zoning; No infrastructure available 
Adjustment: None 
5. East of the Southeast corner Hwy. 41 and Prairie-Kootenai County (6/09) 
Buyer: Unknown 
Size: 20.5 Acres 
Price: 
Comments: 
$2.75/SF, off the corner, Prairie frontage, CCS zoning 
Inferior tratlic/access/frontage ( off corner); Similar 
zoning, size 
Adjustment: + 10% $3.02/SF 
6. Northeast comer Larch and Boyer - Sandpoint (2009) 
Buyer: Super 1 
Size: 5 Acres 
Price: $7.30/SF Effective rate with impact fee's $11.89 
Comments: Buyer is to pay significant impact fees; Inferior 
size/access; Superior demographic 
Adjustment: -70% $3.60/SF 




Comments: Condemnation value; Inferior location; Superior size 
Aqjustment: -35% $3A4/SF 







Inferior access/traffic; Similar demographic & size 
+ 10% $2.96/SF 
When we met with Ron Harvey back on September 1, 2010, he asked that we provide 
support for our contention that ITD's valuation was too low. I believe that the above eight 
examples provide that support, and then some. 
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The above comparables aiso have to be considered in iight of the post-take condition 
that will exist. Hughes' property will potentially be bifurcated both by the new Highway 95 
alignment and by an extension of Sylvan Road through the property on the east side of the 
current alignment. When we met with Mr. Harvey and Mr. Minzghor it was brought up for 
the first time that ITD contemplates Sylvan Road extending through the Hughes property as a 
frontage road, even though that is not technically pmt of this take. Further conversations 
with Mr. Minzghor and Mr. Wuest of ITD confirm the desire to take an additional 1.9 acres 
to extend Sylvan road through the Property. Assuming that does occur, the property will 
effectively be chopped into three pieces with just over 29 acres directly affected. ITD will 
take 16,3 acres plus an additional L9 acres for Sylvan Road leaving an 8.0 acre parcel east of 
the new alignment and a 3.8 acre parcel sandwiched between existing and new alignments. 
My clients understand that the strategic location of this property on the intersection of n:vo 
busy highways means it will be more affected than most properties, but ITD's valuation does 
not seem to take that into account. Frankly, I could go on and on, but unless you want more 
information/argument, I will refrain for the time being. I think if ITD objectively considers 
our comparables and takes into consideration the costs associated with a contested 
condemnation it will see that a jury will easily place the value of this property in the area of 
$3,500,000.00, if not more. With that in mind, my clients would ask ITD to review the the 
above and revise its offer. However if that offer is going to be a reiteration of the amount 
previously offered, it would be best for you to just file the Complaint and we will carry on 
accordingly. 
In conjunction with the taking, my client will also seek to have ITD provide utility 
and conduit infrastructure and associated easements under the new freeway (when built), 
appropriate commercial width accesses at locations to be determined, and approval of a post-
construction transportation plan appropriate to their project. This communication is made 
pursuant to Rule 408 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence in contemplation of avoiding the 
condemnation litigation and is not intended to be admissible in any subsequent proceedings 
related thereto. 
I look fo1ward to hearing your thoughts,. 
Yours very truly, 





n:Sue Turner To:Attn: Douglass. Martlce, Es'-1. 112086645884} 15:0711/17/10Grv1. J7 Pg 03-11 
HOLLAND&HART~IIJ 
VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
November 17, 2010 
Re; U.S.- 95 Condemnation; "Grathol" Parcel No. 19 
Dear Doug: 
Maryv. York 
Phone (208} 342-sooo 
Fax (208) 343-8869 
myork@hollandhart.com 
I am writing in response to your email message from Friday, November 12, 2010. 
I appreciate the information you provided and will endeavor to respond to each of the 
issues you raised. For ease of reference, I will respond to your comments in the order 
set forth in your message-. 
I appreciate the clarification on the status of the current title holder of the 
property. ITD has held off filing the condemnation action w1til we heard back from you 
on this issue. Now that we have confirmation that the current title holder is HJ Grathol, 
we will be filing the condemnation this week. I have attached for your- reference a copy 
of the complaint that will be filed. We discussed a couple of weeks ago that you would 
be willing to accept service on behalf of HJ Grathol. Please let me know as soon as 
possible if that is not the case, and we will have service made by a process server. 
The next issue raised is your clients' apparent dissatisfaction with the length 
of time involved in the Project and their perception that ITD has been less than 
sttaightforward with them in negotiations. To be clear, ITD has not engaged in any 
·improper delay as to the Project and has not given your clients "the run around." With 
your experience in condemnation matters, you c~rtainly understand the work and detail 
involved in planning and designing a project of this size and scope. The time involved 
here is a direct result of the complicated nature, and the size and scope of the Project. 
ITD has been diligent in its efforts and has taken its responsibility to the public and 
landowners ·very seriously. ITD disagrees with the contention that the. acquisition of the 
Grat.ho! property is a "moving target." To the contrary, the property required for the 
Project (16.314 acres) and the design of the Project as it relates to the Orathol property 
have remained unchanged since ITD's initial negotiation contacts with your clients and 
ITD's appraisal of the property. 
Holland&Hartut 
Phone (208) 342-SOOO Fax [208) 343·8869 www.hollandhart,com 
101 South Capitol Boulevard Suite 1400 Bo;se,ID 83702 Malllng Addres$ P.O.Box2S27 Bolse,ID 83701-2527 
Aspen Boulder CarsonCity Colq,adoSpdngs Denw1 Deffie/TediCen\tf Bi:llngs 8Qlse Cheyenne .l.\d<sonHole la.Ve93s Reno Sal!LakeOiy Sanial'e Waffllngton,0,C.0 
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As support for the. claim that ITD's U.S. 95 Project is a "moving target," you 
reforence the extension of Sylvan Road. For purposes of clarification, the extep_sion of 
Sylvan Road.is a separate project by the Lakes Highway District and is not part of 
ITD's U.S. 95 Project. While the Sylvan Road extension could benefit the traveling 
pubJic as a frontage road to U.S. 95, it is not part of ITD's Project, and the property that 
could be used for the extension road is not part of this condemnation nor is i.t on the 
Project plans. 
The issue over the extension of Sylvan Road has o_nly been raised because the 
Lakes Highway District wants the roadway extended, and ITO has agreed to construct 
the extension road for property owners who agree to dedicate 1he property to the 
Highway District. If a landowner decides not to dedicate lands needed. for the roadway, 
then it will not be constructed. Based on your email, it appears that your clients do not 
desire to have the Sylvan Road extension built. Therefore, we will consider the issue 
closed. However, in response to the comment t11at your clients cannot see how the 
Sylvan Road extension would help them, .it is worth noting that they relied on the 
extension of Sylvan Road in their development plan submitted to the County as part of 
their rezone application. 
The next issue raised in your email is the prospect that one of your clients may 
seek to «force a realignment" of U.S. 95. Given the amount of time and money spent in 
the planning, design, and location of the Project, that effort by your clients would be 
futile. You also acknowledge that such a result "is unlikely." [ am sure you are aware 
that courts give substantial deference to an agency's design and site selection of a 
public project. This is .particularly true with respect to the present Project> given the 
extensive and detailed planning and design for the location of this Project, and the 
substantial review, public comment, and environmental permitting process that this 
Project has gone through. 
For these reasons, we again request that your clients stipulate to possession. 
While ITD will eventually acquire fee title to the portions of the property required for 
the Project, it does not need fee title at this point in time for the "land swap" referenced 
in your message, Possession will suffice for the time b·eing. Additionally, as you 
know, the grant of posscssio11 by a landowner is one of the elements that a court will 
consider in its determining whether attorney fees should be awarded to the property 
owner in a condemnation action. In addition, no reason exists for the court to deny 
possession in. this case, particularly given the amount of detailed planning, money, and 
effort that ITO has invested in this Project to date. 
As to your clients' concern about this process dragging on in the event they grant 
possession, I can assure you that ITD is c_ommitted to moving forward with the 
condemnation expeditiously. As evidence ofITD's commitment to moving this matter 
forward, we intend to file ITD's complaint this week. 
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Lastly, your message conveys a settlement offer in the amount of $2.8 million, 
with the caveats described. I have presented the offer to my clients and have been 
instructed to decline· the offer. A~ we und_erstnnd the offer, it is a discounted proposal 
from the $3,5 million value that your clients believe is due as a result of the taking of a 
portion of their property and damages caused to the remainder. The $3 .5 million figure 
is based primarily on the sales identified in your letter of October 27, 2010 and the 
alleged damages that may be caused to the remainder, including potential damages 
resulting from the extension of Sylvan Road. As explained above, the Sylvan Road 
extension is not part of the acquisition and, based upon your representation that your 
clients will not be dedicating any land to the Lakes Highway District, will not be 
constructed by ITO. we:have reviewed the sales referenced in your October 27th letter, 
and respectfully disagree that the sales support the valuation figure advocated by your 
clients. The sales include properties located within the cities of Coeur d'Alene and 
Sandpoint, properties in far superior locations, sales with incotrect information, and a 
sale that was actually a settlement that included amounts for improvements in addition 
to the land value. While we have yet to see any specific analysis of these sales by your 
clients' appraiser, Skip Sherwood, at this point, we do not agree that the referenced 
sales support the valuation advocated by your clients. 
Despite the present disagreement over values, which is typical in condemnation 
cases, we hope that the parties can continue to work toward a resolution of this matter. 
To that end, please feel free to contact me with any concerns your clients may have 
during the construction process or any other matter. 
Additionally, please-let me know as soon as possible whether you will accept 
service and whether your clients will stipulate to possession. If not, we will move 
forward with service of process and the setting of a possession hearing. In the 
meantime, if you have any questions or would like to discuss these issues in more 
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MARC A. LYONS• 
DOUGLASS. MARFICE' 
MICHAEL A. EALY' 
TERRANCE R. HARRIS' 
CHRISTOPHER D. GABBERT 
THERON J. DE SMBT 
MEGAN S, O'DOWD 
WILLIAM F. BOYD, OF COUNSEL 
MaryV. York 
Holland & Hart, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 1336 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816-1336 
TELEPHONE: {208) 664-5818 
FACSIMILE: (208) 664-5884 
E-MAIL: flrrn@ramsdenlyons.corn 
WEBSITE: www.rarnsdenlyons.com 
November 17, 2011 
Re: The State of Idaho v. HJ Grathol, et al. 
Kootenai Co. Case No. CV-10-10095 
Dear Mary: 
STREET ADDRESS: 
700 NORTHWEST BLVD. 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814 
ALL ATTORNEYS LICENSED IN JDAHO 
• LICENSED IN WASHINGTON 
I assume that you are in the process, or at least close to, preparing an Acarrequi offer. 
Therefore, I thought I would take the opportunity to convey what I think are a few salient 
points for ITD to consider in formulating its offer. 
First, I think we have given ITD ample information concerning our view of the raw 
land value of the take. ITD's appraisal puts that figure at only $571,000.00 which equates to 
about .80¢ per square foot; this, for a prime, commercially zoned, 16 acre site on a controlled 
intersection of two main highways. There is considerable evidence that the more appropriate 
per square foot value should be somewhere north of $2.50. Simply put, I believe ITD's 
valuation cherry-picked the lowest available comparable and ignored better, more 
appropriate comparables. Obviously, that is the nature of things, but I think it will ultimately 
reflect poorly on ITD's credibility. I understand that I1D will strenuously argue that my 
client's valuation is equally non-credible and you will no doubt exert considerable effort to 
impeach or even exclude our appraiser's opinions. However, at the end of the day, an 
appraisal (in whatever form) is really one person's educated opinion as to value. The Judge 
in this case will be the final voice on the issue and whether he decides to accept, reject or 
partially accept/reject the appraisers' respective opinions will simply be a function of how 
the Judge views those opinions in relation to the world he operates in. 
Recognizing that evidence is going to come in through both ITD's witness and 
Grathol's witness of other comparable sales ranging from $2.50 up to nearly $10.00 per 
square foot, the .80¢ per square foot value conclusion that ITD will push for simply isn't 
very believable. We both know that in matters such as this where there is competent, 
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admissible evidence of a range of values the Court is likely to use some Solomon-esque 
approach and effectively average the numbers. If that happens, compensation for just the 
raw land portion of property taken could easily wind up somewhere in the 1.9 to 2.3 million 
dollar range. It might be lower; but it might also be significantly higher. 
Second, ITD's valuation concludes that there are no damages to the remainder 
property. This position, taken in conjunction with the bottom-of-the-scale square foot 
valuation undercuts the ~redibility ofITD even further. Simply put, to claim that carving out 
a 16 acre prime, commercial intersection property leaving a remnant parcel on the west side, 
a larger remnant on the east side and a highly probable, if not inevitable, additional bisection 
of the property by the frontage road, will cause no damages to the remainder is patently 
unbelievable. The evidence is going to demonstrate that from the standpoint of a 
commercially developable parcel, an elevated freeway type interchange will substantially 
hinder the use and desirability of the remaining property. That is just a fact. Instead of an at-
grade, high visibility, signalized intersection, which any developer would find desirable; the 
post project corridor will be a fly-by with exit ramps. This is fine for some commercial uses, 
but far less than desirable for many others. For those uses that are now effectively negated 
by the project, Grathol is entitled to severance damage consideration. 
Third, although the frontage (Sylvan Road) corridor remains a bone of contention, for 
purposes of its Acarrequi offer, the State would be remiss if it did not factor this in. With 
respect to the damage case only, we are confident that the Court is going to consider the fact 
that Sylvan Road was always contemplated as part of this project or at least ancillary to it. fu 
fact, we think the evidence of this indisputable. Regardless of whether Sylvan Road is part 
of the physically defined ''take," it is a factor that is going to directly impact the value and 
usability of the remaining property. While ITD may believe it can simply wrest control of 
the Sylvan Road corridor from Grathol as a future development concession, we believe that 
constitutes a de facto take and we intend to argue strenuously for it. Obviously, Judge 
Hosack may disagree as I know you do, but ITD should nevertheless recognize that there is a 
very real risk associated with this. Likewise, ITD should recognize in making its Acarrequi 
offer the value of achieving closure on this case which would also eliminate the pending 
appeal before the Supreme Court. You have read our briefing on the Appeal and know our 
position. As an advocate, you certainly don't have to agree with a single word of our 
argument, but you do have to recognize that ifwe prevail on that argument, the consequences 
to ITD would be grievous. Consider, just for example, the ramifications of the Supreme 
Court agreeing that ITO' s process for issuance of condemnation Orders has been flawed and 
not in conformity with the statute. The reverberations that such a ruling would send through 
the Department are almost impossible to overstate. 
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I acknowledge that these arguments may be perceived by ITD as academic or 
fanciful, but they do merit consideration and, in my opinion, concern. ITD would be wise to 
recognize that institutional hubris can sometimes be very, very dangerous. Does ITD really 
want to risk the possibility (however remote it thinks that possibility may be) that the 
Supreme Court could effectively rule that every pending and past condemnation order issued 
by the Department is/was legally deficient? In every settlement mediation I have ever 
attended, I am reminded by the mediator that resolving difficult cases should be about 
measuring risk. How much does one stand to gain versus how much they might potentially 
lose. In this case, Grathol's "risk" is low. While it's incurred significant litigation costs thus 
far, being in the development field that is something Grathol is pretty well accustomed to; 
sort of the "cost of doing business." Other than its litigation costs, Grathol really only stands 
to gain by proceeding to trial and through the appeal. If we just convince the Judge that 
ITD's valuation number is too low (and I am confident that we can do so), Grathol is going 
to recover additional compensation and reimbursement of its litigation costs. Same thing 
with severance damages. If we prove up any of them, Grathol will recover yet even more 
compensation, as well as the costs and fees of getting there. Last, if Grathol prevails on its 
appeal, the outcome of the trial probably becomes irrelevant because ITD will have to start 
with a clean slate in terms of the take. Meantime, Grathol can sit back and watch while ITD 
tries to deal with the domino effect of such a decision. Conversely, the ''upside" to your 
client in this case is almost non-existent. Frankly, the best ITD can hope to achieve is a 
ruling from the District Court that it owes no more money to Grathol than what has been 
offered. Even if it does so, ITD will not be awarded its litigation costs or fees, and it will 
still be whatever it has had to pay your firm and the various witnesses and consultants. 
Based on the proceedings to date, I surmise those expenses are considerable. Clearly, its 
downside risk is far and away greater than any potential upside and even prevailing for ITD 
is probably a zero-sum gain. 
As I stated as the outset, I think that all of these considerations are germane to ITD's 
calculation of an appropriate Acarrequi offer. You are certainly free to accept or reject any 
of the contentions I put forth, but ITD would be wise to think through the entire constellation 
of potential outcomes in this case and to make Grathol an offer that it has to give very serious 
consideration to. 







December 15, 2011 
MaryV. York 
Phone (208) 342-5000 
Fax (208) 343-8869 
myork@hollandhart.com 
OFFER OF SETTLEMENT PROTECTED BY RULE 408 
OF THE IDAHO RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Via Fax: 208-664-5884 and 
E-mail: dmarflce@ramsdenlyo11s.com and 
U.S. Mail 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Re: ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al., Case No. CV 10-10095, First Judicial District 
Comt, State of Idaho, County of Kootenai 
Dear Doug: 
I have been authorized by the State ofldaho, Idaho Transportation Board {"ITD") 
to make an offer of settlement to your clients in the case of ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al., 
Case No. CVI0-10095, First Judicial District Court, State ofldaho, County of Kootenai. 
Specifically, in accordance with Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 
873,673 P.2d 1067 (1983), the succeeding cases, and other relevant provisions ofldaho 
law, ITD hereby offers to pay your clients the sum of $1,100,000.00 as settlement of all 
claims in this case. 
This offer is made for settlement purposes only. This settlement offer shall remain 
open and available for acceptance by your clients until end of business on December 30, 
2011. 
Please convey ITD's offer to your clients, and we will await a response from you. 
In the meantime, if you have any questions or if I can be of any assistance, please do not 
hesitate to contact me. 
MVY:ntp 
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Holland & Hart ttP 
phone (208) 342-5000 Fax [208) 343-8869 www.hollandhart.com 
101 South Capitol Boulevard Suite 1400 Boise, ID 83702 Malling Address P.O.Box 2527 Boise,ID 83701-2527 




n:Nr.ioml T. Pratt To:Douglas Marflce, Esq. (1 )645884) 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V. York (ISB #5020) 
Steve C. Bowman (ISB #4404) 
Ted S. Tollefaon (fSB #6813) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND"& HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
IO 1 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box' 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701~2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
16:3312/19/iiGM. Pg 19-21 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ ORA THOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants-. 
Case No. CVto-10095 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S NOTICE OF 
DISCLOSURE OF REBUTTAL 
EXPERTS 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S NOTICE OF DISCLOSURE OF REBUTTAL EXPERTS- I 
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Plaintiff Idaho Transportation Department hereby gives notice that it has disclosed its 
rebuttal expert witnesses Jason Minzghor, Stan Moe, Carole Richardson, Ken Geibel, Kevin 
Picanco, Jeff Key, Larry Pynes, George Hedley, and Denni$ Reinstein ort the date set forth 
below, in accordance with the Court's scheduling orders of April 5, 2011 and November 161 
20661, and Rule 26(b )( 4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure .. 
DA TED this 19th day of December, 2011. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
B 
T- S. efso r the firm 
Mary V. y· , of the firm 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
idaho Transportation Department 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
PLAINTIFF ITD'S NOTICE OF DISCLOSURE OF REBUTTAL EXPERTS - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 19th day of December 2011, I caused to be s_erved a true apd 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below! and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert) Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 







PLAINTIFF ITO'S NOTICE OF·DISCLOSURE OF REBUTTAL EXPERTS-3 
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MARC A. l.YONS• 
DOUGLASS. MARFICE• 
MICHAEL A. EALY• 
TERRANCE R. HARRIS• 
CHRISTOPHER D. GABBERT 
THERON J. DE SMET 
MEGAN S. O'DOWD 
WILLIAM F. BOYD, 01' COUNSEL, 
Mary V. York 
Holland & Hart, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 1336 
COEUR D"ALENE, ID 83816-1336 
TELEPHONE: (208) 664-5818 




Re: The State of Idaho v. HJ Grathol, et al. 
Dear Mary: 
STREET ADDRESS: 
700 NORTHWEST BLVD. 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814 
ALL ATTORNEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO 
'LICENSED IN WASHINGTON 
Reference is made to your letter of December 15, 2011 containing an offer of 
settlement in_ the total sum of $1,100,000.00. My clients have reviewed the settlement 
proposal and have instructed me to reject the same. I have, however, been authorized to 
convey a counter proposal. This counteroffer is, of course, subject to Rule 408 of the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence. 
HJ Grathol will agree to settle all claims arising from, and related to, the case of The 
State of ldalw v. HJ Grathol, et al., Case No. CV-10-10095, Kootenai County, including the 
pending appeal before the Idaho Supreme Court in exchange for the total sum of 
$2,450,000.00 (which amount includes the amount previously paid into court and/or 
distributed to HJ Grathol), together with reimbursement of HJ Grathol's actual attorneys fees 
incurred to date or 80% ofITD's attorneys fees paid to date, whichever is less. 
Additionally, HJ Grathol will convey, as part of the above recited consideration, an 
80' right of way for the extension of Sylvan Road to Roberts Road provided that ITD agrees 
to the non·monetary concessions set forth in the table attached hereto. 
This offer will remain open for 10 days from the date of this letter. 
Yours very truly, 
~ 
Douglas S. Mar ce 
DSM/sj 
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Grant of utility easements across all With exec. of ITD to HJ Grathol 
1 
ITD R.O.W. on US 95 and Hwy 54, purch. agrmnt; 
and Sylvan Rd. serving all of HJ recorded by 
Grathol parcels. May 2012 
Installation of utility stubs, sleeves or By May 2012 ITD, with sizes and 
2 conduits within granted easements. locations per HJ 
Grathol 
Grant access points from Hwy. 54 With exec. of ITD to HJ Grathol 
and existing US 95 to HJ Grathol. purch. agrmnt; 
3 
ITD to grant access for two drive recorded by 
approaches off of US 95, two off of May 2012 
Hwy. 54, and one off either US 95 or 
Hwy. 54 for corner parcel. 
Grant thre~ access points off of With exec. of ITD to HJ Grathol 
4 
Sylvan Road, each side, to HJ purch. agrmnt; 
Grathol property. recorded by 
May 2012 
Construction of Sylvan Road to Completion by ITD 
5 County standards within an 80' December 2012 
R.O.W 
Grant of easements for use of ITD With exec. of ITD to HJ Grathol 
R.O.W. on US 95 and Hwy. 54 for purch. agrmnt; 
6 stormwater retention and land recorded by 
application of water re-use May 2012 
purposes. 
Agreement not to impose any Wrth execution ITD 
project sign restrictions on HJ of purchase 
7 Grathol project; all signs to be in agreement 
conformance with County 
ordinances. 
Agreement that any required or With execution ITD 
desired signalization of Sylvan Rd. of purchase 
8 and Hwy 54 intersection will be agreement 






Januaiy 10, 2012 
MaryV. York 
Phone (208) 342-5000 
Fax (208) 343-8869 
myork@hollandhart.com 
OFFER OF SETTLEMENT PROTECTED BY RULE 408 
OF THE IDAHO RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Via Fax: 208-664-5884 and 
E-mail: dmmfice@ramsde11lyons.co111 and 
U.S.Mail 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Nmthwest Blvd. 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Re: ITD v. HJ Grathol, et al., Case No. CVl0-10095, First Judicial District 
Court, State of Idaho, County of Kootenai 
Dear Doug: 
This letter is in response to your letter of December 29, 2011, in which you 
conveyed yom client's counter offer for a proposed resolution of this case. My clients have 
reviewed the proposed settlement and do not see any justifiable or legally permissible basis 
for the dollar amounts your client has demanded in this case. Accordingly, my clients have 
instructed me to reject the proposed offer. 




Holland &Hart LlP 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
iTATE Of IDAH00TEHAI > SS COUNTY OF KO 1 
flLEO: 
2012 JUL -2 PH If: lt6 
~!K :!~T COURT d 
lJJo~cJbL 
DEPUTY . 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE IDAHO TRANSPORTATION 
DEPARTMENT, by and through THE 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ GRATHOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SAVINGS 
BANK, a Washington corporation; and 
DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F. 
MAGNUSON IN OPPOSITION TO 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
JOHN F. MAGNUSON being duly sworn on his oath deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of 18 years and competent to testify herein. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F. MAGNUSON IN OPPOSITION TO ATTORNEY'S FEES - 1 
ORIGINAL 
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2. I am engaged in the general practice of law in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. I have 
practiced law since the year 1988, or 24 years. During that time I have prosecuted and 
defended civil actions of various kinds and involving numerous different legal and factual 
issues. 
3. Sometimes the cases in which I am involved are legally complex and 
sometimes they are not; my experience has covered a wide range of complexity. I know a 
complex case when I see one; it is one that has new or novel legal issues which are 
complicated and difficult to learn or one where it is hard to find what the law is. 
4. I have appeared in State of Idaho trial courts and appellate courts, as well as 
federal trial and appellate courts. 
5. My experience includes familiarity with and work on cases involving real 
estate and commercial transactions. In addition I have experience with condemnation cases 
involving the taking of private property by state, municipal, and other governmental 
agencies. 
6. In the course of my practice over the years, I have participated in cases where 
one or both sides have moved for summary judgment, and where the court has granted 
summary judgment. 
7. My hourly rate during the year 2011 and fo date in 2012 is $250. (There are 
rare occasions when I may charge $275; if the case is very complex or if it is not particularly 
desirable for one reason or another.) It is my observation, from talking to other lawyers and 
from seeing applications for fees, that the current prevailing hourly rate in Idaho for 
attorneys with 20 years of experience or more is $250. (I accept that there may be a few 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F. MAGNUSON IN OPPOSITION TO A TIORNEY'S FEES - 2 
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lawyers in the State with specialized skills and somewhat higher rates, but those examples 
are not usual and customary for Idaho.) 
8. I read the Complaint and Answer filed by the parties in the above entitled 
action, along with the written decision of the Court that is dated May 25, 2012. I read the 
York Affidavit of June 18, 2012 in support of the motion for fees and costs. 
9. In my opinion the above entitled case involved issues which were not 
especially or unusually novel or difficult, and the skill requisite to provide the legal services 
required were not so advanced as to necessitate exceptional legal practitioners or 
involvement of multiple lawyers with specialized experiences in a unique or esoteric area of 
law. 
10. I understand that Holland & Hart seeks attorney's fees and paralegal fees 
which total $724,136.00 for 2,720 hours of work. This compares to Ramsden & Lyons fees 
in the amount of $212,000.00 and 930 hours. 
11. I have an opinion as to the reasonableness of the Holland & Hart charges for 
attorney's and paralegal fees. My opinion is: 
a. The charges are excessive and unreasonable and not in keeping with the 
prevailing charges for like work in Idaho, or at the least, in the First Judicial 
District. 
b. One reason the charges are unreasonable is because the hourly rates of 
the lawyers involved are too high; 
c. Another reason the charges are unreasonable is because too much time 
was spent by the lawyers working on the case; the time is excessive. 
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12. I have an opinion as to what reasonable attorney's and paralegal fees ought to 
be for this case. My opinion is: The fees for prosecution of the suit brought by ITD ought to 
be substantially similar to the fees for defense of the case, because the time spent by the 
lawyers for the plaintiff and for the defendant ought to be approximately the same; and, there 
is no reason that the Holland & Hart hourly rate should be substantially higher than the 
prevailing hourly rate for like work in this geographic area. I am informed that Marfice and 
Gabbert charge $250 and $230, respectively. Mr. Marfice's rate is the same charged by me 
and by most similarly qualified and similarly experienced attorneys in this region. 
13. It is my opinion that this case is not overly complex; that the mere fact that it 
involved a condemnation does not make the case exceptionally novel or difficult; and that the 
law involving takings and just compensation in this case is not hard to understand even 
through there were some issues which would not be typical in a condemnation case. 
14. There does not appear to be anything about this case in terms of the issues or 
the circumstances that justifies the prosecution with five lawyers, two paralegals and two 
"tech support," with a total of at least 2,720 hours of work. The case is not so unique as to be 
either desirable or undesirable. An award of attorney's fees in the amount sought by Holland 
& Hart would be unprecedented in comparison to fee awards in any case with which I have 
been involved. 
15. Also, it is my opinion that Marfice's and Gabbert's legal skill are such as to 
call tie Plaintiff's requested fees into question. I can say this because I have worked with 
them and against both of them and know their skills, compared to all other lawyers I have 
worked with and against in Idaho. Moreover, their experience is commensurate with their · 
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opponents'. Marfice has 23 years and Gabbert has 9 years. ITD's lawyers' experience ranges 
from 21 years to 3 years. Therefore, Grathol's lawyers' rates of $230-250 should not be 
exceeded by the Holland & Hart lawyers. 
ih 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on this day~ of June, 2012. 
JUDYE. SCOTT 
STATE 0.F WASHINGTON 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
MY COMMISSION EXPl~S 
10-14-14 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the .1__ day of ~1o 12, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas /us Mail 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
__ O~ght Mail 
_ ,H'and Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
/4Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
_ _J;laria Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
SlATE Of, IOAHO } 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI SS 
FILED: 
2012 JUL -2 PH ft: 46 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST nIDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE IDAHO TRANSPORTATION 
DEPARTMENT, by and through THE 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ ORA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VIN GS 
BANK, a Washington corporation; and 
DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOEL P. HAZEL IN 
OPPOSITION TO ATTORNEY'S 
FEES 
JOEL P. HAZEL being duly sworn on his oath deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of 18 years and competent to testify herein. 
2. I am engaged in the general practice of law in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. I have 
practiced law since the year 1994, or 18 years. During that time I have prosecuted and 
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defended civil actions of various kinds and involving numerous different legal and factual 
issues. 
3. My experience includes familiarity with and work on cases involving real 
estate and commercial transactions. In addition I have experience with condemnation cases 
involving the taking of private property by state, municipal, and other governmental 
agencies. 
4. Sometimes the cases in which I am involved are legally complex and 
sometimes they are not; my experience has covered a wide range of complexity. 
5. I have appeared in State of Idaho trial courts and appellate courts, as well as 
federal trial and appellate courts. 
6. My hourly rate for the year 2011 was $240 and my 2012 rate is $255. It is my 
observation, from talking to other lawyers and from seeing applications for fees, that the 
current prevailing hourly rate in Idaho for attorneys with about 20 years of experience is 
approximately $250. (I accept that there may be a few lawyers in the State with specialized 
skills and somewhat higher rates, but those examples are not usual and customary for Idaho.) 
7. I read the Complaint and Answer filed by the parties in the above entitled 
action, along with the written decision of the Court that is dated May 25, 2012. I read the 
York Affidavit of June 18, 2012 in support of the motion for fees and costs. 
8. In my opinion the above entitled case involved issues which were not 
especially or unusually novel or difficult, and the skill requisite to provide the legal services 
required were not so advanced as to necessitate exceptional legal practitioners or 
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involvement of multiple lawyers with specialized experiences in a unique or esoteric area of 
law. 
9. I understand that Holland & Hart seeks attorney's fees and paralegal fees 
which total $724,136.00 for 2,720 hours of work. This compares to Ramsden & Lyons fees 
in the amount of $212,000.00 and 930 hours. 
10. I have an opinion as to the reasonableness of the Holland & Hart charges for 
attorney's and paralegal fees. My opinion is: 
a. The charges are excessive and unreasonable and not in keeping with the 
prevailing charges for like work in Idaho, or at the least, in the First Judicial 
District. 
b. One reason the charges are unreasonable is because the hourly rates of 
the lawyers involved are quite high; 
c. Another reason the charges are unreasonable is because too much time 
was spent by the lawyers working on the case; the time is excessive. 
11. I have an opinion as to what reasonable attorney's and paralegal fees ought to 
be for this case. My opinion is: The fees for prosecution of the suit brought by ITD ought to 
be substantially similar to the fees for defense of the case, because the time spent by the 
lawyers for the plaintiff and for the defendant ought to be approximately the same; and, there 
is no reason that the Holland & Hart hourly rate should be substantially higher than the 
prevailing hourly rate for like work in this geographic area. I am informed that Marfice and 
Gabbert charge $250 and $230, respectively. Mr. Marfice's rate is very close to the same 
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charged by me and by most similarly qualified and similarly experienced attorneys in this 
region. 
12. It is my opinion that this case is not exceptionally complex; that the mere fact 
that it involved a condemnation does not make the case exceptionally novel or difficult; and 
that the law involving takings and just compensation in this case is not hard to understand 
even through there were some issues which would not be typical in a condemnation case. 
13. There does not appear to be anything about this case in terms of the issues or 
the circumstances that justifies using five lawyers, two paralegals and two "tech support," 
with a total of at least 2,720 hours of work. The case is not so unique as to be either desirable 
or undesirable. In my experience, an award of attorney's fees in the amount sought by 
Holland & Hart would be unprecedented in comparison to fee awards in any case with which 
I have been involved. 
14. Also, it is my opinion that Marfice's and Gabbert's legal skill are such as to 
call the Plaintiffs requested fees into question. I can say this because I have worked with 
them and against both of them and know their skills, compared to all other lawyers I have 
worked with and against in Idaho. Moreover, their experience is commensurate with their 
opponents'. Marfice has 23 years and Gabbert has 9 years. ITD's lawyers' experience ranges 
from 21 years to 3 years. Therefore, Grathol's lawyers' rates of $230-250 should not be 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on this daytit1-J of July, 2012. 
Notary for the ~te 9f Idaho 
Residing at: ct:dtif 
Commission Expires: 7,-,;l/- ~/~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the L day of July, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addres~o the following: 
J. Tim Thomas Vus Mail 
Deputy Attorney General __ Overnight Mail 
Idaho Transportation Department Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 7129 __ Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
~Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ /acsimile (208) 343-8869 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884. 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 .·· 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
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STA1 t: OF IDAriO I SS 
COUNTY OF KOOTEHAlf 
FILED: 081/ ~ 
2012JUL 13 PH 1:00 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VINOS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants/ Appellants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Fee Category: L.4. 
Fee: $101.00 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF, THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, an executive department of 
state government and its board. 
AND TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Defendant, HJ Grathol appeals against the above-named 
Plaintiff to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Second Judgment and Decree of Condemnation, 
entered in the above-entitled action on the 26th day of June, 2012, Honorable Judge Charles 
Hosack presiding and such judgment is final pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-716. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 ORIGINAL 
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2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgment or order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to 
Rule 1 l(a)(l) I.A.R. 
3. Preliminary statement of issues on appeal. 
(A) Did the trial court err in concluding that the "larger parcel" must 
encompass the entirety of Defendant's land for purposes of identifying 
comparable sales, determining "highest and best" use, and for condemnation 
valuation purposes? 
(B) Did the trial court err m disregarding un-contradicted testimony on 
severance damages? 
(C) Did the trial court err in treating Defendant's testimony as to impacts of 
the condemnation on Grathol's proposed commercial development as irrelevant 
for purposes of establishing severance damages? 
(D) Did the trial court err in its treatment of the impact of the eventual 
development of a frontage road (Sylvan) across Grathol's property? 
4. An order has not been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5(a). A reporter's transcript is requested. 
5(b). The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the Reporter's 
Transcript in electronic format: 
• Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, February 2, 2012 
(previously transcribed); 
• Hearing on Status Conference, February 13, 2012; and 
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• Transcript of Trial, March 5-9, 2012 (previously transcribed). 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's 
Record, in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. The preparation of 
this record is requested to be scanned pursuant to I.A.R. 2 7 (b): 
(a) Plaintiff's Disclosure of Advancing Experts; 
(b) Defendant HJ Grathol's Expert Witness Disclosure; 
( c) Plaintiff's Disclosure of Rebuttal Experts; 
(d) Order Re: Plainitff's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
(e) Order Re: Plainitff's Motion in Limine; 
(f) Defendant HJ Grathol's Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure; 
(g) Order Re: Defendant HJ Grathol's Severance Damages; 
(h) Defendant's Trial Bench Brief; 
(i) Defendant HJ Grathol's Post Trial Brief; 
G) PlaintiffITD's Post Trial Brief; 
(k) Defendant HJ Grathol's Reply to Plaintiff's Post Trial Brief w/ 
Appendix; 
(1) PlaintiffITD's Response to Defendant's Post Trial Brief; 
(m) Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment; 
(n) Judgment-dated June 4, 2012; and 
( o) Second Judgment and Decree of Condemnation. 
7. The appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or 
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: 
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• All admitted trial exhibits. 
8. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out 
below: 
Name and Address: Byrl Cinnamon and Joann Schaller, Official Court Reporters, P.O. 
Box 9000, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816; (Hearing on 2/2/12-previously transcribed) 
Name and Address: Anne Brownell (MacManus-Browning), Official Court Reporter, 
P.O. Box 9000, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816; (Hearing on 2/13/12- not yet transcribed) 
Name and Address: Anita Self, M&M Court Reporting Service, Inc., 816 Sherman, 
Ave, Ste. 7, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814; (Court trial-previously transcribed) 
(b) That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the Reporter's Transcript; 
(c) That the estimated fee for the preparation of the Clerk's Record has been 
paid; 
( d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to 1.A.R. 20. 
DATED this 13th day of July, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of July, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
E. Don Copple 
Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, LLP 
P.O. Box 1583 




P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Anne Brownell 
Court Reporter 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Anita Self 
M&M Court Reporting Service, Inc. 
816 Sherman, Ave, Ste. 7 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
,X USMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 334-4498 
.,<' US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
-r:' USMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 386-9428 
)<' US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile 
>< US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile 
X US Mail 





In the Supreme Court of the State of flra'lf o00TrnA,lf J 














STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington ) 
corporation, and DOES 1 through 5, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
2012 JUL 24 PM 6: 03 -
C~RK DISTf},CT C~URT 
L\ j}j,UJ)1\/l 
ORDER AUGMENTING APPEAL 
Supreme Court Docket No. 40168-2012 
Kootenai County Docket No. 20 I 0-10095 
A Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript was filed July 5, 2011, in appeal No. 
38511, Dept of Transportation v. HJ Grathol; therefore, good cause appearing, · 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the Appeal Record in this case shall be 
AUGMENTED to include the Court File, Reporter's Transcript, and Clerk's Record filed in prior 
appeal No. 38511. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare and file a 
LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD with this Court, which shall contain the documents requested in the 
Notice of Appeal, together with a copy of this Order, but shall not duplicate any document included 
in the Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal No. 38511. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Reporter shall prepare and 
lodge a SUPPLEMENT AL REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT with the District Court, which shall 
contain the proceedings requested in the Notice of Appeal, but shall not duplicate any proceedings 
included in the Reporter's Transcript filed in prior appeal No. 38511. The LIMITED CLERK'S 
RECORD and REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT shall be filed with this Court after settlement. 
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cc: 
DATED this j l.fr)day of July, 2012. 
Stephen W. enyon. Clerk ., . u 
Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Court Reporter 
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700 Northwest Blvd. 
Post Office Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Christopher D. Gabbert, ISB #6772 
Attorneys for Defendant HJ Grathol 
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HJ ORA THOL, a California general 
partnership; STERLING SA VINOS BANK, a 
Washington corporation; and DOES 1 through 
5, 
Defendants/ Appellants. 
Case No. CV-10-10095 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF, THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, an executive department of 
state government and its board. 
AND TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Defendant, HJ Grathol appeals against the above-named 
Plaintiff to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Second Judgment and Decree of Condemnation, 
entered in the above-entitled action on the 26th day of June, 2012, Honorable Judge Charles 
Hosack presiding and such judgment is final pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-716. 
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2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgment or order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to 
Rule 1 l(a)(l) I.A.R. 
3. Preliminary statement of issues on appeal. 
(A) Did the trial court err in concluding that the "larger parcel" must 
encompass the entirety of Defendant's land for purposes of identifying 
comparable sales, determining "highest and best" use, and for 
condemnation valuation purposes? 
(B) Did the trial court err in disregarding un-contradicted testimony on 
severance damages? 
(C) Did the trial court err in treating Defendant's testimony as to impacts of 
the condemnation on Grathol's proposed commercial development as 
irrelevant for purposes of establishing severance damages? 
(D) Did the trial court err in its treatment of the impact of the eventual 
development of a frontage road (Sylvan) across Grathol's property? 
4. An order has not been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5(a). A reporter's transcript is requested. 
5(b). The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the Reporter's 
Transcript in electronic format: 
• Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, February 2, 2012 
(previously transcribed); 
• Hearing on Status Conference, February 13, 2012; and 
• Transcript of Trial, March 5-9, 2012 (previously transcribed). 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's 
Record, in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, 1.A.R. The preparation of 
this record is requested to be scanned pursuant to I.A.R. 27(b): 
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(a) Plaintiffs Disclosure of Advancing Experts -dated July 21, 2011; 
(b) Defendant HJ Grathol's Expert Witness Disclosure - dated August 19, 
2011; 
(c) Plaintiffs Disclosure of Rebuttal Experts - dated December 19, 2011; 
(d) Order Re: Plainitffs Motion for Summary Judgment- dated February 3, 
2012; 
(e) Order Re: Plainitffs Motion in Limine- dated February 3, 2012; 
(f) Defendant HJ Grathol's Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure - dated 
February 10, 2012; 
(g) Order Re: Defendant HJ Grathol's Severance Damages - February 16, 
2012; 
(h) Defendant's Trial Bench Brief- dated February 27, 2012; 
(i) Defendant HJ Grathol's Post Trial Brief- dated March 23, 2012; 
G) PlaintiffITD's Post Trial Brief- dated March 23, 2012; 
(k) Defendant HJ Grathol's Reply to Plaintiffs Post Trial Briefw/ Appendix 
- dated April 6, 2012; 
(1) Plaintiff ITD's Response to Defendant's Post Trial Brief - dated April 6, 
2012; 
(m) Post-Trial Memorandum Decision and Order for Judgment - dated May 
25, 2012; 
(n) Judgment - dated June 4, 2012; and 
( o) Second Judgment and Decree of Condemnation - dated June 26, 2012. 
7. The appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or 
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: 
• All admitted trial exhibits. 
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8. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out 
below: 
Name and Address: Byrl Cinnamon and Joann Schaller, Official Court Reporters, P.O. 
Box 9000, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816; (Hearing on 2/2/12 - previously transcribed) 
Name and Address: Anne Brownell (MacManus-Browning), Official Court Reporter, 
P.O. Box 9000, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816; (Hearing on 2/13/12-not yet transcribed) 
Name and Address: Anita Self, M&M Court Reporting Service, Inc., 816 Sherman, 
Ave, Ste. 7, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814; (Court trial-previously transcribed) 
(b) That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the Reporter's Transcript; 
(c) That the estimated fee for the preparation of the Clerk's Record has been 
paid; 
( d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to I.A.R. 20. 
DATED this 26th day of July, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of July, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 
MaryV. York 
Ted S. Tollefson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
E. Don Copple 
Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, LLP 
P.O. Box 1583 




P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Anne Brownell 
Court Reporter 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Anita Self 
M&M Court Reporting Service, Inc. 
816 Sherman, Ave, Ste. 7 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
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LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division. 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V. York (ISB #5020) 
Steven C. Bowman (ISB # 4404) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P .0. Box 2S27 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2S27 
Telephone: (208) 342-S000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Respondent 
NO. 5142 P. 2/5 
STATE OF IO\HO } 
COUNTY OF KOOTEN.AJ SS 
~dd-9*~ tmfJuLf? AH r, : I I+ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE O(JDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
HJ ORA THOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SA VINOS BANK, a Washington 
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TO: APPELLANT HJ GRATHOL AND TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-
ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GNEN THAT the Respondent in the above-entitled proceeding 
hereby requests pursuant to Rule 19, I.AR., the inclusion of the following material in the clerk's 
record in addition to that required to be included by the I.AR. and requested to be included by 
Appellant in itsAmendedNotice of Appeal dated July 26, 2012. 
1. Clerk's Record: 
a. The entire Clerk's Record on Appeal from the first appeal in this case, Idaho 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38511-2011, State of Idaho, Department of 
Transportation v. HjGrathol, Kootenai County District Court #2010-10095. 
b. The entire clerk's record on file with the Kootenai County District Court from 
March 3~ 2011 to the date of the filing of Appellant's Amended Notice of Appeal. 
Respondent requests that the additional documents to be included in the Clerk's Record 
be scanned pursuant to Rule 27(b), I.A.R. 
I II 
Ill 
2. I certify that: 
a. As Special Deputy Attorney General for the State ofldaho, Idaho Transportation 
Board ("trD") in this case, that !TD is exempt from any filing feei-and costs 
associated with the preparation of the Clerk's Record on Appeal; and 
b. This request has been served upon the clerk of the district court and upon all 
parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
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DATED this 27th day of July, 2012. 
1. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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CERTfflCATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 27th day of July, 2012, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. D U.S. Mail 
,...bri---1..-- T'\ .,....~1..1..--- "C',..A r, Hand Delivered \,, l5~Upllti1 JJ, \.li:I.IJUti1", =~· 1--1 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP [8'.I Fax (208) 664-5884 
700 Northwest Blvd. D E-mail 
P.O. Box 1336 D Overnight UPS 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816~1336 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant, HJ Grathol 
Clerk of the Court - Appeals D U.S. Mail 
First Judicial District Court D Hand Delivered 
Kootenai County ~ Fax (208) 446-1188 
324 W. Garden Ave. D E-mail 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 D Overnight UPS 
S6979S3_1.00CX 
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STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civii Litigation Division 
J, TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83 707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V, York (ISB #5020) 
Steven C, Bowman (ISB #4404) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HARTLLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: {208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
HJ ORA THOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants/ A ellants. 
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AMENDED REQUEST F.OR ADDmONAL TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD ON APPEAL- 1 
1580 of 1617
AUG. 3. 2012 9:36AM N0.5185 P. 3/8 
TO: APPELLANT HJ GRATHOL AND TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE .. 
ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GNEN THAT the Respondent in the above-entitled proceeding 
hereby requests pursuant to Rule 19, I.AR, the inclusion of the following material in the clerk's 
record in addition to that required to be included by the I.AR. and requested to be included by 
Appellant in its Amended Notice of Appeal dated July 26, 2012. 
1. Clerk's Record: 
a The entire Clerk's Record on Appeal from the first appeal in this case, Idaho Supreme 
Court Docket No. 38511-2011, State of Idaho, Department of Transportation v. HJ 
Grathol, Kootenai County District Court #2010-10095. 
b. Respondent requests the following documents be included in the Clerk's Record, in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R: 
TITLE DATE 
(1) ITD's Brief in Opposition to Defendant Grathol's Motion for Jury 3/24/11 
Trial 
(2) Affidavit of Mary V. York in Support ofITD's Brief in Opposition 3/24/11 
to Defendant Grathol's Motion for Jury Trial 
(3) Notice of Trial 4/5/11 
(4) Notice of Service of Discovery Responses ~"" 4/lS/11 
(5) Notice of Service of Discovery Requests 5/13/11 
(6) Notice of Service of Discovery Responses 5/17/11 
(7) Notice of Service of Discovery 7/8/11 
(8) Plaintiff !TD' s Notice of Disclosure of Advancing Experts 7/21/11 
(9) Notice of Compliance 8/22/11 
(10) Notice of Service 8/29/11 
(11) HJ Grathol's Motion to Compel 9/14/11 
(12) Affidavit of Alan Johnson in Support of Defendant's Motion to 9/14/11 
Compel 
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(35) Notice of Service 11/4/11 
(36) Amended Notice of Hearing 11/7/11 
(37) Notice of Service of Discovery Requests 11/14/11 
(38) Amended Pretrial Order 11/16/11 
(39) Notice of Hearing 11/16/11 
(40) Notice of Service of Discovery Responses 12/6/11 
(41) Plaintiff ITD's Notice of Disclosure of Rebuttal Experts 12/19/11 
(42) Notice of Service 12/27/11 
(43) PlaintiffITD's Motion for Summary Judgment 1/6/2012 
(44) PlaintiffITD's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 1/6/12 
(45) Plaintiff ITD's Motion in Limine 1/6/12 
(46) PlaintiffITD's Brief in Support of Motion in Limine 1/6/12 
(47) Affidavit of Mary York in Support of PlaintiffITD's Motion for 1/6/12 
Summary Judgment and Motion in Limine 
(48) Notice of Hearing 1/10/12 
(49) Notice of Service 1/17/12 
(50) Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 1/20/12 
(51) Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion in Limine 1/20/12 
(52) Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Support of Defendant's 1/20/12 
Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Plaintiff's Motion in Limine 
(53) Amended Notice of Hearing 1/24/12 ., 4!'""' 
(54) PlaintiffITD's Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary 1/27/12 
Judgment 
(55) ITD's Reply Brief in Support of Motion in Limine 1/27/12 
(56) Notice of Hearing 2/2/12 
(57) Notice ofHearini 2/2/12 
(58) Amended Notice of Hearing 2/3/12 
(59) Administrative assignment of Judge Charles W. Hosack 2/8/12 
(60) Order Assigning District Judge Hosack 2/8/12 
(61) Lodging of Transcript 2/C)/12 
(62) Notice of Piling Original Transcript 2/10/12 
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(63) Notice of Transcript Lodged 2/13/12 
(64) Notice of Transcript Delivery-Certificate of Witness-Deponent 2/15/12 
Alan Johnson 
(6S) Notice of Service of Discovery Responses 2/21/12 
(66) Defendant HJ Grathol 's Witness List 2/27/i2 
(67) Defendant HJ Grathol' s List of Exhibits 2/27/12 
(68) PlaintifflTD's Trial Witness List 2/27/12 
(69) Plaintiff ITD' s Trial Exhibit List 2/27/12 
(70) Plaintiff ITD's Trial Brief 2/27/12 
(71) ITD's Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses Not Timely Disclosed 2/29/12 
(72) Brief in Support ofITD's Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses Not 2/29/12 
Timely Disclosed 
(73) Affidavit of Mary V. York in Support ofITD's Motion to Exclude 3/1/12 
Expert Witnesses Not Timely Disclosed 
(74) Trial Subpoena (Jason Minzghor) 3/5/12 
(7S) Order re PlaintifflTD's Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses Not 3/6/12 
Timely Disclosed 
(70) Motion to Enlarge Time 3/29/12 
(77) Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert in Support of Motion to 3/29/12 
Enlarge Time 
(78) Order to Enlarge Time 3/30/12 
(79) Plaintiff ITD' s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 4/6/12 
(86) Defendant's (Proposed) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 4/6/12 
(81) MVYork Letter to Judge Hosack enclosing proposed form S/31/12 
Judgment 
(82) Opinion filed 6/6/12 
(83) ITD's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs 6/18/12 
(84) ITD's Brief in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs 6/18/12 
(85) Affidavit of Mary V. York in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees 6/18/12 
and Costs 
(86) Plaintiff's Second Notice of Tender of Funds and Satisfaction of 6/20/12 
Judgment 
(87) Remittitur 7/2/12 
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(88) Defendant's Motion to Disallow Costs and Objection to Plaintiffs 7/2/12 
Application for Attorney Fees and Costs 
(89) Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow Costs 7/2/12 
and Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs 
(C)O'\ Affidavit of Christopher D. Gabbert Re: Attorney Fees a.nd Costs 7/2/12 , ... ..,,,,, 
(91) Affidavit of John F. Magnuson in Opposition to Attorney's Fees 7/2/12 
(92) Affidavit of Joel P. Hazel in Opposition to Attorney's Fees 7/2/12 
(93) Notice of Appeal 7/13/12 
(94) A.mended Notice of Appeal 7/26/12 
Respondent requests that the additional documents to be included in the Clerk's Record 
be scanned pursuant to Rule 27(b), I.A.R. 
2. I certify that: 
a. As Special Deputy Attorney General for the State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation 
Board ("ITO") in this case, that ITD is exempt from any filing fees and costs 
associated with the preparation of the Clerk's Record on Appeal; and 
b. This request has been served upon the clerk of the district court and upon all parties 
required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2012. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
ofthe 
Steven C. o an, r the firm 
Special eputy Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Idaho Transportation Department 
1. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of August, 2012, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Douglas S. Marfice, Esq. 
Christopher D. Gabbert, Esq. 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant1 HJ Grathol 
Clerk of the Court-Appeals 
First Judicial District Court 
Kootenai County 
324 W. Garden Ave. 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
5704625_1.DOCX 
D U.S. Mail 
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[8J Fax (208) 664-S884 
D E-mail 
D Overnight UPS 
D U.S.Mail 
D Hand Delivered 
IZI Fax (208) 446· 1188 
D E-mail 
D Overnight UPS 
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TO: Clerk of the Courts 
Idaho Supreme Court Building 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0101 
DOCKET NO. 40168 
KOOTENAI CV-2010-10095 
STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington corporation; 
and DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
Notice is hereby given that on August 14, 2012, I 
lodged the original Transcript on Appeal in the 
above-referenced case, totalling 47 pages, and 
two hard copies and one electronic copy, with the 
District Court Clerk of the County of Kootenai in 
the First Judicial District. Both an electronic 
PDF file of the transcript and a PDF file of this 
Notice of Transcript Lodged with designation of 
proceedings contained within the transcript are 
attached to e-mail and sent to the Idaho Supreme 
Court at sctfilings@idcourts.net. 
Proceedings: 
February 2, 2012 SUMMARY JUfGMENT MOTION 
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ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
STEVEN L. OLSEN (ISB #3586) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
J. TIM THOMAS (ISB #5923) 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-8815 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
Mary V. York (ISB #5020) 
Steven C. Bowman (ISB #4404) 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2527 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY Of. KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ ORA THOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
CaseNo. CVl0-10095 
ITD'S REPLY BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
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After prevailing at trial, Plaintiff State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("!TD") 
filed a Motion For Attorney Fees And Costs on June 18, 2012. The amount of the attorney fees, 
costs as a matter of right, and discretionary costs sought by ITO are set forth in detail in the 
Affidavit Of Mary V. York filed on June 18, 2012 (the "June 18, 2012 York Aff.''). 
In opposition to ITD's motion, Defendant HJ Grathol, a California general partnership 
("Grathol"), filed a Motion and Memorandum To Disallow Costs And Objection To Plaintiff's 
Application For Attorney Fees And Costs. Accordingly, ITD now files this Reply Brief in 
support of its motion. 
I. SUMMARY OF REPLY BRIEF 
Grathol argues that no statutory basis exists for the award of attorney fees and costs to a 
condemnor. In fact, Idaho Code § 7-718 expressly authorizes the award of costs, including 
attorney fees, to either side in a condemnation case. 
Grathol contends that ITD did not make a timely offer of settlement in compliance with 
the Acarrequi decision and subsequent cases. In fact, Grathol expressly agreed to an extension 
of time for ITD to make an Acarrequi offer and agreed not to make any argument that ITD' s 
Acarrequi offer was untimely. 
Grath~l argues that ITD is not the prevailing party because it dld not make a timely 
Acarrequi offer. However, ITD did make a timely Acarrequi offer of $1.1 million. Since ITD's 
offer was $1.1 million and the just compensation award was $675,000.00, ITD is the prevailing 
party. 
Omthol argues that it never sought over $7 million in just compensation in this case. 
This argument is directly refuted by its own expert disclosures and the deposition testimony of 
its principal, Mr. Alan Johnson. Both made clear that Gratbol intended to present testimony and 
evidence at trial that it suffered damages and lost profits in excess of $7 million. The only thing 
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that prevented Grathol from presenting this claim at trial was ITO' s motion for summary 
judgment to dismiss the claim, which the Court granted. 
Grathol argues that Holland & Hart's hourly rates are excessive because they are higher 
than the rates charged by attorneys in the Coeur d'Alene area. This argument fails to account for 
the fact that ITD is a statewide agency and needs legal services throughout the state. ITD has 
relied on Holland & Hart's extensive experience in condemnation cases, construction claims, and 
environment.al matters for more than a decade. Grathol's argument also fails to account for the 
fact that Holland & Hart is a regional law firm with offices throughout the Rocky Mountain 
states and Washington, D .C. Its rates are in line with other regional law firms with offices in 
Idaho. Moreover, the remedy for a claim that hourly rates are too high is not to deny the claim 
for attorney fees but to lower the amount of fees awarded. 
Grathol argues that ITD's attorneys spent too much time on the case. This argument is 
refuted by the fact that ITD prevailed on all issues and claims in this case. The argument is also 
refuted by the fact that it was much easier and less ex.pensive for Grathol to make large, 
unfounded claims for compensation-many of which were contrary to law-than it was for ITD 
to defend against those claims and to do the work necessary to have the unlawful and unfounded 
• r 
claims dismissed. The difficulty and expense faced by ITD were exacerbated by Orathol's 
constant changing of both the amount and alleged factual bases for its claims. Grathol started 
changing its claims at the outset of the case and continued to change them through trial. It was 
very expensive for ITD to deal with Grathol' s constantly shifting claims, coupled with its refusai 
to disclose expert opinions and the continual changing of those opinions once disclosed. The 
time spent by ITD attorneys was also increased significantly by the many instances of 
malfeasance and impropriety by Grathol and its attorneys and experts as discussed in detail in 
ITD's opening brief. 
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Grathol argues that certain costs as a matter of right sought by ITD were not necessary. 
Grathol bases its argument on self-serving observations about what is and is not necessary for 
proper trial preparation, which should be disregarded given that Grathol failed to prepare and 
present an effective case at trial 
Il. IDAHO CODE§ 7-718 GOVERNS THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS IN CONDEMNATION CASES. 
The award of costs and attorney fees in Idaho is typically governed by Idaho Code § 12-
121 and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. However, as noted in ITD's opening 
brief, the award of costs and attorney fees in Idaho condemnation cases has developed its own 
set of rules and applications. 
The statutory provisions governing condemnation cases are found in Title 7, Chapter 7 of 
the Idaho Code. Section 7-718 expressly authorizes the award of attorney fees and costs to both 
condemnors and condemnees. "Costs may be allowed or not, and, if allowed, may be 
apportioned between the parties on the same or adverse sides in the discretion of the court." 
Idaho Code § 7 • 718. Thus, the Idaho Code expressly authorizes the award of costs to either side 
in a condemnation case. 
The "gosts" authorized under§ 7-718 include attorney fees. Sef.Ada County Highway 
Dist. V. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 876-77, 673 P.2d 1067, 1070w71 (1983) (holclingthatcosts 
under§ 7-718 include attorney fees); State ex rel Ohman v. Talbot Family Trust, i20 Idaho 825, 
8311 820 P.2d 695, 701 (1991) (Bistline, J., dissenting) (same). 
As explained in more detail in ITD's opening brief, Idaho case law has established a 
two-part analysis for the award of costs and attorney fees in condemnation cases: First, a 
determination must be made as to who is the prevailing pai-t"; under Rule 54(d)(l)(B) and 
guidelines established inAcarrequi and its progeny. Second, once the prevailing party has been 
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identified, the amount of costs and attorney fees to be awarded shall be determined based on the 
provisions of Rules 54(d)(l) and S4(e)(3). The trilogy of Idaho cases that set forth these rules 
are: Ada County Highway Dist. v. Acarrequi, supra; State ex rel Ohman v. Talbot Family Trust, 
supra; and State of Idaho v. Jardine, 130 Idaho 318, 940 P.2d 1137 (1997). 
Grathol' s argument that Idaho Code § 12-117 is the exclusive provision governing the 
award of attorney fees in condemnation cases is incorrect. It is directly refuted by § 7-718. 
Grathol also mistakenly argues that Talbot did not extend the analysis of who is the 
prevailing party in condemnation cases to condemnors. In fact, the Court in Talbot found the 
State to be the prevailing party under theAcarrequi guidelines and I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). Talbot, 
120 Idaho at 829-30, 699-700. The State made no motion for attorney fees to the district court in 
that case, so the issue of an actual award of attorney fees to the State was not raised. 
m. THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ATTORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS MAY BE AWARDED TO A CONDEMN OR. 
Orathol contends that no case authority exists for an award of attorney fees to the 
condemnor. This is not conect. As noted in Talbot, ''(t)his Cowt has held that in eminent 
domain actions, the award of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial cowt." 120 Idaho 
at 828, 698 ( citing Acarrequi). 
InAcarrequi, the Idaho Supreme Court held that "[e]xcept in the most extreme and 
unlikely situation, we cannot envision an award of attorneys' fees and costs to a condemnor." 
105 Idaho at 878,673 P.2d at 1072. Thus, the Court has acknowledged that attorney fees may be 
awarded to the condemnor in certain cases. If any case qualifies as the (!extreme" and ''unlikely" 
case, it is the case now before the Court. The conduct of Gtathol and its attorneys was certainly 
Hextreme." In addition, G-rathol's claims for compensation and the alleged bases oft1le claims 
were so exorbitant, so far removed from market value, so lacking in foundation, constantly 
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shifting and changing, and contrary to Idaho law as to make this case precisely the "unlikely" 
case in which attorney fees should be awarded to ITD. 
The abuses and improper tactics by Gtathol included: 
• opposing the motion for possession on meritless grounds; 
• repeatedly failing and refusing to answer discovery; 
• repeatedly failing and refusing to disclose expert opinions; 
• hiding expert opinions behind an inapplicable and improper assertion of the 
federal ''actor-viewer'' exception, which only applies in federal court and only 
applies to the drafting of expert reports; even in federal court, the exception does 
not excuse the duty to disclose expert opinions and does not circumvent written 
discovery asking for expert opinions; 
• making repeated and continuing demands for compensation based on an alleged 
taking for Sylvan Road - despite having no factual basis for the claims and 
despite repeated rulings from the Court denying and dismissing the claims; 
• presenting improper valuations that bad no "before and after" analysis, no 
understandable explanation, and numerous violations of law and deviations from 
accepted appraisal standards; 
• making claims for damages that were clearly barred by Idaho law; 
• dropping claims for damages barred by law only after forcing ITD to engage in 
expensive briefmg and preparation for oral argument on a motion for summary to 
dismiss these claims; and 
• 'making outlandish demands for compensation that were ttot supported by the 
market, had no relation to "fair market value," and were soundly rejected by the 
Court. 
These improper tactics and abuses were discussed in detail in ITD's opening brief, at 13-28 (filed 
June 18, 2012), 
In addition, Grathol's two valuation experts, Mr. Sherwood and Mr. Johnson, employed 
improper valuation methods and tactics that initiated a host of battles that should not have been 
necessary and involved fights over issues clearly barred by law or whoUy unsupported by the 
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facts in the case. Grathol' s tactics substantially and unnecessarily increased the attorney fees and 
costs in this case. 
The improper methods and tactics of Mr. Sherwood and Mr. Johnson included the 
following: 
• Failure to use the date of talcing as the date of value, as required by Idaho statute; 
• The use of multiple dates of value, in violation of statute; 
• Failure to do a "before and after'' analysis of the value of the property; 
• Failure to use the entire Grathol property as the "larger parcel" for purposes of 
determining the "before and after" value; 
• Using sales as alleged '"comparable sales" that were in far superior locations, with 
substantially greater demand for commercial development, and substantially 
better situated for the installation of utilities or with utilities already installed; 
• Sherwood's use of a negotiated settlement of a condemnation as one of his 
primary "comparable sales,'' despite his testimony that such a transaction is not an 
indication of "market value"; 
• Failure to identify, quantify, or explain any of the adjustments they made to sales 
as part of the "comparable sales approach" to real estate appraisal; 
• Producing only a limited, restricted appraisal report that expressly noted that third 
parties would have difficulty understanding the report; 
• Repeatedly changing valuation conclusions and the explanations for the 
"'·conclusions reached; ,.. 
• . Continuing to assert claims for compensation based on the time needed for 
constr..1ction of the USe9S Project {i.e., Hcon.struction delay"), despite an order 
from the Court bar.ring such claims; and 
• Johnson based his valuation after the taking as though a hypothetical development 
were completed, This approach was barred by law, 
As the Court knows, these abuses and tactics were the subject of many motions and a 
great deal of litigation before, during, and after trial. Ultimately, the Court rejected the methods 
and conclusions of Grathol' s valuation experts completely, but only after very great effort and 
expense by ITD. 
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For these reasons, discussed in detail in ITDis opening brief, ITO should be awarded its 
reasonable costs and attorney fees in this case. 
IV, ITD MADE A TIMELY OFFER OF SETTLEMENT UNDERACARREQUL 
Grathol contends that ITD did not make a timely offer of settlement in compliance with 
the Acarrequi decision and subsequent cases. Grathol not.ably omits the fact that it agreed, in 
writing, to an extension of time for ITO to make an offer under Acarrequi. 
The Court's scheduling order required Grathol to make expert disclosures by August 19, 
2011. GTathol refused to provide the required information and opinions until October 6, 2011. 
Grathol only made the disclosures when confronted with a motion by ITD to compel Grathol to 
disclose its experts and their opinions or to exclude any experts by Grathol. After Grathol finally 
made its disclosures, the parties resolved ITD's motion by stipulation filed October 18, 2011. 
In that stipulation, Grathol agreed as follows: 
The parties also agree to extend by one month the date by which 
ITD may submit an offer of settlement in accordance with Ada 
County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P .2d 
1067 {1983) and succeeding cases and other relevant provisions of 
Idaho law. Under this extension, ITD' s "Acarrequi" Offer will be 
due no later than November 21, 2011 and Grathol may not assert 
any argument that an "Aca"equi" offer made on or before 
,.November 21, 2011 is untimely. 
Stipulation For Extension Of Time For Plaintiff's Rebuttal Expert Disclosures And For 
Acarrequi Offer, at 2, 12 (filed Oct. i8i 201 i). Thus, not only did Grathol agree by fomial 
stipulation to extend the deadline for making anAcarrequi offer, it agreed not to make any 
argument that !TD 's offer was untimely. 
Grathol then agreed in writing to extend the Acarrequi offer date from November 21 to 
December 16, 2011. See Ex. C to the June 18, 2012 York Aff. ITD delivered its offer under 
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Acarrequi, in the amount of $1.1 million, to Grathol on December 15, 2011-within the time 
agreed to by the parties. Therefore, the offer was timely made. 
V. ITD IS THE PREVAILING PARTY. 
Under the rules set forth inAcarrequi, awards of costs and attorney fees in a 
condemnation proceeding lie within the discretion of the trial court and an award of costs and 
fees do not require a fmding by the trial court that the claims were "brought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Acarrequi at 876-77, 673 P .2d at 
1070~ 71. Additionally, Acarrequi established factors and guidelines to assist the trial court in 
making its detennination of the prevailing party and whether an award of costs and fees should 
be made in a condemnation action. Id at 878,673 P.2d at 1072. Based on those criteria, 
discussed below, ITD is the prevailing party in this action: 
A, ITD Made A Timely Offer Of Settlement Of At Least 90% Of The Verdict. 
On December 15, 2011, ITO made an offer of settlement to Gtathol in the amount of 
$1.1 million. See Ex. B to the June 18, 2012 York Aff. The just compensation award was 
$675,000.00. Thus, ITD clearly made an "offer of settlement of at least 90 percent of the 
ultimate jury verdict," and satisfied this element of the prevailing party analysis. Acarrequi, 
,.. 
105 Idaho at 878,673 P.2d at 1072. 
... 
B. · ITD's Settlement Offer Of $1.1 Million Was Timely Made. 
As noted above, ITD' s offer of $1.1 million was made within the time period agreed to 
by the parties in writing. 
C. Grathol Did Not Voluntarily Grant Possession Of The Property Pending 
Resolution Of The Just Compensation Issue. 
Grathol did not volunt.arily grant possession of the property, and delayed responding to 
requests for possession by ITD to the point that ITD began to be pressed by funding and 
construction deadlines on the US 95 Project. ITD's Opening Brf., at 8. 
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1. Grathol opposed ITD's motion for possession on meritless grounds. 
As explained in detail in ITD's opening brief, Grathol opposed ITD's motion for 
possession on meritless grounds. Id. at 9-10. Grathol's baseless arguments were rejected by the 
District Court, and Grathol wasted time, money, and effort on a meaningless appeal. Grathol's 
appeal was rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. See Decision in Supreme Cottrt Docket No. 
38511, at 4-6 (attached as Ex. E to the June 18, 2012 York Aff.). 
In short, Orathol took the routine issue of possession of the condemned property and 
turned it into a prolonged legal battle that had no factual or legal merit. This needless battle cost 
ITD substantial amounts in attorney fees and costs. 
D. Conclusion. 
Based on the factors established in Acarrequi, ITD is clearly the prevailing party in this 
action. 
VI. GRATHOL'S CHALLENGE TO FACTORS UNDER RULE 54 HA VE NO MERIT. 
A. Hourly Rates. 
Grathol argues that Holland & Hart's hourly rates are excessive because they are higher 
than the rates charged by attorneys in the Coeur d'Alene area. This argument fails to account for 
the fact that ITD is a statewide agency and needs legal services throughout the state. ITD has 
relied on Holland & Hart's extensive experience in condemnation cases, construction claims, and 
environmental matters for more than a decade. 
Grathol' s argument also fails to account for the fact that Holland & Hart is a regional law 
fum with offices throughout the Rocky Mountain states and Washington D.C. Its rates are in 
line with other regional law fums with offices in Idaho. 
Over the yeats, Idaho courts have found the hourly rates charged by Holland & Hart 
attorneys to be reasonable. See, e.g., LaPeter v. Canada Life, 2007 WL 4287489, at *2 and *2, 
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n.1. (D. Idaho May 11, 2007); Restoration Industry Ass'n v. Certified Restorers Consulting 
Group, 2008 WL 821078, at * 1 (D. Idaho March 24, 2008); A VP Restaurant Group v. Godzilla, 
et al., CVOC-0711663 (Fourth District Court, 2009). 
Lastly, the remedy for a claim that hourly rates are too hlgh is not to deny the claim for 
attorney fees as suggested by Gtathol. Rather, the remedy is to lower the amount of fees 
awarded. 
8. Time Spent. 
Grathol argues that ITO' s attorneys spent too much time on the case. This argument is 
refuted by the fact that ITD prevailed across the board in this case. 
Gtathol' s argument is also refuted by the fact that it was much easier and much less 
expensive for Grathol to make large, unsubstantiated claims for compensation, many of which 
were based on theories barred by Idaho law, than it was for ITD to defend against those claims 
and to do the work necessary to have the unlawful and unfounded claims dismissed. 
The substantial fees and costs incurred by ITD in this case are directly attributable to the 
improper claims and tactics by Grathol. Grathol cannot now claim that ITD spent too much time 
on the case when Grathol is the reason and cause for all of this work. 
~~ ~ .. 
For example, the difficulty and the costs incurred by ITD were greatly increased by 
Grathol's constant changing of both the amount of its claims for compensation and damages and 
the alleged factual or causal basis for its various claims. This occurred from the outset of the 
case and continued all the way through trial. ITD's fees and costs were also increased 
substantially by the many instances of malfeasance and impropriety by Gtathol and its attorneys 
and experts cited above and in ITD' s opening brief. 
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C. Costs As A Matter Of Right. 
Gtathol takes issue with some of the "costs as a matter of right" sought by ITD. It argues 
that certain of these costs were not necessary. Grathol bases its argument on self-serving 
observations about what is and is not necessary for proper trial preparation. No weight should be 
given to such observations by Grathol since it failed to prepare and present an effective case at 
trial. 
1, Travel expenses of Mr. George Hedley. 
Mr. Hedley is a highly respected commercial real estate developer and general contractor. 
His testimony was critical to countering all of Gtathol' s unfounded testimony about the property 
having great development potential. Grathol called two expert witnesses who testified on the 
issue of development potential: Mr. Johnson and Mr. Reeslund. Therefore, it was clearly 
necessary for ITO to present testimony to put the actual development potential of the property 
before the Court. 
Mr. Hedley's travel expenses of $386.70 were reasonable and necessary, and ITD is 
allowed to recover these costs as a matter of right. 
2. Preparation of trial exhibits. 
Grathol lias objected to ITD's request to recover costs as a matter "of right for the 
preparation of trial exhibits pursuant to Rule 54(C)(6). As the Court will recall, both ITO and 
Grathol used ITD's demonstrative exhibits at trial. The exhibits for which ITD seeks 
reimbursement were all enlargements of key documents: 
Exhibit 1S: Kootenai County Zoning District Map 
Exhibits 33 and 33-1: Development Site Plans proposed by Grathol 
Exhibit 162 and 162-1: Alan Johnson Valuations (Model #2 and Model #3) 
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Exhibit 163: Skip Sherwood Valuation (Model #1) (after cross-examination, during 
which handwritten notes were added to Ex. 163, the Exhibit was marked Ex. 163a). 
All of these exhibits were admitted into evidence. 
ITD is entitled as a matter of right to recover the cost of preparing these exhibits for trial. 
ITD notes that the amount of $295.46 listed in the June 18, 2012 York Aff. is a clerical error. 
The correct amount is $514.96, paid by ITD to Ascensio Innovative Technology to enlarge the 
above exhibits for use at trial. 
3. Expert witness fees, 
ITD is entitled to expert witness fees as a matter of right for each testifying expert in an 
amount ofup to $2,000.00 per expert. I.R.C.P. S4(C)(8). Grathol alleges that Mr. Moe was 
"severely impeached" (Grathol Mem., at 19), and therefore ITD should not be allowed to recover 
$2,000.00 for Mr. Moe. Grathol's argument is based on an imaginative, revisionist history of the 
events at trial. More importantly, its argument is contrary to law, 
Rule S4(C) provides for costs as a matter of right. It makes no exception for experts who 
are impeached at trial. Rather, the rule requires that the prevailing party "shall'' be entitled to 
recover expert witness fees ofup to $2,000.00 per expert. 
• t' 
Moreover, Mr. Moe was not severely impeached as now alleged by Grathol. In fact, 
nearly all of his testimony went wichallenged. The Court agreed with Mr. Moe's opinion on the 
"larger parcel." The Court agreed with Mr. Moe that the entire property had the same ''highest 
and best use,'' both befme and after the US~9S Project Mr. Pynes used comparable sales first 
identified by Mr. Moe. And Mr. Moe's opinion of just compensation in the amount of 
$571,000.00 was very close to the Court's conclusion of$675,000.00, particularly when 
compared to the millions of dollars testified to by Grathol' s experts and rejected by the Court. 
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Similarly, Grathol argues that ITD should not be allowed to recover fees paid to 
Mr. Hedley, alleging that his testimony "added nothing to further ITD's position and instead only 
supported Grathol's claim of severance damage." Grathol Mem. at 19. Again, this is pure 
imagination and revisionist history by Gtathol. Mr. Hedley offered critical testimony on the 
issue of the actual development potential of the Grathol property, rather than the claimed or 
imagined potential testified to by Grathol's witnesses. Among other things, Mr. Hedley testified 
that, given what it would cost to bring utilities to the site, construct a waste water system, and 
install necessary infrastructure, the property had no value for development. In other words, the 
land was worth nothing because the costs to develop it would be prohibitively high. 
Mr. Hedley's testimony was made necessary by Grathol's ill-conceived and 
unsubstantiated claims regarding the development potential of the property. If Grathol did not 
think this issue was relevant, it should not have had its witnesses testify at length about the 
development potential of the property. 
Most importantly, however, ITD is entitled to recover Mr. Hedley's fees (up to 
$2,000.00) as a matter of right, regardless of the mischaracterization of his testimony by Grathol. 
4. Deposition Costs. 
Grathol ;gues that ITD should be denied its right to recover the costs for the depositions 
of Grathol witnesses Mr. Johnson, Mr. Reeslund, Mr. Sherwood, Mr. Terrell, Mr. Vandervert, 
and the cost of a copy of the deposition oflTD witness Mr. Moe, on the grounds that these 
depositions were "unnecessary for the preparation of the case for trial," and "[n]ot one of the 
depositions was entered into evidence or read to a witness at trial." Grathol Mem. at 19-20, 
The second argument by Gtathol is contrary to law. Specifically, the last paragraph of 
Rule 54(C) states: 
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As to the issue of whether the depositions were necessary, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Reeslund, 
and Mr. Sherwood were all designated as experts by Grathol and all three experts testified at 
trial. For Grathol to argue that ITD's deposition of Grathol's expert witnesses was not necessary 
for preparation for trial has no merit and warrants no discussion. This argument is particularly 
inappropriate given the long and difficult battle that ITD had in obtaining any expert disclosures 
from Grathol. See ITD Brf. Supp. Mot. Exclude Experts Or Compel Expert Disclosures (filed 
Sept, 23, 2011). The disclosures ITD eventually forced from Grathol were cryptic, at best. 
As to Mr. Terrell and Mr, Vandervert, Grathol initially identified 35 witnesses who might 
be called at trial in its responses to ITO discovery on April 15, 2011. For many months after 
that, Grathol refused to narrow that list despite requests by ITD. Finally, on February 8, 2012, 
Grathoi narrowed its list of fact witnesses to Jim Coleman, Brett Terrell, Tom Vandervert, and 
Mike Winger. Set.Ex. 0 to Feb. 29, 2012 York Aff. 
After pushing hard to force Grathol to identify the witnesses it actually intended to call at 
trial, ITD ended up deposing only Mr. Terrell and Mr. Vandervert. These depositions occurred 
on February 13 and 14, 2012, The importance of the depositions of Mr. Terrell and 
Mr. V andervert became even greater when, at the deposition, ITD learned that these witnesses 
were not fact witnesses at all, but were instead planning to offer expert opinions on value, land 
planning, and development potential of the Grathol property. 
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In fact, after the depositions, Grathol served supplemental discovery responses 
identifying Mr. Terrell and Mr. Vandervert as expert witnesses on February 17, 2012, just two 
weeks before trial. Feb. 29, 2012 York Aff., Ex. Q, These expert disclosures were untimely. 
Gra1hol was required to disclose all experts and the opinions of all experts by August 19, 2011. 
Moreover, Grathol did not disclose the opinions these two witnesses would offer at trial or the 
basis for the opinions. Id. Grathol once again invoked the ''actor/viewer" exception to hide the 
opinions of Mr. Terrell and Mr. Vandervert and refused to comply with the requirements of Rule 
26 and ITD' s discovery requesting the opinions of Grathol' s experts and the basis of the 
opinions. Id. 
Under the circumstances, ITO was forced to file a motion to exclude Mr. Terrell and 
Mr. Vandervert from testifying at trial. See Motion To Exclude Expert Witnesses (filed Feb. 29, 
2012). Had these experts been allowed to testify, the Court's Pretrial Orders, the Stipulation 
between the parties (resolving the long running dispute over expert disclosures), and the Idaho 
rules governing discovery would all have been rendered meaningless. 
At the start of the trial, the Court ruled that these witnesses would not be permitted to 
testify as to opinions, but could testify as to facts within their knowledge. Based on this ruling, 
~-
Grathol elected not to call either witness. 
Under these circumstances, Grathol cannot argue that the depositions of Mr. Terrell and 
Mr. Vandervert were unnecessary. IfITD had not deposed them, it would have been ambushed 
at trial by smprise expert witnesses. It should also be noted that the entire fight over these 
witnesses should not have happened. The additional costs and attorney fees incurred in this side 
battle were caused solely by Grathol' s continuous refusal to comply with the rules of discovery 
and obey the Court's pretrial orders. 
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Lastly, Grathol argues that ITD should not be allowed to recover the cost of obtaining a 
copy of the deposition of Mr. Stan Moe, ITD' s expert who was deposed by Grathol. Since 
Grathol took the deposition, it cannot now argue that the deposition was unnecessary. ITD is 
clearly entitled to recover the cost of obtaining a copy of the deposition of Mr. Moe as a matter 
of right 
VII. REPLY TO LESSER ARGUMENTS BY GRATHOL. 
A. Grathol Did Seek To Recover In Excess Of $7 Million In This Case. 
Grath.ol now claims that it never sought to recover in excess of $7 million as just 
compensation in this case. This claim is directly refuted by its own expert disclosures and the 
deposition testimony of its principal, Mr. Alan Johnson. Both made clear that Grathol intended 
to present testimony and evidence at trial to attempt to recover damages and lost profits in excess 
of $7 million. 
On October 6, 2011, Grathol served its third supplemental responses to discovery where 
it fmally disclosed the expert opinions of Mr. Alan Johnson. In these disclosures, Grath.ol stated 
th.at Mr. Johnson would t.estify that Grathol expected to make $8,670,000.00 profit from its 
development before the US-9S Project, and only 15% of that amount after the Project. (See 
• r 
Grathol's Third Supp. Resps. to Discovery, at 7-8, attached as Ex. K to the Feb. 29, 2012 York 
Aff.). Fifteen percent of $8,670,000.00 results in a claim for $7,369,500.00. 
Thus, Grathol's expert disclosures stated that Mr. Johnson would be testifying to a loss in 
excess of $7 million, which it described in its disclosures as an alternative theory, Id. at 7. 
When ITD received Grathol' s expert disclosures stating that an expert would testify at trial that 
Orathol would suffer a loss of $7,369,500.00 because of the US-95 Project, ITO had to prepare a 
defense to that claim. Grathol cannot now say that it never sought this amount or that ITD 
should not have taken Grathol's expert disclosures seriously. 
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On December 18, 2011, ITO deposed Mr. Johnson to questi~n him about what his 
testimony would be at trial regarding the amount of just compensation that should be paid to 
Gtathol. Mr. Johnson made clear in his deposition that he would be testifying that Orathol 
should be paid over $7 million in compensation and damages. 
Q. And so then if I'm understanding this testimony 
correctly, then, in order to get under this alternative"· what we're 
calling alternative theory here -- is that you would subtract or you 
would take the 8.6 million and then you would subtract the 1.493 
million, and that would be the number that you would be testifying 
to. Is that correct? 
A. Please state that again. 
Q. Sure. No problem. All right. So we've got what we'll 
call your after-take profits, which is the 3.293 minus 1.88? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And that, I have written down as $1,493,000. So we'll 
say, according to this alternative theory, in the after condition, or 
after the project's completed -- let me rephrase that. How would 
you characterize that 1.493 million dollars? 
A. I would characterize that as the potential profit after the 
take. 
Q. Potential profit after the take. And the potential profit 
without the take is $8,670,000. Correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So to get what you believe -- what you'll be damaged 
by the take is you would take the 8.67 number and subtract the 
$1,493,000. Is that correct? 
A. That would be legitimate, yes. 
Q. ls that what you anticipate testifying to regarding this 
alternative theory? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So then ifmy numbers are correct, if you subtract those 
two numbers, that's approximately $7,177,000 in lost profits. 
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Q. Okay. So do you anticipate testifying that this project~~ 
or excuse me •• that f/'D 's condemnation and construction will 
cost you approtimately $7,177,000 in profits? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that number is based upon lost profits, not based 
upon the value of the land. Correct? 
A. That is correct 
Q. So if I understand your proposed testimony correctly is 
that you'll be testifying to both a $3,779,000 number and a 
$7,177,000 number? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you believe that both of those should be 
compensated -- excuse me. Would you add those two numbers 
together to get your ultimate just compensation or are those two 
separate valuations? 
A. They're two separate valuations. 
Q. So you believe that - is it fair to say that your 
anticipated testimony will be that HJ Grathol should be 
compensated somewhere between 3. 7 million and 7.1 million 
dollars in damages? 
A. That would be my testimony. 
Q. Is that not accurate? 
A. It is accurate. Thar is my testimony. 
Johnson Depa. Tr., at 111 :8 to 113: 16 (Ex. 3 to Jan. 6, 2012 York Aff.) (emphasis added). 
Orathol continued to pursue this theory until ITD filed a motion for summary judgment to 
dismiss Grathol's claims for compensation based on "lost profits.'' See ITD's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Brief In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment, at 39-43 (filed 
Jan, 6, 2012). At the hearing on ITD's motion for summary judgment and in the face of 
controlling Idaho law on this issue, counsel for Grathol conceded that its claims based on lost 
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profits should be dismissed. See Order Re: Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment, at 2 
(filed Feb. 3, 2012). 
B. ITD Was Forced To Retain An Expert To Rebut Mr. Johnson's Testimony 
Regarding Lost Profits. 
Gtathol now argues that ITD should not be permitted to recover the expert fees of 
Mr. Reinstein under Rule 54(D) (discretionary costs) because Mr. Reinstein did not testify. 
Grathol's argument ignores the facts that required ITD to retain Mr. Reinstein and pay him to 
prepare a rebuttal report. 
Until the Court dismissed the $7 million claim by Grathol based on lost profits, ITD was 
forced to defend against it Since the claim was to be presented by one of Grathol' s experts, 
Mr. Alan Johnson, ITD had to retain an expert to rebut the testimony. Since the claim was based 
on a combination of business valuation and lost profits, ITD retained Mr. Dennis Reinstein, an 
Idaho CPA with experience in these areas. Mr. Reinstein reviewed Mr. Johnson's expert 
disclosures, his deposition transcript, and related documents produced by Grathol. Mr. Reinstein 
then prepared a detailed rebuttal report. A copy of Mr. Reinstein's report is attached as Ex. 10 to 
the Jan. 6, 2012 York Aff. 
Under the ,,,Court's scheduling order and amendments to the scheduijpg order, all of 
Mr. Reinstein's work had to be done two months before the February 2, 2012 hearing on ITD's 
motion for summary judgment. Therefore, ITO had no way to avoid having to retain 
Mr. Reinstein and having him prepare a report to rebut the upcoming testimony of Mr. Johnson. 
The fact that the Court later dismissed the lost profits claim on summary judgment, does not 
mean the work by Mr. Reinstein was not necessary. On the contrary, until the claim was 
dismissed on summary judgment, ITD was forced to defend against it and do the work necessary 
to prepare that defense. 
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C. ITD Should Be Allowed To Recover The Fees Of David Evans And 
Associates. 
During the course of the case, Grathol alleged that it would suffer severance damages for 
loss or impainnent of access, and loss or damage based adverse impacts on development plans. 
Grathol fought long and hard to avoid explaining the cause of these alleged severance damages 
or assigning dollar values to the cl~ed damages. Grathol also gave profit estimates based on 
exceedingly low estimates of the cost of building infrastructure for its development and waste 
water treatment facilities on the site. 
Because of these claims, and the inability to force Grathol to explain the causes of the 
alleged damages or the dollar amounts of the damages and the infrastructure costs, !TD retained 
the services of a land planner, traffic engineer, and civil engineer with David Evans and 
Associates. These experts analyzed Grathol's claims, which was made vecy difficult by the lack 
of explanation or foundation for the claims by Orathol, and prepared a rebuttal report. Portions 
of that report are attached as Exs. 11 and 12 to the Jan. 6, 2012 York Aff. 
In response to the David Evans and Associates report, Grathol dropped all pretense of 
identifying specific impacts to access or specific impairments of access caused by the US-95 
Project. It also mad;: no attempt to point to specific impacts to its proposed '!eevelopment," no 
longer sought separate recovery of severance damages for these claims, and no longer tried to 
establish benchmarks for losses or lost profits based on low-ball estimates of infrastructure costs 
and the costs of constructing waste water treatment facilities on the site. Rather, Grathol only 
spoke about such impacts and costs in general terms and only in the context of the impaet on fair 
market value of the property. Therefore, the work by David Evans and Associates had a major 
impact on the case, the most significant of which was eliminating separate severance damage 
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claims and reducing the scope and length of the trial by forcing these issues and claims to the 
periphery of the case. 
D. Discretionary Costs. 
Grathol complains that ITD did not provide extensive argument in support of its request 
to recover discretionary costs. The discretionary costs are self-explanatory. ITD has asked to 
recover its discretionary costs to help offset the burden of defending against the excessive and 
unfounded claims for compensation by Grathol. 
The most important of these costs are the expert witness fees above and beyond the 
$2,000.00 fee per expert recoverable as a matter of right. Condemnation cases are expert driven 
cases. ITD's experts spent a great deal of time and effort combating claims by Grathol that were 
largely une,cplained, unquantified, and constantly changing. The work of these experts played a 
very significant role in the favorable outcome for ITD in this case, and ITD respectfully requests 
that it be allowed to recover the fees and costs of its experts in full. 
VIII, CONCLUSION 
Defendant HJ Grathol attempted to tum the condemnation of a portion of its property into 
the equivalent of winning the state lottery, Grathol bought the entire 56.8-acre parcel for 
.., . ... 
$1.4 million in May of 2008. The real estate market only went down, dramatically, from May 
of 2008 to November 17, 2010) the date of taking. Yet Grathol made demands and sought to 
recover as much as $7,369,500.00 for the taking of 16.314 acres of the 56.8-acre parcel (see 
Grathol's ThL1li Supp. Resps. to Discovery, at 7-8 (Ex. K to Feb. Feb. 29, 2012 York Aff.), and 
at trial sought as much as $3,093,360.00 (see Grathol Tr. Ex. J). 
Grathol' s outlandish demands for compensation had no connection with fair market value 
and were not based on sound principles or reasoning. They fought aggressively to avoid 
answering discovery and disclosing expert opinions and made every effort to prevent their claims 
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from being subjected to scrutiny and evaluation. Orathol engaged in improper and abusive 
. 
tactics throughout the case, which made it substantially and needlessly more expensive. 
After a five-day trial, the Court awarded Grathol just compensation in the amount of 
$675,000.00 for the taking. See Post Trial Memorandum Decision And Order For Judgment, at 
33 (filed May 24, 2012). The award was far below the amounts sought by Grathol in the case. 
The award was also far below the pretrial offer of settlement by ITO in the amount of 
$1.1 million. See Ex. B to the June 18, 2012 YorkAff, Accordingly, ITD is clearly the 
prevailing party in this case. 
As the prevailing party, ITD is entitled by law to recover its reasonable attorney fees and 
costs. In addition, this case was extremely costly and vexatious due entirely to abuses and 
improper tactics by Grathol in an effort to obtain a wholly unjustified and unfair windfall, not 
just compensation. Accordingly, ITD respectfully requests that the Court award ITD its attorney 
fees and costs in this case. 
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of August, 2012. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
By_c.-...q,.;.......,"4---~-i'----~-------
MaryV. y I 
Steven C. wman 
Special Deputy Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IdahoTransportation Department 
J. Tim Thomas 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HJ GRATHOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVl0-10095 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 
DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF 
ITD'S MOTION FOR COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
After a bench trial in the above-captioned case, the Court entered Judgment on June 4, 
2012, and Second Judgment and Decree of Condemnation on June 26, 2012. Plaintiff, State of 
Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board ("ITD") then filed a Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs on 
June 18, 2012, which was construed by this Court as a Memorandum of Costs and Attorney's 
Fees, along with an affidavit of computation and supporting brief. After ITD's memorandum 
and Defendant HJ Grathol's objection were fully briefed by the parties, the Court heard oral 
argument on ITD's motion on August 29, 2012. 
After considering the arguments of counsel, reviewing the briefing of the parties and the 
record in this matter, and good cause appearing therefore, the Court issued an oral ruling on the 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF ITO'S 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 1 
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record granting in part and denying in part ITD's motion. The Court now enters the following 
written order based on its August 29, 2012, oral ruling. 
Based upon and for the reasons set forth in the Court's oral ruling, and in this Court's 
discretion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that ITD is the prevailing party in this matter, pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 54(d). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as the prevailing party, ITD's request for costs as a 
matter of right, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C), is hereby GRANTED. Additionally, this Court 
finds ITD's requested costs reasonable. ITD is therefore awarded the full amount of its 
requested costs as a matter of right, as amended by ITD to correct a clerical error of $219 .50, in 
the total amount of $13,298.56, in this Court's discretion. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that ITD's request for discretionary costs, pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D), is hereby GRANTED in the amount of $11,000.00. These discretionary 
costs satisfy the requirements of I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) and are hereby awarded to ITD in this 
Court's discretion. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that ITD's motion for attorney's fees, in this Court's 
discretion, is DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant HJ Grathol is directed to pay ITD the total 
sum of $24,298.56 upon the entry of a final judgment. This sum shall bear interest at the legal 
rate until paid in full. 
DATED this /0 day of September, 2012. 
CHARLES W. HOSACK 
SR. DISTRICT JUDGE 
···--
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL D!SlRICT O;~~::~ 
DEPUTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, Case No. CVI0-10095 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, FINAL JUDGMENT 
vs. (Costs and Attorney's Fees) 
HJ GRA THOL, a California general partnership; 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a Washington 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
For the purposes of comporting with I.R.C.P. 54(a) and 58(a), this Court now enters its 
Final Judgment. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
all claims for relief, including costs and attorney's fees, asserted by or against all parties in this 
action are now addressed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Judgment is hereby 
entered in favor of Plaintiff, Idaho Transportation Board, in the amount of $24,298.56, as against 
Defendant, HJ Grathol, and shall bear interest at the legal rate until paid in full. 
ENTERED this IQ day of September, 2012. 
l-ff)l\.T ri:..:r A lH P<.! l-ln<.! Arv 
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Clerk of the Kootenai County District Court 
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HJ GRA THOL, a California general 
partnership., 
DEFENDANT - APPELLANT 
And 
STERLING SAVINGS BANK, a 
Washington corporation, and 





















CASE NO. 40168-2012 
I, Clifford T. Hayes, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for 
the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in the above entitled cause 
was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true, full and correct record of the pleadings and 
documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I further certify that no exhibits were offered in this case. 
I certify that the Attorneys for the Appellant and Respondent were notified that the Clerk's Record and 
February 2, 2012 Transcripts were complete and ready to be picked up (additional requested transcripts 
have already been transcribed and previously provided), or if the attorney is out of town, the copies were 
mailed by U.S. mail, postage prepaid on the 17 TH day of September 2011. 
I do further certify that the Clerk's Record will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at Kootenai County, 
Idaho this 17 TH day September, 2011. .""1'.l~l:Z?.!~ .... 
CLIFFORD T. HA YES 
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